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



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

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
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
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PREFACE TO VOL. V.

VOLUMES V AND VI.

FROM THE BATTLE OF MARATHON TO THE
PEACE OF NIKIAS.

B.C. 490-421.

I HAD reckoned upon carrying my readers in these two volumes down to the commencement of the great Athenian expedition against Syracuse.

But the narration of events, now that we are under the positive guidance of Thucydides, — coupled with the exposition of some points on which I differ from the views generally taken by my predecessors, — have occupied greater space than I had foreseen: and I have been obliged to enlarge my Sixth Volume beyond the usual size, in order to arrive even at the Peace of Nikias.

The interval of disturbance and partial hostility, which ensued between that peace and the Athenian expedition, will therefore be reserved for the beginning of my Seventh Volume, the publication of which will not be long delayed.

G. G.

Dec. 1848.

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CHAPTER XLIV

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HISTORY OF GREECE.

PART II.

CONTINUATION OF HISTORICAL GREECE.

CHAPTER XXXVIII.

FROM THE BATTLE OF MARATHON TO THE MARCH OF XERXES AGAINST GREECE.

IN the last chapter but one of the preceding volume, I described the Athenian victory at Marathon, the repulse of the Persian general Datis, and the return of his armament across the *Ægean* to the Asiatic coast. He had been directed to conquer both *Eretria* and *Athens*: an order which he had indeed executed in part with success, as the string of *Eretrian* prisoners brought to *Susa* attested, — but which remained still unfulfilled in regard to the city principally obnoxious to *Darius*. Far from satiating his revenge upon *Athens*, the Persian monarch was compelled to listen to the tale of an ignominious defeat. His wrath against the *Athenians* rose to a higher pitch than ever, and he commenced vigorous preparations for a renewed attack upon them, as well as upon *Greece* generally. Resolved upon assembling the entire force of his empire, he directed the various satraps and sub-governors throughout all *Asia* to provide troops, horses, and ships, both of war and burden. For no less than three years the empire was agitated by this immense levy, which *Darius* determined to conduct in person against *Greece*.¹ Nor was

¹ Herodot. vii, 3, 4.

his determination abated by a revolt of the Egyptians, which broke out about the time when his preparations were completed. He was on the point of undertaking simultaneously the two enterprises, — the conquest of Greece and the reconquest of Egypt, — when he was surprised by death, after a reign of thirty-six years. As a precaution previous to this intended march, he had nominated as successor Xerxes, his son by Atossa; for the ascendancy of that queen insured to Xerxes the preference over his elder brother Artabazanes, son of Darius by a former wife, and born before the latter became king. The choice of the reigning monarch passed unquestioned, and Xerxes succeeded without opposition.¹ It deserves to be remarked, that though we shall meet with several acts of cruelty and atrocity perpetrated in the Persian regal family, there is nothing like that systematic fratricide which has been considered necessary to guarantee succession in Turkey and other Oriental empires.

The intense wrath against Athens, which had become the predominant sentiment in the mind of Darius, was yet unappeased at the time of his death, and it was fortunate for the Athenians that his crown now passed to a prince less obstinately hostile as well as in every respect inferior. Xerxes, personally the hand-

¹ Herodot. vii, 1-4. He mentions — simply as a report, and seemingly without believing it himself — that Demaratus the exiled king of Sparta was at Susa at the moment when Darius was about to choose a successor among his sons (this cannot consist with Ktesias, Persic. c. 23): and that he suggested to Xerxes a convincing argument by which to determine the mind of his father, urging the analogy of the law of regal succession at Sparta, whereby the son of a king, born after his father became king, was preferred to an elder son born before that event. The existence of such a custom at Sparta may well be doubted.

Some other anecdotes, not less difficult of belief than this, and alike calculated to bestow a factitious importance on Demaratus, will be noticed in the subsequent pages. The latter received from the Persian king the grant of Pergamus and Teuthrania, with their land-revenues, which his descendants long afterwards continued to occupy (Xenoph. Hellen. iii, 1-6): and perhaps these descendants may have been among the persons from whom Herodotus derived his information respecting the expedition of Xerxes. See vii, 239.

Plutarch (De Fraternali Amore, p. 488) gives an account in many respects different concerning the circumstances which determined the succession of Xerxes to the throne, in preference to his elder brother.

somest¹ and most stately man amid the immense crowd which he led against Greece, was in character timid and faint-hearted, over and above those defects of vanity, childish self-conceit, and blindness of appreciation, which he shared more or less with all the Persian kings. Yet we shall see that, even under his conduct, the invasion of Greece was very near proving successful: and it well might have succeeded altogether, had he been either endued with the courageous temperament, or inflamed with the fierce animosity, of his father.

On succeeding to the throne, Xerxes found the forces of the empire in active preparation, pursuant to the orders of Darius; except Egypt, which was in a state of revolt. His first necessity was to reconquer this country; a purpose for which the great military power now in readiness was found amply sufficient. Egypt was subdued and reduced to a state of much harder dependence than before: we may presume that the tribute was increased, as well as the numbers of the Persian occupying force maintained, by contributions levied on the natives. Achæmenes, brother of Xerxes, was installed there as satrap.

But Xerxes was not at first equally willing to prosecute the schemes of his deceased father against Greece. At least such is the statement of Herodotus; who represents Mardonius as the grand instigator of the invasion, partly through thirst for warlike enterprise, partly from a desire to obtain the intended conquest as a satrapy for himself. Nor were there wanting Grecian counsellors to enforce his recommendation, both by the promise of help and by the color of religion. The great family of the Alcæadae, belonging to Larissa, and perhaps to other towns in Thessaly, were so eager in the cause, that their principal members came to Susa to offer an easy occupation of that frontier territory of Hellas: while the exiled Peisistratids from Athens still persevered in striving to procure their own restoration at the tail of a Persian army. On the present occasion, they brought with them to Susa a new instrument, the holy mystic Onomakritus, — a man who had acquired much reputation, not by prophesying himself, but by collecting, arranging, interpret-

¹ Herod. vii, 197. The like personal beauty is ascribed to Darius Codomannus, the last of the Persian kings (Plutarch, Alexand. c. 21).

ing, and delivering out, prophetic verses passing under the name of the ancient seer or poet Musæus. Thirty years before, in the flourishing days of the Peisistratids, he had lived at Athens, enjoying the confidence of Hipparchus, and consulted by him as the expositor of these venerated documents. But having been detected by the poet Lasus of Hermione, in the very act of interpolating them with new matter of his own, Hipparchus banished him with indignation. The Peisistratids, however, now in banishment themselves, forgot or forgave this offence, and carried Onomakritus with his prophecies to Susa, announcing him as a person of oracular authority, to assist in working on the mind of Xerxes. To this purpose his interpolations, or his omissions, were now directed: for when introduced to the Persian monarch, he recited emphatically various encouraging predictions wherein the bridging of the Hellespont and the triumphant march of a barbaric host into Greece, appeared as predestined; while he carefully kept back all those of a contrary tenor, which portended calamity and disgrace. So at least Herodotus,¹ strenuous in upholding the credit of Bakis, Musæus, and other Grecian prophets whose verses were in circulation, expressly assures us. The religious encouragements of Onomakritus, and the political co-operation proffered by the Alcæadae, enabled Mardonius effectually to overcome the reluctance of his master. Nor indeed was it difficult to show, according to the feelings then prevalent, that a new king of Persia was in honor obliged to enlarge the boundaries of the empire.² The conquering impulse springing from the first founder was as yet unexhausted; the insults offered by the Athenians remained still unavenged: and in addition to this double stimulus to action, Mardonius drew a captivating picture of Europe as an acquisition; — “it was the finest land in the world, produced every variety of fruit-bearing trees, and was

¹ Herodot. vii. 6; viii. 20, 96, 77. Ὀνομακρίτης — κατέλεγε τῶν χρησμάτων ἐμὲν τι ἐνέειν σφάλμα φέρον τῷ Πέρσῃ. τῶν μὲν ἔλεγε οὐδέν: ὁ δὲ τὰ εὐτυχέστατα ἐκλεγόμενος, ἔλεγε τὸν τε Ἑλλήσποντον ὡς ζευχθῆναι χρεὼν εἰς ὑπὸ ἑνὸς Πέρσῃ, τὴν τε ἑλᾶσιν ἐξηγεόμενος, etc.

An intimation somewhat curious respecting this collection of prophecies was of an extremely varied character, and contained promises or threats to meet any emergency which might arise.

² Æschyl. Pers. 761.

too good a possession for any mortal man except the Persian kings.”¹ Fifteen years before, the Milesian Aristagoras,² when entreating the Spartans to assist the Ionic revolt, had exaggerated the wealth and productiveness of Asia in contrast with the poverty of Greece, — a contrast less widely removed from the truth, at that time, than the picture presented by Mardonius.

Having thus been persuaded to alter his original views, Xerxes convoked a meeting of the principal Persian counsellors, and announced to them his resolution to invade Greece, setting forth the mingled motives of revenge and aggrandizement which impelled him, and representing the conquest of Greece as carrying with it that of all Europe, so that the Persian empire would become coextensive with the æther of Zeus and the limits of the sun's course. On the occasion of this invasion, now announced and about to take place, we must notice especially the historical manner and conception of our capital informant, — Herodotus. The invasion of Greece by Xerxes, and the final repulse of his forces, constitute the entire theme of his three last books, and the principal object of his whole history, towards which the previous matter is intended to conduct. Amidst those prior circumstances, there are doubtless many which have a substantive importance and interest of their own, recounted at so much length that they appear coördinate and principal, so that the thread of the history is for a time put out of sight. Yet we shall find, if we bring together the larger divisions of his history, omitting the occasional prolixities of detail, that such thread is never lost in the historian's own mind: it may be traced by an attentive reader, from his preface and the statement immediately following it — of Cræsus, as the first barbaric conqueror of the Ionian Greeks — down to the full expansion of his theme, “Græcia Barbariæ lento collisa duello,” in the expedition of Xerxes. That expedition, as forming the consummation of his historical scheme, is not only related more copiously and continuously than any events preceding it, but is also ushered in with an unusual solemnity of religious and poetical accompaniment, so that the

Herodot. vii. 5. ὡς ἡ Εὐρώπη περικαλλὴς χώρα, καὶ δένδρεα παντοῖα φέρει τὰ ἡμέρα, βασιλεῖ τε μόνῳ θνητῶν ἀξίη ἐκτῆσθαι — χώραν πτωχὴν αὐτῇ (vii. 8).

² Herodot. i. 49

seventh book of Herodotus reminds us in many points of the second book of the Iliad: probably too, if the lost Grecian epics had reached us, we should trace many other cases in which the imagination of the historian has unconsciously assimilated itself to them. The dream sent by the gods to frighten Xerxes, when about to recede from his project, — as well as the ample catalogue of nations and eminent individuals embodied in the Persian host, — have both of them marked parallels in the Iliad: and Herodotus seems to delight in representing to himself the enterprise against Greece as an antithesis to that of the Atreidae against Troy. He enters into the internal feelings of Xerxes with as much familiarity as Homer into those of Agamemnon, and introduces "the counsel of Zeus" as not less direct, special, and overruling, than it appears in the Iliad and Odyssey: though the godhead in Herodotus, compared with Homer, tends to become neuter instead of masculine or feminine, and retains only the jealous instincts of a ruler, apart from the appetites, lusts, and caprices of a man: acting, moreover, chiefly as a centralized, or at least as a homogeneous, force, in place of the discordant severalty of agents conspicuous in the Homeric theology. The religious idea, so often presented elsewhere in Herodotus, — that the godhead was jealous and hostile to excessive good fortune or immoderate desires in man, — is worked into his history of Xerxes as the ever-present moral and as the main cause of its disgraceful termination: for we shall discover as we proceed, that the historian, with that honorable frankness which Plutarch calls his "malignity," neither ascribes to his countrymen credit greater than they deserve for personal valor, nor seeks to veil the many chances of defeat which their mismanagement laid open.²

¹ Homer, Iliad, i. 3. Διὸς δ' ἐπιτέλλεται βοῦντι. Herodotus is characterized as Ὀμηρον ζήλωτης — Ὀμηροκωπῆτος (Dionys. Halic. ad Cn. Pompeium, p. 772, Reiske; Longinus De Sublim. p. 86, ed. Pearce).

² While Plutarch — if indeed the treatise De Herodoti Malignitate be the work of Plutarch — treats Herodotus as uncanon, malicious, corrupt, the calumniator of great men and glorious deeds, — Dionysius of Halikarnassus, on the contrary, with more reason, treats him as a pattern of excellent dispositions in an historian, contrasting him in this respect with Thucydides, to whom he imputes an unfriendly spirit in criticizing Athens, arising from his long banishment: Ἡ μὲν Ἡροδοτὸν διαθεσίς ἐν ἅπασιν ἐπιεικής, καὶ τοῖς μὲν ἀγαθοῖς σπρηδομένη, τοῖς δὲ κακοῖς ἀνταγόμενα· ἡ δὲ Θουκυδίδι

I have already mentioned that Xerxes is described as having originally been averse to the enterprise, and only stimulated thereto by the persuasions of Mardonius: this was probably the genuine Persian belief, for the blame of so great a disaster would naturally be transferred from the monarch to some evil counselor.¹ As soon as Xerxes, yielding to persuasion, has announced to the Persian chief men whom he had convoked his resolution to bridge over the Hellespont and march to the conquest of Greece and Europe, Mardonius is represented as expressing his warm concurrence in the project, extolling the immense force² of Persia and depreciating the Ionians in Europe — so he denominated them — as so poor and disunited that success was not only certain but easy. Against the rashness of this general — the evil genius of Xerxes — we find opposed the prudence and long experience of Artabanus, brother of the deceased Darius, and therefore uncle to the monarch. The age and relationship of this Persian Nestor emboldens him to undertake the dangerous task of questioning the determination which Xerxes, though professing to invite the opinions of others, had proclaimed as already

δὲν διαθεσίς αἰσιν καὶ πικρὰ, καὶ τῇ πατρίδι τῆς φύλης μνησκακοῦσα· τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἀμάρτηματα ἐπιτίγχεται καὶ μᾶλα ἀκρεβῶς, τῶν δὲ κατὰ νόον καὶ λογικῶν ἀνὰ πᾶσι οὐ μίμνηται ἢ ὥσπερ ἡναγκασμένος. (Dionys. Hal. ad Cn. Pompeium de Princip. Historicis Judic. p. 774, Reisk.)

Precisely the same fault which Dionysius here imputes to Thucydides (though in other places he acquits him, ἀπο παντος φθόνου καὶ πάσης κολακίας, p. 824), Plutarch and Dio cast far more harshly upon Herodotus. In neither case is the reproach deserved.

Both the moralists and the rhetoricians of ancient times were very apt to treat history, not as a series of true matters of fact, exemplifying the laws of human nature and society, and enlarging our knowledge of them for purposes of future inference, — but as if it were a branch of fiction, so to be handled as to please our taste or improve our morality. Dionysius, blaming Thucydides for the choice of his subject, goes so far as to say that the Peloponnesian war, a period of ruinous discord in Greece, ought to have been left in oblivion and never to have passed into history (σιωπῇ καὶ λήθῃ παραδοθεῖς, ὑπὸ τῶν ἐπιγιγνομένων ἡγνοῆσθαι, *ibid.* p. 768), — and that especially Thucydides ought never to have thrown the blame of it upon his own city, since there were many other causes to which it might have been imputed (ἐτέραις ἔχοντα πολλὰς ἀφορμαῖς περιῶσαι τὰς αἰτίας, p. 770). ¹ Herodot. viii, 99. Μαρδόνιον ἐν αἰτίῃ τιθέντες: compare c. 100

² Herodot. vii, 9.

settled in his own mind. The speech which Herodotus puts into the mouth of Artabanus is that of a thoughtful and religious Greek: it opens with the Grecian conception of the necessity of hearing and comparing opposite views, prior to any final decision, — reproves Mardonius for falsely depreciating the Greeks and seducing his master into personal danger, — sets forth the probability that the Greeks, if victorious at sea, would come and destroy the bridge by which Xerxes had crossed the Hellespont, — reminds the latter of the imminent hazard which Darius and his army had undergone in Scythia, from the destruction — averted only by Histiaeus and his influence — of the bridge over the Danube: such prudential suggestions being further strengthened by adverting to the jealous aversion of the godhead towards overgrown human power.¹

The impatient monarch silences his uncle in a tone of insult and menace: nevertheless, in spite of himself, the dissuasive work upon him so powerfully, that before night they gradually alter his resolution, and decide him to renounce the scheme. In this latter disposition he falls asleep, when a dream appears: a tall, stately man stands over him, denounces his change of opinion, and peremptorily commands him to persist in the enterprise as announced. In spite of this dream, Xerxes still adheres to his altered purpose, assembles his council the next morning, and after apologizing for his angry language towards Artabanus, acquaints them to their great joy that he adopts the recommendations of the latter, and abandons his project against Greece. But in the following night, no sooner has Xerxes fallen asleep, than the same dream and the same figure again appear to him, repeating the previous command in language of terrific menace. The monarch in a state of great alarm, springs from his bed and sends for Artabanus, whom he informs of the twice-repeated vision and divine mandate interdicting his change of resolution. "If (says he) it be the absolute will of God that this expedition against Greece should be executed, the same vision will appear to thee also, provided thou puttest on my attire, sittest in my throne and sleepest in my bed."² Not without reluctance,

¹ Herodot. vii. 10.

² Herodot. vii. 15. Εἰ ὡν θεός ἐστι ὁ ἐπιπέμπων καὶ οἱ πάντως ἐν ἡδονῇ

Artabanus obeys this order (for it was high treason in any Persian to sit upon the regal throne¹), but he at length complies, expecting to be able to prove to Xerxes that the dream deserved no attention. "Many dreams (he says) are not of divine origin, nor anything better than mere wandering objects such as we have been thinking upon during the day: this dream, of whatever nature it may be, will not be foolish enough to mistake me for the king, even if I be in the royal attire and bed; but if it shall still continue to appear to thee, I shall myself confess it to be divine."² Accordingly, Artabanus is placed in the regal throne and bed, and, as soon as he falls asleep, the very same figure shows itself to him also, saying, "Art thou he who dissuadest Xerxes, on the plea of solicitude for his safety, from marching against Greece? Xerxes has already been forewarned of that which he will suffer if he disobeys, and thou too shalt not escape, either now or in future, for seeking to avert that which must and shall be." With these words the vision assumes a threatening attitude, as though preparing to burn out the eyes of Artabanus with hot irons, when the sleeper awakes in terror, and runs to communicate with Xerxes. "I have hitherto, O king, recommended to thee to rest contented with that vast actual empire on account of which all mankind think thee happy; but since the divine impulsion is now apparent, and since destruction from on high is prepared for the Greeks, I too alter my opinion, and advise thee to command the Persians as God directs: so that nothing may be found wanting on thy part for that which God puts into thy hands."³

ἔστι γενέσθαι στρατηλάτην ἐπὶ τὴν Ἑλλάδα, ἐπιπτήσεται καὶ σοὶ τὸν τῶν τούτων ἀντικρὺ ὄραμα καὶ ἐμοὶ ἐντελλόμενον. Εὐρίσκει δὲ ὡς ἂν γινόμενα ταῦτα, εἰ ἡβαιοὶ τὴν ἑμὴν σκευὴν πᾶσαν, καὶ ἐνθάδε, μετὰ ταῦτα ἵζοιτο ἐς τὸν ἐμὸν θρόνον, καὶ ἔπειτα ἐν κοίτῃ τῇ ἐμῇ κατυπνώσκειαι. Compare vii. 8. θεὸς τε αὐτὰ ἔειπε, etc.

¹ See Brissonius. De Regno Persarum. lib. i. p. 27.

² Herodot. vii. 16. Οὐ γὰρ δὴ ἐς τοσούτῳ γε εὐφροσύνης ἀνήκει λόγος, δι. ὃ καὶ ἐστὶ τὸ ἐπιφαυρομένοιο τοι ἐν τῷ ὕπνῳ, ὥστε νοεῖς. εἰς αὐτῶν τὸ δοῦν, τῇ σὴ ἐσθλήτῃ τεκμαιρομένων. . . . εἰ γὰρ δὴ ἐπιφαιτῆσαι γε συνεχῶς, οὐκ ἂν καὶ αὐτὸς θεὸς εἴη.

³ Herodot. vii. 18. Ἐπεὶ δὲ δαιμονίη τις γίγνεται ὁρμή, καὶ Ἕλληνας, ὡς ποιεῖ, φθορὰ τις καταλαμβάνει θεήλατος, ἐγὼ μὲν καὶ αὐτὸς τραπομαι, καὶ

It is thus that Herodotus represents the great expedition of Xerxes to have originated: partly in the rashness of Mardonius, who reaps his bitter reward on the field of battle at Plataea, — but still more in the influence of "mischievous Oneiros," who is sent by the gods — as in the second book of the *Iliad* — to put a cheat upon Xerxes, and even to overrule by terror both his scruples and those of Artabanus. The gods having determined — as in the instances of Astyagès, Polykratès, and others — that the Persian empire shall undergo signal humiliation and repulse at the hands of the Greeks, constrain the Persian monarch into a ruinous enterprise against his own better judgment. Such religious imagination is not to be regarded as peculiar to Herodotus, but as common to him with his contemporaries generally, Greeks as well as Persians, though peculiarly stimulated among the Greeks by the abundance of their epic or quasi-historical poetry: modified more or less in each individual narrator, it is made to supply connecting links as well as initiating causes for the great events of history. As a cause for this expedition, incomparably the greatest fact and the most fertile in consequences, throughout the political career both of Greeks and Persians, nothing less than a special interposition of the gods would have satisfied the feelings either of one nation or the other. The story of the dream has its rise, as Herodotus tells us,¹ in Persian fancy, and is in some sort a consolation for the national vanity; but it is turned and colored by the Grecian historian, who mentions

την γνώμην μεταπίπτειναι. . . . Ποίει δὲ οὕτω δίκως, τοῦ θεοῦ παραδίδοντος, τὸν σὸν ἐνδείσεται μηδέν.

The expression τοῦ θεοῦ παραδίδοντος in this place denotes what is expressed by τὸ χρέον γίγνεσθαι, c. 17. The dream threatens Artabanus and Xerxes for trying to turn aside the current of destiny, — or in other words, to contravene the predetermined will of the gods.

¹ Herodot. vii, 12. Καὶ δὴ κού ἐν τῇ νυκτὶ εἶδε θύμιν τοιήνδε, ὡς λέγεται ὑπὸ Περσέων.

Herodotus seems to use *δνειρον* in the neuter gender, not *δνειρος* in the masculine: for the alteration of Bähr (ad vii, 16) of *ἐὼντα* in place of *ἐώντος*, is not at all called for. The masculine gender *δνειρος* is commonly used in Homer; but there are cases of the neuter *δνειρον*.

Respecting the influence of dreams in determining the enterprises of the early Turkish Sultans, see Von Hammer, *Geschichte des Osmanischen Reichs*, book ii, vol. i, p. 49.

also a third dream, which appeared to Xerxes after his resolution to march was finally taken, and which the mistake of the Magian interpreters falsely construed¹ into an encouragement, though it really threatened ruin. How much this religious conception of the sequence of events belongs to the age, appears by the fact, that it not only appears in Pindar and the Attic tragedians generally, but pervades especially the *Persæ* of Æschylus, exhibited seven years after the battle of Salamis, — in which we find the premonitory dreams as well as the jealous enmity of the gods towards vast power and overweening aspirations in man,² though without any of that inclination, which Herodotus seems to have derived from Persian informants, to exculpate Xerxes by representing him as disposed himself to sober counsels, but driven in a contrary direction by the irresistible fiat of the gods.³

¹ Compare the dream of Darius Codomannus. Plutarch, Alexander, c. 18. Concerning the punishment inflicted by Astyagès on the Magians for misinterpreting his dreams, see Herodot. i, 128.

Philochorus, skilled in divination, affirmed that Nikias put a totally wrong interpretation upon that fatal eclipse of the moon which induced him to delay his retreat, and proved his ruin (Plutarch, Nikias, c. 23).

² Æschylus, *Pers.* 96, 104, 181, 220, 368, 745, 825: compare Sophocles, *Ajax*, 129, 744, 775, and the end of the *Œdipus Tyrannus*; Euripid. *Hecub.* 58; Pindar, *Olymp.* viii, 86; *Isthm.* vi, 39; Pausanias, ii, 33, 3. Compare the sense of the word *δυσδαίμων* in Xenophon, *Agésilas*, c. 11, sect. 8. — "the man who in the midst of success fears the envious gods," — opposed to the person who confides in its continuance; and Klausen, *Theologumena Æschyli*, p. 18.

³ The manner in which Herodotus groups together the facts of his history, in obedience to certain religious and moral sentiments in his own mind, is well set forth in Hoffmeister, *Sittlich — religiöse Lebensansicht des Herodotos*, Essen, 1832, especially sects. 21, 22, pp. 112, *seqq.* Hoffmeister traces the veins of sentiment running through, and often overlaying, or transforming, the matters of fact through a considerable portion of the nine books. He does not, perhaps, sufficiently advert to the circumstance, that the informants from whom Herodotus collected his facts were for the most part imbued with sentiments similar to himself; so that the religious and moral vein pervaded more or less his original materials, and did not need to be added by himself. There can be little doubt that the priests, the ministers of temples and oracles, the exegetæ or interpreting guides around these holy places were among his chief sources for instructing himself: a stranger, visiting so many different cities must have been constantly in a situation to have no other person whom he could consult. The temples were interest-

While we take due notice of those religious conceptions with which both the poet and the historian surround this vast conflict

ing both in themselves and in the trophies and offerings which they exhibited, while the persons belonging to them were, as a general rule, accessible and communicative to strangers, as we may see both from Pausanias and Plutarch, — both of whom, however, had books before them also to consult, which Herodotus hardly had at all. It was not only the priests and ministers of temples in Egypt, of Hēraklēs at Tyre, and of Bélus at Babylon, that Herodotus questioned (i, 181; ii, 3, 44, 143), but also those of Delphi (*Δελφῶν οἶδα ἐγὼ οὕτως ἀκούσας γενέσθαι*, i, 20; compare i, 91, 92, 51); Dodōna (ii, 52); of the Ismenian Apollo at Thebes (v, 59); of Athēnē Alea at Tegea (i, 66); of Demētēr at Paros (vi, 134 — if not the priests, at least persons full of temple inspirations); of Halus in Aenaea Phthiōtis (vii, 197); of the Kabeiri in Thrace (ii, 51); of persons connected with the Herōon of Protesilaus in the Chersonese (ix, 116, 120). The facts which these persons communicated to him were always presented along with associations referring to their own functions or religious sentiments, nor did Herodotus introduce anything new when he incorporated them as such in his history. The treatise of Plutarch — “*Cur Pythia nunc non reddat Oracula Carmine*” — affords an instructive description of the ample and multifarious narratives given by the expositors at Delphi, respecting the eminent persons and events of Grecian history, so well fitted to satisfy the visitors who came full of curiosity — *φιλοθεάμονες, φιλόλογοι, and φιλομαθεῖς* (Plutarch, *ib.* p. 394) — such as Herodotus was in a high degree. Compare pp. 396, 397, 400, 407, of the same treatise: also Plutarch, *De Defectu Oraculorum*, p. 417 — *οἱ Δελφῶν θεόλογοι*, etc. Plutarch remarks that in his time political life was extinguished in Greece, and that the questions put to the Pythian priestess related altogether to private and individual affairs; whereas, in earlier times, almost all political events came somehow or other under her cognizance, either by questions to be answered, or by commemorative public offerings (p. 407). In the time of Herodotus, the great temples, especially those of Delphi and Olympia, were interwoven with the whole web of Grecian political history. See the Dissertation of Preller, annexed to his edition of Polemonis Fragmenta, c. 3, pp. 157–162; *De Historiā atque Arte Periegetarum*; also K. F. Herrmann, *Gottesdienstliche Alterthümer der Griechen*, part 1, ch. 12, p. 52.

The religious interpretation of historical phenomena is not peculiar to Herodotus, but belongs to him in common with his informants and his age generally, as indeed Hoffmeister remarks (pp. 31–136): though it is remarkable to notice the frankness with which he (as well as the contemporary poets: see the references in Monk ad Euripid. *Alcestitis*, 1154) predicates envy and jealousy of the gods, in cases where the conduct, which he supposes them to pursue, is really such as would deserve that name in a man, — and such as he himself ascribes to the despot (iii, 80): he does not think himself obliged to call the gods just and merciful while he is attributing to

Greeks and barbarians, we need look no farther than ambition and revenge for the real motives of the invasion: considering that it had been a proclaimed project in the mind of Darius for three years previous to his death, there was no probability that his son and successor would gratuitously renounce it. Shortly after the reconquest of Egypt, he began to make his preparations, the magnitude of which attested the strength of his resolve as well as the extent of his designs. The satraps and subordinate officers, throughout the whole range of his empire, received orders to furnish the amplest quota of troops and munitions of war, — horse and foot, ships of war, horse-transport, provisions, or supplies of various kinds, according to the circumstances of the territory; while rewards were held out to those who should execute the orders most efficiently. For four entire years these preparations were carried on, and as we are told that similar preparations had been going forward during the three years preceding the death of Darius, though not brought to any ultimate result, we cannot doubt that the maximum of force, which the empire could possibly be made to furnish,¹ was now brought to execute the schemes of Xerxes. The Persian empire was at this moment more extensive than ever it will appear at any subsequent period; for it comprised maritime Thrace and Macedonia as far as the borders of Thessaly, and nearly all the islands of the Ægean north of Krete and east of Eubœa, including even

them acts of envy and jealousy in their dealing with mankind. But the religious interpretation does not reign alone throughout the narrative of Herodotus: it is found side by side with careful sifting of fact and specification of positive, definite, appreciable causes: and this latter vein is what really distinguishes the historian from his age, — forming the preparation for Thucydides, in whom it appears predominant and almost exclusive. See this point illustrated in Creuzer, *Historische Kunst der Griechen*, Abschnitt iii, pp. 150–159.

Jäger (*Disputationes Herodotæ*, p. 16. Göttingen, 1828) professes to detect evidences of old age (*senile ingenium*) in the moralizing color which overspreads the history of Herodotus, but which I believe to have belonged to his middle and mature age not less than to his latter years. — if indeed he lived to be very old, which is noway proved, except upon reasons which I have already disputed in my preceding volume. See Bähr, *Commentatio de Vita et Scriptis Herodoti*, in the fourth volume of his edition, c. 6, p. 388.

¹ Herodot. vii, 19. *χωρον πάντα ἐρευνᾶν τῆς ἡπείρου.*

the Cyclades. There existed Persian forts and garrisons at Doriskus, Eion, and other places on the coast of Thrace, while Abdëra, with the other Grecian settlements on that coast were numbered among the tributaries of Susa.¹ It is necessary to bear in mind these boundaries of the empire, at the time when Xerxes mounted the throne, as compared with its reduced limits at the later time of the Peloponnesian war, — partly that we may understand the apparent chances of success to his expedition, as they presented themselves both to the Persians and to the medizing Greeks, — partly that we may appreciate the after-circumstances connected with the formation of the Athenian maritime empire.

In the autumn of the year 481 B.C., the vast army thus raised by Xerxes arrived, from all quarters of the empire, at or near to Sardis; a large portion of it having been directed to assemble at Kritala in Kappadokia, on the eastern side of the Halys, where it was joined by Xerxes himself on the road from Susa.² From thence he crossed the Halys, and marched through Phrygia and Lydia, passing through the Phrygian towns of Kelenna, Anaua, and Kolassar, and the Lydian town of Kallatëbus, until he reached Sardis, where winter-quarters were prepared for him. But this land force, vast as it was (respecting its numbers, I shall speak farther presently), was not all that the empire had been required to furnish. Xerxes had determined to attack Greece, not by traversing the Ægean, as Darius had passed to Eretria and Marathon, but by a land force and fleet at once: the former crossing the Hellespont, and marching through Thrace, Macedonia, and Thessaly; while the latter was intended to accompany and cooperate. A fleet of one thousand two hundred and seven ships of war, besides numerous vessels of service and burden, had been assembled on the Hellespont and on the coasts of Thrace

¹ Herodot. vii. 106. Κατίστασαν γὰρ ἐπὶ πρυτανίᾳ ταῖς τε τοῖς ἑλλήσποντοισι (i. e. the invasion by Xerxes) ἱπάρχει ἐν τῇ Θερμακίᾳ καὶ τοῖς ἑλλήσποντοισι πανταχῇ. vii. 108. ἐδόδοτο γὰρ, ὡς καὶ πρυτανίᾳ δεικνύται, ἡ μὲν οὖν Θεσσαλίας πᾶσα, καὶ ἦν ὑπὸ βασιλῆα δασμοφόρος, Μεγαβαλὼν τε καταστρεψαμένην καὶ ὑπερὸν Μαρδονίου; also vii. 59, and Xenophon. Memorab. iii. 5, 11. Compare Æschylus Pers. 871–896, and the vision ascribed to Cyrus in reference to his successor Darius, covering with his wings both Europe and Asia (Herodot. i. 209).

² Herodot. vii. 26–31

and Ionia; moreover, Xerxes, with a degree of forethought much exceeding that which his father Darius had displayed in the Scythian expedition, had directed the formation of large magazines of provisions at suitable maritime stations along the line of march, from the Hellespont to the Strymonic gulf. During the four years of military preparation, there had been time to bring together great quantities of flour and other essential articles from Asia and Egypt.¹

If the whole contemporary world were overawed by the vast assemblage of men and muniments of war which Xerxes thus brought together, so much transcending all past, we might even say all subsequent, experience, — they were no less astounded by two enterprises which entered into his scheme, — the bridging of the Hellespont, and the cutting of a ship-canal through the isthmus of Mount Athos. For the first of the two there had indeed been a precedent, since Darius about thirty-five years before had caused a bridge to be thrown over the Thracian Bosphorus, and crossed it in his march to Scythia; but this bridge, though constructed by the Ionians and by a Samian Greek, having had reference only to distant regions, seems to have been little known or little thought of among the Greeks generally, as we may infer from the fact, that the poet Æschylus² speaks as if he had never heard of it, while the bridge of Xerxes was ever remembered, both by Persians and by Greeks, as a most imposing display of Asiatic omnipotence. The bridge of boats — or rather, the two separate bridges not far removed from each other — which Xerxes caused to be thrown across the Hellespont, stretched from the neighborhood of Abydos, on the Asiatic side to the coast between Sestos and Madytus on the European, where the strait is about an English mile in breadth. The execution of the work was at first intrusted, not to Greeks, but to Phœnicians and Egyptians, who had received orders long beforehand to prepare cables of extraordinary strength and size expressly for the purpose; the material used by the Phœnicians was flax, that employed by the Egyptians was the fibre of the papyrus. Already had the work been completed and announced to Xerxes as available for transit, when a storm arose, so violent as alto-

¹ Herodot. vii. 23–25.

² Æschylus, Pers. 731, 754, 879.

gether to ruin it. The wrath of the monarch, when apprized of this catastrophe, burst all bounds; it was directed partly against the chief-engineers, whose heads he caused to be struck off,¹ but partly also against the Hellespont itself. He commanded that the strait should be scourged with three hundred lashes, and that a set of fetters should be let down into it as a farther punishment: moreover Herodotus had heard, but does not believe, that he even sent irons for the purpose of branding it. "Thou bitter water (exclaimed the scourgers while inflicting this punishment), this is the penalty which our master inflicts upon thee, because thou hast wronged him though he hath never wronged thee. King Xerxes will cross thee, whether thou wilt or not; but thou deservest not sacrifice from any man, because thou art a treacherous river of (useless) salt water."²

Such were the insulting terms heaped by order of Xerxes on the rebellious Hellespont, — Herodotus calls them "non-Hellenic and blasphemous terms," which, together with their brevity, leads us to believe that he gives them as he heard them, and that they are not of his own invention, like so many other speeches in his work, where he dramatizes, as it were, a given position. It has been common, however, to set aside in this case not merely the words, but even the main incident of punishment inflicted on the Hellespont,³ as a mere Greek fable rather than a real fact: the extreme childishness and absurdity of the proceeding giving to it the air of an enemy's calumny. But this reason will not

¹ Plutarch (*De Tranquillitate Animi*, p. 470), speaks of them as having had their noses and ears cut off.

² Herodot. vii, 34, 35. ἐπετίλλετο δὲ ὃν βαπτίζοντας, λέγειν βάρβαρά τε καὶ ἀτασθαλά, Ὡς πικρὸν ἕδωρ, δεσπότης τοὶ δίκην ἐπιτιθεὶ τῇδε, ὅτι μὴ ἠδίκησας, οἶδεν πρὸς ἐκείνον ἄδικον παθόν. Καὶ βασιλεὺς μὲν Ἐξέσης διατίθεται σε, ἣν τε σὺ γὰρ βούλῃ, ἣν τε καὶ μὴ· σοὶ δὲ κατὰ δίκην ἄρα οὐδεὶς ἀνθρώπων θύει, ὥς ἐόντι δολιρῷ τε καὶ ἀλυνρῷ ποταμῷ.

The assertion — that no one was in the habit of sacrificing to the Hellespont — appears strange, when we look to the subsequent conduct of Xerxes himself (vii, 53): compare vii, 113, and vi, 76. The epithet *salt* employed as a reproach, seems to allude to the undrinkable character of the water.

³ See Stanley and Blomfield ad *Aischyl. Pers.* 731, and K. O. Müller (in his *Review of Benjamin Constant's work Sur la Religion*), *Kleine Schriften*, vol. ii, p. 59.

appear sufficient, if we transport ourselves back to the time and to the party concerned. To transfer to inanimate objects the sensitive as well as the willing and designing attributes of human beings, is among the early and wide-spread instincts of mankind, and one of the primitive forms of religion: and although the enlargement of reason and experience gradually displaces this elementary Fetichism, and banishes it from the regions of reality into those of conventional fictions, yet the force of momentary passion will often suffice to supersede the acquired habit, and even an intelligent man¹ may be impelled in a moment of agonizing pain to kick or beat the lifeless object from which he has suffered. By the old procedure, never formally abolished, though gradually disused, at Athens, — an inanimate object which had caused the death of a man was solemnly tried and cast out of the border: and the Arcadian youths, when they returned hungry from an unsuccessful day's hunting,² scourged and pricked the

¹ See Auguste Comte, *Traité de Philosophie Positive*, vol. v, leçon 52, pp. 40, 46.

² See vol. ii, part 2, c. i, p. 297 of the present work; and compare Wachsmuth, *Hellenisch. Alterthümer*, 2, i, p. 320, and K. F. Hermann, *Griech. Staatsalterthümer*, sect. 104.

For the manner in which Cyrus dealt with the river Gyndes, see Herodot. i, 202. The Persian satrap Pharnuchés was thrown from his horse at Sardis, and received an injury of which he afterwards died: he directed his attendants to lead the horse to the place where the accident had happened, to cut off all his legs, and leave him to perish there (Herodot. vii, 88). The kings of Macedonia offered sacrifice even during the time of Herodotus, to the river which had been the means of preserving the life of their ancestor Perdikkas; after he had crossed it, the stream swelled and arrested his pursuers (Herodot. viii, 138): see an analogous story about the inhabitants of Apollonia and the river Aöus, Valerius Maxim. i, 5, 2.

After the death of the great boxer, wrestler, etc., Theagenés of Thasos, a statue was erected to his honor. A personal enemy, perhaps one of the fourteen hundred defeated competitors, came every night to gratify his wrath and revenge by flogging the statue. One night the statue fell down upon this scourger and killed him; upon which his relatives indicted the statue for murder: it was found guilty by the Thasians, and thrown into the sea. The gods, however, were much displeased with the proceeding, and visited the Thasians with continued famine, until at length a fisherman by accident fished up the statue, and it was restored to its place (Pausan. vi, 11, 2). Compare the story of the statue of Hermés in *Babrius, Fabul.* 119, edition of Mr. Lewis.

god Pan or his statue by way of revenge. Much more may we suppose a young Persian monarch, corrupted by universal subservience around him, to be capable of thus venting an insane wrath: and the vengeance ascribed by Herodotus to Cyrus towards the river Gyndēs (which he caused to be divided into three hundred and sixty streamlets, because one of his sacred horses had been drowned in it), affords a fair parallel to the scourging of the Hellespont by Xerxes. To offer sacrifice to rivers, and to testify in this manner gratitude for service rendered by rivers, was a familiar rite in the ancient religion. While the grounds for distrusting the narrative are thus materially weakened, the positive evidence will be found very forcible. The expedition of Xerxes took place when Herodotus was about four years old, so that he afterwards enjoyed ample opportunity of conversing with persons who had witnessed and taken part in it: and the whole of his narrative shows that he availed himself largely of such access to information. Besides, the building of the bridge across the Hellespont, and all the incidents connected with it, were acts essentially public in their nature, — known to many witnesses, and therefore the more easily verified, — the decapitation of the unfortunate engineers was an act fearfully impressive, and even the scourging of the Hellespont, while essentially public, appears to Herodotus (as well as to Arrian, afterwards), not childish but impious. The more attentively we balance, in the case before us, the positive testimony against the intrinsic negative probabilities, the more shall we be disposed to admit without diffidence the statement of our original historian.

New engineers — perhaps Greek along with, or in place of, Phœnicians and Egyptians — were immediately directed to recommence the work, which Herodotus now describes in detail, and which was doubtless executed with increased care and solidity. To form the two bridges, two lines of ships — triremes and pentekonters blended together — were moored across the strait breastwise, with their sterns towards the Euxine, and their heads towards the Ægean, the stream flowing always rapidly

¹ Herodot. vii, 35–54: compare viii, 109. Arrian, Exp. Alex. vii, 14 2

towards the latter.¹ They were moored by anchors head and stern, and by very long cables. The number of ships placed to

¹ Herodot. vii, 36. The language in which Herodotus describes the position of these ships which formed the two bridges, seems to me to have been erroneously or imperfectly apprehended by most of the commentators: see the notes of Bähr, Kruse, Wesseling, Rennell, and especially Larcher: Schweighäuser is the most satisfactory. — τοῦ μὲν Πόντου ἐπικαρσίας, τοῦ δὲ Ἑλλήσποντου κατὰ ῥόον. The explanation given by Tzetzes of ἐπικαρσίας by the word πλάγίως seems to me hardly exact: it means, *oblique*, but *at right angles with*. The course of the Bosphorus and Hellespont, flowing out of the Euxine sea, is conceived by the historian as meeting that sea at right angles; and the ships, which were moored near together along the current of the strait, taking the line of each from head to stern, were therefore also at right angles with the Euxine sea. Moreover, Herodotus does not mean to distinguish the two bridges hereby, and to say that the ships of the one bridge were τοῦ Πόντου ἐπικαρσίας, and those of the other bridge τοῦ Ἑλλήσποντου κατὰ ῥόον, as Bähr and other commentators suppose: both the predicates apply alike to both the bridges, — as indeed it stands to reason that the arrangement of ships best for one bridge must also have been best for the other. Respecting the meaning of ἐπικαρσίας in Herodotus, see iv, 101; i, 180. In the Odyssey (ix, 70: compare Eustath. ad loc.) ἐπικάρσαι does not mean oblique, but headlong before the wind: compare ἐπικάρ, Iliad, xviii, 392. The circumstance stated by Herodotus — that in the bridge higher up the stream, or nearest to the Euxine, there were in all three hundred and sixty vessels, while in the other bridge there were no more than three hundred and fourteen — has perplexed the commentators, and induced them to resort to inconvenient explanations, — as that of saying, that in the higher bridge the vessels were moored not in a direct line across, but in a line slanting, so that the extreme vessel on the European side was lower down the stream than the extreme vessel on the Asiatic side. This is one of the false explanations given of ἐπικαρσίας (*slanting, schräg*): while the idea of Gronovius and Larcher, that the vessels in the higher bridge presented *their broadside* to the current, is still more inadmissible. But the difference in the number of ships employed in the one bridge compared with the other seems to admit of an easier explanation. We need not suppose, nor does Herodotus say, that the two bridges were quite close together: considering the multitude which had to cross them, it would be convenient that they should be placed at a certain distance from each other. If they were a mile or two apart, we may well suppose that the breadth of the strait was not exactly the same in the two places chosen, and that it may have been broader at the point of the upper bridge, — which, moreover, might require to be made more secure, as having to meet the first force of the current. The greater number of vessels in the upper bridge will thus be accounted for in a simple and satisfactory manner.

carry the bridge nearest to the Euxine was three hundred and sixty: the number in the other, three hundred and fourteen.

In some of the words used by Herodotus there appears an obscurity: they run thus. — ἔξωθεν δὲ ὡς Πεντηκοντήρους καὶ τριήρας συνθέντες, ὑπὸ μὲν τὴν (these words are misprinted in Bähr's edition) πρὸς τοῦ Εὐξείνου Πόντου ἐξήκοντα τε καὶ τριηκοσίας, ὑπὸ δὲ τὴν ἑτέραν τέσσαρας καὶ δέκα καὶ τριηκοσίας (τοῦ μὲν Πόντου, ἐπικρασίας, τοῦ δὲ Ἑλλησπόντου κατὰ ῥαυγί, ἵνα ἀνακωχέῃ τὸν τόνον τῶν ὀπλῶν· συνθέντες δὲ, ἀγκύρας κατήκταν περιμήκεας, etc.

There is a difficulty respecting the words ἵνα ἀνακωχέῃ τὸν τόνον τῶν ὀπλῶν. — what is the nominative case to this verb? Bähr says in his note, *sc.* ὁ ῥαυγί, and he construes τῶν ὀπλῶν to mean the cables whereby the anchors were held fast. But if we read farther on, we shall see that τὰ ὀπλῶν mean, not the anchor-cables, but the cables which were stretched across from shore to shore to form the bridge; the very same words τῶν ὀπλῶν τοῦ τόνου, applied to these latter cables, occur a few lines afterwards. I think that the nominative case belonging to ἀνακωχέῃ is ἡ γεφύρα (not ὁ ῥαυγί), and that the words from τοῦ μὲν Πόντου down to ῥαυγί are to be read parenthetically, as I have printed them above: the express object for which the ships were moored was, "that the bridge might hold up, or sustain, the tension of its cables stretched across from shore to shore." I admit that we should naturally expect ἀνακωχέωσι and not ἀνακωχέῃ, since the proposition would be true of both bridges; but though this makes an awkward construction, it is not inadmissible, since each bridge had been previously described in the singular number.

Bredow and others accuse Herodotus of ignorance and incorrectness in this description of the bridges, but there seems nothing to bear out this charge.

Herodotus (iv, 85), Strabo (xiii, p. 591), and Pliny (II. N. iv, 12; vi, 1) give seven stadia as the breadth of the Hellespont in its narrowest part. Dr. Pococke also assigns the same breadth: Tournefort allows but a mile (vol. ii. lett. 4). Some modern French measurements give the distance as something considerably greater, — eleven hundred and thirty or eleven hundred and fifty toises (see Miot's note on his translation of Herodotus). The Duke of Ragusa states it at seven hundred toises (Voyage en Turquie, vol. ii. p. 164). If we suppose the breadth to be one mile, or five thousand two hundred and eighty feet, three hundred and sixty vessels at an average breadth of fourteen and two thirds feet would exactly fill the space. Rennell says "Eleven feet is the breadth of a barge: vessels of the size of the smallest coasting-craft were adequate to the purpose of the bridge." (On the Geography of Herodotus, p. 127.)

The recent measurements or estimates stated by Miot go much beyond Herodotus: that of the Duke of Ragusa nearly coincides with him. But we need not suppose that the vessels filled up entirely the whole breadth

Over or through each of the two lines of ships, across from shore to shore, were stretched six vast cables, which discharged the double function of holding the ships together, and of supporting the bridge-way to be laid upon them. They were tightened by means of capstans on each shore: in three different places along the line, a gap was left between the ships for the purpose of enabling trading vessels, in voyage to or from the Euxine, to pass and repass beneath the cables.

Out of the six cables assigned to each bridge, two were of flax and four of papyrus, combined for the sake of increased strength; for it seems that in the bridges first made, which proved too weak to resist the winds, the Phenicians had employed cables of flax for one bridge, the Egyptians those of papyrus for the other.¹ Over these again were laid planks of wood, sawn to the appropriate width, secured by ropes to keep them in their places: and lastly, upon this foundation the causeway itself was formed, out of earth and wood, with a palisade on each side high enough to prevent the cattle which passed over from seeing the water.

The other great work which Xerxes caused to be performed, for facilitating his march, was, the cutting through of the isthmus which connects the stormy promontory of Mount Athos

without leaving any gaps between: we only know, that there were no gaps left large enough for a vessel in voyage to sail through, except in three specified places.

¹ For the long celebrity of these cables, see the epigram of Archimælus, composed two centuries and a half afterwards, in the time of Hiero the Second, of Syracuse, ap. Athenæum, v, 209.

Herodotus states that in thickness and compact make (παχυτῆς καὶ καλῶς) the cables of flax were equal to those of papyrus; but that in weight the former were superior; for each cubit in length of the flaxen cable weighed a talent: we can hardly reason upon this, because we do not know whether he means an Attic, an Euboic, or an Æginæan talent: nor, if he means an Attic talent, whether it be an Attic talent of commerce, or of the monetary standard.

The cables contained in the Athenian dockyard are distinguished as σχοῖνα ἑκτοβάκτυλα, ἑξδάκτυλα. — in which expressions, however, M. Boeckh cannot certainly determine whether circumference or diameter be meant: he thinks probably the former. See his learned book. Das Seewesen der Athener, ch. x, p. 165.

with the main land.¹ That isthmus, near the point where it joins the main land, was about twelve stadia or furlongs across, from the Strymonic to the Toronaic gulf: and the canal dug by order of Xerxes was broad and deep enough for two triremes to sail abreast. In this work too, as well as in the bridge across the Hellespont, the Phenicians were found the ablest and most efficient among all the subjects of the Persian monarch; but the other tributaries, especially the Greeks from the neighboring town of Akanthus, and indeed the entire maritime forces of the empire,² were brought together to assist. The head-quarters of the fleet were first at Kymē and Phokaea, next at Eleus in the southern extremity of the Thracian Chersonese, from which point it could protect and second at once the two enterprises going forward at the Hellespont and at Mount Athos. The canal-cutting at the latter was placed under the general directions of two noble Persians, — Bubarēs and Artachæus, and distributed under their measurement as task-work among the contingents of the various nations; an ample supply of flour and other provisions being brought for sale in the neighboring plain from various parts of Asia and Egypt.

Three circumstances in the narrative of Herodotus, respecting this work, deserve special notice. First, the superior intelligence of the Phenicians, who, within sight of that lofty island of Thasos which had been occupied three centuries before by their free ancestors, were now laboring as instruments to the ambition of a foreign conqueror. Amidst all the people engaged, they alone took the precaution of beginning the excavation at a breadth far greater than the canal was finally destined to occupy, so as gradually to narrow it, and leave a convenient slope for the sides: the others dug straight down, so that the time as well as the toil of their work was doubled by the continual falling in of the sides, — a remarkable illustration of the degree of practical intelligence then prevalent, since the nations assembled were many and diverse. Secondly, Herodotus remarks that Xerxes must have performed this laborious work

¹ For a specimen of the destructive storms near the promontory of Athos see Ephorus, Fragment. 121, ed. Didot; Diodor. xiii, 41.

² Herodot. vii, 22, 23, 116; Diodor. xi, 2.

from motives of mere ostentation: "for it would have cost no trouble at all," he observes,¹ "to drag all the ships in the fleet

¹ Herodot. vii, 24: ὥς μὲν ἐμὲ συμβαλλεόμενον εὕρισκεν, μεγαλοφροσύνης εἶνεκα αὐτὸ Ξέρξης ὀρέσσει· ἰκέλευε, ἐθέλων τε δύναμιν ἀποδείκνυσθαι, καὶ ἀνημόνια λυπέσθαι· παρὲν γὰρ, μὴδένα πόνον λαβόντας, τὸν ἰσθμὸν τὰς νῆας διεφύσαι, ἡρύσσειν δὲ ἐκείνῃ διώρυχα τῇ θαλάσῃ, εὖρος ὥς δύο τρεῖς πλῆν ὁμοῦ ἑλασπευμίας.

According to the manner in which Herodotus represents this excavation to have been performed, the earth dug out was handed up from man to man from the bottom of the canal to the top — the whole performed by and, without any aid of cranes or barrows.

The pretended work of turning the course of the river Halys, which Grecian report ascribed to Cræsus on the advice of Thales, was a far greater work than the cutting at Athos (Herodot. i, 75).

As this ship-canal across the isthmus of Athos has been treated often as a fable both by ancients (Juvenal, Sat. x,) and by moderns (Cousinéry, Voyage en Macédoine), I transcribe the observations of Colonel Leake. That excellent observer points out evident traces of its past existence: but in my judgment, even if no such traces now remained, the testimony of Herodotus and Thucydides (iv, 109) would alone be sufficient to prove that it had existed really. The observations of Colonel Leake illustrate at the same time the motives in which the canal originated: "The canal (he says) seems to have been not more than sixty feet wide. As history does not mention that it was ever kept in repair after the time of Xerxes, the waters from the heights around have naturally filled it in part with soil in the course of ages. It might, however, without much labor, be renewed: and there can be no doubt that it would be useful to the navigation of the Aegean: for such is the fear entertained by the Greek boatmen, of the strength and uncertain direction of the currents around Mount Athos, and of the gales and high seas to which the vicinity of the mountain is subject during half the year, and which are rendered more formidable by the deficiency of harbors in the gulf of Orfaná that I could not, as long as I was on the peninsula, and though offering a high price, prevail upon any boat to carry me from the eastern side of the peninsula to the western. Xerxes, therefore, was perfectly justified in cutting this canal, as well from the security which it afforded to his fleet, as from the facility of the work and the advantages of the ground, which seems made expressly to tempt such an undertaking. The experience of the losses which the former expedition under Mardonius had suffered suggested the idea. The circumnavigation of the capes Ampelus and Canastræum was much less dangerous, as the gulfs afford some good harbors, and it was the object of Xerxes to collect forces from the Greek cities in those gulfs as he passed. If there be any difficulty arising from the narrative of Herodotus, it is in comprehending now the operation should have required so long a time as three years, when the king of Persia had such multitudes at his disposal, and among them

across the isthmus: so that the canal was nowise needed." So familiar a process was it, in the mind of a Greek of the fifth century B.C., to transport ships by mechanical force across an isthmus; a special groove, or slip, being seemingly prepared for them: such was the case at the Diolkos across the isthmus of Corinth. Thirdly, it is to be noted, that the men who excavated the canal at Mount Athos worked under the lash; and these, be it borne in mind, were not bought slaves, but freemen, except in so far as they were tributaries of the Persian monarch; and that the father of Herodotus, a native of Halikarnassus, and a subject of the brave queen Artemisia, may perhaps have been among them. We shall find other examples as we proceed, of this indiscriminate use of the whip, and full conviction of its indispensable necessity, on the part of the Persians,¹ — even to drive the troops of their subject-contingents on to the charge in battle. To employ the scourge in this way towards freemen, and especially towards freemen engaged in military service, was altogether repugnant both to Hellenic practice and to Hellenic feeling: the Asiatic and insular Greeks were relieved from it, as from various other hardships, when they passed out of Persian dominion to become, first allies, afterwards subjects, of Athens: and we shall be called upon hereafter to take note of this fact, when we appreciate the complaints preferred against the hegemony of Athens.

At the same time that the subject-contingents of Xerxes ex-

Egyptians and Babylonians, accustomed to the making of canals." (Leake *Travels in Northern Greece*, vol. iii. ch. 24, p. 145.)

These remarks upon the enterprise are more judicious than those of Major Rennell (*Geogr. of Herodot.* p. 116). I may remark that Herodotus does not affirm that the actual cutting of the canal occupied three years, — he assigns that time to the cutting with all its preliminary arrangements included. — προετοιμαζέτο ἐκ τριῶν ἐτῶν καὶ μάλιστα ἐς τὸν Ἀθῶν (vii. 22).

¹ Herodot. vii. 22: ὄνυσσον ὑπὸ μαστίγων παρτοδατοὶ τῆς στρατῆρος διάδοχοι δ' ἐφοίτων. — vii. 56: Ξέρξης δὲ, ἐπεὶ τε διεβή ἐς τὴν Εἰρώπην, ἐθνεῖτο τὸν στρατὸν ὑπὸ μαστίγων διαβαίνοντα; — compare vii. 103, and Xenophon, *Anabasis*, iii. 4–25.

The essential necessity, and plentiful use, of the whip, towards subject-tributaries, as conceived by the ancient Persians, finds its parallel in the modern Turks. See the *Mémoires du Baron de Tott*, vol. i, p. 256, seqq. and his dialogue on this subject with his Turkish conductor Ali-Aga.

cavated this canal, which was fortified against the sea at its two extremities by compact earthen walls, or embankments, they also threw bridges of boats over the river Strymon: and these two works, together with the renovated double bridge across the Hellespont, were both announced to Xerxes as completed and ready for passage, on his arrival at Sardis at the beginning of winter, 481–480 B.C. Whether the whole of his vast army arrived at Sardis at the same time as himself, and wintered there, may reasonably be doubted; but the whole was united at Sardis and ready to march against Greece, at the beginning of spring, 480 B.C.

While wintering at Sardis, the Persian monarch despatched heralds to all the cities of Greece, except Sparta and Athens, to demand the received tokens of submission, earth and water: for news of his prodigious armament was well calculated to spread terror even among the most resolute of them. And he at the same time sent orders to the maritime cities in Thrace and Macedonia to prepare "dinner" for himself and his vast suite as he passed on his march. That march was commenced at the first beginning of spring, and continued in spite of several threatening portents during the course of it, — one of which Xerxes was blind enough not to comprehend, though, according to Herodotus, nothing could be more obvious than its signification,¹ — while

¹ Herodot. vii. 57. Τίμαρ σὺν ἰσοκῇ μέγα, τὸ Ξέρξης ἐν σιδήνι λόφῳ ἐπέμψατο, καίπερ εὐσύμβλητον ἴον· ἵππος γὰρ ἔτεκε λαγόν. Εὐσύμβλητον δὲ τῆδε ἔγινετο, ὅτι ἐμελλε μὲν ἔλθαι στρατὸν ἐπὶ τὴν Ἑλλάδα Ξέρξης ἀγασσάτα καὶ μεγαλοπρεπέστατα, ἠπίσω δὲ περὶ ἐώντοῦ τρέχων ἤξειν ἐς τὸν αὐτὸν χώρον.

The prodigy was, that a mare brought forth a hare, which signified that Xerxes would set forth on his expedition to Greece with strength and splendor, but that he would come back in timid and disgraceful flight.

The implicit faith of Herodotus, first in the reality of the fact, — next, in the certainty of his interpretation, — deserves notice, as illustrating his canon of belief, and that of his age. The interpretation is doubtless here the generating cause of the story interpreted: an ingenious man, after the expedition has terminated, imagines an appropriate simile for its proud commencement and inglorious termination (*Parturiunt montes, nascetur ridiculus mus*), and the simile is recounted, either by himself or by some hearer who is struck with it, as if it had been a real antecedent fact. The aptness of this supposed antecedent fact to foreshadow the great Persian invasion (τὸ εὐσύμβλητον of Herodotus) serves as presumptive evidence to

another was misinterpreted into a favorable omen by the compliant answer of the Magian priests. On quitting Sardis, the vast host was divided into two nearly equal columns: a spacious interval being left between the two for the king himself, with his guards and select Persians. First of all came the baggage, carried by beasts of burden, immediately followed by one half of the entire body of infantry, without any distinction of nations next, the select troops, one thousand Persian cavalry, with one thousand Persian spearmen, the latter being distinguished by carrying their spears with the point downwards, as well as by the spear itself, which had a golden pomegranate at its other extremity, in place of the ordinary spike or point whereby the weapon was planted in the ground when the soldier was not on duty. Behind these troops walked ten sacred horses, of vast power and splendidly caparisoned, bred on the Nisæan plains in Media: next, the sacred chariot of Zeus, drawn by eight white horses, — wherein no man was ever allowed to mount, not even the charioteer, who walked on foot behind with the reins in his hand. Next after the sacred chariot came that of Xerxes himself, drawn by Nisæan horses; the charioteer, a noble Persian, named Patiramphês, being seated in it by the side of the monarch, — who was often accustomed to alight from the chariot and to enter a litter. Immediately about his person were a chosen body of one thousand horse-guards, the best troops and of the highest breed among the Persians, having golden apples at the reverse extremity of their spears, and followed by other detachments of one thousand horse, ten thousand foot, and ten thousand horse, all native Persians. Of these ten thousand Persian infantry, called the Immortals, because their number was always exactly maintained, nine thousand carried spears with pomegranates of silver at the reverse extremity, while the remaining one thousand distributed in front, rear, and on each side of this detachment, were marked by pomegranates of gold on their spears. With them ended what we may call the household

bear out the witness asserting it; while departure from the established analogies of nature affords no motive for disbelief to a man who admits that the gods occasionally send special signs and warnings.

¹ Compare the description of the processional march of Cyrus, as given in the *Cyropædia* of Xenophon, viii. 2, 1-20.

troops: after whom, with an interval of two furlongs, the remaining host followed pell-mell.¹ Respecting its numbers and constituent portions I shall speak presently, on occasion of the great review at Doriskus.

On each side of the army, as it marched out of Sardis, was seen suspended one half of the body of a slaughtered man, placed there expressly for the purpose of impressing a lesson on the subjects of Persia. It was the body of the eldest son of the wealthy Pythius, a Phrygian old man resident at Kelanæ, who had entertained Xerxes in the course of his march from Kappadokia to Sardis, and who had previously recommended himself by rich gifts to the preceding king Darius. So abundant was his hospitality to Xerxes, and so pressing his offers of pecuniary contribution for the Grecian expedition, that the monarch asked him what was the amount of his wealth. "I possess (replied Pythius) besides lands and slaves, two thousand talents of silver, and three million nine hundred and ninety-three thousand of golden darics, wanting only seven thousand of being four million. All this gold and silver do I present to thee, retaining only my lands and slaves, which will be quite enough." Xerxes replied by the strongest expressions of praise and gratitude for his liberality; at the same time refusing his offer, and even giving to Pythius out of his own treasure the sum of seven thousand darics, which was wanting to make up the exact sum of four million. The latter was so elated with this mark of favor, that when the army was about to depart from Sardis, he ventured, under the influence of terror from the various menacing portents, to prefer a prayer to the Persian monarch. His five sons were all about to serve in the invading army against Greece: his prayer to Xerxes was, that the eldest of them might be left behind, as a stay to his own declining years, and that the service of the remaining four with the army might be considered as sufficient. But the unhappy father knew not what he asked. "Wretch! (replied Xerxes) dost thou dare to talk to me about *thy* son, when I am myself on the march against Greece, with my sons, brothers, relatives, and friends? thou who art my slave, and whose duty it

¹ Herodot. vii. 41. Μετὰ δὲ τὴν ἵππων διελάλειπτο καὶ δύο σταδίους, καὶ ἵππειτα ὁ λοιπὸς ὄμιλος ἦν ἀναμίξ.

is to follow me, with thy wife and thy entire family? Know that the sensitive soul of man dwells in his ears: on hearing good things, it fills the body with delight, but boils with wrath when it hears the contrary. As, when thou didst good deeds and mailest good offers to me, thou canst not boast of having surpassed the king in generosity, — so now, when thou hast turned round and become impudent, the punishment inflicted on thee shall not be the full measure of thy deserts, but something less. For thyself and for thy four sons, the hospitality which I received from thee shall serve as protection; but for that one son whom thou especially wishest to keep in safety, the forfeit of his life shall be thy penalty." He forthwith directed that the son of Pythius should be put to death, and his body severed in twain: of which one half was to be fixed on the right-hand, the other on the left-hand, of the road along which the army was to pass.¹

A tale essentially similar, yet rather less revolting, has been already recounted respecting Darius, when undertaking his expedition against Scythia. Both tales illustrate the intense force of sentiment with which the Persian kings regarded the obligation of universal personal service, when they were themselves in the field. They seem to have measured their strength by the number of men whom they collected around them, with little or no reference to quality: and the very mention of exemption — the idea that a subject and a slave should seek to withdraw himself from a risk which the monarch was about to encounter — was an offence not to be pardoned. In this as in the other acts of Oriental kings, whether grateful, munificent, or ferocious, we trace nothing but the despotic force of personal will, translating itself into act without any thought of consequences, and treating subjects with less consideration than an ordinary Greek master would have shown towards his slaves.

From Sardis, the host of Xerxes directed its march to Abydos first across Mysia and the river Kaikos, — then through Atarneus, Karinë, and the plain of Thêbê: they passed Adra-

¹ The incident respecting Pythius is in Herodot. vii, 27, 28, 38, 39. I place no confidence in the estimate of the wealth of Pythius; but in other respects, the story seems well entitled to credit.

myttium and Antandrus, and crossed the range of Ida, most part of which was on their left hand, not without some loss from stormy weather and thunder.¹ From hence they reached Ilium and the river Skamander, the stream of which was drunk up, or probably in part trampled and rendered undrinkable, by the vast host of men and animals: in spite of the immortal interest which the Skamander derives from the Homeric poems, its magnitude is not such as to make this fact surprising. To the poems themselves, even Xerxes did not disdain to pay tribute: he ascended the holy hill of Ilium, — reviewed the Pergamus where Priam was said to have lived and reigned, — sacrificed one thousand oxen to the patron goddess Athênê, — and caused the Magian priests to make libations in honor of the heroes who had fallen on that venerated spot. He even condescended to inquire into the local details,² abundantly supplied to visitors by the inhabitants of Ilium, of that great real or mythical war to which Grecian chronologers had hardly yet learned to assign a precise date: and doubtless when he contemplated the narrow area of that Troy which all the Greeks confederated under Agamemnon had been unable for ten years to overcome, he could not but fancy that these same Greeks would fall an easy prey before his innumerable host. Another day's march between Rhœteium, Ophryneium, and Dardanus on the left-hand, and the Teukrians of Gergis on the right-hand, brought him to Abydos, where his two newly-constructed bridges over the Hellespont awaited him.

On this transit from Asia into Europe Herodotus dwells with peculiar emphasis, — and well he might do so, since when we consider the bridges, the invading number, the unmeasured hopes succeeded by no less unmeasured calamity, — it will appear not only to have been the most imposing event of his century, but to rank among the most imposing events of all history. He surrounds it with much dramatic circumstance, not only mentioning the marble throne erected for Xerxes on a hill near Abydos, from whence he surveyed both his masses of land-force covering the shore, and his ships sailing and racing in the strait (a race in

¹ Herodot. vii, 42.

² Herodot. vii, 43. *θεροόμενος δὲ, καὶ πρὸς ὁμοίαν κείνον ἔκαστα, etc.*

which the Phenicians of Sidon surpassed the Greeks and all the other contingents), but also superadding to this real fact a dialogue with Artabanus, intended to set forth the internal mind of Xerxes. He farther quotes certain supposed exclamations of the Abydenes at the sight of his superhuman power. "Why (said one of these terror-stricken spectators!), why dost thou, O Zeus, under the shape of a Persian man and the name of Xerxes, thus bring together the whole human race for the ruin of Greece? It would have been easy for thee to accomplish *that* without so much ado." Such emphatic ejaculations exhibit the strong feeling which Herodotus or his informants throw into the scene, though we cannot venture to apply to them the scrutiny of historical criticism.

At the first moment of sunrise, so sacred in the mind of Orientals,² the passage was ordered to begin: the bridges being perfumed with frankincense and strewed with myrtle boughs, while Xerxes himself made libations into the sea with a golden censer, and offered up prayers to Helios, that he might effect without hindrance his design of conquering Europe even to its farthest extremity. Along with his libation he cast into the Hellespont the censer itself, with a golden bowl and a Persian cimeter; — "I do not exactly know³ (adds the historian) whether he threw them in as a gift to Helios, or as a mark of repentance and atonement to the Hellespont for the stripes which he had inflicted upon it." Of the two bridges, that nearest to the Euxine was devoted to the military force, — the other, to the attendants, the baggage, and the beasts of burden. The ten thousand Persians, called Immortals, all wearing garlands on their heads, were

¹ Herodot. vii. 45, 53, 56. Ὁ Ζεὺς, τί δὲ ἄνθρωποι εὐδαιμονίᾳ Περσῶν, καὶ οὐνομα ἀντὶ Διὸς Ξέρξεσσι θεῖονος, ἀνάστατον τὴν Ἑλλάδα ἐθέλλει ποιῆσαι, ἀγων παντὶς ἀνθρώπου; καὶ γὰρ ἄνευ τούτων ἔξεν τοι ποῦκεν ταῦτα.

² Tacitus, Histor. iii. 24. "Undique clamor, et orientem solem, ita in Erythræa mos est, consalutavere." — in his striking description of the night battle near Cremona, between the Roman troops of Vitellius and Vespasian, and the rise of the sun while the combat was yet unfinished: compare also Quintus Curtius (iii. 3, 8, p. 41, ed. Mutzel).

³ Herodot. vii. 54. ταῦτα οὐκ ἔχω ἀπρεκέως διακρίναι, οὔτε εἰ τῷ Ἥλιῳ ἀσπιδεὶς κατῆκε ἐς τὸ πέλαγος, οὔτε εἰ μετεμίσθασέ οἱ τὸν Ἑλλησποντον μάστιγόςαντι, καὶ ἐντι τούτων τὴν θάλασσαν ἐδωρίετο.

the first to pass over, and Xerxes himself, with the remaining army, followed next, though in an order somewhat different from that which had been observed in quitting Sardis: the monarch having reached the European shore, saw his troops crossing the bridges after him "under the lash." But in spite of the use of this sharp stimulus to accelerate progress, so vast were the numbers of his host, that they occupied no less than seven days and seven nights, without a moment of intermission, in the business of crossing over, — a fact to be borne in mind presently, when we come to discuss the totals computed by Herodotus.¹

Having thus cleared the strait, Xerxes directed his march along the Thracian Chersonese, to the isthmus whereby it is joined with Thrace, between the town of Kardias on his left hand and the tomb of Helle on his right, — the eponymous heroine of the strait. After passing this isthmus, he turned westward along the coast of the gulf of Melas and the Ægean sea, — crossing the river from which that gulf derived its name, and even drinking its waters up — according to Herodotus — with the men and animals of his army. Having passed by the Æolic city of Ænos and the harbor called Stentoris he reached the sea-coast and plain called Doriskus, covering the rich delta near the mouth of the Hebrus: a fort had been built there and garrisoned by Darius. The spacious plain called by this same name reached far along the shore to Cape Serreium, and comprised in it the towns of Salé and Zoné, possessions of the Samothracian Greeks planted on the territory once possessed by the Thracian Kikones on the mainland. Having been here joined by his fleet, which had doubled² the southernmost promontory of the Thracian Chersonese, he thought the situation convenient for a general review and enumeration both of his land and his naval force.

Never probably in the history of mankind has there been

¹ Herodot. vii. 55, 56. Δαδὴ δὲ ὁ στρατὸς αὐτοῦ ἐν ἑπτὰ ἡμέρησι καὶ ἐν ἑπτα τριήσιν, ἔλθοντας οὐδὲνα χρόνον.

² Herodot. vii. 58-59; Pliny, H. N. iv. 11. See some valuable remarks on the topography of Doriskus and the neighborhood of the town still called Enos, in Grisebach, Reise durch Rumelien und nach Brussa, ch. vi, vol. i, pp. 157-159 (Göttingen, 1841). He shows reason for believing that the indentation of the coast, marked on the map as the gulf of Ænos, did not exist in ancient times, any more than it exists now.

brought together a body of men from regions so remote and so widely diverse, for one purpose and under one command, as those which were now assembled in Thrace near the mouth of the Hebrus. About the numerical total we cannot pretend to form any definite idea; about the variety of contingents there is no room for doubt. "What Asiatic nation was there (asks Herodotus,¹ whose conceptions of this expedition seem to outstrip his powers of language) that Xerxes did not bring against Greece?" Nor was it Asiatic nations alone, comprised within the Oxus, the Indus, the Persian gulf, the Red Sea, the Levant, the Ægean and the Euxine: we must add to these also the Egyptians, the Ethiopians on the Nile south of Egypt, and the Libyans from the desert near Kyrênê. Not all the expeditions, fabulous or historical, of which Herodotus had ever heard, appeared to him comparable to this of Xerxes, even for total number; much more in respect of variety of component elements. Forty-six different nations,² each with its distinct national costume, mode of arming and local leaders, formed the vast land-force; eight other nations furnished the fleet, on board of which Persians, Medes, and Sakæ served as armed soldiers or marines; and the real leaders, both of the entire army and of all its various divisions, were

¹ Herodot. vii. 20-21.

² See the enumeration in Herodotus, vii. 61-96. In chapter 76, one name has dropped out of the text (see the note of Wesseling and Schweighäuser,) which, in addition to those specified under the head of the land-force, makes up exactly forty-six. It is from this source that Herodotus derives the boast which he puts into the mouth of the Athenians (ix. 27) respecting the battle of Marathon, in which they pretend to have vanquished forty-six nations. — *ἑξήσπερ ἔθνη ἔξ καὶ τεσσαράκοντα*: though there is no reason for believing that so great a number of contingents were engaged with Datis at Marathon.

Compare the boasts of Antiochus king of Syria (p. 192) about his immense Asiatic host brought across into Greece, as well as the contemptuous comments of the Roman consul Quinctius (Liv. xxxv. 48-49). "Vana enim genera armorum, et multa nomina gentium inauditarum. Dahæ, et Medos, et Cadusios, et Elymæos — Syros omnes esse: laud paulo magnipiorum melius, propter servilia ingenia quam militum genus?" and the sharp remark of the Arcadian envoy Antiochus (Xenophon, Hellen. vii. 1, 33). Quintus Curtius also has some rhetorical turns about the number of nations, whose names even were hardly known, tributary to the Persian empire (iii. 4, 29; iv. 45, 9) "ignota etiam ipsi Dario gentium nomina," etc.

native Persians of noble blood, who distributed the various native contingents into companies of thousands, hundreds, and tens. The forty-six nations composing the land-force were as follows: Persians, Medes, Kissians, Hyrkansians, Assyrians, Baktrians, Saka, Indians, Arians, Parthians, Chorasmians, Sogdians, Gandarians, Dadikæ, Kaspians, Sarangæ, Paktyes, Utii, Myki, Parikantii, Arabians, Ethiopians in Asia and Ethiopians south of Egypt, Libyans, Paphlagonians, Ligyes, Matieni, Mariandyni, Syrians, Phrygians, Armenians, Lydians, Mysians, Thracians, Kabeilians, Mares, Kolehians, Alarodians, Saspeires, Sagartii. The eight nations who furnished the fleet were: Phenicians, three hundred ships of war; Egyptians, two hundred; Cypriots, one hundred and fifty; Kilikians, one hundred; Pamphylians, thirty; Lykians, fifty; Karians, seventy; Ionic Greeks, one hundred; Doric Greeks, thirty; Æolic Greeks, sixty; Hellespontic Greeks, one hundred; Greeks from the islands in the Ægean, seventeen; in all one thousand two hundred and seven triremes, or ships of war, with three banks of oars. The descriptions of costume and arms which we find in Herodotus are curious and varied; but it is important to mention that no nation except the Lydians, Pamphylians, Cypriots and, Karians (partially also the Egyptian marines on shipboard) bore arms analogous to those of the Greeks (*i. e.* arms fit for steady conflict and sustained charge,¹ — for hand combat in line as well as for defence of the person, — but inconveniently heavy either in pursuit or in flight); while the other nations were armed with missile weapons, — light shields of wicker or leather, or no shields at all, — turbans or leather caps instead of helmets, — swords, and scythes. They were not properly equipped either for fighting in regular order or for resisting the line of spears and shields which the Grecian hoplites brought to bear upon them; their persons too were much less protected against wounds than those of the latter; some of them indeed, as the Mysians and Libyans, did not even carry spears, but only staves with the end hardened in the fire.² A nomadic tribe of Persians, called Sagartii, to the number of eight thousand horsemen, came armed only with a dagger and with the rope known in South America as the lasso, which they cast in

¹ Herodot. vii. 89-93.
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² Herodot. vii. 61-81.
30c.

the fight to entangle an antagonist. The Æthiopians from the Upper Nile had their bodies painted half red and half white, wore the skins of lions and panthers, and carried, besides the javelin, a long bow with arrows of reed, tipped with a point of sharp stone.

It was at Doriskus that the fighting men of the entire land-army were first numbered; for Herodotus expressly informs us that the various contingents had never been numbered separately, and avows his own ignorance of the amount of each. The means employed for numeration were remarkable. Ten thousand men were counted,¹ and packed together as closely as possible: a line was drawn, and a wall of inclosure built around the space which they had occupied, into which all the army was directed to enter successively, so that the aggregate number of divisions, comprising ten thousand each, was thus ascertained. One hundred and seventy of these divisions were affirmed by the informants of Herodotus to have been thus numbered, constituting a total of one million seven hundred thousand foot, besides eighty thousand horse, many war-chariots from Libya and camels from Arabia, with a presumed total of twenty thousand additional men.² Such was the vast land-force of the Persian monarch: his naval equipments were of corresponding magnitude, comprising not only the twelve hundred and seven triremes,³ or war-ships, of three banks of oars, but also three thousand smaller vessels of war and transports. The crew of each trireme comprised two hundred rowers, and thirty fighting-men, Persians or Sakæ; that of each of the accompanying vessels included eighty men, according to an average which Herodotus supposes not far from the truth. If we sum up these items, the total numbers brought by Xerxes from Asia to the plain and to the coast of Doriskus would reach the astounding figure of

¹ The army which Darius had conducted against Scythia is said to have been counted by divisions of ten thousand each, but the process is not described in detail (Herodot. iv, 87).

² Herodot. vii, 60, 87, 184. This same rude mode of enumeration was employed by Darius Codomannus a century and a half afterwards, before he marched his army to the field of Issus (Quintus Curtius, iii, 2, 3, p. 24, Mutzel).

³ Herodot. vii, 89-97.

two million three hundred and seventeen thousand men. Nor is this all. In the farther march from Doriskus to Thermopylae, Xerxes pressed into his service men and ships from all the people whose territory he traversed: deriving from hence a reinforcement of one hundred and twenty triremes with aggregate crews of twenty-four thousand men, and of three hundred thousand new land troops, so that the aggregate of his force when he appeared at Thermopylae was two million six hundred and forty thousand men. To this we are to add, according to the conjecture of Herodotus, a number not at all inferior, as attendants, slaves, sutlers, crews of the provision-craft and ships of burden, etc., so that the male persons accompanying the Persian king when he reached his first point of Grecian resistance amounted to five million two hundred and eighty-three thousand two hundred and twenty! So stands the prodigious estimate of this army, the whole strength of the Eastern world, in clear and express figures of Herodotus,¹ who himself evidently supposes the number to have been even greater; for he conceives the number of "camp followers" as not only equal to, but considerably larger than, that of fighting-men. We are to reckon, besides, the eunuchs, concubines, and female cooks, at whose number Herodotus does not pretend to guess: together with cattle, beasts of burden, and Indian dogs, in indefinite multitude, increasing the consumption of the regular army.

To admit this overwhelming total, or anything near to it, is obviously impossible: yet the disparaging remarks which it has drawn down upon Herodotus are noway merited.² He takes pains to distinguish that which informants told him, from that which he merely guessed. His description of the review at Doriskus is so detailed, that he had evidently conversed with persons who were present at it, and had learned the separate totals promulgated by the enumerators, — infantry, cavalry, and ships of war, great and small. As to the number of triremes,

¹ Herodot. vii, 185-186. *ἐπαύρων πάντα τὸν ἡῶν στρατὸν ἐκ τῆς Ἀσίας* (vii, 157). "Vires Orientis et ultima secum Bactra ferens," to use the language of Virgil about Antony at Actium.

² Even Dahlmann, who has many good remarks in defence of Herodotus hardly does him justice (Herodot. Aus seinem Buche sein Leben, ch. xxxiv p. 176).

his statement seems beneath the truth, as we may judge from the contemporary authority of Æschylus, who in the "Persæ" gives the exact number of twelve hundred and seven Persian ships as having fought at Salamis: but between Doriskus and Salamis. Herodotus¹ has himself enumerated six hundred and forty-seven ships as lost or destroyed, and only one hundred and twenty as added. No exaggeration, therefore, can well be suspected in this statement, which would imply about two hundred and seventy-six thousand as the number of the crews, though there is here a confusion or omission in the narrative which we cannot clear up. But the aggregate of three thousand smaller ships, and still more, that of one million seven hundred thousand infantry, are far less trustworthy. There would be little or no motive for the enumerators to be exact, and every motive for them to exaggerate, — an immense nominal total would be no less pleasing to the army than to the monarch himself, — so that the military total of land-force and ships' crews, which Herodotus gives as two million six hundred and forty-one thousand on the arrival at Thermopylae, may be dismissed as unwarranted and incredible. And the computation whereby he determines the amount of non-military persons present, as equal or more than equal to the military, is founded upon suppositions noway admissible; for though in a Grecian well-appointed army it was customary to reckon one light-armed soldier, or attendant, for every hoplite, no such estimate can be applied to the Persian host. A few grandees and leaders might be richly provided with attendants of various kinds, but the great mass of the army

¹ Only one hundred and twenty ships of war are mentioned by Herodotus (vii. 185) as having joined afterwards from the seaports in Thrace. But four hundred were destroyed, if not more, in the terrible storm on the coast of Magnesia (vii. 190); and the squadron of two hundred sail, detached by the Persians round Eubœa, were also all lost (viii. 7); besides forty-five taken or destroyed in the various sea-fights near Artemisium (vii. 194; viii. 11). Other losses are also indicated (viii. 14-16).

As the statement of Æschylus for the number of the Persian triremes at Salamis appears well-entitled to credit, we must suppose either that the number of Doriskus was greater than Herodotus has mentioned, or that a number greater than that which he has stated joined afterwards.

See a good note of Amersfoordt, ad Demosthen. Orat. de Symmoria, p. 88 (Leyden, 1821).

would have none at all. Indeed, it appears that the only way in which we can render the military total, which must at all events have been very great, consistent with the conditions of possible subsistence, is by supposing a comparative absence of attendants, and by adverting to the fact of the small consumption, and habitual patience as to hardship of Orientals in all ages. An Asiatic soldier will at this day make his campaign upon scanty fare, and under privations which would be intolerable to an European.¹ And while we thus diminish the probable consumption, we have to consider that never in any case of ancient history had so much previous pains been taken to accumulate supplies on the line of march: in addition to which the cities in Thrace were required to furnish such an amount of provisions, when the army passed by, as almost brought them to ruin. Herodotus himself expresses his surprise how provisions could have been provided for so vast a multitude; and were we to admit his estimate literally, the difficulty would be magnified into an impossibility. Weighing the circumstances of the case well, and considering that this army was the result of a maximum of effort throughout the vast empire, that a great numerical total was the thing chiefly demanded, and that prayers for exemption were regarded by the Great King as a capital offence, and that provisions had been collected for three years before along the line of march, — we may

¹ See on this point Volney, Travels in Egypt and Syria, ch. xxiv, vol. ii, pp. 70, 71; ch. xxxii, p. 367; and ch. xxxix, p. 435. (Engl. transl.)

Kinneir, Geographical Memoir of the Persian Empire, pp. 22-23. Bernier, who followed the march of Aurungzebe from Delhi, in 1665, says that some estimated the number of persons in the camp at three hundred thousand, others at different totals, but that no one knew, nor had they ever been counted. He says: "You are, no doubt, at a loss to conceive how so vast a number both of men and animals can be maintained in the field. The best solution of the difficulty will be found in the temperance and simple diet of the Indians." (Bernier, Travels in the Mogul Empire, translated by Brock, vol. ii, App. p. 118.)

So also Petit de la Croix says, about the enormous host of Genghis-Khan: "Les hommes sont si sobres, qu'ils s'accroissent de toutes sortes d'aliments."

That author seems to estimate the largest army of Genghis at seven hundred thousand men (Histoire de Genghis, liv. ii, ch. vi, p. 193).

well believe that the numbers of Xerxes were greater than ever assembled in ancient times, or perhaps at any known epoch of history. But it would be rash to pretend to guess at any positive number, in the entire absence of ascertained data: and when we learn from Thucydides that he found it impossible to find out the exact numbers of the small armies of Greeks who fought at Mantinea,¹ we shall not be ashamed to avow our inability to count the Asiatic multitudes at Doriskus. We may remark, however, that, in spite of the reinforcements received afterwards in Thrace, Macedonia, and Thessaly, it may be doubted whether the aggregate total ever afterwards increased; for Herodotus takes no account of desertions, which yet must have been very numerous, in a host disorderly, heterogeneous, without any interest in the enterprise, and wherein the numbers of each separate contingent were unknown.

Ktesias gives the total of the host at eight hundred thousand men, and one thousand triremes, independent of the war-chariots: if he counts the crews of the triremes apart from the eight hundred thousand men, as seems probable, the total will then be considerably above a million. Ælian assigns an aggregate

¹ Thucyd. v, 68. Xenophon calls the host of Xerxes *ἀνυρίσθητον*, — *ἀνυρίσθητον στρατὸν* (Anab. iii, 2, 13).

It seems not to be considered necessary for a Turkish minister to know the numbers of an assembled Turkish army. In the war between the Russians and Turks in 1770, when the Turkish army was encamped at Babadag near the Balkan, Baron de Tott tells us: "Le Visir me demanda un jour fort sérieusement si l'armée Ottomane étoit nombreuse. C'est à vous que je m'adresserois, lui dis-je, si j'étais curieux de le savoir. Je l'ignore, me répondit-il. Si vous l'ignorez, comment pourrois-je en être instruit? En lisant la Gazette de Vienne, me répliqua-t-il. Je restai confondu."

The Duke of Ragusa (in his voyage en Hongrie, Turquie, etc.), after mentioning the prodigiously exaggerated statements current about the numbers slain in the suppressed insurrection of the Janissaries at Constantinople in 1826, observes: "On a dit et répété que leur nombre s'étoit élevé à huit ou dix mille, et cette opinion s'est accréditée (it was really about five hundred). Mais les Orientaux en général, et les Turcs en particulier, n'ont aucune idée des nombres: ils les emploient sans exactitude, et ils sont par caractère portés à l'exagération. D'un autre côté, le gouvernement a dû favoriser cette opinion populaire, pour frapper l'imagination et inspirer une plus grande terreur." (Vol. ii, p. 37.)

of seven hundred thousand men: Diodorus¹ appears to follow partly Herodotus, partly other authorities. None of these witnesses enable us to correct Herodotus, in a case where we are obliged to disbelieve him. He is, in some sort, an original witness, having evidently conversed with persons actually present at the muster of Doriskus, giving us both their belief as to the numbers, together with the computation, true or false, circulated among them by authority. Moreover, the contemporary Æschylus, while agreeing with him exactly as to the number of triremes, gives no specific figure as to the land-force, but conveys to us, in his Persæ, a general sentiment of vast number, which may seem in keeping with the largest statement of Herodotus: the Persian empire is drained of men, — the women of Susa are left without husbands and brothers, — the Baktrian territory has not been allowed to retain even its old men.² The terror-striking effect

¹ Ktesias, Persica, c. 22, 23; Ælian, V. H. xiii. 3; Diodorus, xi, 2-11.

Respecting the various numerical statements in this case, see the note of Bos ad Cornel. Nepot. Themistocl. c. 2, pp. 75, 76.

The Samian poet Chorilus, a few years younger than Herodotus and contemporary with Thucydides, composed an epic poem on the expedition of Xerxes against Greece. Two or three short fragments of it are all that is preserved: he enumerated all the separate nations who furnished contingents to Xerxes, and we find not only the Sakæ, but also the Solymi (apparently the Jews, and so construed by Josephus) among them. See Fragments, iii and iv, in Næke's edition of Chorilus, pp. 121-134. Josephus cont. Apion, p. 454, ed. Havercamp.

² Æschylus, Pers. 14-124, 722-737. Heeren (in his learned work on the commerce of the ancient world, Ueber den Verkehr der alten Welt, part 1, sect. 1, pp. 162, 558, 3d edition) thinks that Herodotus had seen the actual muster-roll, made by Persian authority, of the army at Doriskus. I cannot think this at all probable: it is much more reasonable to believe that all his information was derived from Greeks who had accompanied the expedition. He must have seen and conversed with many such. The Persian royal scribes, or secretaries, accompanied the king, and took note of any particular fact or person who might happen to strike his attention (Herodot. vii. 100; viii. 90), or to exhibit remarkable courage. They seem to have been specially attached to the person of the king as ministers to his curiosity and amusement, rather than keepers of authentic and continuous records.

Heeren is disposed to accept the numerical totals, given by Herodotus as to the army of Xerxes, much too easily, in my judgment: nor is he correct

of this crowd was probably quite as great as if its numbers had really corresponded to the ideas of Herodotus.

After the numeration had taken place, Xerxes passed in his chariot by each of the several contingents, observed their equipment, and put questions to which the royal scribes noted down the answers: he then embarked on board a Sidonian trireme, which had been already fitted up with a gilt tent, and sailed along the prows of his immense fleet, moored in line about four hundred feet from the shore, and every vessel completely manned for action. Such a spectacle was well calculated to rouse emotions of arrogant confidence, and it was in this spirit that he sent forthwith for Demaratus, the exiled king of Sparta, who was among his auxiliaries, — to ask whether resistance on the part of the Greeks to such a force was even conceivable. The conversation between them, dramatically given by Herodotus, is one of the most impressive manifestations of sentiment in the Greek language.¹ Demaratus assures him that the Spartans most

in supposing that the contingents of the Persian army marched with their wives and families (pp. 557–559).

¹ When Herodotus specifies his informants — it is much to be regretted that he does not specify them oftener — they seem to be frequently Greeks, such as Dikæus the Athenian exile, Thersander of Orchomenus in Boeotia, Archias of Sparta, etc. (iii, 55; viii, 65; ix, 16.) He mentions the Spartan king Demaratus often, and usually under circumstances both of dignity and dramatic interest; it is highly probable that he may have conversed with that prince himself, or with his descendants, who remained settled for a long time in Teuthrania, near the Æolie coast of Asia Minor (Xenoph. Hellenica, iii, 1, 6), and he may thus have heard of representations offered by the exiled Spartan king to Xerxes. Nevertheless, the remarks made by Hoffmeister, on the speeches ascribed to Demaratus by Herodotus, are well deserving of attention (Sittlich-religiöse Lebensansicht des Herodotos, p. 118).

² Herodotus always brings into connection with insolent kings some man or other through whom he gives utterance to his own lessons of wisdom. To Croesus at the summit of his glory, comes the wise Solon: Croesus himself, reformed by his captivity, performs the same part towards Cyrus and Cambyses: Darius, as a prudent and honest man, does not require any such counsellor; but Xerxes in his pride has the sententious Artabanus and the sagacious Demaratus attached to him; while Amasis king of Egypt is employed to transmit judicious counsel to Polykratès, the despot of Samos. Since all these men speak one and the same language, it appears certain that they are introduced by Herodotus merely as spokesmen for his own

certainly, and the Dorians of Peloponnesus probably, will resist him to the death, be the difference of numbers what it may. Xerxes receives the statement with derision, but exhibits no feeling of displeasure: an honorable contrast to the treatment of Charidemus a century and a half afterwards, by the last monarch of Persia.¹

After the completion of the review, Xerxes with the army pursued his march westward, in three divisions and along three different lines of road, through the territories of seven distinct tribes of Thracians, interspersed with Grecian maritime colonies: all was still within his own empire, and he took reinforcements from each as he passed: the Thracian Satræ were preserved from this levy by their unassailable seats amidst the woods and snows of Rhodopê. The islands of Samothrace and Thasos, with their subject towns on the mainland, and the Grecian colo-

criticisms on the behavior and character of the various monarchs, — criticisms which are nothing more than general maxims, moral and religious, brought out by Solon, Croesus, or Artabanus, on occasion of particular events. The speeches interwoven by Herodotus have, in the main, not the same purpose as those of Tacitus, — to make the reader more intimately acquainted with the existing posture of affairs, or with the character of the agents. — but a different purpose quite foreign to history: they embody in the narrative his own personal convictions respecting human life and the divine government.²

This last opinion of Hoffmeister is to a great degree true, but is rather too absolutely delivered.

¹ Herodot. vii, 101–104. How inferior is the scene between Darius and Charidemus, in Quintus Curtius! (iii, 2, 9–19, p. 20, ed. Mutzel.)

Herodotus takes up substantially the same vein of sentiment and the same antithesis as that which runs through the Persæ of Æschylus; but he handles it like a social philosopher, with a strong perception of the real causes of Grecian superiority.

It is not improbable that the skeleton of the conversation between Xerxes and Demaratus was a reality, heard by Herodotus from Demaratus himself or from his sons: for the extreme specialty with which the Lacedæmonian exile confines his praise to the Spartans and Dorians, not including the other Greeks, hardly represents the feeling of Herodotus himself.

The minuteness of the narrative which Herodotus gives respecting the deposition and family circumstances of Demaratus (vi, 63, seq.), and his view of the death of Kleomenês as an atonement to that prince for injury done, may seem derived from family information (vi, 84).

nies Dikæa,¹ Maroneia, and Abdëra, were successively laid under contribution for contingents of ships or men; and, what was still more ruinous, they were further constrained to provide a day's meal for the immense host as it passed: for the day of his passage the Great King was their guest. Orders had been transmitted for this purpose long beforehand, and for many months the citizens had been assiduously employed in collecting food for the army, as well as delicacies for the monarch, — grinding flour of wheat and barley, fattening cattle, keeping up birds and fowls; together with a decent display of gold and silver plate for the regal dinner. A superb tent was erected for Xerxes and his immediate companions, while the army received their rations in the open region around: on commencing the march next morning, the tent with all its rich contents was plundered, and nothing restored to those who had furnished it. Of course, so prodigious a host, which had occupied seven days and seven nights in crossing the double Hellespontine bridge, must also have been for many days on its march through the territory, and therefore at the charge, of each one among the cities, so that the cost brought them to the brink of ruin, and even in some cases drove them to abandon house and home. The cost incurred by the city of Thasus, on account of their possessions of the mainland, for this purpose, was no less than four hundred talents² (equal to ninety-two thousand eight hundred pounds): while at Abdëra, the witty Megakreon recommended to his countrymen to go in a body to the temples and thank the gods, because Xerxes was pleased to be satisfied with one meal in the day. Had the monarch required breakfast as well as dinner, the Abderites must have been reduced to the alternative either of exile or of utter destitution.³ A stream called Lissus, which seems to have been

¹ Herodot. vii. 109, 111, 118.

² This sum of four hundred talents was equivalent to the entire annual tribute charged in the Persian king's rent-roll upon the satrapy comprising the western and southern coast of Asia Minor, wherein were included all the Ionic and Æolic Greeks, besides Lykians, Pamphylians, etc. (Herodot. iii. 90.)

³ Herodot. vii. 118–120. He gives (vii. 187) the computation of the quantity of corn which would have been required for daily consumption, assuming the immense numbers as he conjectures them, and reckoning one

of no great importance, is said to have been drunk up by the army, together with a lake of some magnitude near Pistyrus.¹

Through the territory of the Edonian Thracians and the Pierians, between Pangæus and the sea, Xerxes and his army reached the river Strymon at the important station called Ennea Hodoi, or Nine-Roads, afterwards memorable by the foundation of Amphipolis. Bridges had been already thrown over the river, to which the Magian priests rendered solemn honors by sacrificing white horses and throwing them into the stream. Nor were his religious feelings satisfied without the more precious sacrifices often resorted to by the Persians: he here buried alive nine native youths and nine maidens, in compliment to Nine-Roads, the name of the spot:² moreover, he also left, under the care of the Pæonians of Siris, the sacred chariot of Zeus, which had been brought from the seat of empire, but which doubtless was found inconvenient on the line of march. From the Strymon he marched forward along the Strymonic gulf, passing through the territory of the Bisaltæ, near the Greek colonies of Argilus and Stageirus, until he came to the Greek town of Akanthus, hard by the isthmus of Athos, which had been recently cut through. The fierce king of the Bisaltæ³ refused submission to Xerxes, fled to Rhodopë for safety, and forbade his six sons to join the Persian host. Unhappily for themselves, they nevertheless did so, and when they came back he caused all of them to be blinded.

All the Greek cities, which Xerxes had passed by, obeyed his orders with sufficient readiness, and probably few doubted the ultimate success of so prodigious an armament. But the inhabitants of Akanthus had been eminent for their zeal and exertions in the cutting of the canal, and had probably made considerable profits during the operation; Xerxes now repaid their zeal by

choenix of wheat for each man's daily consumption, equal to one eighth of a medimnus. It is unnecessary to examine a computation founded on such inadmissible data.

¹ Herodot. vii. 108, 109.

² Herodot. vii. 114. He pronounces this savage practice to be specially Persian. The old and cruel Persian queen Amestris, wife of Xerxes, sought to prolong her own life by burying alive fourteen victims, children of illustrious men, as offerings to the subterranean god.

³ Herodot. viii. 116.

contracting with them the tie of hospitality, accompanied with praise and presents; though he does not seem to have exempted them from the charge of maintaining the army while in their territory. He here separated himself from his fleet, which was directed to sail through the canal of Athos, to double the two southwestern capes of the Chalkidic peninsula, to enter the Thermaic gulf, and to await his arrival at Therma. The fleet in its course gathered additional troops from the Greek towns in the two peninsulas of Sithonia and Pallênê, as well as on the eastern side of the Thermaic gulf, in the region called Krusis, or Krossæa, on the continental side of the isthmus of Pallênê. These Greek towns were numerous, but of little individual importance. Near Therma (Salonichi) in Mygdonia, in the interior of the gulf and eastward of the mouth of the Axios, the fleet awaited the arrival of Xerxes by land from Akanthus. He seems to have had a difficult march, and to have taken a route considerably inland, through Pæonia and Krestônia, — a wild, woody, and untrodden country, where his baggage-camels were set upon by lions, and where there were also wild bulls, of prodigious size and fierceness: at length he rejoined his fleet at Therma, and stretched his army throughout Mygdonia, the ancient Pieria, and Bottiæis, as far as the mouth of the Haliakmôn.¹

Xerxes had now arrived within sight of Mount Olympus, the northern boundary of what was properly called Hellas; after a march through nothing but subject territory, with magazines laid up beforehand for the subsistence of his army, with additional contingents levied in his course, and probably with Thracian volunteers joining him in the hopes of plunder. The road along which he had marched was still shown with solemn reverence by the Thracians, and protected both from intruders and from tillage, even in the days of Herodotus.² The Macedonian princes, the last of his western tributaries, in whose territory he now found himself, — together with the Thessalian Aleuada, — undertook to conduct him farther. Nor did the task as yet appear difficult: what steps the Greeks were taking to oppose him, shall be related in the coming chapter.

¹ Herodot. vii, 122-127.

Respecting the name Pieria, and the geography of these regions, see the previous volume, vol. iv. ch. xxv. p. 14.

² Herodot. vii, 116.

CHAPTER XXXIX.

PROCEEDINGS IN GREECE FROM THE BATTLE OF MARATHON TO THE TIME OF THE BATTLE OF THERMOPYLÆ.

Our information respecting the affairs of Greece immediately after the repulse of the Persians from Marathon, is very scanty.

Kleomenês and Leotychidês, the two kings of Sparta (the former belonging to the elder, or Eurystheneid, the latter to the younger, or the Prokleïd, race), had conspired for the purpose of dethroning the former Prokleïd king Demaratus: and Kleomenês had even gone so far as to tamper with the Delphian priestess for this purpose. His manœuvre being betrayed shortly afterwards, he was so alarmed at the displeasure of the Spartans, that he retired into Thessaly, and from thence into Arcadia, where he employed the powerful influence of his regal character and heroic lineage to arm the Arcadian people against his country. The Spartans, alarmed in their turn, voluntarily invited him back with a promise of amnesty. But his renewed lease did not last long: his habitual violence of character became aggravated into decided insanity, insomuch that he struck with his stick whomsoever he met; and his relatives were forced to confine him in chains under a Helot sentinel. By severe menaces, he one day constrained this man to give him his sword, with which he mangled himself dreadfully and perished. So shocking a death was certain to receive a religious interpretation, but which among the misdeeds of his life had drawn down upon him the divine wrath, was a point difficult to determine. Most of the Greeks imputed it to the sin of his having corrupted the Pythian priestess:¹ but the Athenians and Argeians were each disposed to an hypothesis of their own, — the former believed that the gods had thus punished the Spartan king for having cut timber in the sacred grove of Eleusis, — the latter recognized the avenging hand of the hero Argus, whose grove Kleomenês had burnt,

¹ Herodot. vi, 74, 75.

along with so many suppliant warriors who had taken sanctuary in it. Without pronouncing between these different suppositions, Herodotus contents himself with expressing his opinion that the miserable death of Kleomenês was an atonement for his conduct to Demaratus. But what surprises us most is, to hear that the Spartans, usually more disposed than other Greeks to refer every striking phenomenon to divine agency, recognized on this occasion nothing but a vulgar physical cause: Kleomenês had gone mad, they affirmed, through habits of intoxication, learned from some Scythian envoys who had come to Sparta.¹

The death of Kleomenês, and the discredit thrown on his character, emboldened the Æginetans to prefer a complaint at Sparta respecting their ten hostages whom Kleomenês and Leotychides had taken away from the island, a little before the invasion of Attica by the Persians under Datis, and deposited at Athens as guarantee to the Athenians against aggression from Ægina at that critical moment. Leotychidês was the surviving auxiliary of Kleomenês in the requisition of these hostages, and against him the Æginetans complained. Though the proceeding was one unquestionably beneficial to the general cause of Greece,² yet such was the actual displeasure of the Lacedæmonians against the deceased king and his acts, that the survivor Leotychidês was brought to a public trial, and condemned to be delivered up as prisoner in atonement to the Æginetans. The latter were about to carry away their prisoner, when a dignified Spartan named Theasidês, pointed out to them the danger which they were incurring by such an indignity against the regal person, — the Spartans, he observed, had passed sentence under feelings of temporary wrath, which would probably be exchanged for sympathy if they saw the sentence realized.

Accordingly the Æginetans, instead of executing the sentence, contented themselves with stipulating that Leotychidês should accompany them to Athens and redemand their hostages detained there. The Athenians refused to give up the hostages, in spite of the emphatic terms in which the Spartan king set forth the

¹ Herodot. vi, 84.

² Herodot. vi, 61. Κλεομένης, πάντα ἐν τῇ Αἰγίνῃ, καὶ κοινὰ τῇ Ἑλλάδι ἀγαθὰ προσεργασάμενον, etc.

sacred obligation of restoring a deposit:¹ they justified the refusal in part by saying that the deposit had been lodged by the two kings jointly, and could not be surrendered to one of them alone: but they probably recollected that the hostages were placed less as a deposit than as a security against Æginetan hostility, — which security they were not disposed to forego.

Leotychidês having been obliged to retire without success, the Æginetans resolved to adopt measures of retaliation for themselves: they waited for the period of a solemn festival celebrated every fifth year at Sunium, on which occasion a ship peculiarly equipped and carrying some of the leading Athenians as Theôrs, or sacred envoys, sailed thither from Athens. This ship they found means to capture, and carried all on board prisoners to Ægina. Whether an exchange took place, or whether the prisoners and hostages on both sides were put to death, we do not know; but the consequence of their proceeding was an active and decided war between Athens and Ægina,² beginning seemingly about 488 or 487 B.C., and lasting until 481 B.C., the year preceding the invasion of Xerxes.

An Æginetan citizen named Nikodromus took advantage of this war to further a plot against the government of the island. Having been before, as he thought, unjustly banished, he now organized a revolt of the people against the ruling oligarchy, concerting with the Athenians a simultaneous invasion in support of his plan. Accordingly, on the appointed day he rose with his

¹ Herodot. vi, 85: compare vi, 49–73, and the preceding volume of this history, c. xxxvi. pp. 437–441.

² Herodot. vi, 87, 88.

Instead of *ἦν γὰρ ὅθι τοῖσι Ἀθηναίοισι πεντήρης ἐπὶ Σουνίῳ* (vi, 87), I follow the reading proposed by Schömann and sanctioned by Boeckh — *πεντήρης*. It is hardly conceivable that the Athenians at that time should have had any ships with five banks of oars (*πεντήρης*): moreover, apart from this objection, the word *πεντήρης* makes considerable embarrassment in the sentence; see Boeckh, *Urkunden über das Attische Seewesen*, chap. vii. pp. 75, 76.

The elder Dionysius of Syracuse is said to have been the first Greek who constructed *πεντήρεις* or quinquereme ships (Diodor. xiv, 40, 41).

There were many distinct *pentaëterides*, or solemnities celebrated every fifth year, included among the religious customs of Athens: see Aristoteles *Πολιτ.* Fragm. xxvii, ed. Neumann; Pollux, viii, 107.

partisans in arms and took possession of the Old Town,—a strong post which had been superseded in course of time by the more modern city on the sea-shore, less protected though more convenient.¹ But no Athenians appeared, and without them he was unable to maintain his footing: he was obliged to make his escape from the island after witnessing the complete defeat of his partisans, — a large body of whom, seven hundred in number, fell in to the hands of the government, and were led out for execution. One man alone among these prisoners burst his chains, fled to the sanctuary of *Dēmêtēr Thesmophorus*, and was fortunate enough to seize the handle of the door before he was overtaken. In spite of every effort to drag him away by force, he clung to it with convulsive grasp: his pursuers did not venture to put him to death in such a position, but they severed the hands from the body and then executed him, leaving the hands still hanging to and grasping² the door-handle, where they seem to have long remained without being taken off. Destruction of the seven hundred prisoners does not seem to have drawn down upon the Æginetan oligarchy either vengeance from the gods or censure from their contemporaries; but the violation of sanctuary, in the case of that one unfortunate man whose hands were cut off, was a crime which the goddess *Dēmêtēr* never forgave. More than fifty years afterwards, in the first year of the Peloponnesian war, the Æginetans, having been previously conquered by Athens, were finally expelled from their island: such expulsion was the divine judgment upon them for this ancient impiety, which half a

¹ See Thucyd. i, 8.

The acropolis at Athens, having been the primitive city inhabited, bore the name of *The City* even in the time of Thucydides (ii, 15), at a time when Athens and Peiræus covered so large a region around and near it.

² Herodot. vi, 91. *χεῖρες δὲ κεῖναι ἐμπεφυκνῖαι ἦσαν τοῖσι ἐπισπαστήροισι*. The word *κεῖναι* for *ἐκείναι*, "those hands," appears so little suitable in this phrase, that I rather imagine the real reading to have been *κεῖναι* (the Ionic dialect for *κεῖναι*), "the hands with nothing attached to them:" compare a phrase not very unlike, Homer, *Iliad*, iii, 376, *κεῖνῃ δὲ τροφάλει* *ἄμ' ἔσπετο*, etc.

Compare the narrative of the arrest of the Spartan king Pausanias, and of the manner in which he was treated when in sanctuary at the temple of *Athênê Chalkiœkos* (Thucyd. i, 134).

century of continued expiatory sacrifice had not been sufficient to wipe out.¹

The Athenians who were to have assisted *Nikodromus* arrived at Ægina one day too late. Their proceedings had been delayed by the necessity of borrowing twenty triremes from the Corinthians, in addition to fifty of their own: with these seventy sail they defeated the Æginetans, who met them with a fleet of equal number, and then landed on the island. The Æginetans solicited aid from Argos, but that city was either too much displeased with them, or too much exhausted by the defeat sustained from the Spartan *Kleomenês*, to grant it. Nevertheless, one thousand Argeian volunteers, under a distinguished champion of the pentathlon named *Eurybatês*, came to their assistance, and a vigorous war was carried on, with varying success, against the Athenian armament.

At sea, the Athenians sustained a defeat, being attacked at a moment when their fleet was in disorder, so that they lost four ships with their crews: on land they were more successful, and few of the Argeian volunteers survived to return home. The general of the latter, *Eurybatês*, confiding in his great personal strength and skill, challenged the best of the Athenian warriors to single combat: he slew three of them in succession, but the arm of the fourth, *Sôphanês* of *Dekeleia*, was victorious, and proved fatal to him.² At length the invaders were obliged to leave the island without any decisive result, and the war seems

¹ Herodot. vi, 91. *Ἀπὸ τούτου δὲ καὶ ἄγος σφί ἐγένετο, τὸ ἐκθύσασθαι οἱ ἄλλοι τε ἐγένοντο ἐπιμηχανώμενοι, ἀλλ' ἔφθησαν ἐκπεσόντες πρυττανικῆς νῆσον ἢ σφί ἢ ἡσων γενέσθαι τὴν θεόν*.

Compare Thucyd. ii, 27 about the final expulsion from Ægina. The Lacedæmonians assigned to these expelled Æginetans a new abode in the territory of *Thyrea*, on the eastern coast of Peloponnesus, where they were attacked, taken prisoners, and put to death by the Athenians, in the eighth year of the war (Thucyd. iv, 57). Now Herodotus, while he mentions the expulsion, does not allude to their subsequent and still more calamitous fate. Had he known the fact, he could hardly have failed to notice it, as a farther consummation of the divine judgment. We may reasonably presume ignorance in this case, which would tend to support the opinion shown out in my preceding volume (chap. xxxiii, p. 225, note) respecting the date of composition of his history, — in the earliest years of the Peloponnesian war.

Herodot. ix, 75.

to have been prosecuted by frequent descents and privateering on both sides,—in which Nikodromus and the Æginetan exiles, planted by Athens on the coast of Attica near Sunium, took an active part;¹ the advantage on the whole being on the side of Athens.

The general course of this war, and especially the failure of the enterprise concerned with Nikodromus in consequence of delay in borrowing ships from Corinth, were well calculated to impress upon the Athenians the necessity of enlarging their naval force. And it is from the present time that we trace among them the first growth of that decided tendency towards maritime activity, which coincided so happily with the expansion of their democracy, and opened a new phase in Grecian history, as well as a new career for themselves.

The exciting effect produced upon them by the repulse of the Persians at Marathon has been dwelt upon in my preceding volume. Miltiades, the victor in that field, having been removed from the scene under circumstances already described, Aristeidēs and Themistoklēs became the chief men at Athens: and the former was chosen archon during the succeeding year. His exemplary uprightness in magisterial functions insured to him lofty esteem from the general public, not without a certain proportion of active enemies, some of them sufferers by his justice. These enemies naturally became partisans of his rival, Themistoklēs, who had all the talents necessary for bringing them into coöperation: and the rivalry between the two chiefs became so bitter and menacing, that even Aristeidēs himself is reported to have said, "If the Athenians were wise, they would cast both of us into the barathrum." Under such circumstances, it is not too much to say that the peace of the country was preserved mainly by the institution called Ostracism, of which so much has been said in the preceding volume. After three or four years of continued political rivalry, the two chiefs appealed to a vote of ostracism, and Aristeidēs was banished.

¹ Herodot. vi, 90-93. Thucyd. i, 41. About Sôphanês, comp. ix, 75.

How much damage was done by such a privateering war, between countries so near as Ægina and Attica, may be seen by the more detailed description of a later war of the same kind in 388 B.C. (Xenophon. Hellenic v. 1.)

Of the particular points on which their rivalry turned, we are unfortunately little informed. But it is highly probable that one of them was, the important change of policy above alluded to,—the conversion of Athens from a land-power into a sea-power,—the development of this new and stirring element in the minds of the people. By all authorities, this change of policy is ascribed principally and specially to Themistoklēs:¹ on that account, if for no other reason, Aristeidēs would probably be found opposed to it,—but it was, moreover, a change not in harmony with that old-fashioned Hellenism, undisturbed uniformity of life and narrow range of active duty and experience, which Aristeidēs seems to have approved in common with the subsequent philosophers. The seaman was naturally more of a wanderer and cosmopolite than the heavy-armed soldier: the modern Greek seaman even at this moment is so to a remarkable degree, distinguished for the variety of his ideas and the quickness of his intelligence:² the land-service was a type of steadiness and in-

¹ Plutarch, Themist. c. 19.

² See Mr. Galt's interesting account of the Hydriot sailors, Voyages and Travels in the Mediterranean, pp. 376-378 (London, 1802).

"The city of Hydra originated in a small colony of boatmen belonging to the Morea, who took refuge in the island from the tyranny of the Turks. About forty years ago they had multiplied to a considerable number, their little village began to assume the appearance of a town, and they had cargoes that went as far as Constantinople. In their mercantile transactions, the Hydriots acquired the reputation of greater integrity than the other Greeks, as well as of being the most intrepid navigators in the Archipelago; and they were of course regularly preferred. Their industry and honesty obtained its reward. The islands of Spezzia, Paros, Myconi, and Ipsara, resemble Hydra in their institutions, and possess the same character for commercial activity. In paying their sailors, Hydra and its sister islands have a peculiar custom. The whole amount of the freight is considered as a common stock, from which the charges of victualing the ship are deducted. The remainder is then divided into two equal parts: one is allotted to the crew, and equally shared among them without reference to age or rank; the other part is appropriated to the ship and captain. The capital of the cargo is a trust given to the captain and crew on certain fixed conditions. The character and manners of the Hydriot sailors, from the moral effect of these customs, are much superior in regularity to the ideas that we are apt to entertain of sailors. They are sedate, well-dressed, well-bred, shrewd, informed, and speculative. They seem to form a class, in the orders of mankind, which has no existence among us. By their

flexible ranks, the sea-service that of mutability and adventure. Such was the idea strongly entertained by Plato and other philosophers:¹ though we may remark that they do not render justice to the Athenian seaman, whose training was far more perfect and laborious, and his habits of obedience far more complete,² than that of the Athenian hoplite, or horseman: a training beginning with Themistoklēs, and reaching its full perfection about the commencement of the Peloponnesian war.

In recommending extraordinary efforts to create a navy as well as to acquire nautical practice, Themistoklēs displayed all that sagacious appreciation of the circumstances and dangers of the time for which Thucydides gives him credit: and there can be no doubt that Aristeidēs, though the honest politician of the two, was at this particular crisis the less essential to his country. Not only was there the struggle with Ægina, a maritime power equal or more than equal, and within sight of the Athenian harbor, — but there was also in the distance a still more formidable contingency to guard against. The Persian armament had been driven with disgrace from Attica back to Asia; but the Persian monarch still remained with undiminished means of aggression and increased thirst for revenge; and Themistoklēs knew well that the danger from that quarter would recur greater than ever. He believed that it would recur again in the same way, by an expedition across the Ægean like that of Datis to Marathon;³ against

voyages, they acquire a liberality of notion which we expect only among gentlemen, while in their domestic circumstances their conduct is suitable to their condition. The Greeks are all traditionary historians, and possess much of that kind of knowledge to which the term *learning* is usually applied. This, mingled with the other information of the Hydriots, gives them that advantageous character of mind which I think they possess."

¹ Plato, Legg. iv, pp. 705, 706. Plutarch, Themistoklēs, c. 19. Isokratēs, Panathenæic, c. 43.

Plutarch, Philopœmen. c. 14. Πλὴν Ἐπαμεινώνδαν μὲν ἐνιοὶ λέγουσιν ὀκνοῦντα γεῦσαι τῶν κατὰ θάλασσαν ὠφελειῶν τοὺς πολίτας, ὅπως αὐτῷ μὴ λάθωσιν ἀντὶ μονίμων ὀπλιτῶν, κατὰ Πλάτωνα, ναῦται γινόμενοι καὶ διαφθαρέντες, ἀπρακτοὶ ἐκ τῆς Ἀσίας καὶ τῶν νήσων ἀπελθεῖν ἐκουσίως: compare vii, p. 301.

² See the remarkable passage in Xenophon (Memorab. iii, 5, 19), attesting that the Hoplites and the Hippeis, the persons first in rank in the city were also the most disobedient on military service.

³ Thucyd. i, 93. ἰδὼν (Themistoklēs) τῆς βασιλείας στρατιᾶς τῇ αὐτῇ θάλασσαν ἐξοδὸν εὐπροωτέραν τῆς κατὰ γῆν οὖσαν.

which the best defence would be found in a numerous and well-trained fleet. Nor could the large preparations of Darius for renewing the attack remain unknown to a vigilant observer, extending as they did over so many Greeks subject to the Persian empire. Such positive warning was more than enough to stimulate the active genius of Themistoklēs, who now prevailed upon his countrymen to begin with energy the work of maritime preparation, as well against Ægina as against Persia.¹ Not only were two hundred new ships built, and citizens trained as seamen, — but the important work was commenced, during the year when Themistoklēs was either archon or general, of forming and fortifying a new harbor for Athens at Peiræus, instead of the ancient open bay of Phalærum. The latter was indeed somewhat nearer to the city, but Peiræus, with its three separate natural ports,² admitting of being closed and fortified, was incomparably superior in safety as well as in convenience. It is not too much to say, with Herodotus, — that the Æginetan "war was the salvation of Greece, by constraining the Athenians to make themselves a maritime power."³ The whole efficiency of the resistance subsequently made to Xerxes turned upon this new movement in the organization of Athens, allowed as it was to attain tolerable completeness through a fortunate concurrence of accidents; for the important delay of ten years, between the defeat of Marathon and the fresh invasion by which it was to be avenged, was in truth the result of accident. First, the revolt of Egypt; next, the death of Darius; thirdly, the indifference of Xerxes, at his first accession, towards Hellenic matters, — postponed until 480 B.C., an invasion which would naturally have been undertaken in 487 or 486 B.C., and which would have found Athens at that time without her wooden walls, — the great engine of her subsequent salvation.

Another accidental help, without which the new fleet could not have been built, — a considerable amount of public money, — was also by good fortune now available to the Athenians. It is

¹ Thucyd. i, 14. Herodot. vii, 144.

² Thucyd. i, 93.

³ Herodot. vii, 144. Οὗτος γὰρ ὁ πόλεμος τιστὰς ἔσωσε τότε τὴν Ἑλλάδα ἀναγκάσας θαλασσίους γενέσθαι Ἀθηναίους.

Thucyd. i, 18. ναυτικοὶ γένοντα.

first in an emphatic passage of the poet Æschylus, and next from Herodotus on the present occasion, that we hear of the silver mines of Laurium¹ in Attica, and the valuable produce which they rendered to the state. They were situated in the southern portion of the territory, not very far from the promontory of Sunium,² amidst a district of low hills which extended across much of the space between the eastern sea at Thorikus, and the western at Anaphlystus. At what time they first began to be worked, we have no information; but it seems hardly possible that they could have been worked with any spirit or profitable result until after the expulsion of Hippias and the establishment of the democratical constitution of Kleisthenês. Neither the strong local factions, by which different portions of Attica were set against each other before the time of Peisistratus, nor the rule of that despot succeeded by his two sons, were likely to afford confidence and encouragement. But when the democracy of Kleisthenês first brought Attica into one systematic and comprehensive whole, with equal rights to all the parts, and a common centre at Athens, — the power of that central government over the mineral wealth of the country, and its means of binding the whole people to respect agreements concluded with individual undertakers, would give a new stimulus to private speculation in the district of Laurium. It was the practice of the Athenian government either to sell, or to let for a long term of years, particular districts of this productive region to individuals or companies, — on consideration partly of a sum or fine paid down, partly of a reserved rent equal to one-twenty-fourth part of the gross produce.

We are told by Herodotus that there was in the Athenian

¹ Æschylus, *Persæ*, 235.

² The mountain region of Laurium has been occasionally visited by modern travellers, but never carefully surveyed until 1836, when Dr. Fiedler examined it mineralogically by order of the present Greek government. See his *Reisen durch Griechenland*, vol. i, pp. 39, 73. The region is now little better than a desert, but Fiedler especially notices the great natural fertility of the plain near Thorikus, together with the good harbor at that place, — both circumstances of great value at the time when the mines were in work. Many remains are seen of shafts sunk in ancient times, — and sunk in so workmanlike a manner as to satisfy the eye of a miner of the present day. — p. 76.

treasury, at the time when Themistoklês made his proposition to enlarge the naval force, a great sum¹ arising from the Laurian mines, out of which a distribution was on the point of being made among the citizens, — ten drachmæ to each man. This great amount in hand must probably have been the produce of the purchase-money or fines received from recent sales, since the small annual reserved rent can hardly have been accumulated during many successive years: new and enlarged enterprises in mines must be supposed to have been recently begun by individuals under contract with the government, in order to produce at the moment so overflowing an exchequer and to furnish means for the special distribution contemplated. Themistoklês availed himself of this precious opportunity, — set forth the necessities of the war with Ægina and the still more formidable menace from the great enemy in Asia, — and prevailed upon the people to forego the promised distribution for the purpose of obtaining an efficient navy.² One cannot doubt that there must have been

¹ Herodot. vii, 144. "Ὅτε Ἀθηναίοισι γενομένων χρημάτων μεγάλων ἐν τῷ κοινῷ, τὰ ἐκ τῶν μετάλλων σφί προσήλθε τῶν ἀπὸ Λαυρείου, ἐμελλόν λάξεσθαι ἑρχηδὸν ἑκάστος δέκα δραχμάς."

² All the information — unfortunately it is very scanty — which we possess respecting the ancient mines of Laurium, is brought together in the valuable Dissertation of M. Boeckh, translated and appended to the English translation of his *Public Economy of Athens*. He discusses the fact stated in this chapter of Herodotus, in sect. 8 of that Dissertation: but there are many of his remarks in which I cannot concur.

After multiplying ten drachmæ by the assumed number of twenty thousand Athenian citizens, making a sum total distributed of thirty-three and one-third talents, he goes on: "That the distribution was made annually might have been presumed from the principles of the Athenian administration, without the testimony of Cornelius Nepos. We are not, therefore, to suppose that the savings of several years are meant, nor merely a surplus, but that all the public money arising from the mines, as it was not required for any other object, was divided among the members of the community," (p. 632.)

We are hardly authorized to conclude from the passage of Herodotus that all the sum received from the mines was about to be distributed: the treasury was very rich, and a distribution was about to be made, — but it does not follow that nothing was to be left in the treasury after the distribution. Accordingly, all calculations of the total produce of the mines, based upon this passage of Herodotus, are uncertain. Nor is it clear that there was any regular annual distribution, unless we are to take the passage of

many speakers who would try to make themselves popular by opposing this proposition and supporting the distribution, inasmuch that the power of the people generally to feel the force of a distant motive as predominant over a present gain deserves notice as an earnest of their approaching greatness.

Immense, indeed, was the recompense reaped for this self-denial, not merely by Athens but by Greece generally, when the preparations of Xerxes came to be matured, and his armament was understood to be approaching. The orders for equipment of ships and laying in of provisions, issued by the Great King to his subject Greeks in Asia, the Ægean, and Thrace, would of course become known throughout Greece Proper, — especially the vast labor bestowed on the canal of Mount Athos, which would be the theme of wondering talk with every Thasian or Akanthian citizen who visited the festival games in Peloponnesus. All these premonitory evidences were public enough, without any need of that elaborate stratagem whereby the exiled Demaratus

Cornelius Nepos as proving it: but he talks rather about the magistrates employing this money for jobbing purposes, — not about a regular distribution: "Nam cum pecunia publica quæ ex metallis redibat, largitione magistratum quotannis periret." Corn. Nep. Themist. c. 2. A story is told by Polyænus, from whomsoever he copied it, — of a sum of one hundred talents in the treasury, which Themistoklēs persuaded the people to hand over to one hundred rich men, for the purpose of being expended as the latter might direct, with an obligation to reimburse the money in case the people were not satisfied with the expenditure: these rich men employed each the sum awarded to him in building a new ship, much to the satisfaction of the people (Polyæn. i. 30). This story differs materially from that of Herodotus, and we cannot venture either to blend the two together or to rely upon Polyænus separately.

I imagine that the sum of thirty three talents, or fifty talents, necessary for the distribution, formed part of a larger sum lying in the treasury, arising from the mines. Themistoklēs persuaded the people to employ the whole sum in ship-building, which of course implied that the distribution was to be renounced. Whether there had been distributions of a similar kind in former years, as M. Boëckh affirms, is a matter on which we have no evidence. M. Boëckh seems to me not to have kept in view the fact, which he himself states just before, that there were two sources of receipt into the treasury, — original purchase-money paid down, and reserved annual rent. It is from the former source that I imagine the large sum lying in the treasury to have been derived: the small reserved rent probably went among the annual items of the state-budget.

is alleged to have secretly transmitted, from Susa to Sparta, intelligence of the approaching expedition.¹ The formal announcements of Xerxes all designated Athens as the special object of his wrath and vengeance,² and other Grecian cities might thus hope to escape without mischief: so that the prospect of the great invasion did not at first provoke among them any unanimous dispositions to resist. Accordingly, when the first heralds despatched by Xerxes from Sardis in the autumn of 481 B.C., a little before his march to the Hellespont, addressed themselves to the different cities with demand of earth and water, many were disposed to comply. Neither to Athens, nor to Sparta, were any heralds sent; and these two cities were thus from the beginning identified in interest and in the necessity of defence. Both of them sent, in this trying moment, to consult the Delphian oracle: while both at the same time joined to convene a Pan-Hellenic congress at the Isthmus of Corinth, for the purpose of organizing resistance against the expected invader.

I have in the preceding volume pointed out the various steps whereby the separate states of Greece were gradually brought, even against their own natural instincts, into something approaching more nearly to political union. The present congress, assembled under the influence of common fear from Persia, has more of a Pan-Hellenic character than any political event which has yet occurred in Grecian history. It extends far beyond the range of those Peloponnesian states who constitute the immediate allies of Sparta: it comprehends Athens, and is even summoned in part by her strenuous instigation: it seeks to combine, moreover, every city of Hellenic race and language, however distant, which can be induced to take part in it, — even the Kretans, Korkyræans, and Sicilians. It is true that all these states do not actually come, but earnest efforts are made to induce them to come: the dispersed brethren of the Hellenic family are intreated to marshal themselves in the same ranks for a joint political purpose,³ — the defence of the common

¹ Herodot. vii, 239.

² Herodot. vii, 8-138.

³ Herodot. vii, 145. Φρονήσαντες εἰ πως ἐν τε γένοιτο τὸ Ἑλληνικόν, καὶ εἰ συγκύψαντες τῶν ἐλπίδων πρήσσοιεν πάντες, ὡς δεινῶν ἐπιόντων ὁμοίως πᾶσι Ἕλλησι.

hearth and metropolis of the race. This is a new fact in Grecian history, opening scenes and ideas unlike to anything which has gone before, — enlarging, prodigiously, the functions and duties connected with that headship of Greece which had hitherto been in the hands of Sparta, but which is about to become too comprehensive for her to manage, — and thus introducing increased habits of coöperation among the subordinate states, as well as rival hopes of aggrandizement among the leaders. The congress at the isthmus of Corinth marks such further advance in the centralizing tendencies of Greece, and seems at first to promise an onward march in the same direction: but the promise will not be found realized.

Its first step was, indeed, one of inestimable value. While most of the deputies present came prepared, in the name of their respective cities, to swear reciprocal fidelity and brotherhood, they also addressed all their efforts to appease the feuds and dissensions which reigned among the particular members of their own meeting. Of these the most prominent, as well as the most dangerous, was the war still subsisting between Athens and Ægina. The latter was not exempt, even now, from suspicions of *medizing*,¹ i. e., embracing the cause of the Persians, which had been raised by her giving earth and water ten years before to Darius: but her present conduct gave no countenance to such suspicions: she took earnest part in the congress as well as in the joint measures of defence, and willingly consented to accommodate her difference with Athens.² In this work of reconciling feuds, so essential to the safety of Greece, the Athenian Themistoklēs took a prominent part, as well as Cheileos of Tegea in Arcadia.³ The congress proceeded to send envoys and solicit coöperation from such cities as were yet either equivocal or indifferent, especially Argos, Korkyra, and the Kretan and Sicilian Greeks, — and at the same time to despatch spies across to Sardis, for the purpose of learning the state and prospects of the assembled army.

These spies presently returned, having been detected and condemned to death by the Persian generals, but released by

¹ Herodot. viii, 92.

Plutarch, Themistokl. c. 10. About Cheileos, Herodot. ix, 9.

² Herodot. vii, 145

express order of Xerxes, who directed that the full strength of his assembled armament should be shown to them, in order that the terror of the Greeks might be thus magnified. The step was well calculated for such a purpose: but the discouragement throughout Greece was already extreme, at this critical period when the storm was about to burst upon them. Even to intelligent and well-meaning Greeks, much more to the careless, the timid, or the treacherous, — Xerxes with his countless host appeared irresistible, and indeed something more than human:¹ of course, such an impression would be encouraged by the large number of Greeks already his tributaries: and we may even trace a manifestation of a wish to get rid of the Athenians altogether, as the chief objects of Persian vengeance and chief hindrance to tranquil submission. This despair of the very continuance of Hellenic life and autonomy breaks forth even from the sanctuary of Hellenic religion, the Delphian temple; when the Athenians, in their distress and uncertainty, sent to consult the oracle. Hardly had their two envoys performed the customary sacrifices, and sat down in the inner chamber near the priestess Aristonikē, when she at once exclaimed: "Wretched men, why sit ye there? Quit your land and city, and flee afar! Head, body, feet, and hands are alike rotten: fire and sword, in the train of the Syrian chariot, shall overwhelm you: nor only your city, but other cities also, as well as many even of the temples of the gods, — which are now sweating and trembling with fear, and foreshadow, by drops of blood on their roofs, the hard calamities impending. Get ye away from the sanctuary, with your souls steeped in sorrow."²

¹ Herodot. vii, 203. οὐ γὰρ θεὸν εἶναι τὸν ἐπίοντα ἐπὶ τὴν Ἑλλάδα, ἀλλ' ἀνθρώπον, etc.: compare also vii, 56.

² Herodot. vii, 140.

Ἄλλ' ἵτον ἐξ αὐτοῦ, κακοῖς δ' ἐπικίδνατε θυμόν.

The general sense and scope of the oracle appears to me clear, in this case. It is a sentence of nothing but desolation and sadness; though Bähr and Schweighäuser, with other commentators, try to infuse into it something of encouragement by construing θυμόν, *fortitude*. The translation of Valla and Schultz is nearer to the truth. But even when the general sense of an oracle is plain (which it hardly ever is), the particular phrases are always wild and vague.

So terrific a reply had rarely escaped from the lips of the priestess. The envoys were struck to the earth by it, and durst not carry it back to Athens. In their sorrow they were encouraged yet to hope by an influential Delphian citizen named Timon (we trace here, as elsewhere, the underhand working of these leading Delphians on the priestess), who advised them to provide themselves with the characteristic marks of supplication, and to approach the oracle a second time in that imploring guise: "O lord, we pray thee (they said), have compassion on these boughs of supplication, and deliver to us something more comfortable concerning our country; else we quit not thy sanctuary, but remain here until death." Upon which the priestess replied: "Athênê with all her prayers and all her sagacity cannot propitiate Olympian Zeus.¹ But this assurance I will give you, firm as adamant: when everything else in the land of Kekrops shall be taken, Zeus grants to Athênê that the wooden wall alone shall remain unconquered, to defend you and your children. Stand not to await the assailing horse and foot from the continent, but turn your backs and retire: you shall yet live to fight another day. O divine Salamis, thou too shalt destroy the children of women, either at the seed-time or at the harvest."²

This second answer was a sensible mitigation of the first: it left open some hope of escape, though faint, dark, and unintelligible,—and the envoys wrote it down to carry back to Athens, not concealing, probably, the terrific sentence which had preceded it. When read to the people, the obscurity of the meaning provoked many different interpretations. What was meant by "the wooden wall?" Some supposed that the acropolis itself, which

¹ Herodot. vii, 141.

Οὐ δύναται Παλλὰς Δὲ Ὀλύμπιον ἐξιλάσασθαι
Λισσομένη πολλοῖσι λόγοις καὶ μῆτιδι πυκνῇ.

Compare with this the declaration of Apollo to Cræsus of Lydia (i, 91)

Τείχος Τριτογενεῖ ξύλινον διδοὶ εὐρύσπα Ζεὺς
Μοῦνον ἐπὶ νόητον τελέθειν, τὸ δὲ τέκνα τ' ὀνήσει.

Ἡ θεὴ Σαλαμὶς, ἀπολεῖ δὲ σὺ τέκνα γυναικῶν etc.
(Herodot. vii, 141)

had originally been surrounded with a wooden palisade, was the refuge pointed out: but the greater number, and among them most of those who were by profession expositors of prophecy, maintained that the wooden wall indicated the fleet. But these professional expositors, while declaring that the god bade them go on shipboard, deprecated all idea of a naval battle, and insisted on the necessity of abandoning Attica forever: the last lines of the oracle, wherein it was said that Salamis would destroy the children of women, appeared to them to portend nothing but disaster in the event of a naval combat. Such was the opinion of those who passed for the best expositors of the divine will: it harmonized completely with the despairing temper then prevalent, heightened by the terrible sentence pronounced in the first oracle; and emigration to some foreign land presented itself as the only hope of safety even for their persons. The fate of Athens,—and of Greece generally, which would have been helpless without Athens,—now hung upon a thread, when Themistoklēs, the great originator of the fleet, interposed with equal steadfastness of heart and ingenuity, to insure the proper use of it. He contended that if the god had intended to designate Salamis as the scene of a naval disaster to the Greeks, that island would have been called in the oracle by some such epithet as "wretched Salamis:" but the fact that it was termed "divine Salamis," indicated that the parties, destined to perish there, were the enemies of Greece, not the Greeks themselves. He encouraged his countrymen, therefore, to abandon their city and country, and to trust themselves to the fleet as the wooden wall recommended by the god, but with full determination to fight and conquer on board.¹ Great, indeed, were the consequences

Herodot. vii, 143. Ταύτη Θεμιστοκλέους ἀποφαινομένου, Ἀθηναῖοι ταῦτά σφι ἐγνώσαν αἰρετώτερα εἶναι μᾶλλον ἢ τὰ τῶν χρησμολόγων, οἳ οὐκ εἰων ναυμαχίην ἀρτέεσθαι, ἔλλα ἐκλείποντας χώραν τὴν Ἀττικὴν, ἄλλην τινὲ οἰκίσειν.

There is every reason to accept the statement of Herodotus as true, respecting these oracles delivered to the Athenians, and the debated interpretation of them. They must have been discussed publicly in the Athenian assembly, and Herodotus may well have conversed with persons who had heard the discussion. Respecting the other oracle which he states to have been delivered to the Spartans.—intimating that either Sparta

which turned upon this bold stretch of exegetical conjecture. Unless the Athenians had been persuaded, by some plausible show of interpretation, that the sense of the oracle encouraged instead of forbidding a naval combat, they would in their existing depression have abandoned all thought of resistance.

Even with the help of an encouraging interpretation, however, nothing less than the most unconquerable resolution and patriotism could have enabled the Athenians to bear up against such terrific denunciations from the Delphian god, and persist in resistance in place of seeking safety by emigration. Herodotus emphatically impresses this truth upon his readers: ¹ nay, he even steps out of his way to do so, proclaiming Athens as the real saviour of Greece. Writing as he did about the beginning of the Peloponnesian war, — at a time when Athens, having attained the maximum of her empire, was alike feared, hated, and admired, by most of the Grecian states, — he knows that the opinion which he is giving will be unpopular with his hearers generally, and he apologizes for it as something wrung from him against his will by the force of the evidence.² Nor was it only

must be conquered or a king of Sparta must perish, — we may well doubt whether it was in existence before the battle of Thermopylæ (Herodot. vii. 220).

The later writers, Justin (ii. 12), Cornelius Nepos (c. 2), and Polyænus (i. 30), give an account of the proceeding of Themistoklēs, inferior to Herodotus in vivacity as well as in accuracy.

¹ Herodot. vii. 139. οὐδὲ σφέας χρηστήρια φοβερὰ, ἐλθόντα ἐκ Δελφῶν, καὶ ἐς δεῖμα βαλόντα, ἐπεισε ἐκλιπεῖν τὴν Ἑλλάδα, etc.

For the abundance of oracles and prophecies, from many different sources, which would be current at such a moment of anxiety, we may compare the analogy of the outbreak of the Peloponnesian war, described by the contemporary historian (Thucyd. ii. 8).

² Herodot. vii. 139. Ἐνθαῦτα ἀναγκαίῃ ἐξέργομαι γνώμην ἀποδείξασθαι, ἐπίφθονον μὲν πρὸς τῶν πλεόνων ἀνθρώπων· ὅμως δὲ, τῇ γέ μαι φαίνεται εἶναι ἀληθές, οὐκ ἐπισχίσω. Εἰ Ἀθηναῖοι, καταβρωδῆσαντες τὸ ἐπιδόντα κίνδυνον, ἐξέλιπον τὴν σφετέρην, etc. Νῦν δὲ, Ἀθηναίους ἰστίς λέγων σωτήρας γενέσθαι τῆς Ἑλλάδος, οὐκ ἂν ἀμαρτάνοι τὸ ἀληθές, etc.

The whole chapter deserves peculiar attention, as it brings before us the feelings of those contemporaries to whom his history is addressed, and the mode of judging with which they looked back on the Persian war. One is apt unconsciously to fancy that an ancient historian writes for men in the abstract, and not for men of given sentiments, prejudices, and belief. The

that the Athenians dared to stay and fight against immense odds: true, and they alone, threw into the cause that energy and forwardness whereby it was enabled to succeed,¹ as will appear farther in the sequel. But there was also a third way, not less deserving of notice, in which they contributed to the result. As soon as the congress of deputies met at the isthmus of Corinth, it became essential to recognize some one commanding state, and with regard to the land-force no one dreamed of contesting the preëminence of Sparta. But in respect to the fleet, her pretensions were more disputable, since she furnished at most only sixteen ships, and little or no nautical skill; while Athens brought two-thirds of the entire naval force, with the best ships and seamen. Upon these grounds the idea was at first started, that Athens should command at sea and Sparta on land: but the majority of the allies manifested a decided repugnance, announcing that they would follow no one but a Spartan. To the honor of the Athenians, they at once waived their pretensions, as soon as they saw that the unity of the confederate force, at this moment of peril, would be compromised.² To appreciate this generous abnegation of a claim in itself so reasonable, we must recollect that the love of preëminence was among the most prominent attributes of the Hellenic character: a prolific source of their greatness and excellence, but producing also no small amount both of their follies and their crimes. To renounce at the call of public obligation a claim to personal honor and glory, is perhaps the rarest of all virtues in a son of Hellen.

We find thus the Athenians nerved up to the pitch of resistance, — prepared to see their country wasted, and to live as well as to fight on shipboard, when the necessity should arrive, — fur-

persons whom Herodotus addressed are those who were so full of admiration for Sparta, as to ascribe to her chiefly the honor of having beaten back the Persians; and to maintain that, even without the aid of Athens, the Spartans and Peloponnesians both could have defended, and would have defended, the isthmus of Corinth, fortified as it was by a wall built expressly. The Peloponnesian allies of that day forgot that they were open to attack by sea as well as by land.

¹ Herodot. vii. 139. ἐλόμενοι δὲ τὴν Ἑλλάδα περιεῖναι ἐλευθέρην, τοῦτο τὸ Ἑλληνικὸν πᾶν τὸ λοιπὸν, ὅσον μὴ ἐμήδισε, αὐτοὶ οὐτοὶ ἦσαν οἱ ἐπεγείραντες, καὶ βασιλεία μετὰ γε θεοῦς ἀνωσάμενοι.

² Herodot. viii. 2, 3: compare vii. 161.

nishing two thirds of the whole fleet, and yet prosecuting the building of fresh ships until the last moment,¹ — sending forth the ablest and most forward leader in the common cause, while content themselves to serve like other states under the leadership of Sparta. During the winter preceding the march of Xerxes from Sardis, the congress at the Isthmus was trying, with little success, to bring the Grecian cities into united action. Among the cities north of Attica and Peloponnesus, the greater number were either inclined to submit, like Thebes and the greater part of Boeotia, or at least lukewarm in the cause of independence, — so rare at this trying moment (to use the language of the unfortunate Plataeans fifty-three years afterwards), was the exertion of resolute Hellenic patriotism against the invader.² Even in the interior of Peloponnesus, the powerful Argos maintained an ambiguous neutrality. It was one of the first steps of the congress to send special envoys to Argos, to set forth the common danger and solicit coöperation; the result is certain, that no coöperation was obtained, — the Argeians did nothing throughout the struggle; but as to their real position, or the grounds of their refusal, contradictory statements had reached the ears of Herodotus. They themselves affirmed that they were ready to have joined the Hellenic cause, in spite of dissuasion from the Delphian oracle, — exacting only as conditions, that the Spartans should conclude a truce with them for thirty years, and should equally divide the honors of headship with Argos. To the proposed truce there would probably have been no objection, nor was there any as to the principle of dividing the headship: but the Spartans added, that they had two kings, while the Argeians had only one; and inasmuch as neither of the two Spartan kings could be deprived of his vote, the Argeian king could only be admitted to a third vote conjointly with them. This proposition appeared to the Argeians, who considered that even the undivided headship was no more than their ancient right, as nothing

¹ Herodot. vii, 144.

² Thucyd. iii, 56. *ἐν καιροῖς οἷς σπάνιον ἦν τῶν Ἑλλήνων τινὰ ἀρετὴν τῇ ζεῦξιν δυνάμει ἀντιτάσσασθαι.*

This view of the case is much more conformable to history than the boasts of later orators respecting wide-spread patriotism in these times. See Demosthen. Philipp. iii, 27, p. 120.

better than insolent encroachment, and incensed them so much that they desired the envoys to quit their territory before sunset, — preferring even a tributary existence under Persia to a formal degradation as compared with Sparta.¹

Such was the story told by the Argeians themselves, but seemingly not credited either by any other Greeks or by Herodotus himself. The prevalent opinion was, that the Argeians had a secret understanding with Xerxes, and some even affirmed that they had been the parties who invited him into Greece, as a means both of protection and of vengeance to themselves against Sparta after their defeat by Kleomenēs. And Herodotus himself evidently believed that they *medized*, though he is half afraid to say so, and disguises his opinion in a cloud of words which betray the angry polemics going on about the matter, even fifty years afterwards.² It is certain that in act the Argeians were

¹ Herodot. vii, 147–150.

² The opinion of Herodotus is delivered in a remarkable way, without mentioning the name of the Argeians, and with evident reluctance. After enumerating all the Grecian contingents assembled for the defence of the Isthmus, and the different inhabitants of Peloponnesus, ethnically classified, he proceeds to say: *Τούτων ὧν τῶν ἐπὶ τῶν ἐθνέων αἱ λοιπαὶ πόλεις, πᾶρες τῶν κατέλεξα, ἐκ τοῦ μέσου ἐκατέατο· εἰ δὲ ἐλευθέρως ἐξεσσι εἰπεῖν, ἐκ τοῦ μέσου κατήμενοι ἐμήδιζον* (viii, 73). This assertion includes the Argeians without naming them.

Where he speaks respecting the Argeians by name, he is by no means so free and categorical; compare vii, 152, — he will give no opinion of his own, differing from the allegation of the Argeians themselves, — he mentions other stories, incompatible with that allegation, but without guaranteeing their accuracy, — he delivers a general admonition that those who think they have great reason to complain of the conduct of others would generally find, on an impartial scrutiny, that others have as much reason to complain of them, — “and thus the conduct of Argos has not been so much worse than that of others,” — *οὕτω δὲ οὐκ Ἀργείοισι αἰσχιστὰ πεποιήται.*

At the beginning of the Peloponnesian war, when the history of Herodotus was probably composed, the Argeians were in a peculiarly favorable position. They took part neither with Athens nor Lacedæmon, each of whom was afraid of offending them. An historian who openly countenanced a grave charge of treason against them in the memorable foregone combat against Xerxes, was thus likely to incur odium from both parties in Greece.

The comments of Plutarch on Herodotus in respect to this matter are

neutral, and one of their reasons for neutrality was, that they did not choose to join any Pan-Hellenic levy except in the capacity of chiefs; but probably the more powerful reason was, that they shared the impression then so widely diffused throughout Greece as to the irresistible force of the approaching host, and chose to hold themselves prepared for the event. They kept up secret negotiations even with Persian agents, yet not compromising themselves while matters were still pending; nor is it improbable, in their vexation against Sparta, that they would have been better pleased if the Persians had succeeded, — all which may reasonably be termed, *medizing*.

The absence of Hellenic fidelity in Argos was borne out by the parallel examples of Krete and Korkyra, to which places envoys from the Isthmus proceeded at the same time. The Kretans declined to take any part, on the ground of prohibitory injunctions from the oracle;¹ the Korkyræans promised without performing, and even without any intention to perform. Their neutrality was a serious loss to the Greeks, since they could fit out a naval force of sixty triremes, second only to that of Athens. With this important contingent they engaged to join the Grecian fleet, and actually set sail from Korkyra; but they took care not to sail round cape Malea, or to reach the scene of action. Their fleet remained on the southern or western coast of Peloponnesus, under pretence of being weatherbound, until the decisive result of the battle of Salamis was known. Their impression was that the Persian monarch would be victorious, in which case they would have made a merit of not having arrived in time; but they were also prepared with the plausible excuse of detention from foul winds, when the result turned out otherwise, and when they were reproached by the Greeks for their absence.² Such duplicity is not very astonishing, when we recollect that it was the habitual policy of Korkyra to isolate herself from Hellenic confederacies.³

of little value (De Herodoti Malignit. c. 28, p. 863), and are indeed unfair, since he represents the Argeian version of the facts as being universally believed (*ἅπαντες ἰσασιν*), which it evidently was not.

¹ Herodot. vii, 169.

² Herodot. vii, 168.

³ Thucyd. i, 32-37. It is perhaps singular that the Corinthian envoys in

The envoys who visited Korkyra proceeded onward on their mission to Gelon, the despot of Syracuse. Of that potentate, regarded by Herodotus as more powerful than any state in Greece, I shall speak more fully in a subsequent chapter: it is sufficient to mention now, that he rendered no aid against Xerxes. Nor was it in his power to do so, whatever might have been his inclinations; for the same year which brought the Persian monarch against Greece, was also selected by the Carthaginians for a formidable invasion of Sicily, which kept the Sicilian Greeks to the defence of their own island. It seems even probable that this simultaneous invasion had been concerted between the Persians and Carthaginians.¹

The endeavors of the deputies of Greeks at the Isthmus had thus produced no other reinforcement to their cause except some fair words from the Korkyræans. It was near the time when Xerxes was about to pass the Hellespont, in the beginning of 480 B.C., that the first actual step for resistance was taken, at the instigation of the Thessalians. Though the great Thessalian family of the Aleuadae were among the companions of Xerxes, and the most forward in inviting him into Greece, with every promise of ready submission from their countrymen, it seems that these promises were in reality unwarranted: the Aleuadae were at the head only of a minority, and perhaps were even in exile, like the Peisistratidae;² while most of the Thessalians were disposed to resist Xerxes, for which purpose they now sent envoys to the Isthmus,³ intimating the necessity of guarding the passes of Olympus, the northernmost entrance of Greece. They offered their own cordial aid in this defence, adding that they should be under the necessity of making their own separate submission, if this demand were not complied with. Accordingly, a body of ten thousand Grecian heavy-armed infantry, under the

Thucydides do not make any allusion to the duplicity of the Korkyræans in regard to the Persian invasion, in the strong invective which they deliver against Korkyra before the Athenian assembly (Thucyd. i, 37-42). The conduct of Corinth herself, however, on the same occasion, was not altogether without reproach.

¹ Herodot. vii, 158-167. Diodor. xi, 22.

² See Schol. ad Aristeid., Anathenæic. p. 138.

³ Herodot. vii, 172: compare c. 130.

command of the Spartan Euænetus and the Athenian Themistoklēs, were despatched by sea to Halus in Achæa Phthiôtis, where they disembarked and marched by land across Achæa and Thessaly.¹ Being joined by the Thessalian horse, they occupied the defile of Tempê, through which the river Peneius makes its way to the sea, by a cleft between the mountains Olympus and Ossa.

The long, narrow, and winding defile of Tempê, formed then, and forms still, the single entrance, open throughout winter as well as summer, from lower or maritime Macedonia into Thessaly: the lofty mountain precipices approach so closely as to leave hardly room enough in some places for a road: it is thus eminently defensible, and a few resolute men would be sufficient to arrest in it the progress of the most numerous host.² But the Greeks soon discovered that the position was such as they could not hold, — first, because the powerful fleet of Xerxes would be able to land troops in their rear; secondly, because there was also a second entrance passable in summer, from upper Macedonia into Thessaly, by the mountain-passes over the range of Olympus; an entrance which traversed the country of the Perrhæbians and came into Thessaly near Gonnus, about the spot where the defile of Tempê begins to narrow. It was in fact by this second pass, evading the insurmountable difficulties of Tempê,

¹ Herodot. vii. 173.

² Herodot. vii. 172. τὴν εὐβολὴν τὴν Ὀλυμπικὴν. See the description and plan of Tempê in Dr. Clarke's Travels, vol. iv, ch. ix, p. 280; and the Dissertation of Kriegk, in which all the facts about this interesting defile are collected and compared (Das Thessalische Tempe. Frankfort, 1834).

The description of Tempê in Livy (xliii, 18; xliv, 6) seems more accurate than that in Pliny (H. N. iv, 8). We may remark that both the one and the other belong to times subsequent to the formation and organization of the Macedonian empire, when it came to hold Greece in a species of dependence. The Macedonian princes after Alexander the Great, while they added to the natural difficulties of Tempê by fortifications, at the same time made the road more convenient as a military communication. In the time of Xerxes, these natural difficulties had never been approached by the hand of art, and were doubtless much greater.

The present road through the pass is about thirteen feet broad in its narrowest part, and between fifteen and twenty feet broad elsewhere, — the pass is about five English miles in length (Kriegk, pp. 21–33).

that the advancing march of the Persians was destined to be made, under the auspices of Alexander, king of Macedon, tributary to them, and active in their service; who sent a communication of this fact to the Greeks at Tempê, admonishing them that they would be trodden under foot by the countless host approaching, and urging them to renounce their hopeless position.¹ This Macedonian prince passed for a friend, and probably believed himself to be acting as such in dissuading the Greeks from unavailing resistance to Persia: but he was in reality a very dangerous mediator; and as such the Spartans had good reason to dread him, in a second intervention of which we shall hear more hereafter.² On the present occasion, the Grecian commanders were quite ignorant of the existence of any other entrance into Thessaly, besides Tempê, until their arrival in that region. Perhaps it might have been possible to defend both entrances at once, and considering the immense importance of arresting the march of the Persians at the frontiers of Hellas, the attempt would have been worth some risk. So great was the alarm, however, produced by the unexpected discovery, justifying, or seeming to justify, the friendly advice of Alexander, that they remained only a few days at Tempê, then at once retired back to their ships, and returned by sea to the isthmus of Corinth, — about the time when Xerxes was crossing the Hellespont.³

This precipitate retreat produced consequences highly disastrous and discouraging. It appeared to leave all Hellas north of mount Kithæron and of the Megarid territory without defence, and it served either as reason or pretext for the majority of the Grecian states north of that boundary to make their submission to Xerxes, which some of them had already begun to do before.⁴ When Xerxes in the course of his march reached the Thermaic gulf, within sight of Olympus and Ossa, the heralds whom he had sent from Sardis brought him tokens of submission from a third portion of the Hellenic name, — the Thessalians, Dolopes, Ænians, Perrhæbians, Magnètes, Lokrians, Dorians, Melians, Phthiôtid Achæans, and Boeotians, — among the latter

¹ Herodot. vii. 173.

² Herodot. viii. 140–143.

³ Herodot. vii. 173, 174.

⁴ Diodor. xi. 3. ἐπὶ παρουσίᾳ τῆς ἐν τοῖς Τέμπεσι φυλακῆς, etc.

is included Thebes, but not Thespiæ or Platæa. The Thessalians, especially, not only submitted, but manifested active zeal and rendered much service in the cause of Xerxes, under the stimulus of the Aleuadae, whose party now became predominant: they were probably indignant at the hasty retreat of those who had come to defend them.¹

Had the Greeks been able to maintain the passes of Olympus and Ossa, all this northern fraction might probably have been induced to partake in the resistance instead of becoming auxiliaries to the invader. During the six weeks or two months which elapsed between the retreat of the Greeks from Tempê and the arrival of Xerxes at Therma, no new plan of defence appears to have been formed; for it was not until that arrival became known at the Isthmus that the Greek army and fleet made its forward movement to occupy Thermopylæ and Artemisium.²

CHAPTER XL.

BATTLES OF THERMOPYLÆ AND ARTEMISIUM.

It was while the northerly states of Greece were thus successively falling off from the common cause, that the deputies assembled at the Isthmus took among themselves the solemn engagement, in the event of success, to inflict upon these recusant brethren condign punishment, — to tithe them in property, and perhaps to consecrate a tenth of their persons, for the profit of the Delphian god. Exception was to be made in favor of those states which had been driven to yield by irresistible necessity.³ Such a vow seemed at that moment little likely to be executed: it was the manifestation of a determined feeling binding together

¹ Herodot. vii, 131, 132, 174.

² Herodot. vii, 132; Diodor. xi, 3.

³ Herodot. vii, 177

the states which took the pledge, but it cannot have contributed much to intimidate the rest.

To display their own force, was the only effective way of keeping together doubtful allies; and the pass of Thermopylæ was now fixed upon as the most convenient point of defence, next to that of Tempê, — leaving out indeed, and abandoning to the enemy, Thessalians, Perrhæbians, Magnètes, Phthiôtid Achæans, Dolopes, Ænians, Malians, etc., who would all have been included if the latter line had been adhered to; but comprising the largest range consistent with safety. The position of Thermopylæ presented another advantage which was not to be found at Tempê; the mainland was here separated from the island of Eubœa only by a narrow strait, about two English miles and a half in its smallest breadth, between mount Knêmis and cape Kênæum. On the northern portion of Eubœa, immediately facing Magnesia and Achæa Phthiôtis, was situated the line of coast called Artemisium: a name derived from the temple of Artemis, which was its most conspicuous feature, belonging to the town of Histiaæa. It was arranged that the Grecian fleet should be mustered there, in order to coöperate with the land-force, and to oppose the progress of the Persians on both elements at once. To fight in a narrow space¹ was supposed favorable to the Greeks on sea not less than on land, inasmuch as their ships were both fewer in number and heavier in sailing than those in the Persian service. From the position of Artemisium, it was calculated that they might be able to prevent the Persian fleet from advancing into the narrow strait which severs Eubœa, to the north and west, from the mainland, and which, between Chalkis and Bœotia, becomes not too wide for a bridge. It was at this latter point that the Greek seamen would have preferred to place their defence: but the occupation of the northern part of the Eubœan strait was indispensable to prevent the Persian fleet from landing troops in the rear of the defenders of Thermopylæ.

Of this Eubœan strait, the western limit is formed by what

¹ Herodot. viii, 15-60. Compare Isokratês, Panegyric, Or. iv, p. 59.

I shall have occasion presently to remark the revelation which took place in Athenian feeling on this point between the Persian and Peloponnesian wars.

was then called the *Maliac gulf*, into which the river *Spercheius* poured itself, — after a course from west to east between the line of Mount Othrys to the north, and Mount Ceta to the south, — near the town of Antikyra. The lower portion of this spacious and fertile valley of the *Spercheius* was occupied by the various tribes of the Malians, bordering to the north and east on Achæa Phthiôtis: the southernmost Malians, with their town of Trachis, occupied a plain — in some places considerable, in others very narrow — inclosed between mount Ceta and the sea. From Trachis the range of Ceta stretched eastward, bordering close on the southern shore of the Maliac gulf: between the two lay the memorable pass of Thermopylæ.¹ On the road from Trachis to Thermopylæ, immediately outside of the latter and at the mouth of the little streams called the Phenix and the Asôpus, was placed the town of Anthêla, celebrated for its temples of Amphiktyon and of the Amphiktyonic Dêmêtêr, as well as for the autumnal assemblies of the Amphiktyonic council, for whom seats were provided in the temple.

Immediately near to Anthêla, the northern slope of the mighty and prolonged ridge of Ceta approached so close to the gulf, or at least to an inaccessible morass which formed the edge of the gulf, as to leave no more than one single wheel track between. This narrow entrance formed the western gate of Thermopylæ. At some little distance, seemingly about a mile, to the eastward, the same close conjunction between the mountain and the sea was repeated, — thus forming the eastern gate of Thermopylæ, not far from the first town of the Lokrians, called Alpêni. The space between these two gates was wider and more open, but it was distinguished, and is still distinguished, by its abundant flow of thermal springs, salt and sulphureous. Some cells were here prepared for bathers, which procured for the place the appellation of Chytri, or the Pans: but the copious supply of mineral water spread its mud and deposited its crust over all the adjacent ground; and the Phocians, some time before, had designedly endeavored so to conduct the water as to render the pass utterly

¹ The word *Pass* commonly conveys the idea of a path inclosed between mountains. In this instance it is employed to designate a narrow passage, having mountains on one side only, and water (or marsh ground) on the other.

impracticable, at the same time building a wall across it near to the western gate. They had done this in order to keep off the attacks of the Thessalians, who had been trying to extend their conquests southward and eastward. The warm springs, here as in other parts of Greece, were consecrated to Hêraklês,¹ whose legendary exploits and sufferings ennobled all the surrounding region, — mount Ceta, Trachis, cape Kenæum, Lichades islands, the river Dyrras: some fragments of these legends have been transmitted and adorned by the genius of Sophoklês, in his drama of the Trachinian maidens.

Such was the general scene — two narrow openings with an intermediate mile of enlarged road and hot springs between them — which passed in ancient times by the significant name of Thermopylæ, the Hot Gates; or sometimes, more briefly, Pylæ — The Gates. At a point also near Trachis, between the mountains and the sea, about two miles outside or westward of Thermopylæ, the road was hardly less narrow, but it might be turned by marching to the westward, since the adjacent mountains were lower, and presented less difficulty of transit; while at Thermopylæ itself, the overhanging projection of mount Ceta was steep, woody, and impracticable, leaving access, from Thessaly into Lokris and the territories southeast of Ceta, only through the strait gate;² save and except an unfrequented as well as cir-

¹ According to one of the numerous hypotheses for refining religious legend into matter of historical and physical fact, Hêraklês was supposed to have been an engineer, or water-finder, in very early times, — *δεινὸς περὶ ζήτησιν ἰδμάτων καὶ συναγωγῆν*. See Plutarch, *Cum principibus viris philosopho esse disserendum*, c. i, p. 776.

² About Thermopylæ, see Herodot. vii, 175, 176, 199, 200.

Ἡ δ' αὖ διὰ Τρηχίνος ἰσοδοῦς ἐς τὴν Ἑλλάδα ἐστὶ, τῇ στενότητι, ἡμίπλευρον· οὐ μὲντοι κατὰ τοῦτο γ' ἐστὶ τὸ στενότερον τῆς χώρας τῆς ἄλλης, ἀλλ' ἐμπροσθε τε Θερμοπυλίων καὶ ὀπισθε· κατὰ τε Ἀλφειοῦ, ὀπισθε ἔοντας, καὶ παρὰ ἑμαξιοῦς μόνον· καὶ ἐμπροσθε κατὰ Φοίνικα ποταμὸν, ἑμαξιοῦς δ' ἄλλῃ μόνον.

Compare Pausanias, vii, 15, 2. τὸ στενὸν τὸ Ἡρακλείας τε μεταξὺ καὶ Θερμοπυλίων; Strabo, ix. p. 429; and Livy, xxxvi, 12.

Herodotus says about Thermopylæ — *στενωτέρῃ γὰρ ἐφαίνετο ἑοῦσα τῇ εἰς Θεσσαλίαν*, i. e. than the defile of Tempê.

If we did not possess the clear topographical indications given by Herodotus, it would be almost impossible to comprehend the memorable event

cuitous mountain-path, which will be presently spoken of. The wall originally built across the pass by the Phocians was now half ruined by age and neglect: but the Greeks easily reestablished it, determined to await in this narrow pass, in that age narrower even than the defile of Tempè, the approach of the invading host. The edge of the sea line appears to have been for the most part marsh, fit neither for walking nor for sailing: but there were points at which boats could land, so that constant communication could be maintained with the fleet at Artemisium, while Alpèni was immediately in their rear to supply provisions.

Though the resolution of the Greek deputies assembled at the Isthmus, to defend conjointly Thermopylæ and the Eubœan

here before us; for the configuration of the coast, the course of the rivers, and the general local phenomena, have now so entirely changed, that modern travellers rather mislead than assist. In the interior of the Maliac gulf, three or four miles of new land have been formed by the gradual accumulation of river deposit, so that the gulf itself is of much less extent, and the mountain bordering the gate of Thermopylæ is not now near to the sea. The river Spercheius has materially altered its course; instead of flowing into the sea in an easterly direction considerably north of Thermopylæ, as it did in the time of Herodotus, it has been diverted southward in the lower part of its course, with many windings, so as to reach the sea much south of the pass: while the rivers Dyrras, Melas, and Asôpus, which in the time of Herodotus all reached the sea separately between the mouth of Spercheius and Thermopylæ, now do not reach the sea at all, but fall into the Spercheius. Moreover, the perpetual flow of the thermal springs has tended to accumulate deposit and to raise the level of the soil generally throughout the pass. Herodotus seems to consider the road between the two gates of Thermopylæ as bearing north and south, whereas it would bear more nearly east and west. He knows nothing of the appellation of Callidromus, applied by Livy and Strabo to an undefined portion of the eastern ridge of Ceta.

Respecting the past and present features of Thermopylæ, see the valuable observations of Colonel Leake, *Travels in Northern Greece*, vol. ii, ch. x, pp. 7-40; Gell, *Itinerary of Greece*, p. 239; Kruse, *Hellas*, vol. iii, ch. x, p. 129. Dr. Clarke observes: "The hot springs issue principally from two mouths at the foot of the limestone precipices of Ceta, upon the left of the causeway, which here passes close under the mountain, and on this part of it scarcely admits two horsemen abreast of each other, the morass on the right, between the causeway and the sea, being so dangerous, that we were very near being buried, with our horses, by our imprudence in venturing a few paces into it from the paved road." (*Clarke's Travels*, vol. iv, ch. viii p. 247.)

strait, had been taken, seemingly, not long after the retreat from Tempè, their troops and their fleet did not actually occupy these positions until Xerxes was known to have reached the Thermaic gulf. Both were then put in motion; the land-force under the Spartan king Leonidas, the naval force under the Spartan commander Eurybiadès, apparently about the latter part of the month of June. Leonidas was the younger brother, the successor, and the son-in-law, of the former Eurystheneid king Kleomenès, whose only daughter Gorgo he had married. Another brother of the same family — Dorieus, older than Leonidas — had perished, even before the death of Kleomenès, in an unsuccessful attempt to plant a colony in Sicily; and room had been thus made for the unexpected succession of the youngest brother. Leonidas now conducted from the Isthmus to Thermopylæ a select band of three hundred Spartans, — all being citizens of mature age, and persons who left at home sons to supply their places.¹ Along with them were five hundred hoplites from Tegea, five hundred from Mantinea, one hundred and twenty from the Arcadian Orchomenus, one thousand from the rest of Arcadia, four hundred from Corinth, two hundred from Phlius, and eighty from Mykenæ. There were also, doubtless, Helots and other light troops, in undefined number, and probably a certain number of Lacedæmonian hoplites, not Spartans. In their march through Boeotia they were joined by seven hundred hoplites of Thespiæ, hearty in the cause, and by four hundred Thebans, of more equivocal fidelity, under Leontiadès. It appears, indeed, that the leading men of Thebes, at that time under a very narrow oligarchy, decidedly *medized*, or espoused the Persian interest, as much as they dared before the Persians were actually in the country: and Leonidas, when he made the requi-

¹ Herodot. vii. 177, 205. ἐπιλεξάμενος ἄνδρας τε τοὺς κατεσκευάστας τρηκιστοὺς, καὶ τοῖσι ἐπὶ χεῖρας παῖδες ἱόντες.

In selecting men for a dangerous service, the Spartans took by preference those who already had families: if such a man was slain, he left behind him a son to discharge his duties to the state, and to maintain the continuity of the family sacred rites, the extinction of which was considered as a great misfortune. In our ideas, the life of the father of a family in mature age would be considered as of more value, and his death a greater loss, than that of a younger and unmarried man.

sition for a certain number of their troops to assist in the defence of Thermopylae, was doubtful whether they would not refuse compliance, and openly declare against the Greek cause. The Theban chiefs thought it prudent to comply, though against their real inclinations, and furnished a contingent of four hundred men,¹ chosen from citizens of a sentiment opposed to their own. Indeed the Theban people, and the Boeotians generally, with the exception of Thespiae and Plataea, seem to have had little sentiment on either side, and to have followed passively the inspirations of their leaders.

With these troops Leonidas reached Thermopylae, whence he sent envoys to invite the junction of the Phocians and the Lokrians of Opus. The latter had been among those who had sent earth and water to Xerxes, of which they are said to have repented: the step was taken, probably, only from fear, which at this particular moment prescribed acquiescence in the summons of Leonidas, justified by the plea of necessity in case the Persians should prove ultimately victorious:² while the Phocians, if originally disposed to *medize*, were now precluded from doing so by the fact that their bitter enemies, the Thessalians, were active in the cause of Xerxes, and influential in guiding his movements.³ The Greek envoys added strength to their summons by all the encouragement in their power. "The troops now at Thermopylae, they said, were a mere advanced body, preceding the main strength of Greece, which was expected to arrive every day: on the side of the sea, a sufficient fleet was already on guard: nor was there any cause for fear, since the

¹ Herodot. vii. 205; Thucyd. iii. 62; Diodor. xi. 4; Plutarch. Aristides, c. 18.

The passage of Thucydides is very important here, as confirming, to a great degree, the statement of Herodotus, and enabling us to appreciate the criticisms of Plutarch, on this particular point very plausible (De Herodoti Malign. pp. 865, 866). The latter seems to have copied from a lost Boeotian author named Aristophanes, who tried to make out a more honorable case for his countrymen in respect to their conduct in the Persian war.

The statement of Diodorus. — *Θηβαίων ἀπὸ τῆς ἐπὶ τῇ μετὰ τὴν τετραπόλει*, — is illustrated by a proceeding of the Korkyraean government (Thucyd. iii. 75), when they enlisted their enemies in order to send them away: also that of the Italian Cumæ (Dionys. Hal. vii. 5).

² Diodor. xi. 4.

³ Herodot. viii. 39.

invader was, after all, not a god, but a man, exposed to those reverses of fortune which came inevitably on all men, and most of all, upon those in preëminent condition."¹ Such arguments prove but too evidently the melancholy state of terror which then pervaded the Greek mind: whether reassured by them or not, the great body of the Opuntian Lokrians, and one thousand Phocians, joined Leonidas at Thermopylae.

That this terror was both genuine and serious, there cannot be any doubt: and the question naturally suggests itself, why the Greeks did not at once send their full force instead of a mere advanced guard? The answer is to be found in another attribute of the Greek character, — it was the time of celebrating both the Olympic festival-games on the banks of the Alpheius, and the Karneian festival at Sparta and most of the other Dorian states.² Even at a moment when their whole freedom and existence were at stake, the Greeks could not bring themselves to postpone these venerated solemnities: especially the Peloponnesian Greeks, among whom this force of religious routine appears to have been the strongest. At a period more than a century later, in the time of Demosthenes, when the energy of the Athenians had materially declined, we shall find them, too, postponing the military necessities of the state to the complete and splendid fulfilment of their religious festival obligations, — starving all their measures of foreign policy in order that the Theoric exhibitions might be imposing to the people and satisfactory to the gods. At present, we find little disposition in the Athenians to make this sacrifice, — certainly much less than in the Peloponnesians. The latter, remaining at home to celebrate

¹ Herodot. vii. 203. *λεγοντες δὲ ἀγγέλων, ὡς αὐτοὶ μὲν ἤκοιεν πρόδρομοι τῶν ἄλλων, οἱ δὲ λοιποὶ τῶν συμμάχων προσδοκίμοι πᾶσαν εἰσι ἡμέρην... καὶ σφι εἶη δευτὸν οὐδὲν: οὐ γὰρ θεὸν εἶναι τὸν ἐπίοντα ἐπὶ τὴν Ἑλλάδα, ἀλλ' ἄνθρωπον· εἶναι δὲ θνητὸν οὐδένα, οὐδὲ ἐσεσθαι, τῷ κακῷ ἐξ ἀρχῆς γινομένῳ οὐ συνεμίχθη, τοῖσι δὲ μεγίστοισι αὐτέων, μέγιστα· ὀφείλειν ὦν καὶ τὸν ἐπελαύνοντα, ὡς ὄντα θνητὸν, ἀπὸ τῆς δόξης πεσεῖν ἄν.*

² Herodot. vii. 206. It was only the Dorian states (Lacedæmon, Argos, Sikyon, etc.) which were under obligation of abstinence from aggressive military operations during the month of the Karneian festival: other states (even in Peloponnesus), Elis, Mantinea, etc., and of course Athens, were not under similar restraint (Thucyd. v. 54, 75).

their festivals while an invader of superhuman might was at their gates, remind us of the Jews in the latter days of their independence, who suffered the operations of the besieging Roman army round their city to be carried on without interruption during the Sabbath.¹ The Spartans and their confederates reckoned that Leonidas with his detachment would be strong enough to hold the pass of Thermopylæ until the Olympic and Karneian festivals should be past, after which period they were prepared to march to his aid with their whole military force;² and they engaged to assemble in Boeotia for the purpose of defending Attica against attack on the land-side, while the great mass of the Athenian force was serving on shipboard.

At the time when this plan was laid, they believed that the narrow pass of Thermopylæ was the only means of possible access for an invading army. But Leonidas, on reaching the spot, discovered for the first time that there was also a mountain-path starting from the neighborhood of Trachis, ascending the gorge of the river Asôpus and the hill called Anopæa, then crossing the crest of Ceta and descending in the rear of Thermopylæ near the Lokrian town of Alpeni. This path—then hardly used, though its ascending half now serves as the regular track from Zeitun, the ancient Lamia, to Salona on the Corinthian gulf, the ancient Amphissa—was revealed to him by its first discoverers, the inhabitants of Trachis, who in former days had conducted the Thessalians over it to attack Phocis, after the Phocians had blocked up the pass of Thermopylæ. It was therefore not unknown to the Phocians; it conducted from Trachis into their country, and they volunteered to Leonidas that they would occupy and defend it.³ But the Greeks thus found themselves at Thermopylæ under the same necessity of providing a double line of defence, for the mountain-path as well as for the defile, as that which had induced their former army to abandon Tempê: and so insufficient did their numbers seem, when

¹ Josephus, *Bell. Judaic.* i. 7, 3; ii. 16, 4; *Ibid.* *Antiqq. Judaic.* xiv. 4, 2. If their bodies were attacked on the Sabbath, the Jews defended themselves; but they would not break through the religious obligations of the day in order to impede any military operations of the besiegers. See Reimar. ad *Dion. Cass.* lxi. 7.

² Herodot. vii. 206; viii. 40.

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³ Herodot. vii. 212, 216, 219.

the vast host of Xerxes was at length understood to be approaching, that a panic terror seized them; and the Peloponnesian troops especially, anxious only for their own separate line of defence at the isthmus of Corinth, wished to retreat thither forthwith. The indignant remonstrances of the Phocians and Lokrians, who would thus have been left to the mercy of the invader, induced Leonidas to forbid this retrograde movement: but he thought it necessary to send envoys to the various cities, insisting on the insufficiency of his numbers, and requesting immediate reinforcements.¹ So painfully were the consequences now felt, of having kept back the main force until after the religious festivals in Peloponnesus.

Nor was the feeling of confidence stronger at this moment in their naval armament, though it had mustered in far superior numbers at Artemisium on the northern coast of Eubœa, under the Spartan Eurybiades. It was composed as follows: one hundred Athenian triremes, manned in part by the citizens of Plataea, in spite of their total want of practice on shipboard; forty Corinthian, twenty Megarian, twenty Athenian, manned by the inhabitants of Chalkis, and lent to them by Athens; eighteen Æginetan, twelve Sikyonian, ten Lacedæmonian, eight Epidaurian, seven Eretrian, five Trœzenian, two from Styra in Eubœa, and two from the island of Keos. There were thus in all two hundred and seventy-one triremes; together with nine pentekonteres, furnished partly by Keos and partly by the Lokrians of Opus. Themistoklēs was at the head of the Athenian contingent, and Adeimantus of the Corinthian; of other officers we hear nothing.² Three cruising vessels, an Athenian, an Æginetan, and a Trœzenian, were pushed forward along the coast of Thessaly, beyond the island of Skiathos, to watch the advancing movements of the Persian fleet from Therma.

It was here that the first blood was shed in this memorable contest. Ten of the best ships in the Persian fleet, sent forward in the direction of Skiathos, fell in with these three Grecian triremes, who probably supposing them to be the precursors of the

¹ Herodot. vii. 207.

² Herodot. viii. 1, 2, 3. Diodorus (xi, 12) makes the Athenian number stronger by twenty triremes.

entire fleet sought safety in flight. The Athenian trireme escaped to the mouth of the Peneius, where the crew abandoned her, and repaired by land to Athens, leaving the vessel to the enemy: the other two ships were overtaken and captured afloat, — not without a vigorous resistance on the part of the Æginetan, one of whose hoplites, Pythês, fought with desperate bravery, and fell covered with wounds. So much did the Persian warriors admire him, that they took infinite pains to preserve his life, and treated him with the most signal manifestations both of kindness and respect, while they dealt with his comrades as slaves.

On board the Trœzenian vessel, which was the first to be captured, they found a soldier named Leon, of imposing stature: this man was immediately taken to the ship's head and slain, as a presaging omen in the approaching contest: perhaps, observes the historian, his name may have contributed to determine his fate.¹ The ten Persian ships advanced no farther than the dangerous rock Myrmêx, between Skiathos and the mainland, which had been made known to them by a Greek navigator of Skyros, and on which they erected a pillar to serve as warning for the coming fleet. Still, so intense was the alarm which their presence — communicated by fire-signals² from Skiathos, and strengthened by the capture of the three look-out ships — inspired to the fleet at Artemisium, that they actually abandoned their station, believing that the entire fleet of the enemy was at hand.³ They sailed up the Eubœan strait to Chalkis, as the narrowest and most defensible passage; leaving scouts on the high lands to watch the enemy's advance.

Probably this sudden retreat was forced upon the generals by the panic of their troops, similar to that which king Leonidas, more powerful than Eurybiadês and Themistoklês, had found means to arrest at Thermopylæ. It ruined for the time the

¹ Herodot. vii, 180. *τάχα δ' ἂν τι καὶ τοῦ ὀνόματος ἐπαύρουτο.*

Respecting the influence of a name and its etymology, in this case unhappy for the possessor, compare Herodot. ix, 91; and Tacit. Hist. iv, 53.

² For the employment of fire-signals, compare Livy, xxvii, 5; and the opening of the Agamemnon of Æschylus, and the same play, v. 270, 300 also Thucydides, iii, 22-80.

³ Herodot. vii, 181, 182, 183.

whole scheme of defence, by laying open the rear of the army at Thermopylæ to the operations of the Persian fleet. But that which the Greeks did not do for themselves was more than compensated by the beneficent intervention of their gods, who opposed to the invader the more terrible arms of storm and hurricane. He was allowed to bring his overwhelming host, land-force as well as naval, to the brink of Thermopylæ and to the coast of Thessaly, without hindrance or damage; but the time had now arrived when the gods appeared determined to humble him, and especially to strike a series of blows at his fleet which should reduce it to a number not beyond what the Greeks could contend with.¹ Amidst the general terror which pervaded Greece, the Delphians were the first to earn the gratitude of their countrymen by announcing that divine succor was at hand.² On entreating advice from their own oracle, they were directed to pray to the Winds, who would render powerful aid to Greece. Moreover, the Athenian seamen, in their retreat at Chalkis, recollecting that Boreas was the husband of the Attic princess or heroine Oreithyia, daughter of their ancient king Erechtheus, addressed fervent prayers to their son-in-law for his help in need. Never was help more effective, or more opportune, than the destructive storm, presently to be recounted, on the coast of Magnesia, for which grateful thanks and annual solemnities were still rendered even in the time of Herodotus, at Athens as well as at Delphi.³

¹ Herodot. vii, 184. *μέχρι μὲν δὴ τούτου τοῦ χώρου καὶ τῶν Θερμοπυλίων, ἀπαυλὴς τε καὶ κἀν ἡν ὁ στρατός, καὶ πλεῖστος ἦν τῆνικαὶτα ἐπὶ τόσον.* etc. — viii, 13. *ἔποιετο δὲ πᾶν ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ, ὥσως ἂν ἐξισωθείη τῷ Ἑλληνικῷ ὁ Περσικόν, μηδὲ πολλῶ πλείον ἦν.* Compare viii, 109; and Diodor. xi, 13.

² Herodot. vii, 178. *Δελφοὶ δὲ δεξάμενοι τὸ μαντήιον, πρῶτα μὲν, Ἑλλήνων τοῖσι βοήλομενοι εἶναι ἑλευθέροισι ἐξήγγειλαν τὰ χρησθέντα αὐτοῖσι καὶ σφί δεινῶς καταβρῶδιοναι τὸν βαρβαρὸν ἐξαγγείλαντες, χάριν ἀθάνατον κατεθέντο.*

³ Herodot. vii, 189. The language of the historian in this chapter is remarkable: his incredulous reason rather gets the better of religious acquiescence.

Clemens Alexandrinus, reciting this incident together with some other miracles of Ækus, Aristeus, Empedoklês, etc., reproves his pagan opponents for their inconsistency, while believing these, in rejecting the miracles of Moses and the prophets (Stromat. vi, pp. 629, 630).

Xerxes had halted on the Thermaic gulf for several days, employing a large portion of his numerous army in cutting down the woods and clearing the roads, on the pass over Olympus from upper Macedonia into Perrhabia, which was recommended by his Macedonian allies as preferable to the defile of Tempé.¹ Not intending to march through the latter, he is said to have gone by sea to view it; and remarks are ascribed to him on the facility of blocking it up so as to convert all Thessaly into one vast lake.² His march from Therma through Macedonia, Perrhabia, Thessaly, and Achaia Phthiotis, into the territory of the Malians and the neighborhood of Thermopylae, occupied eleven or twelve days;³ the people through whose towns he passed had already made their submission, and the Thessalians especially were zealous in seconding his efforts. His numerous host was

¹ The pass over which Xerxes passed was that by Petra, Pythium, and Oloosson. — "saltum ad Petram." — "Perrhabiae saltum," — (Liv. xlv. 21: xlv. 27.) Petra was near the point where the road passed from Pieria, or lower Macedonia, into upper Macedonia (see Liv. xxxix. 26).

Compare respecting this pass, and the general features of the neighboring country, Colonel Leake, *Travels in Northern Greece*, vol. iii. ch. xviii. pp. 337-343, and ch. xxx. p. 430; also Boué, *La Turquie en Europe*, vol. i. pp. 198-202.

The Thracian king Sitalkes, like Xerxes on this occasion, was obliged to cause the forests to be cut, to make a road for his army, in the early part of the Peloponnesian war (Thucyd. ii. 98).

² Herodot. vii. 130, 131. That Xerxes, struck by the view of Olympus and Ossa, went to see the narrow defile between them, is probable enough; but the remarks put into his mouth are probably the fancy of some ingenious contemporary Greeks, suggested by the juxtaposition of such a landscape and such a monarch. To suppose this narrow defile walled up was easy for the imagination of any spectator; to suppose that he could order it to be done, was in character with a monarch who disposed of an indefinite amount of manual labor, and who had just finished the cutting of Athos. Such dramatic fitness was quite sufficient to convert that which might have been said into that which was said, and to procure for it a place among the historical anecdotes communicated to Herodotus.

³ The Persian fleet did not leave Therma until eleven days after Xerxes and his land-force (Herodot. vii. 183); it arrived in one day on the Sêpias Aktê, or southeastern coast of Magnesia (ibid.), was then assailed and distressed for three days by the hurricane (vii. 191), and proceeded immediately afterwards to Aphetae (vii. 193). When it arrived at the latter places Xerxes himself had been three days in the Malian territory (vii. 196).

still farther swelled by the presence of these newly-submitted people, and by the Macedonian troops under Alexander; so that the river Onochónus in Thessaly, and even the Apidanus in Achaia Phthiotis, would hardly suffice to supply it, but were drunk up, according to the information given to Herodotus. At Alus in Achaia, he condescended to listen to the gloomy legend connected with the temple of Zeus Laphysteus and the sacred grove of the Athamantid family: he respected and protected these sacred places, — an incident which shows that the sacrilege and destruction of temples imputed to him by the Greeks, though true in regard to Athens, Abæ, Milêtus, etc., was by no means universally exhibited, and is even found qualified by occasional instances of great respect for Grecian religious feeling.¹ Along the shore of the Malian gulf he at length came into the Trachinian territory near Thermopylae, where he encamped, seemingly awaiting the arrival of the fleet, so as to combine his farther movements in advance,² now that the enemy were immediately in his front.

But his fleet was not destined to reach the point of communication with the same ease as he had arrived before Thermopylae. After having ascertained by the ten ships already mentioned, which captured the three Grecian guardships, that the channel between Skiathos and the mainland was safe, the Persian admiral Megabates sailed with his whole fleet from Therma, or from Pydna,³ his station in the Thermaic gulf, eleven days after the monarch had begun his land-march; and reached in one long day's sail the eastern coast of Magnesia, not far from its southernmost promontory. The greater part of this line of coast, formed by the declivities of Ossa and Pelion, is thoroughly rocky and inhospitable: but south of the town called Kasthanæa there was a short extent of open beach, where the fleet rested for the night before coming to the line of coast called the Sêpias Aktê.⁴

¹ This point is set forth by Hoffmeister, *Sittlich-religiöse Lebensansicht des Herodotos*, Essen, 1832, sect. 19, p. 93.

² Herodot. vii. 196, 197, 201.

³ Diodor. xi. 12.

⁴ Diodorus (xi. 12), Plutarch (Themistoklēs, 8), and Mannert (*Geogr. der Gr. und Römer*, vol. vii. p. 596), seem to treat Sêpias as a cape, the southeastern corner of Magnesia: this is different from Herodotus, who

The first line of ships were moored to the land, but the larger number of this immense fleet swung at anchor in a depth of eight lines. In this condition they were overtaken the next morning by a sudden and desperate hurricane,—a wind called by the people of the country Hellespontias, which blew right upon the shore. The most active among the mariners found means to forestall the danger by beaching and hauling their vessels ashore; but a large number, unable to take such a precaution, were carried before the wind and dashed to pieces near Melibœa, Kasthanaea, and other points of this unfriendly region. Four hundred ships of war, according to the lowest estimate, together with a countless heap of transports and provision craft, were destroyed: and the loss of life as well as property was immense. For three entire days did the terrors of the storm last, during which time the crews ashore, left almost without defence, and apprehensive that the inhabitants of the country might assail or plunder them, were forced to break up the ships driven ashore in order to make a palisade out of the timbers.¹ Though the Magian priests who accompanied the armament were fervent in prayer and sacrifice,—not merely to the Winds, but also to Thetis and the Nereids, the tutelary divinities of Sôpias Aktê,—they could obtain no mitigation until the fourth day:² thus long did the prayers of Delphi and Athens, and the jealousy of the gods against superhuman arrogance, protract the terrible visitation. At length, on the fourth day, calm weather returned, when all those ships which were in condition to proceed, put to sea and sailed along the land, round the southern promontory of Magnesia, to Aphetæ, at the entrance of the gulf of Pagasæ. Little, indeed, had Xerxes gained by the laborious cutting through mount Athos, in hopes to

mentions it as a line of some extent (*ἀπασα ἡ ἀκτὴ ἢ Σηπτίας*, vii, 191), and notices separately *τὴν ἀκτὴν τῆς Μαγνησίας*, vii, 193.

The geography of Apollonius Rhôdius (i, 560–580) seems sadly inaccurate. ¹ Herodot. vii, 189–191.

² Herodot. vii, 191. On this occasion, as in regard to the prayers addressed by the Athenians to Boreas, Herodotus suffers a faint indication of skepticism to escape him: *ἡμέρας γὰρ δὴ ἐχρεμάζετο τρεῖς· τέλος δὲ, ἐντομὰ τι περὶντες καὶ καταείδοντες γούμαι τῷ ἀνέμῳ οἱ Μῆγοι, πρὸς τε τοῦτοιαι, καὶ θεῶν καὶ τῆς Νηοῖαι θύοντες, ἐπαύσαν τετάρτη ἡμέρῃ· ἢ ἀλλῶς . . . αὐτὸς ἐθέλων ἐκόπασε*

escape the unseen atmospheric enemies which howl around that formidable promontory: the work of destruction to his fleet was only transferred to the opposite side of the intervening Thracian sea.

Had the Persian fleet reached Aphetæ without misfortune, they would have found the Eubœan strait evacuated by the Greek fleet and undefended, so that they would have come immediately into communication with the land army, and would have acted upon the rear of Leonidas and his division. But the storm completely altered this prospect, and revived the spirits of the Greek fleet at Chalkis. It was communicated to them by their scouts on the high lands of Eubœa, who even sent them word that the entire Persian fleet was destroyed: upon which, having returned thanks and offered libations to Poseidon the Saviour, the Greeks returned back as speedily as they could to Artemisium. To their surprise, however, they saw the Persian fleet, though reduced in number, still exhibiting a formidable total and appearance at the opposite station of Aphetæ. The last fifteen ships of that fleet, having been so greatly crippled by the storm as to linger behind the rest, mistook the Greek ships for their own comrades, fell into the midst of them, and were all captured. Sandôkēs, sub-satrap of the Æolic Kymê,—Aridôlis, despot of Alabanda in Karia,—and Penthylus, despot of Paphos in Cyprus,—the leaders of this squadron, were sent prisoners to the isthmus of Corinth, after having been questioned respecting the enemy: the latter of these three had brought to Xerxes a contingent of twelve ships, out of which eleven had foundered in the storm, while the last was now taken with himself aboard.¹

Meanwhile Xerxes, encamped within sight of Thermopylæ, suffered four days to pass without making any attack: a probable reason may be found in the extreme peril of his fleet, reported to have been utterly destroyed by the storm: but Herodotus assigns a different cause. Xerxes could not believe, according to him, that the Greeks at Thermopylæ, few as they were in number, had any serious intention to resist: he had heard in his march that a handful of Spartans and other Greeks, under an

¹ Herodot. vii, 194.

Herakleid leader, had taken post there, but he treated the news with scorn: and when a horseman, — whom he sent to reconnoitre them, and who approached near enough to survey their position, without exciting any attention among them by his presence, — brought back to him a description of the pass, the wall of defence, and the apparent number of the division, he was yet more astonished and puzzled. It happened too, that at the moment when this horseman rode up, the Spartans were in the advanced guard, outside of the wall: some were engaged in gymnastic exercises, others in combing their long hair, and none of them heeded the approach of the hostile spy. Xerxes next sent for the Spartan king, Demaratus, to ask what he was to think of such madness; upon which the latter reminded him of their former conversation at Doriskus, again assuring him that the Spartans in the pass would resist to the death, in spite of the smallness of their number; and adding, that it was their custom, in moments of special danger, to comb their hair with peculiar care. In spite of this assurance from Demaratus, and of the pass not only occupied, but in itself so narrow and impracticable, before his eyes, Xerxes still persisted in believing that the Greeks did not intend to resist, and that they would disperse of their own accord. He delayed the attack for four days: on the fifth he became wroth at the impudence and recklessness of the petty garrison before him, and sent against them the Median and Kissian divisions, with orders to seize them and bring them as prisoners into his presence.¹

Though we read thus in Herodotus, it is hardly possible to believe that we are reading historical reality: we rather find laid out before us a picture of human self-conceit in its most exaggerated form, ripe for the stroke of the jealous gods, and destined, like the interview between Cæsar and Solon, to point and enforce that moral which was ever present to the mind of the historian; whose religious and poetical imagination, even unconsciously to himself, surrounds the naked facts of history with accompaniments of speech and motive which neither Homer nor Æschylus would have deemed unsuitable. The whole pro-

¹ Herod. vii, 208, 210. *πείθει δὲ αὐτοὺς Μήδους καὶ Κισσίων θυνωθεὶς ἐντειλάμενος σφραγίσαντας ἀγεῖν ἐς αὐτὴν τὴν ἑσπέρην.*

ceedings of Xerxes, and the immensity of host which he summoned, show that he calculated on an energetic resistance; and though the numbers of Leonidas, compared with the Persians, were insignificant, they could hardly have looked insignificant in the position which they then occupied, — an entrance a little wider than a single carriage-road, with a cross wall, a prolonged space somewhat widened, and then another equally narrow exit, behind it. We are informed by Diodorus¹ that the Lokrians, when they first sent earth and water to the Persian monarch, engaged at the same time to seize the pass of Thermopylæ on his behalf, and were only prevented from doing so by the unexpected arrival of Leonidas; nor is it unlikely that the Thessalians, now the chief guides of Xerxes,² together with Alexander of Macedon, would try the same means of frightening away the garrison of Thermopylæ, as had already been so successful in causing the evacuation of Tempê. An interval of two or three days might be well bestowed for the purpose of leaving to such intrigues a fair chance of success: the fleet, meanwhile, would be arrived at Aphetæ after the dangers of the storm: we may thus venture to read the conduct of Xerxes in a manner somewhat less childish than it is depicted by Herodotus.

The Medes, whom Xerxes first ordered to the attack, animated as well by the recollection of their ancient Asiatic supremacy as by the desire of avenging the defeat of Marathon,³ manifested great personal bravery. The position was one in which bows and arrows were of little avail: a close combat hand to hand was indispensable, and in this the Greeks had every advantage of organization as well as armor. Short spears, light wicker shields, and tunics, in the assailants, were an imperfect match for the long spears, heavy and spreading shields, steady ranks,⁴ and practised fighting of the defenders. Yet the bravest men of the Persian army pressed on from behind, and having nothing but numbers in their favor, maintained long this unequal combat, with great slaughter to themselves and little loss to the Greeks. Though constantly repulsed, the attack was as constantly renewed

¹ Diodor. xi, 4. ² Herodot. vii, 174; viii, 29–32. ³ Diodor. xi, 6.

⁴ Herodot. vii, 211; ix, 62, 63; Diodor. xi, 7: compare Æschyl. Pers. 244

for two successive days: the Greek troops were sufficiently numerous to relieve each other when fatigued, since the space was so narrow that few could contend at once; and even the Immortals, or ten thousand choice Persian guards, and the other choice troops of the army, when sent to the attack on the second day, were driven back with the same disgrace and the same slaughter as the rest. Xerxes surveyed this humiliating repulse from a lofty throne expressly provided for him: "thrice (says the historian, with Homeric vivacity) did he spring from his throne, in agony for his army."¹

At the end of two days' fighting no impression had been made, the pass appeared impracticable, and the defence not less triumphant than courageous, — when a Malian, named Ephialtēs, revealed to Xerxes the existence of the unfrequented mountain-path. This at least was the man singled out by the general voice of Greece as the betrayer of the fatal secret: after the final repulse of the Persians, he fled his country for a time, and a reward was proclaimed by the Amphiktyonic assembly for his head; having returned to his country too soon, he was slain by a private enemy, whom the Lacedæmonians honored as a patriot.² There were, however, other Greeks who were also affirmed to have earned the favor of Xerxes by the same valuable information: and very probably there may have been more than one informant, — indeed, the Thessalians, at that time his guides, can hardly have been ignorant of it. So little had the path been thought of, however, that no one in the Persian army knew it to be already occupied by the Phocians. At nightfall, Hydarnēs with a detachment of Persians was detached along the gorge of the river Asōpus, ascended the path of Anopara, through the woody region between the mountains occupied by the Ceteans and those possessed by the Trachinians, and found himself at daybreak near the summit, within sight of the Phocian guard of one thousand men. In the stillness of daybreak, the noise of

¹ Herodot. vii, 212. Ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ προσοδοίᾳ τῆς μάχης λέγεται βασιλεὺς ἐπημιμένον, τρίς ἀναβραμὲν ἐκ τοῦ θρόνου, δαίσαντα περὶ τῇ στρατῷ. See Homer Iliad, xx. 62; Aeschyl. Pers. 472.

² Herodot. vii, 213, 214; Diodor. xi, 8.

Ktesias states that it was two powerful men of Trachis, Kalliadēs and Timaphernēs, who disclosed to Xerxes the mountain-path (Persica, c. 24).

his army trampling through the wood¹ aroused the defenders; but the surprise was mutual, and Hydarnēs in alarm asked his guide whether these men also were Lacedæmonians. Having ascertained the negative, he began the attack, and overwhelmed the Phocians with a shower of arrows, so as to force them to abandon the path and seek their own safety on a higher point of the mountain. Anxious only for their own safety, they became unmindful of the inestimable opening which they were placed to guard. Had the full numerical strength of the Greeks been at Thermopylæ, instead of staying behind for the festivals, they might have planted such a force on the mountain-path as would have rendered it not less impregnable than the pass beneath.

Hydarnēs, not troubling himself to pursue the Phocians, followed the descending portion of the mountain-path, shorter than the ascending, and arrived in the rear of Thermopylæ not long after midday.² But before he had yet completed his descent, the fatal truth had already been made known to Leonidas, that the enemy were closing in upon him behind. Scouts on the hills, and deserters from the Persian camp, especially a Kymæan³ named Tyrastiadās, had both come in with the news: and even if such informants had been wanting, the prophet Megistias, descended from the legendary seer Melampus, read the approach of death in the gloomy aspect of the morning sacrifices. It was evident that Thermopylæ could be no longer defended; but there was ample time for the defenders to retire, and the detachment of Leonidas were divided in opinion on the subject. The greater number of them were inclined to abandon a position now become untenable, and to reserve themselves for future occasions on which they might effectively contribute to repel the invader. Nor is it to be doubted that such was the natural impulse, both

¹ Herodot. vii, 217, 218. ἥως τε δὴ διαφαίνει — ἦν μὲν δὴ νημεμία, ψόφου δὲ γενομένου πολλοῦ, etc.

I cannot refrain from transcribing a remark of Colonel Leake: "The stillness of the dawn, which saved the Phocians from being surprised, is very characteristic of the climate of Greece in the season when the occurrence took place, and like many other trifling circumstances occurring in the history of the Persian invasion, is an interesting proof of the accuracy and veracity of the historian." (Travels in Northern Greece, vol. ii, c. x, p. 55.)

² Herodot. vii, 216, 217.

³ Diodor. xi, 9.

of brave soldiers and of prudent officers, under the circumstances. But to Leonidas the idea of retreat was intolerable. His own personal honor, together with that of his Spartan companions and of Sparta herself,¹ forbade him to think of yielding to the enemy the pass which he had been sent to defend. The laws of his country required him to conquer or die in the post assigned to him, whatever might be the superiority of number on the part of the enemy;² moreover, we are told that the Delphian oracle had declared that either Sparta itself, or a king of Sparta, must fall a victim to the Persian arms. Had he retired, he could hardly have escaped that voice of reproach which, in Greece especially, always burst upon the general who failed: while his voluntary devotion and death would not only silence every whisper of calumny, but exalt him to the pinnacle of glory both as a man and as a king, and set an example of chivalrous patriotism at the moment when the Greek world most needed the lesson.

The three hundred Spartans under Leonidas were found fully equal to this act of generous and devoted self-sacrifice. Perhaps he would have wished to inspire the same sentiment to the whole detachment: but when he found them indisposed, he at once ordered them to retire, thus avoiding all unseemly reluctance and dissension:³ the same order was also given to the prophet Megistias, who however refused to obey it and stayed, though he sent away his only son.⁴ None of the contingents remained with

¹ Herodot. vii, 219. ἐνθαῖτα ἐβούλευοντο οἱ Ἕλληνες, καὶ σφῶν ἐσχεζοντο αἱ γνώμαι.

² Herodot. vii, 104.

³ Herodot. vii, 220. Ταύτη καὶ μᾶλλον τῇ γνώμῃ πλείστος εἶμι, Λεωνίδην. ἐπεὶ τε ἡσθέτο τοὺς συμμαχοὺς ὄντας ἀπροσέτιον, καὶ οὐκ ἐθέλοντας συνδιακινδυνεύειν, κελύσαι σφῶν ἀπαλλασσέσθαι αὐτῷ δὲ ἀπέναι οὐ καλῶς ἔχειν· μένοντι δὲ αὐτῷ κλέος μέγα ἔλλεπτο, καὶ ἡ Σπάρτης εὐδαιμονία οὐκ ἐξηλείβετο.

Compare a similar act of honorable self-devotion, under less conspicuous circumstances, of the Lacedæmonian commander Anaxibius, when surprised by the Athenians under Iphikratēs in the territory of Abydos (Xenophon, Hellenic. iv. 8, 38). He and twelve Lacedæmonian harpasts, all refused to think of safety by flight. He said to his men, when resistance was hopeless, Ἄνδρες, ἐμοὶ μὲν καλὸν ἐνθαδε ἀποθανεῖν; ὑμεῖς δὲ, πρὶν θυμίζαι τοῖς πολεμίοις, σπεύδετε εἰς τὴν σωτηρίαν.

⁴ Herodot. vii, 221. According to Plutarch, there were also two persons

Leonidas except the Thespian and the Theban. The former, under their general Demophilus, volunteered to share the fate of the Spartans, and displayed even more than Spartan heroism, since they were not under that species of moral constraint which arises from the necessity of acting up to a preëstablished fame and superiority. But retreat with them presented no prospect better than the mere preservation of life, either in slavery or in exile and misery; since Thespiæ was in Bœotia, sure to be overrun by the invaders;¹ while the Peloponnesian contingents had behind them the isthmus of Corinth, which they doubtless hoped still to be able to defend. With respect to the Theban contingent, we are much perplexed: for Herodotus tells us that they were detained by Leonidas against their will as hostages, that they took as little part as possible in the subsequent battle, and surrendered themselves prisoners to Xerxes as soon as they could. Diodorus says that the Thespians alone remained with the Spartans; and Pausanias, though he mentions the eighty Mykenæans as having stayed along with the Thespians (which is probably incorrect), says nothing about the Thebans.² All things con-

belonging to the Herakleid lineage, whom Leonidas desired to place in safety, and for that reason gave them a despatch to carry home. They indignantly refused, and stayed to perish in the fight (Plutarch. Herodot. Malign. p. 866).

¹ The subsequent distress of the surviving Thespians is painfully illustrated by the fact, that in the battle of Platæa in the following year, they had no heavy armor (Herodot. ix, 30). After the final repulse of Xerxes, they were forced to recruit their city by the admission of new citizens (Herodot. viii, 75).

² Herodot. vii, 222. Θηβαῖοι μὲν ἄκουτες ἔμενον, καὶ οὐ βουλόμενοι, κατείχετο γὰρ σφῶν Λεωνίδης, ἐν ὁμήρῳ λόγῳ ποιούμενος. How could these Thebans serve as hostages? Against what evil were they intended to guard Leonidas, or what advantages could they confer upon him? Unwilling comrades on such an occasion would be noway desirable. Plutarch (De Herodot. Malign. p. 865) severely criticizes this statement of Herodotus, and on very plausible grounds: among the many unjust criticisms in his treatise, this is one of the few exceptions.

Compare Diodorus. xi, 9; and Pausan. x, 20, 1.

Of course the Thebans, taking part as they afterwards did heartily with Xerxes, would have an interest in representing that their contingent had done as little as possible against him, and may have circulated the story that Leonidas detained them as hostages. The politics of Thebes before

sidered, it seems probable that the Thebans remained, but remained by their own offer, — being citizens of the anti-Persian party, as Diodorus represents them to have been, or perhaps because it may have been hardly less dangerous for them to retire with the Peloponnesians, than to remain, suspected as they were of *medism*: but when the moment of actual crisis arrived, their courage not standing so firm as that of the Spartans and Thespians, they endeavored to save their lives by taking credit for *medism*, and pretending to have been forcibly detained by Leonidas.

The devoted band thus left with Leonidas at Thermopylae consisted of the three hundred Spartans, with a certain number of Helots attending them, together with seven hundred Thespians and apparently four hundred Thebans. If there had been before any Lacedaemonians, not Spartans, present, they must have retired with the other Peloponnesians. By previous concert with the guide, Ephialtēs, Xerxes delayed his attack upon them until near noon, when the troops under Hydarnēs might soon be expected in the rear. On this last day, however, Leonidas, knowing that all which remained was to sell the lives of his detachment dearly, did not confine himself to the defensive,¹ but advanced into the wider space outside of the pass; becoming the aggressor and driving before him the foremost of the Persian host, many of whom perished as well by the spears of the Greeks as in the neighboring sea and morass, and even trodden down by their

the battle of Thermopylae were essentially double-faced and equivocal: not daring to take any open part against the Greeks before the arrival of Xerxes.

The eighty Mykenæans, like the other Peloponnesians, had the isthmus of Corinth behind them as a post which presented good chances of defence.

¹ The story of Diodorus (xi, 10) that Leonidas made an attack upon the Persian camp during the night, and very nearly penetrated to the regal tent, from which Xerxes was obliged to flee suddenly, in order to save his life, while the Greeks, after having caused immense slaughter in the camp, were at length overpowered and slain, — is irreconcilable with Herodotus and decidedly to be rejected. Justin, however (ii, 11), and Plutarch (De Herodot. Malign. p. 866), follow it. The rhetoric of Diodorus is not calculated to strengthen the evidence in its favor. Plutarch had written, or intended to write, a biography of Leonidas (De Herodot. Mal. *ibid.*); but it is not preserved.

own numbers. It required all the efforts of the Persian officers, assisted by threats and the plentiful use of the whip, to force their men on to the fight. The Greeks fought with reckless bravery and desperation against this superior host, until at length their spears were broken, and they had no weapon left except their swords. It was at this juncture that Leonidas himself was slain, and around his body the battle became fiercer than ever: the Persians exhausted all their efforts to possess themselves of it, but were repulsed by the Greeks four several times, with the loss of many of their chiefs, especially two brothers of Xerxes. Fatigued, exhausted, diminished in number, and deprived of their most effective weapons, the little band of defenders retired, with the body of their chief, into the narrow strait behind the cross wall, where they sat all together on a hillock, exposed to the attack of the main Persian army on one side, and of the detachment of Hydarnēs, which had now completed its march, on the other. They were thus surrounded, overwhelmed with missiles, and slain to a man; not losing courage even to the last, but defending themselves with their remaining daggers, with their unarmed hands, and even with their mouths.¹

Thus perished Leonidas with his heroic comrades, — three hundred Spartans and seven hundred Thespians. Amidst such equal heroism, it seemed difficult to single out any individual as distinguished: nevertheless, Herodotus mentions the Spartans Dienekēs, Alpheus, and Maron, — and the Thespian Dithyrambus, — as standing preeminent. The reply ascribed to the first became renowned.² "The Persian host (he was informed) is so prodigious that their arrows conceal the sun." "So much the better (he answered), we shall then fight them in the shade." Herodotus had asked and learned the name of every individual among this memorable three hundred, and even six hundred years afterwards, Pausanias could still read the names engraved on a column at Sparta.³ One alone among them — Aristodēmus

¹ Herodot. vii, 225.

² Herodot. vii, 226.

³ Herodot. vii, 224. ἐπυθόμην δὲ καὶ ἀπάντων τῶν τριακοσίων. Pausanias, iii, 14, 1. Annual festivals, with a panegyric oration and gymnastic matches, were still celebrated even in his time in honor of Leonidas, jointly with Pausanias, whose subsequent treason tarnished his laurels acquired at Plataea. It is remarkable, and not altogether creditable to

-- returned home, having taken no part in the combat. He, together with Eurytus, another soldier, had been absent from the detachment on leave, and both were lying at Alpeni, suffering from a severe complaint in the eyes. Eurytus, apprized that the fatal hour of the detachment was come, determined not to survive it, asked for his armor, and desired his attendant Helot to lead him to his place in the ranks; where he fell gallantly fighting, while the Helot departed and survived. Aristodēmus did not imitate this devotion of his sick comrade: overpowered with physical suffering, he was carried to Sparta—but he returned only to scorn and infamy among his fellow-citizens.¹ He was denounced as "the coward Aristodēmus;" no one would speak or communicate with him, or even grant him a light for his fire.²

Spartan sentiment, that the two kings should have been made partners in the same public honors.

¹ Herod. vii. 229. Ἀριστοδῆμον — λειποψύχοντα λειποθῆναι — ἀλγίστα ἀπονοστήσαι ἐς Σπάρτην. The commentators are hard upon Aristodēmus when they translate these epithets, "animo deficientem, timidum, pusillanimum," considering that *λειποψύχης* is predicated by Thucydides (iv. 12) even respecting the gallant Brasidas. Herodotus scarcely intends to imply anything like pusillanimity, but rather the effect of extreme physical suffering. It seems, however, that there were different stories about the cause which had kept Aristodēmus out of the battle.

The story of another soldier, named Pantitēs, who having been sent on a message by Leonidas into Thessaly, did not return in time for the battle, and was so disgraced when he went back to Sparta that he hanged himself.—given by Herodotus as a report, is very little entitled to credit. It is not likely that Leonidas would send an envoy into Thessaly, then occupied by the Persians: moreover, the disgrace of Aristodēmus is particularly explained by Herodotus by the difference between his conduct and that of his comrade Eurytus: whereas Pantitēs stood alone.

² See the story of the single Athenian citizen, who returned home alone, after all his comrades had perished in an unfortunate expedition to the island of Ægina. The widows of the slain warriors crowded round him, each asking him what had become of her husband, and finally put him to death by pricking with their bodkins (Herodot. v. 87).

In the terrible battle of St. Jacob on the Birs, near Basle (August, 1444), where fifteen hundred Swiss crossed the river and attacked forty thousand French and Germans under the Dauphin of France, against strong remonstrances from their commanders, — all of them were slain, after deeds of unrivalled valor and great loss to the enemy, except sixteen men, who receded from their countrymen in crossing the river, thinking the enterprise desperate. These sixteen men, on their return, were treated with

After a year of such bitter disgrace, he was at length enabled to retrieve his honor at the battle of Plataea, where he was slain, after surpassing all his comrades in heroic and even reckless valor.

Amidst the last moments of this gallant band, we turn with repugnance to the desertion and surrender of the Thebans. They are said to have taken part in the final battle, though only to save appearances and under the pressure of necessity: but when the Spartans and Thespians, exhausted and disarmed, retreated to die upon the little hillock within the pass, the Thebans then separated themselves, approached the enemy with outstretched hands, and entreated quarter. They now loudly proclaimed that they were friends and subjects of the Great King, and had come to Thermopylæ against their own consent; all which was confirmed by the Thessalians in the Persian army. Though some few were slain before this proceeding was understood by the Persians, the rest were admitted to quarter; not without the signal disgrace, however, of being branded with the regal mark as untrustworthy slaves,—an indignity to which their commander, Leontiadēs was compelled to submit along with the rest. Such is the narrative which Herodotus recounts, without any expression of mistrust or even of doubt: Plutarch emphatically contradicts it, and even cites a Boeotian author,¹ who affirms that Anaxarchus, not Leontiadēs, was commander of the Thebans at Thermopylæ. Without calling in question the equivocal conduct and surrender of this Theban detachment, we may reasonably dismiss the story of this ignominious branding, as an invention of that strong anti-Theban feeling which prevailed in Greece after the repulse of Xerxes.

The wrath of that monarch, as he went over the field after the close of the action, vented itself upon the corpse of the gallant Leonidas, whose head he directed to be cut off and fixed on a cross. But it was not wrath alone which filled his mind: he was

intolerable scorn and hardly escaped execution (Vogelin, Geschichte der Schweizer Eidgenossenschaft, vol. i. ch. 5. p. 393).

¹ Herodot. vii. 233; Plutarch. Herodot. Malign. p. 867. The Boeotian history of Aristophanēs, cited by the latter, professed to be founded in part upon memorials arranged according to the sequence of magistrates and generals — ἐκ τῶν κατὰ ἄρχοντας ἱπομνημάτων ἱστῶρησε.

farther impressed with involuntary admiration of the little detachment which had here opposed to him a resistance so unexpected and so nearly invincible, — he now learned to be anxious respecting the resistance which remained behind. "Demaratus (said he to the exiled Spartan king at his side), thou art a good man: all thy predictions have turned out true: now tell me, how many Lacedæmonians are there remaining, and are they all such warriors as these fallen men?" "O king (replied Demaratus), the total of the Lacedæmonians and of their towns is great; in Sparta alone, there are eight thousand adult warriors, all equal to those who have here fought; and the other Lacedæmonians, though inferior to them, are yet excellent soldiers." "Tell me (rejoined Xerxes), what will be the least difficult way of conquering such men?" Upon which Demaratus advised him to send a division of his fleet to occupy the island of Kythéra, and from thence to make war on the southern coast of Laconia, which would distract the attention of Sparta, and prevent her from coöperating in any combined scheme of defence against his land-force. Unless this were done, the entire force of Peloponnesus would be assembled to maintain the narrow isthmus of Corinth, where the Persian king would have far more terrible battles to fight than anything which he had yet witnessed.¹

Happily for the safety of Greece, Achaemenes, the brother of Xerxes, interposed to dissuade the monarch from this prudent plan of action; not without aspersions on the temper and motives of Demaratus, who, he affirmed, like other Greeks, hated all power, and envied all good fortune, above his own. The fleet, added he, after the damage sustained by the recent storm, would bear no farther diminution of number: and it was essential to keep the entire Persian force, on land as well as on sea, in one undivided and cooperating mass.²

A few such remarks were sufficient to revive in the monarch his habitual sentiment of confidence in overpowering number: yet while rejecting the advice of Demaratus, he emphatically repelled the imputations against the good faith and sincere attachment of that exiled prince.³

¹ Herodot. vii, 235.

² Herodot. vii, 236.

³ Herodot. vii, 237. The citizen (Xerxes is made to observe) does in

Meanwhile the days of battle at Thermopylæ had been not less actively employed by the fleets at Aphetæ and Artemisium. It has already been mentioned that the Greek ships, having abandoned their station at the latter place and retired to Chalkis, were induced to return, by the news that the Persian fleet had been nearly ruined by the recent storm, — and that, on returning to Artemisium, the Grecian commanders felt renewed alarm on seeing the enemy's fleet, in spite of the damage just sustained, still mustering in overwhelming number at the opposite station of Aphetæ. Such was the effect of this spectacle, and the impression of their own inferiority, that they again resolved to retire without fighting, leaving the strait open and undefended. Great consternation was caused by the news of their determination among the inhabitants of Eubœa, who entreated Eurybiadès to maintain his position for a few days, until they could have time to remove their families and their property. But even such postponement was thought unsafe, and refused: and he was on the point of giving orders for retreat, when the Eubœans sent their envoy, Pelagon, to Themistoklès, with the offer of thirty talents, on condition that the fleet should keep its station and hazard an engagement in defence of the island. Themistoklès employed the money adroitly and successfully, giving five talents to Eurybiadès, with large presents besides to the other leading chiefs: the most unmanageable among them was the Corinthian Adeimantus, — who at first threatened to depart with his own squadron alone, if the remaining Greeks were mad enough to remain. His alarm was silenced, if not tranquillized, by a present of three talents.¹

However Plutarch may be scandalized at such inglorious revelations preserved to us by Herodotus respecting the underhand agencies of this memorable struggle, there is no reason to call in question the bribery here described. But Themistoklès doubtless was only tempted to do, and enabled to do, by means of the

deed naturally envy another citizen more fortunate than himself, and if asked for counsel, will keep back what he has best in his mind, unless he be a man of very rare virtue. But a foreign friend usually sympathizes heartily with the good fortune of another foreigner, and will give him the best advice in his power whenever he is asked."

¹ Plutarch, Themistoklès, c. 7; Herodot. viii, 5, 6.

Eubœan money, that which he would have wished and had probably tried to accomplish without the money, — to bring on a naval engagement at Artemisium. It was absolutely essential to the maintenance of Thermopylæ, and to the general plan of defence, that the Eubœan strait should be defended against the Persian fleet, nor could the Greeks expect a more favorable position to fight in. We may reasonably presume that Themistoklēs, distinguished not less by daring than by sagacity, and the great originator of maritime energies in his country, concurred unwillingly in the projected abandonment of Artemisium: but his high mental capacity did not exclude that pecuniary corruption which rendered the presents of the Eubœans both admissible and welcome, — yet still more welcome to him perhaps, as they supplied means of bringing over the other opposing chiefs and the Spartan admiral.¹ It was finally determined, therefore, to remain, and if necessary, to hazard an engagement in the Eubœan strait: but at any rate to procure for the inhabitants of the island a short interval to remove their families. Had these Eubœans heeded the oracles, says Herodotus,² they would have packed up and removed long before: for a text of Bakis gave them express warning: but, having neglected the sacred writings as unworthy of credit, they were now severely punished for such presumption.

Among the Persian fleet at Aphetæ, on the other hand, the feeling prevalent was one of sanguine hope and confidence in their superior numbers, forming a strong contrast with the discouragement of the Greeks at Artemisium. Had they attacked the latter immediately, when both fleets first saw each other from their opposite stations, they would have gained an easy victory,

¹ The expression of Herodotus is somewhat remarkable: Οἱ τε δὲ πλεῖστοι δώρουσι (Eurybiadēs, Adeimantus, etc.), ἀνατιπυσμένοι ἦσαν, καὶ τοῖσι Εὐβοεῖσι ἐλεχμίστο· αὐτοὶ τε δὲ Θημιστοκλῆς ἐκείδον, ἔλάνθαν δὲ τὰ λοιπὰ ἔχον.

² Herodot. viii. 20. Οἱ γὰρ Εὐβοεῖς παραχρησάμενοι τὸν Βακίδα χρησμὸν ὡς οὐδὲν λίσσεται, αἵ τε τι ἐξελκυσάντο αἶθεν, αἵ τε ποιεσάμενοι, ὡς παρυσμένον σοὶ πόλειον· περιπετὴ δὲ ἐποίησαντο σφίσι αὐτοῖσι τὰ πρηγμένα· Βάκιδ γὰρ ὧδε ἔχει περὶ τούτων ὁ χρησμὸς:

Φράζον βαρβαρόφωνον ὅταν ἔρχῃ εἰς ἄλ᾽ βαλλῇ

Βούλιον, Εὐβοεῖς ἀπὸ γῆν πολυμηκάδας αἰγας.

Τούτοις δὲ αἶθεν τοῖσι ἑπεσι χρησάμεναι ἐν τοῖσι τότε παρούσι τε καὶ προσοκίμοις κακοῖσι, παρὶν σφί σμφερὴ χαῖσθαι πρὸς τὰ μέγιστα.

for the Greek fleet would have fled, as the admiral was on the point of ordering, even without an attack. But this was not sufficient for the Persians, who wished to cut off every ship among their enemies even from flight and escape.¹ Accordingly, they detached two hundred ships to circumnavigate the island of Eubœa, and to sail up the Eubœan strait from the south, in the rear of the Greeks, — and postponing their own attack in front until this squadron should be in position to intercept the retreating Greeks. But though the manœuvre was concealed by sending the squadron round outside of the island of Skiathos, it became known immediately among the Greeks, through a deserter, — Skyllias of Skionê. This man, the best swimmer and diver of his time, and now engaged like other Thracian Greeks in the Persian service, passed over to Artemisium, and communicated to the Greek commanders both the particulars of the late destructive storm, and the despatch of the intercepting squadron.²

It appears that his communications, respecting the effects of the storm and the condition of the Persian fleet, somewhat reassured the Greeks, who resolved during the ensuing night to sail from their station at Artemisium for the purpose of surprising the detached squadron of two hundred ships, and who even became bold enough, under the inspirations of Themistoklēs, to go out and offer battle to the main fleet near Aphetæ.³ Wanting to acquire some practical experience, which neither leaders nor soldiers as yet possessed, of the manner in which Phœnicians and others in the Persian fleet handled and manœuvred their ships, they waited till a late hour of the afternoon, when little daylight remained.⁴ Their boldness in thus advancing out, with inferior numbers and even inferior ships, astonished the Persian admirals, and distressed the Ionians and other subject Greeks

¹ Herodot. viii. 6. καὶ ἐμῆλλον δὲθεν ἐκσεῖσθαι (οἱ Ἕλληνες)· ἔδει δὲ μὴ περὶ τὸν τῷ ἐκείνων (Περσῶν) λόγῳ, περιγενίσθαι.

² Herodot. viii. 7, 8. Wonderful stories were recounted respecting the prowess of Skyllias as a diver.

³ Diodorus, xi. 12.

⁴ Herodot. viii. 9. διὰ τὴν ὀψὴν γινομένην τῆς ἡμέρης φυλάξαντες, αὐτοὶ ἐπαγέρον ἐπὶ τοὺς βαρβάρους, ἀπόπειραν αὐτῶν ποιήσασθαι βουλόμενοι τῇ τῇ μάχῃ καὶ τοῦ διεκπλοῦν.

who were serving them as unwilling auxiliaries: to both it seemed that the victory of the Persian fleet, which was speedily brought forth to battle, and was numerous enough to encompass the Greeks, would be certain as well as complete. The Greek ships were at first marshalled in a circle, with the sterns in the interior, and presenting their prows in front at all points of the circumference;¹ in this position, compressed into a narrow space, they seemed to be awaiting the attack of the enemy, who formed a larger circle around them: but on a second signal given, their ships assumed the aggressive, rowed out from the inner circle in direct impact against the hostile ships around, and took or disabled no less than thirty of them: in one of which Philaon, brother of Gorgus, despot of Salamis in Cyprus, was made prisoner. Such unexpected forwardness at first disconcerted the Persians, who however rallied and inflicted considerable damage and loss on the Greeks: but the near approach of night put an end to the combat, and each fleet retired to its former station, — the Persians to Aphetae, the Greeks to Artemisium.²

The result of this first day's combat, though indecisive in itself, surprised both parties and did much to exalt the confidence of the Greeks. But the events of the ensuing night did yet more. Another tremendous storm was sent by the gods to aid them. Though it was the middle of summer, — a season when rain rarely falls in the climate of Greece, — the most violent wind, rain, and thunder, prevailed during the whole night, blowing right on shore against the Persians at Aphetae, and thus but little troublesome to the Greeks on the opposite side of the strait. The seamen of the Persian fleet, scarcely recovered from the former storm at Sêpias Aktê, were almost driven to despair by this repetition of the same peril: the more so when they found the prows of their ships surrounded, and the play of their oars impeded, by the dead bodies and the spars from the recent battle, which the current drove towards their shore. If this storm was

¹ Compare the description in Thucyd. ii, 84, of the naval battle between the Athenian fleet under Phormio and the Lacedæmonian fleet, where the ships of the latter are marshalled in this same array.

² Herodot. viii, 11. πολλὸν παρὰ δόξαν ἀγωνισάμενοι — ἐπεραλκίως ἀνέστησαν, etc.

injurious to the main fleet at Aphetae, it proved the entire ruin of the squadron detached to circumnavigate Eubœa, who, overtaken by it near the dangerous eastern coast of that island, called the Hollows of Eubœa, were driven upon the rocks and wrecked. The news of this second conspiracy of the elements, or intervention of the gods, against the schemes of the invaders, was highly encouraging to the Greeks; and the seasonable arrival of fifty-three fresh Athenian ships, who reinforced them the next day, raised them to a still higher pitch of confidence. In the afternoon of the same day, they sailed out against the Persian fleet at Aphetae, and attacked and destroyed some Kilikian ships even at their moorings; the fleet having been too much damaged by the storm of the preceding night to come out and fight.¹

But the Persian admirals were not of a temper to endure such insults, — still less to let their master hear of them. About noon on the ensuing day, they sailed with their entire fleet near to the Greek station at Artemisium, and formed themselves into a half moon; while the Greeks kept near to the shore, so that they could not be surrounded, nor could the Persians bring their entire fleet into action; the ships running foul of each other, and not finding space to attack. The battle raged fiercely all day, and with great loss and damage on both sides: the Egyptians bore off the palm of valor among the Persians, the Athenians among the Greeks. Though the positive loss sustained by the Persians was by far the greater, and though the Greeks, being near their own shore, became masters of the dead bodies as well as of the disabled ships and floating fragments, — still, they were themselves hurt and crippled in greater proportion with reference to their inferior total: and the Athenian vessels especially, foremost in the preceding combat, found one half of their number out of condition to renew it.² The Egyptians alone had captured five Grecian ships with their entire crews.

Under these circumstances, the Greek leaders, — and Themistoklēs, as it seems, among them, — determined that they could no longer venture to hold the position of Artemisium, but must

¹ Herodot. viii, 13, 14; Diodor. xi, 12.

² Herodot. viii, 17, 18.

withdraw the naval force farther into Greece: though this was in fact a surrender of the pass of Thermopylae, and though the removal which the Eubœans were hastening was still unfinished. These unfortunate men were forced to be satisfied with the promise of Themistoklēs to give them convoy for their boats and their persons; abandoning their sheep and cattle for the consumption of the fleet, as better than leaving them to become booty for the enemy. While the Greeks were thus employed in organizing their retreat, they received news which rendered retreat doubly necessary. The Athenian Abrōnychus, stationed with his ship near Thermopylae, in order to keep up communication between the army and fleet, brought the disastrous intelligence that Xerxes was already master of the pass, and that the division of Leonidas was either destroyed or in flight. Upon this the fleet abandoned Artemisium forthwith, and sailed up the Eubœan strait: the Corinthian ships in the van, the Athenians bringing up the rear. Themistoklēs, conducting the latter, stayed long enough at the various watering-stations and landing-places to inscribe on some neighboring stones invitations to the Ionian contingents serving under Xerxes: whereby the latter were conjured not to serve against their fathers, but to desert, if possible, — or at least, to fight as little and as backwardly as they could. Themistoklēs hoped by this stratagem perhaps to detach some of the Ionians from the Persian side, or, at any rate, to render them objects of mistrust, and thus to diminish their efficiency.² With no longer delay than was requisite for such inscriptions, he followed the remaining fleet, which sailed round the coast of Attica, not stopping until it reached the island of Salamis.

The news of the retreat of the Greek fleet was speedily conveyed by a citizen of Histiaea to the Persians at Aphetae, who at first disbelieved it, and detained the messenger until they had sent to ascertain the fact. On the next day, their fleet passed across to the north of Eubœa, and became master of Histiaea and the neighboring territory: from whence many of them, by permission and even invitation of Xerxes, crossed over to Ther-

¹ Herodot. viii, 18. *δρημόν δὲ ἐβοῦλευον ἰσω εἰς τὴν Ἑλλάδα.*

² Herodot. viii, 19, 21, 22; Plutarch, Themistoklēs, c. 9.

mopylae to survey the field of battle and the dead. Respecting the number of the dead, Xerxes is asserted to have deliberately imposed upon the spectators: he buried all his own dead, except one thousand, whose bodies were left out, — while the total number of Greeks who had perished at Thermopylae, four thousand in number, were all left exposed, and in one heap, so as to create an impression that their loss had been much more severe than their own. Moreover, the bodies of the slain Helots were included in the heap, all of them passing for Spartans or Thespians in the estimation of the spectators. We are not surprised to hear, however, that this trick, gross and public as it must have been, really deceived very few.¹ According to the statement of Herodotus, twenty thousand men were slain on the side of the Persians, — no unreasonable estimate, if we consider that they wore little defensive armor, and that they were three days fighting. The number of Grecian dead bodies is stated by the same historian as four thousand: if this be correct, it must include a considerable proportion of Helots, since there were no hoplites present on the last day except the three hundred Spartans, the seven hundred Thespians, and the four hundred Thebans. Some hoplites were of course slain in the first two days' battles, though apparently not many. The number who originally came to the defence of the pass seems to have been about seven thousand:² but the epigram, composed shortly afterwards, and inscribed on the spot by order of the Amphiktyonic assembly, transmitted to posterity the formal boast that four thousand warriors "from Peloponnesus had here fought with three hundred myriads or three million of enemies."³ Respecting this alleged Persian total, some remarks have already been made: the statement of four thousand warriors from Peloponnesus, must indicate all

¹ Herodot. viii, 24, 25. *οὐ μὲν οὐδ' ἔκλυαν τοὺς διαβεβηκότας Ξέρξης ταῦτα πρὸς τοὺς ἑκάστος τοῖς ἰωῦτο· καὶ γὰρ δὴ καὶ γελοῖον ἦν, etc.*

² About the numbers of the Greeks at Thermopylae, compare Herodot. vii, 202; Diodorus, xi, 4; Pausanias, x, 20, 1; and Manso's Sparta, vol. ii, p. 308; Beylage 24th.

Isokratēs talks about one thousand Spartans, with a few allies, *Panegyric*, Or. iv p. 59. He mentions also only sixty Athenian ships of war at Artemisium: in fact, his numerical statements deserve little attention.

³ Herodot. vii, 228.

those who originally marched out of that peninsula under Leonidas. Yet the Amphiktyonic assembly, when they furnished words to record this memorable exploit, ought not to have immortalized the Peloponnesians apart from their extra-Peloponnesian comrades, of merit fully equal, — especially the Thespians, who exhibited the same heroic self-devotion as Leonidas and his Spartans, without having been prepared for it by the same elaborate and iron discipline. While this inscription was intended as a general commemoration of the exploit, there was another near it, alike simple and impressive, destined for the Spartan dead separately: "Stranger, tell the Lacedæmonians, that we lie here in obedience to their orders." On the hillock within the pass, where this devoted band received their death-wounds, a monument was erected, with a marble lion in honor of Leonidas; decorated, apparently, with an epigram by the poet Simonides. That distinguished genius composed at least one ode, of which nothing but a splendid fragment now remains, to celebrate the glories of Thermopylæ; besides several epigrams, one of which was consecrated to the prophet Megistias, "who, though well aware of the fate coming upon him, would not desert the Spartan chiefs."

CHAPTER XLI.

BATTLE OF SALAMIS. — RETREAT OF XERXES.

THE sentiment, alike durable and unanimous, with which the Greeks of after-times looked back on the battle of Thermopylæ, and which they have communicated to all subsequent readers, was that of just admiration for the courage and patriotism of Leonidas and his band. But among the contemporary Greeks that sentiment, though doubtless sincerely felt, was by no means predominant: it was overpowered by the more pressing emotions of disappointment and terror. So confident were the Spartans

and Peloponnesians in the defensibility of Thermopylæ and Artemisium, that when the news of the disaster reached them, not a single soldier had yet been put in motion: the season of the festival games had passed, but no active step had yet been taken.¹ Meanwhile the invading force, army and fleet, was in its progress towards Attica and Peloponnesus, without the least preparations, — and, what was still worse, without any combined and concerted plan, — for defending the heart of Greece. The loss sustained by Xerxes at Thermopylæ, insignificant in proportion to his vast total, was more than compensated by the fresh Grecian auxiliaries which he now acquired. Not merely the Malians, Lokrians, and Dorians, but also the great mass of the Bœotians, with their chief town Thebes, all except Thespiæ and Plataea, now joined him.² Demaratus, his Spartan companion, moved forward to Thebes to renew an ancient tie of hospitality with the Theban oligarchical leader, Attaginus, while small garrisons were sent by Alexander of Macedon to most of the Bœotian towns,³ as well to protect them from plunder as to insure their fidelity. The Thespians, on the other hand, abandoned their city, and fled into Peloponnesus; while the Plataeans, who had been serving aboard the Athenian ships at Artemisium,⁴ were disembarked at Chalkis as the fleet retreated, for the purpose of marching by land to their city, and removing their families. Nor was it only the land-force of Xerxes which had been thus strengthened; his fleet also had received some accessions from Karystus in Eubœa, and from several of the Cyclades, — so that the losses sustained by the storm at Sêpias and the fights at Artemisium, if not wholly made up, were at least in part repaired, while the fleet remained still prodigiously superior in number to that of the Greeks.⁵

¹ Herodot. viii. 40, 71, 73.

² Herodot. viii. 66. Diodorus calls the battle of Thermopylæ a *Kadmeian victory* for Xerxes, — which is true only in the letter, but not in the spirit: he doubtless lost a greater number of men in the pass than the Greeks, but the advantage which he gained was prodigious (Diodor. xi. 12); and Diodorus himself sets forth the terror of the Greeks after the event (xi. 13-15).

³ Plutarch, De Herodot. Malignit. p. 864; Herodot. viii. 34.

Herodot. viii. 44, 50.

⁵ Herodot. viii. 66.

At the beginning of the Peloponnesian war, near fifty years after these events, the Corinthian envoys reminded Sparta that she had allowed Xerxes time to arrive from the extremity of the earth at the threshold of Peloponnesus, before she took any adequate precautions against him: a reproach true almost to the letter.¹ It was only when roused and terrified by the news of the death of Leonidas, that the Lacedaemonians and the other Peloponnesians began to put forth their full strength. But it was then too late to perform the promise made to Athens, of taking up a position in Boeotia so as to protect Attica. To defend the isthmus of Corinth was all that they now thought of, and seemingly all that was now open to them: thither they rushed with all their available population under the conduct of Kleombrotus, king of Sparta (brother of Leonidas), and began to draw fortifications across it, as well as to break up the Skironian road from Megara to Corinth, with every mark of anxious energy. The Lacedaemonians, Arcadians, Eleians, Corinthians, Sikyonians, Epidaurians, Phliasians, Troezenians, and Hermionians, were all present here in full numbers; many myriads of men (bodies of ten thousand each) working and bringing materials night and day.² As a defence to themselves against attack by land, this was an excellent position: they considered it as their last chance,³ abandoning all hope of successful resistance at sea. But they forgot that a fortified isthmus was no protection even to themselves against the navy of Xerxes,⁴ while it professedly threw out not only Attica, but also Megara and Ægina. And thus rose a new peril to Greece from the loss of Thermopylae: no other position could be found which, like that memorable strait, comprehended and protected at once all the separate cities. The disunion thus produced brought them within a hair's breadth of ruin.

If the causes of alarm were great for the Peloponnesians, yet more desperate did the position of the Athenians appear. Expecting, according to agreement, to find a Peloponnesian army in

Thucyd. i. 69. τὸν τε γὰρ Μῆδον αὐτοὶ ἴσμεν ἀπὸ περὶ τῶν γῆς πρότερον ἐπὶ Πελοπόννησον ἐλθόντα, πρὶν τὰ παρ' ἡμῶν ἀξίως προσηνέσθαι.

¹ Herodot. viii. 71. συνδραμόντες ἐκ τῶν πόλεων.

² Herodot. viii. 74.

⁴ Herodot. vii. 139.

Boeotia ready to sustain Leonidas, or at any rate to coöperate in the defence of Attica, they had taken no measures to remove their families or property: but they saw with indignant disappointment as well as dismay, on retreating from Artemisium, that the conqueror was in full march from Thermopylae, that the road to Attica was open to him, and that the Peloponnesians were absorbed exclusively in the defence of their own isthmus and their own separate existence.¹ The fleet from Artemisium had been directed to muster at the harbor of Troezen, there to await such reinforcements as could be got together: but the Athenians entreated Eurybiades to halt at Salamis, so as to allow them a short time for consultation in the critical state of their affairs, and to aid them in the transport of their families. While Eurybiades was thus staying at Salamis, several new ships which had reached Troezen came over to join him; and in this way Salamis became for a time the naval station of the Greeks, without any deliberate intention beforehand.²

Meanwhile Themistoklēs and the Athenian seamen landed at Phalerum, and made their mournful entry into Athens. Gloomy as the prospect appeared, there was little room for difference of opinion,³ and still less room for delay. The authorities and the public assembly at once issued a proclamation, enjoining every Athenian to remove his family out of the country in the best

¹ Plutarch, Themistoklēs, c. 9. ἡ δὲ μὲν ὁρμή τῆς προδοσίας εἶχε τοὺς Ἀθηναίους, ἡ δὲ δεινότης καὶ κατήρεια μεμνημένοι.

Herodot. viii. 40. δοκούντες γὰρ εἰρήσειν Πελοποννησίους πανόημι ἐν τῇ Βοιωτῇ ὑποκαταμένους τὸν βασιλέα, τὸν μὲν εἶπον οὐδὲν εἶναι, οἱ δὲ ἐπυνθάνοντο τὸν Ἰσθμὸν αὐτοὺς τοιχίζοντας ἐς τὴν Πελοπόννησον, περὶ πλεόντων δὲ ποταμῶν περιμέναι, καὶ ταύτην ἔχοντας ἐν φυλακῇ, τὰ τε ἄλλα ἀπιέναι.

Thucyd. i. 74. ὅτε γοῦν ἦμεν (we Athenians) ἐπὶ σώοι, οὐ παρεγένεσθαι (Spartans).

Both Lysias (Oratio Funeb. c. 8) and Isokratēs take pride in the fact that the Athenians, in spite of being thus betrayed, never thought of making separate terms for themselves with Xerxes (Panegyric, Or. iv. p. 60). But there is no reason to believe that Xerxes would have granted them separate terms: his particular vengeance was directed against them. Isokratēs has confounded in his mind the conduct of the Athenians when they refused the offers of Mardonius in the year following the battle of Salamis with their conduct before the battle of Salamis against Xerxes.

² Herodot. viii. 40-42.

³ Plato, Legg. iii. p. 699.

way he could. We may conceive the state of tumult and terror which followed on this unexpected proclamation, when we reflect that it had to be circulated and acted upon throughout all Attica, from Sunium to Orôpus, within the narrow space of less than six days; for no longer interval elapsed before Xerxes actually arrived at Athens, where indeed he might have arrived even sooner.¹ The whole Grecian fleet was doubtless employed in carrying out the helpless exiles; mostly to Trœzen, where a kind reception and generous support were provided for them (the Trœzenian population being seemingly semi-Ionic, and having ancient relations of religion as well as of traffic with Athens),—but in part also to Ægina: there were, however, many who could not, or would not, go father than Salamis. Themistoklès impressed upon the sufferers that they were only obeying the oracle, which had directed them to abandon the city and to take refuge behind the wooden walls; and either his policy, or the mental depression of the time, gave circulation to other stories, intimating that even the divine inmates of the acropolis were for a while deserting it. In the ancient temple of Athênè Polias on that rock, there dwelt, or was believed to dwell, as guardian to the sanctuary and familiar attendant of the goddess, a sacred serpent, for whose nourishment a honey-cake was placed once in the month. The honey-cake had been hitherto regularly consumed; but at this fatal moment the priestess announced that it remained untouched: the sacred guardian had thus set the example of quitting the acropolis, and it behooved the citizens to follow the example, confiding in the goddess herself for future return and restitution. The migration of so many ancient men, women, and children, was a scene of tears and misery inferior only to that which would have ensued on the actual capture of the city.² Some few individuals, too poor to hope for mainte-

¹ Herodot. viii. 66, 67. There was, therefore, but little time for the breaking up and carrying away of furniture, alluded to by Thucydides, i. 19—*δαρμονίαις ἐκλείπειν τὴν πόλιν καὶ διασπινθασσάμενοι*, etc.

² Herodot. viii. 41; Plutarch. Themistoklès. c. x.

In the years 1821 and 1822, during the struggle which preceded the liberation of Greece, the Athenians were forced to leave their country and seek refuge in Salamis three several times. These incidents are sketched in a manner alike interesting and instructive by Dr. Waddington, in his *Visit to*

nance, or too old to care for life, elsewhere,—confiding, moreover, in their own interpretation¹ of the wooden wall which the Pythian priestess had pronounced to be inexpugnable,—shut themselves up in the acropolis along with the administrators of the temple, obstructing the entrance or western front with wooden doors and palisades.² When we read how great were the sufferings of the population of Attica near half a century afterwards, compressed for refuge within the spacious fortifications of Athens at the first outbreak of the Peloponnesian war,³ we may form some faint idea of the incalculably greater misery which overwhelmed an emigrant population, hurrying, they knew not whither, to escape the long arm of Xerxes. Little chance did

Greece (London, 1825). Letters, vi. vii. x. He states, p. 92, "Three times have the Athenians emigrated in a body, and sought refuge from the sabre among the houseless rocks of Salamis. Upon these occasions, I am assured, that many have dwelt in caverns, and many in miserable huts, constructed on the mountainside by their own feeble hands. Many have perished too, from exposure to an intemperate climate: many, from diseases contracted through the looseness of their habitations: many from hunger and misery. On the retreat of the Turks, the survivors returned to their country. But to what a country did they return? To a land of desolation and famine; and in fact, on the first reoccupation of Athens, after the departure of Omar Brioud, several persons are known to have subsisted for some time on grass, and a supply of corn reached the Piræus from Syra and Hydra."

A century and a half ago, also, in the war between the Turks and Venetians, the population of Attica was forced to emigrate to Salamis, Ægina, and Corinth. M. Buchon observes, "Les troupes Albanaises, envoyées en 1688 par les Turcs (in the war against the Venetians) se jetèrent sur l'Attique, mettant tout à feu et à sang. En 1688, les chroniques d'Athènes racontent que ses malheureux habitants furent obligés de se réfugier à Salamine, à Egine, et à Corinthe, et que ce ne fut qu'après trois ans qu'ils purent rentrer en partie dans leur ville et dans leurs champs. Beaucoup des villages de l'Attique sont encore habités par les descendants de ces derniers envahisseurs, et avant la dernière révolution, on n'y parloit que la langue albanaise: mais leur physionomie diffère autant que leur langue de la physionomie de la race Grecque." (Buchon. La Grèce Continentale et la Morée. Paris, 1843, ch. ii. p. 82.)

¹ Pausanias seems to consider these poor men somewhat presumptuous for pretending to understand the oracle better than Themistoklès.—*Ἀθηναίων τινες ἄλλοι τῶν ἐς τὴν πόλιν ἔρχομένων ἢ Θέμ. προκλῆς εἰδέναι νομίζοντες* (i. 18. 2).

² Herodot. viii. 50.

³ Thucyd. ii. 16. 17.

there seem that they would ever revisit their homes except as his slaves.

In the midst of circumstances thus calamitous and threatening, neither the warriors nor the leaders of Athens lost their energy, — arm as well as mind was strung to the loftiest pitch of human resolution. Political dissensions were suspended: Themistoklēs proposed to the people a decree, and obtained their sanction, inviting home all who were under sentence of temporary banishment: moreover, he not only included but even specially designated among them his own great opponent Aristeidēs, now in the third year of ostracism. Xanthippos the accuser, and Kimon the son, of Miltiadēs, were partners in the same emigration: the latter, enrolled by his scale of fortune among the horsemen of the state, was seen with his companions cheerfully marching through the Kerameikos to dedicate their bridles in the acropolis, and to bring away in exchange some of the sacred arms there suspended, thus setting an example of ready service on ship-board, instead of on horseback.¹ It was absolutely essential to obtain supplies of money, partly for the aid of the poorer exiles, but still more for the equipment of the fleet; there were no funds in the public treasury, — but the Senate of Areopagus, then composed in large proportion of men from the wealthier classes, put forth all its public authority as well as its private contributions and example to others,² and thus succeeded in raising the sum of eight drachms for every soldier serving.

This timely help was indeed partly obtained by the inexhaustible resource of Themistoklēs, who, in the hurry of embarkation, either discovered or pretended that the Gorgon's head from the statue of Athēnē was lost, and directing upon this ground every man's baggage to be searched, rendered any treasures, which private citizens might be carrying out, available to the public service.³ By the most strenuous efforts, these few important days were made to suffice for removing the whole population of Attica, — those of military competence to the fleet at Salamis, —

¹ Plutarch, Themistoklēs, c. 10, 11; and Kimon, c. 5.

² Whether this be the incident which Aristotle (*Politic.* v, 3, 5) had in his mind, we cannot determine.

³ Plutarch, Themistoklēs, c. x.

the rest to some place of refuge, — together with as much property as the case admitted. So complete was the desertion of the country, that the host of Xerxes, when it became master, could not seize and carry off more than five hundred prisoners.¹ Moreover, the fleet itself, which had been brought home from Artemisium partially disabled, was quickly repaired, so that, by the time the Persian fleet arrived, it was again in something like fighting condition.

The combined fleet which had now got together at Salamis consisted of three hundred and sixty-six ships, — a force far greater than at Artemisium. Of these, no less than two hundred were Athenian; twenty among which, however, were lent to the Chalkidians, and manned by them. Forty Corinthian ships, thirty Æginetan, twenty Megarian, sixteen Lacedæmonian, fifteen Sikyonian, ten Epidaurian, seven from Ambrakia, and as many from Eretria, five from Troezen, three from Hermionē, and the same number from Leukas; two from Keos, two from Styra, and one from Kythnos; four from Naxos, despatched as a contingent to the Persian fleet, but brought by the choice of their captains and seamen to Salamis; — all these triremes, together with a small squadron of the inferior vessels called pentekonters, made up the total. From the great Grecian cities in Italy there appeared only one trireme, a volunteer, equipped and commanded by an eminent citizen named Phayllus, thrice victor at the Pythian games.² The entire fleet was thus a trifle larger than the combined force, three hundred and fifty-eight ships, collected by the Asiatic Greeks at Lade, fifteen years earlier, during the Ionic revolt. We may doubt, however, whether this total, borrowed from Herodotus, be not larger than that which actually fought a little afterwards at the battle of Salamis, and which Æschylus gives decidedly as consisting of three hundred sail, in addition to ten prime and chosen ships. That great poet, himself one of the combatants, and speaking in a drama represented only seven years after the battle, is better authority on the point even than Herodotus.³

Herodot. ix, 99.

² Herodot. viii, 43–48.

³ Æschylus, *Persæ*, 347; Herodot. viii, 48; vi, 9; Pausanias, i, 14, 4. The total which Herodotus announces is three hundred and seventy-eight.

Hardly was the fleet mustered at Salamis, and the Athenian population removed, when Xerxes and his host overran the de-

but the items which he gives amount, when summed up, only to three hundred and sixty-six. There seems no way of reconciling this discrepancy except by some violent change, which we are not warranted in making.

Ktesias represents that the numbers of the Persian war-ships at Salamis were above one thousand, those of the Greeks seven hundred (Persica, c. 26).

The Athenian orator in Thucydides (i, 74) calls the total of the Grecian fleet at Salamis "nearly four hundred ships, and the Athenian contingent somewhat less than *two parts* of this total (*ναὺς μὲν γὰρ ἐς τὰς τετρακοσίας ὀλίγη ἐλάσσονες τῶν δύο μοιρῶν*)."

The Scholiast, with Poppo and most of the commentators on this passage, treat τῶν δύο μοιρῶν as meaning unquestionably *two parts out of three*: and if this be the sense, I should agree with Dr. Arnold in considering the assertion as a mere exaggeration of the orator, not at all carrying the authority of Thucydides himself. But I cannot think that we are here driven to such a necessity; for the construction of Didot and Gölter, though Dr. Arnold pronounces it "a most undoubted error," appears to me perfectly admissible. They maintain that αἱ δύο μοῖραι does not of necessity mean *two parts out of three*: in Thucydides i, 10, we find καὶ οἱ Πελοποννήσιοι τῶν πέντε τὰς δύο μοῖρας ἔχουσιν, where the words mean *two parts out of five*. Now in the passage before us, we have ναὺς μὲν γὰρ ἐς τὰς τετρακοσίας ὀλίγη ἐλάσσονες τῶν δύο μοιρῶν: and Didot and Gölter contend, that in the word τετρακοσίας is implied a quaternary division of the whole number, — *four hundreds or hundredth parts*: so that the whole meaning would be — "To the aggregate *four hundreds* of ships we contributed something less than *two*." The word τετρακοσίας, equivalent to τεσσαράς ἑκατοντάδας, naturally includes the general idea of τεσσαράς μοῖρας: and this would bring the passage into exact analogy with the one cited above, — τῶν πέντε τὰς δύο μοῖρας. With every respect to the judgment of Dr. Arnold on an author whom he had so long studied, I cannot enter into the grounds on which he has pronounced this interpretation of Didot and Gölter to be "an undoubted error." It has the advantage of bringing the assertion of the orator in Thucydides into harmony with Herodotus, who states the Athenians to have furnished one hundred and eighty ships at Salamis.

Wherever such harmony can be secured by an admissible construction of existing words, it is an unquestionable advantage, and ought to count as a reason in the case, if there be a doubt between two admissible constructions. But on the other hand, I protest against altering numerical statements in one author, simply in order to bring him into accordance with another, and without some substantive ground in the text itself. Thus, for example, in this very passage of Thucydides, Bloomfield and Poppo propose to alter τετρακοσίας into τριακοσίας, in order that Thucydides may be in harmony with Æschylus and other authors, though not with Herod-

serted country, his fleet occupying the roadstead of Phalærum with the coast adjoining. His land-force had been put in motion under the guidance of the Thessalians, two or three days after the battle of Thermopylae, and he was assured by some Arcadians who came to seek service, that the Peloponnesians were, even at that moment, occupied with the celebration of the Olympic games. "What prize does the victor receive?" he asked. Upon the reply made, that the prize was a wreath of the wild olive, Tritantæchmēs, son of the monarch's uncle Artabanus, is said to have burst forth, notwithstanding the displeasure both of the monarch himself and of the bystanders: "Heavens, Mar-donius, what manner of men are these against whom thou hast brought us to fight! men who contend not for money, but for honor!"¹ Whether this be a remark really delivered, or a dramatic illustration imagined by some contemporary of Herodotus, it is not the less interesting as bringing to view a characteristic of Hellenic life, which contrasts not merely with the manners of contemporary Orientals, but even with those of the earlier Greeks themselves during the Homeric times.

Among all the various Greeks between Thermopylae and the borders of Attica, there were none except the Phocians disposed to refuse submission: and they refused only because the paramount influence of their bitter enemies the Thessalians made them despair of obtaining favorable terms.² Nor would they even listen to a proposition of the Thessalians, who, boasting that it was in their power to guide as they pleased the terrors of the Persian host, offered to insure lenient treatment to the territory of Phocis, provided a sum of fifty talents were paid to them.³ The proposition being indignantly refused, they conducted Xerxes through the little territory of Doris, which medized and escaped plunder, into the upper valley of the Kephissus,

while Didot and Gölter would alter τριακοσίῳ into τετρακοσίῳ in Demosthenes de Corona (c. 70), in order that Demosthenes may be in harmony with Thucydides. Such emendations appear to me inadmissible in principle: we are not to force different witnesses into harmony by retouching their statements.

¹ Herodot. viii, 26. Παπαί, Μαρδονίε, κοῖνος ἐπ' ἀνδρᾶς ἡγάγες μαχησάμενοις ἡμῶς. οἳ οὐ περι χρημάτων τὸν ἀγῶνα ποιεῖνται, ἀλλὰ περὶ ἀρετῆς.

² Herodot. viii, 30.

³ Herodot. viii, 28, 29.

among the towns of the inflexible Phocians. All of them were found deserted; the inhabitants having previously escaped either to the wide-spreading summit of Parnassus, called Tithorea, or even still farther, across that mountain into the territory of the Ozolian Lokrians. Ten or a dozen small Phocian towns, the most considerable of which were Elateia and Hyampolis, were sacked and destroyed by the invaders, nor was the holy temple and oracle of Apollo at Abæ better treated than the rest: all its treasures were pillaged, and it was then burnt. From Panopeus Xerxes detached a body of men to plunder Delphi, marching with his main army through Bœotia, in which country he found all the towns submissive and willing, except Thespiæ and Plataea: both were deserted by their citizens, and both were now burnt. From hence he conducted his army into the abandoned territory of Attica, reaching without resistance the foot of the acropolis at Athens.¹

Very different was the fate of that division which he had detached from Panopeus against Delphi: Apollo defended his temple here more vigorously than at Abæ. The cupidity of the Persian king was stimulated by accounts of the boundless wealth accumulated at Delphi, especially the profuse donations of Croesus. The Delphians, in the extreme of alarm, while they sought safety for themselves on the heights of Parnassus, and for their families by transport across the gulf into Achaia, consulted the oracle whether they should carry away or bury the sacred treasures. Apollo directed them to leave the treasures untouched, saying that he was competent himself to take care of his own property. Sixty Delphians alone ventured to remain, together with Akêratus, the religious superior: but evidences of superhuman aid soon appeared to encourage them. The sacred arms suspended in the interior cell, which no mortal hand was ever permitted to touch, were seen lying before the door of the temple; and when the Persians, marching along the road called Schistê, up that rugged path under the steep cliffs of Parnassus which conducts to Delphi, had reached the temple of Athênê Pronœa, — on a sudden, dreadful thunder was heard, — two vast mountain crags detached themselves and rushed down with deafening noise

¹ Herodot. viii. 32-34.

among them, crushing many to death, — the war-shout was also heard from the interior of the temple of Athênê. Seized with a panic terror, the invaders turned round and fled; pursued not only by the Delphians, but also, as they themselves affirmed, by two armed warriors of superhuman stature and destructive arm. The triumphant Delphians confirmed this report, adding that the two auxiliaries were the heroes Phylakus and Autonoüs, whose sacred precincts were close adjoining: and Herodotus himself when he visited Delphi, saw in the sacred ground of Athênê the identical masses of rock which had overwhelmed the Persians.¹ Thus did the god repel these invaders from his Delphian sanctuary and treasures, which remained inviolate until one hundred and thirty years afterwards, when they were rifled by the sacrilegious hands of the Phocian Philomêlus. On this occasion, as will be seen presently, the real protectors of the treasures were, the conquerors at Salamis and Plataea.

Four months had elapsed since the departure from Asia when Xerxes reached Athens, the last term of his advance. He brought with him the members of the Peisistratid family, who doubtless thought their restoration already certain, — and a few Athenian exiles attached to their interest. Though the country was altogether deserted, the handful of men collected in the acropolis ventured to defy him: nor could all the persuasions of

¹ Herodot. viii. 38, 39; Diodor. xi. 14; Pausan. x. 8. 4.

Compare the account given in Pausanias (x. 23) of the subsequent repulse of Brennus and the Gauls from Delphi: in his account, the repulse is not so exclusively the work of the gods as in that of Herodotus: there is a larger force of human combatants in defence of the temple, though greatly assisted by divine intervention: there is also loss on both sides. A similar descent of crags from the summit is mentioned.

See for the description of the road by which the Persians marched, and the extreme term of their progress, Ulrichs, *Reisen und Forschungen in Griechenland*, ch. iv. p. 46; ch. x. p. 146.

Many great blocks of stone and cliff are still to be seen near the spot, which have rolled down from the top, and which remind the traveller of these passages.

The attack here described to have been made by order of Xerxes upon the Delphian temple, seems not easy to reconcile with the words of Mardonius, Herodot. ix. 42: still less can it be reconciled with the statement of Plutarch (Numa, c. 9), who says that the Delphian temple was burnt by the Medes.

the Peisistratids, eager to preserve the holy place from pillage, induce them to surrender.¹ The Athenian acropolis, — a craggy rock rising abruptly about one hundred and fifty feet, with a flat summit of about one thousand feet long from east to west, by five hundred feet broad from north to south, — had no practicable access except on the western side;² moreover, in all parts where there seemed any possibility of climbing up, it was defended by the ancient fortification called the Pelasgic wall. Obligated to take the place by force, the Persian army was posted around the northern and western sides, and commenced their operations from the eminence immediately adjoining on the northwest, called Areopagus³ from whence they bombarded, if we may venture upon the expression, with hot missiles, the wood-work before the gates; that is, they poured upon it multitudes of arrows with burning tow attached to them. The wooden palisades and boarding presently took fire and were consumed: but when the Persians tried to mount to the assault by the western road leading up to the gate, the undaunted little garrison still kept them at bay, having provided vast stones, which they rolled down upon them in the ascent. For a time the Great King seemed likely to be driven to the slow process of blockade; but at length some adventurous men among the besiegers tried to scale the precipitous rock before them on its northern side, hard by the temple or chapel of Aglaurus, which lay nearly in front of the Persian position, but behind the gates and the western ascent. Here the rock was naturally so inaccessible, that it was

¹ Herodot. viii, 52.

² Pausanias, i, 22, 4; Kruse, *Hellas*, vol. ii, ch. vi, p. 76. Ernst Curtius (*Die Akropolis von Athen*, p. 5, Berlin, 1844) says that the plateau of the acropolis is rather less than four hundred feet higher than the town: Fiedler states it to be one hundred and seventy-eight fathoms, or one thousand and sixty-eight feet above the level of the sea (*Reise durch das Königreich Griechenland*, i, p. 2); he gives the length and breadth of the plateau in the same figures as Kruse, whose statement I have copied in the text. In Colonel Leake's valuable *Topography of Athens*, I do not find any distinct statement about the height of the acropolis. We must understand Kruse's statement, if he and Curtius are both correct, to refer only to the precipitous impracticable portion of the whole rock.

³ Athenian legend represented the Amazons as having taken post on the

altogether unguarded, and seemingly even unfortified:¹ moreover, the attention of the little garrison was all concentrated on the host which fronted the gates. Hence the separate escalading party was enabled to accomplish their object unobserved, and to reach the summit in the rear of the garrison; who, deprived of their last hope, either cast themselves headlong from the walls, or fled for safety to the inner temple. The successful escaladers opened the gates to the entire Persian host, and the whole acropolis was presently in their hands. Its defenders were slain, its temples pillaged, and all its dwellings and buildings, sacred as well as profane, consigned to the flames.² The citadel of Athens fell into the hands of Xerxes by a surprise, very much the same as that which had placed Sardis in those of Cyrus.³

Thus was divine prophecy fulfilled: Attica passed entirely into the hands of the Persians, and the conflagration of Sardis was retaliated upon the home and citadel of its captors, as it also was upon their sacred temple of Eleusis. Xerxes immediately despatched to Susa intelligence of the fact, which is said to have excited unmeasured demonstrations of joy, confuting, seem-

Areopagus, and fortified it as a means of attacking the acropolis, — *ἀντε πύργωσαν* (Æschyl. *Eumenid.* 638).

¹ Herodot. viii, 52, 53. *ἐμπροσθε ὡν πρὸ τῆς ἀκροπόλεως, ὁπισθεν δὲ τῶν πύλων καὶ τῆς ἀνοδοῦ, τῇ δὲ οὔτε τις ἐφύλασσε, οὔτ' ἂν ἤλπιε μὴ κατὰ τις κατὰ ταῦτα ἀναβαίη ἀνθρώπων, ταύτῃ ἀνέβησαν τινες κατὰ τὸ ἱερὸν τῆς Κέκροπος θυγατρὸς Ἀγλαύρου, καίτοι περ ἀποκρήμνου ἐόντος τοῦ χώρου.*

That the Aglaurion was on the north side of the acropolis, appears clearly made out; see Leake, *Topography of Athens*, ch. v, p. 261; Kruse, *Hellas*, vol. ii, ch. vi, p. 119; Forchhammer, *Topographie Athens*, pp. 365, 366; in *Kieler Philologischen Studien*, 1841. Siebelis (in the *Plan of Athens* prefixed to his edition of Pausanias, and in his note on Pausanias, i, 18, 2) places the Aglaurion erroneously on the eastern side of the acropolis.

The expressions *ἐμπροσθε τρὸ τῆς ἀκροπόλεως* appear to refer to the position of the Persian army, who would naturally occupy the northern and western fronts of the acropolis: since they reached Athens from the north, — and the western side furnished the only regular access. The hill called Areopagus would thus be nearly in the centre of their position. Forchhammer explains these expressions unsatisfactorily.

² Herodot. viii, 52, 53.

³ Herodot. i, 84.

ingly, the gloomy predictions of his uncle Artabanus.¹ On the next day but one, the Athenian exiles in his suite received his orders, or perhaps obtained his permission, to go and offer sacrifice amidst the ruins of the acropolis, and atone, if possible, for the desecration of the ground: they discovered that the sacred olive-tree near the chapel of Erechtheus, the special gift of the goddess Athênê, though burnt to the ground by the recent flames, had already thrown out a fresh shoot of one cubit long. — at least the piety of restored Athens afterwards believed this encouraging portent,² as well as that which was said to have been seen by Dikæus, an Athenian companion of the Peisistratids, in the Thriasian plain. It was now the day set apart for the celebration of the Eleusinian mysteries; and though in this sorrowful year there was no celebration, nor any Athenians in the territory, Dikæus still fancied that he beheld the dust and heard the loud multitudinous chant, which was wont to accompany in ordinary times the processional march from Athens to Eleusis. He would even have revealed the fact to Xerxes himself, had not Demaratus deterred him from doing so: but he as well as Herodotus construed it as an evidence that the goddesses themselves were passing over from Eleusis to help the Athenians at Salamis. But whatever may have been received in after times, on that day certainly no man could believe in the speedy resurrection of conquered Athens as a free city: not even if he had witnessed the portent of the burnt olive-tree suddenly sprouting afresh with preternatural vigor. So hopeless did the circumstances of the Athenians then appear, not less to their confederates assembled at Salamis than to the victorious Persians.

About the time of the capture of the acropolis, the Persian fleet also arrived safely in the bay of Phalærum, reinforced by ships from Karystus as well as from various islands of the Cyclades, so that Herodotus reckons it to have been as strong as before the terrible storm at Sêpias Aktê, — an estimate certainly not admissible.³

¹ Herodot. v, 102; viii, 53-99; ix, 65. *Ἰδέε γὰρ κατὰ τὸ θεοπρόπιον καὶ τὴν Ἀττικὴν τὴν ἐν τῇ ἡπείρῳ γενέσθαι ὑπὸ Περσῶν.*

² Herodot. viii, 55-65.

³ Herodot. viii, 66. Colonel Leake observes upon this statement (Athens

Soon after their arrival, Xerxes himself descended to the shore to inspect the fleet, as well as to take counsel with the various naval leaders about the expediency of attacking the hostile fleet, now so near him in the narrow strait between Salamis and the coasts of Attica. He invited them all to take their seats in an assembly, wherein the king of Sidon occupied the first place and the king of Tyre the second. The question was put to each of them separately by Mardonius, and when we learn that all pronounced in favor of immediate fighting, we may be satisfied that the decided opinion of Xerxes himself must have been well known to them beforehand. One exception alone was found to this unanimity, — Artemisia, queen of Halikarnassus in Karia; into whose mouth Herodotus puts a speech of some length, deprecating all idea of fighting in the narrow strait of Salamis, — predicting that if the land-force were moved forward to attack Peloponnesus, the Peloponnesians in the fleet at Salamis would return for the protection of their own homes, and thus the fleet would disperse, the rather as there was little or no food in the island, — and intimating, besides, unmeasured contempt for the efficacy of the Persian fleet and seamen as compared with the Greek, as well as for the subject contingents of Xerxes generally. That queen Artemisia gave this prudent counsel, there is no reason to question; and the historian of Halikarnassus may have had means of hearing the grounds on which her opinion rested: but I find a difficulty in believing that she can have publicly delivered any such estimate of the maritime subjects of Persia, — an estimate not merely insulting to all who heard it, but at the time not just, though it had come to be nearer the truth at the time when Herodotus wrote,¹ and though Artemisia

and the Demi of Attica, App. vol. ii. p. 250). "About one thousand ships is the greatest accuracy we can pretend to, in stating the strength of the Persian fleet at Salamis: and from these are to be deducted, in estimating the number of ships engaged in the battle, those which were sent to occupy the Megaric strait of Salamis, two hundred in number."

The estimate of Colonel Leake appears somewhat lower than the probable reality. Nor do I believe the statement of Diodorus, that ships were detached to occupy the Megaric strait: see a note shortly following.

¹ The picture drawn in the Cyropaedia of Xenophon represents the subjects of Persia as spiritless and untrained to war (*ἀνὰλκίδες καὶ ἀσύνητακτοι*)

herself may have lived to entertain the conviction afterwards. Whatever may have been her reasons, the historian tells us that friends as well as rivals were astonished at her rashness in dissuading the monarch from a naval battle, and expected that she would be put to death. But Xerxes heard the advice with perfect good temper, and even esteemed the Karian queen the more highly: though he resolved that the opinion of the majority, or his own opinion, should be acted upon: and orders were accordingly issued for attacking the next day,¹ while the land-force should move forward towards Peloponnesus.

Whilst on the shore of Phalærum, an omnipotent will compelled seeming unanimity and precluded all real deliberation. — great, indeed, was the contrast presented by the neighboring Greek armament at Salamis, among the members of which unmeasured dissension had been reigning. It has already been stated that the Greek fleet had originally got together at that island, not with any view of making it a naval station, but simply in order to cover and assist the emigration of the Athenians. This object being accomplished, and Xerxes being already in Attica, Eurybiadēs convoked the chiefs to consider what position was the fittest for a naval engagement. Most of them, especially those from Peloponnesus, were averse to remaining at Salamis, and proposed that the fleet should be transferred to the isthmus of Corinth, where it would be in immediate communication with the Peloponnesian land-force, so that in case of defeat at sea, the ships would find protection on shore, and the men would join in the land service. — while if worsted in a naval action near Salamis, they would be inclosed in an island from whence there were no hopes of escape.² In the midst of the debate, a messenger arrived with news of the capture and conflagration of Athens and her acropolis by the Persians: and such was the terror produced by this intelligence, that some of the chiefs, without even awaiting the conclusion of the debate and the final vote, quitted the council forthwith, and began to hoist sail, or prepare their rowers, for departure. The majority came to a

and even designedly kept so forming a contrast to the native Persians (Xenophon: *Cyropæd.* viii, 1, 45)

¹ Herodot. viii, 68, 69, 70.

² Herodot. viii, 70.

vote for removing to the Isthmus, but as night was approaching, actual removal was deferred until the next morning.¹

Now was felt the want of a position like that of Thermopylæ, which had served as a protection to all the Greeks at once, so as to check the growth of separate fears and interests. We can hardly wonder that the Peloponnesian chiefs, — the Corinthian in particular, who furnished so large a naval contingent, and within whose territory the land-battle at the Isthmus seemed about to take place, — should manifest such an obstinate reluctance to fight at Salamis, and should insist on removing to a position where, in case of naval defeat, they could assist, and be assisted by, their own soldiers on land. On the other hand, Salamis was not only the most favorable position, in consequence of its narrow strait, for the inferior numbers of the Greeks, but could not be abandoned without breaking up the unity of the allied fleet: since Megara and Ægina would thus be left uncovered, and the contingents of each would immediately retire for the defence of their own homes, — while the Athenians also, a large portion of whose expatriated families were in Salamis and Ægina, would be in like manner distracted from combined maritime efforts at the Isthmus. If transferred to the latter place, probably not even the Peloponnesians themselves would have remained in one body; for the squadrons of Epidaurus, Trœzen, Hermionē, etc., each fearing that the Persian fleet might make a descent on one or other of these separate ports, would go home to repel such a contingency, in spite of the efforts of Eurybiadēs to keep them together. Hence the order for quitting Salamis and repairing to the Isthmus was nothing less than a sentence of extinction for all combined maritime defence; and it thus became doubly abhorrent to all those who, like the Athenians, Æginetans, and Megarians, were also led by their own separate safety to cling to the defence of Salamis. In spite of all such opposition, however, and in spite of the protest of Themistoklēs, the obstinate determination of the Peloponnesian leaders carried the vote for retreat, and each of them went to his ship to prepare for it on the following morning.

When Themistoklēs returned to his ship, with the gloom of

¹ Herodot. viii, 49, 50, 56.

this melancholy resolution full upon his mind, and with the necessity of providing for removal of the expatriated Athenian families in the island as well as for that of the squadron, — he found an Athenian friend named Mnēsiphilus, who asked him what the synod of chiefs had determined. Concerning this Mnēsiphilus, who is mentioned generally as a sagacious practical politician, we unfortunately have no particulars: but it must have been no common man whom fame selected, truly or falsely, as the inspiring genius of Themistoklēs. On learning what had been resolved, Mnēsiphilus burst out into remonstrance on the utter ruin which its execution would entail: there would presently be neither any united fleet to fight, nor any aggregate cause and country to fight for.¹ He vehemently urged Themistoklēs again to open the question, and to press by every means in his power for a recall of the vote for retreat, as well as for a resolution to stay and fight at Salamis. Themistoklēs had already in vain tried to enforce the same view: but disheartened as he was by ill-success, the remonstrances of a respected friend struck him so forcibly as to induce him to renew his efforts. He went instantly to the ship of Eurybiadēs, asked permission to speak with him, and being invited aboard, reopened with him alone the whole subject of the past discussion, enforcing his own views as emphatically as he could. In this private communication, all the arguments bearing upon the case were more unsparingly laid open than it had been possible to do in an assembly of the chiefs, who would have been insulted if openly told that they were likely to desert the fleet when once removed from Salamis. Speaking thus freely and confidentially, and speaking to Eurybiadēs alone, Themistoklēs was enabled to bring him partially round, and even prevailed upon him to convene a fresh synod. So soon as this synod had assembled, even before Eurybiadēs had explained the object and formally opened the discussion, Themistoklēs addressed himself to each of the chiefs separately, pouring forth at large his fears and anxiety as to the abandonment of Salamis: inasmuch that the Corinthian Adeimantus rebuked him by saying

¹ Herodot. viii. 57. Ὅσα δὲ ἐν ἡπείρῳ τὰς νῆας ἀπὸ Σαλαμῖνος, περὶ οὐδενὸς ἐστὶ πατρὸς καὶ μαγίστης: κατὰ γὰρ πόλεις ἕκαστοι τρέφονται, etc. Compare vii. 139, and Thucyd. i. 73.

“Themistoklēs, those who in the public festival-matches rise up before the proper signal, are scourged.” “True, (rejoined the Athenian), but those who lag behind the signal win no crowns.”¹

¹ Herodot. viii. 58, 59. The account given by Herodotus, of these memorable debates which preceded the battle of Salamis, is in the main distinct, instructive, and consistent. It is more probable than the narrative of Diodorus (xi. 15, 16), who states that Themistoklēs succeeded in fully convincing both Eurybiadēs and the Peloponnesian chiefs of the propriety of fighting at Salamis, but that, in spite of all their efforts, the armament would not obey them, and insisted on going to the Isthmus. And it deserves our esteem still more, if we contrast it with the loose and careless accounts of Plutarch and Cornelius Nepos. Plutarch (Themist. c. 11) describes the scene as if Eurybiadēs was the person who desired to restrain the forwardness and oratory of Themistoklēs, and with that view, first made to him the observation given in my text out of Herodotus, which Themistoklēs followed up by the same answer, — next, lifted up his stick to strike Themistoklēs, upon which the latter addressed to him the well-known observation, — “Strike, but hear me.” (Πάραξον μὲν, ἀκούσον δέ.) Larcher expresses his surprise that Herodotus should have suppressed so impressive an anecdote as this latter: but we may see plainly from the tenor of his narrative that he cannot have heard it. In the narrative of Herodotus, Themistoklēs gives no offence to Eurybiadēs, nor is the latter at all displeased with him: nay, Eurybiadēs is even brought over by the persuasion of Themistoklēs, and disposed to fall in with his views. The persons whom Herodotus represents as angry with Themistoklēs, are the Peloponnesian chiefs, especially Adeimantus the Corinthian. They are angry too, let it be added, not without plausible reason: a formal vote has just been taken by the majority, after full discussion: and here is the chief of the minority, who persuades Eurybiadēs to reopen the whole debate: not an unreasonable cause for displeasure. Moreover, it is Adeimantus, not Eurybiadēs, who addresses to Themistoklēs the remark, that “persons who rise before the proper signal are scourged:” and he makes the remark because Themistoklēs goes on speaking to, and trying to persuade, the various chiefs, before the business of the assembly has been formally opened. Themistoklēs draws upon himself the censure by sinning against the forms of business and talking before the proper time. But Plutarch puts the remark into the mouth of Eurybiadēs, without any previous circumstance to justify it, and without any fitness. His narrative represents Eurybiadēs as the person who was anxious both to transfer the ships to the Isthmus, and to prevent Themistoklēs from offering any opposition to it: though such an attempt to check argumentative opposition from the commander of the Athenian squadron is noway credible.

Dr. Blomfield (ad Æschyl. Pers. 728) imagines that the story about Eurybiadēs threatening Themistoklēs with his stick, grew out of the story

Eurybiadēs then explained to the synod that doubts had arisen in his mind, and that he called them together to reconsider the previous resolve: upon which Themistoklēs began the debate, and vehemently enforced the necessity of fighting in the narrow sea of Salamis and not in the open waters at the Isthmus, — as well as of preserving Megara and Ægina: contending that a naval victory at Salamis would be not less effective for the defence of Peloponnesus than if it took place at the Isthmus, whereas, if the fleet were withdrawn to the latter point, they would only draw the Persians after them. Nor did he omit to add, that the Athenians had a prophecy assuring to them victory in this, their own island. But his speech made little impression on the Peloponnesian chiefs, who were even exasperated at being again summoned to reopen a debate already concluded, — and concluded in a way which they deemed essential to their safety. In the bosom of the Corinthian Adeimantus, especially, this feeling of anger burst all bounds. He sharply denounced the presumption of Themistoklēs, and bade him be silent as a man who had now no free Grecian city to represent, — Athens being in the power of the enemy: nay, he went so far as to contend that Eurybiadēs had no right to count the vote of Themistoklēs, until the latter could produce some free city as accrediting him to the synod. Such an attack, alike ungenerous and insane, upon the leader of more than half of the whole fleet, demonstrates the ungovernable impatience of the Corinthians to carry away the fleet to their Isthmus: it provoked a bitter retort against them from Themistoklēs, who reminded them that while he had around him two hundred well-manned ships, he could procure for himself anywhere both city and territory as good or better than Corinth. But he now saw clearly that it was hopeless to think of enforcing his policy by argument, and that nothing would succeed except the direct language of intimidation. Turning to Eurybiadēs, and addressing him personally, he said: "If thou wilt stay here, and fight bravely here, all will turn out well: but

as related in Herodotus, though to Herodotus himself it was unknown. I cannot think that this is correct, since the story will not fit on to the narrative of that historian: it does not consist with his conception of the relations between Eurybiadēs and Themistoklēs.

if thou wilt not stay, thou wilt bring Hellas to ruin.¹ For with us, all our means of war are contained in our ships. Be thou yet persuaded by me. If not, we Athenians shall migrate with our families on board, just as we are, to Siris in Italy, which is ours from of old, and which the prophecies announce that we are one day to colonize. You chiefs then, when bereft of allies like us, will hereafter recollect what I am now saying."

Eurybiadēs had before been nearly convinced by the impressive pleading of Themistoklēs. But this last downright menace clenched his determination, and probably struck dumb even the Corinthian and Peloponnesian opponents: for it was but too plain, that without the Athenians the fleet was powerless. He did not however put the question again to vote, but took upon himself to rescind the previous resolution and to issue orders for staying at Salamis to fight. In this order all acquiesced, willing or unwilling;² the succeeding dawn saw them preparing for fight instead of for retreat, and invoking the protection and companionship of the Æakid heroes of Salamis, — Telamon and Ajax: they even sent a trireme to Ægina to implore Æakus himself and the remaining Æakids. It seems to have been on this same day, also, that the resolution of fighting at Salamis was taken by Xerxes, whose fleet was seen in motion, towards the close of the day, preparing for attack the next morning.

But the Peloponnesians, though not venturing to disobey the orders of the Spartan admiral, still retained unabated their former fears and reluctance, which began again after a short interval to prevail over the formidable menace of Themistoklēs, and were further strengthened by the advices from the Isthmus. The messengers from that quarter depicted the trepidation and affliction of their absent brethren while constructing their cross wall at that point, to resist the impending land invasion. Why were

¹ Herodot. viii, 61, 62. *Σὺ δ' ἢ μὲνεις αὐτοῦ, καὶ μένων ἔσσαι ἀνὴρ ἀγαθός ἐν ἡμῖν, ἀνατρεψείς τὴν Ἑλλάδα.*

All the best commentators treat this as an elliptical phrase, — some such words as *σώσεις τὴν Ἑλλάδα* or *καλῶς ἂν ἔχοι*, being understood after *ἀγαθός*. I adopt their construction, not without doubts whether it be the true one.

² Herodot. viii, 64. *Οὕτω μὲν οἱ περὶ Σαλαμίνα, ἔπειτα ἀκροβολισάμενοι, ἔπειτα τὸ Εἰρηνιάδην ἔδοξε, αὐτοῦ παρεσκευάζοντο ὡς ναυμαχέουτες.*

they not there also, to join hands and to help in the defence, — even if worsted at sea, — at least on land, instead of wasting their efforts in defence of Attica, already in the hands of the enemy? Such were the complaints which passed from man to man, with many a bitter exclamation against the insanity of Eurybiadēs: at length the common feeling broke out in public and mutinous manifestation, and a fresh synod of the chiefs was demanded and convoked.¹ Here the same angry debate, and the same irreconcilable difference, was again renewed; the Peloponnesian chiefs clamoring for immediate departure, while the Athenians, Æginetans,² and Megarians, were equally urgent in favor of staying to fight. It was evident to Themistoklēs that the majority of votes among the chiefs would be against him, in spite of the orders of Eurybiadēs; and the disastrous crisis, destined to deprive Greece of all united maritime defence, appeared imminent, — when he resorted to one last stratagem to meet the desperate emergency, by rendering flight impossible. Contriving a pretext for stealing away from the synod, he despatched a trusty messenger across the strait with a secret communication to the Persian generals. Sikinnus his slave, — seemingly an Asiatic Greek,³ who understood Persian, and had perhaps been sold during the late Ionic revolt, but whose superior qualities are marked by the fact that he had the care and teaching of the children of his master, — was instructed to acquaint them privately, in the name of Themistoklēs, who was represented as wishing success at heart to the Persians, that the Greek fleet

¹ Herodot. viii, 74. *ὅς μιν δὲ αὐτὸν ἄλλα ἄλλα κινίστατο, φανῶσα ποιῶμενοι τὴν Εὐρυβιάδου ἀπολαίην: τέλος δὲ ἐξέρχεται ἐς τὸ μέσον, συλλογὸς τε δὲ ἔχεται, καὶ πολλὰ ἔλεγτο περὶ τῶν αἰτίων, etc.* Compare Plutarch, Themist. c. 12.

² Lykurgus (cont. Leokrat. c. 17, p. 183) numbers the Æginetans among those who were anxious to escape from Salamis during the night, and were only prevented from doing so by the stratagem of Themistoklēs. This is a great mistake, as indeed these orators are perpetually misconceiving the facts of their past history. The Æginetans had an interest not less strong than the Athenians in keeping the fleet together and fighting at Salamis.

³ Plutarch (Themistoklēs, c. 12) calls Sikinnus a Persian by birth, which cannot be true.



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was not only in the utmost alarm, meditating immediate flight, but that the various portions of it were in such violent dissension, that they were more likely to fight against each other than against any common enemy. A splendid opportunity, it was added, was thus opened to the Persians, if they chose to avail themselves of it without delay, first, to inclose and prevent their flight, and then to attack a disunited body, many of whom would, when the combat began, openly espouse the Persian cause.¹

Such was the important communication despatched by Themistoklēs across the narrow strait, only a quarter of a mile in breadth at the narrowest part, which divides Salamis from the neighboring continent on which the enemy were posted. It was delivered with so much address as to produce the exact impression which he intended, and the glorious success which followed caused it to pass for a splendid stratagem: had defeat ensued, his name would have been covered with infamy. What surprises us the most is, that after having reaped signal honor from it in the eyes of the Greeks, as a stratagem, he lived to take credit for it, during the exile of his latter days,² as a capital service rendered to the Persian monarch: nor is it improbable, when we reflect upon the desperate condition of Grecian affairs at the moment, that such facility of double interpretation was in part his inducement for sending the message.

It appears to have been delivered to Xerxes shortly after he had issued his orders for fighting on the next morning: and he entered so greedily into the scheme, as to direct his generals to close up the strait of Salamis on both sides during the night,³ to

¹ Herodot. viii. 75.

² Thucyd. i. 137. It is curious to contrast this with Æschylus, *Persæ*, 351, *seq.* See also Herodot. viii. 109, 110.

Isokratēs might well remark about the ultimate rewards given by the Persians to Themistoklēs. — Θημιστοκλῆα δ', ὅς ὑπὲρ τῆς Ἑλλάδος αὐτοῦς κατενέμαχον, τῶν ἀρχόντων δόξων ἡξίωσαν (*Panegyric*, Or. iv. p. 74), — though that orator speaks as if he knew nothing about the stratagem by which Themistoklēs compelled the Greeks to fight at Salamis against their will. See the same Oration, c. 27. p. 61.

³ Æschylus, *Persæ*, 370.

Herodotus does not mention this threat to the generals, nor does he even notice the personal interference of Xerxes in any way, so far as regards the night-movement of the Persian fleet. He treats the communication of

the north as well as to the south of the town of Salamis, at the risk of their heads if any opening were left for the Greeks to escape. The station of the numerous Persian fleet was along the coast of Attica, — its head-quarters were in the bay of Phalerum, but doubtless parts of it would occupy those three natural harbors, as yet unimproved by art, which belonged to the deme of Peiræus, — and would perhaps extend besides to other portions of the western coast southward of Phalerum: while the Greek fleet was in the harbor of the town called Salamis, in the portion of the island facing mount Ægaleos, in Attica. During the night,¹ a portion of the Persian fleet, sailing from Peiræus northward along the western coast of Attica, closed round to the north of the town and harbor of Salamis, so as to shut up the northern issue from the strait on the side of Eleusis: while another portion blocked up the other issue between Peiræus and the southeastern corner of the island, landing a detachment of troops on the desert island of Psyttaleia, near to that corner.²

Sikinnus as having been made to the Persian generals, and the night-movement as undertaken by them. The statement of the contemporary poet seems the more probable of the two: but he omits, as might be expected, all notice of the perilous dissensions in the Greek camp.

¹ Diodorus (xi. 17) states that the Egyptian squadron in the fleet of Xerxes was detached to block up the outlet between Salamis and the Megarid; that is, to sail round the southwestern corner of the island to the northwestern strait, where the northwestern corner of the island is separated by a narrow strait from Megara, near the spot where the fort of Budorum was afterwards situated, during the Peloponnesian war.

Herodotus mentions nothing of this movement, and his account evidently implies that the Greek fleet was inclosed to the north of the town of Salamis, the Persian right wing having got between that town and Eleusis. The movement announced by Diodorus appears to me unnecessary and improbable. If the Egyptian squadron had been placed there, they would have been far indeed removed from the scene of the action, but we may see that Herodotus believed them to have taken actual part in the battle along with the rest (viii. 100).

² Herodot. viii. 76. Τοῖσι δὲ ὡς πρῶτον ἐγένετο τὸ ἀγγελλόμενον, τοῦτο μὲν ἐς τὴν νῆσον τὴν Ψυτταλείαν, μεταξὺ Σαλαμῖνός τε κινύσου καὶ τῆς ἡττοῦ, πολλοὺς ὅν τι Περσῶν ἀπεσέβαν· τοῦτο δὲ, ἐπειδὴ ἐγένετο μισαὶ νύκτι, ἀνήγον αἱ τὸ ἀπ' ἑσπερας κέρως κυκλονόμενοι πρὸς τὴν Σαλαμῖνα· ἀνέγον δ' οἱ αὐτοὶ τὴν Κεόν τε καὶ τὴν Κυνόσουραν τεταγμένοι, κατεῖχον τε μὴ καταναίχῃς τὰν τῶν ἑλλήνων νηῶν.

These measures were all taken during the night, to prevent the anticipated flight of the Greeks, and then to attack them in the narrow strait close on their own harbor the next morning.

He had previously stated Phalerum as the main station of the Persian fleet; not necessarily meaning that the whole of it was there. The passage which I have just transcribed intimated what the Persians did to accomplish their purpose of surrounding the Greeks in the harbor of Salamis, and the first part of it, wherein he speaks of the western (more properly northwestern) wing, presents no extraordinary difficulty, though we do not know how far the western wing extended before the movement was commenced. Probably it extended to the harbor of Peiræus, and began from thence its night-movement along the Attic coast to get beyond the town of Salamis. But the second part of the passage is not easy to comprehend, where he states that, "those who were stationed about Keos and Kynosura also moved, and beset with their ships the whole strait as far as Munchia." What places are Keos and Kynosura, and where were they situated? The only known places of those names, are the island of Keos, not far south of cape Sunium in Attica, — and the promontory Kynosura, on the northeastern coast of Attica, immediately north of the bay of Marathon. It seems hardly possible to suppose that Herodotus meant this latter promontory, which would be too distant to render the movement which he describes at all practicable: even the island of Keos is somewhat open to the same objection, though not in so great a degree, of being too distant. Hence Barthélemy, Kruse, Bähr, and Dr. Thirlwall, apply the names Keos and Kynosura to two promontories (the southernmost and the southeasternmost) of the island of Salamis, and Kiepert has realized their idea in his newly published maps. But in the first place, no authority is produced for giving these names to two promontories in the island, and the critics only do it because they say it is necessary to secure a reasonable meaning to this passage of Herodotus. In the next place, if we admit their supposition, we must suppose that, *before this night-movement commenced*, the Persian fleet was already stationed in part off the island of Salamis: which appears to me highly improbable. Whatever station that fleet occupied before the night-movement, we may be very sure that it was not upon an island then possessed by the enemy: it was somewhere on the coast of Attica; and the names Keos and Kynosura must belong to some unknown points in Attica, not in Salamis. I cannot therefore adopt the supposition of these critics, though on the other hand Larcher is not satisfactory in his attempt to remove the objections which apply to the supposition of Keos and Kynosura as commonly understood. It is difficult in this case to reconcile the statement of Herodotus with geographical considerations, and I rather suspect that on this occasion the historian has been himself misled by too great a desire to find the oracle of Bakis truly fulfilled. It is from Bakis that he copies the name Kynosura (viii, 77)

Meanwhile, that angry controversy among the Grecian chiefs, in the midst of which Themistoklēs had sent over his secret envoy, continued without abatement and without decision. It was the interest of the Athenian general to prolong the debate, and to prevent any concluding vote until the effect of his stratagem should have rendered retreat impossible: nor was prolongation difficult in a case so critical, where the majority of chiefs was on one side and that of naval force on the other, — especially as Eurybiadēs himself was favorable to the view of Themistoklēs. Accordingly, the debate was still unfinished at nightfall, and either continued all night, or was adjourned to an hour before daybreak on the following morning, when an incident, interesting as well as important, gave to it a new turn. The ostracized Aristeidēs arrived at Salamis from Ægina. Since the revocation of his sentence, proposed by Themistoklēs himself, he had had no opportunity of revisiting Athens, and he now for the first time rejoined his countrymen in their exile at Salamis; not uninformed of the dissensions raging, and of the impatience of the Peloponnesians to retire to the Isthmus. He was the first to bring the news that such retirement had become impracticable from the position of the Persian fleet, which his own vessel, in coming from Ægina, had only eluded under favor of night. He caused Themistoklēs to be invited out from the assembled synod of chiefs, and after a generous exordium, wherein he expressed his hope that their rivalry would for the future be only a competition in doing good to their common country, apprized him that the new movement of the Persians excluded all hope of now reaching the Isthmus and rendered farther debate useless. Themistoklēs expressed his joy at the intelligence, and communicated his own secret message whereby he had himself brought the movement about, in order that the Peloponnesian chiefs might be forced to fight at Salamis, even against their own consent. He moreover desired Aristeidēs to go himself into the synod, and communicate the news: for if it came from the lips of Themistoklēs, the Peloponnesians would treat it as a fabrication. So obstinate indeed was their incredulity, that they refused to accept it as truth even on the assertion of Aristeidēs: nor was it until the arrival of a Tenian vessel, deserting from the Persian fleet, that they at last brought themselves to credit the actual posture of

affairs and the entire impossibility of retreat. Once satisfied of this fact, they prepared themselves at dawn for the impending battle.¹

Having caused his land-force to be drawn up along the shore opposite to Salamis, Xerxes had erected for himself a lofty seat, or throne, upon one of the projecting declivities of mount Ægaleos, near the Herakleion and immediately overhanging the sea,² — from whence he could plainly review all the phases of the combat and the conduct of his subject troops. He was persuaded himself that they had not done their best at Artemisium, in consequence of his absence, and that his presence would inspire them with fresh valor: moreover, his royal scribes stood ready by his side to take the names both of the brave and of the backward combatants. On the right wing of his fleet, which approached Salamis on the side of Eleusis, and was opposed to the Athenians on the Grecian left, — were placed the Phœnicians and Egyptians; on his left wing the Ionians,³ — approaching from the side of Peiræus, and opposed to the Lacedæmonians, Æginetans, and Megarians. The seamen of the Persian

¹ Herodot. viii. 79, 80.

Herodotus states, doubtless correctly, that Aristeidēs, immediately after he had made the communication to the synod, went away, not pretending to take part in the debate: Plutarch represents him as present, and as taking part in it (Aristeidēs, c. 9). According to Plutarch, Themistoklēs desires Aristeidēs to assist him in persuading Eurybiadēs: according to Herodotus, Eurybiadēs was already persuaded: it was the Peloponnesian chiefs who stood out.

The details of Herodotus will be found throughout both more credible and more consistent than those of Plutarch and the later writers.

² Æschylus, Pers. 473; Herodot. viii. 90. The throne with silver feet upon which Xerxes had sat, was long preserved in the acropolis of Athens — having been left at his retreat. Harpokration, Ἀργυροπόδες θρόνος.

A writer, to whom Plutarch refers, — Akastodōrus, — affirmed that the seat of Xerxes was erected, not under mount Ægaleos, but much farther to the northwest, on the borders of Attica and the Megarid, under the mountains called Kerata (Plutarch, Themistoklēs, 13). If this writer was acquainted with the topography of Attica, we must suppose him to have ascribed an astonishingly long sight to Xerxes: but we may probably take the assertion as a sample of that carelessness in geography which marks so many ancient writers. Ktesias recognizes the Ἡρακλεῖον Persica, c. 26)

³ Herodot. viii, 85; Diodor. xi. 16.

fleet, however, had been on shipboard all night, in making that movement which had brought them into their actual position: while the Greek seamen now began without previous fatigue, fresh from the animated harangues of Themistoklēs and the other leaders: moreover, just as they were getting on board, they were joined by the triremes which had been sent to Ægina to bring to their aid Æakus, with the other Æakid heroes. Honored with this precious heroic aid, which tended so much to raise the spirits of the Greeks, the Æginetan trireme now arrived just in time to take her post in the line, having eluded pursuit from the intervening enemy.¹

The Greeks rowed forward from the shore to attack with the usual pean, or war-shout, which was confidently returned by the Persians; and the latter were the most forward of the two to begin the fight: for the Greek seamen, on gradually nearing the enemy, became at first disposed to hesitate, — and even backed water for a space, so that some of them touched ground on their own shore: until the retrograde movement was arrested by a supernatural feminine figure hovering over them, who exclaimed with a voice that rang through the whole fleet, — “Ye worthies, how much farther are ye going to back water?” The very circulation of this fable attests the dubious courage of the Greeks at the commencement of the battle.² The brave Athenian cap-

¹ Herodot. viii. 83; Plutarch (Themistoklēs, c. 13; Aristeidēs, c. 9; Pelopidas, c. 21). Plutarch tells a story out of Phaniās respecting an incident in the moment before the action, which it is pleasing to find sufficient ground for rejecting. Themistoklēs, with the prophet Euphrantidēs, was offering sacrifice by the side of the admiral’s galley, when three beautiful youths, nephews of Xerxes, were brought in prisoners. As the fire was just then blazing brilliantly, and sneezing was heard from the right, the prophet enjoined Themistoklēs to offer these three prisoners as a propitiatory offering to Dionysus Omēstēs: which the clamor of the bystanders compelled him to do against his will. This is what Plutarch states in his life of Themistoklēs; in his life of Aristeidēs, he affirms that these youths were brought prisoners from Psyttaleia, when Aristeidēs attacked it at the beginning of the action. Now Aristeidēs did not attack Psyttaleia until the naval combat was nearly over, so that no prisoners can have been brought from thence at the commencement of the action: there could therefore have been no Persian prisoners to sacrifice, and the story may be dismissed as a fiction.

² Herodot. viii. 84. *φασίσαν δὲ διακελεύσασθαι, ὥστε καὶ ἅπαν ἀκούσα*

tains Ameinias and Lyxomēdēs (the former, brother of the poet Æschylus) were the first to obey either the feminine voice or the inspirations of their own ardor: though according to the version current at Ægina, it was the Æginetan ship, the carrier of the Æakid heroes, which first set this honorable example.¹ The Naxian Demokritus was celebrated by Simonides as the third ship in action. Ameinias, darting forth from the line, charged with the beak of his ship full against a Phœnician, and the two became entangled so that he could not again get clear: other ships came in aid on both sides, and the action thus became general. Herodotus, with his usual candor, tells us that he could procure few details about the action, except as to what concerned Artemisia, the queen of his own city: so that we know hardly anything beyond the general facts. But it appears that, with the exception of the Ionic Greeks, many of whom — apparently a greater number than Herodotus likes to acknowledge — were lukewarm, and some even averse,² the subjects of Xerxes conducted themselves generally with great bravery: Phœnicians, Cyprians, Kilikians, Egyptians, vied with the Persians and

τοὺς τοῦ Ἑλλήνων στρατοπέδου, ἀνεδείξαντες πρότερον τὰδε· Ὡ δαμόνιοι, μὴ καὶ κῆπον ἐπὶ πρῶτον ἀνακρούσθε;

Æschylus (Pers. 396–415) describes finely the war-shout of the Greeks and the response of the Persians: for very good reasons, he does not notice the incipient backwardness of the Greeks, which Herodotus brings before us.

The war-shout, here described by Æschylus, a warrior actually engaged, shows us the difference between a naval combat of that day and the improved tactics of the Athenians fifty years afterwards, at the beginning of the Peloponnesian war. Phormio especially enjoins on his men the necessity of silence (Thucyd. ii. 89).

¹ Simonides, Epigram 138, Bergk; Plutarch, De Herodot. Malignitate, c. 36.

According to Plutarch (Themist. 12) and Diodorus (xi. 17), it was the Persian admiral’s ship which was first charged and captured: if the fact had been so, Æschylus would probably have specified it.

² Herodot. viii. 85; Diodor. xi. 16. Æschylus, in the Persæ, though he gives a long list of the names of those who fought against Athens, does not make any allusion to the Ionic or to any other Greeks as having formed part of the catalogue. See Blomfield ad Æschyl. Pers. 42. Such silence easily admits of explanation: yet it affords an additional reason for believing that the Persians so admitted did not fight very heartily.

Medes serving as soldiers on shipboard, in trying to satisfy the exigent monarch who sat on shore watching their behavior. Their signal defeat was not owing to any want of courage, — but, first, to the narrow space which rendered their superior number a hindrance rather than a benefit: next, to their want of orderly line and discipline as compared with the Greeks. thirdly, to the fact that, when once fortune seemed to turn against them, they had no fidelity or reciprocal attachment, and each ally was willing to sacrifice or even to run down others, in order to effect his own escape. Their numbers and absence of concert threw them into confusion, and caused them to run foul of each other: those in the front could not recede, nor could those in the rear advance: ¹ the oar-blades were broken by collision, — the steersmen lost control of their ships, and could no longer adjust the ship's course so as to strike that direct blow with the beak which was essential in ancient warfare. After some time of combat, the whole Persian fleet was driven back and became thoroughly unmanageable, so that the issue was no longer doubtful, and nothing remained except the efforts of individual bravery to protract the struggle. While the Athenian squadron on the left, which had the greatest resistance to surmount, broke up and drove before them the Persian right, the Æginetans on the right intercepted the flight of the fugitives to Phalerum: ² Demokritus, the Naxian captain, was said to have captured five ships of the Persians with his own single trireme. The chief admiral, Ariabignēs, brother of Xerxes, attacked at once by two Athenian triremes, fell, gallantly trying to board one of them, and the number of distinguished Persians and Medes who shared his fate was great: ³ the more so, as few of them knew how to swim, while among the Greek seamen who were cast into the sea, the greater number were swimmers, and had the friendly shore of

¹ Herodot. vii. 86; Diodor. xi. 17. The testimony of the former, both to the courage manifested by the Persian fleet, and to their entire want of order and system, is decisive, as well as to the effect of the personal overlooking of Xerxes.

² Simonides, Epigr. 138. Bergk.

³ The many names of Persian chiefs whom Æschylus reports as having been slain, are probably for the most part inventions of his own, to please the ears of his audience. See Blomfield, Prefat. ad Æschyl. Pers. p. xii.

Salamis near at hand. It appears that the Phenician seamen of the fleet threw the blame of defeat upon the Ionic Greeks; and some of them, driven ashore during the heat of the battle under the immediate throne of Xerxes, excused themselves by denouncing the others as traitors. The heads of the Ionic leaders might have been endangered if the monarch had not seen with his own eyes an act of surprising gallantry by one of their number. An Ionic trireme from Samothrace charged and disabled an Attic trireme, but was herself almost immediately run down by an Æginetan. The Samothracian crew, as their vessel lay disabled on the water, made such excellent use of their missile weapons, that they cleared the decks of the Æginetan, sprung on board, and became masters of her. This exploit, passing under the eyes of Xerxes himself, induced him to treat the Phenicians as dastardly calumniators, and to direct their heads to be cut off: his wrath and vexation, Herodotus tells us, were boundless, and he scarcely knew on whom to vent it.¹

In this disastrous battle itself, as in the debate before the battle, the conduct of Artemisia of Halikarnassus was such as to give him full satisfaction. It appears that this queen maintained her full part in the battle until the disorder had become irretrievable; she then sought to escape, pursued by the Athenian trierarch, Ameinias, but found her progress obstructed by the number of fugitive or embarrassed comrades before her. In this dilemma, she preserved herself from pursuit by attacking one of her own comrades; she charged the trireme of the Karian prince, Damasithymus, of Kalyndus, ran it down and sunk it, so that the prince with all his crew perished. Had Ameinias been aware that the vessel which he was following was that of Artemisia, nothing would have induced him to relax in the pursuit, — for the Athenian captains were all indignant at the idea of a female invader assailing their city; ² but knowing her ship only as one among the enemy, and seeing her thus charge and destroy another enemy's ship, he concluded her to be a deserter, turned

¹ Herodot. viii. 90.

² Compare the indignant language of Demosthenēs a century and a quarter afterwards, respecting the second Artemisia, queen of Karia, as the enemy of Athens, — *ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν ἄνθρωπος ὁ βάρβαρον ἀνδρῶν καὶ ταῦτα ναῖκα, φοβηθῆσθαι* (Demosthenes, De Rhodior. Libertat. c. x, p. 127).

his pursuit elsewhere, and suffered her to escape. At the same time, it so happened that the destruction of the ship of Damasthimus happened under the eyes of Xerxes and of the persons around him on shore, who recognized the ship of Artemisia, but supposed the ship destroyed to be a Greek. Accordingly they remarked to him, "Master, seest thou not how well Artemisia fights, and how she has just sunk an enemy's ship?" Assured that it was really her deed, Xerxes is said to have replied, "My men have become women; my women, men." Thus was Artemisia not only preserved, but exalted to a higher place in the esteem of Xerxes by the destruction of one of his own ships, — among the crew of which not a man survived to tell the true story.¹

Of the total loss of either fleet, Herodotus gives us no estimate; but Diodorus states the number of ships destroyed on the Grecian side as forty, on the Persian side as two hundred; independent of those which were made prisoners with all their crews. To the Persian loss is to be added, the destruction of all those troops whom they had landed before the battle in the island of Psyttaleia: as soon as the Persian fleet was put to flight, Aristeidēs carried over some Grecian hoplites to that island, overpowered the enemy, and put them to death to a man. This

¹ Herodot. viii. 87, 88, 93. The story given here by Herodotus respecting the stratagem whereby Artemisia escaped, seems sufficiently probable; and he may have heard it from fellow-citizens of his own who were aboard her vessel. Though Plutarch accuses him of extravagant disposition to compliment this queen, it is evident that he does not himself like the story, nor consider it to be a compliment; for he himself insinuates a doubt: "I do not know whether she ran down the Kalyndian ship intentionally, or came accidentally into collision with it." Since the shock was so destructive that the Kalyndian ship was completely run down and sunk, so that every man of her crew perished, we may be pretty sure that it was intentional; and the historian merely suggests a possible hypothesis to palliate an act of great treachery. Though the story of the sinking of the Kalyndian ship has the air of truth, however, we cannot say the same about the observation of Xerxes, and the notice which he is reported to have taken of the act: all this reads like nothing but romance.

We have to regret (as Plutarch observes, *De Malign.* Herodot. p. 873) that Herodotus tells us so much less about others than about Artemisia; but he doubtless heard more about her than about the rest, and perhaps his own relatives may have been among her contingent.

loss appears to have been much deplored, as they were choice troops; in great proportion, the native Persian guards.¹

Great and capital as the victory was, there yet remained after it a sufficient portion of the Persian fleet to maintain even maritime war vigorously, not to mention the powerful land-force, as yet unshaken. And the Greeks themselves, immediately after they had collected in their island, as well as could be done, the fragments of shipping and the dead bodies, made themselves ready for a second engagement.² But they were relieved from this necessity by the pusillanimity³ of the invading monarch, in whom the defeat had occasioned a sudden revulsion from contemptuous confidence, not only to rage and disappointment, but to the extreme of alarm for his own personal safety. He was possessed with a feeling of mingled wrath and mistrust against his naval force, which consisted entirely of subject nations, — Phenicians, Egyptians, Kilikians, Cyprians, Pamphylians, Ionic Greeks, etc., with a few Persians and Medes serving on board, in a capacity probably not well suited to them. None of these subjects had any interest in the success of the invasion, or any other motive for service except fear, while the sympathies of the Ionic Greeks were even decidedly against it. Xerxes now came to suspect the fidelity, or undervalue the courage, of all these naval subjects;⁴ he fancied that they could make no resistance to the Greek fleet, and dreaded lest the latter should sail forthwith to the Hellespont, so as to break down the bridge and intercept his personal retreat; for, upon the maintenance of that bridge he conceived his own safety to turn, not less than that of his father Darius, when retreating from Scythia, upon the preservation of the bridge over the Danube.⁵ Against the Phenicians, from

¹ Herodot. viii. 95; Plutarch. *Aristid.* c. 9; *Æschyl.* *Pers.* 454-470; *Diodor.* xii. 19. ² Herodot. viii. 96.

³ The victories of the Greeks over the Persians were materially aided by the personal timidity of Xerxes, and of Darius Codomannus at Issus and Arbēla (*Arrian.* ii. 11. 6; iii. 14. 3).

⁴ See this feeling especially in the language of Mardonius to Xerxes (*Herodot.* viii. 100), as well as in that put into the mouth of Artemisia by the historian (viii. 68), which indicates the general conception of the historian himself, derived from the various information which reached him.

⁵ Herodot. vii. 30.

whom he had expected most, his rage broke out in such fierce threats, that they stole away from the fleet in the night, and departed homeward.¹ Such a capital desertion made future naval struggle still more hopeless, and Xerxes, though at first breathing revenge, and talking about a vast mole or bridge to be thrown across the strait to Salamis, speedily ended by giving orders to the whole fleet to leave Phalerum in the night, — not without disembarking, however, the best soldiers who served on board.² They were to make straight for the Hellespont, and there to guard the bridge against his arrival.³

This resolution was prompted by Mardonius, who saw the real terror which beset his master, and read therein sufficient evidence of danger to himself. When Xerxes despatched to Susa intelligence of his disastrous overthrow, the feeling at home was not simply that of violent grief for the calamity, and fear for the personal safety of the monarch, — it was farther imbittered by

¹ This important fact is not stated by Herodotus, but it is distinctly given in Diodorus, xi. 19. It seems probable enough.

If the tragedy of Phrynichus, entitled *Phemissæ*, had been preserved, we should have known more about the position and behavior of the Phœnician contingent in this invasion. It was represented at Athens only three years after the battle of Salamis, in B.C. 477 or 476, with Themistoklēs as choregus, four years earlier than the *Persæ* of Æschylus, which was affirmed by Glaukus to have been (*παρὰ τὴν τοῖς ὁδοῖς*) altered from it. The Chorus in the *Phemissæ* consisted of Phœnician women, possibly the widows of those Phœnicians whom Xerxes had caused to be beheaded after the battle (Herodot. viii. 90, as Dr. Blomfield supposes, *Præf. ad Æsch. Pers.* p. ix), or only of Phœnicians absent on the expedition. The fragments remaining of this tragedy, which gained the prize, are too scanty to sustain any conjectures as to its scheme or details (see Welcker *Griechische Tragœd.* vol. i, p. 26; and Droysen, *Phrynichos, Æschylos, und die Trilogie*, pp. 4-6).

² Herodot. viii. 97-107. Such was the terror of these retreating seamen, that they are said to have mistaken the projecting cliffs of Cape Zōstēr (about half-way between Peiræus and Sunium) for ships, and redoubled the haste of their flight as if an enemy were after them, — a story which we can treat as nothing better than silly exaggeration in the Athenian informants of Herodotus.

Ktesias, *Pers. c. xxvi*; Strabo, ix, p. 395; the two latter talk about the intention to carry a mole across from Attica to Salamis, as if it had been conceived before the battle.

anger against Mardonius, as the instigator of this ruinous enterprise. That general knew full well that there was no safety for him in returning to Persia with the shame of failure on his head: it was better for him to take upon himself the chance of subduing Greece, which he had good hopes of being yet able to do, — and to advise the return of Xerxes himself to a safe and easy residence in Asia. Such counsel was eminently palatable to the present alarm of the monarch, while it opened to Mardonius himself a fresh chance not only of safety, but of increased power and glory. Accordingly, he began to reassure his master, by representing that the recent blow was after all not serious, — that it had only fallen upon the inferior part of his force, and upon worthless foreign slaves, like Phœnicians, Egyptians, etc., while the native Persian troops yet remained unconquered and unconquerable, fully adequate to execute the monarch's revenge upon Hellas; — that Xerxes might now very well retire with the bulk of his army if he were disposed, and that he, Mardonius, would pledge himself to complete the conquest, at the head of three hundred thousand chosen troops. This proposition afforded at the same time consolation for the monarch's wounded vanity, and safety for his person: his confidential Persians, and Artemisia herself, on being consulted, approved of the step. The latter had acquired his confidence by the dissuasive advice which she had given before the recent deplorable engagement, and she had every motive now to encourage a proposition indicating solicitude for his person, as well as relieving herself from the obligation of farther service. "If Mardonius desires to remain," she remarked, contemptuously², by all means let him have the troops: should he succeed, thou wilt be the gainer: should he even perish, the loss of some of thy slaves is trifling, so long as thou remainest safe, and thy house in power. Thou hast already accomplished the purpose of thy expedition, in burning Athens." Xerxes, while adopting this counsel, and directing the return of his fleet, showed his satisfaction with the Halikarnassian queen, by intrusting her with some of his children, directing her to transport them to Ephesus.

The Greeks at Salamis learned with surprise and joy the de-

¹ Compare Herodot. vii, 10.

² Herodot. viii. 101. 102.

parture of the hostile fleet from the bay of Phalærum, and immediately put themselves in pursuit; following as far as the island of Andros without success. Themistoklēs and the Athenians are even said to have been anxious to push on forthwith to the Hellespont, and there break down the bridge of boats, in order to prevent the escape of Xerxes, — had they not been restrained by the caution of Eurybiadēs and the Peloponnesians, who represented that it was dangerous to detain the Persian monarch in the heart of Greece. Themistoklēs readily suffered himself to be persuaded, and contributed much to divert his countrymen from the idea; while he at the same time sent the faithful Sikinnus a second time to Xerxes, with the intimation that he, Themistoklēs, had restrained the impatience of the Greeks to proceed without delay and burn the Hellespontine bridge, — and that he had thus, from personal friendship to the monarch, secured for him a safe retreat.¹ Though this is the story related by Herodotus, we can hardly believe that, with the great Persian land-force in the heart of Attica, there could have been any serious idea of so distant an operation as that of attacking the bridge at the Hellespont. It seems more probable that Themistoklēs fabricated the intention, with a view of frightening Xerxes away, as well as of establishing a personal claim upon his gratitude in reserve for future contingences.

Such crafty manœuvres and long-sighted calculations of possibility, seem extraordinary: but the facts are sufficiently attested, — since Themistoklēs lived to claim as well as to receive fulfilment of the obligation thus conferred, — and though extraordinary, they will not appear inexplicable, if we reflect, first, that the Persian game, even now, after the defeat of Salamis, was not only not desperate, but might perfectly well have succeeded, if it had been played with reasonable prudence: next, that there existed in the mind of this eminent man an almost unparalleled

¹ Herodot. viii, 109, 110; Thucyd. i, 137. The words *ἐν καρδίᾳ προσέειπεν* may probably be understood in a sense somewhat larger than that which they naturally bear in Thucydides. In point of fact, not only was it false that Themistoklēs was the person who dissuaded the Greeks from going to the Hellespont, but it was also false that the Greeks had ever any serious intention of going there. Compare Cornelius Nepos Themistokl. c. 5.

combination of splendid patriotism, long-sighted cunning, and selfish rapacity. Themistoklēs knew better than any one else that the cause of Greece had appeared utterly desperate, only a few hours before the late battle: moreover, a clever man, tainted with such constant guilt, might naturally calculate on being one day detected and punished, even if the Greeks proved successful.

He now employed the fleet among the islands of the Cyclades, for the purpose of levying fines upon them as a punishment for adherence to the Persian. He first laid siege to Andros, telling the inhabitants that he came to demand their money, bringing with him two great gods, — Persuasion and Necessity. To which the Andrians replied, that "Athens was a great city, and blest with excellent gods: but that *they* were miserably poor, and that there were two unkind gods who always stayed with them and would never quit the island, — Poverty and Helplessness.¹ In these gods the Andrians put their trust, refusing to deliver the money required; for the power of Athens could never overcome their inability." While the fleet was engaged in contending against the Andrians with their sad protecting deities, Themistoklēs sent round to various other cities, demanding from them private sums of money on condition of securing them from attack. From Karystus, Paros, and other places, he thus extorted bribes for himself apart from the other generals,² but it appears that Andros was found unproductive, and after no very long absence, the fleet was brought back to Salamis.³

The intimation sent by Themistoklēs perhaps had the effect of hastening the departure of Xerxes, who remained in Attica only a few days after the battle of Salamis, and then withdrew his army through Boeotia into Thessaly, where Mardonius made choice of the troops to be retained for his future operations. He retained all the Persians, Medes, Sakæ, Baktrians, and Indians,

¹ Herodot. viii, 111. *ὅτι Ἀνδρῶν ἦν εἶναι γεωργίας ἐς τὰ μέγιστα καὶ θεῶν δύο ἀρχηγόων οἱ αὐτοὶ ἐκλείπειν σόειον τὴν νῆσον, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἀλλοχομένους — Πενίην τε καὶ Ἀμηχανίην.*

Compare Alkæus, Fragm. 90. ed. Bergk, and Herodot. vii, 172.

² Herodot. viii, 112; Plutarch. Themistoklēs, c. 21, — who cites a few bitter lines from the contemporary poet Timokreon.

³ Herodot. viii, 112-121.

horse as well as foot, together with select detachments of the remaining contingents: making in all, according to Herodotus, three hundred thousand men. But as it was now the beginning of September, and as sixty thousand out of his forces, under Artabazus, were destined to escort Xerxes himself to the Hellespont, Mardonius proposed to winter in Thessaly, and to postpone farther military operations until the ensuing spring.¹

Having left most of these troops under the orders of Mardonius in Thessaly, Xerxes marched away with the rest to the Hellespont, by the same road as he had taken in his advance a few months before. Respecting his retreat, a plentiful stock of stories were circulated,² — inconsistent with each other, fanciful and

¹ Herodot. viii. 114-126.

² The account given by Æschylus of this retiring march appears to me exaggerated, and in several points incredible (*Persæ*, 482-513). That they suffered greatly during the march from want of provisions, is doubtless true, and that many of them died of hunger. But we must consider in deduction: 1. That this march took place in the months of October and November, therefore not very long after the harvest. 2. That Mardonius maintained a large army in Thessaly all the winter, and brought them out in fighting condition in the spring. 3. That Artabazus also, with another large division, was in military operation in Thrace all the winter, after having escorted Xerxes into safety.

When we consider these facts, it will seem that the statements of Æschylus, even as to the sufferings by famine, must be taken with great allowance. But his statement about the passage of the Strymon appears to me incredible, and I regret to find myself on this point differing from Dr. Thirlwall, who considers it an undoubted fact. (*Hist. Greece*, ch. xv, p. 351, 2d ed.) "The river had been frozen in the night hard enough to bear those who arrived first. But the ice suddenly gave way under the morning sun, and numbers perished in the waters." — so Dr. Thirlwall states, after Æschylus, — adding, in a note, "It is a little surprising that Herodotus, when he is describing the miseries of the retreat, does not notice this disaster, which is so prominent in the narrative of the Persian messenger in Æschylus. There can, however, be no doubt as to the fact: and perhaps it may furnish a useful warning, not to lay too much stress on the silence of Herodotus, as a ground for rejecting even important and interesting facts which are only mentioned by later writers," etc.

That a large river, such as the Strymon, near its mouth (180 yards broad and in latitude about N. 40° 50'), at a period which could not have been later than the beginning of November, should have been frozen over in one night so hardly and firmly as to admit of a portion of the army marching over it at daybreak, before the sun became warm, — is a statement which

even incredible: Grecian imagination, in the contemporary poet Æschylus, as well as in the Latin moralizers Seneca or Juvenal,¹ delighted in handling this invasion with the maximum of light and shadow, — magnifying the destructive misery and humiliation of the retreat so as to form an impressive contrast with the superhuman pride of the advance, and illustrating the antithesis with unbounded license of detail. The sufferings from want of provision were doubtless severe, and are described as frightful and death-dealing: the magazines stored up for the advancing march had been exhausted, so that the retiring army were now forced to seize upon the corn of the country through which they passed, — an insufficient maintenance, eked out by leaves, grass, the bark of trees, and other wretched substitutes for food. Plague and dysentery aggravated their misery, and occasioned many to

surely requires a more responsible witness than Æschylus to avouch it. In fact, he himself describes it as a "frost out of season," (*χειμὼν ἄκαιρος*), brought about by a special interposition of the gods. If he is to be believed, none of the fugitives were saved, except such as were fortunate enough to cross the Strymon on the ice during the interval between break of day and the sun's heat. One would imagine that there was a pursuing enemy on their track, leaving them only a short time for escape: whereas in fact, they had no enemy to contend with, — nothing but the difficulty of finding subsistence. During the advancing march of Xerxes, a bridge of boats had been thrown over the Strymon: nor can any reason be given why that bridge should not still have been subsisting: Artabazus must have recrossed it after he had accompanied the monarch to the Hellespont. I will add, that the town and fortress of Eion, which commanded the mouth of the Strymon, remained as an important strong-hold of the Persians some years after this event, and was only captured, after a desperate resistance, by the Athenians and their confederates under Kimon.

The Athenian auditors of the *Persæ* would not criticize nicely, the historical credibility of that which Æschylus told them about the sufferings of their retreating foe, nor his geographical credibility when he placed Mount Pangæus on the hither side of the Strymon, to persons marching out of Greece (*Persæ*, 494). But I must confess that, to my mind, his whole narrative of the retreat bears the stamp of the poet and the religious man, not of the historical witness. And my confidence in Herodotus is increased when I compare him on this matter with Æschylus, — as well in what he says as in what he does not say.

¹ Juvenal. Satir. x, 178.

Ille tamen qualis rediit, Salamine relictâ.

La Caurum atque Eurum solitus sœvire flagellis, etc

be left behind among the cities through whose territory the retreat was carried; strict orders being left by Xerxes that these cities should maintain and tend them. After forty-five days' march from Attica, he at length found himself at the Hellespont, whither his fleet, retreating from Salamis, had arrived long before him.¹ But the short-lived bridge had already been knocked to pieces by a storm, so that the army was transported on shipboard across to Asia, where it first obtained comfort and abundance, and where the change from privation to excess engendered new maladies. In the time of Herodotus, the citizens of Abdera still showed the gilt cimeter and tiara, which Xerxes had presented to them when he halted there in his retreat, in token of hospitality and satisfaction: and they even went the length of affirming that never, since his departure from Attica, had he loosened his girdle until he reached their city. So fertile was Grecian fancy in magnifying the terror of the repulsed invader! who reëntered Sardis, with a broken army and humbled spirit, only eight months after he had left it, as the presumed conqueror of the western world.²

Meanwhile the Athenians and Peloponnesians, liberated from the immediate presence of the enemy either on land or sea, and passing from the extreme of terror to sudden ease and security, indulged in the full delight and self-congratulation of unexpected victory. On the day before the battle, Greece had seemed irretrievably lost: she was now saved even against all reasonable hope, and the terrific cloud impending over her was dispersed.³

¹ Herodot. viii, 130.

² See the account of the retreat of Xerxes, in Herodotus, viii, 115-120, with many stories which he mentions only to reject. The description given in the *Persæ* of Æschylus (v. 486, 515, 570) is conceived in the same spirit. The strain reaches its loudest pitch in Justin (ii, 13), who tells us that Xerxes was obliged to cross the strait in a fishing-boat. "*Ipse cum paucis Abydon contendit. Ubi cum solutum pontem hibernis tempestatibus offendisset, piscatoriâ scaphâ trepidus trajecit. Erat res spectaculo digna et, æstimatione sortis humanæ, rerum varietate miranda—in exiguo latentem videre navigio, quem paulo ante vix æquor omne capiebat: carentem etiam omni servorum ministerio, ejus exercitus propter multitudinem terris graves erant.*"

³ Herodot. viii, 109. *ἡμεῖς δὲ, εὐρημα γὰρ εὐρήκαμεν ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς καὶ τῇ Ἑλλάδι μὴ δάσκατον ἄνδρας ἀνέγοντας.*

In the division of the booty, the Æginetans were adjudged to have distinguished themselves most in the action, and to be entitled to the choice lot; while various tributes of gratitude were also set apart for the gods. Among them were three Phenician triremes, which were offered in dedication to Ajax at Salamis, to Athênâ at Sunium, and to Poseidon at the isthmus of Corinth; farther presents were sent to Apollo at Delphi, who, on being asked whether he was satisfied, replied, that all had done their duty to him except the Æginetans: from them he required additional munificence on account of the prize awarded to them, and they were constrained to dedicate in the temple four golden stars upon a staff of brass, which Herodotus himself saw there. Next to the Æginetans, the second place of honor was awarded to the Athenians; the Æginetan Polykritus, and the Athenians Eumenês and Ameinias, being ranked first among the individual combatants.¹ Respecting the behavior of Adeimantus and the Corinthians in the battle, the Athenians of the time of Herodotus drew the most unfavorable picture, representing them to have fled at the commencement, and to have been only brought back by the information that the Greeks were gaining the victory. Considering the character of the debates which had preceded, and the impatient eagerness manifested by the Corinthians to fight at the Isthmus instead of at Salamis, some such backwardness on their part, when forced into a battle at the latter place, would not be in itself improbable: yet in this case it seems that not only the Corinthians themselves, but also the general voice of Greece, contradicted the Athenian story, and defended them as having behaved with bravery and forwardness. We must recollect that, at the time when Herodotus probably collected his information, a bitter feeling of hatred prevailed between Athens and Corinth, and Aristius, son of Adeimantus, was among the most efficient enemies of the former.²

¹ Herodot. viii, 93-122: Diodor. xi, 27.

² Herodot. viii, 94; Thucyd. i, 42, 103. *τὸ ἀσπρόν μῖσος* from Corinth towards Athens. About Aristus, Thucyd. ii, 67.

Plutarch (*De Herodot. Malignit.* p. 870) employs many angry words in refuting this Athenian scandal, which the historian himself does not uphold as truth. The story advanced by Dio Chrysostom (*Or. xxxvii*, p. 456), that Herodotus asked for a reward from the Corinthians, and on being

Besides the first and second prizes of valor, the chiefs at the Isthmus tried to adjudicate among themselves the first and second prizes of skill and wisdom. Each of them deposited two names on the altar of Poseidon: and when these votes came to be looked at, it was found that each man had voted for himself as deserving the first prize, but that Themistoklēs had a large majority of votes for the second.¹ The result of such voting allowed no man to claim the first prize, nor could the chiefs give a second prize without it; so that Themistoklēs was disappointed of his reward, though exalted so much the higher, perhaps, through that very disappointment, in general renown. He went shortly afterwards to Sparta, where he received from the Lacedæmonians honors such as were never paid, before nor afterwards, to any foreigner. A crown of olive was indeed given to Eurybiadēs as the first prize, but a like crown was at the same time conferred on Themistoklēs as a special reward for unparalleled sagacity; together with a chariot, the finest which the city afforded. Moreover, on his departure, the three hundred select youths called Hippeis, who formed the active guard and police of the country, all accompanied him in a body as escort of honor to the frontiers of Tegea.² Such demonstrations were so astonishing, from the haughty and immovable Spartans, that they were ascribed by some authors to their fear lest Themistoklēs should be offended by being deprived of the general prize,—

refused, inserted this story into his history for the purpose of being revenged upon them, deserves no attention without some reasonable evidence. The statement of Dyllus, that he received ten talents from the Athenians as a reward for his history, would be much less improbable, so far as the fact of pecuniary reward, apart from the magnitude of the sum; but this also requires proof. Dio Chrysostom is not satisfied with rejecting this tale of the Athenians, but goes the length of affirming that the Corinthians carried off the palm of bravery, and were the cause of the victory. The epigrams of Simonides, which he cites, prove nothing of the kind (p. 459). Marcellinus (Vit. Thucyd. p. xvi), insinuates a charge against Herodotus, something like that of Plutarch and Dio.

¹ Herodot. viii. 123. Plutarch (Themist. c. 17; compare De Herodot. Malign. p. 871) states that *each individual chief gave his second vote to Themistoklēs*. The more we test Herodotus by comparison with others, the more we shall find him free from the exaggerating spirit.

² Herodot. viii. 124; Plutarch, Themist. c. 17.

and they are even said to have excited the jealousy of the Athenians so much, that he was displaced from his post of general and Xanthippus nominated.¹ Neither of these last reports is likely to be true, nor is either of them confirmed by Herodotus: the fact that Xanthippus became general of the fleet during the ensuing year, is in the regular course of Athenian change of officers, and implies no peculiar jealousy of Themistoklēs.

CHAPTER XLII.

BATTLES OF PLATÆA AND MYKALÆ. — FINAL REPULSE OF THE PERSIANS.

THOUGH the defeat at Salamis deprived the Persians of all hope from farther maritime attack of Greece, they still anticipated success by land from the ensuing campaign of Mardonius. Their fleet, after having conveyed the monarch himself with his accompanying land-force across the Hellespont, retired to winter at Kymē and Samos: in the latter of which places large rewards were bestowed upon Theomēstor and Phylakus, two Samian captains who had distinguished themselves in the late engagement. Theomēstor was even nominated despot of Samos under Persian protection.² Early in the spring they were reassembled, to the number of four hundred sail, but without the Phenicians, at the naval station of Samos, intending, however, only to maintain a watchful guard over Ionia, and hardly supposing that the Greek fleet would venture to attack them.³

For a long time, the conduct of that fleet was such as to justify such a belief in its enemies. Assembled at Ægina in the spring, to the number of one hundred and ten ships, under the

¹ Diodor. xi. 27; compare Herodot. viii. 123. and Thucyd. i. 74.

² Herodot. viii. 85.

Herodot. viii. 130; Diodor. xi. 27.

Spartan king Leotychidēs, it advanced as far as Delos, but not farther eastward: nor could all the persuasions of Chian and other Ionian envoys, despatched both to the Spartan authorities and to the fleet, and promising to revolt from Persia as soon as the Grecian fleet should appear, prevail upon Leotychidēs to hazard any aggressive enterprise. Ionia and the western waters of the Ægean had now been for fifteen years completely under the Persians, and so little visited by the Greeks, that a voyage thither appeared, especially to the maritime inexperience of a Spartan king, like going to the Pillars of Hēraklēs,¹ — not less venturesome than the same voyage appeared fifty-two years afterwards to the Lacedæmonian admiral Alkidas, when he first hazarded his fleet amidst the preserved waters of the Athenian empire.

Meanwhile the hurried and disastrous retreat of Xerxes had produced less disaffection among his subjects and allies than might have been anticipated. Alexander, king of Macedon, the Thessalian Aleuada,² and the Boeotian leaders, still remained in hearty coöperation with Mardonius: nor were there any, except the Phocians, whose fidelity to him appeared questionable, among all the Greeks northwest of the boundaries of Attica and Megaris. It was only in the Chalkidic peninsula, that any actual revolt occurred. Potidæa, situated on the isthmus of Pallênê,

¹ Herodot. viii. 131, 132: compare Thucyd. iii. 29-32.

Herodotus says, that the Chian envoys had great difficulty in inducing Leotychidēs to proceed even as far as Delos. — τὸ γὰρ πρῶτον τῶν δεινῶν ἦν τοῖσι Χίαισι, ὅτι τὰς γῶνας ἔχει ἐκείνοισι, στρατὸς τε πάντα πλεῖστα ἰδοῦναι αὐτοῖς: τὰ δὲ Σάμον ἰσχυρῶς δέξαι καὶ Ἡρακλῆος στῆλας ἰσὺν ἀπέχου.

This last expression of Herodotus has been erroneously interpreted by some of the commentators, as if it were a measure of the geographical ignorance, either of Herodotus himself, or of those whom he is describing. In my judgment, no inferences of this kind ought to be founded upon it: it marks fear of an enemy's country which they had not been accustomed to visit, and where they could not calculate the risk beforehand. — rather than any serious comparison between one distance and another. Speaking of our forefathers, such of them as were little used to the sea, we might say, — "A voyage to Bordeaux or Lisbon seemed to them as distant as a voyage to the Indies." — by which we should merely affirm something as to their state of feeling, not as to their geographical knowledge.

² Herodot. ix. 1, 2, 67; viii. 136.

together with the other towns in the long tongue of Pallênê, declared themselves independent: and the neighboring town of Olynthus, occupied by the semi-Grecian tribe of Bottiæans, was on the point of following their example. The Persian general, Artabazus, on his return from escorting Xerxes to the Hellespont, undertook the reduction of these towns, and succeeded perfectly with Olynthus. He took the town, slew all the inhabitants, and handed it over to a fresh population, consisting of Chalkidic Greeks, under Kritobulus of Torônê. It was in this manner that Olynthus, afterwards a city of so much consequence and interest, first became Grecian and Chalkidic. But Artabazus was not equally successful in the siege of Potidæa, the defence of which was aided by citizens from the other towns in Pallênê. A plot which he concerted with Timoxenus, commander of the Skiōnean auxiliaries in the town, became accidentally disclosed: a considerable body of his troops perished while attempting to pass at low tide under the walls of the city, which were built across the entire breadth of the narrow isthmus joining the Pallenean peninsula to the mainland: and after three months of blockade, he was forced to renounce the enterprise, withdrawing his troops to rejoin Mardonius, in Thessaly.¹

The latter, before he put himself in motion for the spring campaign, thought it advisable to consult the Grecian oracles, especially those within the limits of Boeotia and Phocis. He sent a Karian, named Mys, familiar with the Greek as well as the Karian language, to consult Trophônus at Lebadeia, Amphiaræus, and the Ismenian Apollo at Thebes, Apollo at mount Ptoon near Akraphiæ, and Apollo at the Phocian Abæ. This step was probably intended as a sort of ostentatious respect towards the religious feelings of allies upon whom he was now very much dependent: but neither the questions put, nor the answers given, were made public: and the only remarkable fact which Herodotus had heard was, that the priest of the Ptoian Apollo delivered his answer in Karian, or at least in a language intelligible to no person present except the Karian Mys himself.² It appears, however, that at this period, when Mardonius was

¹ Herodot. viii. 128, 129.

² Herodot. viii. 134, 135: Pausanias, ix. 24, 3.

seeking to strengthen himself by oracles, and laying his plans for establishing a separate peace and alliance with Athens against the Peloponnesians, some persons in his interest circulated predictions, that the day was approaching when the Persians and the Athenians jointly would expel the Dorians from Peloponnesus.¹ The way was thus paved for him to send an envoy to Athens, — Alexander, king of Macedon; who was instructed to make the most seductive offers, to promise reparation of all the damage done in Attica, as well as the active future friendship of the Great King, and to hold out to the Athenians a large acquisition of new territory as the price of their consent to form with him an equal and independent alliance.² The Macedonian prince added warm expressions of his own interest in the welfare of the Athenians, recommending them, as a sincere friend, to embrace propositions so advantageous as well as so honorable: especially as the Persian power must in the end prove too much for them, and Attica lay exposed to Mardonius and his Grecian allies, without being covered by any common defence as Peloponnesus was protected by its isthmus.³

This offer, despatched in the spring, found the Athenians re-established wholly or partially in their half-ruined city. A simple tender of mercy and tolerable treatment, if despatched

¹ Herodot. viii. 141. Λακεδαιμόνιοι δὲ . . . ἀναμνησθέντες τῶν λαμπρῶν ὡς ποτὶς χρὸν ἐστὶ ἅμα τοῖσι ἄλλοισι Δωριεῦσι ἐκπίπτειν ἐκ Πελοποννήσου ὑπὸ Μήδων τε καὶ Ἀθηναίων, κάρτα τε ἔδεισαν μὴ ὁμολογήσωσι τῷ Πέρσῃ Ἀθηναίοι, etc.

Such oracles must have been generated by the hopes of the *medizing* party in Greece at this particular moment: there is no other point of time to which they could be at all adapted, — no other, in which expulsion of all the Dorians from Peloponnesus, by united Persians and Athenians, could be even dreamed of. The Lacedaemonians are indeed said here, "to call to mind the prophecies," — as if these latter were old, and not now produced for the first time. But we must recollect that a fabricator of prophecies, such as Onomakritus, would in all probability at once circulate them as old; that is, as forming part of some old collection like that of Bakis or Musæus. And Herodotus doubtless, himself, believed them to be old, so that he would naturally give credit to the Lacedaemonians for the same knowledge, and suppose them to be alarmed by "calling these prophecies to mind."

² Herodot. ix. 7.

³ Herodot. viii. 142.

by Xerxes from Thermopylæ the year before, might perhaps have been sufficient to detach them from the cause of Hellas: and even at the present moment, though the pressure of overwhelming terror had disappeared, there were many inducements for them to accede to the proposition of Mardonius. The alliance of Athens would insure to the Persian general unquestionable predominance in Greece, and to Athens herself protection from farther ravage as well as the advantage of playing the winning game: while his force, his position, and his alliances, even as they then stood, threatened a desolating and doubtful war, of which Attica would bear the chief brunt. Moreover, the Athenians were at this time suffering privations of the severest character; for not only did their ruined houses and temples require to be restored, but they had lost the harvest of the past summer, together with the seed of the past autumn.¹ The prudential view of the case being thus favorable to Mardonius rather than otherwise, and especially strengthened by the distress which reigned at Athens, the Lacedaemonians were so much afraid lest Alexander should carry his point, that they sent envoys to dissuade the Athenians from listening to him, as well as to tender succor during the existing poverty of the city. After having heard both parties, the Athenians delivered their reply in terms of solemn and dignified resolution, which their descendants delighted in repeating. To Alexander they said: "Cast not in our teeth that the power of the Persian is many times greater than ours: we too know *that*, as well as thou: but we, nevertheless, love freedom well enough to resist him in the best manner we can. Attempt not the vain task of talking us over into alliance with him. Tell Mardonius that as long as the sun shall continue in his present path, we will never contract alliance with Xerxes: we will encounter him in our own defence, putting our trust in the aid of those gods and heroes to whom he has shown

¹ Herodot. viii. 142. Περσικαὶ νομοὶ μέντοι ἔμιν ἐνταχθόμεθα (say the Spartan envoys to the Athenians), καὶ ὅτι καρπῶν ἐστερηθήτε διζῶν ἤδη, καὶ ἐπὶ σπέρματι χειρὶν ἔδη πολλόν. Seeing that this is spoken before the invasion of Mardonius, the loss of *two crops* must include the seed of the preceding autumn, and the advice of Themistoklēs to his countrymen — καὶ τίς ἀναγιγνώσκων ἀναγκῶς ἐχέτω (viii. 109 — *must have been found impracticable in most cases to carry into effect.*

no reverence, and whose houses and statues he has burned. Come thou not to us again with similar propositions, nor persuade us, even in the spirit of good-will, into unholy proceedings: thou art the guest and friend of Athens, and we would not that thou shouldst suffer injury at our hands."¹

To the Spartans, the reply of the Athenians was of a similar decisive tenor: protesting their unconquerable devotion to the common cause and liberties of Hellas, and promising that no conceivable temptations, either of money or territory, should induce them to desert the ties of brotherhood, common language, and religion. So long as a single Athenian survived, no alliance should ever be made with Xerxes. They then thanked the Spartans for offering them aid during the present privations: but while declining such offers, they reminded them that Mardonius, when apprized that his propositions were refused, would probably advance immediately, and they therefore earnestly desired the presence of a Peloponnesian army in Boeotia to assist in the defence of Attica.² The Spartan envoys, promising fulfilment of this request,³ and satisfied to have ascertained the sentiments of Athens, departed.

Such unshaken fidelity on the part of the Athenians to the general cause of Greece, in spite of present suffering, combined with seductive offers for the future, was the just admiration of their descendants, and the frequent theme of applause by their orators.⁴ But among the contemporary Greeks it was hailed

¹ Lykurgus the Athenian orator, in alluding to this incident a century and a half afterwards, represents the Athenians as having been "on the point of stoning Alexander." — *ἡμεῖς δὲ κατέλειπον* (Lykurg. cont. Leokrat. c. 17. p. 186) — one among many specimens of the careless manner in which these orators deal with past history.

² Herodot. viii. 143. 144; Plutarch. Aristeidēs, c. 10. According to Plutarch, it was Aristeidēs who proposed and prepared the reply to be delivered. But here as elsewhere, the loose, exaggerating style of Plutarch contrasts unfavorably with the simplicity and directness of Herodotus.

³ Herodot. ix. 7. *συνθέμενοι δὲ ἡμῖν τὸν Πέρσῃ ἀντιώσεσθαι ἐς τὴν Βοιωτίαν*, etc.

Diodorus gives the account of this embassy to Athens substantially in the same manner, coupling it however with some erroneous motives (xi. 28).

⁴ Herodot. ix. 7. *ἰσχυόμενοι τε ὅτι κινδυνεύοντες ἐστὶν ἀποστρέφειν τὸν Πέρσῃ μᾶλλον ἢ πρὸς τὸν πόλεμον*, etc.

only as a relief from danger, and repaid by a selfish and ungenerous neglect. The same feeling of indifference towards all Greeks outside of their own Isthmus, which had so deeply endangered the march of affairs before the battle of Salamis, now manifested itself a second time among the Spartans and Peloponnesians. The wall across the Isthmus, which they had been so busy in constructing, and on which they had relied for protection against the land-force of Xerxes, had been intermitted and left unfinished when he retired: but it was resumed as soon as the forward march of Mardonius was anticipated. It was, however, still unfinished at the time of the embassy of the Macedonian prince to Athens, and this incomplete condition of their special defence was one reason of their alarm lest the Athenians should accept the terms proposed. That danger being for the time averted, they redoubled their exertions at the Isthmus, so that the wall was speedily brought into an adequate state of defence, and the battlements along the summit were in course of being constructed. Thus safe behind their own bulwark, they thought nothing more of their promise to join the Athenians in Boeotia, and to assist in defending Attica against Mardonius: indeed, their king Kleombrotus, who commanded the force at the Isthmus, was so terrified by an obscuration of the sun at the moment when he was sacrificing to ascertain the inclinations of the gods in reference to the coming war, that he even thought it necessary to retreat with the main force to Sparta, where he soon after died.¹ Besides these two reasons, — indifference and unfavorable omens, — which restrained the Spartans from aiding Attica, there was also a third: they were engaged in celebrating the festival of the Hyakinthia, and it was their paramount object, says the historian,² to fulfil "the exigencies of the god." As the

The orators are not always satisfied with giving to Athens the credit which she really deserved: they venture to represent the Athenians as having refused these brilliant offers from Xerxes on his first invasion, instead of from Mardonius in the ensuing summer. Xerxes never made any offer to them. See Isokratēs, Or. iv, Panegyric. c. 27. p. 61.

¹ Herodot. ix. 10.

² Herodot. ix. 7. *Οἱ γὰρ Λακεδαιμόνιοι ὁρᾶζον τε τούτων τὸν χρόνον καὶ σφίη ἡ Ὑακίνθια· περὶ πλείστον δ' ἔχον τὰ τοῦ θεοῦ πορνεύον· ἅμα δὲ τὸ τεῖχος αὐτῶν ἐν τῷ Ἰσθμῷ ἐτείχισαν, καὶ ἤδη ἐπαλξέας ἐλάμβανον.*

Olympia and the Karnia in the preceding year, so now did the Hyakinthia, prevail over the necessities of defence, putting out of sight both the duties of fidelity towards an exposed ally, and the bond of an express promise.

Meanwhile, Mardonius, informed of the unfavorable reception which his proposals had received at Athens, put his army in motion forthwith from Thessaly, joined by all his Grecian auxiliaries, and by fresh troops from Thrace and Macedonia. As he marched through Boeotia, the Thebans, who heartily espoused his cause, endeavored to dissuade him from farther military operations against the united force of his enemies, — urging him to try the efficacy of bribes, presented to the leading men in the different cities, for the purpose of disuniting them. But Mardonius, eager to repossess himself of Attica, heeded not their advice: about ten months after the retreat of Xerxes, he entered the country without resistance, and again established the Persian head-quarters in Athens, May or June, 479 B.C.¹

Before he arrived, the Athenians had again removed to Salamis, under feelings of bitter disappointment and indignation. They had in vain awaited the fulfilment of the Spartan promise, that a Peloponnesian army should join them in Boeotia for the defence of their frontier; at length, being unable to make head against the enemy alone, they found themselves compelled to transport their families across to Salamis.² The migration was far less terrible than that of the preceding summer, since Mardonius had no fleet to harass them; but it was more gratuitous, and might have been obviated had the Spartans executed their covenant, which would have brought about the battle of Plataea two months earlier than it actually was fought.

Mardonius, though master of Athens, was so anxious to conciliate the Athenians, that he at first abstained from damaging either the city or the country, and despatched a second envoy to

Nearly a century after this, we are told that it was always the practice for the Amyklæan hoplites to go home for the celebration of the Hyakinthia, on whatever expedition they might happen to be employed (Xenoph. Hellen. iv. 5, 11).

¹ Diodor. xi. 28; Herodot. ix. 2, 3, 17. οἱ μὲν ἄλλοι πάντες παρείχον στρατὸν καὶ συνεσέβαλον ἐς Ἀθήνας ὅσοι περ ἐμῆδιζον Ἑλλήνων τῶν ταύτης οἰκημένων, etc. ² Herodot. ix. 4.

Salamis to repeat the offers made through Alexander of Macedon. he thought that they might now be listened to, since he could offer the exemption of Attica from ravage, as an additional temptation. Murychidēs, a Hellespontine Greek, was sent to renew these propositions to the Athenian senate at Salamis; but he experienced a refusal not less resolute than that of Alexander of Macedon when sent to Athens, and all but unanimous. One unfortunate senator, Lykidas, made an exception to this unanimity, and ventured to recommend acceptance of the propositions of Murychidēs. So furious was the wrath, or so strong the suspicion of corruption, which his single-voiced negative provoked, that senators and people both combined to stone him to death: while the Athenian women in Salamis, hearing what had passed, went of their own accord to the house of Lykidas, and stoned to death his wife and children. In the desperate pitch of resolution to which the Athenians were now wound up, an opponent passed for a traitor: unanimity, even though extorted by terror, was essential to their feelings.¹ Murychidēs, though his propositions were refused, was dismissed without injury.

While the Athenians thus gave renewed proofs of their steadfast attachment to the cause of Hellas, they at the same time sent

¹ Herodot. ix. 5. I dare not reject this story about Lykidas (see Lykurgus cont. Leokrat. c. 30. p. 222), though other authors recount the same incident as having happened to a person named Kyrtilus, during the preceding year, when the Athenians quitted Athens: see Demosthen. de Coronâ, p. 236, c. 59; and Cicero de Officiis. iii. 11. That two such acts were perpetrated by the Athenians, is noway probable: and if we are to choose between the two, the story of Herodotus is far the more probable. In the migration of the preceding year, we know that a certain number of Athenians actually did stay behind in the acropolis, and Kyrtilus might have been among them, if he had chosen. Moreover, Xerxes held out no offers, and gave occasion to no deliberation; while the offers of Mardonius might really appear to a well-minded citizen deserving of attention.

Isokrates (Or. iv. Panegyric. p. 74, c. 42) states that the Athenians condemned many persons to death for *medism* (in allusion doubtless to Themistoklēs as one), but he adds, — “even now they imprecate curses on any citizen who enters into amicable negotiation with the Persians.” — ἐν δὲ τοῖς συλλόγοις ἐπὶ καὶ νῦν ὅπως ποιοῦνται, εἰς ἐπικηρυκίαν Πέρσαις ὄν πολέμων. It is difficult to believe that in his time any such imprecation can have been included in the solemnities whereby the Athenian meetings were opened.

envoys, conjointly with Megara and Plataea, to remonstrate with the Spartans on their backwardness and breach of faith, and to invoke them even thus late to come forth at once and meet Mardonius in Attica: not omitting to intimate, that if they were thus deserted, it would become imperatively necessary for them, against their will, to make terms with the enemy. So careless, however, were the Spartan ephors respecting Attica and the Megarid, that they postponed giving an answer to these envoys for ten successive days, while in the mean time they pressed with all their efforts the completion of the isthmian fortifications. And after having thus amused the envoys as long as they could, they would have dismissed them at last with a negative answer, — such was their fear of adventuring beyond the Isthmus, — had not a Tegean, named Chileos, whom they much esteemed, and to whom they communicated the application, reminded them that no fortifications at the Isthmus would suffice for the defence of Peloponnesus, if the Athenians became allied with Mardonius, and thus laid the peninsula open by sea. The strong opinion of this respected Tegean, proved to the ephors that their selfish policy would not be seconded by their chief Peloponnesian allies, and brought to their attention, probably for the first time, that danger by sea might again be renewed, though the Persian fleet had been beaten in the preceding year, and was now at a distance from Greece. It changed their resolution, not less completely than suddenly; and they despatched forthwith in the night five thousand Spartan citizens to the Isthmus, — each man with seven Helots attached to him. And when the Athenian envoys, ignorant of this sudden change of policy, came on the next day to give peremptory notice that Athens would no longer endure such treacherous betrayal, but would forthwith take measures for her own security and separate pacification, — the ephors affirmed on their oath that the troops were already on their march, and were probably by this time out of the Spartan territory.¹ Considering

¹ Herodot. ix, 10, 11; Plutarch, Aristeidēs, c. 10. Plutarch had read a decree ascribed to Aristeidēs, in which Kimon, Xanthippus, and Myronidēs, were named envoys to Sparta. But it is impossible that Xanthippus could have taken part in the embassy, seeing that he was now in command of the fleet.

Probably the Helots must have followed: one hardly sees how so great a

that this step was an expiation, imperfect, tardy, and reluctant, for foregoing desertion and breach of promise, — the ephors may probably have thought that the mystery of the night-march, and the sudden communication of it as an actual fact to the envoys, in the way of reply, would impress more emphatically the minds of the latter, — who returned with the welcome tidings to Salamis, and prepared their countrymen for speedy action. Five thousand Spartan citizens, each with seven light-armed Helots as attendants, were thus on their march to the theatre of war. Throughout the whole course of Grecian history, we never hear of any number of Spartan citizens at all approaching to five thousand being put on foreign service at the same time. But this was not all: five thousand Lacedæmonian Perioeci, each with one light-armed Helot to attend him, were also despatched to the Isthmus, to take part in the same struggle. Such unparalleled efforts afford sufficient measure of the alarm which though late yet real, now reigned at Sparta. Other Peloponnesian cities followed the example, and a large army was now collected under the Spartan Pausanias.

It appears that Mardonius was at this moment in secret correspondence with the Argeians, who, though professing neutrality, are said to have promised him that they would arrest the march of the Spartans beyond their own borders.¹ We may reasonably doubt whether they ever made such a promise: but at any rate, the suddenness of the march as well as the greatness of the force prevented them from fulfilling it; and they were forced to content themselves with apprizing Mardonius instantly of the fact, through their swiftest courier. It determined that general

number could have been all suddenly collected, and marched off in one night, no preparations having been made beforehand.

Dr. Thirlwall (Hist. Gr. ch. xvi. p. 366) suspects the correctness of the narrative of Herodotus, on grounds which do not appear to me convincing. It seems to me that, after all, the literal narrative is more probable than anything which we can substitute in its place. The Spartan foreign policy all depended on the five ephors: there was no public discussion or criticism. Now the conduct of these ephors is consistent and intelligible, — though selfish, narrow-minded, and insensible to any dangers except what are present and obvious. Nor can I think, with Dr. Thirlwall, that the manner of communication ultimate¹ adopted is of the nature of a jest.

¹ Herodot. ix, 12.

to evacuate Attica, and to carry on the war in Bœotia, — a country in every way more favorable to him. He had for some time refrained from committing devastations in or round Athens, hoping that the Athenians might be induced to listen to his propositions; but the last days of his stay were employed in burning and destroying whatever had been spared by the host of Xerxes during the preceding summer. After a fruitless attempt to surprise a body of one thousand Lacedæmonians which had been detached for the protection of Megara,¹ he withdrew all his army into Bœotia, not taking either the straight road to Plataea through Eleuthera, or to Thebes through Phylê, both which roads were mountainous and inconvenient for cavalry, but marching in the northeasterly direction to Dekeleia, where he was met by some guides from the adjoining regions near the river Asôpus, and conducted through the deme of Sphendaleis to Tanagra. He thus found himself, by a route longer but easier, in Bœotia, on the plain of the Asôpus: along which river he next day marched westward to Skolus, a town in the territory of Thebes, seemingly near to that of Plataea.² He then took up a position not far off in the plain on the left bank of the Asôpus: his left wing over against Erythræ, his centre over against Hysia, and

¹ There were stories current at Megara even in the time of Pausanias, respecting some of these Persians, who were said to have been brought to a situation by the intervention of Artemis (Pausan. i. 40. 2).

² Herodot. ix. 15. The situation of the Attic deme Sphendaleis, or Sphendaleis, seems not certainly known (Ross, Ueber die Deme von Attika p. 178); but Colonel Leake and Mr. Finlay think that it stood "near Ato Merkurio, which now gives name to the pass leading from Dekeleia through the ridges of Parnes into the extremity of the Tanagrian plain, at a place called Malakasa." (Leake, Athens and the Demi of Attica, vol. ii, sect. iv, p. 125.)

Mr. Finlay (Oropus and the Diakria, p. 38) says that "Malakasa is the only place on this road where a considerable body of cavalry could conveniently halt."

It appears that the Bœotians from the neighborhood of the Asôpus were necessary as guides for this road. Perhaps even the territory of Oropus was at this time still a part of Bœotia: we do not certainly know at what period it was first conquered by the Athenians.

The combats between Athenians and Bœotians will be found to take place most frequently in this southeastern region of Bœotia, Tanagra, Cenophyta, Delium, &c.

his right in the territory of Plataea: and he employed his army in constructing forthwith a fortified camp¹ of ten furlongs square, defended by wooden walls and towers, cut from trees in the Theban territory.

Mardonius found himself thus with his numerous army, in a plain favorable for cavalry; with a camp more or less defensible, — the fortified city of Thebes² in his rear, — and a considerable stock of provisions as well as a friendly region behind him from whence to draw more. Few among his army, however, were either hearty in the cause or confident of success:³ even the native Persians had been disheartened by the flight of the monarch the year before, and were full of melancholy auguries. A splendid banquet to which the Theban leader Attaginus invited Mardonius, along with fifty Persians and fifty Theban or Bœotian guests, exhibited proofs of this depressed feeling, which were afterwards recounted to Herodotus himself by one of the guests present, — an Orchomenian citizen of note named Thersander. The banquet being so arranged as that each couch was occupied by one Persian and one Theban, this man was accosted by his Persian neighbor in Greek, who inquired to what city he belonged, and, upon learning that he was an Orchomenian,⁴ continued thus: "Since thou hast now partaken with me in the same table and cup, I desire to leave with thee some memorial of my convictions: the rather, in order that thou mayst be thyself forewarned so as to take the best counsel for thine own safety. Seest thou these Persians here feasting, and the army which we left yonder encamped near the river? Yet a little while, and out of all these thou shalt behold but few surviving." Thersander listened to these words

¹ Herodot. ix. 15.

² The strong town of Thebes was of much service to him (Thucyd. i. 90).

³ Herodot. ix. 40, 45, 67. Plutarch, Aristeidēs, c. 18.

⁴ Herodot. ix. 16. Thersander, though an Orchomenian, passes as a Theban — *Περσῶν τε καὶ Θηβαίων ἐν κλινῇ ἐκάστη* — a proof of the intimate connection between Thebes and Orchomenus at this time, which is farther illustrated by Pindar, Isthm. i. 51 (compare the Scholia ad loc. and at the beginning of the Ode), respecting the Theban family of Herodotus and Asôpodorus. The ancient mythical feud appears to have gone to sleep, but a deadly hatred will be found to grow up in later times between these two towns.

with astonishment, spoken as they were with strong emotion and a flood of tears, and replied: "Surely, thou art bound to reveal this to Mardonius, and to his confidential advisers:" but the Persian rejoined: "My friend, man cannot avert that which God hath decreed to come; no one will believe the revelation, sure though it be. Many of us Persians know this well, and are here serving only under the bond of necessity. And truly this is the most hateful of all human sufferings, — to be full of knowledge, and at the same time to have no power over any result."¹ "This (observes Herodotus) I heard myself from the Orchomenian Thersander, who told me farther that he mentioned the fact to several persons about him, even before the battle of Plataea." It is certainly one of the most curious revelations in the whole history; not merely as it brings forward the historian in his own personality, communicating with a personal friend of the Theban leaders, and thus provided with good means of information as to the general events of the campaign, — but also as it discloses to us, on testimony not to be suspected, the real temper of the native Persians, and even of the chief men among them. If so many of these chiefs were not merely apathetic, but despondent, in the cause, much more decided would be the same absence of will and hope in their followers and the subject allies. To follow the monarch in his overwhelming march of the preceding year, was gratifying in many ways to the native Persians: but every man was sick of the enterprise as now cut down under Mardonius: and Artabazus, the second in command, was not merely slack but jealous of his superior.² Under such circumstances we shall presently not be surprised to find the whole army disappearing forthwith, the moment Mardonius is slain.

Among the Grecian allies of Mardonius, the Thebans and

¹ Herodot. ix. 16, 17. The last observation here quoted is striking and emphatic — *ἐχέσθη δὲ ἡβρόη ἵσσι τῶν ἐν ἀνθρώποισι αἴτη, τοῦ δὲ φρονέοντα μηδένος κοῦτεεν*. It will have to be more carefully considered at a later period of this history, when we come to touch upon the scientific life of the Greeks, and upon the philosophy of happiness and duty as conceived by Aristotle. If carried fully out, this position is the direct negative of what Aristotle lays down in his Ethics, as to the superior happiness of the *βίος θεωρητικός*, or life of scientific observation and reflection.

² Herodot. ix. 66.

Boeotians were active and zealous, most of the remainder lukewarm, and the Phocians even of doubtful fidelity. Their contingent of one thousand hoplites, under Harmokydēs, had been tardy in joining him, having only come up since he retired from Attica into Boeotia: and some of the Phocians even remained behind in the neighborhood of Parnassus, prosecuting manifest hostilities against the Persians. Aware of the feeling among this contingent, which the Thessalians took care to place before him in an unfavorable point of view, Mardonius determined to impress upon them a lesson of intimidation. Causing them to form in a separate body on the plain, he then brought up his numerous cavalry all around them: while the phémē, or sudden simultaneous impression, ran through the Greek allies as well as the Phocians themselves, that he was about to shoot them down.¹ The general Harmokydēs, directing his men to form a square and close their ranks, addressed to them short exhortations to sell their lives dearly, and to behave like brave Greeks against barbarian assassins, — when the cavalry rode up, apparently to the charge, and advanced close to the square, with uplifted javelins and arrows on the string, some few of which were even actually discharged. The Phocians maintained, as enjoined, steady ranks with a firm countenance, and the cavalry wheeled about without any actual attack or damage. After this mysterious demonstration, Mardonius condescended to compliment the Phocians on their courage, and to assure them, by means of a herald, that he had been greatly misinformed respecting them: he at the same time exhorted them to be faithful and forward in service for the future, and promised that all good behavior should be amply recompensed. Herodotus seems uncertain, — difficult as the supposition is to entertain, — whether Mardonius did not really intend at first to massacre the Phocians in the field, and desisted from the intention only on seeing how much blood it would cost to accomplish. However this may be, the scene itself was a

¹ Herodot. ix. 17. *δραγὶ δὲ φημ, ὡς κατακοῦται σόλας*. Respecting *φημ*, see a note a little farther on, at the battle of Mykalē, in this same chapter.

Compare the case of the Delians at Adramyitium, surrounded and slain with missiles by the Persian satrap, though not his enemies — *περιστήται τοῦ λατοῦ κατακόντισε* (Thucyd. viii. 108).

remarkable reality, and presented one among many other proofs of the lukewarmness and suspicious fidelity of the army.¹

Conformably to the suggestion of the Thebans, the liberties of Greece were now to be disputed in Boeotia: and not only had the position of Mardonius already been taken, but his camp also fortified, before the united Grecian army approached Kithæron in its forward march from the Isthmus. After the full force of the Lacedæmonians had reached the Isthmus, they had to await the arrival of their Peloponnesian and other confederates. The hoplites who joined them were as follows: from Tegea, fifteen hundred; from Corinth, five thousand, — besides a small body of three hundred from the Corinthian colony of Potidæa; from the Arcadian Orchomenus, six hundred; from Sikyon, three thousand; from Epidaurus, eight hundred; from Træzen, one thousand; from Lepreon, two hundred; from Mykênæ and Tiryns, four hundred; from Phlius, one thousand; from Hermione, three hundred; from Eretria and Styra, six hundred; from Chalkis, four hundred; from Ambrakia, five hundred; from Leukas and Anaktorium, eight hundred; from Palæ in Kephallenia, two hundred; from Ægina, five hundred. On marching from the Isthmus to Megara, they took up three thousand Megarian hoplites; and as soon as they reached Eleusis in their forward progress, the army was completed by the junction of eight thousand Athenian hoplites, and six hundred Plataean, under Aristeidês, who passed over from Salamis.² The total force of hoplites, or heavy-armed

¹ Οὐκ ἔχω ἀπρὸς τὴν ἀλήθειαν εἰπεῖν, ὅτι εἰ ἡλθον μὲν ἀποδοῦναι τοῖς Περσέσιν, ἡνθέοντων τῶν Θεσσαλῶν, etc. (Herodot. ix, 18.)

This confession of uncertainty as to motives and plans, distinguishing between them and the visible facts which he is describing, is not without importance as strengthening our confidence in the historian.

² Compare this list of Herodotus with the enumeration which Pausanias read inscribed on the statue of Zeus, erected at Olympia by the Greeks who took part in the battle of Plataea (Pausan. v, 23, 1).

Pausanias found inscribed all the names here indicated by Herodotus except the Palæ of Kephallenia; and he found in addition the Eleians, Keans, Kythnians, Tenians, Naxians, and Mèlians. The five last names are islanders in the Ægean: their contingents sent to Plataea must, at all events, have been very small, and it is surprising to hear that they sent any, especially when we recollect that there was a Greek fleet at this moment

troops, was thus thirty-eight thousand seven hundred men: there were no cavalry, and but very few bowmen; but if we add those who are called light-armed, or unarmed generally, — some perhaps with javelins or swords, but none with any defensive armor, — the grand total was not less than one hundred and ten thousand men. Of these light-armed, or unarmed, there were, as computed by Herodotus, thirty-five thousand in attendance on the five thousand Spartan citizens, and thirty-four thousand five hundred in attendance on the other hoplites, — together with eighteen hundred Thespians, who were properly hoplites, yet so badly armed as not to be reckoned in the ranks.¹

Such was the number of Greeks present or near at hand in the combat against the Persians at Plataea, which took place some little time afterwards: but it seems that the contingents were not at first completely full, and that new additions² continued to arrive until a few days before the battle, along with the convoys of cattle and provisions which came for the subsistence of the army. Pausanias marched first from the Isthmus to Eleusis, where he was joined by the Athenians from Salamis: at Eleusis, as well as at the Isthmus, the sacrifices were found encouraging, and the united army then advanced across the ridge of Kithæron, so as to come within sight of the Persians. When Pausanias saw them occupying the line of the Asôpus in the plain beneath, he kept his own army on the mountain declivity

on service, to which it would be natural that they should join themselves in preference to land-service.

With respect to the name of the Eleians, the suspicion of Brøndstedt is plausible, that Pausanias may have mistaken the name of the Palæ of Kephallenia for theirs, and may have fancied that he read ΕΑΛΕΙΟΙ when it was really written ΗΑΛΕΙΕ, in an inscription at that time about six hundred years old. The place in the series wherein Pausanias places the name of the Eleians, strengthens the suspicion. Unless it be admitted, we shall be driven, as the most probable alternative, to suppose a fraud committed by the vanity of the Eleians, which may easily have led them to alter a name originally belonging to the Palæ. The reader will recollect that the Eleians were themselves the superintendents and curators at Olympia.

Plutarch seems to have read the same inscription as Pausanias (De Herodoti Malignit. p. 873).

¹ Herodot. ix, 19, 28, 29.

² Herodot. ix, 28. οἱ ἐπιβοῦτωντές τε καὶ οἱ ἀρχὴν ἐλθόντες Ἑλλήνων.

near Erythræ, without choosing to adventure himself in the level ground. Mardonius, finding them not disposed to seek battle in the plain, despatched his numerous and excellent cavalry under Masistius, the most distinguished officer in his army, to attack them. For the most part, the ground was so uneven as to check their approach, — but the Megarian contingent, which happened to be more exposed than the rest, were so hard pressed that they were forced to send to Pausanias for aid. They appear to have had not only no cavalry, but no bowmen or light-armed troops of any sort with missile weapons; while the Persians, excellent archers and darters, using very large bows, and trained in such accomplishments from their earliest childhood, charged in successive squadrons and overwhelmed the Greeks with darts and arrows, — not omitting contemptuous taunts on their cowardice for keeping back from the plain.¹ So general was then the fear of the Persian cavalry, that Pausanias could find none of the Greeks, except the Athenians, willing to volunteer and go to the rescue of the Megarians. A body of Athenians, however, especially three hundred chosen troops under Olympiodorus, strengthened with some bowmen, immediately marched to the spot and took up the combat with the Persian cavalry. For some time the struggle was sharp and doubtful: at length the general, Masistius, — a man renowned for bravery, lofty in stature, clad in conspicuous armor, and mounted on a Nisæan horse with golden trappings, — charging at the head of his troops, had his horse struck by an arrow in the side. The animal immediately reared and threw his master on the ground, close to the ranks of the Athenians, who, rushing forward, seized the horse, and overpowered Masistius before he could rise. So impenetrable were the defences of his helmet and breastplate,² however, that they had considerable difficulty in killing him, though he was in their power: at length a spearman pierced him in the eye. The death of the general passed unobserved by the Persian cavalry, but as soon as they missed him and became aware of the loss.

¹ About the missile weapons and skill of the Persians, see Herodot. i. 124; Xenophon, Anab. iii. 4. 17.

Cyrus the younger was eminent in the use both of the bow and the javelin (Xenoph. Anab. i. 8, 26; i. 9, 5: compare Cyropæd. i. 2. 4).

² See Quintus Curtius, iii. 11, 15; and the note of Mutzel.

they charged furiously and in one mass to recover the dead body. At first the Athenians, too few in number to resist the onset, were compelled for a time to give way, abandoning the body; but reinforcements presently arriving at their call, the Persians were driven back with loss, and it finally remained in their possession.¹

The death of Masistius, coupled with that final repulse of the cavalry which left his body in possession of the Greeks, produced a strong effect on both armies, encouraging the one as much as it disheartened the other. Throughout the camp of Mardonius, the grief was violent and unbounded, manifested by wailings so loud as to echo over all Bœotia; while the hair of men, horses, and cattle, was abundantly cut in token of mourning. The Greeks, on the other hand, overjoyed at their success, placed the dead body in a cart, and paraded it around the army: even the hoplites ran out of their ranks to look at it; not only hailing it as a valuable trophy, but admiring its stature and proportions.² And so much was their confidence increased, that Pausanias now ventured to quit the protection of the mountain-ground, inconvenient from its scanty supply of water, and to take up his position in the plain beneath, interspersed only with low hillocks. Marching from Erythræ in a westerly direction along the declivities of Kithærôn, and passing by Hysia, the Greeks occupied a line of camp in the Plataean territory along the Asôpus and on its right bank; with their right wing near to the fountain called Gargaphia,³ and their left wing near to the chapel, surrounded

¹ Herodot. ix. 21, 22, 23; Plutarch, Aristeidês, c. 14.

² Herodot. ix. 24, 25. *ὁμοῦ γὰρ τε χρομένοι ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀπασαν γὰρ τὴν Βοιωτίαν κατερεχέοντο*, etc.

The exaggerated demonstrations of grief, ascribed to Xerxes and Atossa in the Persæ of Æschylus, have often been blamed by critics: we may see from this passage how much they are in the manners of Orientals of that day.

³ Herodot. ix. 25–30; Plutarch, Aristeidês, c. 11. *τὸ τοῦ Ἀρδουκρίτου ἕως τοῦ τοῦ Ἀσώπου ποταμοῦ περικυκλωμένον*.

The expression of Herodotus respecting this position taken by Pausanias, *ὅτι καὶ ἐν ταῖς δόξαις ἐπὶ τῷ Ἀσώπῳ ἐστρατοπεδεύοντο*, as well as the words which follow in the next chapter (31) — *Οἱ βαρβαροὶ πυνθύνοντο εἶναι τοὺς Ἕλληνας ἐν τῇ πεδίῳ, τῇ πεδίῳ καὶ αὐτοὶ ἐπὶ τῷ Ἀσώπῳ τὸν ταύτην βούλοντο*. — show plainly that the Grecian troops were encamped along the

by a shady grove, of the Plataean hero, Androkratês. In this position they were marshalled according to nations, or separate fractions of the Greek name, — the Lacedæmonians on the right wing, with the Tegeans and Corinthians immediately joining them, — and the Athenians on the left wing: a post which, as second in point of dignity, was at first claimed by the Tegeans, chiefly on grounds of mythical exploits, to the exclusion of the Athenians, but ultimately adjudged by the Spartans, after hearing both sides, to Athens.¹ In the field, even Lacedæmonians followed those democratical forms which pervaded so generally Grecian military operations: in this case, it was not the generals, but the Lacedæmonian troops in a body, who heard the argument, and delivered the verdict by unanimous acclamation.

Asopus on the Plataean side, while the Persians in their second position occupied the ground on the opposite, or Theban side of the river. Which ever army commenced the attack had to begin by passing the Asopus (c. 36-59).

For the topography of this region, and of the positions occupied by the two armies, compare Squire, in Walpole's Turkey, p. 338; Kruse, *Hellas*, vol. ii, ch. vi, p. 9, *seq.*, and ch. viii, p. 592, *seq.*; and the still more copious and accurate information of Colonel Leake, *Travels in Northern Greece*, ch. xvi, vol. ii, pp. 324-330. Both of them have given plans of the region; that which I annex is borrowed from Kiepert's maps. I cannot but think that the fountain Gargaphia is not yet identified, and that both Kruse and Leake place the Grecian position farther from the river Asopus than is consistent with the words of Herodotus, which words seem to specify points near the two extremities, indicating that the fountain of Gargaphia was *near* the river towards the right of the Grecian position, and the chapel of Androkratês also *near* the river towards the left of that position, where the Athenians were posted. Nor would such a site for a chapel of Androkratês be inconsistent with Thucydides (iii, 24), who merely mentions that chapel as being on the right hand of the first mile of road from Plataea to Thebes.

Considering the length of time which has elapsed since the battle, it would not be surprising if the spring of Gargaphia were no longer recognizable. At any rate, neither the fountain pointed out by Colonel Leake (p. 332) nor that of Vergilian, which had been supposed by Colonel Squire and Dr. Clarke, appear to me suitable for Gargaphia.

The errors of that plan of the battle of Plataea which accompanies the Voyage d'Anacharsis, are now well understood.

¹ Herodot. ix, 26-29. Judging from the battles of Corinth (B.C. 396) and Mantinea (B.C. 418), the Tegeans seem afterwards to have dropped this pretension to occupy the left wing, and to have preferred the post in the line next to the Lacedæmonians (Xenoph. Hellen. iv, 2, 19).

Mardonius, apprized of this change of position, marched his army also a little farther to the westward, and posted himself opposite to the Greeks, divided from them by the river Asopus. At the suggestion of the Thebans, he himself, with his Persians and Medes, the picked men of his army, took post on the left wing, immediately opposite to the Lacedæmonians on the Greek right, and even extending so far as to cover the Tegean ranks on the left of the Lacedæmonians: Bactrians, Indians, Sakæ, with other Asiatics and Egyptians, filled the centre: and the Greeks and Macedonians in the service of Persia, the right, — over against the hoplites of Athens. The numbers of these last-mentioned Greeks Herodotus could not learn, though he estimates them conjecturally at fifty thousand:¹ nor can we place any confidence in the total of three hundred thousand, which he gives as belonging to the other troops of Mardonius, though probably it cannot have been much less.

In this position lay the two armies, separated only by a narrow space including the river Asopus, and each expecting a battle, whilst the sacrifices on behalf of each were offered up. Pausanias, Mardonius, and the Greeks in the Persian army, had each a separate prophet to offer sacrifice, and to ascertain the dispositions of the gods; the two first had men from the most distinguished prophetic breeds in Elis, — the latter invited one from Leukas.² All received large pay, and the prophet of Pausanias had indeed been honored with a recompense above all pay, — the gift of full Spartan citizenship for himself as well as for his brother. It happened that the prophets on both sides delivered the same report of their respective sacrifices, — favorable for resistance if attacked; unfavorable for beginning the battle. At a moment when doubt and indecision was the reigning feeling on both sides, this was the safest answer for the prophet to give, and the most satisfactory for the soldiers to hear. And though the answer from Delphi had been sufficiently encouraging, and the

Herodot. ix, 31, 32.

² Herodot. ix, 36, 38. *μεγιστοῦ αἰῶνος οὐκ ἔστιν.*

These prophets were men of great individual consequence, as may be seen by the details which Herodotus gives respecting their adventures; compare also the history of Euenius, ix, 33.

kindness of the patron-heroes of Plataea¹ had been solemnly invoked, yet Pausanias did not venture to cross the Asopus and begin the attack, in the face of a pronounced declaration from his prophet. Nor did even Hegesistratus, the prophet employed by Mardonius, choose on his side to urge an aggressive movement, though he had a deadly personal hatred against the Lacedæmonians, and would have been delighted to see them worsted. There arose commencements of conspiracy, perhaps encouraged by promises or bribes from the enemy, among the wealthier Athenian hoplites, to establish an oligarchy at Athens under Persian supremacy, like that which now existed at Thebes, — a conspiracy full of danger at such a moment, though fortunately repressed² by Aristides, with a hand at once gentle and decisive. Moreover, the annoyance inflicted by the Persian cavalry, under the guidance of the Thebans, was incessant: their constant assaults, and missile weapons from the other side of the Asopus, prevented the Greeks from using it for supplies of water, so that the whole army was forced to water at the fountain Gargaphia, at the extreme right of the position,³ near the Lacedæmonian hoplites. Moreover, the Theban leader, Timagenidas, remarking the convoys which arrived over the passes of Kitharon, in the rear of the Grecian camp, and the constant reinforcements of hoplites which accompanied them, prevailed upon Mardonius to employ his cavalry in cutting off such communication. The first move-

¹ Plutarch, Aristides, c. xi; Thucyd. ii. 74.

² Plutarch, Aristides, c. 13.

³ Herodot. ix. 40, 49, 50. τὴν τε ἀριστερὰν τῆς Γαργαφίης, ὅτι ἡ ἰδρυμένη πόλις τοῦ στρατοῦ τὸ Ἑλλάδος — ἔρκεται δὲ ἀπὸ τοῦ Ἀσώπου, ὅτι δὴ ἐπὶ τῇ ἀριστερᾷ ἰδρυμένη ἀπὸ τοῦ ποταμοῦ γὰρ οὐκ οὐκ ἔστιν ἰδρυμένη, ὅπου τε τὸν ποταμὸν καὶ τὴν πόλιν.

Diodorus (xi. 30) affirms that the Greek position was so well defended by the nature of the ground, and so difficult of attack, that Mardonius was prevented from making use of his superior numbers. It is evident from the account of Herodotus that this is quite incorrect. The position seems to have had no protection except what it derived from the river Asopus, and the Greeks were ultimately forced to abandon it by the incessant attacks of the Persian cavalry. The whole account, at once diffuse and uninteresting, given by Diodorus of this battle (xi. 30-36), forms a strong contrast with the clear, impressive, and circumstantial narrative of Herodotus.

ment of this sort, undertaken by night against the pass called the Oak Heads, was eminently successful: a train of five hundred beasts of burden with supplies, was attacked descending into the plain with its escort, all of whom were either slain or carried prisoners to the Persian camp: nor was it safe for any farther convoys to approach the Greeks.¹ Eight days had already been passed in inaction before Timagenidas suggested, or Mardonius executed, this manœuvre, which it is fortunate for the Greeks that he did not attempt earlier, and which afforded clear proof how much might be hoped from an efficient employment of his cavalry, without the ruinous risk of a general action. Nevertheless, after waiting two days longer, his impatience became uncontrollable, and he determined on a general battle forthwith.² In vain did Artabazus endeavor to dissuade him from the step, — taking the same view as the Thebans, that in a pitched battle the united Grecian army was invincible, and that the only successful policy was that of delay and corruption to disunite them: he recommended standing on the defensive, by means of Thebes, well fortified and amply provisioned, — which would allow time for distributing effective bribes among the leading men throughout the various Grecian cities. This suggestion, which Herodotus considers as wise and likely to succeed, was repudiated by Mardonius as cowardly and unworthy of the recognized superiority of the Persian arms.³

But while he overruled, by virtue of superior authority, the objections of all around him, Persian as well as Greek, he could not but feel daunted by their reluctant obedience, which he suspected might arise from their having heard oracles or prophecies of unfavorable augury. He therefore summoned the chief officers, Greek as well as Persian, and put the question to them, whether they knew any prophecy announcing that the Persians were doomed to destruction in Greece. All were silent: some did not know the prophecies, but others, Herodotus intimates, knew them full well, though they did not dare to speak. Receiving no answer, Mardonius said, "Since ye either do not know or

¹ Herodot. ix. 38, 39.

² Herodot. ix. 40, 41.

³ Herodot. ix. 42.

will not tell, I, who know well, will myself speak out. There is an oracle to the effect, that Persian invaders of Greece shall plunder the temple of Delphi, and shall afterwards all be destroyed. Now we, being aware of this, shall neither go against that temple, nor try to plunder it: on that ground, therefore, we shall not be destroyed. Rejoice ye, therefore, ye who are well-affected to the Persians, — we shall get the better of the Greeks." With that he gave orders to prepare everything for a general attack and battle on the morrow.¹

It is not improbable that the Orchomenian Thersander was present at this interview, and may have reported it to Herodotus. But the reflection of the historian himself is not the least curious part of the whole, as illustrating the manner in which these prophecies sunk into men's minds, and determined their judgments. Herodotus knew, though he does not cite it, the particular prophecy to which Mardonius made allusion; and he pronounces, in the most affirmative tone,² that it had no reference to the Persians: it referred to an ancient invasion of Greece by the Illyrians and the Encheleis. But both Bakis, from whom he quotes four lines, and Musæus had prophesied, in the plainest manner, the destruction of the Persian army on the banks of the Thermôdon and Asôpus. And these are the prophecies which we must suppose the officers convoked by Mardonius to have known also, though they did not dare to speak out: it was the fault of Mardonius himself that he did not take warning.

The attack of a multitude like that of Mardonius was not likely under any circumstances to be made so rapidly as to take the Greeks by surprise: but the latter were forewarned of it by a secret visit from Alexander, king of Macedon; who, riding up to the Athenian advanced posts in the middle of the night, desired to speak with Aristeidês and the other generals. Announcing to them alone his name, and proclaiming his earnest sympathy for the Grecian cause, as well as the hazard which he incurred by this nightly visit, — he apprized them that Mardonius, though

¹ Herodot. ix. 42.

² Herodot. ix. 43. Τοῦτον δ' ἔγωγε τὸν χρησμὸν τὸν Μαρδόνιος εἶπε ἐς Πέρσας ἔχειν, ἐς Ἰλλυρίους τε καὶ τὸν Ἑλλησιων στρατὸν οἶδα πεποιημένον, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐς Πέρσας. Ἀλλὰ ταῦν Βακίῳ ἐς ταύτην τῇ νόχῃν ἐστὶ πεποιημένα, etc.

eager for a battle long ago, could not by any effort obtain favorable sacrifices, but was, nevertheless, even in spite of this obstacle, determined on an attack the next morning. "Be ye prepared accordingly; and if ye succeed in this war (said he) remember to liberate me also from the Persian yoke: I too am a Greek by descent, and thus risk my head because I cannot endure to see Greece enslaved."³

The communication of this important message, made by Aristeidês to Pausanias, elicited from him a proposal not a little surprising as coming from a Spartan general. He requested the Athenians to change places with the Lacedæmonians in the line. "We Lacedæmonians (said he) now stand opposed to the Persians and Medes, against whom we have never yet contended, while ye Athenians have fought and conquered them at Marathon. March ye then over to the right wing and take our places, while we will take yours in the left wing, against the Bœotians and Thessalians, with whose arms and attack we are familiar." The Athenians readily acceded, and the reciprocal change of order was accordingly directed: nor was it yet quite completed when day broke, and the Theban allies of Mardonius immediately took notice of what had been done. That general commanded a corresponding change in his own line, so as to place the native Persians once more over against the Lacedæmonians: upon which Pausanias, seeing that his manœuvre had failed, led back his Lacedæmonians to the right wing, while a second movement on the part of Mardonius replaced both armies in the order originally observed.²

No incident similar to this will be found throughout the whole course of Lacedæmonian history. To evade encountering the best troops in the enemy's line, and to depart for this purpose from their privileged post on the right wing, was a step well calculated to lower them in the eyes of Greece, and could hardly

¹ Herodot. ix. 44-45. The language about the sacrifices is remarkable, ἐγὼ δὲ ἂν ὅτι Μαρδόνιος τε καὶ τῇ στρατῇ οὐ δύναται τὰ σφέα εἶναι ἵπτα γένεσθαι: πάλαι γὰρ ἂν ἐμάχεσθε, etc.

Mardonius had tried many unavailing efforts to procure better sacrifices: A *could* not be done.

² Herodot. ix. 47; Plutarch, Aristeidês, c. 16. Here, as on many other occasions, Plutarch rather spoils than assists the narrative of Herodotus.

have failed to produce that effect, if the intention had been realized: it is at the same time the highest compliment to the formidable reputation of the native Persian troops, — a reputation recognized by Herodotus, and well sustained at least by their personal bravery.¹ Nor can we wonder that this publicly manifested reluctance on the part of the leading troops in the Grecian army contributed much to exalt the rash confidence of Mardonius: a feeling which Herodotus, in Homeric style,² casts into the speech of a Persian herald sent to upbraid the Lacedæmonians, and challenge them to a "single combat with champions of equal numbers, Lacedæmonians against Persians." This herald, whom no one heard or cared for, and who serves but as a mouthpiece for bringing out the feelings belonging to the moment, was followed by something very real and terrible. — a vigorous attack on the Greek line by the Persian cavalry; whose rapid motions, and showers of arrows and javelins, annoyed the Greeks on this day more than ever. The latter, as has been before stated, had no cavalry whatever; nor do their light troops, though sufficiently numerous, appear to have rendered any service, with the exception of the Athenian bowmen. How great was the advantage gained by the Persian cavalry, is shown by the fact that they for a time drove away the Lacedæmonians from the fountain of Gargaphia, so as to choke it up and render it unfit for use. As the army had been prevented by the cavalry from resorting to the river Asôpus, this fountain had been of late the only watering-place: and without it the position which they then occupied became untenable, — while their provisions also were exhausted, inasmuch as the convoys, from fear of the Persian cavalry, could not descend from Kithæron to join them.³

In this dilemma, Pausanias summoned the Grecian chiefs to his tent, and after an anxious debate the resolution was taken, in case Mardonius should not bring on a general action in the course of the day, to change their position during the night, when there

¹ Herodot. ix. 71.

² Compare the reproaches of Hektor to Diomêdês (Iliad, viii, 161).

³ Herodot. ix. 49, 50. Pausanias mentions that the Plataeans restored the fountain of Gargaphia after the victory (το ἴδιον ἀνέσκαυτο); but he hardly seems to speak as if he had himself seen it (ix. 4, 2).

would be no interruption from the cavalry; and to occupy the ground called the island, distant about ten furlongs in a direction nearly west, and seemingly north of the town of Platea, which was itself about twenty furlongs distant: this island, improperly so denominated, included the ground comprised between two branches of the river Oeroë,¹ both of which flow from Kithæron, and, after flowing for a certain time in channels about three furlongs apart, form a junction and run in a northwesterly direction towards one of the recesses of the gulf of Corinth, — quite distinct from the Asôpus, which, though also rising near at hand in the lowest declivities under Kithæron, takes an easterly direction and discharges itself into the sea opposite Eubœa. When in this so-called island, the army would be secure of water from the stream in their rear; nor would they, as now, expose an extended breadth of front to a numerous hostile cavalry separated from them only by the Asôpus.² It was further resolved, that so soon as the army should once be in occupation of the island, half of the troops should forthwith march onward to disengage the convoys blocked up on Kithæron and conduct them to the camp. Such was the plan settled in council among the different Grecian chiefs; the march to be commenced at the beginning of the second night-watch, when the enemy's cavalry would have completely withdrawn.

In spite of what Mardonius is said to have determined, he passed the whole day without any general attack: but his cavalry, probably elated by the recent demonstration of the Lacedæmonians, were on that day more daring and indefatigable than ever, and inflicted much loss as well as severe suffering;³ insomuch that the centre of the Greek force (Corinthians, Megarians, etc., between the Lacedæmonians and Tegeans on the right, and the

¹ See a good description of the ground in Colonel Leake, Travels in Northern Greece, ch. xvi. vol. ii. p. 358.

² Herodot. ix. 51. Ἐς ταῦτα δὲ τὸν χεῖρον ἐκονίζοντες μεταστήναι, ἵνα καὶ ἰδῶσι ἔχονσι χρυσάαι ἀνὸς ὡς, καὶ αἱ ἵπποι σέβας μὴ σπύδατο, ὥστερ' κατ' ἰσθμὸν ἴονταν.

The last words have reference to the position of the two hostile armies, extended front to front along the course of the Asôpus.

³ Herodot. ix. 52. κείνη μὲν τὴν ἡμέτην πάσαν, ποσσκεμμένης τῆς ἵππου εἶχον τῶνον ἀπρίτον.

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Athenians on the left), when the hour arrived for retiring to the island, commenced their march indeed, but forgot or disregarded the preconcerted plan and the orders of Pausanias, in their impatience to obtain a complete shelter against the attacks of the cavalry. Instead of proceeding to the island, they marched a distance of twenty furlongs directly to the town of Plataea, and took up a position in front of the Heraeum, or temple of Hērē, where they were protected partly by the buildings, partly by the comparatively high ground on which the town with its temple stood. Between the position which the Greeks were about to leave and that which they had resolved to occupy (*i. e.* between the course of the Asōpus and that of the Ocroē), there appear to have been a range of low hills: the Lacedæmonians, starting from the right wing, had to march directly over these hills, while the Athenians, from the left, were to turn them and get into the plain on the other side.¹ Pausanias, apprized that the divisions of the centre had commenced their night-march, and concluding of course that they would proceed to the island according to orders, allowed a certain interval of time in order to prevent confusion, and then directed that the Lacedæmonians and Tegeans should also begin their movement towards that same position. But here he found himself embarrassed by an unexpected obstacle. The movement was retrograde, receding from the enemy, and not consistent with the military honor of a Spartan; nevertheless, most of the taxiarchs, or leaders of companies, obeyed without murmuring; but Amompharetus, lochage or captain of that band which Herodotus calls the lochus of Pitana,² obstinately refused. Not having been present at the meeting in which the resolution had been taken, he now heard it for the first time

¹ Herodot. ix, 56. Πάυσανις — σμῆνας ἀπὸ τοῦ οὐδὲν τοῦς λοιτοῦς παντὸς εἰπόντο δὲ καὶ Τεγεῖται. Ἀθηναῖοι δὲ ταχέστερ ἦσαν τὴν ἐμπόδιον ἢ Λακεδαιμόνιοι. Οἱ μὲν γὰρ τῶν τε ὄχλων ἀνταχρῆτο καὶ τῆς ὑπομενῆς τοῦ Κισαίου. Ἀθηναῖοι δὲ, κατὰ τραχέστερ ἐς τὸ πῆδον.

With which we must combine another passage, c. 59, intimating that the track of the Athenians led them to turn and get behind the hills, which prevented Mardonius from seeing them, though they were marching along the plain: Μαρδονίος — ἐπέιχε ἐπὶ Λακεδαιμόνιοις καὶ Τεγεῖται μόνους Ἀθηναίους γὰρ τραπομένους ἐς τὸ πῆδον ὑπὸ τῶν ὄχλων οὐ κατενόη.

² There is on this point a difference between Thucydides and Herodo-

with astonishment and disdain, declaring "that he for one would never so far disgrace Sparta as to run away from the foreigner."¹ Pausanias, with the second in command, Euryanax, exhausted every effort to overcome his reluctance: but they could by no means induce him to retreat; nor did they dare to move without him, leaving his entire lochus exposed alone to the enemy.²

Amidst the darkness of night, and in this scene of indecision and dispute, an Athenian messenger on horseback reached Pausanias, instructed to ascertain what was passing, and to ask for the last directions: for in spite of the resolution taken after formal debate, the Athenian generals still mistrusted the Lacedæmonians, and doubted whether, after all, they would act as they had promised: the movement of the central division having become known to them, they sent at the last moment before they commenced their own march, to assure themselves that the Spartans were about to move also. A profound, and even an exaggerated mistrust, but too well justified by the previous behavior of the Spartans towards Athens, is visible in this proceeding:³ yet it proved fortunate in its results, — for if the Athenians, satisfied with executing their part in the preconcerted plan, had marched at once to the island, the Grecian army would have been severed without the possibility of reuniting, and the issue of the battle might have proved altogether different. The Athenian herald found the Lacedæmonians still stationary in their position, and the generals in hot dispute with Amompharetus; who despised the threat of being left alone to make head against the Persians, and when reminded that the resolution had been taken by general vote of the officers, took up with both hands a vast rock, fit for the hands of Ajax or Hektor, and cast

tus: the former affirms that there never was any Spartan lochus so called (Thucyd. i. 21).

We have no means of reconciling the difference, nor can we be certain that Thucydides is right in his negative comprehending all past time — ὅς οὐδ' ἐγένετο ποπότε.

¹ Herodot. ix, 53, 54.

² Herodot. ix, 52, 53.

³ Herodot. ix, 54. Ἀθηναῖοι — εἶχον ἀτρέμας, σφίς αὐτοὺς ἵνα ἐτάχθησαν ἐπιστάμενοι τὰ Λακεδαιμονίων οὐσνήματα, ὥς ἄλλα φρονεόντων καὶ ἄλλα λεγόντων.

it at the feet of Pausanias, saying — "This is *my* pebble, where with I give my vote not to run away from the strangers." Pausanias denounced him as a madman, — desiring the herald to report the scene of embarrassment which he had just come to witness, and to entreat the Athenian generals **not** to commence their retreat until the Lacedæmonians should **also** be in march. In the mean time the dispute continued, and was even prolonged by the perverseness of Amompharetus until the morning began to dawn; when Pausanias, afraid to remain longer, gave the signal for retreat, — calculating that the refractory captain, when he saw his locus really left alone, would probably make up his mind to follow. Having marched about ten furlongs, across the hilly ground which divided him from the island, he commanded a halt, — either to await Amompharetus, if he chose to follow, or to be near enough to render aid and save him, if he were rash enough to stand his ground single-handed. Happily the latter, seeing that his general had really departed, overcame his scruples, and followed him; overtaking and joining the main body in its first halt near the river Moloeis and the temple of Eleusinian Dêmêter.¹ The Athenians, commencing their movement at the same time with Pausanias, got round the hills to the plain on the other side and proceeded on their march towards the island.

When the day broke, the Persian cavalry were astonished to find the Grecian position deserted. They immediately set themselves to the pursuit of the Spartans, whose march lay along the higher and more conspicuous ground, and whose progress had moreover been retarded by the long delay of Amompharetus: the Athenians on the contrary, marching without halt and being already behind the hills, were not open to view. To Mardonius, this retreat of his enemy inspired an extravagant and contemptuous confidence, which he vented in full measure to the Thessalian Aleuada: "These are your boasted Spartans, who changed their place just now in the line, rather than fight the Persians, and have here shown by a barefaced flight what they are really worth!" With that, he immediately directed his whole army to pursue and attack, with the utmost expedition. The Persians crossed the Asôpus, and ran after the Greeks at their best speed,

¹ Herodot. xi. 56, 57.

pell-mell, without any thought of order or preparations for overcoming resistance: the army already rang with shouts of victory, in full confidence of swallowing up the fugitives as soon as they were overtaken.

The Asiatic allies all followed the example of this disorderly rush forward: but the Thebans and the other Grecian allies on the right wing of Mardonius, appear to have maintained somewhat better order.

Pausanias had not been able to retreat farther than the neighborhood of the Demetrium, or temple of Eleusinian Dêmêter, where he had halted to take up Amompharetus. Overtaken first by the Persian horse, and next by Mardonius with the main body, he sent a horseman forthwith to apprize the Athenians, and to entreat their aid. Nor were the Athenians slack in complying with his request: but they speedily found themselves engaged in conflict against the Theban allies of the enemy, and therefore unable to reach him.² Accordingly, the Lacedæmonians and Tegeates had to encounter the Persians single-handed, without any assistance from the other Greeks. The Persians, on arriving within bowshot of their enemies, planted in the ground the spiked extremities of their gerrha, or long wicker shields, forming a continuous breastwork, from behind which they poured upon the Greeks a shower of arrows:³ their bows were of the largest size, and drawn with no less power than skill. In spite of the wounds and distress thus inflicted, Pausanias persisted in the indispensable duty of offering the battle sacrifice, and the victims were for some time unfavorable, so that he did

¹ Herodot. ix. 59. *ἰδιώκων ὡς πῶλον ἕκαστος εἶχον, οὔτε κόσμῳ οὔδενι κοσμησύντες, οὔτε τάξι.* Καὶ οὕτω μὲν βοῇ τε καὶ ὀμίλῳ ἐπήσαν, ὡς ἀρπαζόμενοι τοὺς Ἕλληνας.

Herodotus dwells especially on the reckless and disorderly manner in which the Persians advanced: Plutarch, on the contrary, says of Mardonius, — *ἔχων συνεταγμένην τὴν δύναμιν ἐπιφύρετο τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις,* etc. (Plutarch, Aristeid. c. 17.)

Plutarch also says that Pausanias *ἤγε τὴν ἄλλην δύναμιν πρὸς τὴν Πλαταιάν,* etc., which is quite contrary to the real narrative of Herodotus. Pausanias intended to march to the island, not to Platæa: he did not reach either the one or the other.

Herodot. ix. 60, 61.

² About the Persian bow, see Xenoph. Anab. iii. 4, 17.

not venture to give orders for advance and close combat. Many were here wounded or slain in the ranks,¹ among them the brave Kallikratēs, the handsomest and strongest man in the army: until Pausanias, wearied out with this compulsory and painful delay, at length raised his eyes to the conspicuous Heræum of the Plataeans, and invoked the merciful intervention of Hērē to remove that obstacle which confined him to the spot. Hardly had he pronounced the words, when the victims changed and became favorable:² but the Tegeans, while he was yet praying, anticipated the effect and hastened forward against the enemy, followed by the Lacedæmonians as soon as Pausanias gave the word. The wicker breastwork before the Persians was soon overthrown by the Grecian charge: nevertheless the Persians, though thus deprived of their tutelary hedge, and having no defensive armor, maintained the fight with individual courage, the more remarkable because it was totally unassisted by discipline or trained collective movement, against the drilled array, the regulated step, the well-defended persons, and the long spears, of the Greeks.³ They threw themselves upon the

¹ Herod. ix, 72.

² Herodot. ix, 62. Καὶ τοῖσι Λακεδαιμονίοισι αὐτίκα μετὰ τὴν εἴηνην τὴν Πωσανίῳ γίνετο θεομένοισι τὰ σφύγια χρησάμ. Plutarch exaggerates the long-suffering of Pausanias (Aristeid. c. 17, ad finem).

The lofty and conspicuous site of the Heræon, visible to Pausanias at the distance where he was, is plainly marked in Herodotus (ix, 61).

For incidents illustrating the hardships which a Grecian army endured from its reluctance to move without favorable sacrifices, see Xenophon, Anabasis, vi, 4, 10-25; Hellenic. iii, 2, 17.

³ Herodot. ix, 62, 63. His words about the courage of the Persians are remarkable: ἡμάτι μὲν γὰρ καὶ ῥάμῃ οὐκ ἔσσαντες ἦσαν οἱ Πέρσαι· ἀνοπλοὶ δὲ ὄντες, καὶ πρὸς ἀνεπιστήμονες ἦσαν, καὶ οὐκ ὁμοιοὶ τοῖσι ἑαυτοῖσι σοφίην. . . . πλείστον γὰρ σφείας ἐδήλατο ἢ ἐσθλῆς ἐρίμος τοῦσα ὅπλων· πρὸς γὰρ ὁπλίτας ὄντες γυμνότες ἀγῶνα ἐποιεύντο. Compare the striking conversation between Xerxes and Demaratus (Herodot. vii, 104).

The description given by Herodotus of the gallant rush made by these badly-armed Persians, upon the presented line of spears in the Lacedæmonian ranks, may be compared with Livy (xxxii, 17), a description of the Romans attacking the Macedonian phalanx, and with the battle of Sem-pach (June, 1386), in which fourteen hundred half-armed Swiss overcame a large body of fully-armed Austrians, with an impenetrable front of projecting spears; which for some time they were unable to break in upon, until

Lacedæmonians, seizing hold of their spears, and breaking them: many of them devoted themselves in small parties of ten to force by their bodies a way into the lines, and to get to individual close combat with the short spear and the dagger.¹ Mardonius himself, conspicuous upon a white horse, was among the foremost warriors, and the thousand select troops who formed his body-guard distinguished themselves beyond all the rest. At length he was slain by the hand of a distinguished Spartan named Acimnēstus; his thousand guards mostly perished around him, and the courage of the remaining Persians, already worn out by the superior troops against which they had been long contending, was at last thoroughly broken by the death of their general. They turned their backs and fled, not resting until they got into the wooden fortified camp constructed by Mardonius behind the Asôpus. The Asiatic allies also, as soon as they saw the Persians defeated, took to flight without striking a blow.²

The Athenians on the left, meanwhile, had been engaged in a serious conflict with the Bœotians; especially the Theban leaders with the hoplites immediately around them, who fought with great bravery, but were at length driven back, after the loss of three hundred of their best troops. The Theban cavalry, however, still maintained a good front, protecting the retreat of the infantry and checking the Athenian pursuit, so that the fugitives were enabled to reach Thebes in safety; a better refuge than

at length one of their warriors, Arnold von Winkelried, grasped an armful of spears, and precipitated himself upon them, making a way for his countrymen over his dead body. See Vogel, Geschichte der Schweizerischen Eidgenossenschaft, ch. vi, p. 240, or indeed any history of Switzerland, for a description of this memorable incident.

¹ For the arms of the Persians, see Herodot. vii, 61.

Herodotus states in another place that the Persian troops adopted the Egyptian breastplates (θώρακας): probably this may have been after the battle of Platæa. Even at this battle, the Persian leaders on horseback had strong defensive armor, as we may see by the case of Masistius, above narrated: by the time of the battle of Kunaxa, the habit had become more widely diffused (Xenoph. Anab. i, 8, 6; Brisson, De Regno Persarum lib. iii, p. 361), for the cavalry at least.

² Herodot. ix, 64, 65.

the Persian fortified camp.¹ With the exception of the Thebans and Bœotians, none of the other *medizing* Greeks rendered any real service: instead of sustaining or reinforcing the Thebans, they never once advanced to the charge, but merely followed in the first movement of flight. So that, in point of fact, the only troops in this numerous Perso-Grecian army who really fought, were the native Persians and Sakæ on the left, and the Bœotians on the right: the former against the Lacedæmonians, the latter against the Athenians.²

Nor did even all the native Persians take part in the combat. A body of forty thousand men under Artabazus, of whom some must doubtless have been native Persians, left the field without fighting and without loss. That general, seemingly the ablest man in the Persian army, had been from the first disgusted with the nomination of Mardonius as commander-in-chief, and had further incurred his displeasure by deprecating any general action. Apprized that Mardonius was hastening forward to attack the retreating Greeks, he marshalled his division and led them out towards the scene of action, though despairing of success, and perhaps not very anxious that his own prophecies should be contradicted. And such had been the headlong impetuosity of Mardonius in his first forward movement,—so complete his confidence of overwhelming the Greeks when he discovered their retreat,—that he took no pains to insure the concerted action of his whole army: accordingly, before Artabazus arrived at the scene of action, he saw the Persian troops, who had been engaged under the commander-in-chief, already defeated and in flight. Without making the least attempt either to save them or to retrieve the battle, he immediately gave orders to his own division to retreat: not repairing, however, either to the fortified camp, or to Thebes, but abandoning at once the whole campaign, and taking the direct road through Phœcis to Thessaly, Macedonia, and the Hellespont.³

As the native Persians, the Sakæ, and the Bœotians, were the only real combatants on the one side, so also were the Lacedæmonians, Tegeans, and Athenians, on the other.

¹ Herodot. ix, 67, 68.

² Herodot. ix, 67, 68. Τῶν δὲ ἄλλων Ἑλλήνων τῶν μετὰ βασιλέας ἔδε ἰσχυροτέρων . . . καὶ τῶν ἄλλων συμμάχων ἑ πᾶς ὁμίλος οὐτε διαμαρτυρήσας οὐδὲν οὐτε τι ἀποδείξας ὡς ἔδυνεν

³ Herodot. ix. 66

It has already been mentioned that the central troops of the Grecian army, disobeying the general order of march, had gone during the night to the town of Plataea instead of to the island. They were thus completely severed from Pausanias, and the first thing which they heard about the battle, was, that the Lacedæmonians were gaining the victory. Elate with this news, and anxious to come in for some share of the honor, they rushed to the scene of action, without any heed of military order; the Corinthians taking the direct track across the hills, while the Megarians, Phliasians, and others, marched by the longer route along the plain, so as to turn the hills and arrive at the Athenian position. The Theban horse under Asôpodôrus, employed in checking the pursuit of the victorious Athenian hoplites, seeing these fresh troops coming up in thorough disorder, charged them vigorously, and drove them back to take refuge in the high ground, with the loss of six hundred men.¹ But this partial success had no effect in mitigating the ruin of the general defeat.

Following up their pursuit, the Lacedæmonians proceeded to attack the wooden redoubt wherein the Persians had taken refuge. But though they were here aided by all or most of the central Grecian divisions, who had taken no part in the battle, they were yet so ignorant of the mode of assailing walls, that they made no progress, and were completely baffled, until the Athenians arrived to their assistance. The redoubt was then stormed, not without a gallant and prolonged resistance on the part of its defenders. The Tegeans, being the first to penetrate into the interior, plundered the rich tent of Mardonius, whose manger for his horses, made of brass, remained long afterwards exhibited in their temple of Athênê Alea,—while his silver-footed throne, and cimeter² were preserved in the acropolis of Athens, along with the breastplate of Masistius. Once within the wall, effective resistance ceased, and the Greeks slaughtered without mercy as well as without limit; so that if we are to credit

¹ Herodot. ix, 69.

² Herodot. ix, 70; Demosthenês cont. Timokrat. p. 741, c. 33. Pausanias (i. 27, 2) doubts whether this was really the cimeter of Mardonius, contending that the Lacedæmonians would never have permitted the Athenians to take it.

Herodotus, there survived only three thousand men out of the three hundred thousand which had composed the army of Mardonius, — save and except the forty thousand men who accompanied Artabazus in his retreat.¹ Respecting these numbers, the historian had probably little to give except some vague reports, without any pretence of computation: about the Grecian loss, his statement deserves more attention, when he tells us that there perished ninety-one Spartans, sixteen Tegeans, and fifty-two Athenians. Herein, however, is not included the loss of the Megarians when attacked by the Theban cavalry, nor is the number of slain Lacedæmonians, not Spartans, specified; while even the other numbers actually stated are decidedly smaller than the probable truth, considering the multitude of Persian arrows and the unshielded right side of the Grecian hoplite. On the whole, the affirmation of Plutarch, that not less than thirteen hundred and sixty Greeks were slain in the action, appears probable: all doubtless hoplites, — for little account was then made of the light-armed, nor indeed are we told that they took any active part in the battle.² Whatever may have been the numerical loss of the Persians, this defeat proved the total ruin of their army: but we may fairly presume that many were spared and sold into slavery,³ while many of the fugitives probably found means to join the retreating division of Artabazus. That general made a rapid march across Thessaly and Macedo-

¹ Herodot. ix, 70: compare Æschyl. Pers. 805-824. He singles out "the Dorian spear" as the great weapon of destruction to the Persians at Plataea, — very justly. Dr. Blomfield is surprised at this compliment; but it is to be recollected that all the earlier part of the tragedy had been employed in setting forth the glory of Athens at Salamis, and he might well afford to give the Peloponnesians the credit which they derived at Plataea. Pindar distributes the honor between Sparta and Athens in like manner (Pyth. i, 76).

² Plutarch, Aristeidês, c. 19. Kleidemus, quoted by Plutarch, stated that all the fifty-two Athenians who perished belonged to the tribe Æantis, which distinguished itself in the Athenian ranks. But it seems impossible to believe that no citizens belonging to the other nine tribes were killed.

Diodorus, indeed, states that Pausanias was so apprehensive of the numbers of the Persians, that he forbade his soldiers to give quarter or take any prisoners (xi, 32); but this is hardly to be believed, in spite of his assertion. His statement that the Greeks lost ten thousand men is still less admissible.

nia, keeping strict silence about the recent battle, and pretending to be sent on a special enterprise by Mardonius, whom he reported to be himself approaching. If Herodotus is correct (though it may well be doubted whether the change of sentiment in Thessaly and the other *medizing* Grecian states was so rapid as he implies), Artabazus succeeded in traversing these countries before the news of the battle became generally known, and then retreated by the straightest and shortest route through the interior of Thrace to Byzantium, from whence he passed into Asia: the interior tribes, unconquered and predatory, harassed his retreat considerably; but we shall find long afterwards Persian garrisons in possession of many principal places on the Thracian coast.¹ It will be seen that Artabazus afterwards rose higher than ever in the estimation of Xerxes.

Ten days did the Greeks employ after their victory, first in burying the slain, next in collecting and apportioning the booty. The Lacedæmonians, the Athenians, the Tegeans, the Megarians, and the Phliasians, each buried their dead apart, erecting a separate tomb in commemoration: the Lacedæmonians, indeed, distributed their dead into three fractions, in three several burial-places: one for those champions who enjoyed individual renown at Sparta, and among whom were included the most distinguished men slain in the recent battle, such as Poseidonius, Amompharetus, the refractory captain, Philokyon, and Kallikratês, — a second for the other Spartans and Lacedæmonians,² — and a

¹ Herodot. ix, 89. The allusions of Demosthenês to Perdikkas king of Macedonia, who is said to have attacked the Persians on their flight from Plataea, and to have rendered their ruin complete, are too loose to deserve attention; more especially as Perdikkas was *not then* king of Macedonia (Demosthenês cont. Aristokrat. pp. 687, c. 51; and *περὶ Συντάξεως*, p. 173, c. 9).

² Herodot. ix, 84. Herodotus indeed assigns this second burial-place only to the other Spartans, apart from the Select. He takes no notice of the Lacedæmonians not Spartans, either in the battle or in reference to burial, though he had informed us that five thousand of them were included in the army. Some of them must have been slain, and we may fairly presume that they were buried along with the Spartan citizens generally. As to the word *λεπας*, or *ελενας*, or *λεπείας* (the two last being both conjectural readings), it seems impossible to arrive at any certainty: we do not know by what name these select warriors were called.

third for the Helots. Besides these sepulchral monuments, erected in the neighborhood of Plataea by those cities whose citizens had really fought and fallen, there were several similar monuments to be seen in the days of Herodotus, raised by other cities which falsely pretended to the same honor, with the connivance and aid of the Plateans.¹ The body of Mardonius was discovered among the slain, and treated with respect by Pausanias, who is even said to have indignantly repudiated advice offered to him by an Æginetan, that he should retaliate upon it the ignominious treatment inflicted by Xerxes upon the dead Leonidas.² On the morrow, the body was stolen away and buried; by whom, was never certainly known, for there were many different pretenders who obtained reward on this plea from Artyntês, the son of Mardonius: the funereal monument was yet to be seen in the time of the traveller Pausanias.³

¹ Herodot. ix, 85. Τῶν δ' ἄλλων ὅσοι καὶ φαίνονται ἐν Πλαταιῇσι ὄντες τάφοι, τοὺτους δὲ, ὡς ἐγὼ περὶ θάνατον αὐτοῦ ἐπισχνομένης τῇ ἀπεστοῇ τῆς μάχης, ἐκάστους χώματα χώσαι κείνα, τῶν ἐπιγινόμενων εἴνεκεν ἀνθρώπων ἵππεϊ καὶ Αἰγινητέων ἐστὶ αὐτόθι καλούμενος τάφος, τὸν ἐγὼ ἀκούω καὶ δέκα ἔτεσι ὕστερον μετὰ ταῦτα, δεηθέντων τῶν Αἰγινητέων, χώσαι Κλεαῖδην τὸν Αὐτοδίκου, ἄνδρα Πλαταιᾶ, πρόξενον ἔσθαι αὐτῶν.

This is a curious statement, derived by Herodotus doubtless from personal inquiries made at Plataea.

² Herodot. ix, 78, 79. This suggestion, so abhorrent to Grecian feeling, is put by the historian into the mouth of the Æginetan Lampôn. In my preceding note, I have alluded to another statement made by Herodotus, not very creditable to the Æginetans; there is, moreover, a third (ix, 80), in which he represents them as having cheated the Helots in their purchases of the booty. We may presume him to have heard all these anecdotes at Plataea: at the time when he probably visited that place, not long before the Peloponnesian war, the inhabitants were united in the most intimate manner with Athens, and doubtless sympathized in the hatred of the Athenians against Ægina. It does not from hence follow that the stories are all untrue. I disbelieve, indeed, the advice said to have been given by Lampôn to crucify the body of Mardonius. — which has more the air of a poetical contrivance for bringing out an honorable sentiment, than of a real incident. But there seems no reason to doubt the truth of the other two stories. Herodotus does but too rarely specify his informants: it is interesting to scent out the track in which his inquiries have been prosecuted.

After the battle of Kunaxa, and the death of Cyrus the younger, his dead body had the head and hands cut off, by order of Artaxerxes, and nailed to a cross (Xenoph. Anab. i, 10, 1; ii, 1, 17).

³ Herodot. ix, 84; Pausanias, ix, 2, 2.

The spoil was rich and multifarious, — gold and silver in Darics as well as in implements and ornaments, carpets, splendid arms and clothing, horses, camels, etc., even the magnificent tent of Xerxes, left on his retreat with Mardonius, was included.¹ By order of the general Pausanias, the Helots collected all the valuable articles into one spot for division; not without stealing many of the golden ornaments, which, in ignorance of the value, they were persuaded by the Æginetans to sell as brass. After reserving a tithe for the Delphian Apollo, together with ample offerings for the Olympic Zeus and the Isthmian Poseidon, as well as for Pausanias as general, — the remaining booty was distributed among the different contingents of the army in proportion to their respective numbers.² The concubines of the Persian chiefs were among the prizes distributed: there were probably however among them many of Grecian birth, restored to their families; and one especially, overtaken in her chariot amidst the flying Persians, with rich jewels and a numerous suite, threw herself at the feet of Pausanias himself, imploring his protection. She proved to be the daughter of his personal friend Hegetoridês, of Kos, carried off by the Persian Pharnadates; and he had the satisfaction of restoring her to her father.³ Large as the booty collected was, there yet remained many valuable treasures buried in the ground, which the Platean inhabitants afterwards discovered and appropriated.

The real victors in the battle of Plataea were the Lacedæmonians, Athenians, and Tegeans: the Corinthians and others, forming part of the army opposed to Mardonius, did not reach the field until the battle was ended, though they doubtless aided both in the assault of the fortified camp and in the subsequent operations against Thebes, and were universally recognized, in inscriptions and panegyrics, among the champions who had con-

Herodot. ix, 80, 81: compare vii, 41–83.

¹ Diodorus (xi, 33) states this proportional distribution. Herodotus only says — ἔλαβον ἕκαστοι τῶν ἄξιοι ἦσαν (ix, 81).

² Herodot. ix, 76, 80, 81, 82. The fate of these female companions of the Persian grandees, on the taking of the camp by an enemy, forms a melancholy picture here as well as at Issus, and even at Kunaxa: see Diodor. xvii, 35; Quintus Curtius, iii, xi, 21; Xenoph. Anab. i, 10, 2.

tributed to the liberation of Greece.¹ It was not till after the taking of the Persian camp that the contingents of Elis and Mantinea, who may perhaps have been among the convoys prevented by the Persian cavalry from descending the passes of Kithæron, first reached the scene of action. Mortified at having missed their share in the glorious exploit, the new-comers were at first eager to set off in pursuit of Artabazus: but the Lacedæmonian commander forbade them, and they returned home without any other consolation than that of banishing their generals for not having led them forth more promptly.²

There yet remained the most efficient ally of Mardonius, — the city of Thebes; which Pausanias summoned on the eleventh day after the battle, requiring that the *medizing* leaders should be delivered up, especially Timægenidas and Attaginus. On receiving a refusal, he began to batter their walls, and to adopt the still more effective measure of laying waste their territory, — giving notice that the work of destruction would be continued

¹ Plutarch animadverts severely (De Malign. Herodot. p. 873; compare Plut. Aristeid. c. 19) upon Herodotus, because he states that none of the Greeks had any share in the battle of Plataea except the Lacedæmonians, Tegeans, and Athenians; the orator Lysias repeats the same statement (Oratio Funer. c. 9).

If this were the fact (Plutarch asks) how comes it that the inscriptions and poems of the time recognize the exploit as performed by the whole Grecian army, Corinthians and others included? But these inscriptions do not really contradict what is affirmed by Herodotus. The actual battle happened to be fought only by a part of the collective Grecian army; but this happened in a great measure by accident; the rest were little more than a mile off, and until within a few hours had been occupying part of the same continuous line of position; moreover, if the battle had lasted a little longer, they would have come up in time to render actual help. They would naturally be considered, therefore, as entitled to partake in the glory of the entire result.

When however in after-times a stranger visited Plataea, and saw Lacedæmonian, Tegean, and Athenian tombs, but no Corinthian nor Æginetan, etc., he would naturally inquire how it happened that none of these latter had fallen in the battle, and would then be informed that they were not really present at it. Hence the motive for these cities to erect empty sepulchral monuments on the spot, as Herodotus informs us that they afterwards did or caused to be done by individual Plateans.

² Herodot. ix. 77

until these chiefs were given up. After twenty days of endurance, the latter at length proposed, if it should prove that Pausanias peremptorily required their persons and refused to accept a sum of money in commutation, to surrender themselves voluntarily as the price of liberation for their country. A negotiation was accordingly entered into with Pausanias, and the persons demanded were surrendered to him, excepting Attaginus, who found means to escape at the last moment. His sons, whom he left behind, were delivered up as substitutes, but Pausanias refused to touch them, with the just remark, which in those times was even generous,¹ that they were nowise implicated in the *medism* of their father. Timægenidas and the remaining prisoners were carried off to Corinth, and immediately put to death, without the smallest discussion or form of trial: Pausanias was apprehensive that if any delay or consultation were granted, their wealth and that of their friends would effectually purchase voices for their acquittal, — indeed, the prisoners themselves had been induced to give themselves up partly in that expectation.² It is remarkable that Pausanias himself, only a few years afterwards, when attainted of treason, returned and surrendered himself at Sparta, under similar hopes of being able to buy himself off by money.³ In this hope, indeed, he found himself deceived, as Timægenidas had been deceived before: but the fact is not the less to be noted, as indicating the general impression that the leading men in a Grecian city were usually open to bribes in judicial matters, and that individuals superior to this temptation were rare exceptions. I shall have occasion to dwell upon this recognized untrustworthiness of the leading Greeks when I come

¹ See, a little above in this chapter, the treatment of the wife and children of the Athenian senator Lykidas (Herodot. ix. 5). Compare also Herodot. iii. 116; ix. 120.

² Herodot. ix. 87, 88.

³ Thucyd. i. 131. καὶ πιστέων χρήμασ. διαλύσειν τὴν διαβολήν. Compare Thucyd. viii. 45, where he states that the trierarchs and generals of the Lacedæmonian and allied fleet, all except Hermokratēs of Syracuse, received bribes from Tissaphernes to betray the interests both of their seamen and of their country: also c. 49 of the same book about the Lacedæmonian general Astyochus. The bribes received by the Spartan kings Leotychidēs and Pleistoanax are recorded (Herodot. vi. 72; Thucyd. ii. 21).

to explain the extremely popular cast of the Athenian judgment.

Whether there was any positive vote taken among the Greeks respecting the prize of valor at the battle of Plataea, may well be doubted: and the silence of Herodotus goes far to negative an important statement of Plutarch, that the Athenians and Lacedæmonians were on the point of coming to an open rupture, each thinking themselves entitled to the prize, — that Aristeidēs appeased the Athenians, and prevailed upon them to submit to the general decision of the allies, — and that Megarian and Corinthian leaders contrived to elude the dangerous rock by bestowing the prize on the Plataeans, to which proposition both Aristeidēs and Pausanias acceded.¹ But it seems that the general opinion recognized the Lacedæmonians and Pausanias as bravest among the brave, seeing that they had overcome the best troops of the enemy and slain the general. In burying their dead warriors, the Lacedæmonians singled out for peculiar distinction Philokyon, Poseidonius, and Anompharetus the lochage, whose conduct in the fight atoned for his disobedience to orders. There was one Spartan, however, who had surpassed them all, — Aristodēmus, the single survivor of the troop of Leonidas at Thermopylae. Having ever since experienced nothing but disgrace and insult from his fellow-citizens, this unfortunate man had become reckless of life, and at Plataea he stepped forth single-handed from his place in the ranks, performing deeds of the most heroic valor, and determined to regain by his death the esteem of his countrymen. But the Spartans refused to assign to him the same funeral honors as were paid to the other distinguished warriors, who had manifested exemplary forwardness and skill, yet without any desperate rashness, and without any previous taint such as to render life a burden to them. Subsequent valor might be held to efface this taint, but could not suffice to exalt Aristodēmus to a level with the most honored citizens.²

But though we cannot believe the statement of Plutarch, that the Plataeans received by general vote the prize of valor, it is certain that they were largely honored and recompensed, as the

¹ Plutarch. Aristeidēs, c. 20; De Herodo. Malign. p. 873.

² Herodot. iv, 71, 72.

proprietors of that ground on which the liberation of Greece had been achieved. The market-place and centre of their town was selected as the scene for the solemn sacrifice of thanksgiving, offered up by Pausanias, after the battle, to Zeus Eleutherius, in the name and presence of all the assembled allies. The local gods and heroes of the Plataean territory, who had been invoked in prayer before the battle, and who had granted their soil as a propitious field for the Greek arms, were made partakers of this ceremony, and witnesses as well as guarantees of the engagements with which it was accompanied.¹ The Plataeans, now re-entering their city, which the Persian invasion had compelled them to desert, were invested with the honorable duty of celebrating the periodical sacrifice in commemoration of this great victory, as well as of rendering care and religious service at the tombs of the fallen warriors. As an aid to enable them to discharge this obligation, which probably might have pressed hard upon them at a time when their city was half-ruined and their fields unsown, they received out of the prize-money the large allotment of eighty talents, which was partly employed in building and adorning a handsome temple of Athênê, — the symbol probably of renewed connection with Athens. They undertook to render religious honors every year to the tombs of the warriors, and to celebrate in every fifth year the grand public solemnity of the Eleutheria with gymnastic matches analogous to the other great festival games of Greece.² In consideration of the discharge of these duties, together with the sanctity of the ground, Pausanias, and the whole body of allies, bound themselves by oath to guarantee the autonomy of Plataea, and the inviolability

¹ Thucyd. ii. 71, 72. So the Roman emperor Vitellius, on visiting the field of Bedriacum, where his troops had recently been victorious, "instaurabat sacrum Diis loci." (Tacitus, Histor. ii, 70.)

² Thucyd. ii. 71; Plutarch, Aristeidēs, c. 19-21; Strabo, ix, p. 412, Pausanias, ix, 2, 4.

The Eleutheria were celebrated on the fourth of the Attic month Bædromion, which was the day on which the battle itself was fought; while the annual decoration of the tombs, and ceremonies in honor of the deceased, took place on the sixteenth of the Attic month Mæmaktêrion. K. F. Hermann (Gottesdienstliche Alterthümer der Griechen, ch. 63, note 9) has treated these two celebrations as if they were one.

to explain the extremely popular cast of the Athenian judiciary.

Whether there was any positive vote taken among the Greeks respecting the prize of valor at the battle of Plataea, may well be doubted: and the silence of Herodotus goes far to negative an important statement of Plutarch, that the Athenians and Lacedæmonians were on the point of coming to an open rupture, each thinking themselves entitled to the prize, — that Aristeidēs appeared the Athenians, and prevailed upon them to submit to the general decision of the allies, — and that Megarian and Corinthian leaders contrived to elude the dangerous rock by bestowing the prize on the Plataeans, to which proposition both Aristeidēs and Pausanias acceded.¹ But it seems that the general opinion recognized the Lacedæmonians and Pausanias as bravest among the brave, seeing that they had overcome the best troops of the enemy and slain the general. In burying their dead warriors, the Lacedæmonians singled out for peculiar distinction Philokyon, Poseidonius, and Anompharetus the lochage, whose conduct in the fight atoned for his disobedience to orders. There was one Spartan, however, who had surpassed them all, — Aristodēmus, the single survivor of the troop of Leonidas at Thermopylae. Having ever since experienced nothing but disgrace and insult from his fellow-citizens, this unfortunate man had become reckless of life, and at Plataea he stepped forth single-handed from his place in the ranks, performing deeds of the most heroic valor, and determined to regain by his death the esteem of his countrymen. But the Spartans refused to assign to him the same funeral honors as were paid to the other distinguished warriors, who had manifested exemplary forwardness and skill, yet without any desperate rashness, and without any previous taint such as to render life a burden to them. Subsequent valor might be held to efface this taint, but could not suffice to exalt Aristodēmus to a level with the most honored citizens.²

But though we cannot believe the statement of Plutarch, that the Plataeans received by general vote the prize of valor, it is certain that they were largely honored and recompensed, as the

¹ Plutarch, Aristeidēs, c. 20; De Herodo. Malign. p. 873.

² Herodot. iv, 71, 72.

proprietors of that ground on which the liberation of Greece had been achieved. The market-place and centre of their town was selected as the scene for the solemn sacrifice of thanksgiving, offered up by Pausanias, after the battle, to Zeus Eleutherius, in the name and presence of all the assembled allies. The local gods and heroes of the Platæan territory, who had been invoked in prayer before the battle, and who had granted their soil as a propitious field for the Greek arms, were made partakers of this ceremony, and witnesses as well as guarantees of the engagements with which it was accompanied.¹ The Platæans, now re-entering their city, which the Persian invasion had compelled them to desert, were invested with the honorable duty of celebrating the periodical sacrifice in commemoration of this great victory, as well as of rendering care and religious service at the tombs of the fallen warriors. As an aid to enable them to discharge this obligation, which probably might have pressed hard upon them at a time when their city was half-ruined and their fields unsown, they received out of the prize-money the large allotment of eighty talents, which was partly employed in building and adorning a handsome temple of Athênê, — the symbol probably of renewed connection with Athens. They undertook to render religious honors every year to the tombs of the warriors, and to celebrate in every fifth year the grand public solemnity of the Eleutheria with gymnastic matches analogous to the other great festival games of Greece.² In consideration of the discharge of these duties, together with the sanctity of the ground, Pausanias, and the whole body of allies, bound themselves by oath to guarantee the autonomy of Platæa, and the inviolability

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of her territory. This was an emancipation of the town from the bond of the Bœotian federation, and from the enforcing supremacy of Thebes as its chief.

But the engagement of the allies appears to have had other objects also, larger than that of protecting Plataea, or establishing commemorative ceremonies. The defensive league against the Persians was again sworn to by all of them, and rendered permanent: an aggregate force of ten thousand hoplites, one thousand cavalry, and one hundred triremes, for the purpose of carrying on the war, was agreed to and promised, the contingent of each ally being specified: moreover, the town of Plataea was fixed on as the annual place of meeting, where deputies from all of them were annually to assemble.¹ This resolution is said to have been adopted on the proposition of Aristeidês, whose motives it is not difficult to trace. Though the Persian army had sustained a signal defeat, no one knew how soon it might reassemble, or be reinforced; indeed, even later, after the battle of Mykalê had become known, a fresh invasion of the Persians was still regarded as not improbable,² nor did any one then anticipate that extraordinary fortune and activity whereby the Athenians afterwards organized an alliance such as to throw Persia on the defensive. Moreover, the northern half of Greece was still *medizing*, either in reality or in appearance, and new efforts on the part of Xerxes might probably keep up his ascendancy in those parts. Now assuming the war to be renewed, Aristeidês and the Athenians had the strongest interest in providing a line of defence which should cover Attica as well as Peloponnesus, and in preventing the Peloponnesians from confining themselves to their isthmus, as they had done before. To take advantage for this purpose of the new-born reverence and gratitude which now bound the Lacedæmonians to Plataea, was an idea eminently suitable to the moment, though the unforeseen subsequent start of Athens, combined with other events, prevented both the extensive alliance and the inviolability of Plataea, projected by Aristeidês, from taking effect.³

¹ Plutarch, Aristeidês, c. 21.

² Thucyd. i, 90.

³ It is to this general and solemn meeting, held at Plataea after the victory, that we might probably refer another vow noticed by the historians

On the same day that Pausanias and the Grecian land army conquered at Plataea, the naval armament under Leotychidês and Xanthippus was engaged in operations hardly less important, at Mykalê on the Asiatic coast. The Grecian commanders of the fleet, which numbered one hundred and ten triremes, having advanced as far as Delos, were afraid to proceed farther eastward, or to undertake any offensive operations against the Persians at Samos, for the rescue of Ionia, — although Ionian envoys, especially from Chios and Samos, had urgently solicited aid both at Sparta and at Delos. Three Samians, one of them named Hegesistratus, came to assure Leotychidês, that their countrymen were ready to revolt from the despot Theomêstor, whom the Persians had installed there, so soon as the Greek fleet should appear off the island. In spite of emphatic appeals to the community of religion and race, Leotychidês was long deaf to the entreaty; but his reluctance gradually gave way before the persevering earnestness of the orator. While yet not thoroughly determined, he happened to ask the Samian speaker what was his name. To which the latter replied, "Hegesistratus, *i. e.* army-leader." "I accept Hegesistratus as an omen (replied

and orators of the subsequent century, if that vow were not of suspicious authenticity. The Greeks, while promising faithful attachment, and continued peaceful dealing among themselves, and engaging at the same time to amerce in a tithe of their property all who had *medized*, — are said to have vowed that they would not repair or rebuild the temples which the Persian invader had burnt; but would leave them in their half-ruined condition as a monument of his sacrilege. Some of the injured temples near Athens were seen in their half-burnt state even by the traveller Pausanias (x, 35, 2), in his time. Periklês, forty years after the battle, tried to convoke a Pan-Hellenic assembly at Athens, for the purpose of deliberating what should be done with these temples (Plutarch, Periklês, c. 17). Yet Theopompus pronounced this alleged oath to be a fabrication, though both the orator Lykurgus and Diodorus profess to report it verbatim. We may safely assert that the oath, *as they give it*, is not genuine; but perhaps the vow of tithing those who had voluntarily joined Xerxes, which Herodotus refers to an earlier period, when success was doubtful, may now have been renewed in the moment of victory: see Diodor. ix, 29; Lykurgus cont. Leokrat. c. 19, p. 193; Polybius, ix, 33; Isokrates, Or. iv; Panegy. c. 41, p. 74; Theopompus, Fragm. 167, ed. Didot; Suidas, v. Δεκατέλειον, Cicero de Republicâ, iii, 9, and the beginning of the chapter last but one preceding of this history

Leotychidês, struck with the significance of this name), pledge thou thy faith to accompany us,—let thy companions prepare the Samians to receive us, and we will go forthwith.” Engagements were at once exchanged, and while the other two envoys were sent forward to prepare matters in the island, Hegesistratus remained to conduct the fleet, which was farther encouraged by favorable sacrifices, and by the assurances of the prophet Dêiphonus, hired from the Corinthian colony of Apollonia.¹

When they reached the Heræum near Kalami in Samos,² and had prepared themselves for a naval engagement, they discovered that the enemy’s fleet had already been withdrawn from the island to the neighboring continent. For the Persian commanders had been so disheartened with the defeat of Salamis that they were not disposed to fight again at sea: we do not know the numbers of their fleet, but perhaps a considerable proportion of it may have consisted of Ionic Greeks, whose fidelity was now very doubtful. Having abandoned the idea of a sea-fight, they permitted their Phœnician squadron to depart, and sailed with their remaining fleet to the promontory of Mykalê near Miletus.³

¹ Herodot. ix, 91, 92, 95; viii, 132, 133. The prophet of Mardorius at Plataea bore the same name, and was probably the more highly esteemed for it (Herodot. ix, 37).

Diodorus states the fleet as comprising two hundred and fifty triremes (xi, 34).

The anecdotes respecting the Apolloniate Euenius, the father of Dêiphonus, will be found curious and interesting (Herodot. ix, 93, 94). Euenius, as a recompense for having been unjustly blinded by his countrymen, had received from the gods the grant of prophecy transmissible to his descendants: a new prophetic breed was thus created, alongside of the Iamids, Telliads, Klytiads, etc.

² Herodot. ix, 96. ἐπεὶ δὲ ἐγένοντο τῆς Σαμῆος πρὸς Καλάμοισι, αἱ μὲν αὐτοῦ ὁρμισάμενοι κατὰ τὸ Ἡραῖον τὸ ταῦτην, περισκευάζοντο ἰς ναυμαχίην.

It is by no means certain that the Heræum here indicated is the celebrated temple which stood near the city of Samos (iii, 80): the words of Herodotus rather seem to indicate that another temple of Hêrê, in some other part of the island, is intended.

³ Herodotus describes the Persian position by topographical indications known to his readers, but not open to be determined by us,—Gæson, Skolopæis, the chapel of Dêmêtêr, built by Philistus, one of the primitive colonists of Miletus, etc. (ix, 96): from the language of Herodotus, we may

Here they were under the protection of a land-force of sixty thousand men, under the command of Tigranês, — the main reliance of Xerxes for the defence of Ionia: the ships were dragged ashore, and a rampart of stones and stakes was erected to protect them, while the defending army lined the shore, and seemed amply sufficient to repel attack from seaward.¹

It was not long before the Greek fleet arrived. Disappointed of their intention of fighting, by the flight of the enemy from Samos, they had at first proposed either to return home, or to turn aside to the Hellespont: but they were at last persuaded by the Ionian envoys to pursue the enemy’s fleet and again offer battle at Mykalê. On reaching that point, they discovered that the Persians had abandoned the sea, intending to fight only on land. So much had the Greeks now become emboldened, that they ventured to disembark and attack the united land-force and sea-force before them: but since much of their chance of success depended on the desertion of the Ionians, the first proceeding of Leotychidês was, to copy the previous manœuvre of Themistoklês, when retreating from Artemisium, at the watering-places of Eubœa. Sailing along close to the coast, he addressed, through a herald of loud voice, earnest appeals to the Ionians among the enemy to revolt; calculating, even if they did not listen to him, that he should at least render them mistrusted by the Persians. He then disembarked his troops and marshalled them for the purpose of attacking the Persian camp on land, while the Persian generals, surprised by this daring manifestation, and suspecting, either from his manœuvre or from previous evidences, that the Ionians were in secret collusion with him, ordered the Samian contingent to be disarmed, and the Milesians to retire to the rear of the army, for the purpose of occupying the various mountain roads up to the summit of Mykalê, —

suppose that Gæson was the name of a town as well as of a river (Ephoras ap. Athenæ. vi, p. 311).

The eastern promontory (cape Poseidion) of Samos was separated only by seven stadia from Mykalê (Strabo, xiv, p. 637), near to the place where Glaukê was situated (Thucyd. viii, 79), — modern observers make the distance rather more than a mile (Poppo, Prolegg. ad Thucyd. vol. ii, p. 465).

¹ Herodot. ix, 96, 97.

with which the latter were familiar as a part of their own territory.¹

Serving as these Greeks in the fleet were, at a distance from their own homes, and having left a powerful army of Persians and Greeks under Mardonius in Bœotia, they were of course full of anxiety lest his arms might prove victorious and extinguish the freedom of their country. It was under these feelings of solicitude for their absent brethren that they disembarked, and were made ready for attack by the afternoon. But it was the afternoon of an ever-memorable day, — the fourth of the month Boëdromion (about September) 479 B. C. By a remarkable coincidence, the victory of Plataea in Bœotia had been gained by Pausanias that very morning. At the moment when the Greeks were advancing to the charge, a divine *phēmē*, or message, flew into the camp, — whilst a herald's staff was seen floated to the shore by the western wave, the symbol of electric transmission across the Ægean; — the revelation, sudden, simultaneous, irresistible, struck at once upon the minds of all, as if the multitude had one common soul and sense, acquainting them that on that very morning their countrymen in Bœotia had gained a complete victory over Mardonius. At once the previous anxiety was dissipated, and the whole army, full of joy and confidence, charged with redoubled energy. Such is the account given by Herodotus,² and doubtless universally accepted in his time, when the

¹ Herodot. ix, 98, 99, 104.

² Herodot. ix, 100, 101. *ἰαί σοι δέ σοι* ("Ελληνσι) *φῆμη τε ἐσέπτατο ἐς τὸ στρατόπεδον πᾶν, καὶ κηρυκὸν ἔφανεν ἐπὶ τῆς κυματοῦχος κίχμενον. ἡ δὲ φῆμη διήλθε σοι ὧδε, ὡς οἱ Ἕλληνες τὴν Μαρδονίου στρατὸν νίκων ἐν Βοιωτίῃ μαχόμενοι. Δῆλα δὲ πολλοὺς τεκμηρίους ἔστι τὰ θεῖα τῶν πραγμάτων· εἰ καὶ τότε τῆς αὐτῆς ἡμέρης συνεπιπτώσης τοῦ τε ἐν Πλαταιῇ καὶ τοῦ ἐν Μυκάλῃ μέλλοντος ἔσεσθαι τραγματος, φῆμη τοῖσι Ἕλλησι τοῖσι ταύτῃ ἐσαπίκετο. ὥστε θαρσύναι τε τὴν στρατὸν πολλῶ μᾶλλον, καὶ ἐθέλειν προθυμότερον κινδυνεύειν. γενομένη δὲ νίκη τῶν μετὰ Πανσάνειω Ἑλλήνων ὁρθῶς σοι ἡ φῆμη συνέβαινε ἐλθούσα· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἐν Πλαταιῇ πρῶτ' ἐτι τῆς ἡμέρης ἐγένετο· τὸ δὲ ἐν Μυκάλῃ, πρὶν δέληναι. ἦν δὲ ἀρρωδία σφ' πρὶν τὴν φῆμιν ἐσαπικέσθαι, οὔτε περὶ σφίων αὐτῶν αὐτῶ, ὡς τῶν Ἑλλήνων, μὴ περὶ Μαρδονίῳ πταίσῃ ἡ Ἕλλας. ὡς μέντοι ἡ κληδὼν αὕτη σοι ἐσέπτατο, μᾶλλον τι καὶ ταχύτερον τὴν πρόσσδον ἐποιεῦντο: compare Plutarch, Paul. Emilius, c. 24, 25, about the battle of Pydna. The *φῆμη* which circulated through the assembled army of Mardonius in Bœotia,*

combatants of Mykalæ were alive to tell their own story: he moreover mentions another of those coincidences which the

respecting his intention to kill the Phocians, turned out incorrect (Herodot. ix, 17).

Two passages in Æschines (cont. Timarchum, c. 27, p. 57, and De Fals. Legat. c. 45, p. 290) are peculiarly valuable as illustrating the ancient idea of *Φῆμη*, — a divine voice, or vocal goddess, generally considered as informing a crowd of persons at once, or moving them all by one and the same unanimous feeling, — the Vox Dei passing into the Vox Populi. There was an altar to *Φῆμη* at Athens (Pausan. i, 17, 1); compare Hesiod. Opp. Di. 761. and the *Ὀσσα* of Homer, which is essentially the same idea as *Φῆμη*: *Iliad*, ii, 93. *μετὰ δὲ σφίσιν Ὀσσα δέδρει Ὀτρύνουσι* *ἰέναι, Διὸς ἄγγελος*; also *Odyssey*, i, 282 — opposed to the idea of a distinct human speaker or informant — *ἦν τίς τοι εἴπῃσι βροτῶν, ἢ Ὀσσαν ἀκούσῃς* *Ἐκ Διὸς, ἥτε μάλιστα φέρεϊ κλέος ἀνδρώποισι*; and *Odysseus*, xxiv, 412. *Ὀσσα δ' ἄρ' ἄγγελος ὦκα κατὰ πτόλιν φέρετο πάντη, Μυηστήρων στυγερὸν θάνατον καὶ κῆρ' ἐνέπονσα*. The word *κληδὼν* is used in the same meaning by Sophokles, *Philoktet.* 255 (see *Andokides de Mysteriis*, c. 22, p. 64): and Herodotus in the passage now before us considers the two as identical, — compare also Herodot. v, 72: both words are used also to signify an omen conveyed by some undesigned human word or speech, which in that particular case is considered as determined by the special intervention of the gods for the information of some person who hears it: see Homer, *Odysseus*, xx, 100: compare also Aristophan. *Aves.* 719; Sophokles, *Edip. Tyr.* 43–472; Xenophon, *Symposion*, c. 14, s. 43.

The descriptions of *Eumæ* by Virgil, *Æneid.* iv, 176, *scqq.*, and Ovid *Metamorph.* xii, 40, *scqq.*, are more diffuse and overcharged, departing from the simplicity of the Greek conception.

We may notice, as partial illustrations of what is here intended, those sudden, unaccountable impressions of panic terror which occasionally ran through the ancient armies or assembled multitudes, and which were supposed to be produced by Pan or by Nymphs — indeed sudden, violent, and contagious impressions of every kind, not merely of fear. Livy, x, 28. "Victorem equitatum velut *lymphaticus* pavor dissipat." ix, 27. "Milites, incertum ob quam causam, *lymphatis* similes ad arma discurrunt," — in Greek, *νυμφόληπτοι*: compare Polyæn. iv, 3, 26, and an instructive note of Mutzel, 24 Quint. Curt. iv, 46, 1 (iv, 12, 14).

But I cannot better illustrate that idea which the Greeks invested with divinity under the name of *Φῆμη*, than by transcribing a striking passage from M. Michelet's *Histoire de la Révolution Française*. The illustration is the more instructive, because the religious point of view, which in Herodotus is predominant, — and which, to the believing mind, furnishes an explanation preëminently satisfactory, — has passed away in the historian of the nineteenth century, and gives place to a graphic description of the real phenomenon, of high importance in human affairs; the common suscepti-

Greek mind always seized upon with so much avidity, there was a chapel of Eleusinian Dêmêtêr close to the field of battle at

bilities, common inspiration and common spontaneous impulse, of a multitude, effacing for the time each man's separate individuality.

M. Michelet is about to describe that ever-memorable event, the capture of the Bastille, on the 14th of July, 1789 (ch. vii, vol. i. p. 165).

"Versaill's, avec un gouvernement organisé, un roi, des ministres, un général, une armée, n'étoit qu'hésitation, doute, incertitude, dans la plus complète anarchie morale.

"Paris, bouleversé, délaissé de toute autorité légale, dans un désordre apparent, atteignit, le 14 Juillet, ce qui moralement est l'ordre le plus profond, l'unanimité des esprits.

"Le 13th Juillet, Paris ne songait qu'à se défendre. Le 14, il attaqua.

"Le 13, au soir, il y avoit encore des doutes, il n'y en eut plus le matin. Le soir étoit plein de troubles, de fureur desordonnée. Le matin fut lumineux et d'une sérénité terrible.

"Une idée se leva sur Paris avec le jour, et tous virent la même lumière. Une lumière dans les esprits, et dans chaque cœur une voix: Va, et tu prendras la Bastille!

"Cela étoit impossible, insensé, étrange à dire;...Et tous le crurent néanmoins. Et cela se fit.

"La Bastille, pour être une vieille forteresse, n'en étoit pas moins imprenable, à moins d'y mettre plusieurs jours, et beaucoup d'artillerie. Le peuple n'avoit en cette crise ni le temps ni les moyens de faire un siège régulier. L'eût-il fait, la Bastille n'avoit pas à craindre, ayant assez de vivres pour attendre un secours si proche, et d'immenses munitions de guerre. Ses murs de dix pieds d'épaisseur au sommet des tours, de trente et quarante à la base, pouvaient résister longtemps des boulets: et ses batteries, à elle, dont le feu plongeoit sur Paris, auroient pu en attendant démolir tout le Marais, tout le Faubourg St. Antoine.

"L'attaque de la Bastille ne fut un acte nullement raisonnable. Ce fut un acte de foi.

"Personne ne proposa. Mais tous crurent et tous agirent. Le long des rues, des quais, des ponts, des boulevards, la foule cria à la foule — à la Bastille — à la Bastille. Et dans le tocsin qui sonnoit, tous entendirent: à la Bastille.

"Personne, je le répète, ne donna l'impulsion. Les parleurs du Palais Royal passèrent le temps à dresser une liste de proscription, à juger à mort la Reine, la Polignac, Artois, le prévôt Flesselles, d'autres encore. Les noms des vainqueurs de la Bastille n'offrent pas un seul des faiseurs de motions. Le Palais Royal ne fut pas le point de départ, et ce n'est pas non plus au Palais Royal que les vainqueurs ramènèrent les dépouilles et les prisonniers.

"Encore moins les électeurs qui siegeaient à l'Hotel de Ville eurent-ils l'idée de l'attaque. Loin de là, pour l'empêcher, pour prévenir le carnage

Mykalæ as well as at Platæa. Diodorus and other later writers, who wrote when the impressions of the time had vanished, and when divine interventions were less easily and literally admitted, treat the whole proceeding as if it were a report designedly circulated by the generals, for the purpose of encouraging their army.

The Lacedæmonians on the right wing, and the portion of the army near them, had a difficult path before them, over hilly ground and ravine; while the Athenians, Corinthians, Sikyonians, and Træzenians, and the left half of the army, marching only along the beach, came much sooner into conflict with the enemy. The Persians, as at Platæa, employed their *gerrha*, or wicker bucklers, planted by spikes in the ground, as a breastwork, from behind which they discharged their arrows, and they made a strenuous resistance to prevent this defence from being overthrown. Ultimately, the Greeks succeeded in demolishing it, and in driving the enemy into the interior of the fortification, where they in vain tried to maintain themselves against the ardor of the pursuers, who forced their way into it almost along with the defenders. Even when this last rampart was carried, and when the Persian allies had fled, the native Persians still continued to prolong the struggle with undiminished bravery. Unpractised in line and drill, and acting only in small knots,¹ with disadvantages of armor, such as had been felt severely at Platæa, they still maintained an unequal conflict with the Greek hoplites; nor was it until the Lacedæmonians with their half of the army arrived to join in the attack, that the defence was abandoned as hopeless. The revolt of the Ionians in the camp put the finishing stroke to this ruinous defeat: first, the disarmed

que la Bastille pouvoit faire si aisément, ils allèrent jusqu'à promettre au gouverneur, que s'il retirait ses canons, on ne l'attaqueroit pas. Les électeurs ne trahissoient pas comme ils en furent accusés; mais ils n'avoient pas la foi.

"Qui l'eut? Celui qui eut aussi le devouement, la force, pour accomplir la foi. Qui? Le peuple, tout le monde."

¹ Diodor. xi. 35; Polyæn. i. 33. Justin (ii, 14) is astonished in relating tantum famæ velocitatem.

² Herodot. ix. 102, 103. Οὔτοι δὲ (Πέρσαι), κατ' ἐλίγους γινόμενοι, ἐμάχοντο τοῖσι αἰεὶ ἐς τὸ τεῖχος ἐσπίπτοναι Ἕλλησιν.

Samians; next, other Ionians and Æolians; lastly, the Milesians who had been posted to guard the passes in the rear, not only deserted, but took an active part in the attack; and the Milesians especially, to whom the Persians had trusted for guidance up to the summits of Mykalê, led them by wrong roads, threw them into the hands of their pursuers, and at last set upon them with their own hands. A large number of the native Persians, together with both the generals of the land-force, Tigranês and Mardontês, perished in this disastrous battle: the two Persian admirals, Artayntês and Ithamithrês, escaped, but the army was irretrievably dispersed, while all the ships which had been dragged up on the shore fell into the hands of the assailants, and were burned. But the victory of the Greeks was by no means bloodless: among the left wing, upon which the brunt of the action had fallen, a considerable number of men were slain, especially Sikyonians, with their commander Perilaus.¹ The honors of the battle were awarded, first to the Athenians, next to the Corinthians, Sikyonians, and Trœzenians; the Lacedæmonians having done comparatively little. Hermolykus the Athenian, a celebrated pankratiast, was the warrior most distinguished for individual feats of arms.²

The dispersed Persian army, so much of it at least as had at first found protection on the heights of Mykalê, was withdrawn from the coast forthwith to Sardis under the command of Artayntês, whom Masistês, the brother of Xerxes, bitterly reproached on the score of cowardice in the recent defeat: the general was at length so maddened by a repetition of these insults, that he drew his cimeter and would have slain Masistês, had he not been prevented by a Greek of Halikarnassus named Xenagoras,³ who was rewarded by Xerxes with the government

¹ Herodot. ix, 104, 105. Diodorus (xi, 36) seems to follow different authorities from Herodotus: his statement varies in many particulars, but is less probable.

Herodotus does not specify the loss on either side, nor Diodorus that of the Greeks; but the latter says that forty thousand Persians and allies were slain.

² Herodot. ix, 105.

³ Herodot. ix, 107. I do not know whether we may suppose Herodotus to have heard this from his fellow-citizen Xenagoras.

of Kilikia. Xerxes was still at Sardis, where he had remained ever since his return, and where he conceived a passion for the wife of his brother Masistês; the consequences of his passion entailed upon that unfortunate woman sufferings too tragical to be described, by the orders of his own queen, the jealous and savage Amêstris.¹ But he had no fresh army ready to send down to the coast, so that the Greek cities, even on the continent, were for the time practically liberated from Persian supremacy, while the insular Greeks were in a position of still greater safety.

The commanders of the victorious Grecian fleet had full confidence in their power of defending the islands, and willingly admitted the Chians, Samians, Lesbians, and the other islanders hitherto subjects of Persia, to the protection and reciprocal engagements of their alliance. We may presume that the despots Stratis and Theomêstor were expelled from Chios and Samos.² But the Peloponnesian commanders hesitated in guaranteeing the same secure autonomy to the continental cities, which could not be upheld against the great inland power without efforts incessant as well as exhausting. Nevertheless, not enduring to abandon these continental Ionians to the mercy of Xerxes, they made the offer to transplant them into European Greece, and to make room for them by expelling the *medizing* Greeks from their seaport towns. But this proposition was at once repudiated by the Athenians, who would not permit that colonies originally planted by themselves should be abandoned, thus impairing the metropolitan dignity of Athens.³ The Lacedæmonians readily acquiesced in this objection, and were glad, in all probability, to find honorable grounds for renouncing a scheme of wholesale dispossession eminently difficult to execute,⁴ — yet, at the same

¹ Herodot. ix, 108–113. He gives the story at considerable length: it illustrates forcibly and painfully the interior of the Persian regal palace.

² Herodot. viii, 132.

³ Herodot. ix, 106; Diodor. xi, 37. The latter represents the Ionians and Æolians as having actually consented to remove into European Greece, and indeed the Athenians themselves as having at first consented to it, though the latter afterwards repented and opposed the scheme.

⁴ Such wholesale transportations of population from one continent to another have always been more or less in the habits of Oriental despots, the Persians in ancient times and the Turks in more modern times: to

time, to be absolved from onerous obligations towards the Ionians and to throw upon Athens either the burden of defending or the shame of abandoning them. The first step was thus taken, which we shall quickly see followed by others, for giving to Athens a separate ascendancy and separate duties in regard to the Asiatic Greeks, and for introducing first, the confederacy of Delos, — next, Athenian maritime empire.

From the coast of Ionia the Greek fleet sailed northward to the Hellespont, chiefly at the instance of the Athenians, and for the purpose of breaking down the Xerxeian bridge; for so imperfect was their information, that they believed this bridge to be still firm and in passable condition in September, 479 B.C., though it had been broken and useless at the time when Xerxes crossed the strait in his retreat, ten months before, about November, 480 B.C.¹ Having ascertained on their arrival at Abydos the destruction of the bridge, Leotychidês and the Peloponnesians returned home forthwith; but Xanthippus with the Athenian squadron resolved to remain and expel the Persians from the Thracian Chersonese. This peninsula had been in great part an Athenian possession, for the space of more than forty years, from the first settlement of the elder Miltiadês² down to the suppression of the Ionic revolt, although during part of that time tributary to Persia: from the flight of the second Miltiadês to the expulsion of Xerxes from Greece (493–480 B.C.), a period during which the Persian monarch was irresistible and full of hatred to Athens, no Athenian citizen would find it safe to live there. But the Athenian squadron from Mykalê were now naturally eager both to reëstablish the ascendancy of Athens and to regain the properties of Athenian citizens in the Chersonese, — probably many of the leading men, especially Kimon, son of Miltiadês, had extensive possessions there to recover, as Alkibiades had in

conjunction of free states, like the Greeks, they must have been impracticable.

See Von Hammer, *Geschichte des Osmannischen Reichs*, vol. i, book vi. p. 251, for the forced migrations of people from Asia into Europe, directed by the Turkish Sultan Bajazet (A.D. 1390–1400).

¹ Herodot. viii, 115, 117; ix, 106, 114.

² See the preceding volume of this history, ch. xxx, p. 119; ch. xxxiv, p. 371 ch xxxv, p. 307.

after days, with private forts of his own.¹ To this motive for attacking the Chersonese may be added another, — the importance of its corn-produce as well as of a clear passage through the Hellespont for the corn ships out of the Propontis to Athens and Ægina.² Such were the reasons which induced Xanthippus and the leading Athenians, even without the coöperation of the Peloponnesians, to undertake the siege of Sestus, — the strongest place in the peninsula, the key of the strait, and the centre in which all the neighboring Persian garrisons, from Kardia and elsewhere, had got together, under Œobazus and Artayktês.³

The Grecian inhabitants of the Chersonese readily joined the Athenians in expelling the Persians, who, taken altogether by surprise, had been constrained to throw themselves into Sestus, without stores of provisions or means of making a long defence. But of all the Chersonesites the most forward and exasperated were the inhabitants of Elæus, — the southernmost town of the peninsula, celebrated for its tomb, temple, and sacred grove of the hero Protesilaus, who figured in the Trojan legend as the foremost warrior in the host of Agamemnon to leap ashore, and as the first victim to the spear of Hektor. The temple of Protesilaus, conspicuously placed on the sea-shore,⁴ was a scene of worship and pilgrimage not merely for the inhabitants of Elæus, but also for the neighboring Greeks generally, insomuch that it had been enriched with ample votive offerings, and probable deposits for security, — money, gold and silver saucers, brazen implements, robes, and various other presents. The story ran, that when Xerxes was on his march across the Hellespont into Greece, Artayktês, greedy of all this wealth, and aware that the monarch would not knowingly permit the sanctuary to be despoiled, preferred a wily request to him: "Master, here is the house of a Greek, who, in invading thy territory, met his just reward and perished: I pray thee give his house to me, in order

¹ Xenoph. Hellen. i, 5, 17. τὰ ἐαυτοῦ τεῖχη.

² Herodot. vii, 147. Schol. ad Aristophan. Equites, 262.

In illustration of the value set by Athens upon the command of the Hellespont, see Demosthenês, *De Fals. Legat.* c. 59.

³ Herodot. ix, 114, 115. Σηστόν — φρούριον καὶ φυλακὴν τοῦ παντὶ Ἑλλησπόντῳ — Thucyd. viii, 62: compare Xenophon, *Hellenic.* ii, 1, 25.

⁴ Thucyd. viii, 102.

that people may learn for the future not to invade *thy land*,⁷—the whole soil of Asia being regarded by the Persian monarchs as their rightful possession, and Protesilaus having been in this sense an aggressor against them. Xerxes, interpreting the request literally, and not troubling himself to ask who the invader was, consented: upon which, Artayktês, while the army were engaged in their forward march into Greece, stripped the sacred grove of Protesilaus, carrying all the treasures to Sestus. Nor was he content without still farther outraging Grecian sentiment: he turned cattle into the grove, ploughed and sowed it, and was even said to have profaned the sanctuary by visiting it with his concubines.¹ Such proceedings were more than enough to raise the strongest antipathy against him among the Chersonesite Greeks, who now crowded to reinforce the Athenians and blocked him up in Sestus. After a certain length of siege, the stock of provisions in the town failed, and famine began to make itself felt among the garrison, which nevertheless still held out, by painful shifts and endurance, until a late period in the autumn, when the patience even of the Athenian besiegers was well-nigh exhausted; nor was it without difficulty that the leaders repressed the clamorous desire manifested in their own camp to return to Athens.

Impatience having been appeased, and the seamen kept together, the siege was pressed without relaxation, and presently the privations of the garrison became intolerable; so that Artayktês and Œobazus were at last reduced to the necessity of escaping by stealth, letting themselves down with a few followers from the wall at a point where it was imperfectly blockaded. Œobazus found his way into Thrace, where, however, he was taken captive by the Absinthian natives and offered up as a sacrifice to their god Pleistôrus: Artayktês fled northward along the shores of the Hellespont, but was pursued by the Greeks, and made prisoner near Ægos Potamos, after a strenuous resistance. He was brought with his son in chains to Sestus, which immediately after his departure had been cheerfully surrendered

¹ Herodot. ix, 116: compare i, 4. Ἀρτακτῆς, ἀνὴρ Πέρσης, δεινὸς δὲ καὶ ἀνίσθαλος δὲ καὶ βασιλέα ἐλαύνοντα ἐπ' Ἀθήνας ἐξηπάτησε, τὰ Πρωτεσίλου τοῦ Ἰφίκλου χρήματα ἐξ Ἐλαιούνης ἐφελόμενος. Compare Herodot. ii, 64.

by its inhabitants to the Athenians. It was in vain that he offered a sum of one hundred talents as compensation to the treasury of Protesilaus, and a farther sum of two hundred talents to the Athenians as personal ransom for himself and his son. So deep was the wrath inspired by his insults to the sacred ground, that both the Athenian commander Xanthippus and the citizens of Elæus disdained everything less than a severe and even cruel personal atonement for the outraged Protesilaus. Artayktês, after having first seen his son stoned to death before his eyes, was hung up to a lofty board fixed for the purpose, and left to perish, on the spot where the Xerxeian bridge had been fixed.¹ There is something in this proceeding more Oriental than Grecian: it is not in the Grecian character to aggravate death by artificial and lingering preliminaries.

After the capture of Sestus, the Athenian fleet returned home with their plunder, towards the commencement of winter, not omitting to carry with them the vast cables of the Xerxeian bridge, which had been taken in the town, as a trophy to adorn the acropolis of Athens.²

¹ Herodot. ix, 118, 119, 120. Οἱ γὰρ Ἐλαιούσιοι τιμωρόντες τῷ Πρωτεσίλῳ ἐδέοντό μιν καταχρησθῆναι καὶ αὐτοῦ τοῦ στρατηγοῦ ταύτη ὁ νόος ἔφερε.

² Herodot. ix, 121. It must be either to the joint Grecian armament of this year, or to that of the former year, that Plutarch must intend his celebrated story respecting the proposition of Themistoklês, condemned by Aristeidês, to apply (Plutarch, Themistoklês, c. 20; Aristeidês, c. 22). He tells us that the Greek fleet was all assembled to pass the winter in the Thessalian harbor of Pagasæ, when Themistoklês formed the project of burning all the other Grecian ships except the Athenian, in order that no city except Athens might have a naval force. Themistoklês, he tells us, intimated to the people, that he had a proposition, very advantageous to the state, to communicate; but that it could not be publicly proclaimed and discussed: upon which they desired him to mention it privately to Aristeidês. Themistoklês did so: and Aristeidês told the people, that the project was at once eminently advantageous and not less eminently unjust. Upon which the people renounced it forthwith, without asking what it was.

Considering the great celebrity which this story has obtained, some allusion to it was necessary, though it has long ceased to be received as matter of history. It is quite inconsistent with the narrative of Herodotus, as well as with all the conditions of the time: Pagasæ was Thessalian, and as such hostile to the Greek fleet rather than otherwise: the fleet seems to have never been there: moreover, we may add, that taking matters as they then

CHAPTER XLIII.

EVENTS IN SICILY DOWN TO THE EXPULSION OF THE GELONIAN DYNASTY AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF POPULAR GOVERNMENTS THROUGHOUT THE ISLAND.

I HAVE already mentioned, in the third volume of this history, the foundation of the Greek colonies in Italy and Sicily, together with the general fact, that in the sixth century before the Christian era, they were among the most powerful and flourishing cities that bore the Hellenic name. Beyond this general fact, we obtain little insight into their history.

Though Syracuse, after it fell into the hands of Gelo, about 485 B.C., became the most powerful city in Sicily, yet in the preceding century Gela and Agrigentum, on the south side of the island, had been its superiors. The latter, within a few years of its foundation, fell under the dominion of one of its own citizens, named Phalaris; a despot energetic, warlike, and cruel. An exile from Astypalæa near Rhodes, but a rich man, and an early settler at Agrigentum, he contrived to make himself despot, seemingly, about the year 570 B.C. He had been named to one of the chief posts in the city, and having undertaken at his own cost the erection of a temple to Zeus Polieus in the acropolis (as the Athenian Alkmæonids rebuilt the burnt temple of Delphi), he was allowed on this pretence to assemble therein a considerable number of men; whom he armed, and availed himself of the opportunity of a festival of Dēmêtêr to turn them against the people. He is said to have made many conquests over the

stood, when the fear from Persia was not at all terminated, the Athenians would have lost more than they gained by burning the ships of the other Greeks, so that Themistoklēs was not very likely to conceive the scheme, nor Aristeidēs to describe it in the language put into his mouth.

The story is probably the invention of some Greek of the Platonic age, who wished to contrast justice with expediency, and Aristeidēs with Themistoklēs, — as well as to bestow at the same time panegyri: upon Athens in the days of her glory.

petty Sikan communities in the neighborhood: but exaction and cruelties towards his own subjects are noticed as his most prominent characteristic, and his brazen bull passed into imperishable memory. This piece of mechanism was hollow, and sufficiently capacious to contain one or more victims inclosed within it, to perish in tortures when the metal was heated: the cries of these suffering prisoners passed for the roarings of the animal. The artist was named Perillus, and is said to have been himself the first person burnt in it, by order of the despot. In spite of the odium thus incurred, Phalaris maintained himself as despot for sixteen years; at the end of which period a general rising of the people, headed by a leading man named Telemachus, terminated both his reign and his life.¹ Whether Telemachus became despot or not, we have no information: sixty years afterwards, we shall find his descendant Thêron established in that position.

It was about the period of the death of Phalaris that the Syracusans reconquered their revolted colony of Kamarina (in the southeast of the island between Syracuse and Gela), expelled or dispossessed the inhabitants, and resumed the territory.² With the exception of this accidental circumstance, we are without information about the Sicilian cities until a time

¹ Everything which has ever been said about Phalaris is noticed and discussed in the learned and acute Dissertation of Bentley on the Letters of Phalaris: compare also Seyffert, *Akragas und sein Gebiet*, pp. 57–61, who, however, treats the pretended Letters of Phalaris with more consideration than the readers of Dr. Bentley will generally be disposed to sanction.

The story of the brazen bull of Phalaris seems to rest on sufficient evidence: it is expressly mentioned by Pindar, and the bull itself, after having been carried away to Carthage when the Carthaginians took Agrigentum, was restored to the Agrigentines by Scipio when he took Carthage. See *Aristot. Polit.* v, 8, 4; *Pindar, Pyth.* i, 185; *Polyb.* xii, 25; *Diodor.* xiii, 90; *Cicero in Verr.* iv, 33.

It does not appear that Timæus really called in question the historical reality of the bull of Phalaris, though he has been erroneously supposed to have done so. Timæus affirmed that the bull which was shown in his own time at Agrigentum was not the identical machine: which was correct, for it must have been then at Carthage, from whence it was not restored to Agrigentum until after 146 B.C. See a note of Boeckh on the Scholia ad *Pindar. Pyth.* i, 185.

² *Thucyd.* vi, 5; *Schol. ad Pindar. Olymp.* .9; compare *Wesseling ad Diodor.* xi, 76.

rather before 500 B.C., just when the war between Kroton and Sybaris had extinguished the power of the latter, and when the despotism of the Peisistratids at Athens had been exchanged for the democratical constitution of Kleisthenês. The first forms of government among the Sicilian Greeks, as among the cities of Greece Proper in the early historical age, appear to have been all oligarchical: we do not know under what particular modifications, but probably all more or less resembling that of Syracuse, where the Gamori — or wealthy proprietors descended from the original colonizing chiefs — possessing large landed properties titled by a numerous Sikel serf population called Kyllirii, formed the qualified citizens, out of whom, as well as by whom, magistrates and generals were chosen; while the Demos, or non-privileged freemen, comprised the small proprietary cultivators who maintained themselves, by manual labor and without slaves, from their own lands or gardens, together with the artisans and tradesmen. In the course of two or three generations, many individuals of the privileged class would have fallen into poverty and would find themselves more nearly on a par with the non-privileged; while such members of the latter as might rise to opulence were not for that reason admitted into the privileged body. Here were ample materials for discontent: ambitious leaders, often themselves members of the privileged body, put themselves at the head of the popular opposition, overthrew the oligarchy, and made themselves despots; democracy being at that time hardly known anywhere in Greece. The general fact of this change, preceded by occasional violent dissensions among the privileged class themselves,¹ is all that we are permitted to know, without those modifying circumstances by which it must have been accompanied in every separate city. Towards or near the year 500 B.C., we find Anaxilaus despot at Rhegium, Skythês at Zanklê, Têrillus at Himera, Peithagoras at Selinus, Kleander at Gela, and Panætius at Leontini.² It was about the year 509 B.C. that

¹ At Gela, Herodot. vii, 153; at Syracuse, Aristot. Politic. v, 3, 1.

² Aristot. Politic. v, 8, 4; v, 10, 4. Καὶ εἰς τυραννίδα μεταβάλλει ἐξ ὀλιγαρχίας, ὥσπερ ἐν Σικελίᾳ σχεδὸν αἱ πλείους τῶν ἀρχαίων· ἐν Λεοντίνου εἰς τὴν Παναίτιου τυραννίδα, καὶ ἐν Γέλᾳ εἰς τὴν Κλεάνδρου, καὶ ἐν Ἀλλαντίᾳ εἰς τὴν Παιθιάδου.

the Spartan prince Dorieus conducted a body of emigrants to the territories of Eryx and Egesta, near the northwestern corner of the island, in hopes of expelling the non-Hellenic inhabitants and founding a new Grecian colony. But the Carthaginians, whose Sicilian possessions were close adjoining, and who had already aided in driving Dorieus from a previous establishment at Kinyps in Libya, — now lent such vigorous assistance to the Egestæan inhabitants, that the Spartan prince, after a short period of prosperity, was defeated and slain with most of his companions: such of them as escaped, under the orders of Euryleon, took possession of Minoa, which bore from henceforward the name of Herakleia,¹ — a colony and dependency of the neighboring town of Selinus, of which Peithagoras was then despot. Euryleon joined the malcontents at Selinus, overthrew Peithagoras, and established himself as despot, until, after a short possession of power, he was slain in a popular mutiny.²

We are here introduced to the first known instance of that series of contests between the Phenicians and Greeks in Sicily, which, like the struggles between the Saracens and the Normans in the eleventh and twelfth centuries after the Christian era, were destined to determine whether the island should be a part of Africa or a part of Europe, — and which were only terminated, after the lapse of three centuries, by the absorption of both into the vast bosom of Rome. It seems that the Carthaginians and Egestæans not only overwhelmed Dorieus, but also made some conquests of the neighboring Grecian possessions, which were subsequently recovered by Gelo of Syracuse.³

Not long after the death of Dorieus, Kleander, despot of Gela, began to raise his city to ascendancy over the other Sicilian Greeks,

¹ Diodorus ascribes the foundation of Herakleia to Dorieus; this seems not consistent with the account of Herodotus, unless we are to assume that the town of Herakleia which Dorieus founded was destroyed by the Carthaginians, and that the name Herakleia was afterwards given by Euryleon or his successors to that which had before been called Minoa (Diodor. iv, 23).

A funereal monument in honor of Athenæus, one of the settlers who perished with Dorieus, was seen by Pausanias at Sparta (Pausanias, iii, 16, 4).

² Herodot. v, 43, 46.

³ Herodot. vii, 158. The extreme brevity of his allusion is perplexing as we have no collateral knowledge to illustrate it.

who had hitherto been, if not all equal, at least all independent. His powerful mercenary force, levied in part among the Sikel tribes,¹ did not preserve him from the sword of a Geloan citizen named Sabyllus, who slew him after a reign of seven years: but it enabled his brother and successor Hippokratês to extend his dominion over nearly half of the island. In that mercenary force two officers, Gelo and Ænesidêmus (the latter a citizen of Agrigentum, of the conspicuous family of the Emmenidæ, and descended from Telemachus, the deposor of Phalaris), particularly distinguished themselves. Gelo was descended from a native of Têlos near the Triopian cape, one of the original settlers who accompanied the Rhodian Antiphêmus to Sicily. His immediate ancestor, named Têlinês, had first raised the family to distinction, by valuable aid to a defeated political party, who had been worsted in a struggle, and forced to seek shelter in the neighboring town of Maktorium. Têlinês was possessed of certain peculiar sacred rites (or visible and portable holy symbols, with a privileged knowledge of the ceremonial acts and formalities of divine service under which they were to be shown) for propitiating the subterranean goddesses, Dêmêtêr and Persephonê; "from whom he obtained them, or how he got at them himself (says Herodotus) I cannot say:" but such was the imposing effect of his presence and manner of exhibiting them, that he ventured to march into Gela at the head of the exiles from Maktorium, and was enabled to reinstate them in power, — deterring the people from resistance in the same manner as the Athenians had been overawed by the spectacle of Phylê-Athênê in the chariot along with Peisistratus. The extraordinary boldness of this proceeding excites the admiration of Herodotus, especially as he had been informed that Têlinês was of an unwarlike temperament: the restored exiles rewarded it by granting to him, and to his descendants after him, the hereditary dignity of hierophants of the two goddesses,² — a function cer-

¹ Polyænus, v, 6.

² See about Têlinês and this hereditary priesthood, Herodot. vii. 153. τούτους ὧν ὁ Τηλίνης κατήγαγε ἐς Γέλην, ἔχων οἰδεμένην ἀνδρῶν δυνάμιν. ἀλλ' ἱερὰ τούτων τῶν θεῶν ἔθεν δὲ αὐτῷ ἑλάνθε, ἣ ἀπὸς ἐκτήσατο, τοῖσι αὖτε ἔχω ἔπειτα. τούτοις δὲ ὡς περὶ τῶν ἱερῶν, κατὰ τὴν ἐξέτασιν, ἐστὶν ὅτι οἱ ἀπογενο-

tainly honorable, and probably lucrative, connected with the

αὐτοῦ ἱεροφάνται τῶν θεῶν ἔσονται: compare a previous passage of this history, vol. i, chap. i, p. 26.

It appears from Pindar, that Hiero exercised this hereditary priesthood (Olymp. vi, 160 (95), with the Scholia ad loc. and Scholia ad Pindar. l'yth. ii, 27).

About the story of Phylê personifying Athênê at Athens, see above, vol. iv of this history, chap. xxx, p. 105.

The ancient religious worship addressed itself more to the eye than to the ear; the words spoken were of less importance than the things exhibited, the persons performing, and the actions done. The vague sense of the Greek and Latin neuter, *ἱερὰ*, or *sacra*, includes the entire ceremony, and is difficult to translate into a modern language: but the verbs connected with it, *ἔχειν*, *κεκτῆσθαι*, *κομίζειν*, *φαίνειν*, *ἱερὰ* — *ἱεροφάντης*, etc., relate to exhibition and action. This was particularly the case with the mysteries (or solemnities not thrown open to the general public but accessible only to those who went through certain preliminary forms, and under certain restrictions) in honor of Dêmêtêr and Persephonê, as well as of other deities in different parts of Greece. The *λεγόμενα*, or things said on these occasions, were of less importance than the *δρώμενα* and *δεικνύμενα*, or matters shown and things done (see Pausanias, ii, 37, 3). Herodotus says, about the lake of Sais in Egypt, 'Εν δὲ τῇ λίμνῃ ταύτῃ τὰ δεικνύμενα τῶν παθόντων αὐτοῦ (of Osiris) νυκτὸς τοιεύσει, τὰ καλῶσι μυστήρια Αἰγύπτιοι: he proceeds to state that the Thesmophoria celebrated in honor of Dêmêtêr in Greece were of the same nature, and gives his opinion that they were imported into Greece from Egypt. Homer (Hymn. Cerer. 476): compare Pausan. ii, 14, 2.

Δεῖξεν Τριπολίμῳ τε, Διόκλει τε πληξίπῳ
Δρησμοσύνην ἱερῶν· καὶ ἐπέφραδεν ὄργια παῖσι
Πρεσβυτέρῳ Κελίοιο.
Ὁλβιος, ὅς τ' αὖδ' ὕπῳ πεν ἐπιχθονίων ἀνθρώπων, etc.

Compare Euripid. Hippolyt. 25; Pindar, Fragm. xevi; Sophocl. Frag. l'viii, ed. Brunck; Plutarch, De Profect. in Virtute, c. 10, p. 81: De Isid. et Osir. p. 353, c. 3. ὥς γὰρ οἱ τελοῦμενοι κατ' ἀρχὰς ἐν θορύβῳ καὶ βοῇ πρὸς ἀλλήλους ὡθαίμενοι σπύσσι, δρώμενων δὲ καὶ δεικνυμένων τῶν ἱερῶν, προσηχόντων ἤδη μετὰ φάσμα καὶ σιωπῆς: and Isokratês, Panegyric. c. 6, about Eleusis, τὰ ἱερὰ καὶ τὴν δεικνυμένην καθ' ἑκάστον ἐνιαυτόν. These mysteries consisted thus chiefly of exhibition and action addressed to the eyes of the communicants, and Clemens Alexandrinus calls them a mystic drama — Δρῶ καὶ Κόρη δράμα ἐχενέσθην μυστικόν, καὶ ἦν πλάνη καὶ τὴν ἀρπαγὴν καὶ τὸ πένθος ἢ Ἐλευσίς δαδουχέλ. The word *ὄργια* is originally nothing more than a consecrated expression for *ἔργα* — *αἱρὰ ἔργα* (see Pausanias, iv, 1. 4. 5), though it comes afterwards to designate the whole ceremony, matters shown as well as matters done — τὰ

administration of consecrated property and with the enjoyment of a large portion of its fruits.

ἅγια κομίζων — ὀργίων παντοίων συνδέτης, etc.: compare Plutarch, Alkibiad. 22-34.

The sacred objects exhibited formed an essential part of the ceremony, together with the chest in which such of them as were movable were brought out — τελετῆς ἐγκύμονα μυστῖδα κίστην (Nonnus, ix, 127). Æschines, in assisting the religious lustrations performed by his mother, was bearer of the chest — κιστόφορος καὶ λικνόφορος (Demosthen. de Coronâ, c. 79, p. 313). Clemens Alexandrius (Cohort. ad Gent. p. 14) describes the objects which were contained in these mystic chests of the Eleusinian mysteries, — cakes of particular shape, pomegranates, salt, ferules, ivy, etc. The communicant was permitted, as a part of the ceremony, to take these out of the chest and put them into a basket, afterwards putting them back again: "Jejunavi et ebibi cyceonem: ex cistâ sumpsi et in calathum misi: accepi rursus, in cistulam transtuli," (Arnobius ad Gent. v, 175, ed. Elmenherst.) while the uninitiated were excluded from seeing it, and forbidden from looking at it "even from the house-top."

Τὸν κάλαθον κατήντα χαμᾶι θασεῖσθαι βίβαλοι

Μὴδ' ἀπὸ τῷ τέγος. (Kallimachus, Hymn. in Cererem, 4.)

Lobeck, in his learned and excellent treatise, Aglaophamus (i, p. 51), says: "Sacrorum nomine tam Græci, quam Romani, præcipuè signa et imagines Deorum, omnemque sacram suppellectilem dignari solent. Quæ res animum illuc potius inclinât, ut putem Hierophantas ejusmodi ἱερὰ in conspectum hominum protulisse, sive deorum simulacra, sive vasa sacra et instrumenta aliæque prisæ religionis monumenta; qualia in sacrario Eleusinio asservata fuisse, etsi nullo testimonio affirmare possumus, tamen probabilitatis speciem habet testimonio similem. Namque non solum in templis ferè omnibus cimelia venerandæ antiquitatis condita erant, sed in mysteriis ipsis talium rerum mentio occurrit, quas initiati summâ cum veneratione aspicerent, non initiatis ne aspicere quidem liceret. . . . Ex his testimoniis efficitur (p. 61) sacra quæ Hierophanta ostendit, illa ipsa fuisse ἅγια φασματα sive simulacra Deorum, eorumque aspectum qui præbeant δεῖξαι τὰ ἱερὰ vel παρῆεναι vel φαίνειν dici, et ab hoc quasi primario Hierophantæ actu tum Eleusiniarum sacerdotum principem nomen accepisse tum totum negotium esse nuncupatum."

Compare also K. F. Hermann, Gottesdienstliche Alterthümer der Griechen, part ii, ch. ii, sect. 32.

A passage in Cicero de Haruspicum Responsis (c. 11), which is transcribed almost entirely by Arnobius adv. Gentes, iv, p. 148, demonstrates the minute precision required at Rome in the performance of the festival of the Megalesia: the smallest omission or alteration was supposed to render the festival unsatisfactory to the gods.

The memorable history of the Holy Tunic at Treves, in 1845, shows

Gelo thus belonged to an ancient and distinguished hierophantic family at Gela, being the eldest of four brothers, sons of Deinomenes, — Gelo, Hiero, Polyzelus, and Thrasybulus: and he further ennobled himself by such personal exploits in the army of the despot Hippokratês as to be promoted to the supreme command of the cavalry. It was greatly to his activity that the despot owed a succession of victories and conquests, in which the Ionic or Chalkidic cities of Kallipolis, Naxos, Leontini, and Zanklê, were successively reduced to dependence.¹

The fate of Zanklê, — seemingly held by its despot Skythês, in a state of dependent alliance under Hippokratês, and in standing feud with Anaxilaus of Rhegium, on the opposite side of the strait of Messina, — was remarkable. At the time when the Ionic revolt in Asia was suppressed, and Milêtus reconquered by the Persians (B.C. 494-493), a natural sympathy was manifested by the Ionic Greeks in Sicily towards the sufferers of the same race on the east of the Ægean sea. Projects were devised for assisting the Asiatic refugees to a new abode, and the Zanklæans especially, invited them to form a new Pan-Ionic colony upon the territory of the Sikels, called Kalê Aktê, on the north coast of Sicily, — a coast presenting fertile and attractive situations, and along the whole line of which there was only one Grecian colony, — Himera. This invitation was accepted by the refugees from Samos and Milêtus, who accordingly put themselves on shipboard for Zanklê; steering, as was usual, along the coast of Akarnania to Korkyra, from thence across to Tarentum, and along the Italian coast to the strait of Messina. It happened that when they reached the town of Epizephyrian Lokri, Skythês, the despot of Zanklê, was absent from his city, together with the larger portion of his military force, on an expedition against the Sikels, — perhaps undertaken to facilitate the contemplated colony at Kalê Aktê: and his enemy the Rhegian Anaxilaus, taking advantage of this accident, proposed to the refugees at Lokri that they should seize for themselves, and retain, the unguarded city of Zanklê. They followed his suggestion, and possessed themselves of the

what immense and wide-spread effect upon the human mind may be produced, even in the nineteenth century, by ἱερὰ δεικνύμενα.

¹ Herodot. vii, 154.

city, together with the families and property of the absent Zankleans; who speedily returned to repair their loss, while their prince Skythês farther invoked the powerful aid of his ally and superior, Hippokratês. The latter, however, provoked at the loss of one of his dependent cities, seized and imprisoned Skythês, whom he considered as the cause of it,¹ at Inykos, in the interior of the island; but he found it at the same time advantageous to accept a proposition made to him by the Samians, captors of the city, and to betray the Zankleans whom he had come to aid. By a convention, ratified with an oath, it was agreed that Hippokratês should receive for himself all the extra-mural, and half the intra-mural, property and slaves belonging to Zankleans, leaving the other half to the Samians. Among the property without the walls, not the least valuable part consisted in the persons of those Zankleans whom Hippokratês had come to assist, but whom he now carried away as slaves: excepting, however, from this lot, three hundred of the principal citizens, whom he delivered over to the Samians to be slaughtered, — probably lest they might find friends to procure their ransom, and afterwards disturb the Samian possession of the town. Their lives were however spared by the Samians, though we are not told what became of them. This transaction, alike perfidious on the part of the Samians and of Hippokratês, secured to the former a flourishing city, and to the latter an abundant booty. We are glad to learn that the imprisoned Skythês found means to escape to Darius, king of Persia, from whom he received a generous shelter, — imperfect compensation for the iniquity of his fellow Greeks.² The Samians, however, did not long retain possession of their conquest, but were expelled by the very per-

¹ Herodot. vi, 22, 23. Σκίθην μὲν τὸν μόνον τῶν Ζανκλαίων, ὡς ἀποβαλόντα τὴν πόλιν, ὁ Ἱπποκράτης πείσας, καὶ τὸν ἀδελφὸν αὐτοῦ Πύθο γόντα, ἐς Ἰνύκον πάλιν ἀπέπεμψε.

The words *ὡς ἀποβαλόντα* seem to imply the relation preëxisting between Hippokratês and Skythês, as superior and subject; and punishment inflicted by the former upon the latter for having lost an important post.

² Herodot. vi, 23, 24. Aristotle (*Polit.* v, 2, 7) represents the Samians as having been first actually received into Zanklê, and afterwards expelling the prior inhabitants: his brief notice is not to be set against the perspicuous narrative of Herodotus.

son who had instigated them to seize it, — Anaxilaus, of Rhegium. He planted in it new inhabitants, of Dorian and Messenian race, recolonizing it under the name of Messênê, — a name which it ever afterwards bore;¹ and it appears to have been governed either by himself or by his son Kleophrôn, until his death about B.C. 476.

Besides the conquests above mentioned, Hippokratês of Gela was on the point of making the still more important acquisition of Syracuse, and was only prevented from doing so, after defeating the Syracusans at the river Helôrus, and capturing many prisoners, by the mediation of the Corinthians and Korkyræans, who prevailed on him to be satisfied with the cession of Kamarina and its territory as a ransom. Having repeopled this territory, which became thus annexed to Gela, he was prosecuting his conquests farther among the Sikels, when he died or was killed at Hybla. His death caused a mutiny among the Geloans, who refused to acknowledge his sons, and strove to regain their freedom; but Gelo, the general of horse in the army, espousing the cause of the sons with energy, put down by force the resistance of the people. As soon as this was done, he threw off the mask, deposed the sons of Hippokratês, and seized the sceptre himself.²

Thus master of Gela, and succeeding probably to the ascendancy enjoyed by his predecessor over the Ionic cities, Gelo became the most powerful man in the island; but an incident which occurred a few years afterwards (B.C. 485), while it aggrandized him still farther, transferred the seat of his power from Gela to Syracuse. The Syracusan Gamori, or oligarchical order of proprietary families, probably humbled by their ruinous defeat at the Helôrus, were dispossessed of the government by a combination between their serf-cultivators, called the Kyllirii, and the smaller freemen, called the Demos; they were forced to retire to Kasmenæ, where they invoked the aid of Gelo to restore them. That ambitious prince undertook the task, and accomplished it with facility; for the Syracusan people,

¹ Thucyd. vi, 4; Schol. ad Pindar. Pyth. ii, 84; Diodor. xi, 48.

² Herodot. vii, 155; Thucyd. vi, 5. The ninth Nemean Ode of Pindar (v, 40), addressed to Chromius the friend of Hiero of Syracuse, commemorates, among other exploits, his conduct at the battle of the Helôrus.

probably unable to resist their political opponents when backed by such powerful foreign aid, surrendered to him without striking a blow.¹ But instead of restoring the place to the previous oligarchy, Gelo appropriated it to himself, and left Gela to be governed by his brother Hiero. He greatly enlarged the city of Syracuse, and strengthened its fortifications: probably it was he who first carried it beyond the islet of Ortygia, so as to include a larger space of the adjacent mainland (or rather island of Sicily) which bore the name of Achradina. To people this enlarged space, he brought all the residents in Kamarina, which town he dismantled, — and more than half of those in Gela; which was thus reduced in importance, while Syracuse became the first city in Sicily, and even received fresh addition of inhabitants from

¹ Herodot. vii. 155. Ὁ γὰρ δῆμος ὁ τῶν Συρακουσίων ἐπὶ τῷ Γέλῳ παραδίδοι τὴν πόλιν καὶ τῷ τῷ.

Aristotle (*Politie*. v. 2, 6) alludes to the Syracusan democracy prior to the despotism of Gelo as a case of democracy ruined by its own lawlessness and disorder. But such can hardly have been the fact, if the narrative of Herodotus is to be trusted. The expulsion of the Gamori was not an act of lawless democracy, but the rising of free subjects and slaves against a governing oligarchy. After the Gamori were expelled, there was no time for the democracy to constitute itself, or to show in what degree it possessed capacity for government, since the narrative of Herodotus indicates that the restoration by Gelo followed closely upon the expulsion. And the superior force, which Gelo brought to the aid of the expelled Gamori, is quite sufficient to explain the submission of the Syracusan people, had they been ever so well administered. Perhaps Aristotle may have had before him reports different from those of Herodotus: unless, indeed, we might venture to suspect that the name of *Gelo* appears in Aristotle by lapse of memory in place of that of *Dionysius*. It is highly probable that the partial disorder into which the Syracusan democracy had fallen immediately before the despotism of Dionysius, was one of the main circumstances which enabled him to acquire the supreme power; but a similar assertion can hardly be made applicable to the early times preceding Gelo, in which, indeed, democracy was only just beginning in Greece.

The confusion often made by hasty historians between the names of Gelo and Dionysius, is severely commented on by Dionysius of Halikarnassus (*Antiq. Roman.* vii. 1. p. 1314): the latter, however, in his own statement respecting Gelo, is not altogether free from error, since he describes Hippokratēs as brother of Gelo. We must accept the supposition of Larcher, that Pausanias (vi. 9, 2), while professing to give the date of Gelo's occupation of Syracuse, has really given the date of Gelo's occupation of Gela.

= M. Fynes Clinton, *Fast. Hellen.* ad ann. 491 B.C.)

the neighboring towns of Megara and Eubœa. Both these towns like Syracuse, were governed by oligarchies, with serf cultivators dependent upon them, and a *Dēmos*, or body of smaller freemen, excluded from the political franchise: both were involved in war with Gelo, probably to resist his encroachments, — both were besieged and taken. The oligarchy who ruled these cities, and who were the authors as well as leaders of the war, anticipated nothing but ruin at the hands of the conqueror; while the *Dēmos*, who had not been consulted and had taken no part in the war (which we must presume to have been carried on by the oligarchy and their serfs alone), felt assured that no harm would be done to them. His behavior disappointed the expectations of both. After transporting both of them to Syracuse, he established the oligarchs in that town as citizens, and sold the *Dēmos* as slaves, under covenant that they should be exported from Sicily. "His conduct (says Herodotus¹) was dictated by the conviction, that a *Dēmos* was a most troublesome companion to live with." It appears that the state of society which he wished to establish was that of Patricians and clients, without any Plebs; something like that of Thessaly, where there was a proprietary oligarchy living in the cities, with *Penestæ*, or dependent cultivators, occupying and tilling the land on their account, — but no small self-working proprietors or tradesmen in sufficient number to form a recognized class. And since Gelo was removing the free population from these conquered towns, and leaving in or around the towns no one except the serf-cultivators, we may presume that the oligarchical proprietors when removed might still continue, even as residents at Syracuse, to receive the produce raised for them by others: but the small self-working proprietors, if removed in like manner, would be deprived of subsistence, because their land would be too distant for personal tillage,

¹ Herodot. vii. 156. Μεγαρίας τε τοὺς ἐν Σικελίᾳ, ὡς πολιορκούμενοι ἐξ ἀμύλην προσεχώρησαν, τοὺς μὲν αὐτῶν παχέας, ἀειραμένους τε πόλεμον αὐτῷ καὶ προσδοκίοντας ἀπολέσθαι διὰ τοῦτο, ἄγων ἐς Συρακούσας πολίτας ἵσταται τὸν δὲ δῆμον τῶν Μεγαρέων, οὐκ ἔντα μεταίτιον τοῦ πολέμου ἔσθαι, ἀλλὰ προσδεκόμενον κακὸν οὐδὲν πείσεσθαι, ἡγαγὼν καὶ τούτους ἐς τὰς Συρακούσας, ἀπὸ τοῦ ἐπ' ἐξαγωγῇ ἐκ Σικελίης. Τὸν δὲ τοῦτον καὶ Εὐβοίαν τοὺς ἐν Σικελίᾳ ἵποίησε διακρίνας. Ἐποίησε δὲ ταῦτα τούτους ἀμφοτέρους ναυίτας δῆμον εἶναι συνοίκημα ἀχαριώτατον.

and they had no serfs. While therefore we fully believe, with Herodotus, that Gelo considered the small free proprietors as "troublesome yoke-fellows," — a sentiment perfectly natural to a Grecian despot, unless where he found them useful aids to his own ambition against a hostile oligarchy, — we must add that they would become peculiarly troublesome in his scheme of concentrating the free population of Syracuse, seeing that he would have to give them land in the neighborhood or to provide in some other way for their maintenance.

So large an accession of size, walls, and population, rendered Syracuse the first Greek city in Sicily. And the power of Gelo, embracing as it did not merely Syracuse, but so considerable a portion of the rest of the island, Greek as well as Sikel, was the greatest Hellenic force then existing. It appears to have comprised the Grecian cities on the east and southeast of the island from the borders of Agrigentum to those of Zanklé or Messênê, together with no small proportion of the Sikel tribes. Messênê was under the rule of Anaxilaus of Rhegium, Agrigentum under that of Thêro son of Ænesidêmus, Himera under that of Terillus; while Selinus, close on the borders of Egesta and the Carthaginian possessions, had its own government free or despotic, but appears to have been allied with or dependent upon Carthage.¹ A dominion thus extensive doubtless furnished ample tribute; besides which Gelo, having conquered and dispossessed many landed proprietors and having recolonized Syracuse, could easily provide both lands and citizenship to recompense adherents. Hence, he was enabled to enlarge materially the military force transmitted to him by Hippokratês, and to form a naval force besides. Phormis² the Mænalîan, who took service under him and became citizen of Syracuse, with fortune enough to send donatives to Olympia, — and Agêsias, the Iamid prophet from Stymphâlus,³ — are doubtless not the only examples of

¹ Diodor. xi. 21.

² Pausan. v. 27, 1, 2. We find the elder Dionysius, about a century afterwards, transferring the entire free population of conquered towns (Kaulonia and Hipponium in Italy, etc.) to Syracuse (Diodor. xiv. 106, 107).

³ See the sixth Olympic Ode of Pindar, addressed to the Syracusan Agêsias. The Scholiast on v. 5. of that ode, — who says that not Agêsias himself, but some of his progenitors migrated from Stymphâlus to Syra-

emigrants joining him from Arcadia; for the Arcadian population were poor, brave, and ready for mercenary soldiership; nor can we doubt that the service of a Greek despot in Sicily must have been more attractive to them than that of Xerxes. Moreover, during the ten years between the battles of Marathon and Salamis, when not only so large a portion of the Greek cities had become subject to Persia, but the prospect of Persian invasion hung like a cloud over Greece Proper, the increased feeling of insecurity throughout the latter probably rendered emigration to Sicily unusually inviting.

These circumstances in part explain the immense power and position which Herodotus represents Gelo to have enjoyed, towards the autumn of 481 B.C., when the Greeks from the isthmus of Corinth, confederated to resist Xerxes, sent to solicit his aid. He was then imperial leader of Sicily: he could offer to the Greek — so the historian tells us — twenty thousand hoplites, two hundred triremes, two thousand cavalry, two thousand archers, two thousand slingers, two thousand light-armed horse, besides furnishing provisions for the entire Grecian force as long as the war might last.² If this numerical statement could be at all trusted, which I do not believe, Herodotus would be much within the truth in saying, that there was no other Hellenic power which would bear the least comparison with that of Gelo:³

case, — is contradicted not only by the Scholiast on v. 167, where Agêsias is rightly termed both Ἀρκάς and Συρακοσιός; but also by the better evidence of Pindar's own expressions, — στυμφαλίῳ τε τῶν κλεινῶν Συρακοσίων, — ἄκοιτον οὐκ ἔλαττον, with reference to Stymphâlus and Syracuse, — δύ' ἀνδράσι (v. 6. 99, 101 — 166-174).

Ergotelês, an exile from Knôssus in Krete, must have migrated somewhere about this time to Himera in Sicily. See the twelfth Olympic Ode of Pindar.

¹ Herodot. viii. 26.

² Herodot. vii. 157. σὺ δὲ δυνάμιός τε ἦκεις μεγάλης, καὶ μοῖρά τοι τῇ Ἑλλάδος οὐκ ἐλαχίστη μετὰ ἀρχοντί γε Σικελίης: and even still stronger c. 163. ἐπὶ Σικελίης τύραννος.

The word ἀρχων corresponds with ἀρχή, such as that of the Athenians and is less strong than τύραννος.

The numerical statement is contained in the speech composed by Herodotus for Gelo (vii. 158).

³ Herodot. vii. 145. τὰ δὲ Γέλωνος πρῆγματα μεγάλα ἐλέγετο εἶναι: οὐδὰ μὲν Ἑλλήνων τῶν οὐ πολλῶν μέγα.

and we may well assume such general superiority to be substantially true, though the numbers above mentioned may be at empty boast rather than a reality.

Owing to the great power of Gelo, we now for the first time trace an incipient tendency in Sicily to combined and central operations. It appears that Gelo had formed the plan of uniting the Greek forces in Sicily for the purpose of expelling the Carthaginians and Egestæans, either wholly or partially, from their maritime possessions in the western corner of the island, and of avenging the death of the Spartan prince, Dorieus; — that he even attempted, though in vain, to induce the Spartans and other central Greeks to coöperate in this plan, — and that, upon their refusal, he had in part executed it with the Sicilian forces alone.¹ We have nothing but a brief and vague allusion to this exploit, wherein Gelo appears as the chief and champion of Hellenic against barbaric interests in Sicily, — the forerunner of Dionysius, Timoleon, and Agathoklès. But he had already begun to conceive himself, and had already been recognized by others, in this commanding position, when the envoys of Sparta, Athens, Corinth, etc., reached him from the isthmus of Corinth, in 481

¹ Herodot. vii, 158. Gelo says to the envoys from Peloponnesus: — "Ἄνδρες Ἕλληνες, λόγον ἔχοντες πλεονέκτην, ἐτολμήσατε ἐμὲ σήμερον ἐπὶ τὸν βάρβαρον παρακαλεῖντες ἔλθεῖν. Αἰτοὶ δέ, ἐμὲ πρῶτον δεηθέντος βαρβαρικοῦ στρατοῦ συνεπαρᾶσθαι, ὅτε μοι πρὸς Καρχηδονίους νεῖκος σνήπτο, ἐπισκήπτοντός τε τὸν Δωριεὺς τοῦ Ἀναξανδρίδου πρὸς Ἐγεσταίων φίλον ἐπαρήξασθαι, ὑποτεινόντός τε τὰ ἐμπόρια συνελανθροῖν, ἀπ' ὧν ἡμῖν μεγάλαι ὠφελίαι τε καὶ ἐπαυρίσεις γέγονασι: οὐτε ἐμεῦ εἰνίκα ἤλθετε βοηθῆσόντες, οὐτε τὸν Δωριεὺς φόνον ἐκπρήξομενοι: τὸ δὲ κατ' ἡμᾶς, τάδε ἅπαντα ἐπὶ βαρβάροις νίμεται. Ἀλλὰ εὖ γὰρ ἡμῖν καὶ ἐπὶ τῷ ἄμεινον κατεστή: τὸν δὲ, ἐπειδὴ περιελήλυθε ὁ πόλεμος καὶ ἀπύκται ἐς ἡμᾶς, οὕτω δὲ Γέλωνος μνήστις γέγονε."

It is much to be regretted that we have no farther information respecting the events which these words glance at. They seem to indicate that the Carthaginians and Egestæans had made some encroachments, and threatened to make more: that Gelo had repelled them by actual and successful war. I think it strange, however, that he should be made to say: "You (the Peloponnesians) have derived great and signal advantages from these seaports;" — the profit derived from the latter by the Peloponnesians can never have been so great as to be singled out in this pointed manner. I should rather have expected, ἀπ' ὧν ἡμῖν (and not ἀπ' ὧν ὑμεῖν), — which must have been true in point of fact, and will be found to read quite consistently with the general purport of Gelo's speech.

B.C., to entreat his aid for the repulse of the vast host of invaders about to cross the Hellespont. Gelo, after reminding them that they had refused a similar application for aid from him, said that, far from requiting them at the hour of need in the like ungenerous spirit, he would bring to them an overwhelming reinforcement (the numbers as given by Herodotus have been already stated), but upon one condition only, — that he should be recognized as generalissimo of the entire Grecian force against the Persians. His offer was repudiated, with indignant scorn, by the Spartan envoy: and Gelo then so far abated in his demand, as to be content with the command either of the land-force or the naval force, whichever might be judged preferable. But here the Athenian envoy interposed his protest: "We are sent here (said he) to ask for an army, and not for a general; and thou givest us the army, only in order to make thyself general. Know, that even if the Spartans would allow thee to command at sea, we would not. The naval command is ours, if they decline it: we Athenians, the oldest nation in Greece, — the only Greeks who have never migrated from home, — whose leader before Troy stands proclaimed by Homer as the best of all the Greeks for marshalling and keeping order in an army, — we, who moreover furnish the largest naval contingent in the fleet, — we will never submit to be commanded by a Syracusan."

"Athenian stranger (replied Gelo), ye seem to be provided with commanders, but ye are not likely to have soldiers to be commanded. Ye may return as soon as you please, and tell the Greeks that their year is deprived of its spring."

That envoys were sent from Peloponnesus to solicit assistance from Gelo against Xerxes, and that they solicited in vain, is an incident not to be disputed: but the reason assigned for refusal — conflicting pretensions about the supreme command — may be suspected to have arisen less from historical transmission, than from the conceptions of the historian, or of his informants, respecting the relations between the parties. In his time, Sparta,

¹ Herodot. vii, 161, 162. Polybius (xii, 26) does not seem to have read this embassy as related by Herodotus, — or at least he must have preferred some other account of it; — he gives a different account of the answer which they made to Gelo: an answer (not insolent, but) business-like and evasive, — πραγματικώτατον ἀπόκριμα, etc. See Timæus, Fragm. 87, ed. Didot.

Athens, and Syracuse were the three great imperial cities of Greece, and his Sicilian witnesses, proud of the great past power of Gelo, might well ascribe to him that competition for preeminence and command which Herodotus has dramatized. The immense total of forces which Gelo is made to promise becomes the more incredible, when we reflect that he had another and a better reason for refusing aid altogether. He was attacked at home, and was fully employed in defending himself.

The same spring which brought Xerxes across the Hellespont into Greece, also witnessed a formidable Carthaginian invasion of Sicily. Gelo had already been engaged in war against them, as has been above stated, and had obtained successes, which they would naturally seek the first opportunity of retrieving. The vast Persian invasion of Greece, organized for three years before, and drawing contingents not only from the whole eastern world, but especially from their own metropolitan brethren at Tyre and Sidon, was well calculated to encourage them: and there seems good reason for believing that the simultaneous attack on the Greeks both in Peloponnesus and in Sicily, was concerted between the Carthaginians and Xerxes,¹ — probably by the Phenicians on behalf of Xerxes. Nevertheless, this alliance does not exclude other concurrent circumstances in the interior of the island, which supplied the Carthaginians both with invitation and with help. Agrigentum, though not under the dominion of Gelo, was ruled by his friend and relative Théro: while Rhegium and Messênê under the government of Anaxilaus, Himera under that of his father-in-law Terillus, and Selinus, seem to have formed an opposing minority among the Sicilian Greeks; at variance with Gelo and Théro, but in amity and correspondence with Carthage.² It was seemingly about the year 481 B.C., that Théro, perhaps invited by an Himeraean party, expelled from Himera the despot Terillus, and

¹ Ephorus, Fragment. 111, ed. Didot; Diodor. xi, 1, 20. Mitford and Dahlmann (*Forschungen, Herodotus, etc.*, sect. 35, p. 186) call in question this alliance or understanding between Xerxes and the Carthaginians; but on no sufficient grounds, in my judgment.

² Herodot. vii, 165; Diodor. xi, 23: compare also xiii, 55, 59. In like manner Rhegium and Messênê formed the opposing interest to Syracuse, under Dionysius the elder (Diodor. xiv, 44).

became possessed of the town. Terillus applied for aid to Carthage, backed by his son-in-law Anaxilaus, who espoused the quarrel so warmly, as even to tender his own children as hostages to Hamilkar the Carthaginian suffes, or general, the personal friend or guest of Terillus. The application was favorably entertained, and Hamilkar, arriving at Panormus in the eventful year 480 B.C., with a fleet of three thousand ships of war and a still larger number of storeships, disembarked a land-force of three hundred thousand men: which would even have been larger, had not the vessels carrying the cavalry and the chariots happened to be dispersed by storms.¹ These numbers we can only repeat as we find them, without trusting them any farther than as proof that the armament was on the most extensive scale. But the different nations of whom Herodotus reports the land-force to have consisted are trustworthy and curious: it included Phenicians, Libyans, Iberians, Ligyes, Helisyki, Sardinians, and Corsicans.² This is the first example known to us of those numerous mercenary armies, which it was the policy of Carthage to compose of nations different in race and language,³ in order to obviate conspiracy or mutiny against the general. Having landed at Panormus, Hamilkar marched to Himera, dragged his vessels on shore under the shelter of a rampart, and then laid siege to the town: while the Himeraeans, reinforced by Théro and the army of Agrigentum, determined on an obstinate defence, and even bricked up the gates. Pressing messages were despatched to solicit aid from Gelo, who collected his whole force, said to have amounted to fifty thousand foot, and five thousand horse, and marched to Himera. His arrival restored the courage of the inhabitants, and after some partial fighting, which turned out to the advantage of the Greeks, a general battle ensued. It was obstinate and bloody, lasting from sunrise until late in the after-

¹ Herodotus (vii, 165) and Diodorus (xi, 20) both give the number of the land-force: the latter alone gives that of the fleet.

² Herodot. vii, 165. The Ligyes came from the southern junction of Italy and France; the gulfs of Lyons and Genoa. The Helisyki cannot be satisfactorily verified: Niebuhr considers them to have been the *Volsci*. an ingenious conjecture.

³ Polyb. i, 67. His description of the mutiny of the Carthaginian mercenaries, after the conclusion of the first Punic war, is highly instructive.

noon; and its success was mainly determined by an intercepted letter which fell into the hands of Gelo, — a communication from the Selinuntines to Hamilkar, promising to send a body of horse to his aid, and intimating the time at which they would arrive. A party of Gelo's horse, instructed to personate this reinforcement from Selinus, were received into the camp of Hamilkar, where they spread consternation and disorder, and are even said to have slain the general and set fire to the ships: while the Greek army, brought to action at this opportune moment, at length succeeded in triumphing over both superior numbers and a determined resistance. If we are to believe Diodorus, one hundred and fifty thousand men were slain on the side of the Carthaginians; the rest fled partly to the Sikanian mountains, where they became prisoners of the Agrigentines, — partly to a hilly ground, where, from want of water, they were obliged to surrender at discretion: twenty ships alone escaped with a few fugitives, and these twenty were destroyed by a storm in the passage, so that only one small boat arrived at Carthage with the disastrous tidings.¹ Dismissing such unreasonable exaggerations, we can only venture to assert that the battle was strenuously disputed, the victory complete, and the slain as well as the prisoners numerous. The body of Hamilkar was never discovered, in spite of careful search ordered by Gelo: the Carthaginians affirmed, that as soon as the defeat of his army became irreparable, he had cast himself into the great sacrificial fire, wherein he had been offering entire victims (the usual sacrifice consisting only of a small part of the beast),² to propitiate the gods, and had there been consumed. The Carthaginians erected funereal monuments to him, graced with periodical sacrifices, both in Carthage and in

¹ Diodor. xi. 21-24.

² Herodotus, vii, 167. σώματα ὅλα καταγίζων. This passage of Herodotus receives illustration from the learned comment of Mövers on the Phœnician inscription recently discovered at Marseilles. It was the usual custom of the Jews, and it had been in old times the custom with the Phœnicians (Porphy. de Abstin. iv, 15), to burn the victim entire: the Phœnicians departed from this practice, but the departure seems to have been considered as not strictly correct, and in times of great misfortune or anxiety the old habit was resumed (Mövers, Das Opferwesen der Karthager. Breslau, 1847, pp. 71-118).



DEATH OF SARDANAPALUS

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their principal colonies: ¹ on the field of battle itself also, a monument was raised to him by the Greeks. On that monument, seventy years afterwards, his victorious grandson, fresh from the plunder of this same city of Himera, offered the bloody sacrifice of three thousand Grecian prisoners.²

We may presume that Anaxilaus with the forces of Rhegium shared in the defeat of the foreign invader whom he had called in, and probably other Greeks besides. All of them were now compelled to sue for peace from Gelo, and to solicit the privilege of being enrolled as his dependent allies, which was granted to them without any harder imposition than the tribute probably involved in that relation.³ Even the Carthaginians themselves were so intimidated by the defeat, that they sent envoys to ask for peace at Syracuse, which they are said to have obtained mainly by the solicitation of Damaretê, wife of Gelo, on condition of paying two thousand talents to defray the costs of the war, and of erecting two temples in which the terms of the treaty were to be permanently recorded.⁴ If we could believe the assertion of Theophrastus, Gelo exacted from the Carthaginians a stipulation that they would for the future abstain from human

¹ Herodot. vii, 166, 167. Hamilkar was son of a Syracusan mother: a curious proof of *connubium* between Carthage and Syracuse. At the moment when the elder Dionysius declared war against Carthage, in 398 B.C., there were many Carthaginian merchants dwelling both in Syracuse and in other Greco-Sicilian cities, together with ships and other property. Dionysius gave license to the Syracusans, at the first instant when he had determined on declaring war, to plunder all this property (Diodor. xiv, 46). This speedy multiplication of Carthaginians with merchandise in the Grecian cities, so soon after a bloody war had been concluded, is a strong proof of the spontaneous tendencies of trade.

² Diodor. xiii, 62. According to Herodotus, the battle of Himera took place on the same day as that of Salamis; according to Diodorus, on the same day as that of Thermopylæ. If we are forced to choose between the two witnesses, there can be no hesitation in preferring the former: but it seems more probable that neither is correct.

As far as we can judge from the brief allusions of Herodotus, he must have conceived the battle of Himera in a manner totally different from Diodorus. Under such circumstances, I cannot venture to trust the details given by the latter.

³ I presume this treatment of Anaxilaus by Gelo must be alluded to in Diodorus, xi, 66: at least it is difficult to understand what other "great benefit" Gelo had conferred on Anaxilaus.

⁴ Diodor. xi, 26.

sacrifices in their religious worship:¹ but such an interference with foreign religious rites would be unexampled in that age, and we know, moreover, that the practice was not permanently discontinued at Carthage.² Indeed, we may reasonably suspect that Diodorus, copying from writers like Ephorus, and Timæus, long after the events, has exaggerated considerably the defeat, the humiliation, and the amercement, of the Carthaginians. For the words of the poet Pindar, a very few years after the battle of Himera, represent a fresh Carthaginian invasion as matter of present uneasiness and alarm:³ and the Carthaginian fleet is found engaged in aggressive warfare on the coast of Italy, requiring to be coerced by the brother and successor of Gelo.

The victory of Himera procured for the Sicilian cities immunity from foreign war together with a rich plunder. Splendid offerings of thanksgiving to the gods were dedicated in the temples of Himera, Syracuse, and Delphi: and the epigram of Simonidēs,⁴ composed for the tripod offered in the latter temple, described Gelo with his three brothers Hiero, Polyzelus, and Thrasybulus, as the joint liberators of Greece from the Barbarian, along with the victors of Salamis and Plataea. And the Sicilians alleged that he was on the point of actually sending reinforcements to the Greeks against Xerxes, in spite of the necessity of submitting to Spartan command, when the intelligence of the defeat and retreat of that prince reached him. But we find another statement decidedly more probable, — that he sent a confidential envoy named Kadmus, to Delphi, with orders to watch the turn of the Xerxeian invasion, and in case it should prove successful (as he thought that it probably would be) to tender presents and submission to the victorious invader on behalf of Syracuse.⁵ When we consider that until the very morning of the battle of Salamis, the cause of Grecian independence must have appeared to an impartial spectator almost desperate,

¹ Schol. ad Pindar. Pyth. ii, 3; Plutarch, De Serâ Numinis Vindictâ, p. 552, c. 6.

² Diodor. xx, 14.

³ Pindar, Nem. ix, 67 (= 28 B) with the Scholia.

⁴ Simonidēs, Epigr. 141, ed Bergk.

⁵ Herodot. vii, 163-165: compare Diodor. xi, 26; Ephorus, Fragm. 111 ad. Didot.

we cannot wonder that Gelo should take precautions for preventing the onward progress of the Persians towards Sicily, which was already sufficiently imperiled by its formidable enemies in Africa. The defeat of the Persians at Salamis, and of the Carthaginians at Himera, cleared away, suddenly and unexpectedly, the terrific cloud from Greece as well as from Sicily, and left a sky comparatively brilliant with prosperous hopes.

To the victorious army of Gelo, there was abundant plunder for recompense as well as distribution: among the most valuable part of the plunder were the numerous prisoners taken, who were divided among the cities in proportion to the number of troops furnished by each. Of course the largest shares must have fallen to Syracuse and Agrigentum: while the number acquired by the latter was still farther increased by the separate capture of those prisoners who had dispersed throughout the mountains in and near the Agrigentine territory. All the Sicilian cities allied with or dependent on Gelo, but especially the two last mentioned, were thus put in possession of a number of slaves as public property, who were kept in chains to work,¹ and were either employed on public undertakings for defence, ornament, and religious solemnity, — or let out to private masters so as to afford a revenue to the state. So great was the total of these public slaves at Agrigentum, that though many were employed on state-works, which elevated the city to signal grandeur during the flourishing period of seventy years which intervened between the recent battle and its subsequent capture by the Carthaginians, — there nevertheless remained great numbers to be let out to private individuals, some of whom had no less than five hundred slaves respectively in their employment.²

The peace which now ensued left Gelo master of Syracuse and Gela, with the Chalkidic Greek towns on the east of the

¹ Diodor. xi, 25. αἱ δὲ πόλεις εἰς πέδας κατέστησαν τοὺς διαιρεθέντας αἰχμαλώτους, καὶ τοὺς δεδεμένους· τῶν ἔργων διὰ τούτων ἐπεσκεύαζον.

For analogous instances of captives taken in war being employed in public works by the captors, and laboring in chains, see the cases of Tegea and Samos in Herodot. i, 66; iii, 39.

² Diodor. xi, 25. Respecting slaves belonging to the public, and let out for hire to individual employers, compare the large financial project conceived by Xenophon, De Vectigalibus, capp. 3 and 4.

island; while Thêro governed in Agrigentum, and his son Thrasydæus in Himera. In power as well as in reputation, Gelo was unquestionably the chief person in the island; moreover, he was connected by marriage, and lived on terms of uninterrupted friendship, with Thêro. His conduct both at Syracuse and towards the cities dependent upon him, was mild and conciliating. But his subsequent career was very short: he died of a dropsical complaint, not much more than a year after the battle of Himera, while the glories of that day were fresh in every one's recollection. As the Syracusan law rigorously interdicted expensive funerals, Gelo had commanded that his own obsequies should be conducted in strict conformity to the law: nevertheless, the zeal of his successor as well as the attachment of the people disobeyed these commands. The great mass of citizens followed his funeral procession from the city to the estate of his wife, fifteen miles distant: nine massive towers were erected to distinguish the spot; and the solemnities of heroic worship were rendered to him. Nor did the respectful recollections of the conqueror of Himera ever afterwards die out among the Syracusan people, though his tomb was defaced, first by the Carthaginians, and afterwards by the despot Agathoklès.¹ And when we recollect the destructive effects caused by the subsequent Carthaginian invasions, we shall be sensible how great was the debt of gratitude owing to Gelo by his contemporaries.

It was not merely as conqueror of Himera, but as a sort of second founder of Syracuse,² that Gelo was thus solemnly worshipped. The size, the strength, and the population of the town were all greatly increased under him. Besides the number of new inhabitants which he brought from Gela, the Hyblæan Megara, and the Sicilian Eubœa, we are informed that he also inscribed on the roll of citizens no less than ten thousand mercenary soldiers. It will, moreover, appear that these new-made citizens were in possession of the islet of Ortygia, and the portion of the city closely bordering on it, which bore the name of Achradina,³ — the interior strongholds of Syracuse. It has

¹ Diodor. xi, 38, 67; Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 29; Aristotle, *Τελώνων Πολίταις*; Fragm. p. 106, ed. Neumanz.

² Diodor. xi, 49.

³ Diodor. xi, 72, 73.

already been stated that Ortygia was the original settlement, and that the city did not overstep the boundaries of the islet before the enlargements of Gelo. We do not know by what arrangements Gelo provided new lands for so large a number of newcomers; but when we come to notice the antipathy with which these latter were regarded by the remaining citizens, we shall be inclined to believe that the old citizens had been dispossessed and degraded.

Gelo left a son in tender years; but his power passed, by his own direction, to two of his brothers, Polyzêlus and Hiero; the former of whom married the widow of the deceased prince, and was named, according to his testamentary directions, commander of the military force, — while Hiero was intended to enjoy the government of the city. Whatever may have been the wishes of Gelo, however, the real power fell to Hiero, — a man of energy and determination, and munificent as a patron of contemporary poets, Pindar, Simonidès, Bacchylidès, Epicharmus, Æschylus, and others; but the victim of a painful internal complaint, jealous in his temper, cruel and rapacious in his government,¹ and noted as an organizer of that systematic espionage which broke up all freedom of speech among his subjects. Especially jealous of his brother Polyzêlus, who was very popular in the city, he despatched him on a military expedition against the Krotoniates, with a view of indirectly accomplishing his destruction: but Polyzêlus, aware of the snare, fled to Agrigentum, and sought protection from his brother-in-law, the despot Thêron; from whom Hiero redemanded him, and, on receiving a refusal, prepared to enforce the demand by arms. He had already advanced on his march as far as the river Gela, but no actual battle appears to have taken place: it is interesting to hear that Simonidès the poet, esteemed and rewarded by both these princes, was the mediator of peace between them.²

The temporary breach, and sudden reconciliation, between

¹ Diodor. xi, 67; Aristotel. *Politic.* v, 9, 3. In spite of the compliments directly paid by Pindar to Hiero (*πρὸς ἄστοις, οὐ φθονίαν ἀγαθοῖς, ξείνοις δὲ θαυμαστὸν παῖρα*, *Pyth.* iii, 71 = 125), his indirect admonitions and hints sufficiently attest the real character (see Dissen ad *Pindar. Pyth.* i, and ii, pp. 161–182).

² Diodor. xi, 48; Schol. *Pindar. Olymp.* ii, 29.

these two powerful despots, proved the cause of sorrow and ruin at Himera. That city, under the dominion of the Agrigentine Thêro, was administered by his son Thrasydæus, — a youth whose oppressive conduct speedily excited the strongest antipathy. The Himereans, knowing that they had little chance of redress from Thêro against his son, took advantage of the quarrel between him and Hiero to make propositions to the latter, and to entreat his aid for the expulsion of Thrasydæus, tendering themselves as subjects of Syracuse. It appears that Kapys and Hippokratês, cousins of Thêro, but at variance with him, and also candidates for the protection of Hiero, were concerned in this scheme for detaching Himera from the dominion of Thêro. But so soon as peace had been concluded, Hiero betrayed Thêro both the schemes and the malcontents at Himera. We seem to make out that Kapys and Hippokratês collected some forces to resist Thêro, but were defeated by him at the river Himera: his victory was followed by seizing and putting to death a large number of Himerean citizens. So great was the number slain, coupled with the loss of others who fled for fear of being slain, that the population of the city was sensibly and inconveniently diminished. Thêro invited and enrolled a large addition of new citizens, chiefly of Dorian blood.²

The power of Hiero, now reconciled both with Thêro and with his brother Polyzêlus, is marked by several circumstances as noway inferior to that of Gelo, and probably the greatest not merely in Sicily, but throughout the Grecian world. The citizens of the distant city of Cumæ, on the coast of Italy, harassed by Carthaginian and Tyrrhenian fleets, entreated his aid, and received from him a squadron which defeated and drove off their enemies:³ he even settled a Syracusan colony in the neighbor-

¹ Schol. ad Pindar. Olymp. ii, 173. For the few facts which can be made out respecting the family and genealogy of Thêro, see Gôller, *De Situ et Origine Syracusarum*, ch. vii, pp. 19-22. The Scholiasts of Pindar are occasionally useful in explaining his brief historical allusions; but they seem to have had very few trustworthy materials before them for so doing.

² Diodor. xi, 48-49.

³ The brazen helmet discovered near the site of Olympia, with the name of Hiero and the victory at Cumæ inscribed on it, yet remains as an interesting relic to commemorate this event: it was among the offerings pre-

sent by Hiero to the Olympic Zeus: see Boeckh, *Corp. Inscriptf. Græc.* No. 16, part i, p. 34.

ung island of Pithekusa. Anaxilaus, despot of Rhegium and Messênê, had attacked, and might probably have overpowered, his neighbors, the Epizephyrian Lokrians; but the menaces of Hiero, invoked by the Lokrians, and conveyed by the envoy Chromius, compelled him to desist.¹ Those heroic honors, which in Greece belonged to the ækist of a new city, were yet wanting to him; and he procured them by the foundation of the new city of Ætna,² on the site and in the place of Katana, the inhabitants of which he expelled, as well as those of Naxos. While these Naxians and Kataneans were directed to take up their abode at Leontini along with the existing inhabitants, Hiero planted ten thousand new inhabitants in his adopted city of Ætna: five thousand from Syracuse and Gela, — with an equal number from Peloponnesus. They served as an auxiliary force, ready to be called forth in the event of discontents at Syracuse, as we shall see by the history of his successor: he gave them not only the territory which had before belonged to Katana, but also a large addition besides, chiefly at the expense of the neighboring Sikel tribes. His son Deinomenês, and his friend and confidant, Chromius, enrolled as an Ætnean, became joint administrators of the city: its religious and social customs were assimilated to the Dorian model,³ and Pindar dreams of future relations between the despot and citizens of Ætna, analogous to those between king and citizens at Sparta. Both Hiero and Chromius were proclaimed as Ætneans at the Pythian and Ne-

sent by Hiero to the Olympic Zeus: see Boeckh, *Corp. Inscriptf. Græc.* No. 16, part i, p. 34.

¹ Diodor. xi, 51; Pindar, i, 74 (= 140); ii, 17 (= 35) with the Scholia; Epicharmus, Fragment, p. 19, ed. Krusemann; Schol. Pindar. Pyth. i, 98; Strabo, v, p. 247.

² *Ἱέρων οἰκιστὴς ἀντι τυράννου βουλόμενος εἶναι, κατὰ νῆν ἐξελὼν Αἰτνὴν μετωνόμασε τὴν πόλιν, ἐαυτὸν οἰκιστὴν προσαγορεύσας* (Schol. ad Pindar. Nem. i, 1).

Compare the subsequent case of the foundation of Thurii, among the citizens of which violent disputes arose, in determining who should be recognized as ækist of the place. On referring to the oracle, Apollo directed them to commemorate *himself* as ækist (Diodor. xii, 35).

³ Chromius ἐπίτροπος τῆς Αἰτνῆς (Schol. Pind. Nem. ix, 1). About the Dorian institutions of Ætna, etc., Pindar, Pyth. i, 60-71.

Deinomenês survived his father, and commemorated the Olympic victories of the latter by costly offerings at Olympia (Pausan. vi, 12, 1).

mean games, when their chariots gained victories; on which occasion the assembled crowd heard for the first time of the new Hellenic city of Ætna. We see, by the compliments of Pindar,¹ that Hiero was vain of his new title as founder; but we must remark that it was procured, not, as in most cases, by planting Greeks on a spot previously barbarous, but by the dispossession and impoverishment of other Grecian citizens, who seem to have given no ground of offence. Both in Gelo and Hiero we see the first exhibition of that propensity to violent and wholesale transplantation of inhabitants from one seat to another, which was not uncommon among Assyrian and Persian despots, and which was exhibited on a still larger scale by the successors of Alexander the Great in their numerous new-built cities.

Anaxilaus of Rhegium died shortly after that message of Hiero which had compelled him to spare the Lokrians; but such was the esteem entertained for his memory, and so efficient the government of Mikythus, a manumitted slave whom he constituted regent, that Rhegium and Messênê were preserved for his children, yet minors.² But a still more important change in Sicily was caused by the death of the Agrigentine Thêro, which took place, seemingly, about 472 B.C. This prince, a partner with Gelo in the great victory over the Carthaginians, left a reputation of good government as well as ability among the Agrigentines, which we find perpetuated in the laureate strains of Pindar,—and his memory doubtless became still farther endeared from comparison with his son and successor. Thrasydæus, now master both of Himera and Agrigentum, displayed on a larger scale the same oppressive and sanguinary dispositions which had before provoked rebellion at the former city. Feeling himself detested by his subjects, he enlarged the military force which had been left by his father, and engaged so many new mercenaries, that he became master of a force of twenty thousand men, horse and foot. And in his own territory, perhaps, he might long have trodden with impunity in the footsteps of Phal-

¹ Pindar, Pyth. i, 60 (= 117); iii, 69 (= 121). Pindar. ap. Strabo. vi p. 265. Compare Nemea, ix, 1-30, addressed to Chromius. Hiero is proclaimed in some odes as a Syracusan; but Syracuse and the newly-founded Ætna are intimately joined together: see Nemea, i, *init.*

² Justin, iv, 2.

æus, had he not imprudently provoked his more powerful neighbor, Hiero. In an obstinate and murderous battle between these two princes, two thousand men were slain on the side of the Syracusans, and four thousand on that of the Agrigentines: an immense slaughter, considering that it mostly fell upon the Greeks in the two armies, and not upon the non-Hellenic mercenaries.¹ But the defeat of Thrasydæus was so complete, that he was compelled to flee not only from Agrigentum, but from Sicily: he retired to Megara, in Greece Proper, where he was condemned to death and perished.² The Agrigentines, thus happily released from their oppressor, sued for and obtained peace from Hiero: they are said to have established a democratical government, but we learn that Hiero sent many citizens into banishment from Agrigentum and Himera, as well as from Gela,³ nor can we doubt that all the three were numbered among his subject cities. The moment of freedom only commenced for them when the Gelonian dynasty shared the fate of the Theronian.

The victory over Thrasydæus rendered Hiero more completely master of Sicily than his brother Gelo had been before him. The last act which we hear of him, is, his interference on behalf of his brothers-in-law,⁴ the sons of Anaxilaus of Rhegium, who were now of age to govern. He encouraged them to prefer, and probably showed himself ready to enforce, their claim against Mikythus, who had administered Rhegium since the death of Anaxilaus, for the property as well as the sceptre. Mikythus

¹ So I conceive the words of Diodorus are to be understood, — *πλείστοι δὲ ἐν παραταξαμένων Ἑλλήνων πρὸς Ἑλληνας ἔπεσον* (Diodor. xi, 53).

² Diodor. xi, 53. *ἐκεῖ θανάτου καταγνωσθεὶς ἐτελεύτησεν*. This is a remarkable specimen of the feeling in a foreign city towards an oppressive tyrant. The Megarians of Greece Proper were much connected with Sicily, through the Hyblæan Megara, as well as Selinus.

³ Diodor. xi, 76. *Οἱ κατὰ τὴν Ἱέρωνος δυναστείαν ἐκπεπτωκότες ἐκ τῶν ἰδίων πόλεων — τούτων δ' ἦσαν Γελῶσι καὶ Ἀκραγαντίνοι καὶ Ἱμεραῖοι*.

⁴ Hiero had married the daughter of Anaxilaus, but he seems also to have had two other wives, — the sister or cousin of Thêro, and the daughter of a Syracusan named Nikoklês: this last was the mother of his son Deinomenês (Schol. Pindar. Pyth. i, 112).

We read of Kleophrôn, son of Anaxilaus, governing Messênê during his father's lifetime: probably this young man must have died, otherwise Mikythus would not have succeeded (Schol. Pindar. Pyth. ii, 34.)

complied readily with the demand, rendering an account so exact and faithful, that the sons of Anaxilaus themselves entreated him to remain and govern, — or more probably to lend his aid to their government. This request he was wise enough to refuse: he removed his own property and retired to Tegea in Arcadia. Hiero died shortly afterwards, of the complaint under which he had so long suffered, after a reign of ten years.¹

On the death of Hiero, the succession was disputed between his brother Thrasybulus, and his nephew, the youthful son of Gelo, so that the partisans of the family became thus divided. Thrasybulus, surrounding his nephew with temptations to luxurious pleasure, contrived to put him indirectly aside, and thus to seize the government for himself.² This family division, — a curse often resting upon the blood-relations of Grecian despots, and leading to the greatest atrocities,³ — coupled with the conduct of Thrasybulus himself, caused the downfall of the mighty Gelonian dynasty. The bad qualities of Hiero were now seen greatly exaggerated, but without his energy, in Thrasybulus, — who put to death many citizens, and banished still more, for the purpose of seizing their property, until at length he provoked among the Syracusans intense and universal hatred, shared even by many of the old Gelonian partisans. Though he tried to strengthen himself by increasing his mercenary force, he could

¹ Diodor. xi. 66.

² Aristotel. Politic. v. 8, 19. Diodorus does not mention the son of Gelo. Mr. Fynes Clinton (*Fasti Hellenici*, App. chap. 10. p. 264, *seq.*) has discussed all the main points connected with Syracusan and Sicilian chronology.

³ Xenophon, Hiero, iii. 8. Εἰ τοίνυν ἐδέχαιτο κατανοεῖν, εὐρήσεις μὲν τοὺς ἐξ ὧτας ὑπὸ τούτων μάλιστα φίλουμένους, τοὺς δὲ τυράννους πολλοὺς μὲν παῖδας ἐαυτῶν ἀπεκτονήκοτας, πολλοὺς δ' ὑπὸ παιδῶν αὐτοῦς ἀπολωλότας, πολλοὺς δὲ ἀδελφοὺς ἐν τυραννίσιν ἀλληλοφόνους γεγενημένους, πολλοὺς δὲ καὶ ὑπὸ γυναικῶν τῶν ἐαυτῶν τυράννων διφθαμμένους, καὶ ὑπὸ ἐταίρων γε τῶν μάλιστα δοκούντων φίλων εἶναι: compare Isokratēs, *De Pace*, Orat. viii. p. 192, § 138.

So also Tacitus (*Hist.* v. 9) respecting the native kings of Judæa, after the expulsion of the Syrian dynasty: "Sibi ipsi reges imponere: qui mobilitate vulgi expulsi, resumptâ per arma dominatione, fugas civium, urbium everisiones, — fractura, comparsa, praedium, mores, — aliaque solita rebus ausi," etc.

not prevent a general revolt from breaking out among the Syracusan population. By summoning those citizens whom Hiero had planted in his new city of Ætna, as well as various troops from his dependent allies, he found himself at the head of fifteen thousand men, and master of the interior strongholds of the city, — the island of Ortygia with Achradina, while the great body of the revolted Syracusans were assembled in the outer city called Tychê. Though superior in number, yet being no match in military efficiency for the forces of Thrasybulus, they were obliged to invoke aid from the other cities in Sicily, as well as from the Sikel tribes, — proclaiming the Gelonian dynasty as the common enemy of freedom in the island, and holding out universal independence as the reward of victory. It was fortunate for them that there was no brother-despot, like the powerful Thêro, to espouse the cause of Thrasybulus: Gela, Agrigentum, Selinus, Himera, and even the Sikel tribes, all responded to the call with alacrity, so that a large force, both military and naval, came to reinforce the Syracusans: Thrasybulus was totally defeated, first in a naval action, next on land, and obliged to shut himself up in Ortygia and Achradina, where he soon found his situation hopeless. He accordingly opened a negotiation with his opponents, which ended in his abdication and retirement to Lokri, while the mercenary troops whom he had brought together were also permitted to depart unmolested.¹ The expelled Thrasybulus afterwards lived and died as a private citizen at Lokri, — a very different fate from that which had befallen Thrasydæus, son of Thêro at Megara, though both seem to have given the same provocation.

Thus fell the powerful Gelonian dynasty at Syracuse, after a continuance of eighteen years.² Its fall was nothing less than an extensive revolution throughout Sicily. Among the various cities of the island there had grown up many petty despots, each with his separate mercenary force; acting as the instruments, and relying on the protection, of the great despot at Syracuse. All these were now expelled, and governments more or less democratical were established everywhere.³ The sons of Anaxilaus

¹ Diodor. ix. 67, 68.

² Diodor. xi. 68.

³ Aristotel. Politic. v. 8, 23.

maintained themselves a little longer at Rhegium and Messênê, but the citizens of these two towns at length followed the general example, compelled them to retire,¹ and began their era of freedom.

But though the Sicilian despots had thus been expelled, the free governments established in their place were exposed at first to much difficulty and collision. It has been already mentioned that Gelo, Hiero, Thêro, Thrasydæus, Thrasybulus, etc., had all condemned many citizens to exile with confiscation of property; and had planted on the soil new citizens and mercenaries in numbers no less considerable. To what race these mercenaries belonged, we are not told: it is probable that they were only in part Greeks. Such violent mutations, both of persons and property, could not occur without raising bitter conflicts, of interest as well as of feeling, between the old, the new, and the dispossessed proprietors, as soon as the iron hand of compression was removed. This source of angry dissension was common to all the Sicilian cities, but in none did it flow more profusely than in Syracuse. In that city, the new mercenaries last introduced by Thrasybulus, had retired at the same time with him, many of them to the Hieronian city of Ætna, from whence they had been brought; but there yet remained the more numerous body introduced principally by Gelo, partly also by Hiero, — the former alone had enrolled ten thousand, of whom more than seven thousand yet remained. What part these Gelonian citizens had taken in the late revolution, we do not find distinctly stated: they seem not to have supported Thrasybulus, as a body, and probably many of them took part against him. After the revolution had been accomplished, a public assembly of the Syracusans was convened, in which the first resolution was, to provide for the religious commemoration of the event, by erecting a colossal statue of Zeus Eleutherius, and by celebrating an annual festival to be called the Eleutheria, with solemn matches and sacrifices. They next proceeded to determine the political constitution; and such was the predominant reaction, doubtless aggravated by the returned exiles, of hatred and fear against the expelled dynasty, — that the whole body of new citizens, who had been domicili-

¹ Diodor. xi, 76.

ated under Gelo and Hiero, were declared ineligible to magistracy or honor. This harsh and sweeping disqualification, falling at once upon a numerous minority, naturally provoked renewed irritation and civil war. The Gelonian citizens, the most warlike individuals in the state, and occupying, as favored partisans of the previous dynasty, the inner and separately fortified sections of Syracuse,¹ — Achradina and Ortygia, — placed themselves in open revolt; while the general mass of citizens, masters of all the outer sections of the city, were not strong enough to assail with success this defensible position. They could only block it up, and intercept its supplies, which the garrison within were forced to come out and fight for. This disastrous internal war continued for some months, with many partial conflicts both by land and sea: the general body of citizens became accustomed to arms, while a chosen regiment of six hundred trained volunteers acquired especial efficiency. Unable to maintain themselves longer, the Gelonians were forced to hazard a general battle, which, after an obstinate struggle, terminated in their complete defeat. The chosen band of six hundred, who had

¹ Diodor. xi, 73. τὴν τε Ἀχραδινὴν καὶ τὴν Νῆσον ἑμφοτέρων τῶν τόπων τοῖσι τὸν ἑχόντων ἰδίον τεῖχος, καλῶς κατεσκευασμένον.

Diodorus goes on to say that the general mass of citizens τὸ πρὸς τὰς Ἐπιπολὰς τετραμμένον αὐτῆς ἐπετείχισαν, — if we could venture to construe this last word rigidly, we might suppose that the parts of the city, exterior to Achradina and the island, had before been unfortified.

Aristotle (Politic. v, 2, 11) mentions, as one of his illustrations of the mischief of receiving new citizens, that the Syracusans, after the Gelonian dynasty, admitted the foreign mercenaries to citizenship, and from hence came to sedition and armed conflict. But the incident cannot fairly be quoted in illustration of that principle which he brings it to support. The mercenaries, so long as the dynasty lasted, had been the first citizens in the community: after its overthrow, they became the inferior, and were rendered inadmissible to honors. It is hardly matter of surprise that so great a change of position excited them to rebel; but this is not a case properly adducible to prove the difficulty of adjusting matters with new-coming citizens.

After the expulsion of Agathoklēs from Syracuse, nearly two centuries after these events, the same quarrel and sedition was renewed, by the exclusion of his mercenaries from magistracy and posts of honor (Diodor. xxi Fragm. p. 282).

eminently contributed to this victory, received from their fellow citizens a crown of honor, and a reward of one mina per head.¹

The meagre annals, wherein these interesting events are indicated rather than described, tell us scarcely anything of the political arrangements which resulted from so important a victory. Probably the Gelonians were expelled: but we may assume as certain, that the separate fortifications of the island and Achradina were abolished, and that from henceforward there was only one fortified city, until the time of the despot Dionysius, more than fifty years afterwards.²

Meanwhile the rest of Sicily had experienced disorders analogous in character to those of Syracuse. At Gela, at Agrigentum, at Himera, the reaction against the Gelonian dynasty had brought back in crowds the dispossessed exiles; who, claiming restitution of their properties and influence, found their demands sustained by the population generally. The Katanæans, whom Hiero had driven from their own city to Leontini, in order that he might convert Katana into his own settlement Ætna, assembled in arms and allied themselves with the Sikels, to reconquer their former home and to restore to the Sikels that which Hiero had taken from them for enlargement of the Ætnæan territory. They were aided by the Syracusans, to whom the neighborhood of these Hieronian partisans was dangerous: but they did not accomplish their object until after a long contest and several battles with the Ætnæans. A convention was at length concluded, by which the latter evacuated Katana and were allowed to occupy the town and territory, — seemingly Sikels, — of Ennesia, or Inessa, upon which they bestowed the name of Ætna,³ with monuments commemorating Hiero as the founder, — while the tomb of the latter at Katana was demolished by the restored inhabitants.

These conflicts, disturbing the peace of all Sicily, came to be so intolerable, that a general congress was held between the various cities to adjust them. It was determined by joint reso-

¹ Diodor. xi, 72, 73, 76.

² Diodorus, xi, 76; Strabo, vi, 268. Compare, as an analogous event, the destruction of the tomb of Agnon, the cecist of Amphipolis, after the revolt of that city from Athens (Thucyd. v, 11).

³ Diodorus, xiv, 7.

lution to readmit the exiles and to extrude the Gelonian settlers everywhere: but an establishment was provided for these latter in the territory of Messênê. It appears that the exiles received back their property, or at least an assignment of other lands in compensation for it. The inhabitants of Gela were enabled to provide for their own exiles by reestablishing the city of Kamarina,¹ which had been conquered from Syracuse by Hippokratês, despot of Gelo, but which Gelo, on transferring his abode to Syracuse, had made a portion of the Syracusan territory, conveying its inhabitants to the city of Syracuse. The Syracusans now renounced the possession of it, — a cession to be explained probably by the fact, that among the new-comers transferred by Gelo to Syracuse, there were included not only the previous Kamarinæans, but also many who had before been citizens of Gela.² For these men, now obliged to quit Syracuse, it would be convenient to provide an abode at Kamarina, as well as for the other restored Geloan exiles; and we may farther presume that this new city served as a receptacle for other homeless citizens from all parts of the island. It was consecrated by the Geloans as an independent city, with Dorian rights and customs: its lands were distributed anew, and among its settlers were men rich enough to send prize chariots to Peloponnesus, as well as to pay for odes of Pindar. The Olympic victories of the Kamarinæan Psaumis secured for his new city an Hellenic celebrity, at a moment when it hardly yet emerged from the hardships of an initiatory settlement.³

Such was the great reactionary movement in Sicily against the high-handed violences of the previous despots. We are only enabled to follow it generally, but we see that all their trans-

¹ Diodor. xi, 76. μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα Καμαρίναν μὲν Γελῶσι κατεκίσανται ἐξ ὧν κατεκληροῦνθησαν.

See the note of Wesseling upon this passage. There can be little doubt that in Thucydides (vi, 5) the correction of κατεκίσθη ὑπὸ Γελῶν (in place of ὑπὸ Γελῶνος) is correct.

² Herodot. vii, 155.

³ See the fourth and fifth Olympic odes of Pindar, referred to Olympiad 62, or 452 B.C., about nine years after the Geloans had reestablished Kamarina. Τὰν νέονικον ἔδραν (Olymp. v, 9) ἀπ' ἡμαρτίας ἀγων ἐς θύας ἵσταται ἀστῶν (Olymp. v, 14).

plantations and expulsions of inhabitants were reversed, and all their arrangements overthrown. In the correction of the past injustice, we cannot doubt that new injustice was in many cases committed, nor are we surprised to hear that at Syracuse many new enrolments of citizens took place without any rightful claim,¹ probably accompanied by grants of land. The reigning feeling at Syracuse would now be quite opposite to that of the days of Gelo, when the Demos, or aggregate of small self-working proprietors, was considered as "a troublesome yoke-fellow," fit only to be sold into slavery for exportation: it is highly probable that the new table of citizens now prepared included that class of men in larger number than ever, on principles analogous to the liberal enrolments of Kleisthenês at Athens. In spite of all the confusion, however, with which this period of popular government opens, lasting for more than fifty years until the despotism of the elder Dionysius, we shall find it far the best and most prosperous portion of Sicilian history. We shall arrive at it in a subsequent chapter.

Respecting the Grecian cities along the coast of Italy, during the period of the Gelonian dynasty, a few words will exhaust the whole of our knowledge. Rhegium, with its despots Anaxilaus and Mikythus, figures chiefly as a Sicilian city, and has been noticed as such in the stream of Sicilian politics. But it is also involved in the only event which has been preserved to us respecting this portion of the history of the Italian Greeks. It was about the year B.C. 473, that the Tarentines undertook an expedition against their non-Hellenic neighbors the Iapygians, in hopes of conquering Hyria and the other towns belonging to them. Mikythus, despot of Rhegium, against the will of his citizens, despatched three thousand of them by constraint as auxiliaries to the Tarentines. But the expedition proved signally disastrous to both. The Iapygians, to the number of twenty thousand men, encountered the united Grecian forces in the field, and completely defeated them: the battle having taken place in a hostile country, it seems that the larger portion, both of Rhegians and Tarentines, perished, insomuch that Herodotus pronounces it to have been the greatest Hellenic slaughter within

¹ Diodor xi, 86. πολλῶν εἰκὴ καὶ ὡς ἐτυχε πεπολιτογραφημένων.

his knowledge.¹ Of the Tarentines slain, a great proportion were opulent and substantial citizens, the loss of whom sensibly affected the city; strengthening the Demos, and rendering the constitution more democratical. In what particulars the change consisted we do not know: the expression of Aristotle gives reason to suppose that even before this event the constitution had been popular.²

CHAPTER XLIV.

FROM THE BATTLES OF PLATEA AND MYKALE DOWN TO THE DEATHS OF THEMISTOKLES AND ARISTEIDES.

AFTER having in the last chapter followed the repulse of the Carthaginians by the Sicilian Greeks, we now return to the central Greeks and the Persians, — a case in which the triumph was yet more interesting to the cause of human improvement generally. The disproportion between the immense host assembled by Xerxes, and the little which he accomplished, naturally provokes both contempt for Persian force and an admiration for the

¹ Herodot. vii, 170; Diodor. xi, 52. The latter asserts that the Iapygian victors divided their forces, part of them pursuing the Rhegian fugitives, the rest pursuing the Tarentines. Those who followed the former were so rapid in their movements, that they entered, he says, along with the fugitives into the town of Rhegium, and even became masters of it.

To say nothing of the fact, that Rhegium continues afterwards, as before, under the rule of Mikythus, — we may remark that Diodorus must have formed to himself a strange idea of the geography of southern Italy, to talk of pursuit and flight from Iapygia to Rhegium.

² Aristotel. Polit. v, 2, 8. Aristotle has another passage (vi, 3, 5) in which he comments on the government of Tarentum: and O. Müller applies this second passage to illustrate the particular constitutional changes which were made after the Iapygian disaster. I think this juxtaposition of the two passages unauthorized: there is nothing at all to connect them together. See History of the Dorians, iii. 9. 14.

comparative handful of men by whom they were so ignominiously beaten. Both these sentiments are just, but both are often exaggerated beyond the point which attentive contemplation of the facts will justify. The Persian mode of making war (which we may liken to that of the modern Turks,¹ now that the period of their energetic fanaticism has passed away) was in a high degree disorderly and inefficient: the men indeed, individually taken, especially the native Persians, were not deficient in the qualities of soldiers, but their arms and their organization were wretched, — and their leaders yet worse. On the other hand, the Greeks, equal, if not superior, in individual bravery, were incomparably superior in soldier-like order as well as in arms: but here too the leadership was defective, and the disunion a constant source of peril. Those who, like Plutarch (or rather the Pseudo-Plutarch) in his treatise on the Malignity of Herodotus, insist on acknowledging nothing but magnanimity and heroism in the proceedings of the Greeks throughout these critical years, are forced to deal very harshly with the inestimable witness on whom our knowledge of the facts depends, — and who intimates plainly that, in spite of the devoted courage displayed, not less by the vanquished at Thermopylae than by the victors at Salamis, Greece owed her salvation chiefly to the imbecility, cowardice, and credulous rashness, of Xerxes.² Had he indeed possessed either the personal energy of Cyrus or the judgment of Artemisia, it may be doubted whether any excellence of management, or any intimacy of union, could have preserved the Greeks against so great a superiority of force; but it is certain that all their courage as soldiers in line would have been unavailing for that purpose, without a higher degree of generalship, and a more hearty spirit of coöperation, than that which they actually manifested.

One hundred and fifty years after this eventful period, we shall see the tables turned, and the united forces of Greece under

¹ Mr. Waddington's Letters from Greece, describing the Greek revolution of 1821, will convey a good idea of the stupidity of Turkish warfare: compare also the second volume of the Memoirs of Baron de Tott, part iii.

² Thucyd. i. 69. ἐπιστάμενοι καὶ τὸν βάρβαρον αὐτὸν περὶ αὐτῷ τὰ πλείω πεισθέντες, etc.: compare Thucyd. vi. 33.

Alexander of Macedon becoming invaders of Persia. We shall find that in Persia no improvement has taken place during this long interval, — that the scheme of defence under Darius Codomannus labors under the same defects as that of attack under Xerxes, — that there is the same blind and exclusive confidence in pitched battles with superior numbers,¹ — that the advice of Mentor the Rhodian, and of Charidemus, is despised like that of Demaratus and Artemisia, — that Darius Codomannus, essentially of the same stamp as Xerxes, is hurried into the battle of Issus by the same ruinous temerity as that which threw away the Persian fleet at Salamis, — and that the Persian native infantry (not the cavalry) even appear to have lost that individual gallantry which they displayed so conspicuously at Plataea. But on the Grecian side, the improvement in every way is very great: the orderly courage of the soldier has been sustained and even augmented, while the generalship and power of military combination has reached a point unexampled in the previous history of mankind. Military science may be esteemed a sort of creation during this interval, and will be found to go through various stages: Demosthenes and Brasidas, the Cyreian army and Xenophon, Agesilaus, Iphikratès, Epaminondas, Philip of Macedon, Alexander:² for the Macedonian princes are borrowers of Greek tactics, though extending and applying them with a personal energy peculiar to themselves, and with advantages of position such as no Athenian or Spartan ever enjoyed. In this comparison between the invasion of Xerxes and that of Alexander we contrast the progressive spirit of Greece, serving as herald and stimulus to the like spirit in Europe, with the stationary mind of Asia, occasionally roused by some splendid individual, but never appropriating to itself new social ideas or powers, either for war or for peace.

It is out of the invasion of Xerxes that those new powers of combination, political as well as military, which lighten up Grecian history during the next two centuries, take their rise. They are brought into agency through the altered position and charac-

¹ Thucyd. i. 142. πλήθει τὴν ἀμαθίαν θρασύνοντες, etc.

² See a remarkable passage in the third Philippic of Demosthenes, c. 10; 123.

ter of the Athenians — improvers, to a certain extent, of military operations on land, but the great creators of marine tactics and manœuvring in Greece, — and the earliest of all Greeks who showed themselves capable of organizing and directing the joint action of numerous allies and dependents, — thus uniting the two distinctive qualities of the Homeric Agamemnon,¹ — ability in command, with vigor in execution.

In the general Hellenic confederacy, which had acted against Persia under the presidency of Sparta, Athens could hardly be said to occupy any ostensible rank above that of an ordinary member: the post of second dignity in the line at Plataea had indeed been adjudged to her, but only after a contending claim from Tegea. But without any difference in ostensible rank, she was in the eye and feeling of Greece no longer the same power as before. She had suffered more, and at sea had certainly done more, than all the other allies put together: even on land at Plataea, her hoplites had manifested a combination of bravery, discipline, and efficiency against the formidable Persian cavalry superior even to the Spartans: nor had any Athenian officer committed so perilous an act of disobedience as the Spartan Amompharetus. After the victory of Mykalê, when the Peloponnesians all hastened home to enjoy their triumph, the Athenian forces did not shrink from prolonged service for the important object of clearing the Hellespont, thus standing forth as the willing and forward champions of the Asiatic Greeks against Persia. Besides these exploits of Athens collectively, the only two individuals gifted with any talents for command, whom this momentous conquest had thrown up, were both of them Athenians: first, Themistoklês; next, Aristeidês. From the beginning to the end of the struggle, Athens had displayed an unreserved Pan-Hellenic patriotism, which had been most ungenerously requited by the Peloponnesians; who had kept within their isthmian walls, and betrayed Attica twice to hostile ravage; the first time, perhaps, unavoidably, — but the second time a culpable neglect, in postponing their outward march against Mardonius. And the Peloponnesians could not but feel, that while they had

¹ Ἀμφότερον, βασιλεὺς τ' ἀγαθός, κρατερός τ' αἰχμητής

Homer, *Iliad*, iii. 173

left Attica unprotected, they owed their own salvation at Salamis altogether to the dexterity of Themistoklês and the imposing Athenian naval force.

Considering that the Peloponnesians had sustained little or no mischief by the invasion, while the Athenians had lost for the time even their city and country, with a large proportion of their movable property irrecoverably destroyed, — we might naturally expect to find the former, if not lending their grateful and active aid to repair the damage in Attica, at least cordially welcoming the restoration of the ruined city by its former inhabitants. Instead of this, we find the same selfishness again prevalent among them; ill-will and mistrust for the future, aggravated by an admiration which they could not help feeling, overlays all their gratitude and sympathy. The Athenians, on returning from Salamis after the battle of Plataea, found a desolate home to harbor them. Their country was laid waste, — their city burnt or destroyed, so that there remained but a few houses standing, wherein the Persian officers had taken up their quarters, — and their fortifications for the most part razed or overthrown. It was their first task to bring home their families and effects from the temporary places of shelter at Trœzen, Ægina, and Salamis. After providing what was indispensably necessary for immediate wants, they began to rebuild their city and its fortifications on a scale of enlarged size in every direction.¹ But as soon as they were seen to be employed on this indispensable work, without which neither political existence nor personal safety was practicable, the allies took the alarm, preferred complaints to Sparta, and urged her to arrest the work: in the front of these complainants, probably, stood the Æginetans, as the old enemies of Athens, and as having most to apprehend from her might at sea. The Spartans, perfectly sympathizing with the jealousy and uneasiness of their allies, were even disposed, from old association, to carry their dislike of fortifications still farther, so that they would have been pleased to see all the other Grecian cities systematically defenceless like Sparta itself.² But while sending an embassy to Athens,

¹ Thucyd. i. 89

² Thucyd. i. 90. τὰ μὲν καὶ αὐτοὶ ἦδιον ἂν ὀρῶντες μῆτε ἐκείνους μὴτ' ἄλλους ὡς οὐκ εἶχοντα, τὸ δὲ πλέον, τῶν συμμάχων ἐξοτρυνόντων καὶ σοφῶς

to offer a friendly remonstrance against the project of re-fortifying the city, they could not openly and peremptorily forbid the exercise of a right common to every autonomous community. — nor did they even venture, at a moment when the events of the past months were fresh in every one's remembrance, to divulge their real jealousies as to the future. They affected to offer prudential reasons against the scheme, founded on the chance of a future Persian invasion; in which case it would be a dangerous advantage for the invader to find any fortified city outside of Peloponnesus to further his operations, as Thebes had recently seconded Mardonius. They proposed to the Athenians, therefore, not merely to desist from their own fortifications, but also to assist them in demolishing all fortifications of other cities beyond the limits of Peloponnesus, — promising shelter within the isthmus, in case of need, to all exposed parties.

A statesman like Themistoklēs was not likely to be imposed upon by this diplomacy: but he saw that the Spartans had the power of preventing the work if they chose, and that it could only be executed by the help of successful deceit. By his advice, the Athenians dismissed the Spartan envoys, saying that they would themselves send to Sparta and explain their views. Accordingly, Themistoklēs himself was presently despatched thither, as one among three envoys instructed to enter into explanations with the Spartan authorities; but his two colleagues, Aristeidēs and Abronichus, by previous concert, were tardy in arriving, — and he remained inactive at Sparta, making use of their absence as an excuse for not even demanding an audience, but affecting surprise that their coming was so long delayed. But while Aristeidēs and Abronichus, the other two envoys, were thus studiously kept back, the whole population of Athens labored unremittingly at the walls. Men, women, and children, all tasked their strength to the utmost during this precious interval: neither private houses, nor sacred edifices, were spared to furnish materials; and such was their ardor in the enterprise, that, before the three envoys were united at Sparta, the wall had already attained a height sufficient at least to attempt defence. Yet the interval

μένων τοῦ τε ναυτικοῦ αὐτῶν τὸ πλῆθος, ὃ πρὶν οὐχ ὑπῆρχε, καὶ τὴν ἐς τὸν Μηδικὸν πόλεμον τόλμαν γενεμένην.

had been long enough to provoke suspicion, even in the slow mind of the Spartans, while the more watchful Æginetans sent them positive intelligence that the wall was rapidly advancing. Themistoklēs, on hearing this allegation, peremptorily denied the truth of it; and the personal esteem entertained towards him was at that time so great, that his assurance¹ obtained for some time unqualified credit, until fresh messengers again raised suspicions in the minds of the Spartans. In reply to these, Themistoklēs urged the ephors to send envoys of their own to Athens, and thus convince themselves of the state of the facts. They unsuspectingly acted upon his recommendation, while he at the same time transmitted a private communication to Athens, desiring that the envoys might not be suffered to depart until the safe return of himself and his colleagues, which he feared might be denied them when his trick came to be divulged. Aristeidēs and Abronichus had now arrived, — the wall was announced to be of a height at least above contempt, — and Themistoklēs at once threw off the mask: he avowed the stratagem practised, — told the Spartans that Athens was already fortified sufficiently to insure the safety and free will of its inhabitants, — and warned them that the hour of constraint was now past, the Athenians being in a condition to define and vindicate for themselves their own rights and duties in reference to Sparta and the allies. He reminded them that the Athenians had always been found competent to judge for themselves, whether in joint consultation, or in any separate affair, such as the momentous crisis of abandoning their city and taking to their ships: they had now, in the exercise of this self-judgment, resolved upon fortifying their city, as a step indispensable to themselves and advantageous even to the allies generally. Nor could there be any equal or fair interchange of opinion unless all the allies had equal means of defence: either all must be unfortified, or Athens must be fortified as well as the rest.²

Mortified as the Spartans were by a revelation which showed that they had been not only detected in a dishonest purpose, but

¹ Thucyd. i. 91. τῷ μὲν Θεμιστοκλεῖ ἐπέιδοντο διὰ φιλίαν αὐτοῦ.

² Thucyd. i. 91. Οὐ γὰρ οἷόν τε εἶναι μὴ ἀπὸ ἑνὶ ἰπάλῳ παρασκευῇ ὁμοίον τι ἢ ἴσον ἐς τὸ καιρὸν βουλευέσθαι. Ἡ πάντας οὖν ἀτειχίστους ἔσθ' ἔχοντα ἑκαστοὺς ἢ καὶ τὰδε νομίζειν ὁρθῶς ἔχειν.

completely outwitted, — they were at the same time overawed by the decisive tone of Themistoklēs, whom they never afterwards forgave. To arrest beforehand erection of the walls would have been practicable, though not perhaps without difficulty; to deal by force with the fact accomplished, was perilous in a high degree: moreover, the inestimable services just rendered by Athens became again predominant in their minds, so that sentiment and prudence for the time coincided. They affected therefore to accept the communication without manifesting any offence, nor had they indeed put forward any pretence which required to be formally retracted. The envoys on both sides returned home, and the Athenians completed their fortifications without obstruction,¹ — yet not without murmurs on the part of the allies, who bitterly reproached Sparta afterwards for having let slip this golden opportunity of arresting the growth of the giant.²

If the allies were apprehensive of Athens before, the mixture of audacity, invention, and deceit, whereby she had just eluded the hindrance opposed to her fortifications, was well calculated to aggravate their uneasiness. On the other hand, to the Athenians, the mere hint of intervention to debar them from that common right of self-defence which was exercised by every autonomous city except Sparta, must have appeared outrageous injustice, — aggravated by the fact that it was brought upon them by their peculiar sufferings in the common cause, and by the very allies who, without their devoted forwardness, would

¹ We are fortunate enough to possess this narrative, respecting the rebuilding of the walls of Athens, as recounted by Thucydides. It is the first incident which he relates, in that general sketch of events between the Persian and Peloponnesian war, which precedes his professed history (i. 89–92). Diodorus (xi. 39, 40), Plutarch (Themistoklēs, c. 19), and Cornelius Nepos (Themist. c. 6, 7), seem all to have followed Thucydides, though Plutarch also notices a statement of Theopompus, to the effect that Themistoklēs accomplished his object by bribing the ephors. This would not be improbable in itself, — nor is it inconsistent with the narrative of Thucydides; but the latter either had not heard or did not believe it.

² Thucyd. i. 69. Καὶ τῶνδε ὑμεῖς αἱτιοί (says the Corinthian envoy addressing the Lacedæmonians), τό τε πρῶτον ἑλθόντες αὐτοῖς the Athenians) τὴν πόλιν μετὰ τὰ Μηδικὰ κρατῦναι, καὶ ἑστέρον τὰ μακρὰ στήλαι, etc.

now have been slaves of the Great King. And the intention of the allies to obstruct the fortifications must have been known to every soul in Athens, from the universal press of hands required to hurry the work and escape interference; just as it was proclaimed to after-generations by the shapeless fragments and irregular structure of the wall, in which even sepulchral stones and inscribed columns were seen imbedded.¹ Assuredly, the sentiment connected with this work, performed as it was alike by rich and poor, strong and weak, — men, women, and children, — must have been intense as well as equalizing: all had endured the common miseries of exile, all had contributed to the victory, all were now sharing the same fatigue for the defence of their recovered city, in order to counterwork the ungenerous hindrance of their Peloponnesian allies. We must take notice of these stirring circumstances, peculiar to the Athenians and acting upon a generation which had now been nursed in democracy for a quarter of a century, and had achieved unaided the victory of Marathon, — if we would understand that still stronger burst of aggressive activity, persevering self-confidence, and aptitude as well as thirst for command, — together with that still wider spread of democratical organization, — which marks their character during the age immediately following.

The plan of the new fortification was projected on a scale not unworthy of the future grandeur of the city. Its circuit was sixty stadia, or about seven miles, with the acropolis nearly in the centre: but the circuit of the previous walls is unknown, so that we are unable to measure the extent of that enlargement which Thucydides testifies to have been carried out on every side. It included within the town the three hills of the Areopagus, the Pnyx, and the Museum; while on the south of the town it was carried for a space even on the southern bank of the Ilissus, thus also comprising the fountain Kallirhoë.² In spite

¹ Thucyd. i. 93. Cornelius Nepos (Themist. c. 7) exaggerates this into a foolish conceit.

² For the dimensions and direction of the Themistoklean walls of Athens see especially the excellent Treatise of Forchhammer — *Topographie von Athen* — published in the *Kieler Philologische Studien*. Kiel, 1841.

The plan of Athens, prepared by Kiepert after his own researches and

of the excessive hurry in which it was raised, the structure was thoroughly solid and sufficient against every external enemy: but there is reason to believe that its very large inner area was never filled with buildings. Empty spaces, for the temporary shelter of inhabitants driven in from the country with their property, were eminently useful to a Grecian city-community: to none more useful than to the Athenians, whose principal strength lay in their fleet, and whose citizens habitually resided in large proportion in their separate demes throughout Attica.

The first indispensable step, in the renovation of Athens after her temporary extinction, was now happily accomplished: the city was made secure against external enemies. But Themistoklēs, to whom the Athenians owed the late successful stratagem, and whose influence must have been much strengthened by its success, had conceived plans of a wider and more ambitious range. He had been the original adviser of the great maritime start taken by his countrymen, as well as of the powerful naval force which they had created during the last few years, and which had so recently proved their salvation. He saw in that force both the only chance of salvation for the future, in case the Persians should renew their attack by sea, — a contingency at that time seemingly probable, — and boundless prospects of future ascendancy over the Grecian coasts and islands: it was the great engine of defence, of offence, and of ambition. To continue this movement required much less foresight and genius than to begin it, and Themistoklēs, the moment that the walls of the city had been finished, brought back the attention of his countrymen to those wooden walls which had served them as a refuge against the Persian monarch. He prevailed upon them to provide harbor-room at once safe and adequate, by the enlargement and fortification of the Peiræus. This again was only the prosecution of an enterprise previously begun: for he had already, while in office two or three years before,¹ made his

published among his recent maps, adopts for the most part the ideas of Forchhammer, as to the course of the walls.

¹ Thucyd. i, 93. ἐπεισε δὲ καὶ τοῦ Πειραιῶς τὰ λοιπὰ ὁ Θεμιστοκλῆς οἰκοδομεῖν (ὑπῆρκετο δ' αὐτοῦ πρότερον ἐπὶ τῆς ἐκείνου ἀρχῆς, ἥς κατ' ἐνιαυτὸν Ἀθηναῖος ἤρξε).

Upon which words the Scholiast observes (Κε' ἐνιαυτὸν) — κατὰ τινὰ

countrymen sensible that the open roadstead of Phalærum was thoroughly insecure, and had prevailed upon them to improve and employ in part the more spacious harbors of Peiræus and Munychia, — three natural basins, all capable of being closed and defended. Something had then been done towards the enlargement of this port, though it had probably been subsequently ruined by the Persian invaders: but Themistoklēs now resumed the scheme on a scale far grander than he could then have ventured to propose, — a scale which demonstrates the vast auguries present to his mind respecting the destinies of Athens. Peiræus and Munychia, in his new plan, constituted a fortified space as large as the enlarged Athens, and with a wall far more elaborate and unassailable. The wall which surrounded them, sixty stadia in circuit,¹ was intended by him to be so stupendous, both in height and thickness, as to render assault hopeless, and to enable the whole military population to act on shipboard, leaving only old men and boys as a garrison.² We may judge how vast his

ἐνιαυτὸν ἡ γυνὴν ἐγείνατο: πρὸ δὲ τῶν Μηδικῶν ἤρξε Θεμιστοκλῆς ἐνιαυτὸν ἕνα.

It seems hardly possible, having no fuller evidence to proceed upon, to determine to which of the preceding years Thucydides means to refer this ἀρχὴ of Themistoklēs. Mr. Fynes Clinton, after discussing the opinions of Dodwell and Corsini (see Fasti Hellenici, ad ann. 481 B.C. and Preface p. xy), inserts Themistoklēs as archon eponymus in 481 B.C., the year before the invasion of Xerxes, and supposes the Peiræus to have been commenced in that year. This is not in itself improbable: but he cites the Scholiast as having asserted the same thing before him (πρὸ τῶν Μηδικῶν ἤρξε Θεμιστοκλῆς ἐνιαυτὸν ἕνα), in which I apprehend that he is not borne out by the analogy of the language: ἐνιαυτὸν ἕνα, in the accusative case, denotes not the duration of the ἀρχή, not the position of the year (compare Thucyd. iii. 68).

I do not feel certain that Thucydides meant to designate Themistoklēs as having been archon eponymus, or as having been one of the nine archons. He may have meant, "during the year when Themistoklēs was stratēgus (or general)," and the explanation of the Scholiast, who employs the word ἡγεμὼν, rather implies that he so understood it. The stratēgi were annual as well as the archons. Now we know that Themistoklēs was one of the generals in 480 B.C., and that he commanded in Thessaly, at Artemisium, and at Salamis. The Peiræus may have been begun in the early part of 480 B.C., when Xerxes was already on his march, or at least at Sardis.

¹ Thucyd. ii, 13.

² Thucyd. i, 94.

country before the Peloponnesian war. The barley, vegetables, figs, and oil, produced in most parts of the territory, — the charcoal prepared in the flourishing deme of Acharnæ,¹ — and the fish obtained in abundance near the coast, — all found opulent buyers and a constant demand from the augmenting town population.

We are farther told that Themistoklēs² prevailed on the Athenians to build every year twenty new ships of the line, — so we may designate the trireme. Whether this number was always strictly adhered to, it is impossible to say: but to repair the ships, as well as to keep up their numbers, was always regarded among the most indispensable obligations of the executive government.

It does not appear that the Spartans offered any opposition to the fortification of the Peiræus, though it was an enterprise greater, more novel, and more menacing, than that of Athens. But Diodorus tells us, probably enough, that Themistoklēs thought it necessary to send an embassy to Sparta,³ intimating that his scheme was to provide a safe harbor for the collective navy of Greece, in the event of future Persian attack.

Works on so vast a scale must have taken a considerable time, and absorbed much of the Athenian force; yet they did not pre-

¹ See the lively picture of the Acharnian demots in the comedy of Aristophanēs so entitled.

Respecting the advantages derived from the residence of metics and from foreign visitors, compare the observations of Isokratēs, more than a century after this period, *Orat. iv, De Pace*, p. 163, and Xerophon, *De Vectigalibus*, c. iv.

² Diodor. xi, 43.

³ Diodor. xi, 41, 42, 43. I mean, that the fact of such an embassy being sent to Sparta is probable enough, — separating that fact from the preliminary discussions which Diodorus describes as having preceded it in the assembly of Athens, and which seem unmeaning as well as incredible. His story — that Themistoklēs told the assembly that he had a conceived scheme of great moment to the state, but that it did not admit of being made public beforehand, upon which the assembly named Aristeidēs and Xanthippus to hear it confidentially and judge of it — seems to indicate that Diodorus had read the well-known tale of the project of Themistoklēs to burn the Grecian fleet in the harbor of Pagasæ, and that he jumbled it in his memory with this other project for enlarging and fortifying the Peiræus.

vent Athens from lending active aid towards the expedition which, in the year after the battle of Plataea (B.C. 478) set sail for Asia under the Spartan Pausanias. Twenty ships from the various cities of Peloponnesus¹ were under his command: the Athenians alone furnished thirty, under the orders of Aristeidēs and Kimon: other triremes also came from the Ionian and insular allies. They first sailed to Cyprus, in which island they liberated most of the Grecian cities from the Persian government: next, they turned to the Bosphorus of Thrace, and undertook the siege of Byzantium, which, like Sestus in the Chersonese, was a post of great moment, as well as of great strength, — occupied by a considerable Persian force, with several leading Persians and even kinsmen of the monarch. The place was captured,² seemingly after a prolonged siege: it might probably hold out even longer than Sestus, as being taken less unprepared. The line of communication between the Euxine sea and Greece was thus cleared of obstruction.

The capture of Byzantium proved the signal for a capital and unexpected change in the relations of the various Grecian cities; a change, of which the proximate cause lay in the misconduct of Pausanias, but towards which other causes, deep-seated as well as various, also tended. In recounting the history of Miltiades,³ I noticed the deplorable liability of the Grecian leading men to be spoiled by success: this distemper worked with singular rapidity on Pausanias. As conqueror of Plataea, he had acquired a renown unparalleled in Grecian experience, together with a prodigious share of the plunder: the concubines, horses,⁴ camels, and gold plate, which had thus passed into his possession, were well calculated to make the sobriety and discipline of Spartan life irksome, while his power also, though great on foreign command, became subordinate to that of the ephors when he returned home. His newly-acquired insolence was manifested immediately after the battle, in the commemorative tripod dedicated by

Thucyd. i, 94; Plutarch, Aristeidēs, c. 23. Diodorus (xi, 44) says that the Peloponnesian ships were fifty in number: his statement is not to be accepted, in opposition to Thucydides.

² Thucyd. i, 94.

³ See the volume of this history immediately preceding, ch xxxvi, p. 373.

⁴ Herodot. ix, 81.

his order at Delphi, which proclaimed himself by name and singly, as commander of the Greeks and destroyer of the Persians: an unseemly boast, of which the Lacedæmonians themselves were the first to mark their disapprobation, by causing the inscription to be erased, and the names of the cities who had taken part in the combat to be all enumerated on the tripod.¹ Nevertheless, he was still sent on the command against Cyprus and Byzantium, and it was on the capture of this latter place that his ambition and discontent first ripened into distinct treason. He entered into correspondence with Gongylus the Eretrian exile (now a subject of Persia, and invested with the property and government of a district in Mysia), to whom he intrusted his new acquisition of Byzantium, and the care of the valuable prisoners taken in it. These prisoners were presently suffered to escape, or rather sent away underhand to Xerxes; together with a letter from the hand of Pausanias himself, to the following effect: "Pausanias, the Spartan commander, having taken these captives, sends them back, in his anxiety to oblige thee. I am minded, if it so please thee, to marry thy daughter, and to bring under thy dominion both Sparta and the rest of Greece: with thy aid, I think myself competent to achieve this. If my proposition be acceptable, send some confidential person down to the seaboard, through whom we may hereafter correspond." Xerxes, highly pleased with the opening thus held out, immediately sent down Artabazus (the same who had been second in command in Bœotia) to supersede Megabates in the satrapy of Daskylium; the new satrap, furnished with a letter of reply bearing the regal seal, was instructed to further actively the projects of Pausanias. The letter was to this purport: "Thus saith King Xerxes to Pausanias. Thy name stands forever recorded in my house as a

¹ In the Athenian inscriptions on the votive offerings dedicated after the capture of Eion, as well as after the great victories near the river Eurymedon, the name of Kimon the commander is not even mentioned (Plutarch, Kimon, c. 7; Diodor. xi. 62).

A strong protest, apparently familiar to Grecian feeling, against singling out the general particularly, to receive the honors of victory, appears in Euripid. *Andromach.* 694: striking verses, which are said to have been indignantly repeated by Kleitus, during the intoxication of the banquet wherein he was slain by Alexander (Quint. Curtius viii. 4. 29 (viii. 4); Plutarch, Alexand. c. 51).

well-doer, on account of the men whom thou hast saved for me beyond sea at Byzantium: and thy propositions now received are acceptable to me. Relax not either night or day in accomplishing that which thou promisest, nor let thyself be held back by cost, either gold or silver, or numbers of men, if thou standest in need of them, but transact in confidence thy business and mine jointly with Artabazus, the good man whom I have now sent, in such manner as may be best for both of us."¹

Throughout the whole of this expedition, Pausanias had been insolent and domineering, degrading the allies at quarters and watering-places in the most offensive manner as compared with the Spartans, and treating the whole armament in a manner which Greek warriors could not tolerate, even in a Spartan Herakleid, and a victorious general. But when he received the letter from Xerxes, and found himself in immediate communication with Artabazus, as well as supplied with funds for corruption,² his insane hopes knew no bounds, and he already fancied himself son-in-law of the Great King, as well as despot of Hellas. Fortunately for Greece, his treasonable plans were not deliberately laid and veiled until ripe for execution, but manifested with childish impatience. He clothed himself in Persian attire — (a proceeding which the Macedonian army, a century and a half afterwards, could not tolerate,³ even in Alexander the Great) — he traversed Thrace with a body of Median and Egyptian guards, — he copied the Persian chiefs, both in the luxury of his table and in his conduct towards the free women of Byzantium. Kleonides, a Byzantine maiden of conspicuous family, having been ravished from her parents by his order, was brought to his chamber at night: he happened to be asleep, and being suddenly awakened, knew not at first who was the person approaching his bed,

¹ These letters are given by Thucydides verbatim (i. 128, 129): he had seen them or obtained copies (ὡς ἱστορικὸν ἀνευρέθη) — they were, doubtless, communicated along with the final revelations of the confidential Argilian slave. As they are autographs, I have translated them literally, retaining that abrupt transition from the third person to the first, which is one of their peculiarities. Cornelius Nepos, who translates the letter of Pausanias, has effaced this peculiarity, and carries the third person from the beginning to the end (Cornel. Nep. Pausan. c. 2).

² Diodor. xi. 44.

³ Arrian. *Exp. Alex.* iv. 7, 7; vii. 8, 4; Quint. Curt. vi. 6, 10 (vi. 21, 11)

but seized his sword and slew her.¹ Moreover, his haughty reserve, with uncontrolled bursts of wrath, rendered him unapproachable; and the allies at length came to regard him as a despot rather than a general. The news of such outrageous behavior, and the manifest evidences of his alliance with the Persians, were soon transmitted to the Spartans, who recalled him to answer for his conduct, and seemingly the Spartan vessels along with him.²

In spite of the flagrant conduct of Pausanias, the Lacedaemonians acquitted him on the allegations of positive and individual wrong; yet, mistrusting his conduct in reference to collusion with the enemy, they sent out Dorkis to supersede him as commander. But a revolution, of immense importance for Greece, had taken place in the minds of the allies. The headship, or hegemony, was in the hands of Athens, and Dorkis the Spartan found the allies not disposed to recognize his authority.

Even before the battle of Salamis, the question had been raised,³ whether Athens was not entitled to the command at sea, in consequence of the preponderance of her naval contingent. The repugnance of the allies to any command except that of Sparta, either on land or water, had induced the Athenians to waive their pretensions at that critical moment. But the subsequent victories had materially exalted the latter in the eyes of Greece: while the armament now serving, differently composed from that which had fought at Salamis, contained a large proportion of the newly-enfranchised Ionic Greeks, who not only had no preference for Spartan command, but were attached to the Athenians on every ground, — as well from kindred race, as from the certainty that Athens with her superior fleet was the only protector upon whom they could rely against the Persians. Moreover, it happened that the Athenian generals on this expe-

¹ Plutarch, Kimon, c. 6; also Plutarch, De Ser. Numin. Vind. c. 10. p. 555. Pausanias, iii. 17, 8. It is remarkable that the latter heard the story of the death of Kleonikê from the lips of a Byzantine citizen of his own day, and seems to think that it had never found place in any written work.

² Thucyd. i. 95-131: compare Duris and Nymphis apud Athenaeum, xii. p. 535.

³ Herodot. viii. 2, 3. Compare the language of the Athenian envoy, as it stands in Herodotus (vii. 155) addressed to Gelo.

dition, Aristeidês and Kimon, were personally just and conciliating, forming a striking contrast with Pausanias. Hence the Ionic Greeks in the fleet, when they found that the behavior of the latter was not only oppressive towards themselves but also revolting to Grecian sentiment generally, addressed themselves to the Athenian commanders for protection and redress, on the plausible ground of kindred race;¹ entreating to be allowed to serve under Athens as leader instead of Sparta. Plutarch tells us that Aristeidês not only tried to remonstrate with Pausanias who repelled him with arrogance, — which is exceedingly probable, — but that he also required, as a condition of his compliance with the request of the Ionic allies, that they should personally insult Pausanias, so as to make reconciliation impracticable upon which a Samian and a Chian captain deliberately attacked and damaged the Spartan admiral-ship in the harbor of Byzantium.² The historians from whom Plutarch copied this latter statement must have presumed in the Athenians a disposition to provoke that quarrel with Sparta which afterwards sprung up as it were spontaneously: but the Athenians had no interest in doing so, nor can we credit the story, — which is, moreover, unnoticed by Thucydides. To give the Spartans a just ground of indignation, would have been glaring imprudence on the part of Aristeidês: but he had every motive to entertain the request of the allies, and he began to take his measures for acting as their protector and chief. And his proceedings were much facilitated by the circumstance that the Spartan government about this time recalled Pausanias to undergo an examination, in consequence of the universal complaints against him which had reached them. He seems to have left no Spartan authority behind him, — even the small Spartan squadron accompanied him home: so that the Athenian generals had the best opportunity for insuring to themselves and exercising that command which the allies besought them to undertake. So effectually did they improve the moment, that when Dorkis arrived to replace Pausanias, they were already in full supremacy; while Dorkis

¹ Thucyd. i. 95. *ἡξίουσαν αὐτοὺς ἡγεμόνας σφῶν γενέσθαι κατὰ τὸ συγγενεῖν αὐτῶν Περσέων καὶ Ἑλλήνων καὶ ἰσχυρὰν αὐτῶν ναυικήν* καὶ Περσέων καὶ Ἑλλήνων καὶ ἰσχυρὰν αὐτῶν ναυικήν.

² Plutarch, Aristeidês, c. 23.

having only a small force, and being in no condition to employ constraint, found himself obliged to return home.¹

This incident, though not a declaration of war against Sparta, was the first open renunciation of her authority as presiding state among the Greeks; the first avowed manifestation of a competitor for that dignity, with numerous and willing followers; the first separation of Greece — considered in herself alone and apart from foreign solicitations, such as the Persian invasion — into two distinct organized camps, each with collective interests and projects of its own. In spite of mortified pride, Sparta was constrained, and even in some points of view not indisposed, to patient acquiescence: for she had no means of forcing the dispositions of the Ionic allies, while the war with Persia altogether, — having now become no longer strictly defensive, and being withal maritime as well as distant from her own territory, — had ceased to be in harmony with her home routine and strict discipline. Her grave senators, especially an ancient Herakleid named Hetemaridas, reproved the impatience of the younger citizens, and discountenanced the idea of permanent maritime command as a dangerous innovation: they even treated it as an advantage, that Athens should take the lead in carrying on the Persian war, since it could not be altogether dropped; nor had the Athenians as yet manifested any sentiments positively hostile, to excite their alarm.² Nay, they actually took credit in the eyes of Athens, about a century afterwards, for having themselves advised this separation of command at sea from command on land.³ Moreover, if the war continued

¹ Thucyd. i. 95; Diodorus, xi. 44-47.

² Thucyd. i. 95. Following Thucydides in his conception of these events, I have embodied in the narrative as much as seems consistent with it in Diodorus (xi. 50), who evidently did not here copy Thucydides, but probably had Ephorus for his guide. The name of Hetemaridas, as an influential Spartan statesman on this occasion, is probable enough; but his alleged speech on the mischiefs of maritime empire, which Diodorus seems to have had before him, composed by Ephorus, would probably have represented the views and feelings of the year 350 B.C., and not those of 476 B.C. The subject would have been treated in the same manner as Isokrates, the master of Ephorus treats it, in his *Crat.* viii. *De Pace*, pp. 179, 180.

³ Xenophon, *Hellen.* vi. 5. 34. It was at the moment when the Spartans

under Spartan guidance, there would be a continued necessity for sending out their kings or chief men to command: and the example of Pausanias showed them the depraving effect of such military power, remote as well as unchecked. The example of their king Leotychides, too, near about this time, was a second illustration of the same tendency. At the same time, apparently, that Pausanias embarked for Asia to carry on the war against the Persians, Leotychides was sent with an army into Thessaly to put down the Aleuadae and those Thessalian parties who had sided with Xerxes and Mardonius. Successful in this expedition, he suffered himself to be bribed, and was even detected with a large sum of money actually on his person: in consequence of which the Lacedaemonians condemned him to banishment, and razed his house to the ground: he died afterwards in exile at Tegea.¹ Two such instances were well calculated to

were soliciting Athenian aid, after their defeat at Leuktra. ἱπομηνύσκοντες αὐτῷ, ὡς τὸν βαρβάρων κοινὴ ἀπὸ μὲν ἑσάντο — ἀναμνήσκοντες δὲ, ὡς Ἀθηναῖοι τε ὑπὸ τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἠρώδησαν ἡγεμόνες τοῦ ναυτικοῦ, καὶ τῶν κοινῶν χρημάτων φύλακες, τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων ταῦτα συμβουλευομένων· αὐτοὶ τε κατὰ γὰρ ἀπολογούμενος ἰφ' ἀπάντων τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἡγεμόνες προκρίθεισαν, συμπολιτεύσαντων αὐτὰ τὰ τῶν Ἀθηναίων.

¹ Herodot. vi. 72; Diodor. xi. 48; Pausanias, iii. 7, 8: compare Plutarch *De Herodoti Malign.* c. 21, p. 859.

Leotychides died, according to Diodorus, in 476 B.C.: he had commanded at Mykalé in 479 B.C. The expedition into Thessaly must therefore have been in one of the two intermediate years, if the chronology of Diodorus were, in this case, thoroughly trustworthy. But Mr. Clinton (*Fasti Hellenici*, Appendix, ch. iii. p. 210) has shown that Diodorus is contradicted by Plutarch, about the date of the accession of Archidamus, — and by others, about the date of the revolt at Sparta. Mr. Clinton places the accession of Archidamus and the banishment of Leotychides (of course, therefore, the expedition into Thessaly) in 469 B.C. I incline to believe that the expedition of Leotychides against the Thessalian Aleuadae took place in the year or in the second year following the battle of Platæa, because they had been the ardent and hearty allies of Mardonius in Boeotia, and because the war would seem not to have been completed without putting them down and making the opposite party in Thessaly predominant.

Considering how imperfectly we know the Lacedaemonian chronology of this date, it is very possible that some confusion may have arisen in the case of Leotychides, from the difference between the date of his banishment and that of his death. King Pleistoanax afterwards, having been banished for the same offence as that committed by Leotychides, and having lived

make the Lacedæmonians distrust the conduct of their Herakleid leaders when on foreign service, and this feeling weighed much in inducing them to abandon the Asiatic headship in favor of Athens. It appears that their Peloponnesian allies retired from this contest at the same time as they did, so that the prosecution of the war was thus left to Athens as chief of the newly-emancipated Greeks.¹

It was from these considerations that the Spartans were induced to submit to that loss of command which the misconduct of Pausanias had brought upon them. Their acquiescence facilitated the immense change about to take place in Grecian politics. According to the tendencies in progress prior to the Persian invasion, Sparta had become gradually more and more the president of something like a Pan-Hellenic union, comprising the greater part of the Grecian states. Such at least was the point towards which things seemed to be tending; and if many separate states stood aloof from this union, none of them at least sought to form any counter-union, if we except the obsolete and impotent pretensions of Argos. The preceding volumes of this history have shown that Sparta had risen to such ascendancy, not from her superior competence in the management of collective interests, nor even in the main from ambitious efforts on her own part to acquire it, — but from the converging tendencies of Grecian feeling, which required some such presiding state, and from the commanding military power, rigid discipline, and ancient undisturbed constitution, which attracted that feeling towards Sparta. The necessities of common defence against Persia greatly strengthened these tendencies, and the success of the defence, whereby so many Greeks were emancipated who required protection against their former master, seemed destined to have

many years in banishment, was afterwards restored: and the years which he had passed in banishment were counted as a part of his reign (Fast Hellen. l. c. p. 211). The date of Archidamus may, perhaps, have been reckoned in one account from the banishment of Leotychidēs, — in another from his death: the rather, as Archidamus must have been very young since he reigned forty-two years even after 469 B.C. And the date which Diodorus has given as that of the death of Leotychidēs, may really be only the date of his banishment, in which he lived until 469 B.C.

¹ Thucyd. i. 18

the like effect still more. For an instant, after the battles of Plataea and Mykalæ, — when the town of Plataea was set apart as a consecrated neutral spot for an armed confederacy against the Persian, with periodical solemnities and meetings of deputies, — Sparta was exalted to be the chief of a full Pan-Hellenic union, Athens being only one of the principal members: and had Sparta been capable either of comprehensive policy, of self-directed and persevering efforts, or of the requisite flexibility of dealing, embracing distant Greeks as well as near, — her position was now such, that her own ascendancy, together with undivided Pan-Hellenic union, might long have been maintained. But she was lamentably deficient in all the requisite qualities, and the larger the union became, the more her deficiency stood manifest. On the other hand, Athens, now entering into rivalry as a sort of leader of opposition, possessed all those qualities in a remarkable degree, over and above that actual maritime force which was the want of the day; so that the opening made by Spartan incompetence and crime, so far as Pausanias was concerned, found her in every respect prepared. But the sympathies of the Peloponnesians still clung to Sparta, while those of the Ionian Greeks had turned to Athens: and thus not only the short-lived symptoms of an established Pan-Hellenic union, but even all tendencies towards it from this time disappear. There now stands out a manifest schism, with two pronounced parties, towards one of which nearly all the constituent atoms of the Grecian world gravitate: the maritime states, newly enfranchised from Persia, towards Athens, — the land-states, which had formed most part of the confederate army at Plataea, towards Sparta.¹ Along with

¹ Thucyd. i. 18. Καὶ μεγάλου κινδύνου επικριμασθέντος οἱ τε Λακεδαιμόνιοι τῶν συμπολεμήσαντων Ἑλλήνων ἤρσαντο δυνάμει προύχοντες, καὶ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι, διανοηθέντες ἐκλιπεῖν τὴν πόλιν καὶ ἀνασκευασάμενοι, ἐς τὰς ναῦς ἐμβάντες ναυτικοὶ ἐγένοντο. Κοινῇ δὲ ὑπώσάμενοι τὸν βάρβαρον, ὕστερον οὐ πολλῷ διεκρίθησαν πρὸς τε Ἀθηναίους καὶ Λακεδαιμονίους, οἱ τε ἀποστάντες βασιλέως Ἕλληνες καὶ οἱ συμπολεμήσαντες. Δυνάμει γὰρ ταῦτα μέγιστα διεφάνη· ἰσχυρὸν γὰρ οἱ μὲν κατὰ γῆν, οἱ δὲ ναυσί. Καὶ ὀλίγον μὲν χρόνον συνέμεινεν ἡ ὁμαχμία, ἔπειτα δὲ διενεχθέντες οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι καὶ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἐπολέμησαν μετὰ τῶν ξυμμάχων πρὸς ἀλλήλους· καὶ τῶν ἄλλων Ἑλλήνων εἰτινές που διασταίεν, πρὸς τούτους ἤδη ἐχώρουν. Ὡστε ἀπὸ τῶν Μηδικῶν ἐς τόνδε ἀεὶ τὸν πόλεμον, etc.

This is a clear and concise statement of the great revolution in Grecian

this national schism and called into action by it, appears the internal political schism in each separate city between oligarchy and

affairs, comparing the period before and after the Persian war. Thucydides goes on to trace briefly the consequences of this bisection of the Grecian world into two great leagues, — the growing improvement in military skill, and the increasing stretch of military effort on both sides from the Persian invasion down to the Peloponnesian war; — he remarks also, upon the difference between Sparta and Athens in their way of dealing with their allies respectively. He then states the striking fact, that the military force put forth separately by Athens and her allies on the one side, and by Sparta and her allies on the other, during the Peloponnesian war, were each of them greater than the entire force which had been employed by both together in the most powerful juncture of their confederacy against the Persian invaders. — *Καὶ ἐγένετο αὐτοῖς ἐς τόνδε τὸν πόλεμον ἡ ἰδίᾳ παρασκευῇ μείζων ἢ ὡς τὰ κράτιστά ποτε μετὰ ἀκραϊφύους τῆς συμμαχίας ἦνθησαν* (i, 19).

I notice this last passage especially (construing it as the Scholiast seems to do), not less because it conveys an interesting comparison, than because it has been understood by Dr. Arnold, Götter, and other commentators, in a sense which seems to me erroneous. They interpret thus: *αὐτοῖς* to mean the Athenians only, and not the Lacedæmonians, — *ἡ ἰδίᾳ παρασκευῇ* to denote the forces equipped by Athens herself, apart from her allies, — and *ἀκραϊφύους συμμαχίας* to refer "to the Athenian alliance only, at a period a little before the conclusion of the thirty years' treaty, when the Athenians were masters not only of the islands, and the Asiatic Greek colonies, but had also united to their confederacy Boeotia and Achaia on the continent of Greece itself." (Dr. Arnold's note.) Now so far, as the words go, the meaning assigned by Dr. Arnold might be admissible; but if we trace the thread of ideas in Thucydides, we shall see that the comparison, as these commentators conceive it, between Athens alone and Athens aided by her allies — between the Athenian empire as it stood during the Peloponnesian war, and the same empire as it *had* stood before the thirty years' truce — is quite foreign to his thoughts. Nor had Thucydides said one word to inform the reader, that the Athenian empire at the beginning of the Peloponnesian war had diminished in magnitude, and thus was no longer *ἀκραϊφύους*; without which previous notification, the comparison supposed by Dr. Arnold could not be clearly understood. I conceive that there are two periods, and two sets of circumstances, which, throughout all this passage, Thucydides means to contrast: first, confederate Greece at the time of the Persian war, next, bisected Greece in a state of war, under the double headship of Sparta and Athens. *Αὐτοῖς* refers as much to Sparta as to Athens — *ἀκραϊφύους τῆς συμμαχίας* means what had been before expressed by *ὁμαίχμια* — and *ποτε* set against *τόνδε τὸν πόλεμον*, is equivalent to the expression which had before been used — *ἀπὸ τῶν Μηδικῶν ἐς τόνδε αἰὲν τὸν πόλεμον*.

democracy. Of course, the germ of these parties had already previously existed in the separate states, but the energetic democracy of Athens, and the pronounced tendency of Sparta to rest upon the native oligarchies in each separate city as her chief support, now began to bestow, on the conflict of internal political parties, an Hellenic importance, and an aggravated bitterness, which had never before belonged to it.

The departure of the Spartan Dorkis left the Athenian generals at liberty; and their situation imposed upon them the duty of organizing the new confederacy which they had been chosen to conduct. The Ionic allies were at this time not merely willing and unanimous, but acted as the forward movers in the enterprise; for they stood in obvious need of protection against the attacks of Persia, and had no farther kindness to expect from Sparta or the Peloponnesians. But even had they been less under the pressure of necessity, the conduct of Athens, and of Aristides as the representative of Athens, might have sufficed to bring them into harmonious coöperation. The new leader was no less equitable towards the confederates than energetic against the common enemy. The general conditions of the confederacy were regulated in a common synod of the members, appointed to meet periodically for deliberative purposes, in the temple of Apollo and Artemis at Delos, — of old, the venerated spot for the religious festivals of the Ionic cities, and at the same time a convenient centre for the members. A definite obligation, either in equipped ships of war or in money, was imposed upon every separate city; and the Athenians, as leaders, determined in which form contribution should be made by each: their assessment must of course have been reviewed by the synod, nor had they at this time power to enforce any regulation not approved by that body. It had been the good fortune of Athens to profit by the genius of Themistokles on two recent critical occasions (the battle of Salamis and the rebuilding of her walls), where sagacity, craft, and decision were required in extraordinary measure, and where pecuniary probity was of less necessity: it was no less her good fortune now, — in the delicate business of assessing a new tax and determining how much each state should bear, without precedents to guide them, when unimpeachable honesty in the assessor was the first of all qualities, — not to

have Themistoklès; but to employ in his stead the well-known, we might almost say the ostentatious, probity of Aristeidès. This must be accounted good fortune, since at the moment when Aristeidès was sent out, the Athenians could not have anticipated that any such duty would devolve upon him. His assessment not only found favor at the time of its original proposition, when it must have been freely canvassed by the assembled allies — but also maintained its place in general esteem, as equitable and moderate, after the once responsible headship of Athens had degenerated into an unpopular empire.¹

Respecting this first assessment, we scarcely know more than one single fact, — the aggregate in money was four hundred and sixty talents, equal to about one hundred and six thousand pounds sterling. Of the items composing such aggregate, — of the individual cities which paid it, — of the distribution of obligations to furnish ships and to furnish money, — we are entirely ignorant: the little information which we possess on these points relates to a period considerably later, shortly before the Peloponnesian war, under the uncontrolled empire then exercised by Athens. Thucydidès, in his brief sketch, makes us clearly understand the difference between *presiding* Athens, with her

¹ Thucyd. v, 18; Plutarch, Aristeidès, c. 24. Plutarch states that the allies expressly asked the Athenians to send Aristeidès for the purpose of assessing the tribute. This is not at all probable: Aristeidès, as commander of the Athenian contingent under Pausanias, was at Byzantium when the mutiny of the Ionians against Pausanias occurred, and was the person to whom they applied for protection. As such, he was the natural person to undertake such duties as devolved upon Athens, without any necessity of supposing that he was specially asked for to perform it.

Plutarch farther states that a certain contribution had been levied from the Greeks towards the war, even during the headship of Sparta. This statement also is highly improbable. The headship of Sparta covers only one single campaign, in which Pausanias had the command: the Ionic Greeks sent their ships to the fleet, which would be held sufficient, and there was no time for measuring commutations into money.

Pausanias states, but I think quite erroneously, that the name of Aristeidès was robbed of its due honor because he was the first person who *ἔραξε φόρον τοῖς Ἕλλησι* (Pausan. viii, 52, 2). Neither the assessment nor the name of Aristeidès was otherwise than popular.

Aristotle employs the name of Aristeidès as a symbol of unrivalled probity (Rhetoric. ii, 24, 2).

autonomous and regularly assembled allies in 476 B.C., and *imperial* Athens, with her subject allies in 432 B.C.; the Greek word equivalent to *ally* left either of these epithets to be understood, by an ambiguity exceedingly convenient to the powerful states, — and he indicates the general causes of the change: but he gives us few particulars as to the modifying circumstances, and none at all as to the first start. He tells us only that the Athenians appointed a peculiar board of officers, called the *Hellênotamiæ*, to receive and administer the common fund, — that Delos was constituted the general treasury, where the money was to be kept, — and that the payment thus levied was called the *phorus*; ¹ a name which appears then to have been first put into circulation, though afterwards usual, — and to have conveyed at first no degrading import, though it afterwards became so odious as to be exchanged for a more innocent synonym.

Endeavoring as well as we can to conceive the Athenian alliance in its infancy, we are first struck with the magnitude of the total sum contributed; which will appear the more remarkable when we reflect that many of the contributing cities furnished ships besides. We may be certain that all which was done at first was done by general consent, and by a freely determining majority: for Athens, at the time when the Ionic allies besought her protection against Spartan arrogance, could have had no power of constraining unwilling parties, especially when the loss of supremacy, though quietly borne, was yet fresh and rankling among the countrymen of Pausanias. So large a total implies, from the very first, a great number of contributing states, and we learn from hence to appreciate the powerful, wide-spread, and voluntary movement which then brought together the maritime and insular Greeks distributed throughout the Ægean sea and the Hellespont. The Phœnician fleet, and the Persian land-force, might at any moment reappear, nor was there any hope of resisting either except by confederacy: so that confederacy, under such circumstances, became, with these exposed Greeks, not merely a genuine feeling, but at that time the first of all their feelings. It was their common fear, rather than Athenian ambi-

Thucyd. i, 95, 96

tion, which gave birth to the alliance, and they were grateful to Athens for organizing it. The public import of the name *Hellenotamiae*, coined for the occasion, — the selection of Delos as a centre, and the provision for regular meetings of the members, — demonstrate the patriotic and fraternal purpose which the league was destined to serve. In truth, the protection of the *Ægean* sea against foreign maritime force and lawless piracy, as well as that of the Hellespont and Bosphorus against the transit of a Persian force, was a purpose essentially public, for which all the parties interested were bound in equity to provide by way of common contribution: any island or seaport which might refrain from contributing, was a gainer at the cost of others: and we cannot doubt that the general feeling of this common danger as well as equitable obligation, at a moment when the fear of Persia was yet serious, was the real cause which brought together so many contributing members, and enabled the forward parties to shame into concurrence such as were more backward. How the confederacy came to be turned afterwards to the purposes of Athenian ambition, we shall see at the proper time: but in its origin it was an equal alliance, in so far as alliance between the strong and the weak can ever be equal, — not an Athenian empire: nay, it was an alliance in which every individual member was more exposed, more defenceless, and more essentially benefited in the way of protection, than Athens. We have here in truth one of the few moments in Grecian history wherein a purpose at once common, equal, useful, and innocent, brought together spontaneously many fragments of this disunited race, and overlaid for a time that exclusive bent towards petty and isolated autonomy which ultimately made slaves of them all. It was a proceeding equitable and prudent, in principle as well as in detail; promising at the time the most beneficent consequences, — not merely protection against the Persians, but a standing police of the *Ægean* sea, regulated by a common superintending authority. And if such promise was not realized, we shall find that the inherent defects of the allies, indisposing them to the hearty appreciation and steady performance of their duties as equal confederates, are at least as much chargeable with the failure as the ambition of Athens. We may add that, in selecting Delos as a centre, the Ionic allies were conciliated by a renewal

tion of the solemnities which their fathers, in the days of former freedom, had crowded to witness in that sacred island.

At the time when this alliance was formed, the Persians still held not only the important posts of Eion on the Strymon and Doriskur in Thrace, but also several other posts in that country,¹ which are not specified to us. We may thus understand why the Greek cities on and near the Chalkidic peninsula, — Argilus, Stageirus, Akanthus, Skôlus, Olynthus, Spartôlus, etc., — which we know to have joined under the first assessment of Aristeidês, were not less anxious² to seek protection in the bosom of the new confederacy, than the Dorian islands of Rhodes and Kos, the Ionic islands of Samos and Chios, the *Æolic* Lesbos and Tenedos, or continental towns such as Milêtus and Byzantium: by all of whom adhesion to this alliance must have been contemplated, in 477 or 476 B.C., as the sole condition of emancipation from Persia. Nothing more was required, for the success of a foreign enemy against Greece generally, than complete autonomy of every Grecian city, small as well as great, — such as the Persian monarch prescribed and tried to enforce ninety years afterwards, through the Lacedæmonian Antalkidas, in the pacification which bears the name of the latter: some sort of union, organized and obligatory upon each city, was indispensable to the safety of all. Nor was it by any means certain, at the time when the confederacy of Delos was first formed, that, even with that aid, the Asiatic enemy would be effectually kept out; especially as the Persians were strong, not merely from their own force, but also from the aid of internal parties in many of the Grecian states, — traitors within, as well as exiles without.

Among these, the first in rank as well as the most formidable, was the Spartan Pausanias. Summoned home from Byzantium to Sparta, in order that the loud complaints against him might be

¹ Herodot. vii, 106. ὑπαρχοι ἐν τῇ Θρηίκῃ καὶ τὰ Ἑλλησπόντου πανταχῇ. Οὗτοι ὡν πάντες, οἱ τε ἐκ Θρηίκης καὶ τοῦ Ἑλλησπόντου, πληγαὶ ἐν Δορίσκῳ, ὑπὸ Ἑλλήνων ὕστερον ταύτης τῆς στρατηγίας: ἐξηρέθησαν, etc.

² Thucyd. v, 13. Τὰς δὲ πόλεις, φερούσας τὸν φόρον τὸν ἐπ' Ἀριστείδου, αὐτονόμους εἶναι. . . εἰσὶ δὲ, Ἀργίλος, Σταγειρος, Ἀκαυθος, Σκῶλος, Ὀλύνθος, Σπαρτώλος.

examined, he had been acquitted¹ of the charges of wrong and oppression against individuals; yet the presumptions of *medism*, or treacherous correspondence with the Persians, appeared so strong that, though not found guilty, he was still not reappointed to the command. Such treatment seems to have only emboldened him in the prosecution of his designs against Greece, and he came out with this view to Byzantium in a trireme belonging to Hermionê, under pretence of aiding as a volunteer without any formal authority in the war. He there resumed his negotiations with Artabazus: his great station and celebrity still gave him a strong hold on men's opinions, and he appears to have established a sort of mastery in Byzantium, from whence the Athenians, already recognized heads of the confederacy, were constrained to expel him by force:² and we may be very sure that the terror excited by his presence as well as by his known designs tended materially to accelerate the organization of the confederacy under Athens. He then retired to Kolônæ in the Troad, where he continued for some time in the farther prosecution of his schemes, trying to form a Persian party, despatching emissaries to distribute Persian gold among various cities of Greece, and probably employing the name of Sparta to impede the formation of the new confederacy:³ until at length the Spartan authorities, apprized of his

¹ Cornelius Nepos states that he was fined (Pausanias, c. 2), which is either noticed by Thucydides, nor at all probable, looking at the subsequent circumstances connected with him.

² Thucyd. i. 130, 131. Καὶ ἐκ τοῦ Βυζαντίου βίη ἐπὶ τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἐπολιτευσθεὶς, etc.: these words seem to imply that he had acquired a strong position in the town.

³ It is to this time that I refer the mission of Arthmius of Zeleia (an Asiatic town, between Mount Ida and the southern coast of the Propontis) to gain over such Greeks as he could by means of Persian gold. In the course of his visit to Greece, Arthmius went to Athens: his purpose was discovered, and he was compelled to flee: while the Athenians, at the instance of Themistoklēs, passed an indignant decree, declaring him and his race enemies of Athens, and of all the allies of Athens, — and proclaiming that whoever should slay him would be guiltless; because he had brought in Persian gold to bribe the Greeks. This decree was engraven on a brazen column, and placed on record in the acropolis, where it stood near the great statue of Athênê Promachos, even in the time of Demosthenēs and his contemporary orators. See Demosthen. Philippic. iii. c. 9, p. 122 and

proceedings, sent a herald out to him, with peremptory orders that he should come home immediately along with the herald: if he disobeyed, "the Spartans would declare war against him," or constitute him a public enemy.

As the execution of this threat would have frustrated all the ulterior schemes of Pausanias, he thought it prudent to obey; the rather, as he felt entire confidence of escaping all the charges against him at Sparta by the employment of bribes,¹ the means for which were abundantly furnished to him through Artabazus. He accordingly returned along with the herald, and was, in the first moments of indignation, imprisoned by order of the ephors; who, it seems, were legally competent to imprison him, even had he been king instead of regent. But he was soon let out, on his own requisition, and under a private arrangement with friends and partisans, to take his trial against all accusers.² Even to

De Fals. Legat. c. 76, p. 428; Æschin. cont. Ktesiphont. ad fin. Harpokrat. v. Ἀρμίους — Demarchus cont. Aristogeiton. sects. 25, 26.

Plutarch (Themistoklēs, c. 6. and Aristeidēs. tom. ii. p. 218) tells us that Themistoklēs proposed this decree against Arthmius and caused it to be passed. But Plutarch refers it to the time when Xerxes was on the point of invading Greece. Now it appears to me that the incident cannot well belong to that point of time. Xerxes did not rely upon bribes, but upon other and different means, for conquering Greece: besides, the very tenor of the decree shows that it must have been passed after the formation of the confederacy of Delos, — for it pronounces Arthmius to be an enemy of Athens and of all the allies of Athens. To a native of Zeleia it might be a serious penalty to be excluded and proscribed from all the cities in alliance with Athens; many of them being on the coast of Asia. I know no point of time to which the mission of Arthmius can be so conveniently referred as this, — when Pausanias and Artabazus were engaged in this very part of Asia, in contriving plots to get up a party in Greece. Pausanias was thus engaged for some years, — before the banishment of Themistoklēs.

¹ Thucyd. i. 131. Ὁ δὲ βουλευόμενος ὡς ἥκιστα ὑποπτος εἶναι καὶ πιστεύων χρημασι διαλύσειν τὴν διαβολὴν, ἀνιχόρει τὸ δεύτερον ἐς Σπάρτην.

² Thucyd. i. 131. Καὶ ἐπεὶ μὲν τὴν νίκην ἐσπίπτει τὸ πρῶτον ὑπὸ τῶν ἐφόρων ἔπειτα διαπραξάμενος ὑστέρων ἐξῆλθε, καὶ καθίστησιν αὐτὸν ἐς κρίσιν τοῖς βουλευμένοις περὶ αὐτὸν ἐλέγχειν.

The word διαπραξάμενος indicates, first, that Pausanias himself originated the efforts to get free, — next, that he came to an underhand arrangement: very probably by a bribe, though the word does not necessarily imply it. The Scholiast says so, distinctly, — χρημασι καὶ λόγοις διαπραξάμενος.

stand forth as accuser against so powerful a man was a serious peril: to undertake the proof of specific matter of treason against him was yet more serious: nor does it appear that any Spartan ventured to do either. It was known that nothing short of the most manifest and invincible proof would be held to justify his condemnation, and amidst a long chain of acts carrying conviction when taken in the aggregate, there was no single treason sufficiently demonstrable for the purpose. Accordingly, Pausanias remained not only at large but unaccused, still audaciously persisting both in his intrigues at home and his correspondence abroad with Artabazus. He ventured to assail the unshielded side of Sparta by opening negotiations with the Helots, and instigating them to revolt; promising them both liberation and admission to political privilege;¹ with a view, first, to destroy the board of ephors, and render himself despot in his own country,—next, to acquire through Persian help the supremacy of Greece. Some of those Helots to whom he addressed himself revealed the plot to the ephors, who, nevertheless, in spite of such grave peril, did not choose to take measures against Pausanias upon no better information,—so imposing was still his name and position. But though some few Helots might inform, probably many others both gladly heard the proposition and faithfully kept the secret: we shall find, by what happened a few years afterwards, that there were a large number of them who had their spears in readiness for revolt. Suspected as Pausanias was, yet by the fears of some and the connivance of others, he was allowed to bring his plans to the very brink of consummation; and his last letters to Artabazus,² intimating that he was ready for action, and bespeaking immediate performance of the engagements concerted between them, were actually in the hands of the messenger. Sparta was saved from an outbreak of the most formidable kind,

δηλώνοντι διακρουσάμενος τὴν κατηγορίαν. Dr. Arnold translates διακρουσάμενος, "having settled the business."

Aristotel. Politic. iv, 13, 13; v, 1, 5; v, 6, 2; Herodot. v, 32. Aristotle calls Pausanias king, though he was only regent: the truth is, that he had all the power of a Spartan king, and seemingly more, if we compare his treatment with that of the Prokleid king Leotychidēs.

¹ Thucyd. i, 132. ὁ μέλλων τὰς τελευταίας βασιλεῖ ἐπιστολὰς πρὸς Ἀρτάβαζον κομίσιν, ἀνὴρ Ἀργίλιος, etc.

not by the prudence of her authorities, but by a mere accident, or rather by the fact that Pausanias was not only a traitor to his country, but also base and cruel in his private relations.

The messenger to whom these last letters were intrusted was a native of Argilus in Thrace, a favorite and faithful slave of Pausanias; once connected with him by that intimate relation which Grecian manners tolerated, and admitted even to the full confidence of his treasonable projects. It was by no means the intention of this Argilian to betray his master; but, on receiving the letter to carry, he recollected, with some uneasiness, that none of the previous messengers had ever come back. Accordingly, he broke the seal and read it, with the full view of carrying it forward to its destination, if he found nothing inconsistent with his own personal safety: he had farther taken the precaution to counterfeit his master's seal, so that he could easily reclose the letter. On reading it, he found his suspicions confirmed by an express injunction that the bearer was to be put to death,—a discovery which left him no alternative except to deliver it to the ephors. But those magistrates, who had before disbelieved the Helot informers, still refused to believe even the confidential slave with his master's autograph and seal, and with the full account besides, which doubtless he would communicate at the same time, of all that had previously passed in the Persian correspondence, not omitting copies of those letters between Pausanias and Xerxes, which I have already cited from Thucydides. for in no other way can they have become public. Partly from the suspicion which, in antiquity, always attached to the testimony of slaves, except when it was obtained under the pretended guarantee of torture, partly from the peril of dealing with so exalted a criminal,—the ephors would not be satisfied with any evidence less than his own speech and their own ears. They directed the Argilian slave to plant himself as a suppliant in the sacred precinct of Poseidon, near Cape Tænarus, under the shelter of a double tent, or hut, behind which two of them concealed themselves. Apprized of this unexpected mark of alarm, Pausanias hastened to the temple, and demanded the reason: upon which the slave disclosed his knowledge of the contents of the letter, and complained bitterly that, after long and faithful service,—with a secrecy never once betrayed, through

out this dangerous correspondence, — he was at length rewarded with nothing better than the same miserable fate which had befallen the previous messengers. Pausanias, admitting all these facts, tried to appease the slave's disquietude, and gave him a solemn assurance of safety if he would quit the sanctuary; urging him at the same time to proceed on the journey forthwith, in order that the schemes in progress might not be retarded.

All this passed within the hearing of the concealed ephors: who at length thoroughly satisfied, determined to arrest Pausanias immediately on his return to Sparta. They met him in the public street, not far from the temple of Athênê Chalkiœkus (or of the Brazen House); but as they came near, either their menacing looks, or a significant nod from one of them, revealed to this guilty man their purpose; and he fled for refuge to the temple, which was so near that he reached it before they could overtake him. He planted himself as a suppliant, far more hopeless than the Argilian slave whom he had so recently talked over at Tanarus, in a narrow-roofed chamber belonging to the sacred building; where the ephors, not warranted in touching him, took off the roof, built up the doors, and kept watch until he was on the point of death by starvation. According to a current story,¹ — not recognized by Thucydides, yet consistent with Spartan manners, — his own mother was the person who placed the first stone to build up the door, in deep abhorrence of his treason. His last moments being carefully observed, he was brought away just in time to expire without, and thus to avoid the desecration of the temple. The first impulse of the ephors was to cast his body into the ravine, or hollow, called the *Kaadas*, the usual place of punishment for criminals: probably, his powerful friends averted this disgrace, and he was buried not far off, until, some time afterwards, under the mandate of the Delphian oracle, his body was exhumed and transported to the exact spot where he had died. Nor was the oracle satisfied even with this reinterment: pronouncing the whole proceeding to be a profanation of the sanctity of Athênê, it enjoined that two bodies should be presented to her as an atonement for the one carried away. In the very early days of Greece, — or among the Carthaginians,

¹ Diodor. xi, 45; Cornel. Nepos, Pausan. c. 7; Polyær. viii, 51.

even at this period, — such an injunction would probably have produced the slaughter of two human victims: on the present occasion, Athênê, or Hikesius, the tutelary god of suppliants, was supposed to be satisfied by two brazen statues; not, however, without some attempts to make out that the expiation was inadequate.¹

Thus perished a Greek who reached the pinnacle of renown simply from the accidents of his lofty descent, and of his being general at Plataea, where it does not appear that he displayed any superior qualities. His treasonable projects implicated and brought to disgrace a man far greater than himself, the Athenian Themistoklès.

The chronology of this important period is not so fully known as to enable us to make out the full dates of particular events; but we are obliged — in consequence of the subsequent events connected with Themistoklès, whose flight to Persia is tolerably well marked as to date — to admit an interval of about nine years between the retirement of Pausanias from his command at Byzantium, and his death. To suppose so long an interval engaged in treasonable correspondence, is perplexing; and we can only explain it to ourselves very imperfectly by considering that the Spartans were habitually slow in their movements, and that the suspected regent may perhaps have communicated with partisans, real or expected, in many parts of Greece. Among those whom he sought to enlist as accomplices was Themistoklès, still in great power, — though, as it would seem, in declining power, — at Athens: and the charge of collusion with the Persians connects itself with the previous movement of political parties in that city.

The rivalry of Themistoklès and Aristeidès had been greatly appeased by the invasion of Xerxes, which had imposed upon both the peremptory necessity of coöperation against a common enemy. Nor was it apparently resumed, during the times which immediately succeeded the return of the Athenians to their country: at least we hear of both in effective service, and in prominent posts. Themistoklès stands forward as the contriver of the city walls and architect of Peiræus: Aristeidès is commander of the fleet, and first organizer of the confederacy of

¹ Thucyd. i, 133, 134; Pausanias, iii, 17, 9.

Delos. Moreover, we seem to detect a change in the character of the latter: he had ceased to be the champion of Athenian old-fashioned landed interest, against Themistoklēs as the originator of the maritime innovations. Those innovations had now, since the battle of Salamis, become an established fact; a fact of overwhelming influence on the destinies and character, public as well as private, of the Athenians. During the exile at Salamis, every man, rich or poor, landed proprietor or artisan, had been for the time a seaman: and the anecdote of Kimon, who dedicated the bridle of his horse in the acropolis, as a token that he was about to pass from the cavalry to service on shipboard,¹ is a type of that change of feeling which must have been impressed more or less upon every rich man in Athens. From henceforward the fleet is endeared to every man as the grand force, offensive and defensive, of the state, in which character all the political leaders agree in accepting it: we ought to add, at the same time, that this change was attended with no detriment either to the land-force or to the landed cultivation of Attica, both of which will be found to acquire extraordinary development during the interval between the Persian and Peloponnesian wars. Still, the triremes and the men who manned them, taken collectively, were now the determining element in the state: moreover, the men who manned them had just returned from Salamis, fresh from a scene of trial and danger, and from a harvest of victory, which had equalized for the moment all Athenians as sufferers, as combatants, and as patriots. Such predominance of the maritime impulse, having become pronounced immediately after the return from Salamis, was farther greatly strengthened by the construction and fortification of the Peiræus, — a new maritime Athens, as large as the old inland city, — as well as by the unexpected formation of the confederacy at Delos, with all its untried prospects and stimulating duties.

The political change arising from hence in Athens was not less important than the military. "The maritime multitude, authors of the victory of Salamis,"² and instruments of the new

¹ Plutarch, Kimon, c. 8.

² Aristotel. Politic. v, 3, 5. Καὶ πάλιν ὁ ναυτικὸς ὄχλος, γενόμενος

vocation of Athens as head of the Delian confederacy, appear now ascendant in the political constitution also; not in any way as a separate or privileged class, but as leavening the whole mass, strengthening the democratical sentiment, and protesting against all recognized political inequalities. In fact, during the struggle at Salamis, the whole city of Athens had been nothing else than "a maritime multitude," among which the proprietors and chief men had been confounded, until, by the efforts of all, the common country had been reconquered: nor was it likely that this multitude, after a trying period of forced equality, during which political privilege had been effaced, would patiently acquiesce in the full restoration of such privilege at home. We see by the active political sentiment of the German people, after the great struggles of 1813 and 1814, how much an energetic and successful military effort of the people at large, blended with endurance of serious hardship, tends to stimulate the sense of political dignity and the demand for developed citizenship: and if this be the tendency even among a people habitually passive on such subjects, much more was it to be expected in the Athenian population, who had gone through a previous training of near thirty years under the democracy of Kleisthenēs. At the time when that constitution was first established,¹ it was perhaps the most democratical in Greece: it had worked extremely well and had diffused among the people a sentiment favorable to equal citizenship and unfriendly to avowed privilege: so that the impressions made by the struggle at Salamis found the popular mind prepared to receive them. Early after the return to Attica, the Kleisthenean constitution was enlarged as respects eligibility to the magistracy. According to that constitution, the fourth or last class on the Solonian census, including the considerable majority of the freemen, were not admissible to offices of state, though they possessed votes in common with the rest: no person was eligible to be a magistrate unless he belonged to

αἰτίας τῆς περὶ Σαλαμίνα νίκης, καὶ διὰ ταύτης τῆς ἡγεμονίας καὶ διὰ τῆς κατὰ θάλασσαν δυνάμει, τὴν δημοκρατίαν ἰσχυροτέραν ἐποίησεν.

¹ Ὁ ναυτικὸς ὄχλος (Thucyd. viii. 72 and *passim*).

² For the constitution of Kleisthenēs, see vol. iv, of this History ch xxxi. p. 142, *seqq.*

one of the three higher classes. This restriction was now annulled, and eligibility extended to all the citizens. We may appreciate the strength of feeling with which such reform was demanded, when we find that it was proposed by Aristeidēs; a man the reverse of what is called a demagogue, and a strenuous friend of the Kleisthenean constitution. No political system would work after the Persian war, which formally excluded "the maritime multitude" from holding magistracy. I rather imagine, as has been stated in the previous volume, that election of magistrates was still retained, and not exchanged for drawing lots until a certain time, though not a long time, afterwards. That which the public sentiment first demanded was the recognition of the equal and open principle: after a certain length of experience, it was found that poor men, though legally qualified to be chosen, were in point of fact rarely chosen: then came the lot, to give them an equal chance with the rich. The principle of sortition, or choice by lot, was never applied, as I have before remarked, to all offices at Athens, — never, for example, to the stratēgi, or generals, whose functions were more grave and responsible than those of any other person in the service of the state, and who always continued to be elected by show of hands.

In the new position into which Athens was now thrown, with so great an extension of what may be termed her foreign relations, and with a confederacy which imposed the necessity of distant military service, the functions of the stratēgi naturally tended to become both more absorbing and complicated; while the civil administration became more troublesome, if not more difficult, from the enlargement of the city, and the still greater enlargement of Peiræus, — leading to an increase of town population, and especially to an increase of the metics, or resident non-freemen. And it was probably about this period, during the years immediately succeeding the battle of Salamis, — when the force of old habit and tradition had been partially enfeebled by so many stirring novelties, — that the archons were withdrawn altogether from political and military duties, and confined to civil or judicial administration. At the battle of Marathon, the polemarch is a military commander, president of the ten stratēgi:

¹ Herod. vi. 10.

we know him afterwards only as a civil magistrate, administering justice to the metics, or non-freemen, while the stratēgi perform military duties without him. I conceive that this alteration, indicating as it does a change in the character of the archons generally, must have taken place at the time which we have now reached,¹ — a time when the Athenian establishments on all sides required a more elaborate distribution of functionaries. The distribution of so many Athenian boards of functionaries, part to do duty in the city, and part in the Peiræus, cannot have commenced until after this period, when Peiræus had been raised by Themistoklēs to the dignity of town, fortress, and state-harbor. Such boards were the astynomi and agoranomi, who maintained the police of streets and markets, — the metronomi, who watched over weights and measures, — the sitophylakes, who carried into effect various state regulations respecting the custody and sale of corn, — with various others who acted not less in Peiræus than in the city.² We may presume that each of these boards was originally created as the exigency appeared to call for it, at a period later than that which we have now reached, most of these duties of detail having been at first discharged by the archons, and afterwards, when these latter became too full of occupation, confided to separate administrators. The special and important change which characterized the period immediately succeeding the battle of Salamis, was the more accurate line drawn between the archons and the stratēgi; assigning the foreign and military department entirely to the stratēgi, and rendering the archons purely civil magistrates, — administrative as well as judicial; while the first creation of the separate boards above named was probably an ulterior enlargement, arising out of increase of population, power, and trade, between the Persian and Peloponnesian wars. It was by some such steps that the Athenian administration gradually attained that complete development which it exhibits in practice during the century from the

¹ Aristotel. Πολιτειῶν Fragm. xlvii, ed. Neumann; Harpokration, v, Πειραιμαρχος; Pollux, viii, 91: compare Meier und Schömann, Der Attische Prozess, ch. ii, p. 50, seqq.

² See Aristotel. Πολιτειῶν Fragm. ii, v, xxiii, xxxviii, l. ed. Neumann; Schömann, Antiqu. Jur. Publ. Græc. c. xli, xlii, cliii.

Peloponnesian war downward, to which nearly all our positive and direct information relates.

With this expansion both of democratical feeling and of military activity at Athens, Aristeidēs appears to have sympathized; and the popularity thus insured to him, probably heightened by some regret for his previous ostracism, was calculated to acquire permanence from his straightforward and incorruptible character, now brought into strong relief from his function as assessor to the new Delian confederacy. On the other hand, the ascendancy of Themistoklēs, though so often exalted by his unrivalled political genius and daring, as well as by the signal value of his public recommendations, was as often overthrown by his duplicity of means and unprincipled thirst for money. New political opponents sprung up against him, men sympathizing with Aristeidēs, and far more violent in their antipathy than Aristeidēs himself. Of these, the chief were Kimon — son of Miltiades — and Alkmaeon; moreover, it seems that the Lacedaemonians, though full of esteem for Themistoklēs immediately after the battle of Salamis, had now become extremely hostile to him, — a change which may be sufficiently explained from his stratagem respecting the fortifications of Athens, and his subsequent ambitious projects in reference to the Peiræus. The Lacedaemonian influence, then not inconsiderable in Athens, was employed to second the political combinations against him.¹ He is said to have given offence by manifestations of personal vanity, — by continual boasting of his great services to the state, and by the erection of a private chapel, close to his own house, in honor of Artemis Aristobulē, or Artemis of admirable counsel; just as Pausanias had irritated the Lacedaemonians by inscribing his own single name on the Delphian tripod, and as the friends of Aristeidēs had displeased the Athenians by endless encomiums upon his justice.² But the main cause of his discredit was, the prostitution of his great influence for arbitrary and corrupt purposes. In the unsettled condition of so many different Grecian communities, recently emancipated from Persia, when there was past misrule to avenge,

¹ Plutarch, Kimon, c. 16; Scholion 2, ad Aristophan. Equit. 84.

² Plutarch (Themistoklēs, c. 22; Kimon, c. 5-8; Aristeidēs, c. 25) Diogenes, xi. 54.

wrong-doers to be deposed and perhaps punished, exiles to be restored, and all the disturbance and suspicions accompanying so great a change of political condition as well as of foreign policy, — the influence of the leading men at Athens must have been great in determining the treatment of particular individuals. Themistoklēs, placed at the head of an Athenian squadron and sailing among the islands, partly for the purposes of war against Persia, partly for organizing the new confederacy, — is affirmed to have accepted bribes without scruple, for executing sentences just and unjust, — restoring some citizens, expelling others, and even putting some to death. We learn this from a friend and guest of Themistoklēs, — the poet Timokreon of Ialysus in Rhodes, who had expected his own restoration from the Athenian commander, but found that it was thwarted by a bribe of three talents from his opponents; so that he was still kept in exile on the charge of *medism*. The assertions of Timokreon, personally incensed on this ground against Themistoklēs, are doubtless to be considered as passionate and exaggerated: nevertheless, they are a valuable memorial of the feelings of the time, and are far too much in harmony with the general character of this eminent man to allow of our disbelieving them entirely. Timokreon is as emphatic in his admiration of Aristeidēs as in his censure of Themistoklēs, whom he denounces as "a lying and unjust traitor."¹

Such conduct as that described by this new Archilochus, even making every allowance for exaggeration, must have caused Themistoklēs to be both hated and feared among the insular allies, whose opinion was now of considerable importance to the Athenians. A similar sentiment grew up partially against him in Athens itself, and appears to have been connected with suspicions of treasonable inclinations towards the Persians. As the Persians could offer the highest bribes, a man open to corruption might naturally be suspected of inclinations towards their cause; and if Themistoklēs had rendered preëminent service against them, so also had Pausanias, whose conduct had undergone so fatal a change for the worse. It was the treason of Pausanias, suspected and believed against him by the Athenians even when

¹ Plutarch, Themist. c. 21

he was in command at Byzantium, though not proved against him at Sparta until long afterwards, — which first seems to have raised the presumption of *medism* against Themistoklēs also, when combined with the corrupt proceedings which stained his public conduct: we must recollect, also, that Themistoklēs had given some color to these presumptions, even by the stratagems in reference to Xerxes, which wore a double-faced aspect, capable of being construed either in a Persian or in a Grecian sense. The Lacedæmonians, hostile to Themistoklēs since the time when he had outwitted them respecting the walls of Athens, — and fearing him also as a supposed accomplice of the suspected Pausanias, — procured the charge of *medism* to be preferred against him at Athens; by secret instigations, and, as it is said, by bribes, to his political opponents.¹ But no satisfactory proof could be furnished of the accusation, which Themistoklēs himself strenuously denied, not without emphatic appeals to his illustrious services. In spite of violent invectives against him from Alkmaeon and Kimon, tempered, indeed, by a generous modera-

¹ This accusation of treason brought against Themistoklēs at Athens, prior to his ostracism, and at the instigation of the Lacedæmonians, — is mentioned by Diodorus (xi, 54). Thucydides and Plutarch take notice only of the second accusation, after his ostracism. But Diodorus has made his narrative confused, by supposing the first accusation preferred at Athens to have come after the full detection of Pausanias and exposure of his correspondence; whereas these latter events, coming after the first accusation, supplied new proofs before unknown, and thus brought on the second, after Themistoklēs had been ostracized. But Diodorus has preserved to us the important notice of this first accusation at Athens, followed by trial, acquittal, and temporary glorification of Themistoklēs, — and preceding his ostracism.

The indictment stated by Plutarch to have been preferred against Themistoklēs by Leobotas son of Alkmaeon, at the instance of the Spartans, probably relates to the first accusation at which Themistoklēs was acquitted. For when Themistoklēs was arraigned after the discovery of Pausanias, he did not choose to stay, nor was there any actual trial: it is not, therefore, likely that the name of the accuser would be preserved. — 'Ο δὲ γραψάμενος αὐτὸν προδοσίας Λεωδότης ἦν Ἀλκμαίωνος, ἅμα συνεπαίτιωμένω τῶν Σπαρτιατῶν (Plutarch, Themist. c. 23).

Compare the second Scholion on Aristophan. Equit. 84, and Aristeidēs. Orat. xlv, Ὑπὲρ τῶν Τετραίων (vol. ii p. 318, ed. Dindorf, p. 243. Jebb).

tion on the part of Aristeidēs,¹ his defence was successful. He carried the people with him and was acquitted of the charge. Nor was he merely acquitted, but, as might naturally be expected, a reaction took place in his favor: his splendid qualities and exploits were brought impressively before the public mind, and he seemed for the time to acquire greater ascendancy than ever.²

Such a charge, and such a failure, must have exasperated to the utmost the animosity between him and his chief opponents, — Aristeidēs, Kimon, Alkmaeon, and others; nor can we wonder that they were anxious to get rid of him by ostracism. In explaining this peculiar process, I have already stated that it could never be raised against any one individual separately and ostensibly, — and that it could never be brought into operation at all, unless its necessity were made clear, not merely to violent party men, but also to the assembled senate and people, including, of course, a considerable proportion of the more moderate citizens. We may well conceive that the conjuncture was deemed by many dispassionate Athenians well suited for the tutelary intervention of ostracism, the express benefit of which consisted in its separating political opponents when the antipathy between them threatened to push one or the other into extra-constitutional proceedings, — especially when one of those parties was Themistoklēs, a man alike vast in his abilities and unscrupulous in his morality. Probably also there were not a few who wished to revenge the previous ostracism of Aristeidēs: and lastly, the friends of Themistoklēs himself, elate with his acquittal and his seemingly augmented popularity, might indulge hopes that the vote of ostracism would turn out in his favor, and remove one or other of his chief political opponents. From all these circumstances we learn without astonishment, that a vote of ostracism was soon after resorted to. It ended in the temporary banishment of Themistoklēs.

¹ Plutarch, Aristeidēs, c. 25.

² Diodor. xi, 54. τότε μὲν ἀπέφυγε τὴν τῆς προδοσίας κρίσιν· διὰ καὶ τὸ μὲν πρῶτον μετὰ τὴν ἀπόλυσιν μέγας ἦν παρὰ τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις· ἡγάπων γὰρ αὐτὸν διαφερόντως οἱ πολῖται· μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα, οἱ μὲν, φοβηθέντες αὐτοῦ τὴν ὑπερβολὴν, οἱ δὲ, φθονήσαντες τῇ δόξῃ, τῶν μὲν εὐεργεσιῶν ἐπελάθοντο, τὴν δὲ ἰσχυρὰ καὶ τὸ φρόνημα ταπεινοῦν ἔσπευδον.

He retired into exile, and was residing at Argos, whither he carried a considerable property, yet occasionally visiting other parts of Peloponnesus,¹ — when the exposure and death of Pausanias, together with the discovery of his correspondence, took place at Sparta. Among this correspondence were found proofs, which Thucydides seems to have considered as real and sufficient, of the privity of Themistoklès. According to Ephorus and others, he is admitted to have been solicited by Pausanias, and to have known his plans, — but to have kept them secret while refusing to coöperate in them,² — but probably after his exile he took a more decided share in them than before; being well-placed for that purpose at Argos, a city not only unfriendly to Sparta, but strongly believed to have been in collusion with Xerxes at his invasion of Greece. On this occasion the Lacedæmonians sent to Athens, publicly to prefer a formal charge of treason against him, and to urge the necessity of trying him as a Pan-Hellenic criminal before the synod of the allies assembled at Sparta.³ Whether this latter request would have been granted, or whether Themistoklès would have been tried at Athens, we cannot tell: for no sooner was he apprized that joint envoys from Sparta and Athens had been despatched to arrest him, than he fled forthwith from Argos to Korkyra. The inhabitants of that island,

¹ Thucyd. i, 137. ἤλθε γὰρ αὐτῷ ἑσπερον ἐκ τῆς Ἀθηνῶν παρὰ τῶν φίλων, καὶ ἐξ Ἀργεῶς ὃ ὑπεξέκειτο, etc.

I follow Mr. Fynes Clinton, in considering the year 471 B.C. to be the date of the ostracism of Themistoklès. It may probably be so, nor is there any evidence positively to contradict it; but I think Mr. Clinton states it too confidently, as he admits that Diodorus includes, in the chapters which he devotes to one archon, events which must have happened in several different years (see Fast. Hellen. B.C. 471).

After the expedition under the command of Pausanias in 478 B.C., we have no one date at once certain and accurate, until we come to the death of Xerxes, where Diodorus is confirmed by the Canon of the Persian kings, B.C. 465. This last event determines by close approximation and inference, the flight of Themistoklès, the siege of Naxos, and the death of Pausanias: for the other events of this period, we are reduced to a more vague approximation, and can ascertain little beyond their order of succession.

² Thucyd. i, 135; Ephorus ap. Plutarch. de Malign. Herodoti, c. 5, p. 855 Diodor. xi, 54; Plutarch. Themist. c. 23.

³ Diodor. xi, 55.

though owing gratitude to him and favorably disposed, could not venture to protect him against the two most powerful states in Greece, but sent him to the neighboring continent. Here, however, being still tracked and followed by the envoys, he was obliged to seek protection from a man whom he had formerly thwarted in a demand at Athens, and who had become his personal enemy, — Admētus, king of the Molossians. Fortunately for him, at the moment when he arrived, Admētus was not at home; and Themistoklès, becoming a suppliant to his wife, conciliated her sympathy so entirely, that she placed her child in his arms and planted him at the hearth in the full solemnity of supplication to soften her husband. As soon as Admētus returned, Themistoklès revealed his name, his pursuers, and his danger, — entreating protection as a helpless suppliant in the last extremity. He appealed to the generosity of the Epirotic prince not to take revenge on a man now defenceless, for offence given under such very different circumstances; and for an offence too, after all, not of capital moment, while the protection now entreated was to the suppliant a matter of life or death. Admētus raised him up from the hearth with the child in his arms, — an evidence that he accepted the appeal and engaged to protect him; refusing to give him up to the envoys, and at last only sending him away on the expression of his own wish to visit the king of Persia. Two Macedonian guides conducted him across the mountains to Pydna, in the Thermaic gulf, where he found a merchant-ship about to set sail for the coast of Asia Minor, and took a passage on board; neither the master nor the crew knowing his name. An untoward storm drove the vessel to the island of Naxos, at that moment besieged by an Athenian armament: had he been forced to land there, he would of course have been recognized and seized, but his wonted subtlety did not desert him. Having communicated both his name and the peril which awaited him, he conjured the master of the ship to assist in saving him, and not to suffer any one of the crew to land; menacing that if by any accident he were discovered, he would bring the master to ruin along with himself, by representing him as an accomplice induced by money to facilitate the escape of Themistoklès: on the other hand, in case of safety, he promised a large reward. Such promises and threats weighed with the master.

who controlled his crew, and forced them to beat about during a day and a night off the coast, without seeking to land. After that dangerous interval, the storm abated, and the ship reached Ephesus in safety.¹

Thus did Themistoklēs, after a series of perils, find himself safe on the Persian side of the Ægean. At Athens, he was proclaimed a traitor, and his property confiscated: nevertheless, as it frequently happened in cases of confiscation, his friends secreted a considerable sum, and sent it over to him in Asia, together with the money which he had left at Argos; so that he was thus enabled liberally to reward the ship-captain who had preserved him. With all this deduction, the property which he possessed of a character not susceptible of concealment, and which was therefore actually seized, was found to amount to eighty talents, according to Theophrastus, — to one hundred talents, according to Theopompus. In contrast with this large sum, it is melancholy to learn that he had begun his political career with a property not greater than three talents.² The poverty of Aristeidēs at the end of his life presents an impressive contrast to the enrichment of his rival.

The escape of Themistoklēs, and his adventures in Persia, appear to have formed a favorite theme for the fancy and exaggeration of authors a century afterwards: we have thus many anecdotes which contradict either directly or by implication the simple narrative of Thucydides. Thus we are told that at the moment when he was running away from the Greeks, the Persian king also had proclaimed a reward of two hundred talents for his head, and that some Greeks on the coast of Asia were watching to take him for this reward: that he was forced to conceal himself strictly near the coast, until means were found

¹ Thucyd. i, 137. Cornelius Nepos (Themist. c. 8) for the most part follows Thucydides, and professes to do so; yet he is not very accurate, especially about the relations between Themistoklēs and Admētus. Diodorus (xi, 56) seems to follow chiefly other guides: also to a great extent Plutarch (Themist. c. 24–26). There were evidently different accounts of his voyage, which represented him as reaching, not Ephesus, but the Æolic Kymē. Diodorus does not notice his voyage by sea.

² Plutarch, Themist. c. 25; also Kritias ap. Ælian. V. H. x, 17: compare Herodot. viii, 12.

to send him up to Susa in a closed litter, under pretence that it was a woman for the king's harem: that Mandanē, sister of Xerxes, insisted upon having him delivered up to her as an expiation for the loss of her son at the battle of Salamis: that he learned Persian so well, and discoursed in it so eloquently, as to procure for himself an acquittal from the Persian judges, when put upon his trial through the importunity of Mandanē: that the officers of the king's household at Susa, and the satraps in his way back, threatened him with still farther perils: that he was admitted to see the king in person, after having received a lecture from the chamberlain on the indispensable duty of falling down before him to do homage, etc., with several other uncertified details,¹ which make us value more highly the narrative of Thucydides. Indeed, Ephorus, Deinō, Kleitarchus, and Herakleidēs, from whom these anecdotes appear mostly to be derived, even affirmed that Themistoklēs had found Xerxes himself alive and seen him: whereas, Thucydides and Charon, the two contemporary authors, for the former is *nearly* contemporary, asserted that he had found Xerxes recently dead, and his son Artaxerxes on the throne.

According to Thucydides, the eminent exile does not seem to have been exposed to the least danger in Persia. He presented himself as a deserter from Greece, and was accepted as such: moreover, — what is more strange, though it seems true, — he was received as an actual benefactor of the Persian king, and a sufferer from the Greeks on account of such dispositions, — in consequence of his communications made to Xerxes respecting the intended retreat of the Greeks from Salamis, and respecting the contemplated destruction of the Hellespontine bridge. He was conducted by some Persians on the coast up to Susa, where he addressed a letter to the king couched in the following terms, such as probably no modern European king would tolerate except from a Quaker: "I, Themistoklēs, am come to thee, having done to thy house more mischief than any other Greek, as long as I was compelled in my own defence to resist the attack of thy father, — but having also done him yet greater good, when I could do so with safety to myself, and when his retreat was

¹ Diodor. xi, 56; Plutarch, Themist. c. 24–30.

endangered. Reward is yet owing to me for my past service moreover. I am now here, chased away by the Greeks, in consequence of my attachment to thee,¹ but able still to serve thee with great effect. I wish to wait a year, and then to come before thee in person to explain my views."

Whether the Persian interpreters, who read this letter to Artaxerxes Longimanus, exactly rendered its brief and direct expression, we cannot say. But it made a strong impression upon him, combined with the previous reputation of the writer, and he willingly granted the prayer for delay: though we shall not readily believe that he was so transported as to show his joy by immediate sacrifice to the gods, by an unusual measure of convivial indulgence, and by crying out thrice in his sleep, "I have got Themistoklēs the Athenian,"—as some of Plutarch's authors informed him.² In the course of the year granted, Themistoklēs had learned so much of the Persian language and customs as to be able to communicate personally with the king, and acquire his confidence: no Greek, says Thucydides, had ever before attained such a commanding influence and position at the Persian court. His ingenuity was now displayed in laying out schemes for the subjugation of Greece to Persia, which were eminently captivating to the monarch, who rewarded him with a Persian wife and large presents, sending him down to Magnesia, on the Meander, not far from the coast of Ionia. The revenues of the district round that town, amounting to the large sum of fifty talents yearly, were assigned to him for bread: those of the neighboring seaport of Myus, for articles of condiment to his bread, which was always accounted the main nourishment: those of Lampsakus on the Hellespont, for wine.³ Not knowing the amount of these two latter items, we cannot determine how much

¹ "Proditionem ultrò imputabat (says Tacitus, Hist. ii. 60, respecting Paullinus and Proculus, the generals of the army of Otho, when they surrendered to Vitellius after the defeat at Bedriacum), spatium longi ante proelium itineris, fatigationem Othonianorum, permixtum vehiculis agmen, ac pleraque fortuita fraudi sue assignabat. — Et Vitellius credidit de perfidiâ et fraudem absolvit."

² Plutarch, Themist. c. 28.

³ Thucyd. i. 138; Diodor. xi. 57. Besides the three above-named places, Neanthes and Phenias described the grant as being still fuller and more

revenue Themistoklēs received altogether: but there can be no doubt, judging from the revenues of Magnesia alone, that he was a great pecuniary gainer by his change of country. After having visited various parts of Asia,¹ he lived for a certain time at Magnesia, in which place his family joined him from Athens. How long his residence at Magnesia lasted we do not know, but seemingly long enough to acquire local estimation and leave mementos behind him. He at length died of sickness, when sixty-five years old, without having taken any step towards the accomplishment of those victorious campaigns which he had promised to Artaxerxes. That sickness was the real cause of his death, we may believe on the distinct statement of Thucydides;² who at the same time notices a rumor partially current in his own time,

specific: they stated that Perkôtē was granted to Themistoklēs for bedding, and Palaskēsis for clothing (Plutarch, Themist. c. 29; Athenæus, i. p. 29).

This seems to have been a frequent form of grants from the Persian and Egyptian kings, to their queens, relatives, or friends, — a grant nominally to supply some particular want or taste: see Dr. Arnold's note on the passage of Thucydides. I doubt his statement, however, about the land-tax, or rent: I do not think that it was a tenth or a fifth of the produce of the soil in these districts which was granted to Themistoklēs, but the portion of regal revenue, or tribute, levied in them. The Persian kings did not take the trouble to assess and collect the tribute: they probably left that to the inhabitants themselves, provided the sum total were duly paid.

¹ Plutarch, Themistoklēs, c. 31. *πλανώμενος περί τὴν Ἀσίαν*: this statement seems probable enough, though Plutarch rejects it.

² Thucyd. i. 138. *Νοσήσας δὲ τελευτᾷ τὸν βίον· λέγουσι δὲ τινες, καὶ ἐκούσας φαρμάκῳ ἀποθανεῖν αὐτὸν, ἀδύνατον νομίσαντα εἶναι ἐπιτελεῖσαι βασιλεὶ ἢ ἐπίσχετο.*

This current story, as old as Aristophanēs (Equit. 83, compare the Scholia), alleged that Themistoklēs had poisoned himself by drinking bull's blood (see Diodor. xi. 58), who assigns to this act of taking poison a still more sublime patriotic character by making it part of a design on the part of Themistoklēs to restrain the Persian king from warring against Greece.

Plutarch (Themist. c. 31, and Kimon, c. 18) and Diodorus both state, as an unquestionable fact, that Themistoklēs died by poisoning himself: omitting even to notice the statement of Thucydides, that he died of disease. Cornelius Nepos (Themist. c. 10) follows Thucydides. Cicero (Brutus, c. 11) refers the story of the suicide by poison to Clitarchus and Stratoklēs, recognizing it as contrary to Thucydides. He puts into the mouth of his fellow dialogist, Atticus, a just rebuke of the facility with which historical truth was sacrificed to rhetorical purpose.

of poison voluntarily taken, from painful consciousness on the part of Themistoklēs himself that the promises made could never be performed, — a farther proof of the general tendency to surround the last years of this distinguished man with impressive adventures, and to dignify his last moments with a revived feeling, not unworthy of his earlier patriotism. The report may possibly have been designedly circulated by his friends and relatives, in order to conciliate some tenderness towards his memory (his sons still continued citizens at Athens, and his daughters were married there). These friends farther stated that they had brought back his bones to Attica, at his own express command, and buried them privately without the knowledge of the Athenians; no condemned traitor being permitted to be buried in Attic soil. If, however, we even suppose that this statement was true, no one could point out with certainty the spot wherein such interment had taken place: nor does it seem, when we mark the cautious expressions of Thucydides,¹ that he himself was satisfied of the fact: moreover, we may affirm with confidence that the inhabitants of Magnesia, when they showed the splendid sepulchral monument erected in honor of Themistoklēs in their own market-place, were persuaded that his bones were really inclosed within it.

Aristeidēs died about three or four years after the ostracism of Themistoklēs;² but respecting the place and manner of his death,

¹ Thucyd. i. 138. τὰ δὲ ὅσα παρὰ κομισθῆναι αὐτοῦ οἱ προσήκοντες οἵκαδε κελύσαντες ἐκείνου, καὶ τεθῆναι κρήνην Ἀθηναίων ἐν τῇ Ἀττικῇ· οὐ γὰρ ἐξήν θάπτειν, ὥς ἐπὶ προδοσίᾳ φέροντο.

Cornelius Nepos, who here copies Thucydides, gives this statement by mistake, as if Thucydides had himself affirmed it: "Idem (sc. Thucydides) ossa ejus clam in Atticā ab amicis sepulta, quoniam legibus non concederetur, quod proditiōis esset damnatus, memoriæ prodidit." This shows the haste or inaccuracy with which these secondary authors so often cite Thucydides is certainly not a witness for the fact: if anything, he may be said to count somewhat against it.

Plutarch (Themist. c. 32) shows that the burial-place of Themistoklēs, supposed to be in Attica, was yet never verified before his time: the guide of Pausanias, however, in the succeeding century, had become more confident (Pausanias, i. 1. 3).

² Respecting the probability of Aristeidēs, see an interesting fragment of Eupolis, the comic writer (Διον. Fragm. iv. p. 457. ed. Meineke).

there were several contradictions among the authors whom Plutarch had before him. Some affirmed that he perished on foreign service in the Euxine sea; others, that he died at home, amidst the universal esteem and grief of his fellow-citizens. A third story, confined to the single statement of Kraterus, and strenuously rejected by Plutarch, represents Aristeidēs as having been falsely accused before the Athenian judicature and condemned to a fine of fifty minæ, on the allegation of having taken bribes during the assessment of the tribute upon the allies, — which fine he was unable to pay, and was therefore obliged to retire to Ionia, where he died. Dismissing this last story, we find nothing certain about his death except one fact, — but that fact at the same time the most honorable of all, — that he died very poor. It is even asserted that he did not leave enough to pay funeral expenses, — that a sepulchre was provided for him at Phalærum at the public cost, besides a handsome donation to his son Lysimachus, and a dowry to each of his two daughters. In the two or three ensuing generations, however, his descendants still continued poor, and even at that remote day, some of them received aid out of the public purse, from the recollection of their incorruptible ancestor. Near a century and a half afterwards, a poor man, named Lysimachus, descendant of the just Aristeidēs, was to be seen at Athens, near the chapel of Iacchus, carrying a mysterious tablet, and obtaining his scanty fee of two oboli for interpreting the dreams of the passers by: Demetrius the Phalerean procured from the people, for the mother and aunt of this poor man, a small daily allowance.¹ On all these points the contrast is marked when we compare Aristeidēs with Themistoklēs. The latter, having distinguished himself by ostentatious cost at Olympia, and by a choregic victory at Athens, with little scruple as to the means of acquisition, — ended his life at Magnesia in dishonorable affluence, greater than ever, and left an enriched posterity both at that place and at Athens. More than five centuries afterwards, his descendant, the Athenian Themistoklēs, attended the lectures of the philosopher Ammonius at Athens, as the comrade and friend of Plutarch himself.²

¹ Plutarch, Arist. c. 26, 27; Cornelius Nepos, Arist. c. 3: compare Aristeidēs, Vesp. 53.

² Plutarch, Themist. c. 5-32.

CHAPTER XLV.

PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONFEDERACY UNDER ATHENS AS HEAD
— FIRST FORMATION AND RAPID EXPANSION OF THE ATHE-
NIAN EMPIRE.

I HAVE already recounted, in the preceding chapter, how the Asiatic Greeks, breaking loose from the Spartan Pausanias, entreated Athens to organize a new confederacy, and to act as presiding city (Vorort), — and how this confederacy, framed not only for common and pressing objects, but also on principles of equal rights and constant control on the part of the members, attracted soon the spontaneous adhesion of a large proportion of Greeks, insular or maritime, near the Ægean sea. I also noticed this event as giving commencement to a new era in Grecian politics. For whereas there had been before a tendency, not very powerful, yet on the whole steady and increasing, towards something like one Pan-Hellenic league under Sparta as president, — from henceforward that tendency disappears and a bifurcation begins: Athens and Sparta divide the Grecian world between them, and bring a much larger number of its members into coöperation, either with one or the other, than had ever been so arranged before.

Thucydides marks precisely, as far as general words can go, the character of the new confederacy during the first years after its commencement: but unhappily he gives us scarcely any particular facts, — and in the absence of such controlling evidence, a habit has grown up of describing loosely the entire period between 477 B.C., and 405 B.C. (the latter date is that of the battle of Ægos Potamos), as constituting “the Athenian empire.” This word denotes correctly enough the last part, perhaps the last forty years, of the seventy-two years indicated; but it is misleading when applied to the first part: nor, indeed, can any single word be found which faithfully characterizes as well the one part as the other. A great and serious change had taken place, and we disguise the fact of that change, if we talk of the Athenian

hegemony, or headship, as a portion of the Athenian empire. Thucydides carefully distinguishes the two, speaking of the Spartans as having lost, and of the Athenians as having acquired, not empire, but headship, or hegemony.¹ The transition from the

Thucyd. i. 94. ἐξεπολιόρκησαν (Βυζαντίον) ἐν τῇδε τῇ ἡγεμονίᾳ. i. e. under the Spartan hegemony, before the Athenians were invited to assume the hegemony: compare ἡγησάμενοι, i. 77, and Herodot. viii. 2, 3. Next, we have (i. 95) φοιτῶντές τε (the Ionians, etc.) πρὸς τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ἡζίουσιν αὐτοὺς ἡγεμόνας σφῶν γενέσθαι κατὰ τὸ ξυγγενές. Again, when the Spartans send out Dorkis in place of Pausanias, the allies οὐκετι ἐφίεσαν τὴν ἡγεμονίαν. Then, as to the ensuing proceedings of the Athenians (i. 96) — παραλαβόντες δὲ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι τὴν ἡγεμονίαν τούτῳ τῷ τρόπῳ ἔκονταν τῶν ξυμμάχων διὰ τὸ Περσίου μίσος, etc.: compare i. 75, — ἡμῖν δὲ προσελθόντων τῶν ξυμμάχων καὶ αὐτῶν δεηθέντων ἡγεμόνας καταστήναι, and vi. 76.

Then the transition from the ἡγεμονία to the ἀρχή (i. 97) — ἡγοῦμενοι δὲ αὐτοκόμον τὸ πρῶτον τῶν ξυμμάχων καὶ ἀπὸ κοινῶν ξυνόδων βουλευόντων, τόσα δὲ ἐπὶ ἡλθον πόλεμος τε καὶ διαχειρίσει πραγμάτων μεταξὺ τοῦδε τοῦ πολέμου καὶ τοῦ Μηδικοῦ.

Thucydides then goes on to say, that he shall notice these “many strides in advance” which Athens made, starting from her original hegemony, so as to show in what manner the Athenian empire, or ἀρχή, was originally formed, — ἅμα δὲ καὶ τῆς ἀρχῆς ἀπόδειξιν ἔχει τῆς τῶν Ἀθηναίων, ἐν οἷσιν τρώπῳ κατέστη. The same transition from the ἡγεμονία to the ἀρχή is described in the oration of the Athenian envoy at Sparta, shortly before the Peloponnesian war (i. 75): but as it was rather the interest of the Athenian orator to confound the difference between ἡγεμονία and ἀρχή, so, after he has clearly stated what the relation of Athens to her allies had been at first, and how it afterwards became totally changed, Thucydides makes him slur over the distinction, and say, — οὕτως οἱδ’ ἡμεῖς θανατοῦσιν οὐδὲν πεποιήκαμεν. . . . εἰ ἀρχὴν τε δεδομένην ἰδεξάμεθα καὶ ταύτην μὴ ἀρεῖμεν, etc.; and he then proceeds to defend the title of Athens to command on the ground of superior force and worth: which last plea is advanced a few years afterwards, still more nakedly and offensively, by the Athenian speakers. Read also the language of the Athenian Euphēmus at Kamarina (vi. 82), where a similar confusion appears, as being suitable to the argument.

It is to be recollected that the word *hegemony*, or headship, is extremely general, denoting any case of following a leader, and of obedience, however temporary, qualified, or indeed little more than honorary. Thus it is used by the Thebans to express their relation towards the Boeotian confederated towns (ἡγεμονεύεσθαι τῶν ἡμῶν, Thuc. iii. 61, where Dr. Arnold draws attention to the distinction between that verb and ἀρχειν, and holds language respecting the Athenian ἀρχή, more precise than his language in the note

Athenian hegemony to the Athenian empire was doubtless gradual, so that no one could determine precisely where the former ends and the latter begins: but it had been consummated before the thirty years' truce, which was concluded fourteen years before the Peloponnesian war. — and it was in fact the substantial cause of that war. Empire then came to be held by Athens, — partly as a fact established, resting on acquiescence rather than attachment or consent on the minds of the subjects, — partly as a corollary from necessity of union combined with her superior force: while this latter point, superiority of force as a legitimate title, stood more and more forward, both in the language of her speakers and in the conceptions of her citizens. Nay, the Athenian orators of the middle of the Peloponnesian war venture to affirm that their empire had been of this same character ever since the repulse of the Persians: an inaccuracy so manifest, that if we could suppose the speech made by the Athenian Euphēmus at Kamarina in 415 B.C. to have been heard by Themistoklēs or Aristeidēs fifty years before, it would have been alike offensive to the prudence of the one and to the justice of the other. The imperial state of Athens, that which she held at the beginning of the Peloponnesian war, when her allies, except Chios and Lesbos, were tributary subjects, and when the Ægean sea was an Athenian lake, — was of course the period of her greatest splendor and greatest action upon the Grecian world. It was also the period most impressive to historians, orators, and philosophers, — suggesting the idea of some one state exercising dominion

ad Thucyd. i. 94), and by the Corinthians to express their claims as metropolis of Korkyra, which were really little more than honorary, — *ἐπὶ τῇ ἡγεμονίᾳ τε εἶναι καὶ τὰ εἰκότα θανατοῦσθαι* (Thucyd. i. 38): compare vii. 55. Indeed, it sometimes means simply a guide (iii. 98; vii. 50).

But the words *ἀρχή*, *ἀρχεῖν*, *ἀρχεσθαι*, *voc. pass.*, are much less extensive in meaning, and imply both superior dignity and coercive authority to a greater or less extent: compare Thucyd. v. 69; ii. 8, etc. The *τῆς ἀρχῆς ἐχούσα* is analogous to *ἀντὶ τυραννός* (vi. 85).

Herodotus is less careful in distinguishing the meanings of these words than Thucydides: see the discussion of the Lacedæmonian and Athenian envoys with Gelo (vii. 155–162). But it is to be observed that he makes Gelo ask for the *ἡγεμονία* and not for the *ἀρχή*, — putting the claim in the least offensive form: compare also the claim of the Argeians for *ἡγεμονία* (vii. 148).

over the Ægean, as the natural condition of Greece, so that if Athens lost such dominion, it would be transferred to Sparta, — holding out the dispersed maritime Greeks as a tempting prize for the aggressive schemes of some new conqueror, — and even bringing up by association into men's fancies the mythical Minos of Krete, and others, as having been rulers of the Ægean in times anterior to Athens.

Even those who lived under the full-grown Athenian empire had before them no good accounts of the incidents between 479–450 B.C.; for we may gather from the intimation of Thucydides, as well as from his barrenness of facts, that while there were chroniclers both for the Persian invasion and for the times before, no one cared for the times immediately succeeding.¹ Hence, the little light which has fallen upon this blank has all been borrowed — if we except the careful Thucydides — from a subsequent age; and the Athenian hegemony has been treated as a mere commencement of the Athenian empire: credit has been given to Athens for a long-sighted ambition, aiming from the Persian war downwards at results which perhaps Themistoklēs² may have partially divined, but which only time and successive accidents opened even to distant view. But such systematic anticipation

¹ Thucyd. i. 97. τοῖς πρὸ ἡμῶν ἀπασιν ἐκλείπεις ἦν τοῦτο τὸ χάριον, καὶ ἡ τὰ πρὸ τῶν Μηδικῶν ἐκτετατοῦσαν ἢ αὐτὰ τὰ Μηδικὰ· τούτων δὲ ὅσπερ καὶ ἡ ψατὸ ἐν τῇ Ἀττικῇ συγγραφή Ἑλληνικός, βραχὺς τε καὶ τοῖς χρόνοις οὐκ ἀκριβὺς ἐπιμνησθή.

Hellaniкус, therefore, had done no more than touch upon the events of this period: and he found so little good information within his reach as to fall into chronological blunders.

² Thucyd. i. 93. τῆς γὰρ θῆς ἀνάσσης πρῶτος ἐτόλμησεν εἰπεῖν ὡς ἀντικτείς ἐσθί, καὶ τὴν ἀρχὴν ἐθῆς συγκατασκεύαζε.

Dr. Arnold says in his note, "*εἰθὺς* signifies probably immediately after the retreat of the Persians." I think it refers to an earlier period, — that point of time when Themistoklēs first counselled the building of the fleet, or at least when he counselled them to abandon their city and repose all their hopes in their fleet. It is only by this supposition that we get a reasonable meaning for the words *ἐτόλμησε εἰπεῖν*, "he was the first who dared to say," — which implies a counsel of extraordinary boldness. "For he was the first who dared to advise them to grasp at the sea, and from that moment forward he helped to establish their empire." The word *συγκατασκεύαζε* seems to denote a collateral consequence, not directly contemplated, though perhaps divined, by Themistoklēs.

of subsequent results is fatal to any correct understanding, either of the real agents or of the real period; both of which are to be explained from the circumstances preceding and actually present, with some help, though cautious and sparing, from our acquaintance with that which was then an unknown future. When Aristeidēs and Kimon dismissed the Lacedæmonian admiral Dorkis, and drove Pausanias away from Byzantium on his second coming out, they had to deal with the problem immediately before them; they had to complete the defeat of the Persian power, still formidable, — and to create and organize a confederacy as yet only inchoate. This was quite enough to occupy their attention, without ascribing to them distant views of Athenian maritime empire.

In that brief sketch of incidents preceding the Peloponnesian war, which Thucydides introduces as "the throwing off of his narrative,"¹ he neither gives, nor professes to give, a complete enumeration of all which actually occurred. During the interval between the first desertion of the Asiatic allies from Pausanias to Athens, in 477 B.C., — and the revolt of Naxos in 466 B.C., — he recites three incidents only: first, the siege and capture of Eion, on the Strymon, with its Persian garrison, — next, the capture of Skyros, and appropriation of the island to Athenian *kleruchs*, or out-citizens, — thirdly, the war with Karystus in Eubœa, and reduction of the place by capitulation. It has been too much the practice to reason as if these three events were the full history of ten or eleven years. Considering what Thucydides states respecting the darkness of this period, we might perhaps suspect that they were all which he could learn about it on good authority: and they are all, in truth, events having a near and special bearing on the subsequent history of Athens herself, — for Eion was the first stepping-stone to the important settlement of Amphipolis, and Skyros in the time of Thucydides was the property of outlying Athenian citizens, or *kleruchs*. Still, we are left in almost entire ignorance of the proceedings of Athens, as conducting the newly-established confederate force: for it is certain that the first ten years of the Athenian hegemony must have been years of most active

¹ Thucyd. ii. 97. Ἐγγραφα δὲ αὐτὰ καὶ τὴν ἐκβολὴν τοῦ λόγου ποιησάμεν διὰ τούτου, etc.

warfare against the Persians. One positive testimony to this effect has been accidentally preserved to us by Herodotus, who mentions, that "before the invasion of Xerxes, there were Persian commanders and garrisons everywhere in Thrace and the Hellespont,¹ all of whom were conquered by the Greeks after that invasion, with the single exception of Maskamēs, governor of Doriskus, who could never be taken, though many different Grecian attempts were made upon the fortress. Of those who were captured by the Greeks, not one made any defence sufficient to attract the admiration of Xerxes, except Bogēs, governor of Eion." Bogēs, after bravely defending himself, and refusing offers of capitulation, found his provisions exhausted, and farther resistance impracticable. He then kindled a vast funeral pile, — slew his wives, children, concubines, and family, and cast them into it, — threw his precious effects over the wall into the Strymon, — and lastly, precipitated himself into the flames.² His brave despair was the theme of warm encomium among the Persians, and his relatives in Persia were liberally rewarded by Xerxes. This capture of Eion, effected by Kimon, has been

¹ Herodot. vii, 106, 107. Κατέσταναν γὰρ ἐτι πρότερον ταύτης τῆς ἐλυσιοῦς ἱπαρχοὶ ἐν τῇ Θρηκίῃ καὶ τοῦ Ἑλλησπόντου πανταχῇ. Οὗτοι ὡν πάντες, οἱ τε ἐκ Θρηκίης καὶ τοῦ Ἑλλησπόντου, πλὴν τοῦ ἐν Δορίσκῳ, ὑπὸ Ἑλλήνων ὕστερον ταύτης τῆς στρατηλατίης ἐξηρέθησαν· τὸν δὲ ἐν Δορίσκῳ Μασκάμην οὐδαμῶς ὡς ἐδυνάσθησαν ἐξελθεῖν, πολλῶν πειρησαμένων.

The loose chronology of Plutarch is little to be trusted: but he too acknowledges the continuance of Persian occupations in Thrace, by aid of the natives, until a period later than the battle of the Eurymedon (Plutarch, Kimon, c. 14).

It is a mistake to suppose, with Dr. Arnold, in his note on Thucyd. viii, 62, "that Sestus was almost the last place held by the Persians in Europe."

Weissenborn (Hellen oder Beiträge zur genaueren Erforschung der alt-griechischen Geschichte. Jena, 1844, p. 144, note 31) has taken notice of this important passage of Herodotus, as well as of that in Plutarch; but he does not see how much it embarrasses all attempts to frame a certain chronology for those two or three events which Thucydides gives us between 476–466 B. C.

² Kutzén (De Atheniensium Imperio Cimonis atque Ferielis tempore constituto. Grævæ, 1837. Commentatio, i. p. 8) has good reason to call in question the stratagem ascribed to Kimon by Pausanias (viii, 8, 2) for the capture of Eion.

mentioned, as already stated, by Thucydides; but Herodotus here gives us to understand that it was only one of a string of enterprises, all unnoticed by Thucydides, against the Persians. Nay, it would seem from his language, that Maskamês maintained himself in Doriskus during the whole reign of Xerxês, and perhaps longer, repelling successive Grecian assaults.

The valuable indication here cited from Herodotus would be of itself a sufficient proof that the first years of the Athenian hegemony were full of busy and successful hostility against the Persians. And in truth this is what we should expect: the battles of Salamis, Plataea, and Mykalê, drove the Persians out of Greece, and overpowered their main armaments, but did not remove them at once from all the various posts which they occupied throughout the Ægean and Thrace. Without doubt, the Athenians had to clear the coasts and the islands of a great number of different Persian detachments: an operation never short nor easy, with the then imperfect means of siege, as we may see by the cases of Sestus and Eion; nor, indeed, always practicable, as the case of Doriskus teaches us. The fear of these Persians, yet remaining in the neighborhood,¹ and even the chance of a renewed Persian invading armament, formed one pressing motive for Grecian cities to join the new confederacy: while the expulsion of the enemy added to it those places which he had occupied. It was by these years of active operations at sea against the common enemy, that the Athenians first established² that constant, systematic, and laborious training, among their own ships' crews, which transmitted itself with continual im-

¹ To these "remaining operations against the Persians" the Athenian envoy at Lacedæmon alludes, in his speech prior to the Peloponnesian war — *ἐμῶν μὲν (you Spartans) οὐκ ἐθέλησαντων παραμείναι πρὸς τὰ λοιπὰ τοῦ βαρβάρου, ἡμῶν δὲ προσελθόντων τῶν συμμάχων καὶ αὐτῶν ἀπεχθόντων ἡγεμονίας καταστήναι*, etc. (Thucyd. i. 75:) and again, iii. 11. *τὰ ὑπολοιπὰ τῶν ἔργων*.

Compare also Plato, Menexen. c. 11. *αὐτὸς δὲ ἡγγέλλετο βασιλεὺς διανοεῖσθαι ὡς ἐπιχειρήσων πάλιν ἐπὶ τοῖς Ἕλληνας*, etc.

² The Athenian nautical training begins directly after the repulse of the Persians. *Τὸ δὲ τῆς θαλάσσης ἐπιστήμονας γενέσθαι* (says Periklês respecting the Peloponnesians, just at the commencement of the Peloponnesian war) *οὐ βραδίως αὐτοῖς προσγενήσεται· οὐδὲ γὰρ ὑμεῖς, μελετῶντες αὐτὴ εὐθὺς ἀπὸ τῶν Μηδικῶν, ἐξείργασθέ πε* (Thucyd. i. 142)

provements down to the Peloponnesian war: it was by these, combined with the present fear, that they were enabled to organize the largest and most efficient confederacy ever known among Greeks, — to bring together deliberative deputies, — to plant their own ascendancy as enforcers of the collective resolutions, — and to raise a prodigious tax from universal contribution. Lastly, it was by these same operations, prosecuted so successfully as to remove present alarm, that they at length fatigued the more lukewarm and passive members of the confederacy, and created in them a wish either to commute personal service for pecuniary contribution, or to escape from the obligation of service in any way. The Athenian nautical training would never have been acquired, — the confederacy would never have become a working reality, — the fatigue and discontents among its members would never have arisen, — unless there had been a real fear of the Persians, and a pressing necessity for vigorous and organized operations against them, during the ten years between 477 and 466 B.C.

As to the ten years from 477–466 B. C., there has been a tendency almost unconscious to assume that the particular incidents mentioned by Thucydides about Eion, Skyros, Karystus, and Naxos, constitute the sum total of events. To contradict this assumption, I have suggested proof sufficient, though indirect, that they are only part of the stock of a very busy period, — the remaining details of which, indicated in outline by the large general language of Thucydides, we are condemned not to know. Nor are we admitted to be present at the synod of Delos, which during all this time continued its periodical meetings: though it would have been highly interesting to trace the steps whereby an institution which at first promised to protect not less the separate rights of the members than the security of the whole, so lamentably failed in its object. We must recollect that this confederacy, formed for objects common to all, limited to a certain extent the autonomy of each member; both conferring definite rights and imposing definite obligations. Solemnly sworn to by all, and by Aristeidês on behalf of Athens, it was intended to bind the members in perpetuity, — marked even in the form of the oath, which was performed by casting heavy lumps of

iron into the sea never again to be seen.¹ As this confederacy was thus both perpetual and peremptory, binding each member to the rest, and not allowing either retirement or evasion, so it was essential that it should be sustained by some determining authority and enforcing sanction. The determining authority was provided by the synod at Delos: the enforcing sanction was exercised by Athens as president. And there is every reason to presume that Athens, for a long time, performed this duty in a legitimate and honorable manner, acting in execution of the resolves of the synod, or at least in full harmony with its general purposes. She exacted from every member the regulated quota of men or money, employing coercion against recusants, and visiting neglect of military duty with penalties. In all these requirements she only discharged her appropriate functions as chosen leader of the confederacy, and there can be no reasonable doubt that the general synod went cordially along with her² in strictness of dealing towards those defaulters who obtained protection without bearing their share of the burden.

But after a few years, several of the confederates becoming weary of personal military service, prevailed upon the Athenians to provide ships and men in their place, and imposed upon themselves in exchange a money-payment of suitable amount. This commutation, at first probably introduced to meet some special case of inconvenience, was found so suitable to the taste of all parties that it gradually spread through the larger portion of the confederacy. To unwarlike allies, hating labor and privation, it was a welcome relief, — while to the Athenians, full of ardor and patient of labor, as well as discipline, for the aggrandizement of their country, it afforded constant pay for a fleet more numerous than they could otherwise have kept afloat. It is plain from the statement of Thucydides that this altered practice was introduced from the petition of the confederates themselves, not from any

¹ Plutarch. Aristides. c. 24.

² Such concurrence of the general synod is in fact implied in the speech put by Thucydides into the mouth of the Mitylenæan envoys at Olympia, in the third year of the Peloponnesian war: a speech pronounced by parties altogether hostile to Athens (Thucyd. iii, 11) — ἡμὰ μὲν γὰρ μαγνυρίῳ ἐχρῶντο (the Athenians) μὴ ἂν τοὺς γε ἰσοψῆθους ἄκοντες, καὶ οὐ τι ὁρῶμεν οἷς ἐπὶ ἡμῶν ἐστρατεύειν.

pressure or stratagem, on the part of Athens.¹ But though such was its real source, it did not the less fatally degrade the allies in reference to Athens, and extinguish the original feeling of equal rights and partnership in the confederacy, with communion of danger as well as of glory, which had once bound them together. The Athenians came to consider themselves as military chiefs and soldiers, with a body of tribute-paying subjects, whom they were entitled to hold in dominion, and restrict, both as to foreign policy and internal government, to such extent as they thought expedient, — but whom they were also bound to protect against foreign enemies. The military force of these subject-states was thus in a great degree transferred to Athens, by their own act, just as that of so many of the native princes in India has been made over to the English. But the military efficiency of the confederacy against the Persians was much increased, in proportion as the vigorous resolves of Athens² were less and less paralyzed by the contentions and irregularity of a synod; so that the war was prosecuted with greater success than ever, while those motives of alarm, which had served as the first pressing stimulus to the formation of the confederacy, became every year farther and farther removed.

Under such circumstances several of the confederate states grew tired even of paying their tribute, — and averse to continuance as members. They made successive attempts to secede, but Athens, acting seemingly in conjunction with the synod, repressed their attempts one after the other, — conquering, fining, and disarming the revolvers; which was the more easily done,

¹ Thucyd. i, 97-99. Αἷται δὲ ἄλλαι ἦσαν τῶν ἀποστασιῶν, καὶ μέγισται, αἱ τῶν φόρων καὶ τῶν ἐκδεῖαι καὶ λειποστράτιον, εἰ τῷ ἐγένετο· οἱ γὰρ Ἀθηναῖοι ἀκριβῶς ἱπρασσον, καὶ λυπηροὶ ἦσαν, οὐκ εἰωθόσιν εὐδὲ βουλευμένοις ταλαιπωρεῖν προσάγοντες τὰς ἀνάγκας. Ἦσαν δὲ πῶς καὶ ἄλλως οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι οἴκετι ὁμοίως ἐν ἡδονῇ ἄρχοντες, καὶ οὔτε ξυνεστράτευον ἀπὸ τοῦ ἴσου, βραδίῳ τε προσάγεσθαι ἦν αὐτοῖς τοὺς ἀφισταμένους· ὧν αὐτοὶ αἷτιοι ἐγένοντο οἱ ξυμμαχοί· διὰ γὰρ τὴν ἀπόκνησιν ταύτην τῶν στρατειῶν, οἱ πλείους αὐτῶν, ἵνα μὴ ἀπ' οἴκον ὦσι, χρήματα ἐτάξαντο ἀντὶ τῶν νεῶν τὸ ἐκνούμενον ἀνάλωμα φέρειν, καὶ τοῖς μὲν Ἀθηναίοις ἡῖξετο τὸ ναυτικὸν ἀπὸ τῆς δαπάνης ἦν ἐκεῖνοι ξυμφέρειν, αὐτοὶ δὲ ὅποτε ἀποσταίεν, ἀπαράσκειν καὶ ἄπειροι ἐς τὸν πόλεμον καθίσταντο.

² See the contemptuous remarks of Periklēs upon the debates of the Lacedæmonian allies at Sparta (Thucyd. i, 141).

since in most cases their naval force had been in great part handed over to her. As these events took place, not all at once, but successively in different years, — the number of mere tribute-paying allies as well as of subdued revolters continually increasing, — so there was never any one moment of conspicuous change in the character of the confederacy: the allies slid unconsciously into subjects, while Athens, without any predetermined plan, passed from a chief into a despot. By strictly enforcing the obligations of the pact upon unwilling members, and by employing coercion against revolters, she had become unpopular in the same proportion as she acquired new power, — and that, too, without any guilt of her own. In this position, even if she had been inclined to relax her hold upon the tributary subjects, considerations of her own safety would have deterred her from doing so; for there was reason to apprehend that they might place their strength at the disposal of her enemies. It is very certain that she never was so inclined; it would have required a more self-denying public morality than has ever been practised by any state, either ancient or modern, even to conceive the idea of relinquishing voluntarily an immense ascendancy as well as a lucrative revenue: least of all was such an idea likely to be conceived by Athenian citizens, whose ambition increased with their power, and among whom the love of Athenian ascendancy was both passion and patriotism. But though the Athenians were both disposed and qualified to push all the advantages offered, and even to look out for new, we must not forget that the foundations of their empire were laid in the most honorable causes: voluntary invitation, efforts both unwearied and successful against a common enemy, unpopularity incurred in discharge of an imperative duty, and inability to break up the confederacy without endangering themselves as well as laying open the *Ægean sea* to the Persians.¹

¹ The speech of the Athenian envoy at Sparta, a little before the Peloponnesian war, sets forth the growth of the Athenian empire, in the main, with perfect justice (Thucyd. i. 75, 76). He admits and even exaggerates its unpopularity, but shows that such unpopularity was, to a great extent, and certainly as to its first origin, unavoidable as well as undeserved. He, of course, as might be supposed, omits those other proceedings by which Athens had herself aggravated it.

There were two other causes, besides that which has just been adverted to, for the unpopularity of imperial Athens. First, the existence of the confederacy, imposing permanent obligations, was in conflict with the general instinct of the Greek mind, tending towards separate political autonomy of each city, as well as with the particular turn of the Ionic mind, incapable of that steady personal effort which was requisite for maintaining the synd of Delos, on its first large and equal basis. Next, — and this is the great cause of all, — Athens, having defeated the Persians, and thrust them to a distance, began to employ the force and the tribute of her subject-allies in warfare against Greeks, wherein these allies had nothing to gain from success, — everything to apprehend from defeat, — and a banner to fight for, offensive to Hellenic sympathies. On this head, the subject-allies had great reason to complain, throughout the prolonged wars of Greek against Greek, for the purpose of sustaining Athenian predominance: but on the point of practical grievances or oppressions, they had little ground for discontent, and little feeling of actual discontent, as I shall show more fully hereafter. Among the general body of citizens in the subject-allied cities, the feeling towards Athens was rather indifference than hatred: the movement of revolt against her proceeded from small parties of leading men, acting apart from the citizens, and generally with collateral views of ambition for themselves: and the positive hatred towards her was felt chiefly by those who were not her subjects.

It is probable that the same indisposition to personal effort, which prompted the confederates of Delos to tender money-payment as a substitute for military service, also induced them to

Καὶ γὰρ αὐτὴν τήνδε (τὴν ἀρχὴν) ἐλάβομεν οὐ βιασάμενοι... ἐξ αὐτοῦ δι τοῦ ἔργου κατηναγκάσθημεν τὸ πρῶτον προσαγαγεῖν αὐτὴν ἐς τόδε, μάλιστα μὲν ὑπὸ δέου, ἔπειτα δὲ καὶ τιμῆς, ὑστερον καὶ ὠφελείας. Καὶ οὐκ ἀσφαλὲς ἐστὶ ἐδοκεῖ εἶναι τοῖς πολλοῖς ἀπηχθήμενους, καὶ τινων καὶ ἤδη ἀποστάντων κεχειρωμένων, ὧν τε ἡμῖν οὐκετι ὁμοίως φίλων ἀλλ' ὑπόπτων καὶ διαφόρων ὄντων, ἀνέντας κινδυνεύειν· καὶ γὰρ ἂν εἰ ἀποστασεις πρὸς ἡμᾶς ἐγίγνωτο παῖσι δὲ ἀνεπίφθορον τὰ συμφορικά τῶν μεγίστων περὶ κινδύνων εὐ τείθεσθαι.

The whole speech well merits attentive study: compare also the speech of Periklēs at Athens, in the second year of the Peloponnesian war (Thucyd. ii. 63).

neglect attendance at the synod. But we do not know the steps whereby this assembly, at first an effective reality, gradually dwindled into a mere form and vanished. Nothing, however, can more forcibly illustrate the difference of character between the maritime allies of Athens, and the Peloponnesian allies of Sparta, than the fact, — that while the former shrank from personal service, and thought it an advantage to tax themselves in place of it, — the latter were "ready enough with their bodies," but uncomplimentary and impracticable as to contributions.¹ The contempt felt by these Dorian landmen for the military efficiency of the Ionians recurs frequently, and appears even to have exceeded what the reality justified: but when we turn to the conduct of the latter twenty years earlier, at the battle of Lade, in the very crisis of the Ionic revolt from Persia,² — we detect the same want of energy, the same incapacity of personal effort and labor, as that which broke up the confederacy of Delos with all its beneficial promise. To appreciate fully the indefatigable activity and daring, together with the patient endurance of laborious maritime training, which characterized the Athenians of that day, — we have only to contrast them with these confederates, so remarkably destitute of both. Amidst such glaring inequalities of merit, capacity, and power, to maintain a confederacy of equal members was impossible: it was in the nature of things that the confederacy should either break up, or be transmuted into an Athenian empire.

It has already been mentioned that the first aggregate assessment of tribute, proposed by Aristides, and adopted by the synod at Delos, was four hundred and sixty talents in money. At that time many of the confederates paid their quota, not in money but in ships; but this practice gradually diminished, as the commutations above alluded to, of money in place of ships, were multiplied, while the aggregate tribute, of course, became larger. It was no more than six hundred talents³ at the commencement of the Peloponnesian war, forty-six years after the first forma-

Thucyd. i, 141. σώμασι δὲ ἐτοιμότεροι οἱ αὐτοῦργοι τῶν ἀνδρῶν ἢ ἰσχύμασι πολεμεῖν, etc.

¹ See Herodot. vi, 12 and the preceding volume of this history, chap. xxxv, vol. iv, p. 301.

² Thucyd. ii. 13.

tion of the confederacy; from whence we may infer that it was never at all increased upon individual members during the interval. For the difference between four hundred and sixty talents and six hundred admits of being fully explained by the numerous commutations of service for money, as well as by the acquisitions of new members, which doubtless Athens had more or less the opportunity of making. It is not to be imagined that the confederacy had attained its maximum number, at the date of the first assessment of tribute: there must have been various cities, like Sinopê and Ægina, subsequently added.¹

Without some such preliminary statements as those just given, respecting the new state of Greece between the Persian and Peloponnesian wars, beginning with the Athenian hegemony, or headship, and ending with the Athenian empire, the reader would hardly understand the bearing of those particular events which our authorities enable us to recount; events unhappily few in number, though the period must have been full of action, and not well authenticated as to dates. The first known enterprise of the Athenians in their new capacity — whether the first absolutely or not, we cannot determine — between 476 B.C. and 466 B.C., was the conquest of the important post of Eion, on the Strymon, where the Persian governor, Bogês, starved out after a desperate resistance, destroyed himself rather than capitulate, together with his family and precious effects, as has already been stated. The next events named are their enterprises against the Dolopes and Pelasgi in the island of Skyros, seemingly about 470 B.C., and the Dryopes in the town and district of Karystus, in Eubœa. To the latter, who were of a different kindred from the inhabitants of Chalkis and Eretria, and received no aid from them, they granted a capitulation: the former were more rigorously dealt with, and expelled from their island. Skyros was barren, and had little to recommend it, except a good maritime position and an excellent harbor; while its inhabitants, seemingly akin to the Pelasgian residents in Lemnos, prior to the Athenian occupation of that spot, were alike piratical and cruel. Some Thessalian traders, recently plundered and imprisoned by them, had raised a complaint against them before the Amphiktyonic

¹ Thucyd. i, 108: Plutarch, Periklès, c. 20.

synod, which condemned the island to make restitution. the mass of the islanders threw the burden upon those who had committed the crime; and these men, in order to evade payment, invoked Kimon with the Athenian armament,— who conquered the island, expelled the inhabitants, and peopled it with Athenian settlers.

Such clearance was a beneficial act, suitable to the new character of Athens as guardian of the Ægean sea against piracy; but it seems also connected with Athenian plans. The island lay very convenient for the communication with Lemnos, which the Athenians had doubtless reoccupied after the expulsion of the Persians,¹ and became, as well as Lemnos, a recognized adjunct, or outlying portion, of Attica: moreover, there were old legends which connected the Athenians with it, as the tomb of their hero Theseus, whose name, as the mythical champion of democracy, was in peculiar favor at the period immediately following the return from Salamis. It was in the year 476 B.C., that the oracle had directed them to bring home the bones of Theseus from Skyros, and to prepare for that hero a splendid entombment and edifice in their new city: they had tried to effect this, but the unsocial manners of the Dolopians had prevented a search, and it was only after Kimon had taken the island that he found, or pretended to find, the body. It was brought to Athens in the year 469 B.C.,² and after being wel-

¹ Xenophon, *Hellenic*, v, 1, 31.

² Mr. Fynes Clinton (*Fasti Hellenic*, ad ann. 476 B.C.) places the conquest of Skyros by Kimon in the year 476 B.C. He says, after citing a passage from Thucyd. i, 98, and from Plutarch, *Theseus*, c. 36, as well as a proposed correction of Bentley, which he justly rejects: "The island was actually conquered in the year of the archon Phædon, B.C. 476. This we know from Thucyd. i, 98, and Diodor. xi, 41-48, combined. Plutarch named the archon Phædon, with reference to the conquest of the island: then, by a negligence not unusual with him, connected the oracle with that fact, as a contemporary transaction: although in truth the oracle was not procured till six or seven years afterwards."

Plutarch has many sins to answer for against chronological exactness; but the charge here made against him is undeserved. He states that the oracle was given in (476 B.C.) the year of the archon Phædon; and that the body of Theseus was brought back to Athens in (469 B.C.) the year of the archon Aphepsion. There is nothing to contradict either statement; nor do the passages of Thucydides and Diodorus, which Mr. Clinton adduces

comed by the people in solemn and joyous procession, as if the hero himself had come back, was deposited in the interior of the

prove that which he asserts. The two passages of Diodorus have, indeed, no bearing upon the event: and in so far as Diodorus is in this case an authority at all, he goes against Mr. Clinton, for he states Skyros to have been conquered in 470 B.C. (Diodor. xi, 60). Thucydides only tells us that the operations against Eion, Skyros, and Karystus, took place in the order here indicated, and at some periods between 476 and 466 B.C.; but he does not enable us to determine positively the date of either. Upon what authority Mr. Clinton states, that "the oracle was not procured till six or seven years afterwards," (*i. e.*, after the conquest,) I do not know: the account of Plutarch goes rather to show that it was procured six or seven years *before* the conquest: and this may stand good until some better testimony is produced to contradict it. As our information now stands, we have no testimony as to the year of the conquest except that of Diodorus, who assigns it to 470 B.C., but as he assigns both the conquest of Eion and the expeditions of Kimon against Karia and Pamphylia with the victories of the Eurymedon, all to the same year, we cannot much trust his authority. Nevertheless, I incline to believe him as to the date of the conquest of Skyros: because it seems to me very probable that this conquest took place in the year immediately before that in which the body of Theseus was brought to Athens, which latter event may be referred with great confidence to 469 B.C., in consequence of the interesting anecdote related by Plutarch about the first prize gained by the poet Sophoklès.

Mr. Clinton has given in his Appendix (Nos. vi-viii, pp. 248-253) two Dissertations respecting the chronology of the period from the Persian war down to the close of the Peloponnesian war. He has rendered much service by correcting the mistake of Dodwell, Wesseling, and Mitford (founded upon an inaccurate construction of a passage in Isokratès) in supposing, after the Persian invasion of Greece, a Spartan hegemony, lasting ten years, prior to the commencement of the Athenian hegemony. He has shown that the latter must be reckoned as commencing in 477, or 476 B.C., immediately after the mutiny of the allies against Pausanias,— whose command, however, need not be peremptorily restricted to one year, as Mr. Clinton (p. 252) and Dodwell maintain: for the words of Thucydides, *ἐν τῇδε τῇ ἡγεμονίᾳ*, imply nothing as to annual duration, and designate merely "the hegemony which preceded that of Athens."

But the refutation of this mistake does not enable us to establish any good positive chronology for the period between 477 and 466 B.C. It will not do to construe *ἡγεμονίᾳ* (*Thuc.* i, 98) in reference to the Athenian conquest of Eion, as if it must necessarily mean "the year after" 477 B.C. If we could imagine that Thucydides had told us all the military operations between 477-466 B.C., we should be compelled to admit plenty of that "interval of inaction" against which Mr. Clinton so strongly protests (p

city,—the monument called the Theseium, with its sacred precinct being built on the spot, and invested with the privilege of a sanctuary for men of poor condition who might feel ground for dreading the oppressions of the powerful, as well as for slaves in case of cruel usage.¹ Such were the protective functions of the mythical hero of democracy, whose installation is interesting as marking the growing intensity of democratical feeling in Athens since the Persian war.

It was about two years or more after this incident, that the first breach of union in the confederacy of Delos took place. The important island of Naxos, the largest of the Cyclades,—an island which thirty years before had boasted a large marine

252). Unhappily, Thucydides has told us but a small portion of the events which really happened.

Mr. Clinton compares the various periods of duration assigned by ancient authors to that which is improperly called the Athenian "empire,"—between 477–405 B.C. (pp. 248, 249.) I confess that I rather agree with Dr. Gillies, who admits the discrepancy between these authors broadly and undisguisedly, than with Mr. Clinton, who seeks to bring them into comparative agreement. His explanation is only successful in regard to one of them,—Demosthenes; whose two statements (forty-five years in one place and seventy-three years in another) are shown to be consistent with each other as well as chronologically just. But surely it is not reasonable to correct the text of the orator Lykurgus from *ἐννεήκοντα* to *ἑβδομήκοντα*, and then to say, that "Lykurgus may be added to the number of those who describe the period as seventy years," (p. 250.) Neither are we to bring Andokides into harmony with others, by supposing that "his calculation ascends to the battle of Marathon, from the date of which (B.C. 490) to the battle of Ægos Potami, are just eighty-five years." (Ibid.) Nor ought we to justify a computation by Demosthenes, of sixty-five years, by saying, "that it terminates at the Athenian defeat in Sicily," (p. 249).

The truth is, that there is more or less chronological inaccuracy in all these passages, except those of Demosthenes,—and historical inaccuracy in all of them, not even excepting those. It is not true that the Athenians *ἦσαν τῆς θαλάσσης*—*ἦσαν τῶν Ἑλλήνων*—*προστάται ἥσαν τῶν Ἑλλήνων*—for seventy-three years. The historical language of Demosthenes, Plato, Lysias, Isokrates, Andokides, Lykurgus, requires to be carefully examined before we rely upon it.

¹ Plutarch (Kimon, c. 8; Theseus, c. 36). *ἐστὶ δὲ φύξιον οἰκέταις καὶ πᾶσι τοῖς ταπεινότεροις καὶ δεδιόσι κρείττονας, ὥς καὶ τοῦ Θεσέως προστατικοῦ τινος καὶ βοηθητικοῦ γενομένου καὶ προσδεχόμενου φιλανθρωπῶς εἰς τῶν ταπεινότερων δέσεις*

force and eight thousand hoplites,—revolted; on what special ground we do not know: but probably the greater islands fancied themselves better able to dispense with the protection of the confederacy than the smaller,—at the same time that they were more jealous of Athens. After a siege, of unknown duration, by Athens and the confederate force, it was forced to surrender, and reduced to the condition of a tributary subject;¹ its armed ships being doubtless taken away, and its fortifications razed: whether any fine or ulterior penalty was levied, we have no information.

We cannot doubt that the reduction of this powerful island, however untoward in its effects upon the equal and self-maintaining character of the confederacy, strengthened its military force by placing the whole Naxian fleet with new pecuniary contributions in the hands of the chief: nor is it surprising to hear that Athens sought both to employ this new force, and to obliterate the late act of severity, by increased exertions against the common enemy. Though we know no particulars respecting operations against Persia, since the attack on Eion, such operations must have been going on; but the expedition under Kimon, undertaken not long after the Naxian revolt, was attended with memorable results. That commander, having under him two hundred triremes from Athens, and one hundred from the various confederates, was despatched to attack the Persians on the south-western and southern coast of Asia Minor. He attacked and drove out several of their garrisons from various Grecian settlements, both in Karia and Lykia: among others, the important trading city of Phaselis, though at first resisting, and even standing a siege, was prevailed upon by the friendly suggestions of the Chians in Kimon's armament to pay a contribution of ten talents and join in the expedition. From the length of time occupied in these various undertakings, the Persian satraps had been enabled to assemble a powerful force, both fleet and army, near the mouth of the river Eurymedon, in Pamphylia, under the command of Tithraustes and Pherendates, both of the regal

¹ Thucyd. i. 98. It has already been stated in the preceding chapter, that Themistokles, as a fugitive, passed close to Naxos while it was under siege, and incurred great danger of being taken.

blood. The fleet, chiefly Phœnician, seems to have consisted of two hundred ships, but a farther reinforcement of eighty Phœnician ships was expected, and was actually near at hand, and the commanders were unwilling to hazard a battle before its arrival. Kimon, anxious for the same reason to hasten on the combat, attacked them vigorously: partly from their inferiority of numbers, partly from discouragement at the absence of the reinforcement, they seem to have made no strenuous resistance. They were put to flight and driven ashore; so speedily, and with so little loss to the Greeks, that Kimon was enabled to disembark his men forthwith, and attack the land-force which was drawn up on shore to protect them. The battle on land was long and gallantly contested, but Kimon at length gained a complete victory, dispersed the army with the capture of many prisoners, and either took or destroyed the entire fleet. As soon as his victory and his prisoners were secured, he sailed to Cyprus for the purpose of intercepting the reinforcement of eighty Phœnician ships in their way, and was fortunate enough to attack them while yet they were ignorant of the victories of the Eurymedon. These ships too were all destroyed, though most of the crews appear to have escaped ashore on the island. Two great victories, one at sea and the other on land, gained on the same day by the same armament, counted with reason among the most glorious of all Grecian exploits, and were extolled as such in the inscription on the commemorative offering to Apollo, set up out of the tithe of the spoils.¹ The number of prisoners, as well as the booty taken by the victors, was immense.

¹ For the battles of the Eurymedon, see Thucyd. i, 100; Diodor. xi, 60-62; Plutarch, Kimon, 12, 13.

The accounts of the two latter appear chiefly borrowed from Ephorus and Kallisthenēs, authors of the following century; and from Phanodemus, an author later still. I borrow sparingly from them, and only so far as consists with the brief statement of Thucydides. The narrative of Diodorus is exceedingly confused, indeed hardly intelligible.

Phanodemus stated the number of the Persian fleet at six hundred ships, Ephorus, at three hundred and fifty. Diodorus, following the latter, gives three hundred and forty. Plutarch mentions the expected reinforcement of eighty Phœnician ships; which appears to me a very credible circumstance, explaining the easy nautical victory of Kimon at the Eurymedon. From Thucydides, we know that the vanquished fleet at the Eurymedon

A victory thus remarkable, which thrust back the Persians to the region eastward of Phasélis, doubtless fortified materially the position of the Athenian confederacy against them; but it tended not less to exalt the reputation of Athens, and even to popularize her with the confederates generally, from the large amount of plunder divisible among them. Probably this increased power and popularity stood her instead throughout her approaching contest with Thasos, at the same time that it explains the increasing fear and dislike of the Peloponnesians.

Thasos was a member of the confederacy of Delos; but her quarrel with Athens seems to have arisen out of causes quite distinct from confederate relations. It has been already stated that the Athenians had within the last few years expelled the Persians from the important post of Eion, on the Strymon, the most convenient post for the neighboring region of Thrace, which was not less distinguished for its fertility than for its mining wealth. In the occupation of this post, the Athenians had had time to become acquainted with the productive character of the adjoining region, chiefly occupied by the Edonian Thracians; and it is extremely probable that many private settlers arrived

consisted of no more than two hundred ships; for so I venture to construe the words of Thucydides, in spite of the authority of Dr Arnold, — *Kαὶ εἶλον (Ἀθηναῖοι) τριῆρεις Φοινίκων καὶ διεφύεραν τὰς πᾶσας ἐς (τὰς) διακοσίας*. Upon which Dr. Arnold observes: "Amounting in all to two hundred: that is, that the whole number of ships taken or destroyed was two hundred, — not that the whole fleet consisted of no more." Admitting the correctness of this construction (which may be defended by viii, 21) we may remark that the defeated Phœnician fleet, according to the universal practice of antiquity, ran ashore to seek protection from its accompanying land-force. When, therefore, this land-force was itself defeated and dispersed, the ships would all naturally fall into the power of the victors; or if any escaped, it would be merely by accident. Moreover, the smaller number is in this case more likely to be the truth, as we must suppose an easy naval victory in order to leave strength for a strenuous land-battle on the same day.

It is remarkable that the inscription on the commemorative offering only specifies "one hundred Phœnician ships with their crews" as having been captured (Diodor. xi, 62). The other hundred ships were probably destroyed. Diodorus represents Kimon as having captured three hundred and forty ships, though he himself cites the inscription which mentions only one hundred.

from Athens, with the view of procuring grants or making their fortunes by partnership with powerful Thracians in working the gold-mines round Mount Pangæus. In so doing, they speedily found themselves in collision with the Greeks of the opposite island of Mount Thasos, who possessed a considerable strip of land, with various dependent towns on the continent of Thrace, and derived a large revenue from the mines of Skaptê Hylê, as well as from others in the neighborhood.¹ The condition of Thasos at this time, about 465 B.C., indicates to us the progress which the Grecian states in the Ægean had made since their liberation from Persia. It had been deprived both of its fortifications and of its maritime force, by order of Darius, about 491 B.C., and must have remained in this condition until after the repulse of Xerxes; but we now find it well-fortified and possessing a powerful maritime force.

In what precise manner the quarrel between the Thasians and the Athenians of Eion manifested itself, respecting the trade and the mines in Thrace, we are not informed; but it reached such a height that the Athenians were induced to send a powerful armament against the island, under the command of Kimon.² Having vanquished the Thasian force at sea, they disembarked, gained various battles, and blocked up the city by land as well as by sea. And at the same time they undertook — what seems to have been part and parcel of the same scheme — the establishment of a larger and more powerful colony on Thracian ground not far from Eion. On the Strymon, about three miles higher up than Eion, near the spot where the river narrows itself again out of a broad expanse of the nature of a lake, was situated the Edonian town or settlement called Ennea Hodoi, (Nine Ways), a little above the bridge, which here served as an important communication for all the people of the interior. Both

¹ About Thasos, see Herodot. vi. 46–48; vii. 118. The position of Ragusa in the Adriatic, in reference to the despots of Servia and Bosnia in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, was very similar to that of Athens and Thasos in regard to the Thracian princes of the interior. In Engel's History of Ragusa we find an account of the large gains made in that city by its contracts to work the gold and silver mines belonging to these princes (Engel, Geschichte des Freystaates Ragusa, sect. 36, p. 163. Wien, 1807).

² Thucyd. i. 100, 101; Plutarch, Kimon, c. 14; Diodor xi. 70.

Histiæus and Aristagoras, the two Milesian despots, had been tempted by the advantages of this place to commence a settlement there: both of them had failed, and a third failure on a still grander scale was now about to be added. The Athenians sent thither a large body of colonists, ten thousand in number, partly from their own citizens, partly collected from their allies and the temptations of the site probably rendered volunteers numerous. As far as Ennea Hodoi was concerned, they were successful in conquering it and driving away the Edonian possessors: but on trying to extend themselves farther to the eastward, to a spot called Drabêskus, convenient for the mining region, they encountered a more formidable resistance from a powerful alliance of Thracian tribes, who had come to the aid of the Edonians in decisive hostility to the new colony, — probably not without instigation from the inhabitants of Thasos. All or most of the ten thousand colonists were slain in this warfare, and the new colony was for the time completely abandoned: we shall find it resumed hereafter.¹

Disappointed as the Athenians were in this enterprise, they did not abandon the blockade of Thasos, which held out more than two years, and only surrendered in the third year. Its fortifications were razed; its ships of war, thirty-three in number, taken away;² its possessions and mining establishments on the opposite continent relinquished: moreover, an immediate contribution in money was demanded from the inhabitants, over and above the annual payment assessed upon them for the future. The subjugation of this powerful island was another step in the growing dominion of Athens over her confederates.

The year before the Thasians surrendered, however, they had

¹ Thucyd. i. 101. Philip of Macedon, in his dispute more than a century after this period with the Athenians respecting the possession of Amphipolis, pretended that his ancestor, Alexander, had been the first to acquire possession of the spot after the expulsion of the Persians from Thrace, (see Philippi Epistola ap. Demosthen. p. 164, R.) If this pretence had been true, Ennea Hodoi would have been in possession of the Macedonians at this time, when the first Athenian attempt was made upon it: but the statement of Thucydides shows that it was then an Edonian township.

² Plutarch, Kimon, c. 14. Galêpsus and Cesymê were among the Thasian settlements on the mainland of Thrace (Thucyd. iv, 108).

taken a step which deserves particular notice, as indicating the newly-gathering clouds in the Grecian political horizon. They had made secret application to the Lacedæmonians for aid, entreating them to draw off the attention of Athens by invading Attica; and the Lacedæmonians, without the knowledge of Athens, having actually engaged to comply with this request, were only prevented from performing their promise by a grave and terrible misfortune at home.¹ Though accidentally unperformed, however, this hostile promise is a most significant event: it marks the growing fear and hatred on the part of Sparta and the Peloponnesians towards Athens, merely on general grounds of the magnitude of her power, and without any special provocation. Nay, not only had Athens given no provocation, but she was still actually included as a member of the Lacedæmonian alliance, and we shall find her presently both appealed to and acting as such. We shall hear so much of Athens, and that too with truth, as pushing and aggressive, — and of Sparta as home-keeping and defensive, — that the incident just mentioned becomes important to remark. The first intent of unprovoked and even treacherous hostility — the germ of the future Peloponnesian war — is conceived and reduced to an engagement by Sparta.

We are told by Plutarch, that the Athenians, after the surrender of Thasos and the liberation of the armament, had expected from Kimon some farther conquests in Macedonia, — and even that he had actually entered upon that project with such promise of success, that its farther consummation was certain as well as easy. Having under these circumstances relinquished it and returned to Athens, he was accused by Periklēs and others of having been bought off by bribes from the Macedonian king Alexander; but was acquitted after a public trial.²

During the period which had elapsed between the first formation of the confederacy of Delos and the capture of Thasos (about thirteen or fourteen years, B.C. 477–463), the Athenians seem to have been occupied almost entirely in their maritime operations, chiefly against the Persians, — having been free from

¹ Thucyd. i. 101. οἱ δὲ ἐπέσχοντο μὲν κρήσας τῶν Ἀθηναίων καὶ ἑυέλλουν διεκωλύθησαν δὲ ἐπὶ τοῖς γενομένοις σισμοῖς.

² Plutarch. Kimon. c. 14.

embarrassments immediately around Attica. But this freedom was not destined to last much longer; and during the ensuing ten years, their foreign relations near home become both active and complicated; while their strength expands so wonderfully, that they are found competent at once to obligations on both sides of the Ægean sea, the distant as well as the near.

Of the incidents which had taken place in Central Greece during the twelve or fifteen years immediately succeeding the battle of Plataea, we have scarcely any information. The feelings of the time, between those Greeks who had supported and those who had resisted the Persian invader, must have remained unfriendly even after the war was at an end, and the mere occupation of the Persian numerous host must have inflicted severe damage both upon Thessaly and Bœotia. At the meeting of the Amphiktyonic synod which succeeded the expulsion of the invaders, a reward was proclaimed for the life of the Melian Ephialtēs, who had betrayed to Xerxes the mountain-path over Cēta, and thus caused the ruin of Leonidas at Thermopylæ: moreover, if we may trust Plutarch, it was even proposed by Lacedæmon that all the *medizing* Greeks should be expelled from the synod,¹ — a proposition which the more long-sighted views of Themistoklēs successfully resisted. Even the stronger measure, of razing the fortifications of all the extra-Peloponnesian cities, from fear that they might be used to aid some future invasion, had suggested itself to the Lacedæmonians, — as we see from their language on the occasion of rebuilding the walls of Athens; and in regard to Bœotia, it appears that the headship of Thebes as well as the coherence of the federation was for the time almost suspended. The destroyed towns of Platea and Thespiæ were restored, and the latter in part repopled,² under Athenian influence; and the general sentiment of Peloponnesus as well as of Athens would have sustained these towns against Thebes, if the latter had tried at that time to enforce her supremacy over them in the name of

¹ Plutarch, Themistokl. c. 20.

² See the case of Sikinnus, the person through whom Themistoklēs communicated with Xerxes before the battle of Salamis, and for whom he afterwards procured admission among the batch of newly-introduced citizens at Thespiæ (Herodot. viii. 75).

"ancient Bœotian right and usage."¹ The Theban government was then in discredit for its previous *medism*, — even in the eyes of Thebans themselves;² while the party opposed to Thebes in the other towns was so powerful, that many of them would probably have been severed from the federation to become allies of Athens like Plataea, if the interference of Lacedæmon had not arrested such a tendency. The latter was in every other part of Greece an enemy to organized aggregation of cities, either equal or unequal, and was constantly bent on keeping the little autonomous communities separate;³ whence she sometimes became by accident the protector of the weaker cities against compulsory alliance imposed upon them by the stronger: the interest of her own ascendancy was in this respect analogous to that of the Persians when they dictated the peace of Antalkidas, — of the Romans in administering their extensive conquests, — and of the kings of medieval Europe in breaking the authority of the barons over their vassals. But though such was the policy of Sparta elsewhere, her fear of Athens, which grew up during the ensuing twenty years, made her act differently in regard to Bœotia: she had no other means of maintaining that country as her own ally and as the enemy of Athens, except by organizing the federation effectively, and strengthening the authority of Thebes. It is to this revolution in Spartan politics that Thebes owed the recovery of her ascendancy,⁴ — a revolution so conspicuously marked, that the Spartans even aided in enlarging her circuit and improving her fortifications: nor was it without difficulty that she maintained this position, even when recovered, against the dangerous neighborhood of Athens, a circumstance which made her not only a vehement partisan of Sparta, but even more furiously anti-Athenian than Sparta, down to the close of the Peloponnesian war.

The revolution, just noticed, in Spartan politics towards Bœotia, did not manifest itself until about twenty years after the com-

¹ Τὰ τῶν Βοιωτῶν πάτρια — τὰ κοινὰ τῶν πάντων Βοιωτῶν πάτρια (Thucyd. iii, 61-65).

² Thucyd. iii, 62.

³ See, among many other evidences, the remarkable case of the Olynthian confederacy (Xenophon, Hellen. v, 2, 16).

⁴ Diodor. xi, 81; Justin, iii, 6.

menement of the Athenian maritime confederacy. During the course of those twenty years, we know that Sparta had had more than one battle to sustain in Arcadia, against the towns and villages of that country, in which she came forth victorious: but we have no particulars respecting these incidents. We also know that a few years after the Persian invasion, the inhabitants of Elis concentrated themselves from many dispersed townships into the one main city of Elis:¹ and it seems probable that Lepreum in Triphylia, and one or two of the towns of Achaia, were either formed or enlarged by a similar process near about the same time.² Such aggregation of towns out of preëxisting separate villages was not conformable to the views, nor favorable to the ascendancy, of Lacedæmon: but there can be little doubt that her foreign policy, after the Persian invasion, was both embarrassed and discredited by the misconduct of her two contemporary kings. Pausanias, who, though only regent, was practically equivalent to a king, and Leotychidès, — not to mention the rapid development of Athens and Peiræus. But in the year B.C. 464, the year preceding the surrender of Thasos to the Athenian armament, a misfortune of yet more terrific moment befell Sparta. A violent earthquake took place in the immediate neighborhood of Sparta itself, destroying a large portion of the town, and a vast number of lives, many of them Spartan citizens. It was the judgment of the earth-shaking god Poseidon, according to the view of the Lacedæmonians themselves, for a recent violation of his sanctuary at Tænarus, from whence certain suppliant Helots had been dragged away not long before for punishment,³ — not improbably some of those Helots whom Pausanias had instigated to revolt. The sentiment of the Helots, at all times one of enmity towards their masters, appears at this moment to have been unusually inflammable: so that an earthquake at Sparta, especially an earthquake construed as divine vengeance for Helot blood recently spilt, was sufficient to rouse many of them at once into revolt, together with some even of the Periœkî. The insurgents took arms and marched directly upon Sparta.

¹ Diodor. xi, 54; Strabo, viii, p. 337.

² Strabo, viii, pp. 337, 348, 356.

³ Thucyd. i, 101-128; Diodor. xi, 62.

which they were on the point of mastering during the first moments of consternation; had not the bravery and presence of mind of the young king Archidamus reanimated the surviving citizens and repelled the attack. But though repelled, the insurgents were not subdued: for some time they maintained the field against the Spartan force, and sometimes with considerable advantage, since Acimnēstus, the warrior by whose hand Mar-donius had fallen at Plataea, was defeated and slain with three hundred followers in the plain of Stenyklērus, overpowered by superior numbers.¹ When at length defeated, they occupied and fortified the memorable hill of Ithômē, the ancient citadel of their Messenian forefathers. Here they made a long and obstinate defence, supporting themselves doubtless by incursions throughout Laconia: nor was defence difficult, seeing that the Lacedæmonians were at that time confessedly incapable of as-sailing even the most imperfect species of fortification. After the siege had lasted some two or three years, without any prospect of success, the Lacedæmonians, beginning to despair of their own sufficiency for the undertaking, invoked the aid of their various allies, among whom we find specified the Æginetans, the Athenians, and the Plateans.² The Athenian troops are said to have consisted of four thousand men, under the command of Kimon; Athens being still included in the list of Lacedæmonian allies.

So imperfect were the means of attacking walls at that day, even for the most intelligent Greeks, that this increased force made no immediate impression on the fortified hill of Ithômē. And when the Lacedæmonians saw that their Athenian allies were not more successful than they had been themselves, they soon passed from surprise into doubt, mistrust, and apprehension. The troops had given no ground for such a feeling, and Kimon, their general, was notorious for his attachment to Sparta; yet the Lacedæmonians could not help calling to mind the ever-wakeful energy and ambition of these Ionic strangers, whom they had introduced into the interior of Laconia, together with their own promise — though doubtless a secret promise — to invade Attica, not long before, for the benefit of the Thasians. They even be-

¹ Herodot. ix, 64.

² Thucyd. i, 102; iii, 54; iv, 57.

gan to fear that the Athenians might turn against them, and listen to solicitations for espousing the cause of the besieged. Under the influence of such apprehensions, they dismissed the Athenian contingent forthwith, on pretence of having no farther occasion for them; while all the other allies were retained, and the siege or blockade went on as before.¹

¹ Thucyd. i, 102. τὴν μὲν ὑποψίαν οὐ δηλοῦντες, εἰπόντες δὲ ὅτι οὐδὲν προσδίδονται αὐτῶν ἔτι.

Mr. Fynes Clinton (Fast. Hellen. ann. 464–461 B.C.), following Plutarch, recognizes two Lacedæmonian requests to Athens, and two Athenian expeditions to the aid of the Spartans, both under Kimon; the first in 464 B.C., immediately on the happening of the earthquake and consequent revolt, — the second in 461 B.C., after the war had lasted some time.

In my judgment, there is no ground for supposing more than one application made to Athens, and one expedition. The duplication has arisen from Plutarch, who has construed too much as historical reality the comic exaggeration of Aristophanēs (Aristoph. Lysistrat. 1138; Plutarch, Kimon, 16). The heroine of the latter, Lysistrata, wishing to make peace between the Lacedæmonians and Athenians, and reminding each of the services which they had received from the other, might permit herself to say to the Lacedæmonians: "Your envoy, Perikleidas, came to Athens, pale with terror, and put himself a suppliant at the altar to entreat our help as a matter of life and death, while Poseidon was still shaking the earth, and the Messenians were pressing you hard: then Kimon with four thousand hoplites went and achieved your complete salvation." This is all very telling and forcible, as a portion of the Aristophanic play, but there is no historical truth in it except the fact of an application made and an expedition sent in consequence.

We know that the earthquake took place at the time when the siege of Thasos was yet going on, because it was the reason which prevented the Lacedæmonians from aiding the besieged by an invasion of Attica. But Kimon commanded at the siege of Thasos (Plutarch, Kimon, c. 14); accordingly, he could not have gone as commander to Laconia at the time when this first expedition is alleged to have been undertaken.

Next, Thucydides acknowledges only one expedition: nor, indeed, does Diodorus (xi, 64), though this is of minor consequence. Now mere silence on the part of Thucydides, in reference to the events of a period which he only professes to survey briefly, is not always a very forcible negative argument. But in this case, his account of the expedition of 461 B.C., with its very important consequences, is such as to exclude the supposition that he knew of any prior expedition, two or three years earlier. Had he known of any such, he could not have written the account which now stands in his text. He dwells especially on the prolongation of the war, and on the incapacity of the Lacedæmonians for attacking walls, as the reasons why

This dismissal, ungracious in the extreme, and probably rendered even more offensive by the habitual roughness of Spartan dealing, excited the strongest exasperation both among the Athenian soldiers and the Athenian people, — an exasperation heightened by circumstances immediately preceding. For the resolution to send auxiliaries into Laconia, when the Lacedæmonians first applied for them, had not been taken without considerable debate at Athens: the party of Periklēs and Ephialtēs, habitually in opposition to Kimon, and partisans of the forward democratical movement, had strongly discountenanced it, and conjured their countrymen not to assist in renovating and strengthening their most formidable rival. Perhaps the previous engagement of the Lacedæmonians to invade Attica on behalf of the Thasians may have become known to them, though not so formally as to exclude denial; and even supposing this engagement to have remained unknown at that time to every one, there were not wanting other grounds to render the policy of refusal plausible. But Kimon, with an earnestness which even the philo-Laonian Kritias afterwards characterized as a sacrifice of the grandeur of Athens to the advantage of Lacedæmon,¹ employed all his credit and influence in seconding the application. The maintenance of alliance with Sparta on equal footing, — peace among the great powers of Greece, and common war against Persia, — together with the prevention of all farther democratical changes in Athens, — were the leading points of his political creed. As yet, both his personal and political ascendancy was predominant over his opponents: as yet, there was no manifest conflict, which had only just begun to show itself in the case of Thasos, between the

they invoked the Athenians as well as their other allies: he implies that their presence in Laconia was a new and threatening incident: moreover, when he tells us how much the Athenians were incensed by their abrupt and mistrustful dismissal, he could not have omitted to notice, as an aggravation of this feeling, that, only two or three years before, they had rescued Lacedæmon from the brink of ruin. Let us add, that the supposition of Sparta, the first military power in Greece, and distinguished for her unintermitting discipline, being reduced all at once to a condition of such utter helplessness as to owe her safety to foreign intervention, — is highly improbable in itself: inadmissible, except on very good evidence.

For the reasons here stated, I reject the first expedition into Laconia mentioned in Plutarch.

¹ Plutarch, Kimon, c. 16

maritime power of Athens, and the union of land-force under Sparta: and Kimon could still treat both of these phenomena as coexisting necessities of Hellenic well-being. Though no way distinguished as a speaker, he carried with him the Athenian assembly by appealing to a large and generous patriotism, which forbade them to permit the humiliation of Sparta. "Consent not to see Hellas lamed of one leg, and Athens drawing without her yoke-fellow;"¹ such was his language, as we learn from his friend and companion, the Chian poet Ion: and in the lips of Kimon it proved effective. It is a speech of almost melancholy interest, since ninety years passed over before such an appeal was ever again addressed to an Athenian assembly.² The despatch of the auxiliaries was thus dictated by a generous sentiment, to the disregard of what might seem political prudence: and we may imagine the violent reaction which took place in Athenian feeling, when the Lacedæmonians repaid them by singling out their troops from all the other allies as objects of insulting suspicion, — we may imagine the triumph of Periklēs and Ephialtēs, who had opposed the mission, — and the vast loss of influence to Kimon, who had brought it about, — when Athens received again into her public assemblies the hoplites sent back from Ithômê.

Both in the internal constitution, indeed, — of which more presently, — and in the external policy of Athens, the dismissal of these soldiers was pregnant with results. The Athenians immediately passed a formal resolution to renounce the alliance between themselves and Lacedæmon against the Persians. They did more: they looked out for land enemies of Lacedæmon, with whom to ally themselves. Of these by far the first, both in Hellenic rank and in real power, was Argos. That city, neutral during the Persian invasion, had now recovered from the effects of the destructive defeat suffered about thirty years before from the Spartan king Kleomenēs: the sons of the ancient citizens had grown to manhood, and the temporary predominance of the Pe-

¹ Plutarch, Kimon, c. 16. 'Ο δ' Ἴων ἀπομνημονεύει καὶ τὸν λόγον, ὃ μάλιστα τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ἐκίνησε, παρακαλὼν μῆτε τὴν Ἑλλάδα χωλὴν, μῆτε ἡν πόλιν ἑτερόζυγα, περιδεῖν γεγεννημένην.

² See Xenophon, Hellenic, vi, 3, — about 372 B. C. — a little before the battle of Leuktra

riœki, acquired in consequence of the ruinous loss of citizens in that defeat, had been again put down. In the neighborhood of Argos, and dependent upon it, were situated Mykenæ, Tiryns, and Midea, — small in power and importance, but rich in mythical renown. Disdaining the inglorious example of Argos, at the period of danger, these towns had furnished contingents both to Thermopylæ and Platæa, which their powerful neighbor had been unable either to prevent at the time, or to avenge afterwards, from fear of the intervention of Lacedæmon. But so soon as the latter was seen to be endangered and occupied at home, with a formidable Messenian revolt, the Argeians availed themselves of the opportunity to attack not only Mykenæ and Tiryns, but also Orneæ, Midea, and other semi-dependent towns around them. Several of these were reduced; and the inhabitants robbed of their autonomy, were incorporated with the domain of Argos: but the Mykenians, partly from the superior gallantry of their resistance, partly from jealousy of their mythical renown, were either sold as slaves or driven into banishment.¹ Through these victories Argos was now more powerful than ever, and the propositions of alliance made to her by Athens, while strengthening both the two against Lacedæmon, opened to her a new chance of recovering her lost headship in Peloponnesus. The Thessalians became members of this new alliance, which was a defensive alliance against Lacedæmon: and hopes were doubtless entertained of drawing in some of the habitual allies of the latter.

The new character which Athens had thus assumed, as a competitor for landed alliances, not less than for maritime ascendancy, came opportunely for the protection of the neighboring town of Megara. It appears that Corinth, perhaps instigated, like Argos, by the helplessness of the Lacedæmonians, had been making border encroachments on the one side upon Kleonæ, on the other side upon Megara:² on which ground the latter, probably despairing of protection from Lacedæmon, renounced the Lacedæmoni-

¹ Diodor. xi. 65; Strabo, viii, p. 372; Pausan. ii. 16, 17, 25. Diodorus places this incident in 468 B.C.; but as it undoubtedly comes after the earthquake at Sparta, we must suppose it to have happened about 463 B.C. See Mr. Fynes Clinton, Fasti Hellenici, Appendix, 8.

² Plutarch, Kimon, c. 17.

an connection, and obtained permission to enrol herself as an ally of Athens.¹ This was an acquisition of signal value to the Athenians, since it both opened to them the whole range of territory across the outer isthmus of Corinth to the interior of the Krissæan gulf, on which the Megarian port of Pegæ was situated, and placed them in possession of the passes of Mount Geraneia, so that they could arrest the march of a Peloponnesian army over the isthmus, and protect Attica from invasion. It was, moreover, of great importance in its effects on Grecian politics: for it was counted as a wrong by Lacedæmon, gave deadly offence to the Corinthians, and lighted up the flames of war between them and Athens; their allies, the Epidaurians and Æginetans, taking their part. Though Athens had not yet been guilty of unjust encroachment against any Peloponnesian state, her ambition and energy had inspired universal awe; while the maritime states in the neighborhood, such as Corinth, Epidaurus, and Ægina, saw these terror-striking qualities threatening them at their own doors, through her alliance with Argos and Megara. Moreover, it is probable that the ancient feud between the Athenians and Æginetans, though dormant since a little before the Persian invasion, had never been appeased or forgotten: so that the Æginetans, dwelling within sight of Peiræus, were at once best able to appreciate, and most likely to dread, the enormous maritime power now possessed by Athens. Periklès was wont to call Ægina the eyesore of Peiræus:² but we may be very sure that Peiræus, grown into a vast fortified port, within the existing generation, was in a much stronger degree the eyesore of Ægina.

The Athenians were at this time actively engaged in prosecuting the war against Persia, having a fleet of no less than two hundred sail, equipped by or from the confederacy collectively, now serving in Cyprus and on the Phœnician coast. Moreover, the revolt of the Egyptians under Inaros, about 460 B.C., opened to them new means of action against the Great King; and their fleet, by invitation of the revolted, sailed up the Nile to Memphis, where there seemed at first a good prospect of throwing off the Persian dominion. Yet in spite of so great an abstraction from their disposable force, their military operations near home

¹ Thucyd. i. 103.
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² Plutarch, Periklès, c. 8.
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were conducted with unabated vigor: and the inscription which remains, — a commemoration of their citizens of the Erechtheid tribe, who were slain in one and the same year, in Cyprus, Egypt, Phenicia, the Halieis, Ægina, and Megara, — brings forcibly before us that energy which astonished and even alarmed their contemporaries. Their first proceedings at Megara were of a nature altogether novel, in the existing condition of Greece. It was necessary for the Athenians to protect their new ally against the superiority of Peloponnesian land-force, and to insure a constant communication with it by sea; but the city, like most of the ancient Hellenic towns, was situated on a hill at some distance from the sea, separated from its port Nisæa by a space of nearly one mile. One of the earliest proceedings of the Athenians was to build two lines of wall, near and parallel to each other, connecting the city with Nisæa, so that the two thus formed one continuous fortress, wherein a standing Athenian garrison was maintained, with the constant means of succor from Athens in case of need. These "long walls," though afterwards copied in other places, and on a larger scale, were at that juncture an ingenious invention, for the purpose of extending the maritime arm of Athens to an inland city.

The first operations of Corinth, however, were not directed against Megara. The Athenians having undertaken a landing in the territory of the Halieis, the population of the southern Argolic peninsula, bordering on Trœzen and Hermionê, were defeated on land by the Corinthian and Epidaurian forces: possibly it may have been in this expedition that they acquired possession of Trœzen, which we find afterwards in their dependence, without knowing when it became so. But in a sea-fight which took place off the island of Kekryphaleia, between Ægina and the Argolic peninsula, the Athenians gained the victory. After this victory and defeat, — neither of them apparently very decisive, — the Æginetans began to take a more energetic part in the war, and brought out their full naval force, together with that of their allies. — Corinthians, Epidaurians, and other Peloponnesians: while Athens equipped a fleet of corresponding magnitude, summoning her allies also; though we do not know the actual numbers on either side. In the great naval battle which ensued off the island of Ægina, the superiority of the

new nautical tactics, acquired by twenty years' practice of the Athenians since the Persian war, — over the old Hellenic ships and seamen, as shown in those states where, at the time of the battle of Marathon, the maritime strength of Greece had resided, — was demonstrated by a victory most complete and decisive. The Peloponnesian and Dorian seamen had as yet had no experience of the improved seacraft of Athens, and when we find how much they were disconcerted with it, even twenty-eight years afterwards, at the beginning of the Peloponnesian war, we shall not wonder at its destructive effect upon them in this early battle. The maritime power of Ægina was irrecoverably ruined: the Athenians captured seventy ships of war, landed a large force upon the island, and commenced the siege of the city by land as well as by sea.¹

If the Lacedæmonians had not been occupied at home by the blockade of Ithômê, they would have been probably induced to invade Attica as a diversion to the Æginetans; especially as the Persian Megabazus came to Sparta at this time on the part of Artaxerxes to prevail upon them to do so, in order that the Athenians might be constrained to retire from Egypt: this Persian brought with him a large sum of money, but was nevertheless obliged to return without effecting his mission.² The Corinthians and Epidaurians, however, while they carried to Ægina a reinforcement of three hundred hoplites, did their best to aid her farther by an attack upon Megara; which place, it was supposed, the Athenians could not possibly relieve without withdrawing their forces from Ægina, inasmuch as so many of their men were at the same time serving in Egypt. But the Athenians showed themselves equal to all these three exigencies at one and the same time, — to the great disappointment of their enemies. Myrônîdês marched from Athens to Megara at the head of the citizens in the two extremes of military age, old and young; these being the only troops at home. He fought the Corinthians near the town, gaining a slight, but debatable advantage, which he commemorated by a trophy, as soon as the Corinthians had returned home. But the latter when they arrived at home, were

¹ Thucyd. i, 105; Lysias, Orat. Funebr. c. 10. Diodor. xi, 78.

² Thucyd. i, 109.

so much reproached by their own old citizens, for not having vanquished the refuse of the Athenian military force,¹ that they returned back at the end of twelve days and erected a trophy on their side, laying claim to a victory in the past battle. The Athenians, marching out of Megara, attacked them a second time, and gained on this occasion a decisive victory. The defeated Corinthians were still more unfortunate in their retreat; for a body of them, missing their road, became entangled in a space of private ground, inclosed on every side by a deep ditch, and having only one narrow entrance. Myrônides, detecting this fatal mistake, planted his hoplites at the entrance to prevent their escape, and then surrounded the enclosure with his light-armed troops, who, with their missile weapons, slew all the Corinthian hoplites, without possibility either of flight or resistance. The bulk of the Corinthian army effected their retreat, but the destruction of this detachment was a sad blow to the city.²

Splendid as the success of the Athenians had been during this year, both on land and at sea, it was easy for them to foresee that the power of their enemies would presently be augmented by the Lacedæmonians taking the field. Partly on this account, — partly also from the more energetic phase of democracy, and the long-sighted views of Periklès, which were now becoming ascendent in the city, — the Athenians began the stupendous undertaking of connecting Athens with the sea by means of long walls. The idea of this measure had doubtless been first suggested by the recent erection of long walls, though for so much smaller a distance, between Megara and Nisæa: for without such an intermediate stepping-stone, the idea of a wall forty stadia long (equal to four and a half miles) to join Athens with Peiræus, and another wall of thirty-five stadia (equal to about four miles) to join it with Phalærum, would have appeared extravagant even

¹ Lysias, Orat. Funeb. c. 10. *ἐνίκων μαχόμενοι ἅπασαν τὴν δύναμιν τῆς ἑκείνων τοῖς ἤδη ἀπεπληροῦσι καὶ τοῖς οὐκ ὄντι δυνάμεσιν*, etc.

The incident mentioned by Thucydides about the Corinthians, that the old men of their own city were so indignant against them on their return, is highly characteristic of Grecian manners, — *κακίζομενοι ὑπὸ τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει πρεσβυτέρων*, etc.

² Thucyd. i. 106. *πάθος μέγα τοῦτο Κορινθίοις ἐγένετο*. Compare Diodor. xi. 78, 79, — whose chronology, however, is very misleading.

to the sanguine temper of Athenians, — as it certainly would have seemed a few years earlier to Themistoklès himself. Coming as an immediate sequel of great recent victories, and while Ægina, the great Dorian naval power, was prostrate and under blockade, it excited the utmost alarm among the Peloponnesians, — being regarded as the second great stride,¹ at once conspicuous and of lasting effect, in Athenian ambition, next to the fortification of Peiræus. But besides this feeling in the bosom of enemies, the measure was also interwoven with the formidable contention of political parties then going on at Athens. Kimon had been recently ostracized; and the democratical movement pressed by Periklès and Ephialtès — of which more presently — was in its full tide of success, yet not without a violent and unprincipled opposition on the part of those who supported the existing constitution. Now, the long walls formed a part of the foreign policy of Periklès, continuing on a gigantic scale the plans of Themistoklès when he first schemed the Peiræus. They were framed to render Athens capable of carrying on war against any superiority of landed attack, and of bidding defiance to the united force of Peloponnesus. But though thus calculated for contingencies which a long-sighted man might see gathering in the distance, the new walls were, almost on the same grounds, obnoxious to a considerable number of Athenians: to the party recently headed by Kimon, who were attached to the Lacedæmonian connection, and desired above all things to maintain peace at home, reserving the energies of the state for anti-Persian enterprise: to many landed proprietors in Attica, whom they seemed to threaten with approaching invasion and destruction of their territorial possessions: to the rich men and aristocrats of Athens, averse to a still closer contact and amalgamation with the maritime multitude in Peiræus: lastly, perhaps, to a certain vein of old Attic feeling, which might look upon the junction of Athens with the separate demes of Peiræus and Phalærum as effacing the special associations connected with the holy rock of

¹ *Καὶ τῶνδε ἡμεῖς αἴτιοι, τό τε πρῶτον ἐάσαντες αὐτοὺς τὴν πόλιν μετὰ τὰ Μηδικὰ κρατῆναι, καὶ ὕστερον τὰ μακρὰ στήσαι τεῖχην*, — is the language addressed by the Corinthians to the Spartans, in reference to Athens, a little before the Peloponnesian war (Thucyd. i. 69).

Athênê. When, to all these grounds of opposition, we add, the expense and trouble of the undertaking itself, the interference with private property, the peculiar violence of party which happened then to be raging, and the absence of a large proportion of military citizens in Egypt, — we shall hardly be surprised to find that the projected long walls brought on a risk of the most serious character both for Athens and her democracy. If any farther proof were wanting of the vast importance of these long walls, in the eyes both of friends and of enemies, we might find it in the fact, that their destruction was the prominent mark of Athenian humiliation after the battle of Ægos Potamos, and their restoration the immediate boon of Pharnabazus and Konon after the victory of Knidus.

Under the influence of the alarm now spread by the proceedings of Athens, the Lacedæmonians were prevailed upon to undertake an expedition out of Peloponnesus, although the Helots in Ithômê were not yet reduced to surrender. Their force consisted of fifteen hundred troops of their own, and ten thousand of their various allies, under the regent Nikomêdês. The ostensible motive, or the pretence, for this march, was the protection of the little territory of Doris against the Phocians, who had recently invaded it and taken one of its three towns. The mere approach of so large a force immediately compelled the Phocians to relinquish their conquest, but it was soon seen that this was only a small part of the objects of Sparta, and that her main purposes, under instigation of the Corinthians, were directed against the aggrandizement of Athens. It could not escape the penetration of Corinth, that the Athenians might presently either enlist or constrain the towns of Bœotia into their alliance, as they had recently acquired Megara, in addition to their previous ally, Plataea: for the Bœotian federation was at this time much disorganized, and Thebes, its chief, had never recovered her ascendancy since the discredit of her support lent to the Persian invasion. To strengthen Thebes, and to render her ascendancy effective over the Bœotian cities, was the best way of providing a neighbor at once powerful and hostile to the Athenians, so as to prevent their farther aggrandizement by land: it was the same policy as Epaminondas pursued eighty years afterwards in organizing Arcadia and Messenê against Sparta. Accordingly, the

Peloponnesian force was now employed partly in enlarging and strengthening the fortifications of Thebes herself, partly in constraining the other Bœotian cities into effective obedience to her supremacy: probably by placing their governments in the hands of citizens of known oligarchical politics,¹ and perhaps banishing suspected opponents. To this scheme the Thebans lent themselves with earnestness; promising to keep down for the future their border neighbors, so as to spare the necessity of armies coming from Sparta.²

But there was also a farther design, yet more important, in contemplation by the Spartans and Corinthians. The oligarchical opposition at Athens were so bitterly hostile to the Long Walls, to Periklês, and to the democratical movement, that several of them opened a secret negotiation with the Peloponnesian leaders, inviting them into Attica, and entreating their aid in an internal rising for the purpose not only of putting a stop to the Long Walls, but also of subverting the democracy. And the Peloponnesian army, while prosecuting its operations in Bœotia, waited in hopes of seeing the Athenian malcontents in arms, encamping at Tanagra, on the very borders of Attica, for the purpose of immediate coöperation with them. The juncture was undoubtedly one of much hazard for Athens, especially as the ostracized Kimon and his remaining friends in the city were suspected of being implicated in the conspiracy. But the Athenian leaders, aware of the Lacedæmonian operations in Bœotia, knew also what was meant by the presence of the army on their immediate borders, and took decisive measures to avert the danger. Having obtained a reinforcement of one thousand Argeians and some Thessalian horse, they marched out to Tanagra, with the full Athenian force then at home; which must, of course, have consisted chiefly of the old and the young, the same who had fought under Myrônidês at Megara; for the blockade of Ægina was still going on. Nor

¹ Diodor. xii, 81; Justin, iii, 6. Τῆς μὲν τῶν Θεβαίων πόλεως μείζονα τὸν περιβολὸν κατεσκεύασαν, τὰς δ' ἐν Βοιωτίᾳ πόλεις ἠνάγκασαν ὑποτάττεσθαι ταῖς Θεβαίαις.

² Diodor. l. c. It must probably be to the internal affairs of Bœotia somewhere about this time, full as they were of internal dissension, that the dictum and simile of Periklês alludes, — which Aristotle notices in his Rhetoric. iii, 4, 2.

was it possible for the Lacedæmonian army to return into Peloponnesus without fighting; for the Athenians, masters of the Megarid, were in possession of the difficult highlands of Geraneia, the road of march along the isthmus; while the Athenian fleet, by means of the harbor of Pegæ, was prepared to intercept them, if they tried to come by sea across the Krissæan gulf, by which way it would appear that they had come out. Near Tanagra, a bloody battle took place between the two armies, wherein the Lacedæmonians were victorious, chiefly from the desertion of the Thessalian horse, who passed over to them in the very heat of the engagement.¹ But though the advantage was on their side, it was not sufficiently decisive to favor the contemplated rising in Attica: nor did the Peloponnesians gain anything by it, except an undisturbed retreat over the highlands of Geraneia, after having partially ravaged the Megarid.

Though the battle of Tanagra was a defeat, yet there were circumstances connected with it which rendered its effects highly beneficial to Athens. The ostracized Kimon presented himself on the field as soon as the army had passed over the boundaries of Attica, requesting to be allowed to occupy his station as an hoplite and to fight in the ranks of his tribe, — the CEnëis. But such was the belief, entertained by the members of the senate and by his political enemies present, that he was an accomplice in the conspiracy known to be on foot, that permission was refused and he was forced to retire. In departing, he conjured his personal friends, Euthippus, of the deme Anaphlystus, and others, to behave in such a manner as might wipe away the stain resting upon his fidelity, and in part also upon theirs. His friends retained his panoply, and assigned to it the station in the ranks which he would himself have occupied: they then entered the engagement with desperate resolution, and one hundred of them fell side by side in their ranks. Periklēs, on his part, who was present among the hoplites of his own tribe, the Akamantis, aware of this application and repulse of Kimon, thought it incumbent upon him to display not merely his ordinary personal courage, but an unusual recklessness of life and safety, though it happened that he escaped unwounded. All these incidents brought about a generous sympathy and spirit of compromise

¹ Thucyd. i, 10.

among the contending parties at Athens, while the unshaken patriotism of Kimon and his friends discountenanced and disarmed those conspirators who had entered into correspondences with the enemy, at the same time that it roused a repentant admiration towards the ostracized leader himself. Such was the happy working of this new sentiment that a decree was shortly proposed and carried, — proposed too, by Periklēs himself, — to abridge the ten years of Kimon's ostracism, and permit his immediate return.¹ We may recollect that, under circumstances partly analogous, Themistoklēs had himself proposed the restoration of his rival Aristeidēs from ostracism, a little before the battle of Salamis:² and in both cases, the suspension of enmity between the two leaders was partly the sign, partly also the auxiliary cause, of reconciliation and renewed fraternity among the general body of citizens. It was a moment analogous to that salutary impulse of compromise, and harmony of parties, which followed the extinction of the oligarchy of Four Hundred, forty-six years afterwards, and on which Thucydides dwells emphatically as the salvation of Athens in her distress, — a moment rare in free communities generally, not less than among the jealous competitors for political ascendancy at Athens.³

¹ Plutarch, Kimon, c. 14; Periklēs, c. 10. Plutarch represents the Athenians as having recalled Kimon from fear of the Lacedæmonians who had just beaten them at Tanagra, and for the purpose of procuring peace. He adds that Kimon obtained peace for them forthwith. Both these assertions are incorrect. The extraordinary successes in Bæotia, which followed so quickly after the defeat at Tanagra, show that the Athenians were under no impressions of fear at that juncture, and that the recall of Kimon proceeded from quite different feelings. Moreover, the peace with Sparta was not made till some years afterwards.

² Plutarch, Themistoklēs, c. 10.

³ Plutarch, Kimon, c. 17; Periklēs, c. 10; Thucyd. viii, 97. Plutarch observes, respecting this reconciliation of parties after the battle of Tanagra, after having mentioned that Periklēs himself proposed the restoration of Kimon —

ὁμοίως τότε πολιτικαὶ καὶ ἡσὺν αἱ διαφοραὶ, μέτροι δὲ οἱ θυμῷ καὶ πρὸς τὸ κοινὸν εὐανέστησι συμφέρον, ἥ δὲ φιλοτιμία πάντων ἐπικρατοῦσα τῶν παθῶν τοῖς τῆς πατρίδος ὑπεχώρει καίροις.

Which remarks are very analogous to those of Thucydides, in recounting the memorable proceedings of the year 411 B.C., after the deposition of the oligarchy of Four Hundred (Thucyd. viii, 97).

So powerful was this burst of fresh patriotism and unanimity after the battle of Tanagra, which produced the recall of Kimon,

Καὶ οὐκ ἥκιστα δὴ τὸν πρῶτον χρόνον ἐπὶ γε ἐμοῦ Ἀθηναῖοι φαίνονται εὖ πολιτεύσαντες· μετρία γὰρ ἦ τε ἐς τοὺς ὀλίγους καὶ τοὺς πολλοὺς ξυγκρασίαι ἐγένετο; καὶ ἐκ πονηρῶν τῶν πραγμάτων γενομένων τοῦτο πρῶτον ἀνῆνεγκε τὴν πόλιν. I may remark that the explanatory note of Dr. Arnold on this passage is less instructive than his notes usually are, and even involves, in my judgment, an erroneous supposition as to the meaning. Dr. Arnold says: "It appears that the constitution as now fixed, was at first, in the opinion of Thucydides, the best that Athens had ever enjoyed within his memory; that is, the best since the complete ascendancy of the democracy effected under Periklēs. But how long a period is meant to be included by the words τὸν πρῶτον χρόνον, and when, and how, did the implied change take place? τὸν πρῶτον χρόνον can hardly apply to the whole remaining term of the war as if this improved constitution had been first subverted by the triumph of the oligarchy under the Thirty, and then superseded by the restoration of the old democracy after their overthrow. Yet Xenophon mentions no intermediate change in the government between the beginning of his history and the end of the war," etc.

Now I do not think that Dr. Arnold rightly interprets τὸν πρῶτον χρόνον. The phrase appears to me equivalent to τοῦτον τὸν χρόνον πρῶτον: the words τὸν πρῶτον χρόνον, apply the comparison altogether to the period preceding this event here described, and not to the period following it. "And it was during this period first, in my time at least, that the Athenians most of all behaved like good citizens: for the Many and the Few met each other in a spirit of moderation, and this first brought up the city from its deep existing distress." No such comparison is intended as Dr. Arnold supposes, between the first moments after this juncture, and the subsequent changes: the comparison is between the political temper of the Athenians at this juncture, and their usual temper as far back as Thucydides could recollect.

Next, the words εὖ πολιτεύσαντες are understood by Dr. Arnold in a sense too special and limited, — as denoting merely the new constitution, or positive organic enactments, which the Athenians now introduced. But it appears to me that the words are of wider import: meaning the general temper of political parties, both reciprocally towards each other and towards the commonwealth: their inclination to relinquish antipathies, to accommodate points of difference, and to coöperate with each other heartily against the enemy, suspending those ἰδίας φιλοτιμίας, ἰδίας διαβολὰς περὶ τῆς τοῦ δήμου προστασίας (ii, 63) noticed as having been so mischievous before. Of course, any constitutional arrangements introduced at such a period would partake of the moderate and harmonious spirit then prevalent, and would therefore form a part of what is commended by Thucydides: but his commendation is not confined to them specially. Compare the phrase ii. 38. ἐλευθέρως δὲ τὰ τε πρὸς τὸ κοινὸν πολιτεύμεν, etc.

and appears to have overlaid the preëxisting conspiracy, that the Athenians were quickly in a condition to wipe off the stain of their defeat. It was on the sixty-second day after the battle that they undertook an aggressive march under Myrônides into Bœotia: the extreme precision of this date, — being the single case throughout the summary of events between the Persian and Peloponnesian wars, wherein Thucydides is thus precise, marks how strong an impression it made upon the memory of the Athenians. At the battle of Ctenophyta, engaged against the aggregate Theban and Bœotian forces, — or, if Diodorus is to be trusted, in two battles, of which that of Ctenophyta was the last, Myrônides was completely victorious. The Athenians became masters of Thebes as well as of the remaining Bœotian towns; reversing all the arrangements recently made by Sparta, — establishing democratical governments, — and forcing the aristocratical leaders, favorable to Theban ascendancy and Lacedæmonian connection, to become exiles. Nor was it only Bœotia which the Athenians thus acquired: Phocis and Lokris were both successively added to the list of their dependent allies, — the former being in the main friendly to Athens and not disinclined to the change, while the latter were so decidedly hostile that one hundred of their chiefs were detained and sent to Athens as hostages. The Athenians thus extended their influence, — maintained through internal party-management, backed by the dread of interference from without in case of need, — from the borders of the Corinthian territory, including both Megara and Pégæ, to the strait of Thermopylæ.¹

These important acquisitions were soon crowned by the completion of the Long Walls and the conquest of Ægina. That island, doubtless starved out by its protracted blockade, was forced to capitulate on condition of destroying its fortifications, surrendering all its ships of war, and submitting to annual tribute as a dependent ally of Athens. The reduction of this once powerful maritime city, marked Athens as mistress of the sea on the Peloponnesian coast not less than on the Ægean. Her admiral Tolmidēs displayed her strength by sailing round Peloponnesus, and even by the insult of burning the Lacedæmonian ports

¹ Thucyd. i, 108; Diodor. xi, 81, 82.

of Methônê and of Gythium. He took Chalkis, a possession of the Corinthians, and Naupaktus belonging to the Ozolian Lokrians, near the mouth of the Corinthian gulf,—disembarked troops near Sikyon with some advantage in a battle against opponents from that town,—and either gained or forced into the Athenian alliance not only Zakynthos and Kephallênia, but also some of the towns of Achaia; for we afterwards find these latter attached to Athens without knowing when the connection began.¹

During the ensuing year the Athenians renewed their attack upon Sikyon, with a force of one thousand hoplites under Periklês himself, sailing from the Megarian harbor of Pêgæ in the Krissæan gulf. This eminent man, however, gained no greater advantage than Tolmidês,—defeating the Sikyonian forces in the field and driving them within their walls: he afterwards made an expedition into Akarnania, taking the Achæan allies in addition to his own forces, but miscarried in his attack on Ceniadæ and accomplished nothing. Nor were the Athenians more successful in a march undertaken this same year against Thessaly, for the purpose of restoring Orestes, one of the exiled princes or nobles of Pharsalus. Though they took with them an imposing force, including their Bœotian and Phocian allies, the powerful Thessalian cavalry forced them to keep in a compact body and confined them to the ground actually occupied by their hoplites; while all their attempts against the city failed, and their hopes of internal rising were disappointed.²

Had the Athenians succeeded in Thessaly, they would have acquired to their alliance nearly the whole of extra-Peloponnesian Greece: but even without Thessaly their power was prodigious, and had now attained a maximum height, from which it never varied except to decline. As a counterbalancing loss against so many successes, we have to reckon their ruinous defeat in Egypt, after a war of six years against the Persians (B.C. 460–455). At first, they had gained brilliant advantages, in conjunction with the insurgent prince Inarôs; expelling the Persians from all Memphis except the strongest part, called the White Fortress: and such was the alarm of the Persian king

¹ Thucyd. i. 108–115; Diodor. xi. 84.
² Thucyd. i. 111; Diodor. xi. 85.

Artaxerxes, at the presence of the Athenians in Egypt, that he sent Megabazus with a large sum of money to Sparta, in order to induce the Lacedæmonians to invade Attica. This envoy, however, failed, and an augmented Persian force being sent to Egypt under Megabyzus, son of Zopyrus,¹ drove the Athenians and their allies, after an obstinate struggle, out of Memphis into the island of the Nile called Prosôpitis. Here they were blocked up for eighteen months, until at length Megabyzus turned the arm of the river, laid the channel dry, and stormed the island by land. A very few Athenians escaped by land to Kyrênê: the rest were either slain or made captive, and Inarôs himself was crucified. And the calamity of Athens was farther aggravated by the arrival of fifty fresh Athenian ships, which, coming after the defeat, but without being aware of it, sailed into the Mendesian branch of the Nile, and thus fell unawares into the power of the Persians and Phenicians; very few either of the ships or men escaping. The whole of Egypt became again subject to the Persians, except Amyrtæus, who contrived, by retiring into the inaccessible fens, still to maintain his independence. One of the largest armaments ever sent forth by Athens and her confederacy was thus utterly ruined.²

It was about the time of the destruction of the Athenian army in Egypt, and of the circumnavigation of Peloponnesus by Tolmidês, that the internal war, carried on by the Lacedæmonians, against the Helots or Messenians at Ithômê, ended. These besieged men, no longer able to stand out against a protracted blockade, were forced to abandon this last fortress of ancient Messenian independence, stipulating for a safe retreat from Peloponnesus with their wives and families, with the proviso, that if any one of them ever returned to Peloponnesus, he should become the slave of the first person who seized him. They were established by Tolmidês at Naupaktus, which had recently been

Herodot. iii. 160.

¹ Thucyd. i. 104, 109, 110; Diodor. xi. 77; xii. 3. The story of Diodorus, in the first of these two passages,—that most of the Athenian forces were allowed to come back under a favorable capitulation granted by the Persian generals,—is contradicted by the total ruin which he himself states to have befallen them in the latter passages, as well as by Thucydides.

taken by the Athenians from the Ozolian Lokrians,¹—where they will be found rendering good service to Athens in the following wars.

After the victory of Tanagra, the Lacedæmonians made no farther expeditions out of Peloponnesus for several succeeding years, not even to prevent Bœotia and Phocis from being absorbed into the Athenian alliance. The reason of this remissness lay, partly, in their general character; partly, in the continuance of the siege of Ithômê, which occupied them at home; but still more, perhaps, in the fact that the Athenians, masters of the Megarid, were in occupation of the road over the highlands of Geraneia, and could therefore obstruct the march of any army out from Peloponnesus. Even after the surrender of Ithômê, the Lacedæmonians remained inactive for three years, after which time a formal truce was concluded with Athens by the Peloponnesians generally, for five years longer.² This truce was concluded in a great degree through the influence of Kimon,³ who was eager to resume effective operations against the Persians; while it was not less suitable to the political interests of Periklès

¹ Thucyd. i, 103; Diodor. xi, 84.

² Thucyd. i, 112.

³ Theopompus, Fragm. 92, ed. Didot; Plutarch, Kimon, c. 18; Diodor. xi, 86.

It is to be presumed that this is the peace which Æschines (De Fals. Legat. c. 54, p. 300) and Andokides or the Pseudo-Andokides (De Pace. c. 1), state to have been made by Miltiades, son of Kimon, proxenus of the Lacedæmonians; assuming that Miltiades son of Kimon is put by the Lacedæmonians; assuming that Miltiades son of Kimon is put by them, through lapse of memory, for Kimon son of Miltiades. But the passages of these orators involve so much both of historical and chronological inaccuracy, that it is unsafe to cite them, and impossible to amend them except by conjecture. Mr. Fynes Clinton (Fasti Hellen. Appendix, 8, p. 257) has pointed out some of these inaccuracies; and there are others besides, not less grave, especially in the oration ascribed to Andokides. It is remarkable that both of them seem to recognize only two long walls, the northern and the southern wall; whereas, in the time of Thucydides, there were three long walls: the two near and parallel, connecting Athens with Peiræus, and a third connecting it with Phalærum. This last was never renewed, after all of them had been partially destroyed at the disastrous close of the Peloponnesian war: and it appears to have passed out of the recollection of Æschines, who speaks of the two walls as they existed in his time. I concur with the various critics who pronounce the oration ascribed to Andokides to be spurious.

that his most distinguished rival should be absent on foreign service,¹ so as not to interfere with his influence at home. Accordingly, Kimon equipped a fleet of two hundred triremes, from Athens and her confederates, and set sail for Cyprus, from whence he despatched sixty ships to Egypt, at the request of the insurgent prince Amyrtæus, who was still maintaining himself against the Persians amidst the fens,—while with the remaining armament he laid siege to Kitium. In the prosecution of this siege, he died, either of disease or of a wound. The armament, under his successor, Anaxikrates, became so embarrassed for want of provisions that they abandoned the undertaking altogether, and went to fight the Phenician and Kilikian fleet near Salamis, in Cyprus. They were here victorious, first on sea, and afterwards on land, though probably not on the same day, as at the Eurymedon; after which they returned home, followed by the sixty ships which had gone to Egypt for the purpose of aiding Amyrtæus.²

From this time forward no farther operations were undertaken by Athens, and her confederacy against the Persians. And it appears that a convention was concluded between them, whereby the Great King on his part promised two things: To leave free, undisturbed, and untaxed, the Asiatic maritime Greeks, not sending troops within a given distance of the coast: to refrain from sending any ships of war either westward of Phasêlis (others place the boundary at the Chelidonean islands, rather more to the westward) or within the Kyanean rocks at the confluence

¹ Plutarch, Periklès, c. 10, and Reipublic. Gerend. Præcep. p. 812.

An understanding to this effect between the two rivals is so natural, that we need not resort to the supposition of a secret agreement concluded between them through the mediation of Elpinikê, sister of Kimon, which Plutarch had read in some authors. The charms as well as the intrigues of Elpinikê appear to have figured conspicuously in the memoirs of Athenian biographers: they were employed by one party as a means of calumniating Kimon, by the other for discrediting Periklès.

² Thucyd. i, 112; Diodorus, xii, 13. Diodorus mentions the name of the general Anaxikrates. He affirms farther that Kimon lived not only to take Kitium and Mallus, but also to gain these two victories. But the authority of Thucydides, superior on every ground to Diodorus, is more particularly superior as to the death of Kimon, with whom he was connected by relationship.

of the Thracian Bosphorus with the Euxine. On their side, the Athenians agreed to leave him in undisturbed possession of Cyprus and Egypt. Kallias, an Athenian of distinguished family, with some others of his countrymen, went up to Susa to negotiate this convention: and certain envoys from Argos, then in alliance with Athens, took the opportunity of going thither at the same time, to renew the friendly understanding which their city had established with Xerxes at the period of his invasion of Greece.¹

As is generally the case with treaties after hostility,—this convention did little more than recognize the existing state of things, without introducing any new advantage or disadvantage on either side, or calling for any measures to be taken in consequence of it. We may hence assign a reasonable ground for the silence of Thucydides, who does not even notice the convention as having been made: we are to recollect always that in the interval between the Persian and Peloponnesian wars, he does not profess to do more than glance briefly at the main events. But the boastful and inaccurate authors of the ensuing century, orators, rhetors, and historians, indulged in so much exaggeration and untruth respecting this convention, both as to date and as to details,—and extolled as something so glorious the fact of

¹ Herodot. vii, 151; Diodor. xii, 3, 4. Demosthenes (*De Falsa Legat.* c. 77, p. 428, R; compare *De Rhodior. Libert.* c. 13, p. 199) speaks of this peace as *τὴν ὑπὸ πάντων ἐνυλλομένην εἰρήνην*. Compare Lykurgus, *cont. Leokrat.* c. 17, p. 187; Isokratēs, *Panegy.* c. 33, 34, p. 244; *Areopagit.* c. 37, pp. 150, 229; *Panathenaic.* c. 20, p. 360.

The loose language of these orators makes it impossible to determine what was the precise limit in respect of vicinity to the coast. Isokratēs is careless enough to talk of the river Halys as the boundary; Demosthenēs states it as “a day’s course for a horse,”—which is probably larger than the truth.

The two boundaries marked by sea, on the other hand, are both clear and natural, in reference to the Athenian empire,—the Kyanean rocks at one end, Phaselis, or the Chelidonian islands—there is no material distance between these two last-mentioned places—on the other.

Dahlmann, at the end of his *Dissertation on the reality of this Kimonian peace*, collects the various passages of authors wherein it is mentioned: among them are several out of the rhetor Aristeidēs (*Forschungen* ad. 140–148).

having imposed such hard conditions on the Great King,—that they have raised a suspicion against themselves. Especially, they have occasioned critics to ask the very natural question, how this splendid achievement of Athens came to be left unnoticed by Thucydides? Now the answer to such question is, that the treaty itself was really of no great moment: it is the state of facts and relations implied in the treaty, and existing substantially before it was concluded, which constitutes the real glory of Athens. But to the later writers, the treaty stood forth as the legible evidence of facts which in their time were passed and gone; while Thucydides and his contemporaries, living in the actual fulness of the Athenian empire, would certainly not appeal to the treaty as an evidence, and might well pass it over, even as an event, when studying to condense the narrative. Though Thucydides has not mentioned the treaty, he says nothing which disproves its reality, and much which is in full harmony with it. For we may show, even from him: 1. That all open and direct hostilities between Athens and Persia ceased, after the last-mentioned victories of the Athenians near Cyprus: that this island is renounced by Athens, not being included by Thucydides in his catalogue of Athenian allies prior to the Peloponnesian war;¹ and that no farther aid is given by Athens to the revolted Amyrtaeus, in Egypt. 2. That down to the time when the Athenian power was prostrated by the ruinous failure at Syracuse, no tribute was collected by the Persian satraps in Asia Minor from the Greek cities on the coast, nor were Persian ships of war allowed to appear in the waters of the Ægean,² nor was the Persian king

¹ Thucyd. ii, 14.

² Thucyd. viii, 5, 6, 56. As this is a point on which very erroneous representations have been made by some learned critics, especially by Dahlmann and Manso (see the treatises cited in the subsequent note, p. 457), I transcribe the passage of Thucydides. He is speaking of the winter of B.C. 412, immediately succeeding the ruin of the Athenian army at Syracuse, and after redoubled exertions had been making—even some months before that ruin actually took place—to excite active hostile proceedings against Athens from every quarter (Thucyd. vii, 25): it being seen that there was a promising opportunity for striking a heavy blow at the Athenian power. The satrap Tissaphernes encouraged the Chians and Erythræans to revolt, sending an envoy along with them to Sparta with persuasions

admitted to be sovereign of the country down to the coast. Granting, therefore, that we were even bound, from the silence of

and promises of aid, — ἐπῆγετο καὶ ὁ Τισσαφέρνης τοὺς Πελοποννησίους καὶ ἰσχυρεῖτο τροφὴν παρέχειν. Ὑπὸ βασιλείᾳ γὰρ νεώστ' ἐτάχανε πεπραγμένους τοὺς ἐκ τῆς αὐτοῦ ἀρχῆς φόρους, οἳς δὲ Ἀθηναίους ἀπὸ τῶν Ἑλληνίδων πόλεων οὐ δυνάμενος πράσσειν εἰσέλετο. Τοὺς τε οὖν φόρους μᾶλλον ἐνόμιζε κομίσσεται, κακώσας τοὺς Ἀθηναίους, καὶ ἅμα βασιλεῖ ξυμμαχίαν Λακεδαιμονίους ποιῆσειν, etc. In the next chapter, Thucydides tells us that the satrap Pharnabazus wanted to obtain Lacedæmonian aid in the same manner as Tissaphernes, for his satrapy also, in order that he might detach the Greek cities from Athens, and be able to levy the tribute upon them. Two Greeks go to Sparta, sent by Pharnabazus, ὅπως ναὺς κομίσσεται ἐς τὸν Ἑλλήσποντον, καὶ αὐτὰς, εἰ δύναίτο ὑπὲρ ὁ Τισσαφέρνης προΐσταναι, τὰς τε ἐν τῇ αὐτοῦ ἀρχῇ πόλεις Ἀθηναίων ἀποστήσειε διὰ τοῦτος φόρους, καὶ ἐφ' αὐτοῦ βασιλεῖ τὴν ξυμμαχίαν τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων ποιήσειε.

These passages, strange to say, are considered by Manso and Dahlmann as showing that the Grecian cities on the Asiatic coast, though subject to the Athenian empire, continued, nevertheless, to pay their tribute regularly to Susa. To me, the passages appear to disprove this very supposition: they show that it was essential for the satrap to detach these cities from the Athenian empire, as a means of procuring tribute from them to Persia: that the Athenian empire, while it lasted, prevented him from getting any tribute from the cities subject to it. Manso and Dahlmann have overlooked the important meaning of the adverb of time νεώστ' — "lately." By that word, Thucydides expressly intimates that the court of Susa had only recently demanded from Tissaphernes and Pharnabazus, tribute from the maritime Greeks within their satrapies: and he implies that until recently no such demand had been made upon them. The court of Susa, apprized, doubtless, by Grecian exiles and agents, of the embarrassments into which Athens had fallen, conceived this a suitable moment for exacting tributes; to which, doubtless, it always considered itself entitled, though the power of Athens had compelled it to forego them. Accordingly, the demand was now for the first time sent down to Tissaphernes, and he "became a debtor for them" to the court (εἰσέλετο), until he could collect them: which he could not at first do, even then, embarrassed as Athens was, — and which, *a fortiori*, he could not have done before, when Athens was in full power.

We learn from these passages two valuable facts. 1. That the maritime Asiatic cities belonging to the Athenian empire paid no tribute to Susa, from the date of the full organization of the Athenian confederacy down to a period after the Athenian defeat in Sicily. 2. That, nevertheless, these cities always continued, throughout this period, to stand rated in the Persian king's books each for its appropriate tribute. — the court of Susa waiting for a convenient moment to occur, when it should be able to enforce its demands, from misfortune accruing to Athens.

Thucydides, to infer that no treaty was concluded, we should still be obliged also to infer, from his positive averments, that a state

This state of relations, between the Asiatic Greeks and the Persian court under the Athenian empire, authenticated by Thucydides, enables us to explain a passage of Herodotus, on which also both Manso and Dahlmann have dwelt (p. 94) with rather more apparent plausibility, as proving their view of the case. Herodotus, after describing the rearrangement and remeasurement of the territories of the Ionic cities by the satrap Artaphernes about 493 B.C., after the suppression of the Ionic revolt), proceeds to state that he assessed the tribute of each with reference to this new measurement, and that the assessment remained unchanged until his own (Herodotus's) time, — καὶ τὰς χώρας σφέων μετρήσας κατὰ παρασάγγας. . . . φόρους ἔταξε ἐκάστοις, οἱ κατὰ χώραν διατελέουσι ἔχοντες ἐκ τούτου τοῦ χρόνου αἰεὶ ἐπὶ καὶ ἐς ἐμὲ, ὡς ἐτάχθησαν ἐξ Ἀρταφέρνηος· ἐτάχθησαν δὲ σχεδὸν κατὰ τὰ αὐτὰ τὰ καὶ προτερον εἶχον (vi, 42). Now Dahlmann and Manso contend that Herodotus here affirms the tribute of the Ionic cities to Persia to have been continuously and regularly paid, down to his own time. But in my judgment this is a mistake: Herodotus speaks, not about the *payment*, but about the *assessment*: and these were two very different things, as Thucydides clearly intimates in the passage which I have cited above. The *assessment* of all the Ionic cities in the Persian king's books remained unaltered all through the Athenian empire; but the *payment* was not enforced until immediately before 412 B.C., when the Athenians were supposed to be too weak to hinder it. It is evident by the account of the general Persian revenues, throughout all the satrapies, which we find in the third book of Herodotus, that he had access to official accounts of the Persian finances, or at least to Greek secretaries who knew those accounts. He would be told, that these assessments remained unchanged from the time of Artaphernes downward: whether they were realized or not was another question, which the "books" would probably not answer, and which he might or might not know.

The passages above cited from Thucydides appear to me to afford positive proof that the Greek cities on the Asiatic coast — not those in the interior, as we may see by the case of Magnesia given to Themistoklēs — paid no tribute to Persia during the continuance of the Athenian empire. But if there were no such positive proof, I should still maintain the same opinion. For if these Greeks went on paying tribute, what is meant by the phrases, of their having "*revolted from Persia*," of their "*having been liberated from the king*," (οἱ ἀποστάντες βασιλέως Ἕλληνες — οἱ ἀπὸ Ἰωνίας καὶ Ἑλλήσποντου ἤδη ἀφεστηκότες ἀπὸ βασιλέως — ὅσοι ἀπὸ βασιλέως νεώστ' ἠλευθέρωντο, Thucyd. i. 18. 89, 95?)

So much respecting the payment of tribute. As to the other point, — that between 477 and 412 B.C., no Persian ships were tolerated along the coast of Ionia, which coast, though claimed by the Persian king, was not

of historical fact, such as the treaty acknowledged and prescribed became actually realized. But when we reflect farther, that Herodotus¹ certifies the visit of Kallias and other Athenian envoys to the court of Susa, we can assign no other explanation of such visit so probable as the reality of this treaty: certainly, no envoys would have gone thither during a state of recognized war; and though it may be advanced as possible that they may have gone with the view to conclude a treaty, and yet not have succeeded,—this would be straining the limits of possibility beyond what is reasonable.²

recognized by the Greeks as belonging to him,—proof will be found in Thucyd. viii, 56: compare Diodor. iv, 26.

¹ Herodot. vii, 151. Diodorus also states that this peace was concluded by Kallias the Athenian (xii, 4).

² I conclude, on the whole, in favor of this treaty as an historical fact,—though sensible that some of the arguments urged against it are not without force. Mr. Mitford and Dr. Thirlwall (ch. xvii, p. 474), as well as Manso and Dahlmann, not to mention others, have impugned the reality of the treaty: and the last-mentioned author, particularly, has examined the case at length and set forth all the grounds of objection; urging, among some which are really serious, others which appear to me weak and untenable (Manso, Sparta, vol. iii, Beylage x, p. 471; Dahlmann, Forschungen auf dem Gebiete der Geschichte, vol. i, Ueber den Kimonischen Frieden, pp. 1-148). Boeckh admits the treaty as an historical fact.

If we deny altogether the historical reality of the treaty, we must adopt some such hypothesis as that of Dahlmann (p. 40): "The distinct mention and averment of such a peace as having been formally concluded, appears to have first arisen among the schools of the rhetors at Athens, shortly after the peace of Antalkidas, and as an oratorical antithesis to oppose to that peace."

To which we must add the supposition, that some persons must have taken the trouble to cause this fabricated peace to be engraved on a pillar, and placed, either in the Metróon or somewhere else in Athens, among the records of Athenian glories. For that it was so engraved on a column is certain (Theopompus ap. Harpokration. Ἀττικοὶ γράμμασι). The suspicion started by Theopompus (and founded on the fact that the peace was engraved, not in ancient Attic, but in Ionic letters—the latter sort having been only legalized in Athens after the archonship of Eukleides), that this treaty was a subsequent invention and not an historical reality, does not weigh with me very much. Assuming the peace to be real, it would naturally be drawn up and engraved in the character habitually used among the Ionic cities of Asia Minor, since they were the parties most specially interested in it—or it might even have been reengraved, seeing that nearly a

We may therefore believe in the reality of this treaty between Athens and Persia, improperly called the Kimonian treaty: im-

century must have elapsed between the conclusion of the treaty and the time when Theopompus saw the pillar. I confess that the hypothesis of Dahlmann appears to me more improbable than the historical reality of the treaty. I think it more likely that there *was* a treaty, and that the orators talked exaggerated and false matters respecting it,—rather than that they fabricated the treaty from the beginning with a deliberate purpose, and with the false name of an envoy conjoined.

Dahlmann exposes justly and forcibly—an easy task, indeed—the loose, inconsistent, and vainglorious statements of the orators respecting this treaty. The chronological error by which it was asserted to have been made shortly after the victories of the Eurymedon—and was thus connected with the name of Kimon—is one of the circumstances which have most tended to discredit the attesting witnesses: but we must not forget that Ephorus (assuming that Diodorus in this case copies Ephorus, which is highly probable—xii, 3,4) did not fall into this mistake, but placed the treaty in its right chronological place, after the Athenian expedition under Kimon against Cyprus and Egypt in 450-449 B.C. Kimon died before the great results of this expedition were consummated, as we know from Thucydides: on this point Diodorus speaks equivocally, but rather giving it to be understood that Kimon lived to complete the whole, and then died of sickness.

The absurd exaggeration of Isokratês, that the treaty bound the Persian kings not to come westward of the river Halys, has also been very properly censured. He makes this statement in two different orations (Arcopagatic p. 150; Panathenaic, p. 462).

But though Dahlmann succeeds in discrediting the orators, he tries in vain to show that the treaty is in itself improbable, or inconsistent with any known historical facts. A large portion of his dissertation is employed in this part of the case, and I think quite unsuccessfully. The fact that the Persian satraps are seen at various periods after the treaty lending aid—underhand, yet without taking much pains to disguise it—to Athenian revolted subjects, does not prove that no treaty had been concluded. These satraps would, doubtless, be very glad to infringe the treaty, whenever they thought they could do so with advantage: if any misfortune had happened to Athens from the hands of the Peloponnesians,—for example, if the Athenians had been unwise enough to march their aggregate land-force out of the city to repel the invading Peloponnesians from Attica, and had been totally defeated,—the Persians would, doubtless, have tried to regain Ionia forthwith. So the Lacedæmonians, at a time when they were actually in alliance with Athens, listened to the persuasions of the revolted Thasians and promised secretly to invade Attica, in order to aid their revolt (Thucyd. i. 103). Because a treaty is very imperfectly observed,—or rather because the parties, without coming to open war, avail themselves of opportunitie

properly, since not only was it concluded after the death of Kimon, but the Athenian victories by which it was immediately brought on were gained after his death. Nay, more, — the probability is, that if Kimon had lived, it would not have been concluded at all; for his interest as well as his glory led him to prosecute the war against Persia, since he was no match for his rival Periklēs, either as a statesman or as an orator, and could only maintain his popularity by the same means whereby he had earned it, — victories and plunder at the cost of the Persians. His death insured more complete ascendancy to Periklēs, whose policy and character were of a cast altogether opposite: while even Thucydides, son of Melēsias, who succeeded Kimon, his relation, as leader of the anti-Perikleian party, was also a man of the senate and public assembly rather than of campaigns and conquests. Averse to distant enterprises and precarious acquisitions, Periklēs was only anxious to maintain unimpaired the Hellenic ascendancy of Athens, now at its very maximum: he was well aware that the undivided force and vigilance of Athens would not be too much for this object, — nor did they in fact prove sufficient, as we shall presently see. With such dispositions he was naturally glad to conclude a peace, which excluded the Persians from all the coasts of Asia Minor, westward of the Chelidoneans, as well as from all the waters of the Ægean, under the simple condition of renouncing on the part of Athens farther aggressions against Cyprus, Phenicia, Kilikia, and Egypt. The Great King on his side had had sufficient experience of Athenian energy to fear the consequences of such aggressions, if prosecuted; nor did he lose much by relinquishing formally a tribute which at the time he could have little hope of realizing, and which of course he intended to resume on the first favorable opportunity. Weighing all these circumstances, we shall find that the peace, improperly called Kimonian, results naturally from the position and feelings of the contracting parties.

to evade it and encroach upon its prescriptions, — we are not entitled to deny that it has ever been made (Dahlmann, p. 116).

It seems to me that the objections which have been taken by Dahlmann and others against the historical reality of this treaty, tell for the most part only against the exaggerated importance assigned to it by subsequent orators.
¹ Plutarch, Periklēs. c. 21-28

Athens was now at peace both abroad and at home, under the administration of Periklēs, with a great empire, a great fleet, and a great accumulated treasure. The common fund collected from the contributions of the confederates, and originally deposited at Delos, had before this time been transferred to the acropolis at Athens. At what precise time this transfer took place, we cannot state: nor are we enabled to assign the successive stages whereby the confederacy, chiefly with the freewill of its own members, became transformed from a body of armed and active warriors under the guidance of Athens, into disarmed and passive tribute-payers, defended by the military force of Athens, — from allies free, meeting at Delos, and self-determining, into subjects isolated, sending their annual tribute, and awaiting Athenian orders. But it would appear that the change had been made before this time: some of the more resolute of the allies had tried to secede, but Athens had coerced them by force, and reduced them to the condition of tribute-payers, without ships or defence; and Chios, Lesbos, and Samos were now the only allies free and armed on the original footing. Every successive change of an armed ally into a tributary, — every subjugation of a seceder, — tended of course to cut down the numbers, and enfeeble the authority, of the Delian synod; and, what was still Athens it altered the reciprocal relation and feelings both of worse, and her allies, — exalting the former into something like a despot, and degrading the latter into mere passive subjects.

Of course, the palpable manifestation of the change must have been the transfer of the confederate fund from Delos to Athens. The only circumstance which we know respecting this transfer, is, that it was proposed by the Samians,¹ — the second power in the confederacy, inferior only to Athens, and least of all likely to favor any job or sinister purpose of the Athenians. It is farther said that, when the Samians proposed it, Aristeidēs characterized it as a motion unjust, but useful: we may well doubt, however, whether it was made during his lifetime. When the synod at Delos ceased to be so fully attended as to command respect, — when war was lighted up, not only with Persia, but with Ægina and Peloponnesus, — the Samians might not unnat

¹ Plutarch, Aristeidēs, c. 25.

urally feel that the large accumulated fund, with its constant annual accessions, would be safer at Athens than at Delos, which latter island would require a permanent garrison and squadron to insure it against attack. But whatever may have been the grounds on which the Samians proceeded, when we find them coming forward to propose the transfer, we may reasonably infer that it was not displeasing, and did not appear unjust, to the larger members of the confederacy, — and that it was no high-handed and arbitrary exercise of power, as it is often called, on the part of Athens.

After the conclusion of the war with Ægina, and the consequences of the battle of Cænophyta, the position of Athens became altered more and more. She acquired a large catalogue of new allies, partly tributary, like Ægina, — partly in the same relation as Chios, Lesbos, and Samos; that is, obliged only to a conformity of foreign policy and to military service. In this last category were Megara, the Bœotian cities, the Phocians, Lokrians, etc. All these, though allies of Athens, were strangers to Delos and the confederacy against Persia; and accordingly, that confederacy passed insensibly into a matter of history, giving place to the new conception of imperial Athens, with her extensive list of allies, partly free, partly subject. Such transition, arising spontaneously out of the character and circumstances of the confederates themselves, was thus materially forwarded by the acquisitions of Athens extraneous to the confederacy. She was now not merely the first maritime state of Greece, but perhaps equal to Sparta even in land-power, — possessing in her alliance Megara, Bœotia, Phocis, Lokris, together with Achæa and Trœzen, in Peloponnesus. Large as this aggregate already was, both at sea and on land, yet the magnitude of the annual tribute, and still more the character of the Athenians themselves, superior to all Greeks in that combination of energy and discipline which is the grand cause of progress, threatened still farther increase. Occupying the Megarian harbor of Pægae, the Athenians had full means of naval action on both sides of the Corinthian isthmus: but, what was of still greater importance to them, by their possession of the Megarid, and of the highlands of Geraneia, they could restrain any land-force from marching out of Peloponnesus, and were thus, considering besides their mas-

tery at sea, completely unassailable in Attica. Ever since the repulse of Xerxes, Athens had been advancing in an uninterrupted course of power and prosperity at home, as well as of victory and ascendancy abroad, — to which there was no exception, except the ruinous enterprise in Egypt. Looking at the position of Greece, therefore, about 448 B.C., — after the conclusion of the five years' truce between the Peloponnesians and Athens, and of the so-called Kimonian peace between Persia and Athens, — a discerning Greek might well calculate upon farther aggrandizement of this imperial state as the tendency of the age; and accustomed as every Greek was to the conception of separate town-autonomy as essential to a freeman and a citizen, such prospect could not but inspire terror and aversion. The sympathy of the Peloponnesians for the islanders and ultramaritime states, who constituted the original confederacy of Athens, was not considerable; but when the Dorian island of Ægina was subjugated also, and passed into the condition of a defenceless tributary, they felt the blow sorely on every ground. The ancient celebrity and eminent service rendered at the battle of Salamis, of this memorable island, had not been able to protect it; while those great Æginetan families, whose victories at the sacred festival-games Pindar celebrates in a large proportion of his odes, would spread the language of complaint and indignation throughout their numerous "guests" in every Hellenic city. Of course, the same anti-Athenian feeling would pervade those Peloponnesian states who had been engaged in actual hostility with Athens, — Corinth, Sikyon, Epidauros, etc., as well as Sparta, the once-recognized head of Hellas, but now tacitly degraded from her preëminence, baffled in her projects respecting Bœotia, and exposed to the burning of her port at Gythium, without being able even to retaliate upon Attica. Putting all those circumstances together, we may comprehend the powerful feeling of dislike and apprehension now diffused so widely over Greece against the upstart despot city; whose ascendancy, newly acquired, maintained by superior force, and not recognized as legitimate, — threatened, nevertheless, still farther increase. Sixteen years hence, this same sentiment will be found exploding into the Peloponnesian war; but it became rooted in the Greek mind during the period which we have now reached, when

Athens was much more formidable than she had come to be at the commencement of that war: nor shall we thoroughly appreciate the ideas of that later period, unless we take them as handed down from the earlier date of the five years' truce, about 451-446 B.C.

Formidable as the Athenian empire both really was and appeared to be, however, this wide-spread feeling of antipathy proved still stronger, so that, instead of the threatened increase, the empire underwent a most material diminution. This did not arise from the attack of open enemies; for during the five years' truce, Sparta undertook only one movement, and that not against Attica: she sent troops to Delphi, in an expedition dignified with the name of the Sacred War, — expelled the Phocians, who had assumed to themselves the management of the temple, — and restored it to the native Delphians. To this the Athenians made no direct opposition: but as soon as the Lacedæmonians were gone, they themselves marched thither and placed the temple again in the hands of the Phocians, who were then their allies.¹ The Delphians were members of the Phocian league, and there was a dispute of old standing as to the administration of the temple, — whether it belonged to them separately or to the Phocians collectively. The favor of those who administered it counted as an element of considerable moment in Grecian politics; the sympathies of the leading Delphians led them to embrace the side of Sparta, but the Athenians now hoped to counteract this tendency by means of their preponderance in Phocis. We are not told that the Lacedæmonians took any ulterior step in consequence of their views being frustrated by Athens, — a significant evidence of the politics of that day.

The blow which brought down the Athenian empire from this its greatest exaltation, was struck by the subjects themselves. The Athenian ascendancy over Boeotia, Phocis, Lokris, and Eubœa, was maintained, not by means of garrisons, but through domestic parties favorable to Athens, and a suitable form of government; just in the same way as Sparta maintained her influence over her

¹ Thucyd. i. 112; compare Philochor. Fragm. 88, ed. Didot.

Peloponnesian allies.¹ After the victory of Cænophyta, the Athenians had broken up the governments in the Boeotian cities established by Sparta before the battle of Tanagra, and converted them into democracies at Thebes and elsewhere. Many of the previous leading men had thus been sent into exile: and as the same process had taken place in Phocis and Lokris, there was at this time a considerable aggregate body of exiles, Boeotian, Phocian, Lokrian, Eubœan, Æginetan, etc., all bitterly hostile to Athens, and ready to join in any attack upon her power. We learn farther that the democracy,² established at Thebes after the battle of Cænophyta, was ill-conducted and disorderly: which circumstances laid open Boeotia still farther to the schemes of assailants on the watch for every weak point. These various exiles, all joining their forces and concerting measures with their partisans in the interior, succeeded in mastering Orchomenus, Charoneia, and some other less important places in Boeotia. The Athenian general, Tolmidès, marched to expel them, with one thousand Athenian hoplites and an auxiliary body of allies. It appears that this march was undertaken in haste and rashness: the hoplites of Tolmidès, principally youthful volunteers, and belonging to the best families of Athens, disdained the enemy too much to await a larger and more commanding force: nor would the people listen even to Periklès, when he admonished them that the march would be full of hazard, and adjured them not to attempt it without greater numbers as well as greater caution.³ Fatally, indeed, were his predictions justified. Though Tolmidès was successful in his first enterprise. — the recapture of Charoneia, wherein he placed a garrison, — yet in his march, probably

¹ Thucyd. i. 19. Λακεδαιμόνιοι, οὐχ ὑποτάκεις ἔχοντες φόρον τοὺς ξυμμάχους, κατ' ὀλίγα μὲν δὲ σώσαντες αὐτοῖς μόνον ἐπιτηδείως ὅπως πολιτεύουσιν θεραπεύοντες — the same also i. 76-144.

² Aristotel. Politic. v. 2. 6. Καὶ ἐν Ἀθήναις μετὰ τὴν ἐν Οἰνοφύτοις μάχην, κακῶς πολιτευομένων, ἡ δημοκρατία διαφύσθη.

³ Plutarch. Periklès. c. 18; also, his comparison between Periklès and Fabius Maximus, c. 3.

Kleinias, father of the celebrated Alkibiadès, was slain in this battle. he had served, thirty-three years before, at the sea-fight of Artemisium: he cannot therefore be numbered among the youthful warriors, though a person of the first rank (Plutarch. Alkibiad. c. 11).

incautious and disorderly, when departing from that place, he was surprised and attacked unawares, near Korôneia, by the united body of exiles and their partisans. No defeat in Grecian history was ever more complete or ruinous. Tolmidēs himself was slain, together with many of the Athenian hoplites, while a large number of them were taken prisoners. In order to recover these prisoners, who belonged to the best families in the city, the Athenians submitted to a convention whereby they agreed to evacuate Boeotia altogether: in all the cities of that country, the exiles were restored, the democratical government overthrown, and Boeotia was transformed from an ally of Athens into her bitter enemy.¹ Long, indeed, did the fatal issue of this action dwell in the memory of the Athenians,² and inspire them with an apprehension of Boeotian superiority in heavy armor on land: but if the hoplites under Tolmidēs had been all slain on the field, their death would probably have been avenged and Boeotia would not have been lost,—whereas, in the case of living citizens, the Athenians deemed no sacrifice too great to redeem them. We shall discover hereafter in the Lacedaemonians a feeling very similar, respecting their brethren captured at Sphakteria.

The calamitous consequences of this defeat came upon Athens in thick and rapid succession. The united exiles, having carried their point in Boeotia, proceeded to expel the philo-Athenian government both from Phocis and Lokris, and to carry the flame of revolt into Eubœa. To this important island Periklēs himself proceeded forthwith, at the head of a powerful force; but before he had time to complete the reconquest, he was summoned home by news of a still more formidable character. The Megarians had revolted from Athens: by a conspiracy previously planned, a division of hoplites from Corinth, Sikyon, and Epidaurus, was already admitted as garrison into their city: the Athenian soldiers who kept watch over the Long Walls had been overpowered and slain, except a few who escaped into the fortified port of Nisæa. As if to make the Athenians at once sensible how seriously this

¹ Thucyd. i. 113; Diodor. xii. 6. Platœa appears to have been considered as quite dissevered from Boeotia: it remained in connection with Athens as intimately as before.

² Xenophon, Memorabil. iii. 5. 4

disaster affected them, by throwing open the road over Geraneia, — Pleistoanax, king of Sparta, was announced as already on his march for an invasion of Attica. He did, in truth, conduct an army, of mixed Lacedaemonians and Peloponnesian allies, into Attica, as far as the neighborhood of Eleusis and the Thriasian plain. He was a very young man, so that a Spartan of mature years, Kleandridēs, had been attached to him by the ephors as adjutant and counsellor. Periklēs, it is said, persuaded both the one and the other, by means of large bribes, to evacuate Attica without advancing to Athens. We may well doubt whether they had force enough to adventure so far into the interior, and we shall hereafter observe the great precautions with which Archidamus thought it necessary to conduct his invasion, during the first year of the Peloponnesian war, though at the head of a more commanding force. Nevertheless, on their return, the Lacedaemonians, believing that they might have achieved it, found both of them guilty of corruption. Both were banished: Kleandridēs never came back, and Pleistoanax himself lived for a long time in sanctuary near the temple of Athênê, at Tegea, until at length he procured his restoration by tampering with the Pythian priestess, and by bringing her bought admonitions to act upon the authorities at Sparta.¹

So soon as the Lacedaemonians had retired from Attica, Periklēs returned with his forces to Eubœa, and reconquered the island completely. With that caution which always distinguished him as a military man, so opposite to the fatal rashness of Tolmidēs, he took with him an overwhelming force of fifty triremes and five thousand hoplites. He admitted most of the Eubœan towns to surrender, altering the government of Chalkis by the expulsion of the wealthy oligarchy called the Hippobotæ; but the inhabitants of Histiaia, at the north of the island, who had taken an Athenian merchantman and massacred all the crew, were more severely dealt with,—the free population being all or in great part expelled, and the land distributed among Athenian kleruchs, or out-settled citizens.²

¹ Thucyd. i. 114; v. 16, Plutarch, Periklēs, c. 22.

² Thucyd. i. 114; Plutarch, Periklēs c. 23; Diodor. xii. 7

But the reconquest of Eubœa was far from restoring Athens to the position which she had occupied before the fatal engagement of Korôneia. Her land empire was irretrievably gone, together with her recently acquired influence over the Delphian oracle; and she reverted to her former condition of an exclusively maritime potentate. For though she still continued to hold Nisæa and Pegæ, yet her communication with the latter harbor was now cut off by the loss of Megara and its appertaining territory, so that she thus lost her means of acting in the Corinthian gulf, and of protecting as well as of constraining her allies in Achaia. Nor was the port of Nisæa of much value to her, disconnected from the city to which it belonged, except as a post for annoying that city. Moreover, the precarious hold which she possessed over unwilling allies had been demonstrated in a manner likely to encourage similar attempts among her maritime subjects, — attempts which would now be seconded by Peloponnesian armies invading Attica. The fear of such a combination of embarrassments, and especially of an irresistible enemy carrying ruin over the flourishing territory round Eleusis and Athens, was at this moment predominant in the Athenian mind. We shall find Periklès, at the beginning of the Peloponnesian war, fourteen years afterwards, exhausting all his persuasive force, and not succeeding without great difficulty, in prevailing upon his countrymen to endure the hardship of invasion, — even in defence of their maritime empire, and when events had been gradually so ripening as to render the prospect of war familiar, if not inevitable. But the late series of misfortunes had burst upon them so rapidly and unexpectedly, as to discourage even Athenian confidence, and to render the prospect of continued war full of gloom and danger. The prudence of Periklès would doubtless counsel the surrender of their remaining landed possessions or alliances, which had now become unprofitable, in order to purchase peace; but we may be sure that nothing short of extreme temporary despondency could have induced the Athenian assembly to listen to such advice, and to accept the inglorious peace which followed. A truce for thirty years was concluded with Sparta and her allies, in the beginning of 445 B.C., whereby Athens surrendered Nisæa, Pegæ, Achaia, and Trœzen,

— thus abandoning Peloponnesus altogether,¹ and leaving the Megarians — with their full territory and their two ports — to be included among the Peloponnesian allies of Sparta.

It was to the Megarians, especially, that the altered position of Athens after this truce was owing: it was their secession from Attica and junction with the Peloponnesians, which laid open Attica to invasion. Hence, arose the deadly hatred on the part of the Athenians towards Megara, manifested during the ensuing years, — a sentiment the more natural, as Megara had spontaneously sought the alliance of Athens a few years before as a protection against the Corinthians, and had then afterwards, without any known ill-usage on the part of Athens, broken off from the alli-

¹ Thucyd. i. 114, 115; ii. 21; Diodor. xii. 5. I do not at all doubt that the word Achaia here used, means the country in the north part of Peloponnesus, usually known by that name. The suspicions of Gœller and others, that it means, not this territory, but some unknown town, appear to me quite unfounded. Thucydides had never noticed the exact time when the Athenians acquired Achaia as a dependent ally, though he notices the Achæans (i. 111) in that capacity. This is one argument, among many, to show that we must be cautious in reasoning from the silence of Thucydides against the reality of an event, — in reference to this period between the Persian and Peloponnesian wars, where his whole summary is so brief.

In regard to the chronology of these events, Mr. Fynes Clinton remarks: "The disasters in Bœotia produced the revolt of Eubœa and Megara about eighteen months after, in Anthestêrion 445 B.C.: and the Peloponnesian invasion of Attica, on the expiration of the five years' truce," (ad ann. 447 B.C.)

Mr. Clinton seems to me to allow a longer interval than is probable: I incline to think that the revolt of Eubœa and Megara followed more closely upon the disasters in Bœotia, in spite of the statement of archons given by Diodorus: *ὅτι πολλὰ ἔσπερον*, the expression of Thucydides means probably no more than three or four months; and the whole series of events were evidently the product of one impulse. The truce having been concluded in the beginning of 445 B.C., it seems reasonable to place the revolt of Eubœa and Megara, as well as the invasion of Attica by Pleistoanax, in 445 B.C. — and the disasters in Bœotia, either in the beginning of 446 B.C., or the close of 447 B.C.

It is hardly safe to assume, moreover (as Mr. Clinton does, ad ann. 450, as well as Dr. Thirlwall, Hist. Gr. ch. xvii, p. 478), that the five years' truce must have been actually expired before Pleistoanax and the Lacedæmonians invaded Attica: the thirty years' truce, afterwards concluded, did not run out its full time.

ance and become her enemy, with the fatal consequence of rendering her vulnerable on the land-side. Under such circumstances we shall not be surprised to find the antipathy of the Athenians against Megara strongly pronounced, inasmuch that the system of exclusion which they adopted against her was among the most prominent causes of the Peloponnesian war.

Having traced what we may call the foreign relations of Athens down to this thirty years' truce, we must notice the important internal and constitutional changes which she had experienced during the same interval.

CHAPTER XLVI.

CONSTITUTIONAL AND JUDICIAL CHANGES AT ATHENS UNDER PERIKLES.

THE period which we have now passed over appears to have been that in which the democratical cast of Athenian public life was first brought into its fullest play and development, as to judiciary, legislation, and administration.

The great judicial change was made by the methodical distribution of a large proportion of the citizens into distinct judicial divisions, by the great extension of their direct agency in that department, and by the assignment of a constant pay to every citizen so engaged. It has been already mentioned that even under the democracy of Kleisthenes, and until the time succeeding the battle of Plataea, large powers still remained vested both in the individual archons and in the senate of Areopagus: which latter was composed exclusively of the past archons after their year of office, sitting in it for life, — though the check exercised by the general body of citizens, assembled for law-making in the *ekklesia*, and for judging in the *heliaea*, was at the same time

materially increased. We must farther recollect, that the distinction between powers administrative and judicial, so highly valued among the more elaborate governments of modern Europe, since the political speculations of the last century, was in the early history of Athens almost unknown. Like the Roman kings,¹ and the Roman consuls before the appointment of the praetor, the Athenian archons not only administered, but also exercised jurisdiction, voluntary as well as contentious, — decided disputes, inquired into crimes, and inflicted punishment. Of the same mixed nature were the functions of the senate of Areopagus, and even of the annual senate of Five Hundred, the creation of Kleisthenes. The strategoi, too, as well as the archons, had doubtless the double competence — in reference to military, naval, and foreign affairs — of issuing orders and of punishing by their

¹ See K. F. Hermann, *Griechische Staatsalterthümer*, sects. 53–107, and his treatise *De Jure et Auctoritate Magistratuum ap. Athen.* p. 53 (Heidelb. 1829); also Rein, *Römisches Privatrecht*, pp. 26, 408, Leips. 1836. M. Laboulaye also insists particularly upon the confusion of administrative and judicial functions among the Romans (*Essai sur les Loix Criminelles des Romains*, pp. 23, 79, 107, etc.): and compare Mr. G. C. Lewis, *Essay on the Government of Dependencies*, p. 42, with his citation from Hugo, *Geschichte des Römischen Rechts*, p. 42. Mr. Lewis has given just and valuable remarks upon the goodness of the received classification of powers as a theory, and upon the extent to which the separation of them either has been, or can be, carried in practice: see also Note E, in the same work, p. 347.

The separation of administrative from judicial functions appears unknown in early societies. M. Meyer observes, respecting the judicial institutions of modern Europe: "Anciennement les fonctions administratives et judiciaires n'étoient pas distinctes. Du temps de la liberté des Germains et même long temps après, les plaids de la nation ou ceux du comté rendoient la justice et administroient les intérêts nationaux ou locaux dans une seule et même assemblée: sous le régime féodal, le roi ou l'empereur dans son conseil, sa cour, son parlement composé des hauts barons ecclésiastiques et laïcs, exercent tous les droits de souveraineté comme de justice: dans la commune, le bailli, mayeur, ou autre fonctionnaire nommé par le prince administraient les intérêts communaux et jugeoient les bourgeois de l'avis de la communauté entière, des corporations qui la composoient, ou des autorités et conseils qui la représentoient: on n'avoit pas encore soupçonné que le jugement d'une cause entre particuliers pût être étranger à la cause commune." — Meyer, *Esprit des Institutions Judiciaires*, book v, chap. 11 vol. iii. p. 239 also chap. 18, p. 383.

own authority, disobedient parties: the *imperium* of the magistrates, generally, enabled them to enforce their own mandates as well as to decide in cases of doubt whether any private citizen had or had not been guilty of infringement. Nor was there any appeal from these magisterial judgments; though the magistrates were subject, under the Kleisthenean constitution, to personal responsibility for their general behavior, before the people judicially assembled, at the expiration of their year of office, — and to the farther animadversion of the *ekklesia*, or public deliberative assembly, meeting periodically during the course of that year: in some of which *ekklesiae*, the question might formally be raised for deposing any magistrate, even before his year was expired.¹ Still, in spite of such partial checks, the accumulation, in the same hand, of powers to administer, judge, punish, and decide civil disputes, without any other canon than the few laws then existing, and without any appeal, — must have been painfully felt, and must have often led to corrupt, arbitrary, and oppressive dealing: and if this be true of individual magistrates, exposed to annual accountability, it is not likely to have been less true of the senate of Areopagus, which, acting collectively, could hardly be rendered accountable, and in which the members sat for life.²

I have already mentioned that shortly after the return of the expatriated Athenians from Salamis, Aristeidēs had been impelled, by the strong democratical sentiment which he found among his countrymen, to propose the abolition of all pecuniary qualification for magistracies, so as to render every citizen legally eligible. This innovation, however, was chiefly valuable as a victory

¹ A case of such deposition of an archon by vote of the public assembly, even before the year of office was expired, occurs in Demosthenēs, *cont. Theokrin.* c. 7: another, the deposition of a strategus, in Demosthen. *cont. Timoth.* c. 3.

² Æschinēs (*cont. Ktesiphont.* c. 9, p. 373) speaks of the senate of Areopagus as *ἐπεσθαι*, and so it was doubtless understood to be; but it is difficult to see how accountability could be practically enforced against such a body. They could only be responsible in this sense, — that, if any one of their number could be proved to have received a bribe, he would be individually punished. But in this sense the dikasteries themselves would also be responsible: though it is always affirmed of them that they were not responsible.

and as an index of the predominant sentiment: notwithstanding the enlarged promise of eligibility, little change probably took place in the fact, and rich men were still most commonly chosen. Hence the magistrates, possessing the large powers administrative and judicial above described, — and still more the senate of Areopagus, which sat for life, — still belonging almost entirely to the wealthier class, remained animated more or less with the same oligarchical interest and sympathies, which manifested themselves in the abuse of authority. At the same time the democratical sentiment among the mass of Athenians went on steadily increasing from the time of Aristeidēs to that of Periklēs: Athens became more and more maritime, the population of Peiræus augmented in number as well as in importance, and the spirit even of the poorest citizen was stimulated by that collective aggrandizement of his city to which he himself individually contributed. Before twenty years had elapsed, reckoning from the battle of Plataea, this new fervor of democratical sentiment made itself felt in the political contests of Athens, and found able champions in Periklēs and Ephialtēs, rivals of what may be called the conservative party, headed by Kimon.

We have no positive information that it was Periklēs who introduced the lot, in place of election, for the choice of archons and various other magistrates, but the change must have been introduced nearly at this time, and with a view of equalizing the chances of office to every candidate, poor as well as rich, who chose to give in his name, and who fulfilled certain personal and family conditions ascertained in the *dokimasy*, or preliminary examination. But it was certainly to Periklēs and Ephialtēs that Athens owed the elaborate constitution of her popular dikasteries, or jury courts regularly paid, which exercised so important an influence upon the character of the citizens. These two eminent men deprived both the magistrates and the senate of Areopagus of all the judicial and penal competence which they had hitherto possessed, save and except the power of imposing a small fine. This judicial power, civil as well as criminal, was transferred to numerous dikasts, or panels of jurors selected from the citizens; six thousand of whom were annually drawn by lot and sworn, and then distributed into ten panels of five hundred each, the remainder forming a supplement in case of

vacancies. The magistrate, instead of deciding causes, or inflicting punishment by his own authority, was now constrained to impanel a jury, — that is, to submit each particular case, which might call for a penalty greater than the small fine to which he was competent, to the judgment of one or other among these numerous popular dikasteries. Which of the ten he should take, was determined by lot, so that no one knew beforehand what dikastery would try any particular cause: he himself presided over it during the trial, and submitted to it the question at issue, with the results of his own preliminary examination, in addition to the speeches of accuser and accused, with the statements of their witnesses. So also the civil judicature, which had before been exercised in controversies between man and man by the archons, was withdrawn from them and transferred to these dikasteries under the presidency of an archon. It is to be remarked, that the system of reference to arbitration for private causes¹ was extensively applied at Athens: a certain number of public arbitrators were

¹ Respecting the procedure of arbitration at Athens, and the public as well as private arbitrators, see the instructive treatise of Hudtwalcker, *Über die öffentlichen und Privat Schieds-richter (Dikasteren) zu Athen*: Jena, 1812.

Each arbitrator seems to have sat alone to inquire into and decide disputes: he received a small fee of one drachma from both parties: also an additional fee when application was made for delay (p. 16). Parties might by mutual consent fix upon any citizen to act as arbitrator: but there were a certain number of public arbitrators, elected or drawn by lot from the citizens every year: and a plaintiff might bring his cause before any one of these. They were liable to be punished under *εἰσφορά*, at the end of their year of office, if accused and convicted of corruption or unfair dealing.

The number of these public *diastetæ*, or arbitrators, was unknown when Hudtwalcker's book was published. An inscription, since discovered by Professor Ross, and published in his work, *Über die Demen von Attika*, p. 22, records the names of all the *diastetæ* for the year of the archon Antiklès, B.C. 325, with the name of the tribe to which each belonged.

The total number is one hundred and four: the number in each tribe is unequal; the largest number is in Kekropis, which furnishes sixteen, the smallest in Pandionis, which sends only three. They must have been either elected or drawn by lot from the general body of citizens, without any reference to tribes. The inscription records the names of the *diastetæ* for this year B.C. 325, in consequence of their being crowned or receiving a vote of thanks from the people. The fragment of a like inscription for the year B.C. 337 also exists.

annually appointed, to one of whom — or to some other citizen adopted by mutual consent of the parties — all private disputes were submitted in the first instance. If dissatisfied with the decision, either party might afterwards carry the matter before the dikastery: but it appears that in many cases the decision of the arbitrator was acquiesced in without this ultimate resort.

I do not here mean to affirm that there never was any trial by the people before the time of Periklès and Ephialtès: I doubt not that, before their time, the numerous judicial assembly called *Heliæa*, pronounced upon charges against accountable magistrates as well as upon various other accusations of public importance; and perhaps in some cases, separate bodies of them may have been drawn by lot for particular trials. But it is not the less true, that the systematic distribution and constant employment of the numerous dikasts of Athens cannot have begun before the age of these two statesmen, since it was only then that the practice of paying them began: for so large a sacrifice of time on the part of poor men, wherein M. Boeckh states,¹ doubtless in very exaggerated language, that "nearly one-third of the citizens sat as judges every day," cannot be conceived without an assured remuneration. From and after the time of Periklès, these dikasteries were the exclusive assemblies for trial of all causes, civil as well as criminal, with some special exceptions, such as cases of homicide and a few others: but before his time, the greater number of these causes had been adjudged either by individual magistrates or by the senate of Areopagus. We may therefore conceive how great and important was the revolution wrought by that statesman, when he first organized these dikastic assemblies into systematic action, and transferred to them nearly all the judicial power which had before been exercised by magistrates and sen-

¹ Public Economy of the Athenians, book ii, chap. xiv, p. 227. Engl. transl.

M. Boeckh must mean that the whole six thousand or nearly the whole, were employed every day. It appears to me that this supposition greatly overstates both the number of days and the number of men actually employed. For the inference in the text, however, a much smaller number is sufficient.

See the more accurate remark of Schömann, *Antiquit. Juris Publicæ Græcor.*, sect. lxxi, p. 310.

ate. The position and influence of these latter became radically altered: the most commanding functions of the archon were abrogated, and he retained only the power of receiving complaints, inquiring into them, exercising some small preliminary interference with the parties for the furtherance of the cause or accusation, fixing the day for trial, and presiding over the dikastic assembly, by whom peremptory verdict was pronounced. His administrative functions remained unaltered, but his powers, inquisitorial and determining, as a judge, passed away.¹

In reference to the senate of Areopagus also, the changes introduced were not less considerable. That senate, anterior to the democracy in point of date, and standing alone in the enjoyment of a life-tenure, appears to have exercised an undefined and extensive control which long continuance had gradually consecrated. It was invested with a kind of religious respect, and believed to possess mysterious traditions emanating from a divine source:² especially, the cognizance which it took of intentional

¹ Aristotel. Politic. ii, 9, 3. Καὶ τὴν μὲν ἐν Ἀρχῇ παρὰ Σόλωνα Ἐφιάλτης ἐκόλουσε καὶ Περικλῆς· τὰ δὲ δικαστήρια μισθοφόρα κατέστησε Περικλῆς· καὶ τοῦτον δὴ τὸν τρόπον ἕκαστος τῶν δημαγωγῶν προέλαβεν, αἰζῶν εἰς τὴν νῦν δημοκρατίαν. Φαίνεται δ' οὐ κατὰ τὴν Σόλωνος γενέσθαι τοῦτο προαίρεσιν, ἀλλὰ μάλλον ἀπὸ συμπτώματος. Τῆς κληρονομίας γὰρ ἐν ταῖς Μυρκαῖς ὁ δῆμος αἴτιος γενόμενος ἐφρονηματούσθη, καὶ δημαγωγούς ἔλαβε φαίλους, ἀντιπολιτευομένων τῶν ἱππικῶν· ἐπεὶ Σόλων γ' ἵσκει τὴν ἀναγκασιότατην ἐποδιδόμην τῷ δήμῳ δόραμιν, τὸ τὰς ἀρχὰς αἰρεῖσθαι καὶ ἐκθένειν· μηδὲ γὰρ τοῦτον κέρως ὧν ὁ δῆμος δοῖλος ἂν εἴη καὶ πόλεμος.

The words τὰ δὲ δικαστήρια μισθοφόρα κατέστησε Περικλῆς, are commonly translated, "Periklēs first gave pay to the dikasteries," wherein it is assumed that these bodies had before judged gratuitously. But it appears to me that the words ought to be translated, "Periklēs first constituted the paid dikasteries:" that is, the dikasteries as well as the pay were of his introduction.

It is evident from this whole passage that Aristotle did not suppose the dikasteries, either gratuitous or paid, to have been constituted by Solon, but to have been foreign to the purpose of that lawgiver, and to have been novelties emanating from Periklēs and Ephialtēs, at the same time that the judicial functions of the senate of Areopagus were cut down.

² Deinarchus cont. Demosthen. Or. i, p. 91. φυλάττει τὰς ἀπορήτων διαθηκὰς, ἐν αἷς τὰ τῆς πόλεως σωτήρια κεῖται, etc. So also Æschinēs calls this senate τὴν σκυνθρωπὸν καὶ τῶν μεγίστων κυρίαν βουλὴν (cont. Ktesiphont. c. 9, p. 273 compare also cont. Timarchum. c. 16, p. 41; Demosth.

homicide was a part of old Attic religion not less than of judicature. Though put in the background for a time, after the expulsion of the Peisistratids, it had gradually recovered itself when recruited by the new archons under the Kleisthenean constitution; and during the calamitous sufferings of the Persian invasion, its forwardness and patriotism had been so highly appreciated as to procure for it an increased sphere of ascendancy. Trials for homicide were only a small part of its attributions: it exercised judicial competence in many other cases besides, and what was of still greater moment, it maintained a sort of censorial police over the lives and habits of the citizens, — it professed to enforce a tutelary and paternal discipline, beyond that which the strict letter of the law could mark out, over the indolent, the prodigal, the undutiful, and the deserters from old rite and custom. To crown all, the senate of Areopagus also exercised a supervision over the public assembly, taking care that none of the proceedings of those meetings should be such as to infringe the established laws of the country. These were powers immense as well as undefined, not derived from any formal grant of the people, but having their source in immemorial antiquity, and sustained by general awe and reverence: when we read the serious expressions of this sentiment in the mouths of the later orators, — Demosthenēs, Æschinēs, or Deinarchus, — we shall comprehend how strong it must have been a century and a half before them, at the period of the Persian invasion. Isokratēs, in his Discourse usually called *Areopagiticus*, written a century and a quarter after that invasion, draws a picture of what the senate of Areopagus had been while its competence was yet undiminished, and ascribes to it a power of interference little short of paternal despotism, which he asserts to have been most salutary and improving in its effect. That the picture of this rhetor is inaccurate,

cont. Aristokrat. c. 65, p. 641). Plutarch. Solon, c. 19. τὴν ἀνω βουλὴν ἐπ' ἀκροῖον πάντων καὶ φύλακα τῶν νόμων, etc.

Ἐδίκασον οὖν οἱ Ἀρισπαγῖται περὶ πάντων σχεδὸν τῶν σφαλμάτων καὶ παρανομῶν, ὡς ἀπαντὰ φησὶν Ἀνδροτίων ἐν πρώτῃ καὶ Φιλόχορος ἐν δευτέρῃ καὶ τρίτῃ τῶν Ἀττικῶν (Philochorus, Fr. 17-58, ed. Didot, p. 13, ed. Siebelis).

See about the Areopagus, Schömann, Antiq. Jur. Att. sect. lxvi, K. F. Hermann Griech. Staatsalterthümer, sect. 109.

— and to a great degree indeed ideal, insinuating his own recommendations under the color of past realities. — is sufficiently obvious: but it enables us to presume generally, the extensive regulating power of the senate of Areopagus, in affairs both public and private, at the time which we are now describing.

Such powers were pretty sure to be abused, and when we learn that the Spartan senate¹ was lamentably open to bribery, we can hardly presume much better of the life-sitting elders at Athens. But even if their powers had been guided by all that beneficence of intention which Isokrates affirms, they were in their nature such as could only be exercised over a passive and stationary people: and the course of events at Athens, at that time peculiarly, presented conditions altogether the reverse. During the pressure of the Persian invasion, indeed, the senate of Areopagus had been armed with more than ordinary authority, which it had employed so creditably as to strengthen its influence, and tighten its supervision during the period immediately following: but that same trial had also called forth in the general body of the citizens a fresh burst of democratical sentiment, and an augmented consciousness of force, both individual and national. Here then were two forces, not only distinct but opposite and conflicting, both put into increased action at the same time.² Nor was this all: a novel cast was just then given to Athenian life and public habits by many different circumstances, — the enlargement of the city, the creation of the fortified port and new town of Peiræus, the introduction of an increased nautical population, the active duties of Athens as head

¹ Aristotel. Politic. ii, 6, 18.

² Aristotle particularly indicates these two conflicting tendencies in Athens, the one immediately following the other, in a remarkable passage of his Politics (v, 3, 5).

Μεταβάλλουσι δὲ καὶ εἰς ὀλιγαρχίαν καὶ εἰς δῆμον καὶ εἰς πολιτείαν ἐκ τοῦ εὐδοκίμησαι τι ἢ ἀνέξθηναι ἢ ἀρχεῖον ἢ μόριον τῆς πόλεως οἶον, ἢ ἐν Ἀρείῳ πάγῳ βουλὴ εὐδοκίμησασα ἐν τοῖς Μηδικαῖς ἔδοξε συντονωτέραν ποιῆσαι τὴν πολιτείαν. Καὶ πάλιν ὁ ναυτικὸς ἔχλος γενόμενος αἰτίος τῆς περὶ Σαλαμίνα νίκης καὶ διὰ ταύτης τῆς ἡγεμονίας καὶ διὰ τὴν κατὰ θαλάτταν δύναμιν, τὴν δημοκρατίαν ἰσχυροτέραν ἐποίησεν.

The word συντονωτέραν ("stricter, more rigid.") stands opposed in another passage to ἀνεμεικτάς (iv, 3, 5).

of the Delian confederacy, etc. All these circumstances tended to open new veins of hope and feeling, and new lines of action, in the Athenians between 480–460 B.C., and by consequence to render the interference of the senate of Areopagus, essentially old-fashioned and conservative as it was, more and more difficult. But at the very time when prudence would have counselled that it should have been relaxed or modified, the senate appear to have rendered it stricter, or at least to have tried to do so: which could not fail to raise against them a considerable body of enemies. Not merely the democratical innovators, but also the representatives of new interests generally at Athens, became opposed to the senate as an organ of vexatious repression, employed for oligarchical purposes.¹

From the character of the senate of Areopagus, and the ancient reverence with which it was surrounded, it served naturally as a centre of action to the oligarchical or conservative party, — that party which desired to preserve the Kleisthenean constitution unaltered, with undiminished authority, administrative as well as judicial, both to individual magistrates and to the collective Areopagus. Of this sentiment, at the time of which we are now speaking, Kimon was the most conspicuous leader, and his brilliant victories at the Eurymedon, as well as his exploits in other warlike enterprises, doubtless strengthened very much his political influence at home. The same party also probably included the large majority of rich and old families at Athens; who, so long as the magistracies were elected and not chosen by lot, usually got themselves chosen, and had every interest in keeping the power of such offices as high as they could. Moreover, the party was farther strengthened by the pronounced support of Sparta, imparted chiefly through Kimon, proxenus of Sparta at Athens. Of course, such aid could only have been indirect, yet it appears to have been of no inconsiderable moment, — for when we consider that Ægina had been in ancient

¹ Plutarch. Reipub. Ger. Præcept. p. 805. Οὐκ ἄγνοῶ δὲ, ὅτι βουλὴν τὰς ἐπαχθέων καὶ ὀλιγαρχικὴν κολοῦσαντες, ὥσπερ Ἐφιάλτης Ἀθηναῖσι καὶ Φερμοῖον παρ' Ἠλλήσιοις, δύναμιν ἅμα καὶ δοῦσαν ἔσχον.

About the oligarchical character of the Areopagites, see Deinarchus cont. Demosthen. pp. 46, 98.

feud with Athens, and Corinth in a temper more hostile than friendly, the good feeling of the Lacedæmonians might well appear to Athenian citizens eminently desirable to preserve and the philo-Laconian character of the leading men at Athens contributed to disarm the jealousy of Sparta during that critical period while the Athenian maritime ascendancy was in progress.¹

The political opposition between Periklēs and Kimon was hereditary, since Xanthippos, the father of the former, had been the accuser of Miltiadēs, the father of the latter. Both were of the first families in the city, and this, combined with the military talents of Kimon, and the great statesmanlike superiority of Periklēs, placed both the one and the other at the head of the two political parties which divided Athens. Periklēs must have begun his political career very young, since he maintained a position first of great influence, and afterwards of unparalleled moral and political ascendancy, for the long period of forty years, against distinguished rivals, bitter assailants, and unscrupulous libellers (about 467-428 B.C.) His public life began about the time when Themistoklēs was ostracized, and when Aristeidēs was passing off the stage, and he soon displayed a character which combined the pecuniary probity of the one with the resource and large views of the other; superadding to both a discretion and mastery of temper never disturbed, — an excellent musical and lettered education received from Pythokleidēs, — an eloquence such as no one before had either heard or conceived, — and the best philosophy which the age afforded. His military duties as a youthful citizen were faithfully and strenuously performed, but he was timid in his first political approaches to the people, — a fact perfectly in unison with the caution of his temperament, but which some of his biographers² explained by saying that he was afraid of being ostracized, and that his countenance resembled that of the despot Peisistratus. We may be pretty sure, however, that this personal resemblance, like the wonderful dream ascribed to his mother³ when pregnant of him, was an after-thought of enemies, when his ascendancy was already

¹ Plutarch, Kimon, c. 16; Themistoklēs, c. 20.

² Plutarch, Periklēs, c. 4-7.

Herodot. vi. 131.

established, — and that young beginners were in little danger of ostracism. The complexion of political parties in Athens had greatly changed since the days of Themistoklēs and Aristeidēs; for the Kleisthenean constitution, though enlarged by the latter after the return from Salamis to the extent of making all citizens without exception eligible for magistracy, had become unpopular with the poorer citizens, and to the keener democratical feeling which now ran through Athens and Peiraus.

It was to this democratical party, — the party of movement against that of resistance, or of reformers against conservatives, if we are to employ modern phraseology, — that Periklēs devoted his great rank, character, and abilities. From the low arts which it is common to ascribe to one who espouses the political interests of the poor against the rich, he was remarkably exempt: he was indefatigable in his attention to public business, but he went little into society, and disregarded almost to excess the airs of popularity: his eloquence was irresistibly impressive, yet he was by no means prodigal of it, taking care to reserve himself, like the Salaminian trireme, for solemn occasions, and preferring for the most part to employ the agency of friends and partisans:¹ moreover, he imbibed from his friend and teacher Anaxagoras, a tinge of physical philosophy, which greatly strengthened his mind,² and armed him against many of the reigning superstitions, — but which at the same time tended to rob him of the sympathy of the vulgar, rich as well as poor. The arts of demagogy were in fact much more cultivated by the oligarchical Kimon, whose open-hearted familiarity of manner was extolled, by his personal friend the poet Ion, in contrast with the reserved and stately demeanor of his rival Periklēs. Kimon employed the rich plunder, procured by his maritime expeditions, in public decorations as well as in largesses to the poorer citizens, — throwing open his fields and fruits to all the inhabitants of his deme, and causing himself to be attended in public by well-dressed slaves, directed to tender their warm tunics in exchange for the threadbare garments of those who seemed in want; while the property of

¹ Plutarch, Reipub. Gerend. Præcept. p. 812; Periklēs, c. 5. 6. 7.

² Plato, Phædrus, c. 54, p. 270, Plutarch, Periklēs, c. 8. Xenoph. Memor. i. 2. 46.

Periklès was administered with a strict, though benevolent economy, by his ancient steward Evangelus, — the produce of his lands being all sold, and the consumption of his house supplied by purchase in the market.¹ It was by such regularity that his perfect and manifest independence of all pecuniary seduction was sustained. In taste, in talent, and in character, Kimon was the very opposite of Periklès, — a brave and efficient commander, a lavish distributor, a man of convivial and amorous habits, but incapable of sustained attention to business, untaught in music or letters, and endued with Laconian aversion to rhetoric and philosophy; while the ascendancy of Periklès was founded on his admirable combination of civil qualities, — probity, firmness, diligence, judgment, eloquence, and power of guiding partisans. As a military commander, though noway deficient in personal courage, he rarely courted distinction, and was principally famous for his care of the lives of the citizens, discountenancing all rash or distant enterprises: his private habits were sober and recluse, — his chief conversation was with Anaxagoras, Protagoras,² Zeno, the musician Damon, and other philosophers, — while the tenderest domestic attachment bound him to the engaging and cultivated Aspasia.

Such were the two men who stood forward at this time as most conspicuous in Athenian party-contest, — the expanding democracy against the stationary democracy of the past generation, which now passed by the name of oligarchy, — the ambitious and talkative energy spread even among the poor population, which was now forming more and more the characteristic of Athens, against the unlettered and uninquiring valor of the conquerors of Marathon.³ Ephialtès, son of Sophônides, was at this time the leading auxiliary, seemingly indeed the equal of Periklès, and no way inferior to him in personal probity, though he was a poor man:⁴ as to aggressive political warfare, he was even more active

¹ Plutarch, Periklès, c. 9, 16; Kimon, c. 10; Reipubl. Gerend. Præcept. 2. 818.

² The personal intercourse between Periklès and Protagoras is attested by the interesting fragment of the latter which we find in Plutarch, Consolatus Apollonium, c. 33, p. 119.

³ Aristophan. Nubes, 972. 1000. *seq.* and Rame, 1071.

⁴ Plutarch, Kimon, c. 10. Elian, V, H. ii, 43; xi, 9.

than Periklès, who appears throughout his long public life to have manifested but little bitterness against political enemies. Unfortunately, our scanty knowledge of the history of Athens brings before us only some general causes and a few marked facts: the details and the particular persons concerned are not within our sight: yet the actual course of political events depends everywhere mainly upon these details, as well as upon the general causes. Before Ephialtès advanced his main proposition for abridging the competence of the senate of Areopagus, he appears to have been strenuous in repressing the practical abuse of magisterial authority, by accusations brought against the magistrates at the period of their regular accountability. After repeated efforts to check the practical abuse of these magisterial powers,¹ Ephialtès and Periklès were at last conducted to the proposition of cutting them down permanently, and introducing an altered system.

We are not surprised to find that such proceedings provoked extreme bitterness of party-feeling, and it is probable that this temper may have partly dictated the accusation preferred against Kimon, about 463 B.C., after the surrender of Thasos, for alleged reception of bribes from the Macedonian prince Alexander, — an accusation of which he was acquitted. At this time the oligarchical or Kimonian party was decidedly the most powerful: and when the question was proposed for sending troops to aid the Lacedæmonians in reducing the revolted Helots on Ithômê, Kimon carried the people along with him to comply, by an appeal to their generous feelings, in spite of the strenuous opposition of Ephialtès.² But when Kimon and the Athenian hoplites returned home, having been dismissed by Sparta under circumstances of insulting suspicion, as has been mentioned in the preceding chapter, the indignation of the citizens was extreme: they renounced their alliance with Sparta, and entered into amity with Argos. Of course the influence of Kimon, and the position of the oligarchi-

¹ Plutarch, Periklès, c. 10: compare Valer. Maxim. iii, 8, 4. 'Εφιάλτης μὲν οὖν, φοβερὸν ὄντα τοῖς ὀλιγαρχικοῖς καὶ περὶ τὰς εὐθύναις καὶ διώξεσι τῶν τὸν δῆμον ἀδικούντων ἀπαραίτητον, ἐπιβουλευσάντες οἱ ἐχθροὶ δὲ Ἀριστοῦ τοῦ Ταγαρχικοῦ κρυφαίως ἀνέστησαν, etc.

² Plutarch, Kimon, c. 16.

cal party, was materially changed by this incident: and in the existing bitterness of political parties, it is not surprising that his opponents should take the opportunity for proposing, soon afterwards, a vote of ostracism,¹—a challenge, indeed, which may, perhaps, have been accepted not unwillingly by Kimon and his party, since they might still fancy themselves the strongest, and suppose that the sentence of banishment would fall upon Ephialtēs or Periklēs. However, the vote ended in the expulsion of Kimon, a sure proof that his opponents were now in the ascendent. On this occasion, as on the preceding, we see the ostracism invoked to meet a period of intense political conflict, the violence of which it would at least abate, by removing for the time one of the contending leaders.

It was now that Periklēs and Ephialtēs carried their important scheme of judicial reform. The senate of Areopagus was deprived of its discretionary censorial power, as well as of all its judicial competence except that which related to homicide. The individual magistrates, as well as the senate of Five Hundred, were also stripped of their judicial attributes, except the power of imposing a small fine,² which were transferred to the newly created panels of salaried dikasts, lotted off in ten divisions from the aggregate heliæa. Ephialtēs³ first brought down the laws of Solon from the acropolis to the neighborhood of the marketplace, where the dikasteries sat,—a visible proof that the judicature was now popularized.

In the representations of many authors, the full bearing of this great constitutional change is very inadequately conceived. What we are commonly told, is, that Periklēs was the first to assign a salary to these numerous dikasteries at Athens; he bribed the

¹ Plutarch. Kimon. c. 17. Οἱ δὲ πρὸς ὀργὴν ἀπελθόντες ἤδη τοῖς λαοῖς ἀντίστασι θανεῖαν ἐπέλεγον, καὶ τὸν Κίμωνα μικρὰς ἐπιλαβόμενοι προφάσει εἰσπράξαντες εἰς ἑπτά δέκα.

I transcribe this passage as a specimen of the inaccurate manner in which the ostracism is so often described. Plutarch says: "The Athenians took advantage of a slight pretence to ostracize Kimon:" but it was the peculiar characteristic of ostracism that it had no pretence: it was a judgment passed without specific or assigned cause.

² Demosthen. cont. Euerg. et Mnesibul. c. 12.

³ Harpokration — Ὁ κάτωθεν νόμος — Pollux. viii. 128.

people with the public money, says Plutarch, in order to make head against Kimon, who bribed them out of his own private purse: as if the pay were the main feature in the case, and as if all which Periklēs did, was to make himself popular by paying the dikasts for judicial service, which they had before rendered gratuitously. The truth is, that this numerous army of dikasts, distributed into ten regiments and summoned to act systematically throughout the year, was now for the first time organized: the commencement of their pay is also the commencement of their regular judicial action. What Periklēs really did, was to sever for the first time from the administrative competence of the magistrates that judicial authority which had originally gone along with it. The great men who had been accustomed to hold these offices were lowered both in influence and authority:¹ while on the other hand a new life, habit, and sense of power, sprang up among the poorer citizens. A plaintiff, having cause of civil action, or an accuser, invoking punishment against citizens guilty of injury either to himself or to the state, had still to address himself to one or other of the archons, but it was only with a view of ultimately arriving before the dikastery, by whom the cause was to be tried. While the magistrates acting individually were thus restricted to simple administration and preliminary police, they experienced a still more serious loss of power in their capacity of

¹ Arist. Polit. iv. 5, 6. ἔτι δ' οἱ ταῖς ἀρχαῖς ἐγκαταστήσαντες τὸν δῆμον οὐκ αὖτε χρένειν· ὁ δ' ἀσμένως δέχεται τὴν προκλήσιν· ὥστε καταλύονται πάντα αἱ ἀρχαί, etc.; compare vi. 1, 8.

The remark of Aristotle is not justly applicable to the change effected by Periklēs, which transferred the power taken from the magistrates, not to the people but to certain specially constituted, though numerous and popular dikasteries, sworn to decide in conformity with known and written laws. Nor is the separation of judicial competence from administrative, to be characterized as "dissolving or extinguishing magisterial authority." On the contrary, it is conformable to the best modern notions. Periklēs cannot be censured for having effected this separation, however persons may think that the judicature which he constituted was objectionable.

Plato seems also to have conceived administrative power as essentially accompanied by judicial (Legg. vi. p. 767) — πάντα ἀρχόντα ἀναγκαῖον καὶ δικαστὰν εἶναι τῶν — an opinion, doubtless, perfectly just, up to a certain narrow limit: the separation between the two sorts of powers cannot be rendered absolutely complete.

members of the Areopagus, after the year of archonship was expired. Instead of their previous unmeasured range of supervision and interference, they were now deprived of all judicial sanction, beyond that small power of fining, which was still left both to individual magistrates, and to the senate of Five Hundred. But the cognizance of homicide was still expressly reserved to them, — for the procedure, in this latter case, religious not less than judicial, was so thoroughly consecrated by ancient feeling, that no reformer could venture to disturb or remove it.¹ It was

¹ Demosthen. cont. Neaer. p. 1872, cont. Aristokrat. p. 642.

Meier (Antischer Prozess, p. 143) thinks that the senate of Areopagus was also deprived of its cognizance of homicide as well as of its other functions, and that this was only restored after the expulsion of the Thirty. He supposes this to be proved by a passage of Lysias which he produces (De Cade Eratosthenis, pp. 31-33).

M. Böckh and O. Müller adopt the same opinion as Meier, and seemingly on the authority of the same passage. (see the Dissertation of O. Müller on the Eumenides of Æschylus, p. 113, Eng. transl.) But in the first place, this opinion is contradicted by an express statement in the anonymous biographer of Thucydides, who mentions the trial of Pyrilampes for murder before the Areopagus; and contradicted also, seemingly, by Xenophon (Memorab. iii. 5. 20); in the next place, the passage of Lysias appears to me to bear a different meaning. He says: *ἡ δὲ τὰς ἀρχαίων ἐστὶν ἐκείνη ἡ δόξα, ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν ἔτι δόξα τοῦ δήμου τὰς ἀρχαίων δόξαι* now — even if we admit the conjectural reading *ἐστὶν ἔτι* in place of *ἐστὶν* to be correct — still, this restoration of functions to the Areopagus, refers naturally to the restored democracy after the violent interruption occasioned by the oligarchy of Thirty. Considering how many persons the Thirty caused to be violently put to death, and the complete subversion of all the laws which they introduced, it seems impossible to suppose that the Areopagus could have continued to hold its sittings and try accusations for intentional homicide, under their government. On the return of the democracy after the Thirty were expelled, the functions of the senate of Areopagus would return also.

If the supposition of the eminent authors mentioned above were correct — if it were true that the Areopagus was deprived not only of its supervising function generally, but also of its cognizance of homicide, during the fifty-five years which elapsed between the motion of Ephialtes and the expulsion of the Thirty, — this senate must have been without any functions at all during that long interval; it must have been for all practical purposes non-existent. But during so long a period of total suspension, the citizens would have lost all their respect for it; it could not have retained so much influence as we know that it actually possessed immediately after the Thirty (Lysias c. Eratosth. c. 11, p. 126), and it would

upon this same ground probably that the stationary party defended all the prerogatives of the senate of Areopagus, — denouncing the curtailments proposed by Ephialtes as impious and guilty innovations.¹ How extreme their resentment be-

hardly have been revived after the expulsion of the Thirty. Whereas, by preserving during that period its jurisdiction in cases of homicide, apart from those more extended privileges which had formerly rendered it obnoxious, the ancient traditional respect for it was kept alive, and it was revived, after the fall of the Thirty, as a venerable part of the old democracy; even apparently with some extension of privileges.

The inferences which O. Müller wishes to draw, as to the facts of these times, from the Eumenides of Æschylus, appear to me ill-supported. In order to sustain his view, that, by virtue of the proposition of Ephialtes "the Areopagus almost entirely ceased to be a high court of judicature" (sect. 36, p. 109,) he is forced to alter the chronology of the events, and to affirm that the motion of Ephialtes must have been carried subsequently to the representation of the Eumenides, though Diodorus mentions it in the year next but one before, and there is nothing to contradict him. All that we can safely infer from the very indistinct allusions in Æschylus, is, that he himself was full of reverence for the Areopagus, and that the season was one in which party bitterness ran so high as to render something like civil war (*ἐμφύλιον ἄγῳ*, v. 864) within the scope of reasonable apprehension. Probably, he may have been averse to the diminution of the privileges of the Areopagus by Ephialtes: yet even thus much is not altogether certain, inasmuch as he puts it forward prominently and specially as a tribunal for homicide, exercising this jurisdiction by inherent prescription, and confirmed in it by the Eumenides themselves. Now when we consider that such jurisdiction was precisely the thing confirmed and left by Ephialtes to the Areopagus, we might plausibly argue that Æschylus, by enhancing the solemnity and predicting the perpetuity of the remaining privilege, intended to conciliate those who resented the recent innovations, and to soften the hatred between the two opposing parties.

The opinion of Böckh, O. Müller, and Meier, respecting the withdrawal from the senate of Areopagus of the judgments on homicide, by the proposition of Ephialtes, has been discussed, and in my judgment refuted, by Forchhammer, in a valuable Dissertation, *De Areopago non privato per Ephialtem Homicidii Judicis*, Kiel, 1828.

¹ This is the language of those authors whom Diodorus copied (Diodor. xi. 77) — *οὐ μὲν δὴρ-ας, γὰρ διέφυγε τῇ λικαίτοις ἀγορῇ, ἡσασιν ἐπεὶ δαλόμενος* (Ephialtes), ἀλλὰ τὴν νεκρὸν ἀναιρεθεὶς, ἀδελφὸς ἐστὶν τοῦ βίου τελευτήν. Compare Pausanias, i. 29, 15.

Plutarch (Perikles, c. 10) cites Aristotle as having mentioned the assassination of Ephialtes. Antipho, however, states that the assassin was never formally known or convicted (De Cade Hero. c. 68).

came, when these reforms were carried, and how fierce was the collision of political parties at this moment, we may judge by the result. The enemies of Ephialtēs caused him to be privately assassinated, by the hand of a Boeotian of Tanagra, named Aristodikos. Such a crime — rare in the political annals of Athens, for we come to no known instance of it afterwards, until the oligarchy of the Four Hundred, in 411 B.C. — marks at once the gravity of the change now introduced, the fierceness of the opposition offered, and the unscrupulous character of the conservative party. Kimon was in exile, and had no share in the deed. Doubtless the assassination of Ephialtēs produced an effect unfavorable in every way to the party who procured it: the popular party, in their resentment, must have become still more attached to the judicial reforms just assured to them, while the hands of Periklēs, the superior leader, left behind and now acting singly, must have been materially strengthened.

It is from this point that the administration of that great man may be said to date: he was now the leading adviser, we might almost say prime minister, of the Athenian people. His first years were marked by a series of brilliant successes, already mentioned, the acquisition of Megara as an ally, and the victorious war against Corinth and Ægina. But when he proposed the great and valuable improvement of the Long Walls, thus making one city of Athens and Peiræus, the same oligarchical party which had opposed his judicial changes and assassinated Ephialtēs again stood forward in vehement resistance. Finding direct opposition unavailing, they did not scruple to enter into treasonable correspondence with Sparta, invoking the aid of a foreign force for the overthrow of the democracy; so odious had it become in their eyes since the recent innovations. How serious was the hazard incurred by Athens, near the time of the battle of Tanagra, has been already recounted: together with the rapid and unexpected reconciliation of parties after that battle, principally owing to the generous patriotism of Kimon and his imme-

The enemies of Periklēs circulated a report, mentioned by Idemeneus, that it was he who had procured the assassination of Ephialtēs, from jealousy of the superiority of the latter (Plutarch, Periklēs, c. 10). We may infer from this report how great the eminence of Ephialtēs was.

diate friends. He was restored from ostracism on this occasion, before his full time had expired, and the rivalry between him and Periklēs henceforward becomes mitigated, or even converted into a compromise,¹ whereby the internal affairs of the city were left to the one, and the conduct of foreign expeditions to the other. The successes of Athens during the ensuing ten years were more brilliant than ever, and she attained the maximum of her power: which doubtless had a material effect in imparting stability to the democracy, as well as to the administration of Periklēs, and enabled both the one and the other to stand the shock of those great public reverses, which deprived the Athenians of their dependent landed alliances, during the interval between the defeat of Korōneia and the thirty years' truce.

Along with the important judicial revolution brought about by Periklēs, were introduced other changes belonging to the same scheme and system.

Thus a general power of supervision, both over the magistrates and over the public assembly, was vested in seven magistrates, now named for the first time, called Nomophylakes, or Law-Guardians, and doubtless changed every year. These nomophylakes sat alongside of the proedri, or presidents, both in the senate and in the public assembly, and were charged with the duty of interposing whenever any step was taken or any proposition made contrary to the existing laws: they were also empowered to constrain the magistrates to act according to law.² We do not know whether

¹ The intervention of Elpinikē, the sister of Kimon, in bringing about this compromise between her brother and Periklēs, is probable enough (Plutarch, Periklēs, c. 10. and Kimon, c. 14). Clever and engaging, she seems to have played an active part in the political intrigues of the day: but we are not at all called upon to credit the scandals insinuated by Eupolis and Stesimbrotus.

² We hear about these nomophylakes in a distinct statement cited from Philochorus, by Photius, Lexic. p. 674, Porson. Νομοφύλακες· ἑπτεροὶ εἰσι τῶν θεσμοθετῶν, ὡς Φιλόχορος ἐν ζ'. οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἄρχοντες ἀνέβαινον εἰς Ἀρείον πύλον ἐστεινόμενοι, οἱ δὲ νομοφύλακες χρύσια στρόφια ἄγοντες· καὶ ταῖς θυσίαις ἐναντίον ἄρχοντων ἐκαθίζοντο· καὶ τὴν πομπὴν ἐπεμπον τῇ Παλλάδι· τὰς δὲ ἀρχὰς ἠνάγκαζον τοῖς νόμοις χρῆσθαι· καὶ ἐν τῇ ἐκκλησίᾳ καὶ ἐν τῇ βουλῇ μετὰ τῶν προέδρων ἐκάθηντο, κωλύοντες τὰ ἀσύμφορα τῇ πόλει πράττειν· ἑπτα δὲ ἦσαν· καὶ κατέστησαν, ὡς Φιλόχορος, ὅτε Ἐφιάλτης μόνῃ κατέλατε τῇ ἐξ Ἀρείου πύλου βουλῇ τὰ ὑπὲρ τοῦ σώματος.

they possessed the presidency of a dikastery, — that is, whether they could themselves cause one of the panels of jurors to be summoned, and put an alleged delinquent on his trial before it, under their presidency, or whether they were restricted to entering a formal protest, laying the alleged illegality before the public assembly. To appoint magistrates, however, invested with this special trust of watching and informing, was not an unimportant step; for it would probably enable Ephialtēs to satisfy many objectors who feared to abolish the superintending power of the Areopagus without introducing any substitute. The nomophylakes were honored with a distinguished place at the public processions and festivals, and were even allowed, like the archons, to enter the senate of Areopagus after their year of office had expired: but they never acquired any considerable power, such as that senate had itself exercised. Their interference must have been greatly superseded by the introduction and increasing application of the *Graphē Paranómōn*, presently to be explained; nor are they even noticed in the description of that misguided assembly which condemned the six generals after the battle of Arginusæ, by a gross violation of legal form not less than of substantial justice.¹ After the expulsion of the Thirty, the senate of Areopagus was again invested with a supervision over magistrates, though without anything like its ancient ascendancy.

Another important change which we may with probability refer to Perikles, is the institution of the *Nomothetæ*. These men were, in point of fact, dikasts, members of the six thousand citizens annually sworn in that capacity. But they were not, like the dikasts for trying causes, distributed into panels, or regiments, known by a particular letter, and acting together throughout the entire year: they were loosed off to sit together only on special occasion and as the necessity arose. According to the reform now introduced, the *ekklesia*, or public assembly, even with the sanction of the senate of Five Hundred, became incompetent either to pass

Harpokration, Pollux, and Suidas, give substantially the same account of these magistrates, though none except Photius mentions the exact date of their appointment. There is no adequate ground for the doubt which M. Boeckh expresses about the accuracy of this statement: see Schömann *Antiq. Jur. Pub. Græc.* sect. lxxvi; and Cicero, *Légis.* iii. 20.
¹ See Xenophon, *Hellenic.* i. 7; Antokidēs de *Mysteriis*, p. 40.

a new law or to repeal a law already in existence; it could only enact a *psaphismos*, — that is, properly speaking, a decree, applicable only to a particular case; though the word was used at Athens in a very large sense, sometimes comprehending decrees of general as well as permanent application. In reference to laws, a peculiar judicial procedure was established. The *thesmothetæ* were directed annually to examine the existing laws, noting any contradictions or double laws on the same matter; and in the first prytany (tenth part) of the Attic year, on the eleventh day, an *ekklesia* was held, in which the first business was to go through the laws *seriatim*, and submit them for approval or rejection: first beginning with the laws relating to the senate, next, those of more general import, especially such as determined the functions and competence of the magistrates. If any law was condemned by the vote of the public assembly, or if any citizen had a new law to propose, the third assembly of the prytany was employed, previous to any other business, in the appointment of *nomothetæ*, and in the provision of means to pay their salary. Previous notice was required to be given publicly by every citizen who had new propositions of the sort to make, in order that the time necessary for the sifting of the *nomothetæ* might be measured according to the number of matters to be submitted to their cognizance. Public advocates were farther named to undertake the formal defence of all the laws attacked, and the citizen who proposed to repeal them had to make out his case against this defence, to the satisfaction of the assembled *nomothetæ*. These latter were taken from the six thousand sworn dikasts, and were of different numbers according to circumstances: sometimes we hear of them as five hundred, sometimes as one thousand, and we may be certain that the number was always considerable.

The effect of this institution was, to place the making or repealing of laws under the same solemnities and guarantees as the trying of causes or accusations in judicature. We must recollect that the citizens who attended the *ekklesia*, or public assembly, were not sworn like the dikasts; nor had they the same solemnity of procedure, nor the same certainty of hearing both sides of the question set forth, nor the same full preliminary notice. How much the oath sworn was brought to act upon the minds of the dikasts, we may see by the frequent appeals to it in the orators.

who contrast them with the unsworn public assembly.¹ And there can be no doubt that the nomothetæ afforded much greater security than the public assembly, for a proper decision. That security depended upon the same principle as we see to pervade all the constitutional arrangements of Athens; upon a fraction of the people casually taken, but sufficiently numerous to have the same interest with the whole, — not permanent, but delegated for the occasion, — assembled under a solemn sanction, and furnished with a full exposition of both sides of the case. The power of passing psephisms, or special decrees, still remained with the public assembly, which was doubtless much more liable to be surprised into hasty or inconsiderate decision than either the dikastery or the nomothetæ, — in spite of the necessity of previous authority from the senate of Five Hundred, before any proposition could be submitted to it.

As an additional security both to the public assembly and the nomothetæ against being entrapped into decisions contrary to existing law, another remarkable provision has yet to be men-

¹ Demosthen. cont. Timokrat. c. 20, pp. 725, 726. Ἄρ' οὐ τῷ δακεὶ συμφέρει τῇ πόλει τοιοῦτος νόμος, ὃς δικάστησαν γυνώσκων αὐτὸς κεραιότερος ἔσται, καὶ τὰς ὑπὸ τῶν ὁμοιοκότων γυνώσκων τοῖς ἀναγκαστοῖς προσταξέει ἅπαν; Ἐνθυμίσαντε, ἀπὸ τοῦ δικάστησαν καὶ τῆς καταγνώσεως αἱ ἀπερίδετοι (Timokratēs) ἐπὶ τὸν δῆμον, ἐκκλίπτων τὸν ἥδιστα; Compare Demosthen. cont. Eubulid. c. 15.

See, about the nomothetæ, Schömann, De Comitibus, ch. vii, p. 248, seqq., and Platner, Prozess und Klagen bey den Attikern, Abschn. ii. 3, p. 33.

Both of them maintain, in my opinion erroneously, that the nomothetæ are an institution of Solon. Demosthenēs, indeed, ascribes it to Solon (Schömann, p. 268): but this counts, in my view, for nothing, when I see that all the laws which he cites for governing the proceedings of the nomothetæ, bear unequivocal evidence of a time much later. Schömann admits this to a certain extent, and in reference to the style of these laws. — "Illorum quidem fragmentorum, quæ in Timokratæ extant, *rationem Solonis ætate formam atque orationem apertum est.*" But it is not merely the style which proves them to be of post-Solonian date: it is the mention of post-Solonian institutions, such as the ten prytanies into which the year was divided, the ten statues of the eponymi, — all derived from the creation of the ten tribes by Kleisthenēs. On the careless employment of the name of Solon by the orators, whenever they desire to make a strong impression on the dikasts, I have already remarked.

tioned, — a provision probably introduced by Periklēs at the same time as the formalities of law-making by means of specially delegated nomothetæ. This was the Graphē Paranomōn, — indictment for informality or illegality, — which might be brought on certain grounds against the proposer of any law or any psephism, and rendered him liable to punishment by the dikastery. He was required, in bringing forward his new measure, to take care that it should not be in contradiction with any preëxisting law, — or if there were any such contradiction, to give formal notice of it, to propose the repeal of that which existed, and to write up publicly beforehand what his proposition was, — in order that there might never be two contradictory laws at the same time in operation, nor any illegal decree passed either by the senate or by the public assembly. If he neglected this precaution, he was liable to prosecution under the graphē paranomōn, which any Athenian citizen might bring against him before the dikastery, through the intervention and under the presidency of the thesmothetæ.

Judging from the title of this indictment, it was originally confined to the special ground of formal contradiction between the new and the old. But it had a natural tendency to extend itself: the citizen accusing would strengthen his case by showing that the measure which he attacked contradicted not merely the letter, but the spirit and purpose of existing laws, — and he would proceed from hence to denounce it as generally mischievous and disgraceful to the state. In this unmeasured latitude, we find the graphē paranomōn at the time of Demosthenēs: the mover of a new law or psephism, even after it had been regularly discussed and passed, was liable to be indicted, and had to defend himself not only against alleged informalities in his procedure, but also against alleged mischiefs in the substance of his measure. If found guilty by the dikastery, the punishment inflicted upon him by them was not fixed, but *variable* according to circumstances: for the indictment belonged to that class wherein, after the verdict of guilty, first a given amount of punishment was proposed by the accuser, next, another and lighter amount was named by the accused party against himself, — the dikastery being bound to make their option between one and the other, without admitting any third modification, — so that it was the

interest even of the accused party to name against himself a measure of punishment sufficient to satisfy the sentiment of the dikasts, in order that they might not prefer the more severe proposition of the accuser. At the same time, the accuser himself, as in other public indictments, was fined in the sum of one thousand drachms, unless the verdict of guilty obtained at least one-fifth of the suffrages of the dikastery. The personal responsibility of the mover, however, continued only one year after the introduction of his new law: if the accusation was brought at a greater distance of time than one year, the accuser could invoke no punishment against the mover, and the sentence of the dikasts neither absolved nor condemned anything but the law. Their condemnation of the law, with or without the author, amounted *ipso facto* to a repeal of it.

Such indictment against the author of a law or of a decree, might be preferred either at some stage prior to its final enactment, — as after its acceptance simply by the senate, if it was a decree, or after its approval by the public assembly, and prior to its going before the nomotheta, if it was a law, — or after it had reached full completion by the verdict of the nomotheta. In the former case, the indictment stayed its farther progress until sentence had been pronounced by the dikasts.

This regulation is framed in a thoroughly conservative spirit, to guard the existing laws against being wholly or partially nullified by a new proposition. As, in the procedure of the nomotheta, whenever any proposition was made for distinctly repealing any existing law, it was thought unsafe to intrust the defence of the law so assailed to the chance of some orator gratuitously undertaking it, and paid advocates were appointed for the purpose; so also, when any citizen made a new positive proposition sufficient security was not supposed to be afforded by the chance of opponents rising up at the time; and a farther guarantee was provided in the personal responsibility of the mover. That the latter, before he proposed a new decree or a new law, should take care that there was nothing in it inconsistent with existing laws, — or, if there were, that he should first formally bring forward a direct proposition for the repeal of such preexistent law, — was in no way unreasonable: it imposed upon him an obligation such as he might perfectly well fulfil, — it served as a check

upon the use of that right, of free speech and initiative in the public assembly, which belonged to every Athenian without exception, and which was cherished by the democracy as much as it was condemned by oligarchical thinkers. — it was a security to the dikasts, who were called upon to apply the law to particular cases, against the perplexity of having conflicting laws quoted before them, and being obliged in their verdict to set aside either one or the other. In modern European governments, even the most free and constitutional, laws have been both made and applied either by select persons or select assemblies, under an organization so different as to put out of sight the idea of personal responsibility on the proposer of a new law. Moreover, even in such assemblies, private initiative has either not existed at all, or has been of comparatively little effect, in law-making; while in the application of laws when made, there has always been a permanent judicial body exercising an action of its own, more or less independent of the legislature, and generally interpreting away the text of contradictory laws so as to keep up a tolerably consistent course of forensic tradition. But at Athens, the fact that the proposer of a new decree, or of a new law, had induced the senate or the public assembly to pass it, was by no means supposed to cancel his personal responsibility, if the proposition was illegal: he had deceived the senate or the people, in deliberately keeping back from them a fact which he knew, or at least might and ought to have known.

But though a full justification may thus be urged on behalf of the *graphé paranómōn*, as originally conceived and intended, it will hardly apply to that indictment as applied afterwards in its plenary and abusive latitude. Thus Æschines indicts Ktesiphon under it for having, under certain circumstances, proposed a crown to Demosthenes. He begins by showing that the proposition was illegal, — for this was the essential foundation of the indictment: he then goes on farther to demonstrate, in a splendid

The privation of this right of public speech (*παρρησία*) followed on the condemnation of any citizen to the punishment called *ἀτιμία*, disfranchisement, entire or partial (Demosthen. cont. Neær. p. 1352, c. 9; cont. Meidiæm. p. 545, c. 27). Compare for the oligarchical sentiment, Xenophon *Republ. Athen.* i, 9.

harangue, that Demosthenês was a vile man and a mischievous politician. accordingly, assuming the argument to be just, Ktesiphon had deceived the people in an aggravated way, — first, by proposing a reward under circumstances contrary to law; next, by proposing it in favor of an unworthy man. The first part of the argument only is of the essence of the *graphê paranomôn*; the second part is in the nature of an abuse growing out of it, — springing from that venom of personal and party enmity which is inseparable, in a greater or less degree, from free political action, and which manifested itself with virulence at Athens, though within the limits of legality. That this indictment, as one of the most direct vents for such enmity, was largely applied and abused at Athens, is certain; but though it probably deterred unpractised citizens from originating new propositions, it did not produce the same effect upon those orators who made politics a regular business, and who could therefore both calculate the temper of the people, and reckon upon support from a certain knot of friends. Aristophan, towards the close of his political life, made it a boast that he had been thus indicted and acquitted seventy-five times. Probably, the worst effect which it produced was that of encouraging the vein of personality and bitterness which pervades so large a proportion of Attic oratory, even in its most illustrious manifestations; turning deliberative into judicial eloquence, and interweaving the discussion of a law, or decree, along with a declamatory harangue against the character of its mover. We may at the same time add that the *graphê paranomôn* was often the most convenient way of getting a law or a psephism repealed, so that it was used even when the annual period had passed over, and when the mover was therefore out of danger, — the indictment being then brought only against the law, or decree, as in the case which forms the subject of the harangue of Demosthenês against Leptinês. If the speaker of this harangue obtained a verdict, he procured at once the repeal of the law, or decree, without proposing any new provision in its place; which he would be required to do, — if not peremptorily, at least by common usage, — if he had carried the law for repeal before the *nomothetæ*.

The *dikasteries* provided under the system of Periklês varied in number of members: we never hear of less than two hun-

dred members, — most generally of five hundred, — and sometimes also of one thousand, fifteen hundred, two thousand members, on important trials.¹ Each man received pay from the treasurers, called *Kolakretæ*, after his day's business was over, of three oboli, or half a drachm: at least this was the amount paid during the early part of the Peloponnesian war. M. Boeckh supposes that the original pay proposed by Periklês was one obolus, afterwards tripled by Kleon; but his opinion is open to much doubt. It was indispensable to propose a measure of pay sufficient to induce citizens to come, and come frequently, if not regularly: now one obolus seems to have proved afterwards an inadequate temptation even to the *ekklesiasts*, or citizens who attended the public assembly, who were less frequently wanted, and must have had easier sittings, than the *dikasts*: much less, therefore, would it be sufficient in the case of the latter. I incline to the belief that the pay originally awarded was three oboli:² the rather, as these new institutions seem to have nearly coincided in point of time with the transportation of the confeder-

¹ See Meier, *Antisch. Prozess*, p. 139. Andokidês mentions a trial under the indictment of *γραφὴ παρανομίας*, brought by his father Leogoras against a senator named Speusippus, wherein six thousand *dikasts* sat, — that is, the entire body of heliasts. However, the loose speech so habitual with Andokidês, renders this statement very uncertain (*Andokidês de Mystériis*, p. 3, § 29).

See Matthiæ, *De Judiciis Atheniensium*, in his *Miscellanea Philologica*, vol. i. p. 252. Matthiæ questions the reading of that passage in Demosthenês (*cont. Meideam*, p. 585), wherein two hundred *dikasts* are spoken of as sitting in judgment: he thinks it ought to be *πεντακοσίους* instead of *κατακοσίους*, — but this alteration would be rash.

² See on this question, Boeckh, *Public Econ. of Athens*, ch. xv, p. 233; K F. Herrmann, *Griech. Staatsalt.* § 134.

The proof which M. Boeckh brings to show, first, that the original pay was one obolus, — next, that Kleon was the first to introduce the triobolus, — is in both cases very inconclusive.

Certain passages from the Scholiast, stating that the pay of the *dikasts* fluctuated (*οὐκ ἑστῆκεν* — *ἀλλ' ὅτε ἄλλως ἰδύσθαι*) do not so naturally indicate a rise from one obolus to three, as a change backwards and forwards according to circumstances. Now it seems that there were some occasions when the treasury was so very poor that it was doubtful whether the *dikasts* could be paid: see *Lysias*, *cont. Epikrat.* c. 1; *cont. Nikomach.* c. 22; and *Aristophan. Equit.* 1370. The amount of pay may, therefore, have been sometimes affected by this cause.

atic treasure from Delos to Athens, — so that the exchequer would then appear abundantly provided. As to the number of dikasts actually present on each day of sitting, or the minimum number requisite to form a sitting, we are very imperfectly informed. Though each of the ten panels or divisions of dikasts included five hundred individuals, seldom probably did all of them attend; but it also seldom happened, probably, that all the ten divisions sat on the same day: there was therefore an opportunity of making up deficiencies in division A, when its lot was called and when its dikasts did not appear in sufficient numbers, from those who belonged to division B or Δ, besides the supplementary dikasts who were not comprised in any of the ten divisions: though on all these points we cannot go beyond conjecture. Certain it is, however, that the dikasteries were always numerous, and that none of the dikasts could know in what causes they would be employed, so that it was impossible to tamper with them beforehand.

Such were the great constitutional innovations of Perikles and Ephialtes,—changes full of practical results,—the transformation as well as the complement of that democratical system which Kleisthenes had begun, and to which the tide of Athenian feeling had been gradually mounting up, during the preceding twenty years. The entire force of these changes is generally not perceived, because the popular dikasteries and the nomothetae are

[illegible]

That there was a good deal of bribery at Athens, where individuals could be approached and dealt with, is very probable (see Xenoph. de Repub. Ath. iii. 3) and we may well believe that there were also particular occasions on which money was given to the dikasts, some of whom were punished with death for such corrupt receipt (Aeschinés cont. Timarch. c. 17-22, pp. 12-15). But the passage above quoted from Xenophon, an unfriendly witness, shows that the precautions taken to prevent corruption of the dikasteries were well-devised and successful, though these precautions might sometimes be eluded.

so often represented as institutions of Solon, and as merely supplied with pay by Periklēs. This erroneous supposition prevents all clear view of the growth of the Athenian democracy, by throwing back its last elaborations to the period of its early and imperfect start. To strip the magistrates of all their judicial power, except that of imposing a small fine, and the Areopagus of all its jurisdiction, except in cases of homicide, — providing popular, numerous, and salaried dikasts to decide all the judicial business at Athens, as well as to repeal and enact laws; this was the consummation of the Athenian democracy: no serious constitutional alteration — I except the temporary interruptions of the Four Hundred and the Thirty — was afterwards made until the days of Macedonian interference. As Periklēs made it, so it remained in the days of Demosthenes, — though with a sensible change in the character, and abatement in the energies, of the people, rich as well as poor.

as well as poor.

In appreciating the practical working of these numerous di-
kasteries at Athens, in comparison with such justice as might
have been expected from individual magistrates, we have to con-
sider, first, that personal and pecuniary corruption seems to have
been a common vice among the leading men of Athens and Sparta,
when acting individually or in boards of a few members, and
not uncommon even with the kings of Sparta, — next, that in the
Grecian cities generally, as we know even from the oligarchical
Xenophon (he particularly excepts Sparta), the rich and great
men were not only insubordinate to the magistrates, but made a
parade of showing that they cared nothing about them.¹ We
know, also, from the same unsuspected source,² that while the

¹ Xenophon, De Republi. Lacel. c. 8. 2. Τῶν ἀνθρώπων δὲ ταῦτα, ὅτι ἐν αὐτοῖς ἄλλαντες ποιεῖται αἱ ἀνθρώπων οἷοι ἐργάζονται δοκεῖν τὰς ἀρχὰς ἀφελείσθαι. ἄλλα νομίζουσιν τοῦτο ἀνεκτικτον εἶναι. ἐν δὲ τῇ Σπάρτῃ οἱ ἀριστοὶ καὶ ἐπιστατοὶ μάλιστα τὰς ἀρχὰς, etc.

Respecting the violent proceedings committed by powerful men at Thebes, whereby it became almost impossible to procure justice against them for fear of being put to death. see Dikaiarchus, Vit. Græc. Fragm. ed. Fabr. p. 143, and Polybius, xx. 4. 6; xxiii. 2.

* Xenophon, Memorab. iii, 5, 18. *Μηδάρως, ἐδῶ ὁ Σικανέτης, ὁ Περικλῆς, οὕτως ἦγον ἀνηκέστῳ πονηρίᾳ πορεύειν Ἀθηναίους. Οἱχ ἔργῳ, ὡς εὐτάκτοι μὲν εἴσιν ἐν τοῖς ναυτικοῖς, εὐτάκτως δ' ἐν τοῖς χρηματικοῖς ἔργῳ πείθεσθαι τοῖς ἐπιστάταις, οὐδένων δὲ καταδεεσθῶν ἐν τοῖς χρηματικῶν ἔργῳ*

poorer Athenian citizens who served on ship board were distinguished for the strictest discipline, the hoplites, or middling burghers, who formed the infantry, were less obedient, and the rich citizens who served on horseback the most disobedient of all. To make rich and powerful criminals effectively amenable to justice, has indeed been found so difficult everywhere, until a recent period of history, that we should be surprised if it were otherwise in Greece. When we follow the reckless demeanor of rich men like Kritias, Alkibiadēs,¹ and Meidias, even under the full grown democracy of Athens, we may be very sure that their predecessors under the Kleisthenean constitution would have been often too formidable to be punished or kept down by an individual anchor of ordinary firmness,² even assuming him to be upright and well

τοῖς τοῖς διδασκαλῶν. Τούτο γὰρ τοῖς ἔφη, καὶ θάνατον ἐστὶ τὸ τοῖς αἰ τοιοῦτον πειθαρχεῖν τοῖς ἰσχυροῖς. τοῖς δὲ ὀπλίταις καὶ τοῖς ἵππεις, οἱ δὲ καὶ καλὰ καὶ ἀγαθὰ. πρὸς ἐκείνους τὸν πόλιν, ἀπειθεστάτοις εἶναι πάντων.

¹ See Xenophon, Memorab. i. 2, 12-25; Thucyd. vi. 15, and the speech which he gives as spoken by Alkibiadēs in the assembly, vi. 17; Plutarch Alkibiad. c. 7-8-16, and the Oration of Demosthenes against Meidias throughout: also Fragm. v. of the *Ηζαγγοί* of Aristophanes, Meineke, ii. p. 1128.

² Sir Thomas Smith, in his *Treatise on the Commonwealth of England*, explains the Court of Star-chamber as originally constituted in order "to deal with offenders too stout for the ordinary course of justice." The abundant compounds of the Greek language furnish a single word exactly describing this same class of offenders. — *Υβριστοδίκαι* — the title of one of the lost comedies of Eupolis: see Meineke, *Historia Critica Comicorum Græcorum*, vol. i, p. 145.

Dean Tucker observes, in his *Treatise on Civil Government*: "There was hardly a session of parliament, from the time of Henry the Third to Henry the Eighth, but laws were enacted for restraining the feuds, robberies, and oppressions of the barons and their dependents on the one side, — and to moderate and check the excesses and extortions of the royal purveyors on the other; these being the two capital evils then felt. Respecting the tyranny of the ancient baronage, even squires as well as others were not ashamed to wear the liveries of their leaders, and to glory in every badge of distinction, whereby they might be known to be retained as the bullies of such or such great men, and to engage in their quarrels, just or unjust, right or wrong. The histories of those times, together with the statutes of the realm, inform us that they associated (or, as they called it, *confederated* together) in great bodies, parading on horseback in fairs and markets, and clad in armor, to the great terror of peaceable subjects; nay, that they

intentioned. Now the *dikasteries* established by Periklēs were inaccessible both to corruption and intimidation: their number,

attended their lords to parliament, equipped in the same military dress, and even dared sometimes to present themselves before the judge of assize, and to enter the courts of justice, in a hostile manner, — while their principals sat with the judges on the bench, intimidating the witnesses, and influencing the juries by looks, nods, signs and signals." (*Treatise concerning Civil Government*, p. 337, by Josiah Tucker, D. D. London, 1781.)

The whole chapter (pp. 301-355) contains many statutes and much other matter, illustrating the intimidation exercised by powerful men in those days over the course of justice.

A passage among the *Fragmenta* of Sallust, gives a striking picture of the conduct of powerful citizens under the Roman Republic. (*Fragm.* i. p. 158, ed. Delph.)

"At discordia, et avaritia, et ambitio, et cætera secundis rebus oriri sueta mala, post Carthaginis excidium maximè aucta sunt. Nam injuriæ validiorum, et ob eas discessio plebis à Patribus, aliæque dissensiones domi fieri jam inde à principio: neque amplius, quam regibus exactis, dum metus à Tarquinio et bellum grave cum Etruriâ positum est. æquo et modesto jure agnatum: dein servili imperio patres plebem exercere: de vitâ atque tergo, regio more consulere: agro peliere, et à cæteris expertibus, soli in imperio agere. Quibus servitiis, et maximè feneratoris onere, oppressa plebes, cum assiduâ bellis tributum simul et militiam toleraret, armata Montem Sacrum et Aventinum insedit. Tumque tribunos plebis, et alia sibi jura paravit. Discordiarum et certaminis utrinque finis fuit secundum bellum Punicum."

Compare the exposition of the condition of the cities throughout Europe in the thirteenth, fourteenth, and fifteenth centuries, in Hüllmann's *Städte-Wesen des Mittelalters*, especially vol. iii. pp. 196-199, *supp.*

The memorable institution which spread through nearly all the Italian cities during these centuries, of naming as *podesta*, or supreme magistrate, a person not belonging to the city itself, to hold office for a short time, — was the expedient which they resorted to for escaping the extreme perversion of judicial and administrative power, arising out of powerful family connections. The restrictions which were thought necessary to guard against either favor or antipathies on the part of the *podesta*, are extremely singular. (Hüllmann, vol. iii, pp. 252-261, *supp.*)

"The proceedings of the patrician families in these cities (observes Hüllmann) in respect to the debts which they owed, was among the worst of the many oppressions to which the trading classes were exposed at their hands, one of the greatest abuses which they practised by means of their superior position. How often did they even maltreat their creditors, who came to demand merely what was due to them!" (*Städte-Wesen*, vol. ii, p. 229.)

Machiavel's *History of Florence* illustrates, throughout, the inveterate habit of the powerful families to set themselves above the laws and judicial

their secret suffrage, and the impossibility of knowing beforehand what individuals would sit in any particular cause, prevented both the one and the other. And besides that the magnitude of their number, extravagant, according to our ideas of judicial business, was essential to this tutelary effect,¹ it served farther to render the trial solemn and the verdict imposing on the minds of parties and spectators, as we may see by the fact that, in important causes, the dikastery was doubled or tripled. Nor was it possible, by any other means than numbers,² to give dignity to an as-

authority. Indeed, he seems to regard this as an incorrigible chronic malady in society, necessitating ever-recurring disputes between powerful men and the body of the people. "The people (he says) desire to live according to the laws; the great men desire to overrule the laws: it is therefore impossible that the two should march in harmony." "Volendo il popolo vivere secondo le leggi, e i potenti comandare a quelle, non è possibile che capino insieme." (Machiavelli, *Istorie Fiorentine*, liv. ii. p. 79, ad ann. 1282.)

The first book of the interesting tale, called the *Promessi Sposi*, of Manzoni, — itself full of historical matter, and since published with illustrative notes by the historian Cantù, — exhibits a state of judicial administration, very similar to that above described, in the Milanese, during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries: demonstrated by repeated edicts, all ineffectual, to bring powerful men under the real control of the laws.

Because men of wealth and power, in the principal governments of modern Europe, are now completely under the control of the laws, the modern reader is apt to suppose that this is the natural state of things. It is therefore not unimportant to produce some references, which might be indefinitely multiplied, reminding him of the very different phenomena which past history exhibits almost everywhere.

¹ The number of Roman judges employed to try a criminal cause under the *quaestiones perpetuae* in the last century and a half of the Republic, seems to have varied between one hundred, seventy-five, seventy, fifty-six, fifty-one, thirty-two, etc. (Laboulaye, *Essai sur les Loix Criminelles des Romains*, p. 336, Paris, 1845.)

In the time of Augustus, there was a total of four thousand judges at Rome, distributed into four decuries (Pliny, *H. N.* xxxiii. l. 31).

The venality, as well as the party corruption of these Roman judges, or jurors, taken from the senatorial and equestrian orders, the two highest and richest orders in the state, — was well-known and flagrant (Appian, *Bell. Civ.* i, 22, 35, 37; Laboulaye, *ibid.* pp. 217-227; Walter, *Geschichte des Römischen Rechts*, ch. xxviii, sect. 237, 238; Asconius in Cicero, *Verrin* pp. 141-145, ed. Orell; and Cicero himself, in the remarkable letter to Atticus, *Ep. ad Attic.* i, 16).

² Numerous dikasteries taken by lot seem to have been established in

assembly of citizens, of whom many were poor, some old, and others were despised individually by rich accused persons who were brought before them. — as Aristophanes and Xenophon give us plainly to understand.¹ If we except the strict and peculiar educational discipline of Sparta, these numerous dikasteries afforded the only organ which Grecian politics could devise, for getting redress against powerful criminals, public as well as private, and for obtaining a sincere and uncorrupt verdict.

Taking the general working of the dikasteries, we shall find that they are nothing but jury-trial applied on a scale broad, systematic, unaided, and uncontrolled, beyond all other historical

later times in Rhodes and other Grecian cities, though Rhodes was not democratically constituted, and to have worked satisfactorily. Sallust says (in his *Oratio ii. ad Cæsarem de Republicâ, ordinandâ*, p. 561, ed. Curt.): "Judices a paucis probari regnum est: ex pecuniâ legi, inhonestum. Quare omnes primæ classis judicare placet: sed numero plures quam judicant. Neque Rhodios, neque alias civitates unquam suorum judiciorum permittit; ubi promiscuè dives et pauper, ut cuique sors tulit, de maximis rebus juxta ac de minimis disceptat."

The necessity of a numerous judicature, in a republic where there is no standing army, or official force professionally constituted, as the only means of enforcing public-minded justice against powerful criminals, is insisted upon by Machiavel, *Discorsi sopra Tito Livio*, lib. i. c. 7.

"Potrebbe ancora allegare, a fortificazione della soprascritta conclusione, l'accidente seguito pur in Firenze contra Piero Soderini: il quale al tutto seguì per non essere in quella repubblica alcuno modo di accuse contro alla ambizione dei potenti cittadini: perchè lo accusare un potente a otto giudici in una repubblica, non basta: bisogna che i giudici siano assai, perchè pochi sempre fanno a modo de pochi," etc.: compare the whole of the same chapter.

¹ Aristophan. *Vesp.* 570; Xenophon, *Rep. Ath.* i. 18. We are not to suppose that all the dikasts who tried a cause were very poor: Demosthenes would not talk to very poor men, as to "the slave whom each of them might have left at home." (Demosthenes cont. Stephan. *A. c.* 26, p. 1127.)

It was criminal by law in the dikasts to receive bribes in the exercise of their functions, as well as in every citizen to give money to them (Demosth. cont. Steph. *B. c.* 13, p. 1137). And it seems perfectly safe to affirm that in practice the dikasts were never tampered with beforehand: had the fact been otherwise, we must have seen copious allusions to it in the many free-spoken pleadings which remain to us, just as there are in the Roman orators: whereas, in point of fact, there are hardly any such allusions. The word *δικαστήριον* (in Isokratēs de *Pac. Or.* viii, p. 169, sect. 63) does not allude to obtaining by corrupt means verdicts of dikasts in the dikastery, but to

experience, and that they therefore exhibit in exaggerated proportions both the excellences and the defects characteristic of the jury-system, as compared with decision by trained and professional judges. All the encomiums, which it is customary to pronounce upon jury-trial, will be found predicable of the Athenian dikasteries in a still greater degree: all the reproaches, which can be addressed on good ground to the dikasteries, will apply to modern juries also, though in a less degree. Nor is the parallel less just, though the dikasteries, as the most democratical feature of democracy itself, have been usually criticized with marked disfavor, — every censure, or sneer, or joke against them, which can be found in ancient authors, comic as well as serious, being accepted as true almost to the letter; while juries are so popular an institution, that their merits have been over-stated, in England at least, and their defects kept out of sight. The theory of the Athenian dikastery, and the theory of jury-trial, as it has prevailed in England since the revolution of 1688, are one and the

obtaining by such means votes for offices in the public assembly, where the election took place by show of hands. Isokratēs says that this was often done in his time, and so perhaps it may have been: but in the case of the dikasteries, much better security was taken against it.

The statement of Aristotle (from his *Πολιτεία*, *Fragm.* xi, p. 69, ed. Neumann: compare Harpokration v. *Δικαστήν*; Plutarch, *Coriolan.* c. 14; and Pollux, viii, 121) intimates that Anytus was the first person who taught the art *τοῦ δεκάζειν τὰ δικάσματα*, a short time before the battle of Ægos Potamos. But besides, that the information on this point is to the last degree vague, we may remark that between the defeat of the oligarchy of Four Hundred and the battle of Ægos Potamos, the financial and political condition of Athens was so exceedingly embarrassed, that it may well be doubted whether she could maintain the paid dikasteries on the ordinary footing. Both all the personal service of the citizens, and all the public money, must have been put in requisition at that time for defence against the enemy, without leaving any surplus for other purposes: there was not enough even to afford constant pay to the soldiers and sailors (compare Thucyd. vi, 91; viii, 69, 71, 76, 86). If therefore, in this time of distress the dikasteries were rarely convoked, and without any certainty of pay, a powerful accused person might find it more easy to tamper with them beforehand, than it had been before, or than it came to be afterwards, when the system was regularly in operation. We can hardly reason with safety, therefore, from the period shortly preceding the battle of Ægos Potamos, either to that which preceded the Sicilian expedition, or to that which followed the subversion of the Thirty.

same: recourse to a certain number of private citizens, taken by chance, or without possibility of knowing beforehand who they will be, sworn to hear fairly and impartially plaintiff and defendant, accuser and accused, and to find a true verdict, according to their consciences, upon a distinct issue before them. But in Athens this theory was worked out to its natural consequences; while English practice, in this respect as in so many others, is at variance with English theory: the jury, though an ancient and a constant portion of the judicial system, has never been more than a portion, — kept in subordination, trammels, and pupillage, by a powerful crown, and by judges presiding over an artificial system of law. In the English state trials, down to a period not long before the revolution of 1688, any jurors who found a verdict contrary to the dictation of the judge were liable to fine; and at an earlier period, if a second jury on being summoned found an opposite verdict, even to the terrible punishment of attainder.¹

¹ Mr. Jardine, in his interesting and valuable publication, *Criminal Trials*, vol. i, p. 115, after giving an account of the trial of Sir Nicholas Throckmorton in 1553, for high treason, and his acquittal, observes: "There is one circumstance in this trial, which ought not to be passed over without an observation. It appears that after the trial was over, the jury were required to give recognizances to answer for their verdict, and were afterwards imprisoned for nearly eight months, and heavily fined, by a sentence of the Star-chamber. Such was the security which the trial by jury afforded to the subject in those times: and such were the perils to which juries were then exposed, who ventured to act upon their conscientious opinions in state prosecutions! But even these proceedings against the jury, monstrous as they appear to our improved notions of the administration of justice, must not be considered as a wanton exercise of unlawful power on this particular occasion. The fact is, that the judges of England had for centuries before exercised a similar authority, though not without some murmuring against it; and it was not until more than a century after it, in the reign of Charles the Second, that a solemn decision was pronounced against its legality."

..... In the reign of James the First, it was held by the Lord Chancellor Egerton, together with the two Chief Justices and the Chief Baron, that when a party indicted is *found guilty on the trial*, the jury shall not be questioned; but on the other side, when a jury hath *acquitted a felon or a traitor* against manifest proof, they may be charged in the Star-chamber for their partiality in finding a manifest offender not guilty. After the abolition of the Star-chamber, there were several instances in the reign of Charles the Second, in which it was resolved, that both grand and petit juries might be

And though, for the last century and a half, the verdict of the jury has been free as to matters of fact, new trials having taken the place of the old attain, yet the ascendancy of the presiding judge over their minds, and his influence over the procedure as the authority on matters of law, has always been such as to overrule the natural play of their feelings and judgment as men and citizens,¹ sometimes to the detriment, much oftener to the benefit — always excepting political trials — of substantial justice. But in Athens, the dikasts judged of the law as well as of the fact: the laws were not numerous, and were couched in few, for the most part familiar, words. To determine how the facts stood, and whether, if the facts were undisputed, the law invoked was properly applicable to them, were parts of the integral question submitted to them, and comprehended in their verdict: moreover, each dikastery construed the law for itself, without being bound to follow the decisions of those which had preceded

used for giving verdicts against plain evidence and the directions of the court." Compare Mr. Amos's Notes on Fortescue, *De Laudibus Legum Angliæ*, c. 27.

¹ Respecting the French juries, M. Cottu (*Reflexions sur la Justice Criminale*, p. 79) remarks: —

"Le désir ardent de bien faire dont les jurés sont généralement animés, et la crainte de s'égarer, les jette dans une obéissance passive à l'impression qui leur est donnée par le président de la Cour d'Assise, et si ce magistrat sait s'emparer de leur estime, alors leur confiance en lui ne connoît plus de bornes. Ils le considèrent comme l'étoile qui doit les guider dans l'obscurité qui les environne, et pleins d'un respect aveugle pour son opinion, ils n'attendent que la manifestation qu'il leur en fait pour la sanctionner par leur déclaration. Ainsi au lieu de deux juges que l'accusé devoit avoir, il n'en a bien souvent qu'un seul, qui est le président de la Cour d'Assise."

Anselm Feuerbach (in the second part of his work, *Ueber die Oeffentlichkeit und Mündlichkeit der Gerechtigkeitspflege*, which contains his review of the French judicial system. *Ueber die Gerichtsverfassung Frankreichs*, Abt. iii. H. v, p. 477) confirms this statement from a large observation of the French courts of justice.

The habit of the French juries, in so many doubtful cases, to pronounce a verdict of guilty, by a majority of seven against five, in which case the law threw the actual condemnation upon the judges present in court, directing their votes to be counted along with those of the jury, is a remarkable proof of this aversion of the jury to the responsibility of decision; see Feuerbach, *ibid.* p. 481, *seqq.* Compare also the treatise of the same author, *Betrachtungen über das Geschwornen Gericht*. pp. 186–198.

it, except in so far as such analogy might really influence the convictions of the members. They were free, self-judging persons, unassisted by the schooling, but at the same time untrammelled by the awe-striking ascendancy, of a professional judge, obeying the spontaneous inspirations of their own consciences, and recognizing no authority except the laws of the city, with which they were familiar.

Trial by jury, as practised in England since 1688, has been politically most valuable, as a security against the encroachments of an anti-popular executive: partly for this reason, partly for others, not necessary to state here, it has had greater credit as an instrument of judicature generally, and has been supposed to produce much more of what is good in English administration of justice, than really belongs to it. Amidst the unqualified encomiums so frequently bestowed upon the honesty, the unprejudiced rectitude of appreciation, the practical instinct for detecting falsehood and resisting sophistry, in twelve citizens taken by hazard and put into a jury-box, — comparatively little account is taken either of the aids, or of the restrictions, or of the corrections in the shape of new trials, under which they act, or of the artificial forensic medium into which they are plunged for the time of their service: so that the theory of the case presumes them to be more of spontaneous agents, and more analogous to the Athenian dikasts than the practice confirms. Accordingly, when we read these encomiums in modern authors, we shall find that both the direct benefits ascribed to jury-trial in insuring pure and even-handed justice, and still more its indirect benefits in improving and educating the citizens generally, might have been set forth yet more emphatically in a laudatory harangue of Periklès about the Athenian dikasteries. If it be true that an Englishman or an American counts more certainly on an impartial and uncorrupt verdict from a jury of his country, than from a permanent professional judge, much more would this be the feeling of an ordinary Athenian, when he compared the dikasteries with the archon. The juror hears and judges under full persuasion that he himself, individually, stands in need of the same protection or redress invoked by others: so also did the dikast. As to the effects of jury-trial, in diffusing respect to the laws and constitution, in giving to every citizen a personal interest in enforcing the

former and maintaining the latter, in imparting a sentiment of dignity to small and poor men, through the discharge of a function exalted as well as useful, in calling forth the patriotic sympathies, and exercising the mental capacities of every individual; all these effects were produced in a still higher degree by the *dikasteries* at Athens; from their greater frequency, numbers, and spontaneity of mental action, without any professional judge, upon whom they could throw the responsibility of deciding for them.¹

¹ I transcribe from an eminent lawyer of the United States, Mr. Livingston, author of a Penal Code for the State of Louisiana (Preface, pp. 12-16) an eloquent panegyric on trial by jury. It contains little more than the topics commonly insisted on, but it is expressed with peculiar warmth, and with the greater fulness, inasmuch as the people of Louisiana, for whom the author was writing, had no familiarity with the institution and its working. The reader will observe that almost everything here said in recommendation of the jury might have been urged by Periklēs with much truer and wider application, in enforcing his transfer of judicial power from individual magistrates to the *dikasteries*.

By our constitution (*i. e.* in Louisiana), the right of a trial by jury is secured to the accused, but it is not exclusively established. This, however, may be done by law, and there are so many strong reasons in its favor, that it has been thought proper to insert in the code a precise declaration that, in all criminal prosecutions, the trial by jury is a privilege which cannot be rescinded. Were it left entirely at the option of the accused, a desire to propitiate the favor of the judge, ignorance of his interest, or the confusion incident to his situation, might induce him to waive the advantage of a trial by his country, and thus by degrees accustom the people to a spectacle which they ought never to behold, — a single man determining the fact, applying the law, and disposing at his will of the life, liberty, and reputation of a citizen. . . . Those who advocate the present disposition of our law say, — admitting the trial by jury to be an advantage, the law does enough when it gives the accused the option to avail himself of its benefits; he is the best judge whether it will be useful to him; and it would be unjust to direct him in so important a choice. This argument is specious, but not solid. There are reasons, and some have already been stated, to show that this choice cannot be freely exercised. There is, moreover, another interest besides that of the culprit to be considered. If he be guilty, the state has an interest in his conviction; and, whether guilty or innocent, it has a higher interest, — that the fact should be fairly canvassed before judges inaccessible to influence, and unbiased by any false views of official duty. It has an interest in the character of its administration of justice, and a paramount duty to perform in rendering it free from suspicion. It is not true, therefore, to say that the laws do enough when they give the choice between

On the other hand, the imperfections inherent in jury-trial were likewise disclosed in an exaggerated form under the Athe-

a fair and impartial trial, and one that is liable to the greatest objections. They must do more; they must restrict that choice, so as not to suffer an ill-advised individual to degrade them into instruments of ruin, though it should be voluntarily inflicted; or of death, though that death should be suicide.

Another advantage of rendering this mode of trial obligatory is, that it diffuses the most valuable information among every rank of citizens; it is a school, of which every jury that is impanelled is a separate class, where the dictates of the laws, and the consequences of disobedience to them, are practically taught. The frequent exercise of these important functions, moreover, gives a sense of dignity and self-respect, not only becoming to the character of a free citizen, but which adds to his private happiness. Neither party-spirit, nor intrigue, nor power, can deprive him of this share in the administration of justice, though they can humble the pride of every other office and vacate every other place. Every time he is called on to act in this capacity, he must feel that though placed in the humblest station, he is yet the guardian of the life, the liberty, and the reputation of his fellow-citizens against injustice and oppression; and that while his plain understanding has been found the best refuge for innocence, his incorruptible integrity is pronounced a sure pledge that guilt will not escape. A state whose most obscure citizens are thus individually elevated to perform these august functions; who are alternately the defenders of the injured, the dread of the guilty, the vigilant guardians of the constitution; without whose consent no punishment can be inflicted, no disgrace incurred; who can by their voice arrest the blow of oppression, and direct the hand of justice where to strike, — such a state can never sink into slavery, or easily submit to oppression. Corrupt rulers may pervert the constitution; ambitious demagogues may violate its precepts; foreign influence may control its operations; but while the people enjoy the trial by jury, taken by lot from among themselves, they cannot cease to be free. The information it spreads, the sense of dignity and independence it inspires, the courage it creates, will always give them an energy of resistance that can grapple with encroachments, and a renovating spirit that will make arbitrary power despair. The enemies of freedom know this: they know how admirable a vehicle it is, to convey the contagion of those liberal principles which attack the vitals of their power, and they therefore guard against its introduction with more care than they would take to avoid pestilential disease. In countries where it already exists, they insidiously endeavor to innovate, because they dare not openly destroy: changes inconsistent with the spirit of the institution are introduced, under the plausible pretext of improvement: *the common class of citizens are too ill-informed to perform the functions of jurors. — a selection is necessary.* This choice must be confided to an agent of executive power, and must be made among the most eminent for education, wealth, and respectability: so that, after several suc-

nian system. Both juror and dikast represent the average man of the time and of the neighborhood, exempt, indeed, from pecuniary corruption or personal fear, deciding according to what he thinks justice, or to some genuine feeling of equity, mercy, religion, or patriotism, which in reference to the case before him he thinks

successful operations of political chemistry, a shining result may be obtained, freed, indeed, from all republican dross, but without any of the intrinsic value that is found in the rugged but inflexible integrity, and incorruptible worth, of the original composition. Men impanelled by this process, bear no resemblance but in name to the sturdy, honest, unlettered jurors who derive no dignity but from the performance of their duties; and the momentary exercise of those functions gives no time for the work of corruption or the influence of fear. By innovations such as these the institution is so changed as to leave nothing to attach the affections, or awaken the interest of the people, and it is neglected as an useless, or abandoned as a mischievous, contrivance."

Consistently with this earnest admiration of jury-trial, Mr. Livingston, by the provisions of his code, limits very materially the interference of the presiding judge, thus bringing back the jurors more nearly to a similarity with the Athenian dikasts (p. 85): "I restrict the charge of the judge to an opinion of the law, and to the repetition of the evidence, *only when required by any one of the jury*. The practice of repeating all the testimony from notes, always (from the nature of things) imperfectly, not seldom inaccurately, and sometimes carelessly taken, — has a double disadvantage: it makes the jurors, who rely more on the judge's notes than on their own memory, inattentive to the evidence; and it gives them an imperfect copy of that which the nature of the trial by jury requires that they should record in their own minds. Forced to rely upon themselves, the necessity will quicken their attention, and it will be only when they disagree in their recollection, that recourse will be had to the notes of the judge." Mr. Livingston goes on to add, that the judges, from their old habits, acquired as practising advocates, are scarcely ever neutral, — almost always take a side, and generally against the prisoners on trial.

The same considerations as those which Mr. Livingston here sets forth to demonstrate the value of jury-trial, are also insisted upon by M. Charles Comte, in his translation of Sir Richard Phillips's Treatise on Juries, enlarged with many valuable reflections on the different shape which the jury-system has assumed in England and France. (*Des Pouvoirs et des Obligations des Jury, traduit de l'Anglais, par Charles Comte, 2d ed. Paris, 1828, with preliminary Considérations sur le Pouvoir Judiciaire, pp. 100, seqq.*)

The length of this note forbids my citing anything further either from the eulogistic observations of Sir Richard Phillips or from those of M. Comte; but they would be found, like those of Mr. Livingston, even more applicable to the dikasteries of Athens than to the juries of England and America

as good as justice, — but not exempt from sympathies, antipathies, and prejudices, all of which act the more powerfully because there is often no consciousness of their presence, and because they even appear essential to his idea of plain and straight-forward good sense. According as a jury are composed of Catholics or Protestants, Irishmen or Englishmen, tradesmen, farmers, or inhabitants of a frontier on which smuggling prevails, there is apt to prevail among them a corresponding bias: at the time of any great national delusion, such as the Popish Plot, — or of any powerful local excitement, such as that of the Church and King mobs, at Birmingham, in 1791, against Dr. Priestley and the Dissenters, — juries are found to perpetrate what a calmer age recognizes to have been gross injustice. A jury who disapprove of the infliction of capital punishment for a particular crime, will acquit prisoners in spite of the clearest evidence of guilt. It is probable that a delinquent, indicted for any state offence before the dikastery, at Athens, — having only a private accuser to contend against, with equal power of speaking in his own defence, of summoning witnesses, and of procuring friends to speak for him, — would have better chance of a fair trial than he would now have anywhere, except in England and the United States of America; and better than he would have had in England down to the seventeenth century.¹ Juries bring the com-

¹ Mr. Jardine (Criminal Trials, Introd. p. 8) observes, that the "proceedings against persons accused of state offences, in the earlier periods of our history, do not deserve the name of trials: they were a mere mockery of justice," etc.

Respecting what English juries have been, it is curious to peruse the following remarks of Mr. Daines Barrington, Observations on the Statutes, p. 479. In remarking on a statute of Henry the Seventh, A.D. 1494, he says:

"The twenty-first chapter recites: 'That perjury is much and customarily used within the city of London, among such persons as passen and been impanelled in issue, joined between party and party.'

"This offence hath been before this statute complained of in preambles to several laws, being always the perjury of a *juror*, who finds a verdict contrary to his oath, and not that which we hear too much of at present, in the witnesses produced at a trial.

"In the Dance of Death, written originally in French, by Macharel, and translated by John Lydgate in this reign, with some additions, to adapt it to English characters, — a juryman is mentioned, who had often been

mon feeling as well as the common reason of the public, — or often, indeed, only the separate feeling of particular fractions of the public, — to dictate the application of the law to particular cases: they are a protection against anything worse, — especially against such corruption and servility as are liable to taint permanent official persons, but they cannot possibly reach anything better. Now the dikast trial at Athens effected the same object, and had in it only the same ingredients of error and misdecision,

bribed for giving a false verdict, which shows the offence to have been very common. The sheriff, who summoned the jury, was likewise greatly accessory to this crime, by summoning those who were most partial and prejudiced. Carew, in his account of Cornwall, informs us that it was a common article in an attorney's bill, to charge *pro amicitia viccomitis*.

It is likewise remarkable, that partiality and perjury in jurors of the city of London is more particularly complained of than in other parts of England, by the preamble of this and other statutes. Stow informs us that in 1468, many jurors of this city were punished by having papers fixed on their heads, stating their offence of having been tampered with by the parties to the suit. He likewise complains that this crying offence continued in the time of Queen Elizabeth, when he wrote his account of London: and Fuller, in his English Worthies, mentions it as a proverbial saying, that London juries hang half and save half. Grafton also, in his Chronicle, informs us that the Chancellor of the diocese of London was indicted for a murder, and that the bishop wrote a letter to Cardinal Wolsey, in behalf of his officer, to stop the prosecution, 'because London juries were so prejudiced, that they would find Abel guilty for the murder of Cain.'

The punishment for a false verdict by the petty jury is by writ of attaint: and the statute directs, that half of the grand-jury, when the trial is *per medietatem linguæ*, shall be strangers, not Londoners.

'And there's no London jury, but are led
In evidence as far by common fame,
As they are by present deposition.'
(Ben Jonson's *Magnetic Lady*, Act. iii, Sc. 3.)

'It appears by 15 Henry the Sixth, c. 5, — which likewise recites the great increase of perjury in jurors, and in the strongest terms, — that in every attainder there were thirteen defendants: the twelve jurors who gave the verdict, and the plaintiff or defendant who had obtained it, who therefore was supposed to have used corrupt means to procure it. For this reason, if the verdict was given in favor of the crown, no attainder could be brought, because the king could not be joined as a defendant with the jury who were prosecuted.'

Compare also the same work, pp. 394-457, and Mr. Amos's Notes on Fortescue de Laudib. Leg. Angliæ, c. 27.

the English jury: but it had them in stronger dose,¹ about

¹ In France, jury-trial was only introduced for the first time by the Constituent Assembly in 1790, and then only for criminal procedure: I transcribe the following remarks on the working of it from the instructive article in Merlin's "Répertoire de Jurisprudence," article *Juré*. Though written in a spirit very favorable to the jury, it proclaims the reflections of an observing lawyer on the temper and competence of the jurymen whom he had seen in action, and on their disposition to pronounce the verdict according to the *feeling* which the case before them inspired.

"Pourquoi faut-il qu'une institution qui rassure les citoyens contre l'arbitraire et la prévention si funeste à l'innocence, que peut produire l'habitude de juger les crimes . . . qu'une institution qui donne pour juges à un accusé, des citoyens indépendans de toute espèce d'influence, ses pairs, ses égaux . . . pourquoi faut-il que cette institution, dont les formes sont simples, touchantes, patriarcales, dont la théorie flatte et entraîne l'esprit par une séduction irrésistible, ait été si souvent méconnue, trompée par l'ignorance et la pusillanimité, prostituée peut-être par une vile et coupable corruption?"

"Rendons pourtant justice aux erreurs, même à la prévarication, des jurés: ils ont trop de fois acquitté les coupables, mais il n'a pas encore été prouvé qu'ils eussent jamais fait couler une goutte de sang innocent: et si l'on pouvoit supposer qu'ils eussent vu quelquefois le crime là où il n'y en avoit qu'une apparence trompeuse et fautive, ce ne seroit pas leur conscience qu'il faudroit accuser: ce seroit la fatalité malheureuse des circonstances qui auroient accompagné l'accusation, et qui auroit trompé de même les juges les plus pénétrants et les plus exercés à rechercher la vérité et à la démêler du mensonge.

"Mais les reproches qu'ont souvent mérités les jurés, c'est d'avoir cédé à une fausse commisération, ou à l'intérêt qu'étoient parvenus à leur inspirer les familles d'accusés qui avoient un rang dans la société: c'est souvent d'être sortis de leurs attributions, qui se bornent à apprécier les faits, et les juger d'une manière différente de la loi. J'ai vu cent exemples de ces usurpations de pouvoir et de ce despotisme des jurés. Trop souvent ils ont voulu voir une action innocente, là où la loi avoit dit qu'il y avoit un crime, et alors ils n'ont pas craint de se jouer de la vérité pour tromper et éluder la loi."

"Serait-il possible d'améliorer l'institution des jurés, et d'en prévenir les écarts souvent trop scandaleux? Gardons nous d'en douter. Que l'on commence par composer le jury de propriétaires intéressés à punir le crime pour le rendre plus rare: que surtout on en éloigne les artisans, les petits cultivateurs, hommes chez qui sans doute la probité est heureusement fort commune, mais dont l'esprit est peu exercé, et qui, accoutumés aux déférences, aux égards, cèdent toujours à l'opinion de ceux de leurs collègues dont le rang est plus distingué: on qui, familiarisés seulement avec les idées relatives à leur profession, n'ont jamais eu dans tout le reste que des idées d'emprunt ou d'inspiration. On sait

the counteracting authority of a judge, and without the benefit of a procedure such as has now been obtained in England. The

qu'aujourd'hui ce sont ces hommes qui dans presque toute la France forment toujours la majorité des jurés : mettez au milieu d'eux un homme d'un état plus élevé, d'un esprit délicat, d'une élocution facile, il entraînera ses collègues, il décidera la délibération : et si cet homme a le jugement faux ou le cœur corrompu, cette délibération sera nécessairement mauvaise.

« Mais pourrât-on parvenir à vaincre l'insouciance des propriétaires riches et éclairés, à leur faire abandonner leurs affaires, leurs familles, leurs habitudes, pour les entraîner dans les villes, et leur y faire remplir des fonctions qui tourmentent quelquefois la probité, et donnent des inquiétudes d'autant plus vives que la conscience est plus délicate ? Pourquoi non ? Pourquoi les mêmes classes de citoyens qui dans les huit ou dix premiers mois de 1792, se portaient avec tant de zèle à l'exercice de ces fonctions, les fuiraient-elles aujourd'hui ? surtout si, pour les y rappeler, la loi fait mouvoir les deux grands ressorts qui sont dans sa main, si elle s'engage à récompenser l'exactitude, et à punir la négligence ? » (Merlin, Répertoire de Jurisprudence, art. Jurés, p. 97.)

In these passages, it deserves notice, that what is particularly remarked about juries, both English and French, is, their reluctance to convict accused persons brought before them. Now the character of the Athenian dikasts, as described by Mr. Mitford and by many other authors, is the precise reverse of this : an extreme severity and cruelty, and a disposition to convict all accused persons brought before them, upon little or no evidence, — especially rich accused persons. I venture to affirm that, to ascribe to them such a temper generally, is not less improbable in itself, than unsupported by any good evidence. In the speeches remaining to us from defendants, we do indeed find complaints made of the severity of the dikasteries : but in those speeches which come from accusers, there are abundance of complaints to the contrary, — of over-indulgence on the part of the dikasteries, and consequent impunity of criminals. Nor does Aristophanes, — by whom most modern authors are guided, even when they do not quote him, — when fairly caught, bear out the temper ascribed by Mr. Mitford to the dikasts : even if we admitted Aristophanes to be a faithful and trustworthy witness, which no man who knows his picture of Sokrates will be disposed to do. Aristophanes takes hold of every quality which will raise a laugh against the dikasts, and his portrait of them as wasps was well calculated for this purpose. — to describe them as boiling over with acrimony, irritation, impatience, to find some one whom they could convict and punish. But even he, when he comes to describe these dikasts in action, represents them as obeying the appeals to their pity, as well as those to their anger. — as being yielding and impressionable when their feelings are approached on either side, and unable, when they hear the exculpatory appeal of the accused, to maintain the anger which had been raised by the speech of the

feelings of the dikasts counted for more, and their reason for less. not merely because of their greater numbers, which naturally heightened the pitch of feeling in each individual, but also because the addresses of orators or parties formed the prominent part of the procedure, and the depositions of witnesses only a very subordinate part ; the dikast,¹ therefore, heard little of the naked facts,

accuser. (See Aristophan. Vesp. 574, 713, 727, 794.) Moreover, if from the Vespæ we turn to the Nubes, where the poet attacks the sophists and not the dikasts, we are there told that the sophists could arm any man with fallacies and subterfuges which would enable him to procure acquittal from the dikasts, whatever might be the crime committed.

I believe that this open-mindedness, and impossibility of the feelings on all sides, by art, eloquence, prayers, tears, invectives, etc., is the true character of the Athenian dikasts. And I also believe that they were, as a general rule, more open to commiseration than to any other feeling, — like what is above said respecting the French jurymen : *εὐκτατος πρὸς ὁμολίην* (ὁ Ἀθηναῖος δίκας), *εὐκτατὸς πρὸς ἔλεον*. — this expression of Plutarch about the Athenian demos is no less true about the dikasts : compare also the description given by Pliny (H. N. xxxv. 10) of the memorable picture of the Athenian demos by the painter Parrhasius.

¹ That the difference between the dikast and the jurymen, in this respect, is only one of degree, I need hardly remark. M. Merlin observes, “ Je ne pense pas, comme bien des gens, que pour être propre aux fonctions de juré, il suffise d'avoir une intelligence ordinaire et de la probité. Si l'accusé paroissoit seul aux débats avec les témoins, il ne faudroit sans doute que du bon sens pour reconnoître la vérité dans des déclarations faites avec simplicité et dégagées de tout raisonnement : mais il y paroît assisté presque toujours d'un ou de plusieurs défenseurs qui par des interpellations captieuses, embarrassent ou égarent les témoins ; et par une discussion subtile, souvent sophistique, quelquefois éloquente, enveloppent la vérité des nuages, et rendent l'évidence même problématique. Certes, il faut plus que de bonnes intentions, il faut plus que du bon sens, pour ne pas se laisser entraîner à ces fausses lueurs, pour se garantir des écarts de la sensibilité, et pour se maintenir invariablement dans la ligne du vrai, au milieu de ces impulsions données en même temps à l'esprit et au cœur. » (Merlin, Répertoire de Jurisprudence, art. Jures, p. 98.)

At Athens, there were no professional advocates : the accuser and the accused — or the plaintiff and defendant, if the cause was civil — each appeared in person with their witnesses, or sometimes with depositions which the witnesses had sworn to before the archon : each might come with a speech prepared by Antipho (Thucyd. viii. 68) or some other rhetor : each might have one or more *ἐμπροσθεν* to speak on his behalf after himself, but seemingly only out of the space of time allotted to him by the clepsydra. In civil causes, the defendant must have been perfectly acquainted with the

the appropriate subjects for his reason, — but he was abundantly supplied with the plausible falsehoods, calumnies, irrelevant statements and suggestions, etc., of the parties, and that too in a manner skilfully adapted to his temper. To keep the facts of the case before the jury, apart from the falsehood and coloring of parties, is the most useful function of the modern judge, whose influence is also considerable as a restraint upon the pleader. The helps to the reason of the dikast were thus materially diminished, while the action upon his feelings, of anger as well as of compassion, was sharpened, as compared with the modern juror.¹ We see, in the remaining productions of the Attic orators, how much there is of plausible deception, departure from the true issue, and appeals to sympathies, antipathies, and prejudices of

plaintiff's case, since, besides the anakrisis, or preliminary examination before the archon, the cause had been for the most part already before an arbitrator. In a criminal case, the accused party had only the anakrisis to guide him, as to the matter of which he was to be accused: but it appears from the prepared speeches of accused parties which we now possess, that this anakrisis must have been sufficiently copious to give him a good idea of that which he had to rebut. The accuser was condemned to a fine of one thousand drachms, if he did not obtain on the verdict one-fifth of the votes of the dikasts engaged.

Antipho not only composed speeches for pleaders before the dikastery, but also gave them valuable advice generally as to the manner of conducting their case, etc., though he did not himself speak before the dikasts: so also Ktesiklēs the *λογιστάδης* (Demosthenēs cont. Theokrin. c. 5) acted as general adviser, or attorney.

Aristotle, in the first and second chapters of his *Treatise de Rhetoricā*, complains that the teachers and writers on rhetoric who preceded him, treated almost entirely of the different means of working on the feelings of the dikasts, and of matters "extraneous to the real question which the dikasts ought to try." (*περὶ τῶν ἐκτὸς τοῦ πράγματος τὰ πλείστα πραγματευομένων διὰ λόγῳ γὰρ καὶ ἑλλογῇ καὶ ῥήγῃ, οὐκ περὶ τοῦ πράγματος ἔστιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν δικαστῶν, etc.*, i, 1, 1: compare, i, 2, 3, and iii. 1, 2.)

This is sufficient to show how prominent such appeals to the feelings of the dikasts were, in actual fact and practice; even if we did not know it from the perusal of the orations themselves.

Respecting the habit of accused persons to bring their wives and children before the dikasts as suppliants for them, to obtain mercy or acquittal, see Aristophan. *Vesp.* 567-976; Andokidēs de *Mysteriis* (ad finem), and Lysias *Orat.* iv, de *Vulnere* (ad finem).

every kind, addressed to the dikasteries.¹ Of course, such arti-

¹ To a person accustomed to the judicature of modern Europe, conducted throughout all its stages by the instrumentality of professional men, — judges, advocates, attorneys, etc., — and viewed by the general public as a matter in which no private citizen either could act or ought to act for himself, — nothing is more remarkable in reading the Attic judicial orations, to a certain extent also the Roman, than the entire absence of this professional feeling, and the exhibition of justice both invoked and administered by private citizens exclusively. The nearest analogy to this, which modern justice presents, is to be found in the courts of Requests and other courts for trying causes limited to small sums of property, — too small to be worth the notice of judges and lawyers.

These courts, in spite of their direct and important bearing on the welfare and security of the poorer classes, have received little elucidation. The *History of the Birmingham Court of Requests*, by Mr. William Hutton, — lately republished by Messrs. Chambers, — forms an exception to this remark, and is full of instruction in respect to the habits, the conduct, and the sufferings of poor persons. It furnishes, besides, the closest approach that I know to the feelings of Athenian dikasts and pleaders, though of course with many important differences. Mr. Hutton was for many years unremitting in his attendance as a commissioner, and took warm interest in the honorable working of the court. His remarks upon the position, the duties, and the difficulties of the commissioners, illustrated by numerous cases given in detail, are extremely interesting, and represent thoughts which must have often suggested themselves to intelligent dikasts at Athens.

"Law and equity (he says, p. 34) often vary. If the commissioners cannot decide *against* law, they can decide *without* it. Their oath binds them to proceed according to *good conscience* (*περὶ οὗτοῦ οὐκ εἰσι νόμοι, γνώμη τῆ δικαιοσύνης*, was the oath of the Athenian dikast) A man only needs information to be able to decide."

A few words from p. 36, about the sources of misjudgment. "Misinformation is another source of evil: both parties equally treat the commissioners with deceit. The only people who can throw light upon the subject will not.

"It is difficult not to be won by the first speaker, if he carries the air of mildness and is master of his tale; or not to be biased in favor of infirmity or infancy. Those who cannot assist themselves, we are much inclined to assist.

"Nothing dissolves like tears. Though they arise from weakness, they are powerful advocates, which instantly disarm, particularly those which the afflicted wish to hide. They come from the heart and will reach it, if the judge has a heart to reach. Distress and pity are inseparable.

"Perhaps there never was a judge, from seventeen to seventy, who could look with indifference upon beauty in distress, if he could, he was unfit to

fices were resorted to by opposite speakers in each particular trial, nor have we any means of knowing to what extent they actually perverted the judgment of the hearers.¹ Probably, the frequent habit of sitting in dikastery, gave them a penetration in detecting sophistry not often possessed by non-professional citizens: nevertheless, it cannot be doubted that, in a considerable proportion of cases, success depended less upon the intrinsic merits of a case, than upon apparent airs of innocence and truth-telling, dexterity of statement, and good general character, in the parties, their witnesses, and the friends who addressed the court on their behalf. The accusatory speeches in Attic oratory, wherein punishment is invoked upon an alleged delinquent, are expressed with a bitterness which is now banished from English criminal judicature, though it was common in the state trials of two centuries ago. Against them may be set the impassioned and emphatic appeals made by defendants and their friends to the commiseration of the dikasts; appeals the more often successful, because they came last, immediately before decision was pronounced. This is true of Rome as well as of Athens.²

be a judge. He should be a stranger to decision, who is a stranger to compassion. All these matters influence the man, and warp his judgment."

This is a description, given by a perfectly honest and unprofessional judge, of his own feelings when on the bench. It will be found illustrated by frequent passages in the Attic pleadings, where they address themselves to the feelings here described in the bosom of the dikasts.

¹ Demosthenes (cont. Phormio. p. 913, c. 2) emphatically remarks, how much more cautious witnesses were of giving false testimony before the numerous dikastery, than before the arbitrator.

² Asconius gives an account of the begging off and supplication to the judges at Rome, when sentence was about to be pronounced upon Scæurus, whom Cicero defended (ad Ciceron. Orat. pro Scæuro, p. 28, ed. Orelli): "Laudaverunt Scæurum consulares novem — Horum magna pars per tabellas laudaverunt, qui aberant: inter quos Pompeius quoque. Unus præterea adolescens laudavit, frater ejus, Faustus Cornelius, Syllæ filius. Is in laudatione multa humiliter et cum lacrimis locutus non minus audientes permovit, quam Scæurus ipse permoverat. Ad genua judicum, cum sententiæ ferrentur, bifariam se dividerunt qui pro eo rogabant: ab uno latere Scæurus ipse et M. Glabrio, sororis filius, et Paulus, et P. Lentulus, et L. Æmilius Buca, et C. Memmius, supplicaverunt: ex altera parte Sylla Faustus, frater Scæuri, et T. Annius Milo, et T. Peducaeus, et C. Cato, et M. Octavius Lænas."

Compare also Cicero, Brutus, c. 23, about the defence of Sergius Galba. Quintilian. I. O. ii. 13

As an organ for judicial purposes, the Athenian dikasteries were thus a simple and plenary manifestation of jury-trial, with its inherent excellences and defects both brought out in exaggerated relief: they insured a decision at once uncorrupt, public-minded, and imposing, — together with the best security which the case admitted against illegal violences on the part of the rich and great.¹ Their extreme publicity, as well as their simple and oral procedure, divested of that verbal and ceremonial technicality which marked the law of Rome, even at its outset, was no small benefit: and as the verdicts of the dikasts, even when wrong, depended upon causes of misjudgment common to them with the general body of the citizens, so they never appeared to pronounce unjustly, nor lost the confidence of their fellow-citizens generally. But whatever may have been their defects as judicial instruments, as a stimulus both to thought and speech, their efficacy was unparalleled, in the circumstances of Athenian society. Doubtless, they would not have produced the same effect if established at Thebes or Argos: the susceptibilities of the Athenian mind, as well as the previous practice and expansive tendencies of democratical citizenship, were also essential conditions, — and that genuine taste of sitting in judgment, and hearing both sides fairly, which, however Aristophanes may caricature and deride it, was alike honorable and useful to the people. The first establishment of the dikasteries is nearly coincident with the great improvement of Attic tragedy in passing from Æschylus to Sophocles. The same development of the national genius, now preparing splendid manifestations both in tragic and comic poetry, was called with redoubled force into the path of oratory, by the new judicial system. A certain power of speech now became necessary, not merely for those who intended to take a prominent part in politics, but also for private citizens to vindicate their rights, or repel accusations in a court of justice. It was an accomplishment of the greatest practical utility, even

¹ Plato, in his Treatise de Legibus (vi, p. 768) adopts all the distinguishing principles of the Athenian dikasteries. He particularly insists, that the citizen, who does not take his share in the exercise of this function, conceives himself to have no concern or interest in the commonwealth, — ὅτι παροῦσαν τῆς πόλεως οὐ μετοχὸς εἶναι.

apart from ambitious purposes; hardly less so than the use of arms or the practice of the gymnasium. Accordingly, the teachers of grammar and rhetoric, and the composers of written speeches to be delivered by others, now began to multiply and to acquire an unprecedented importance, — as well at Athens as under the contemporary democracy of Syracuse,¹ in which, also, some form of popular judicature was established. Style and speech began to be reduced to a system, and so communicated: not always happily, for several of the early rhetors² had adopted an artificial, ornate, and conceited manner, from which Attic good taste afterwards liberated itself, — but the very character of a teacher of rhetoric as an art, — a man giving precepts and putting himself forward in show-lectures as a model for others, is a feature first belonging to the Periklean age, and indicates a new demand in the minds of the citizens. We begin to hear, in the generation now growing up, of the rhetor and the sophist, as persons of influence and celebrity. These two names denoted persons of similar moral and intellectual endowments, or often indeed the same person, considered in different points of view;³ either as professing to improve the moral character, or as communicating power and facility of expression, or as suggesting premises for persuasion, illustrations on the common-places of morals and politics, argumentative abundance on matters of ordinary experience, dialectical subtlety in confuting an opponent,

¹ Aristot. ap. Cicero. Brut. c. 12. "Itaque cum sublati in Sicilia tyrannis res privatae longo intervallo judiciis repeterentur, tum primum quod esset acuta ea gens et controversa natura, artem et praecepta Siculos Coracem et Tisiam conscripsisse," etc. Compare Diodor. xi. 87; Pausan. vi. 17. 8.

² Especially Gorgias: see Aristotel. Rhetor. iii. 1, 26; Timaeus, Fr.; Dionys. Halicarn. De Lysia Judicium, c. 3; also Foss, Dissertatio de Gorgia Leontino, p. 20 (Halle, 1828); and Westermann, Geschichte der Beredsamkeit in Griechenland und Rom., sects. 30, 31.

³ Plato (Gorgias, c. 20-75; Protagoras, c. 9). Lysias is sometimes designated as a sophist (Demosthen. cont. Nearc. c. 7, p. 1351; Athenae. xiii. p. 592). There is no sufficient reason for supposing with Taylor (Via. Lysiae, p. 56, ed. Dobson) that there were two persons named Lysias, and that the person here named is a different man from the author of the speeches which remain to us: see Mr. Fynes Clinton, Fast. H. p. 360. Appendix c. 20.

etc.¹ Antipho of the deme Rhamnus in Attica, Thrasyarchus of Chalkêdon, Tisias, of Syracuse, Gorgias of Leontini, Protagoras of Abdêra, Prodikus of Keôs, Theodôrus of Byzantium, Hippias of Elis, Zeno of Elea, were among the first who distinguished themselves in these departments of teaching. Antipho was the author of the earliest composed speech really spoken in a dikastery, and preserved down to the later critics.² These men were mostly not citizens of Athens, though many of them belonged to towns comprehended in the Athenian empire, at a time when important judicial causes belonging to these towns were often carried up to be tried at Athens, — while all of them looked to that city as a central point of action and distinction. The term *sophist*, which Herodotus³ applies with sincere respect to men of distinguished wisdom, such as Solon, Anacharsis, Pythagoras, etc., now came to be applied to these teachers of virtue, rhetoric, conversation, and disputation; many of whom professed

¹ See the first book of Aristotle's Rhetoric — alluded to in a former note — for his remarks on the technical teachers of rhetoric before his time. He remarks — and Plato remarked before him (i. 1 and 2) — that their teaching was for the most part thoroughly narrow and practical, bearing exclusively on what was required for the practice of the dikastery (*περί τοῦ δικάζεσθαι πάντες πειρῶνται τεχνολογεῖν*): see also a remarkable passage in his Treatise de Sophisticis Elenchis, c. 32, ad finem. And though he himself lays down a far more profound and comprehensive theory of rhetoric, and all matters appertaining to it, — in a treatise which has rarely been surpassed in power of philosophical analysis, — yet when he is recommending his speculations to notice, he appeals to the great practical value of rhetorical teaching, as enabling a man to "help himself," and fight his own battles, in case of need — Ἀποπον εἰ τῷ σώματι μὲν αἰσχροὺν μὴ δύνασθαι βοηθεῖν ἑαυτῷ, λόγῳ δὲ οὐκ αἰσχροὺν (i. 1, 3: compare iii. 1, 2; Plato Gorgias, c. 41-55; Protagoras, c. 9; Phædrus, c. 43-50; Euthydem. c. 1-31 and Xenophon, Memorab. iii. 12, 2, 3).

See also the character of Proxenus in the Anabasis of Xenophon, ii. 6, 16; Plutarch, Vit. x, Orator. p. 307; Aristoph. Nubes, 1108; Xenophon, Memorab. i. 2, 48; Plato, Alkibiad. s. i. c. 31, p. 119; and a striking passage in Plutarch's Life of Cato the elder, c. 1.

² Plutarch, Vit. x, Orator. p. 832; Quintilian, iii. 1, 10. Compare Van Spaan, or Ruhnken, Dissertatio de Antiphonte Oratore Attico, pp. 8, 9, prefixed to Dobson's edition of Antipho and Andokidês. Antipho is said to have been the teacher of the historian Thucydides. The statement of Plutarch, that the father of Antipho was also a sophist, can hardly be true.

³ Herodot. i. 29; iv. 95.

acquaintance with the whole circle of human science, physical as well as moral (then narrow enough), so far as was necessary to talk about any portion of it plausibly and effectively, and to answer any question which might be proposed to them. Though these men passed from one Grecian town to another, partly in the capacity of envoys from their fellow-citizens, partly as exhibiting their talents to numerous hearers, with much renown and large gain,¹—they appeared to have been viewed with jealousy and dislike by a large portion of the public:² for at a time when every citizen pleaded his own cause before the dikastery, they imparted, to those who were rich enough to purchase it, a peculiar skill in the common weapons, which made them seem like fencing-masters, or professional swordsmen, amidst a society of untrained duellists.³ Moreover, Sokratēs, — himself a product of the same age, and a disputant on the same subjects, — and bearing the same name of a *sophist*,⁴ but despising political and

¹ Plato (Hippias Major, c. 1, 2; Menon, p. 95; and Gorgias, c. 1, with Stallbaum's note); Diodor. xii, 53; Pausan. vi, 17, 8.

² Xenophon, Memorab. i, 2, 31. To teach or learn the art of speech was the common reproach made by the vulgar against philosophers and lettered men, — τὸ κοινῇ τοῖς φιλοσόφοις ἐπὶ τῶν πολλῶν ἐπιτιμώμενον (Xenoph. Memor. i, 2, 31). Compare Æschinēs cont. Timar. about Demosthenēs, c. 25, 27, which illustrates the curious fragment of Sophoklēs, 865. Οἱ γὰρ γύνανδροι καὶ λέγειν ἡσκηκότες.

³ Such is probably the meaning of that remarkable passage in which Thucydides describes the Athenian rhetor, Antipho, (viii, 68): Ἀντιφῶν, ἀνὴρ Ἀθηναίων ἀρετῇ τε οὐδενὸς ὕστερος, καὶ κράτιστος ἐνθυμηθῆναι γινώμενος καὶ ἂν γνώῃ εἰπεῖν· καὶ ἐς μὲν δῆμον οὐ παριὼν οἶδ' ἐς ἄλλον ἀγῶνα ἐκούσιος οὐδένα, ἀλλ' ἐπὶ ὅπως τῷ πλήθει διὰ δόξαν δεινότητος δεικνύμενος, τοὺς μὲντοι ἀγωνιζομένους καὶ ἐν δικαστηρίῳ καὶ ἐν δήμῳ, πλείστα εἰς ἀνὴρ, ὅστις ξυμβουλεύσασαί τι, δυνάμενος ὀφείλειν. "Inde illa circa occultandam eloquentiam simulatio," observes Quintilian, Inst. Or. iv, 1, 8.

Compare Plato (Protagoras, c. 8; Protagoras, c. 86). Isokratēs cont. Sophistas, Or. xiii, p. 295, where he complains of the teachers, — αἱ τῶν ἐπισχόντων, δικάζεσθαι διδάσκειν, ἐκλεξιμένοι τὸ διαχερίσασθαι τῶν ἀνομάτων, ὅ τῶν ῥητορῶν ἐργον εἶναι λέγειν, ἀλλ' οὐ τῶν πρωσιώτων τῆς τοιαύτης παιδείας. Demosthen. De Fals. Legat. c. 70, 7., pp. 417-420; and Æschin. cont. Estesiphon. c. 9, p. 371, — κακοῦργον σοφιστῶν, αἰόμενον βήμασι τοὺς νόμους ἰναρῆσαι.

⁴ Æschinēs cont. Timar. h. c. 34 p. 74. Ὑμεῖς μὲν, ὦ Ἀθηναῖοι, Σωκράτη

judicial practice, and looking to the production of intellectual stimulus and moral impressions upon his hearers, — Sokratēs carried on throughout his life a constant polemical warfare against the sophists and rhetors, in that negative vein in which he was unrivalled. And as the works of these latter have not remained, it is chiefly from the observations of their opponents that we know them; so that they are in a situation such as that in which Sokratēs himself would have been, if we had been compelled to judge of him only from the Clouds of Aristophanēs, or from those unfavorable impressions respecting his character, which we know, even from the Apologies of Plato and Xenophon, to have been generally prevalent at Athens. This is not the opportunity, however, for trying to distinguish the good from the evil in the working of the sophists and rhetors: at present, it is enough that they were the natural product of the age, — supplying those wants, and answering to that stimulus, which arose partly from the deliberations of the ekklesia, but still more from the contentions before the dikastery, — in which latter a far greater number of citizens took active part, with or without their own consent. The public and frequent dikasteries constituted by Periklēs, opened to the Athenian mind precisely that career of improvement which was best suited to its natural aptitude: they were essential to the development of that demand out of which grew not only Grecian oratory, but also, as secondary products,

την μὲν τὸν σοφιστὴν ἀπεκτείνετε, ὅτι Κριτίαν ἐφάνη πεπαιδευκῶς, ἕνα τῶν τριάκοντα τῶν τὸν δῆμον καταλασάντων.

Among the sophists whom Isokratēs severely criticizes, he evidently seems to include Plato, as may be seen by the contrast between *δόξα* and *ἐπιστήμη*, which he particularly notes, and which is so conspicuously set forth in the Platonic writings (Isokratēs cont. Sophistas, Or. xiii, p. 293; also p. 295). We know also that Lysias called both Plato and Æschinēs the disciple of Sokratēs, by the name of *sophists* (Aristeidēs, Orat. Platonic. xlii, Ὑπὲρ τῶν τεττάρων, p. 407, vol. ii, ed. Dindorf). Aristeidēs remarks justly that the name *sophist* was a general name, including all the philosophers, teachers, and lettered men.

The general name, *sophists*, in fact, included good, bad, and indifferent; like "the philosophers, the political economists, the metaphysicians," etc. I shall take a future opportunity of examining the indiscriminate censures against them as a class, which most modern writers have copied implicitly from the polemics of ancient times.


the speculative moral and political philosophy, and the didactic analysis of rhetoric and grammar, which long survived after Grecian creative genius had passed away.¹ And it was one of the first measures of the oligarchy of Thirty, to forbid, by an express law, any teaching of the art of speaking. Aristophanês derides the Athenians for their love of talk and controversy, as if it had enfeebled their military energy: but in his time, most undoubtedly, that reproach was not true; nor did it become true, even in part, until the crushing misfortunes which marked the close of the Peloponnesian war. During the course of that war, restless and energetic action was the characteristic of Athens, even in a greater degree than oratory or political discussion, though before the time of Demosthenês a material alteration had taken place.


The establishment of these paid dikasteries at Athens was thus one of the most important and prolific events in all Grecian history. The pay helped to furnish a maintenance for old citizens, past the age of military service. Elderly men were the best persons for such a service, and were preferred for judicial purposes both at Sparta, and, as it seems, in heroic Greece: nevertheless, we need not suppose that *all* the dikasts were either old or poor, though a considerable proportion of them were so, and though Aristophanês selects these qualities as among the most suitable subjects for his ridicule. Periklês has been often censured for this institution, as if he had been the first to insure pay to dikasts who before served for nothing, and had thus introduced poor citizens into courts previously composed of citizens above poverty. But, in the first place, this supposition is not correct in point of fact, inasmuch as there were no such constant dikasteries previously acting without pay; next, if it had been true, the habitual exclusion of the poor citizens would have nullified the popular working of these bodies, and would have prevented them from answering any longer to the reigning senti-


¹ Xenoph. Memor. i, 2, 31. λόγων τέχνην μὴ διδάσκειν. Xenophon ascribes the passing of this law to a personal hatred of Kritias against Sokratês, and connects it with an anecdote exceedingly puerile, when considered as the alleged cause of that hatred, as well as of the consequent law. But it is evident that the law had a far deeper meaning, and was aimed directly at one of the prominent democratic habits.

ment at Athens. Nor could it be deemed unreasonable to assign a regular pay to those who thus rendered regular service it was, indeed, an essential item in the whole scheme¹ and purpose; so that the suppression of the pay of itself seems to have suspended the dikasteries, while the oligarchy of Four Hundred was established, — and it can only be discussed in that light. As the fact stands, we may suppose that the six thousand heliasts who filled the dikasteries were composed of the middling and poorer citizens indiscriminately: though there was nothing to exclude the richer, if they chose to serve.

¹ Thucyd. viii, 67. Compare a curious passage, even in reference to the time of Demosthenês, in the speech of that orator contra Boeotum de Nomine c. 5. καὶ εἰ μισθὸς ἐπορίσθη τοῖς δικαστηρίοις, εἰσῆγον ἂν μὲν ἔθελον εἶναι, &c.








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
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GREECE

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OF PEISISTRATUS AT ATHENS

BY
GEORGE GROTE, ESQ.

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VOLUME VI



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GREECE

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Statuette of Pallas-Athenæ, found in 1870

HISTORY OF GREECE.

PART II.

CONTINUATION OF HISTORICAL GREECE.

CHAPTER XLVII.

FROM THE THIRTY YEARS' TRUCE, FOURTEEN YEARS BEFORE
THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR, DOWN TO THE BLOCKADE OF
POTIDÆA, IN THE YEAR BEFORE THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR.

THE judicial alterations effected at Athens by Periklês and Ephialtês, described in the preceding chapter, gave to a large proportion of the citizens direct jury functions and an active interest in the constitution, such as they had never before enjoyed; the change being at once a mark of previous growth of democratical sentiment during the past, and a cause of its farther development during the future. The Athenian people were at this time ready for personal exertion in all directions: military service on land or sea was not less conformable to their dispositions than attendance in the ekklesia or in the dikastery at home. The naval service especially was prosecuted with a degree of assiduity which brought about continual improvement in skill and efficiency, and the poorer citizens, of whom it chiefly consisted, were more exact in obedience and discipline than any of the more opulent persons from whom the infantry or the cavalry were drawn.¹ The maritime multitude, in addition to self-confi-

¹ Xenophon Memorab. iii, 5, 18.

force and courage, acquired by this laborious training an increased skill, which placed the Athenian navy every year more and more above the rest of Greece: and the perfection of this force became the more indispensable as the Athenian empire was now again confined to the sea and seaport towns: the reverses immediately preceding the thirty years truce having broken up all Athenian land ascendancy over Megara, Boeotia, and the other continental territories adjoining to Attica.

The maritime confederacy, — originally commenced at Delos, under the headship of Athens, but with a common synod and deliberative voice on the part of each member, — had now become transformed into a confirmed empire on the part of Athens, over the remaining states as foreign dependencies; all of them rendering tribute except Chios, Samos, and Lesbos. These three still remained on their original footing of autonomous allies, retaining their armed force, ships, and fortifications, with the obligation of furnishing military and naval aid when required, but not of paying tribute: the discontinuance of the deliberative synod, however, had deprived them of their original security against the encroachments of Athens. I have already stated generally the steps, we do not know them in detail, whereby this important change was brought about, gradually and without any violent revolution, — for even the transfer of the common treasure from Delos to Athens, which was the most palpable symbol and evidence of the change, was not an act of Athenian violence, since it was adopted on the proposition of the Samians. The change resulted in fact almost inevitably from the circumstances of the case, and from the eager activity of the Athenians contrasted with the backwardness and aversion to personal service on the part of the allies. We must recollect that the confederacy, even in its original structure, was contracted for permanent objects, and was permanently binding by the vote of its majority, like the Spartan confederacy, upon every individual member:¹ it was destined to keep out the Persian fleet, and to maintain the police of the Ægean. Consistently with these objects, no individual member could be allowed to secede from

¹ Thucyd. v. 30: αἱ τῆς Σπάρτης συνθήκῃ, — εἰρημένον, κέρρον εἶναι δὲ, ὡς τὸ πλεονεξία τῶν μαχῶν ψηφίσσεται, ἢν μὴ τι θεῶν ἢ ἡρώων κώλυμα εἴη.

the confederacy, and thus to acquire the benefit of protection at the cost of the remainder: so that when Naxos and other members actually did secede, the step was taken as a revolt, and Athens only did her duty as president of the confederacy in reducing them. By every such reduction, as well as by that exchange of personal service for money-payment, which most of the allies voluntarily sought, the power of Athens increased, until at length she found herself with an irresistible navy in the midst of disarmed tributaries, none of whom could escape from her constraining power, — and mistress of the sea, the use of which was indispensable to them. The synod of Delos, even if it had not before become partially deserted, must have ceased at the time when the treasure was removed to Athens, — probably about 460 B.C., or shortly afterwards.

The relations between Athens and her allies were thus materially changed by proceedings which gradually evolved themselves and followed one upon the other without any preconceived plan: she became an imperial or despot city, governing an aggregate of dependent subjects, all without their own active concurrence, and in many cases doubtless contrary to their own sense of political right. It was not likely that they should conspire unanimously to break up the confederacy, and discontinue the collection of contribution from each of the members: nor would it have been at all desirable that they should do so: for while Greece generally would have been a great loser by such a proceeding, the allies themselves would have been the greatest losers of all, inasmuch as they would have been exposed without defence to the Persian and Phœnician fleets. But the Athenians committed the capital fault of taking the whole alliance into their own hands, and treating the allies purely as subjects, without seeking to attach them by any form of political incorporation or collective meeting and discussion, — without taking any pains to maintain community of feeling with the idea of a joint interest, — without admitting any control, real or even pretended, over themselves as managers. Had they attempted to do this, it might have proved difficult to accomplish, — so powerful was the force of geographical dissemination, the tendency to isolated civic life, and the repugnance to any permanent extramural obligations, in every Grecian community: but they do not ap

pear to have ever made the attempt. Finding Athens exalted by circumstances to empire, and the allies degraded into subjects, the Athenian statesmen grasped at the exaltation as a matter of pride as well as profit:¹ nor did even Periklēs, the most prudent and far-sighted of them, betray any consciousness that an empire without the cement of some all-pervading interest or attachment, must have a natural tendency to become more and more burdensome and odious, and ultimately to crumble in pieces. Such was the course of events which, if the judicious counsels of Periklēs had been followed, might have been postponed but could not have been averted.

Instead of trying to cherish or restore the feelings of equal alliance, Periklēs formally disclaimed it. He maintained that Athens owed to her subject allies no account of the money received from them, so long as she performed her contract by keeping away the Persian enemy, and maintaining the safety of the Ægean waters.² This was, as he represented, the obligation which Athens had undertaken; and, provided it were faithfully discharged, the allies had no right to ask questions or institute control. That it was faithfully discharged no one could deny: no ship of war except that of Athens and her allies was ever seen between the eastern and western shores of the Ægean. An Athenian fleet of sixty triremes was kept on duty in these waters, chiefly manned by Athenian citizens, and beneficial as well from the protection afforded to commerce as for keeping the seaman in constant pay and training.³ And such was the effective superintendence maintained, that in the disastrous period preceding the thirty years' truce, when Athens lost Megara and Bœotia, and with difficulty recovered Eubœa, none of her numerous maritime subjects took the opportunity to revolt.

The total of these distinct tributary cities is said to have amounted to one thousand, according to a verse of Aristophanēs,⁴ which cannot be under the truth, though it may well be, and probably is, greatly above the truth. The total annual tribute

¹ Thucyd. ii, 63. τῆς δὲ πόλεως ἡμῶν εἰκὸς τῷ τιμωμένῳ ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀρχεῖν, ὅπερ ἅπαντες ἀγάλλεσθαι, βοηθεῖν, καὶ μὴ φεύγειν τοὺς πόρους, ἢ μηδὲ τὰς τιμὰς διώκειν, etc.

² Plutarch, Periklēs c. 11.

³ Plutarch, Periklēs, c. 12.

⁴ Aristophan. Vesp. 707

collected at the beginning of the Peloponnesian war, and probably also for the years preceding it, is given by Thucydides at about six hundred talents; of the sums paid by particular states, however, we have little or no information.¹ It was placed under the superintendence of the Hellenotamiæ; originally officers of the confederacy, but now removed from Delos to Athens, and acting altogether as an Athenian treasury-board. The sum total of the Athenian revenue,² from all sources, including this tribute, at the beginning of the Peloponnesian war, is stated by Xenophon at one thousand talents: customs, harbor, and market dues, receipts from the silver-mines at Laurium, rents of public property, fines from judicial sentences, a tax per head upon slaves, the annual payment made by each metic, etc., may have made up a larger sum than four hundred talents; which sum, added to the six hundred talents from tribute, would make the total named by Xenophon. But a verse of Aristophanēs,³ during the ninth year of the Peloponnesian war, B.C. 422, gives the general total of that time as "nearly two thousand talents:" this

¹ The island of Kythira was conquered by the Athenians from Sparta in 425 B.C., and the annual tribute then imposed upon it was four talents (Thucyd. iv, 57). In the Inscription No. 143, ap. Boeckh, Corp. Inscr., we find some names enumerated of tributary towns, with the amount of tribute opposite to each, but the stone is too much damaged to give us much information. Tyrodiza, in Thrace, paid one thousand drachms: some other towns, or junctions of towns, not clearly discernible, are rated at one thousand, two thousand, three thousand drachms, one talent, and even ten talents. This inscription must be anterior to 415 B.C., when the tribute was converted into a five per cent. duty upon imports and exports: see Boeckh, Public Econ. of Athens, and his Notes upon the above-mentioned Inscription.

It was the practice of Athens not always to rate each tributary city separately, but sometimes to join several in one collective rating; probably each responsible for the rest. This seems to have provoked occasional remonstrances from the allies, in some of which the rhetor, Antipho, was employed to furnish the speech which the complainants pronounced before the dikastery: see Antipho ap. Harpokration, v, 'Ἀπόταξις—Συντελεῖς. It is greatly to be lamented that the orations composed by Antipho, for the Samothrakians and Lindians, — the latter inhabiting one of the three separate towns in the island of Rhodes, — have not been preserved.

² Xenophon, Anab. vii. 1, 27. οὐ μείον χιλίων ταλάντων: compare Boeckh, Public Econ. of Athens, b. iii, ch. 7, 15, 19.

³ Aristophan. Vesp. 660. τάλαντ' ἑγγὺς δισχίλια.

is in all probability much above the truth, though we may well imagine that the amount of tribute-money levied upon the allies may have been augmented during the interval; I think that the alleged duplication of the tribute by Alkibiadēs, which Thucydides nowhere notices, is not borne out by any good evidence, nor can I believe that it ever reached the sum of twelve hundred talents.¹ Whatever may have been the actual magnitude of the

¹ Very excellent writers on Athenian antiquity (Boeckh, *Public Econ. of Athens*, c. 15, 19, b. iii; Schömann, *Antiq. J. P. Att.* sect. lxxiv; K. E. Hermann, *Gr. Staatsalterthümer*, sect. 157; compare, however, a passage in Boeckh, ch. 17, p. 421, Eng. transl., where he seems to be of an opposite opinion) accept this statement, that the tribute levied by Athenians upon her allies was doubled some years after the commencement of the Peloponnesian war, — at which time it was six hundred talents, — and that it came to amount to twelve hundred talents. Nevertheless, I cannot follow them, upon the simple authority of Æschinēs, and the Pseudo-Andokidēs (Æschin. *De Fals. Legat.* c. 54, p. 301; Andokidēs, *De Pace*, c. 1, and the same orator *cont. Alkibiad.* c. 4). For we may state pretty confidently, that neither of the two orations here ascribed to Andokidēs is genuine: the oration against Alkibiadēs most decidedly not genuine. There remains, therefore, as an original evidence, only the passage of Æschinēs, which has, apparently, been copied by the author of the *Oration De Pace*, ascribed to Andokidēs. Now the chapter of Æschinēs, which professes to furnish a general but brief sketch of Athenian history for the century succeeding the Persian invasion, is so full of historical and chronological inaccuracies, that we can hardly accept it, when standing alone, as authority for any matter of fact. In a note on the chapter immediately preceding, I have already touched upon its extraordinary looseness of statement, — pointed out by various commentators, among them particularly by Mr Fynes Clinton: see above, chap. xlv, note 2, pp. 409–411, in the preceding volume.

The assertion, therefore, that the tribute from the Athenian allies was raised to the sum of twelve hundred talents annually, comes to us only from the orator Æschinēs as an original witness: and in him it forms part of a tissue of statements alike confused and incorrect. But against it we have a powerful negative argument, — the perfect silence of Thucydides. Is it possible that that historian would have omitted all notice of a step so very important in its effects, if Athens had really adopted it? He mentions to us the commutation by Athens of the tribute from her allies into a duty of five per cent. payable by them on their exports and imports (vii, 28) — this was in the nineteenth year of the war, 413 B.C. But anything like the duplication of the tribute all at once, would have altered much more materially the relations between Athens and her allies, and

Athenian budget, however, prior to the Peloponnesian war, we know that during the larger part of the administration of Peri-

would have constituted in the minds of the latter a substantive grievance, such as to aggravate the motive for revolt in a manner which Thucydides could hardly fail to notice. The orator Æschinēs refers the augmentation of the tribute, up to twelve hundred talents, to the time succeeding the peace of Nikias: M. Boeckh (*Public Econ. of Athens*, b. iii, ch. 15–19, pp. 400–434) supposes it to have taken place earlier than the representation of the *Vespæ* of Aristophanēs, that is, about three years before that peace, or 423 B.C. But this would have been just before the time of the expedition of Brasidas into Thrace, and his success in exciting revolt among the dependencies of Athens: if Athens had doubled her tribute upon all the allies, just before that expedition, Thucydides could not have omitted to mention it, as increasing the chances of success to Brasidas, and helping to determine the resolutions of the Akanthians and others, which were by no means adopted unanimously or without hesitation, to revolt.

In reference to the oration called that of Andokidēs against Alkibiadēs, I made some remarks in the fourth volume of this History (vol. iv, ch. xxxi, p. 151), tending to show it to be spurious and of a time considerably later than that to which it purports to belong. I will here add one other remark, which appears to me decisive, tending to the same conclusion.

The oration professes to be delivered in a contest of ostracism between Nikias, Alkibiadēs, and the speaker: one of the three, he says, must necessarily be ostracized, and the question is, to determine which of the three: accordingly, the speaker dwells upon many topics calculated to raise a bad impression of Alkibiadēs, and a favorable impression of himself.

Among the accusations against Alkibiadēs, one is, that after having recommended, in the assembly of the people, that the inhabitants of Melos should be sold as slaves, he had himself purchased a Melian woman among the captives, and had had a son by her: it was criminal, argues the speaker, to beget offspring by a woman whose relations he had contributed to cause to be put to death, and whose city he had contributed to ruin (c. 8).

Upon this argument I do not here touch, any farther than to bring out the point of chronology. The speech, if delivered at all, must have been delivered, at the earliest, nearly a year after the capture of Melos by the Athenians: it may be of later date, but it cannot possibly be earlier.

Now Melos surrendered in the winter immediately preceding the great expedition of the Athenians to Sicily in 415 B.C., which expedition sailed about midsummer (Thucyd. v, 116; vi, 30). Nikias and Alkibiadēs both went as commanders of that expedition: the latter was recalled to Athens for trial on the charge of impiety about three months afterwards, but escaped in the way home, was condemned and sentenced to banishment in his absence, and did not return to Athens until 407 B.C., long after the death of Nikias, who continued in command of the Athenian armament in

klês, the revenue, including tribute, was so managed as to leave a large annual surplus; insomuch that a treasure of coined money was accumulated in the acropolis during the years preceding the Peloponnesian war, — which treasure, when at its maximum, reached the great sum of nine thousand seven hundred talents (equal to two million two hundred and thirty thousand pounds), and was still at six thousand talents, after a serious drain for various purposes, at the moment when that war began.¹ This system of public economy, constantly laying by a considerable sum year after year, — in which Athens stood alone, since none of the Peloponnesian states had any public reserve whatever,² — goes far of itself to vindicate Periklês from the charge of having wasted the public money in mischievous distributions for the purpose of obtaining popularity; and also to exonerate the Athenian Demos from that reproach of a greedy appetite for living

Sicily, enjoying the full esteem of his countrymen, until its complete failure and ruin before Syracuse, — and perished himself afterwards as a Syracusan prisoner.

Taking these circumstances together, it will at once be seen that there never can have been any time, ten months or more after the capture of Melos, when Nikias and Alkibiadês could have been exposed to a vote of ostracism at Athens. The thing is absolutely impossible: and the oration in which such historical and chronological incompatibilities are embodied, must be spurious: furthermore, it must have been composed long after the pretended time of delivery, when the chronological series of events had been forgotten.

I may add that the story of this duplication of the tribute by Alkibiadês is virtually contrary to the statement of Plutarch, probably borrowed from Æschinês, who states that the demagogues *gradually* increased (*κατὰ μικρὸν*) the tribute to thirteen hundred talents (Plutarch, Aristeid. c. 24).

¹ Thucyd. ii, 13.

² Thucyd. i, 80. The foresight of the Athenian people, in abstaining from immediate use of public money and laying it up for future wants, would be still more conspicuously demonstrated, if the statement of Æschinês, the orator, were true, that they got together seven thousand talents between the peace of Nikias and the Sicilian expedition. M. Boeckh believes this statement, and says: "It is not impossible that one thousand talents might have been laid by every year, as the amount of tribute received was so considerable." (Public Economy of Athens, ch. xx, p. 446, Eng. Trans.) I do not believe the statement: but M. Boeckh and others, who do admit it, ought in fairness to set it against the many remarks which they pass in condemnation of the democratical prodigality.

by the public purse which it is common to ascribe to them. After the death of Kimon, no farther expeditions were undertaken against the Persians, and even for some years before his death, not much appears to have been done: so that the tribute-money remained unexpended, though it was the duty of Athens to hold it in reserve against future attack, which might at any time be renewed.

Though we do not know the exact amount of the other sources of Athenian revenue, however, we know that the tribute received from the allies was by far the largest item in it.¹ And altogether the exercise of empire abroad became a prominent feature in Athenian life, and a necessity to Athenian sentiment, not less than democracy at home. Athens was no longer, as she had been once, a single city, with Attica for her territory: she was a capital or imperial city, — a despot city, was the expression used by her enemies, and even sometimes by her own citizens,² — with many dependencies attached to her, and bound to follow her orders. Such was the manner in which not merely Periklês and the other leading statesmen, but even the humblest Athenian citizen, conceived the dignity of Athens; and the sen-

¹ Thucyd. i. 122-143; ii, 13. The πεντηκοστὴ, or duty of two per cent. upon imports and exports at the Peiræus, produced to the state a revenue of thirty-six talents in the year in which it was farmed by Andokidês, somewhere about 400 B.C. after the restoration of the democracy at Athens from its defeat and subversion at the close of the Peloponnesian war (Andokidês de Mysteries, c. 23, p. 65). This was at a period of depression in Athenian affairs, and when trade was doubtless not near so good as it had been during the earlier part of the Peloponnesian war.

It seems probable that this must have been the most considerable permanent source of Athenian revenue next to the tribute; though we do not know what rate of customs-duty was imposed at the Peiræus during the Peloponnesian war. Comparing together the two passages of Xenophon (Republ. Ath. i. 17, and Aristophan. Vesp. 657), we may suppose that the regular and usual rate of duty was one per cent. or one ἑκατοστὴ, — while in case of need this may have been doubled or tripled, — τὰς πολλὰς ἑκατοστὰς. (see Boeckh, b. iii, chs. 1-4, pp. 298-318, Eng. Trans.) The amount of revenue derived even from this source, however, can have borne no comparison to the tribute.

² By Periklês, Thucyd. ii, 63. By Kleon, Thucyd. iii, 37. By the envoys at Mélos, v, 89. By Eupheinus, vi, 85. By the hostile Corinthians, i, 124 as a matter of course.

timement was one which carried with it both personal pride and stimulus to active patriotism. To establish Athenian interests among the dependent territories, was one important object in the eyes of Periklès, and while he discountenanced all distant¹ and rash enterprises, such as invasions of Egypt or Cyprus, he planted out many kleruchies and colonies of Athenian citizens, intermingled with allies, on islands, and parts of the coast. He conducted one thousand citizens to the Thracian Chersonese, five hundred to Naxos, and two hundred and fifty to Andros. In the Chersonese, he farther repelled the barbarous Thracian invaders from without, and even undertook the labor of carrying a wall of defence across the isthmus, which connected the peninsula with Thrace; since the barbarous Thracian tribes, though expelled some time before by Kimon,² had still continued to renew their incursions from time to time. Ever since the occupation of the elder Miltiadès, about eighty years before, there had been in this peninsula many Athenian proprietors, apparently intermingled with half-civilized Thracians: the settlers now acquired both greater numerical strength and better protection, though it does not appear that the cross-wall was permanently maintained. The maritime expeditions of Periklès even extended into the Euxine sea, as far as the important Greek city of Sinôpê, then governed by a despot named Timesilaus, against whom a large proportion of the citizens were in active discontent. He left Lamachus with thirteen Athenian triremes to assist in expelling the despot, who was driven into exile along with his friends and party: the properties of these exiles were confiscated, and assigned to the maintenance of six hundred Athenian citizens, admitted to equal fellowship and residence with the Sinôpeans. We may presume that on this occasion Sinôpê became a member of the Athenian tributary alliance, if it had not been so before: but we do not know whether Kotyôra and Trapezus, dependencies of Sinôpê, farther eastward, which the ten thousand Greeks found on their retreat fifty years afterwards, existed in the time of Periklès or not. Moreover, the numerous and well-equipped Athenian fleet, under the command of Periklès, produced an imposing effect upon the barbarous princes and tribes along the

¹ Plutarch, Periklès, c. 20.

² Plutarch, Kimon, c. 14.

coast,¹ contributing certainly to the security of Grecian trade, and probably to the acquisition of new dependent allies.

It was by successive proceedings of this sort that many detachments of Athenian citizens became settled in various portions of the maritime empire of the city, — some rich, investing their property in the islands as more secure — from the incontestable superiority of Athens at sea — even than Attica, which, since the loss of the Megarid, could not be guarded against a Peloponnesian land invasion,² — others poor, and hiring themselves out as laborers.³ The islands of Lemnos, Imbros, and Skyros, as well as the territory of Estiæa, on the north of Eubœa, were completely occupied by Athenian proprietors and citizens, — other places partially so occupied. And it was doubtless advantageous to the islanders to associate themselves with Athenians in trading enterprises, since they thereby obtained a better chance of the protection of the Athenian fleet. It seems that Athens passed regulations occasionally for the commerce of her dependent allies, as we see by the fact, that shortly before the Peloponnesian war, she excluded the Megarians from all their ports. The commercial relations between Peiræus and the Ægean reached their maximum during the interval immediately preceding the Peloponnesian war: nor were these relations confined to the country east and north of Attica: they reached also the western regions. The most important settlements founded by Athens during this period were Amphipolis in Thrace, and Thurii in Italy.

Amphipolis was planted by a colony of Athenians and other Greeks, under the conduct of the Athenian Agnon, in 437 B.C. It was situated near the river Strymon, in Thrace, on the eastern bank, and at the spot where the Strymon resumes its river-course after emerging from the lake above. It was originally a township or settlement of the Edonian Thracians, called Ennea

¹ Plutarch, Periklès, c. 19, 20.

² Xenophon, Rep. Ath. ii, 16. *τὴν μὲν οὐσίαν τὰς νήσοις παρατίθενται, πιστεύοντες τῇ ἀρχῇ τῇ κατὰ θάλασσαν· τὴν δὲ Ἀττικὴν γῆν περιορῶσι τεμνομένην, γιγνώσκοντες ὅτι εἰ αὐτὴν ἐλεήσουσιν, ἐτέρων ἀγαθῶν μείζονα στερήσονται.*

Compare also Xenophon (Memorabil. ii. 8, 1, and Symposium, iv, 31).

³ See the case of the free laborer and the husbandman at Naxos, Plato Enthyphro, c. 3.

Hodoi, or Nine Ways, — in a situation doubly valuable, both as being close upon the bridge over the Strymon, and as a convenient centre for the ship-timber and gold and silver mines of the neighboring region, — and distant about three English miles from the Athenian settlement of Eion at the mouth of the river. The previous unsuccessful attempts to form establishments at Ennea Hodoi have already been noticed, — first, that of Histæus the Milesian, followed up by his brother Aristagoras (about 497–496 B.C.), next, that of the Athenians about 465 B.C., under Leagrus and others, — on both these occasions the intruding settlers had been defeated and expelled by the native Thracian tribes, though on the second occasion the number sent by Athens was not less than ten thousand.¹ So serious a loss deterred the Athenians for a long time from any repetition of the attempt: though it is highly probable that individual citizens from Eion and from Thasus connected themselves with powerful Thracian families, and became in this manner actively engaged in mining, to their own great profit, — as well as to the profit of the city collectively, since the property of the kleruchs, or Athenian citizens occupying colonial lands, bore its share in case of direct taxes being imposed on Athenian property generally. Among such fortunate adventurers we may number the historian Thucydides himself; seemingly descended from Athenian parents intermarrying with Thracians, and himself married to a wife either Thracian or belonging to a family of Athenian colonists in that region, through whom he became possessed of a large property in the mines, as well as of great influence in the districts around.² This was one of the various ways in which the collective power of Athens enabled her chief citizens to enrich themselves individually.

¹ Thucyd. i. 100.

² Thucyd. iv. 105; Marcellinus, Vit. Thucyd. c. 19. See Rotscher, Leben des Thukydides, ch. i. 4, p. 96. who gives a genealogy of Thucydides, as far as it can be made out with any probability. The historian was connected by blood with Miltiadês and Kimon, as well as with Olorus, king of one of the Thracian tribes, whose daughter Hegesipylê was wife of Miltiadês, the conqueror of Marathon. In this manner, therefore, he belonged to one of the ancient heroic families of Athens, and even of Greece, being an Æakid through Ajax and Philæus (Marcellin. c. 2).

The colony under Agnon, despatched from Athens in the year 437 B.C., appears to have been both numerous and well sustained, inasmuch as it conquered and maintained the valuable position of Ennea Hodoi in spite of those formidable Edonian neighbors who had baffled the two preceding attempts. Its name of Ennea Hodoi was exchanged for that of Amphipolis, — the hill on which the new town was situated being bounded on three sides by the river. The settlers seem to have been of mixed extraction, comprising no large proportion of Athenians: some were of Chalkidic race, others came from Argilus, a Grecian city colonized from Andros, which possessed the territory on the western bank of the Strymon, immediately opposite to Amphipolis,¹ and which was included among the subject allies of Athens. Amphipolis, connected with the sea by the Strymon and the port of Eion, became the most important of all the Athenian dependencies in reference to Thrace and Macedonia.

The colony of Thurii on the coast of the gulf of Tarentum in Italy, near the site and on the territory of the ancient Sybaris, was founded by Athens about seven years earlier than Amphipolis, not long after the conclusion of the thirty years' truce with Sparta, B.C. 443. Since the destruction of the old Sybaris by the Krotoniates, in 509 B.C., its territory had for the most part remained unappropriated: the descendants of the former inhabitants, dispersed at Laus and in other portions of the territory, were not strong enough to establish any new city; nor did it suit the views of the Krotoniates themselves to do so. After an interval of more than sixty years, however, during which one unsuccessful attempt at occupation had been made by some Thesalian settlers, these Sybarites at length prevailed upon the Athenians to undertake and protect the recolonization; the proposition having been made in vain to the Spartans. Lampon and Xenokritus, the former a prophet and interpreter of oracles, were sent by Periklês with ten ships as chiefs of the new colony of Thurii, founded under the auspices of Athens. The settlers were collected from all parts of Greece, and included Dorians, Ionians, islanders, Bœotians, as well as Athenians. But the descendants of the ancient Sybarites procured themselves to be

¹ Thucyd. iv. 102; 2, 6.

created as privileged citizens, and monopolized for themselves the possession of political powers, as well as the most valuable lands in the immediate vicinity of the walls; while their wives also assumed an offensive preeminence over the other women of the city in the public religious processions. Such spirit of privilege and monopoly appears to have been a frequent manifestation among the ancient colonies, and often fatal either to their tranquillity or to their growth; sometimes to both. In the case of Thurii, founded under the auspices of the democratical Athens, it was not likely to have any lasting success: and we find that after no very long period, the majority of the colonists rose in insurrection against the privileged Sybarites, either slew or expelled them, and divided the entire territory of the city, upon equal principles, among the colonists of every different race. This revolution enabled them to make peace with the Krotoniates, who had probably been unfriendly so long as their ancient enemies, the Sybarites, were masters of the city, and likely to turn its powers to the purpose of avenging their conquered ancestors. And the city from this time forward, democratically governed, appears to have flourished steadily and without internal dissension for thirty years, until the ruinous disasters of the Athenians before Syracuse occasioned the overthrow of the Athenian party at Thurii. How miscellaneous the population of Thurii was, we may judge from the denominations of the ten tribes, — such was the number of tribes established, after the model of Athens, — Arkas, Achais, Eleia, Bœotia, Amphiktyonis, Doris, Ias, Athenais, Euboïs, Nesiôtis. From this mixture of race they could not agree in recognizing or honoring an Athenian *ækist*, or indeed any *ækist* except Apollo.¹ The Spartan general, Kleandridas, banished a few years before for having suffered himself to be bribed by Athens along with king Pleisteanax, removed to Thurii, and was appointed general of the citizens in their war against Tarentum. That war was ultimately adjusted by the joint foundation of the new city of Herakleia, half-way between the two, — in the fertile territory called Siritis.²

The most interesting circumstance respecting Thurii is, that

¹ Diodor. xii, 35.

² Diodor. xii. 11, 12; Strabo. vi. 264; Plutarch, Periklès. c. 22.

the rhetor Lysias, and the historian Herodotus, were both domiciliated there as citizens. The city was connected with Athens, yet seemingly only by a feeble tie; nor was it numbered among the tributary subject allies.¹ From the circumstance that so large a proportion of the settlers at Thurii were not native Athenians, we may infer that there were not many of the latter at that time who were willing to put themselves so far out of connection with Athens, — even though tempted by the prospect of lots of land in a fertile and promising territory. And Periklès was probably anxious that those poor citizens for whom emigration was desirable should become *kleruchs* in some of the islands or ports of the *Ægean*, where they would serve — like the colonies of Rome — as a sort of garrison for the insurance of the Athenian empire.²

The fourteen years between the thirty years' truce and the breaking out of the Peloponnesian war, are a period of full maritime empire on the part of Athens, — partially indeed resisted, but never with success. They are a period of peace with all cities extraneous to her own empire; and of splendid decorations to the city itself, from the genius of Pheidias and others, in sculpture as well as in architecture. Since the death of Kimon, Periklès had become more and more the first citizen in the commonwealth: his qualities told for more the longer they were known, and even the disastrous reverses which preceded the thirty years' truce had not overthrown him, since he had protested against that expedition of Tolmidès into Bœotia out of which they first arose. But if the personal influence of Periklès had increased, the party opposed to him seems also to have become stronger and better organized than it had been before; and to have acquired a leader in many respects more effective than Kimon. — Thucydides, son of Melèsias. The new chief was a near relative of Kimon, but of a character and talents more analogous to that of Periklès: a statesman and orator

¹ The Athenians pretended to no subject allies beyond the Ionian gulf, Thucyd. vi, 14; compare vi, 45, 104; vii, 34. Thucydides does not even mention Thurii, in his catalogue of the allies of Athens at the beginning of the Peloponnesian war (Thucyd. ii, 15).

² Plutarch, Periklès, c. 11.

rather than a general, though competent to both functions if occasion demanded, as every leading man in those days was required to be. Under Thucydides, the political and parliamentary opposition against Periklēs assumed a constant character and an organization such as Kimon, with his exclusively military aptitudes, had never been able to establish. The aristocratical party in the commonwealth, — the “honorable and respectable” citizens, as we find them styled, adopting their own nomenclature, — now imposed upon themselves the obligation of undeviating regularity in their attendance on the public assembly, sitting together in a particular section, so as to be conspicuously parted from the Demos. In this manner, their applause and dissent, their mutual encouragement to each other, their distribution of parts to different speakers, was made more conducive to the party purposes than it had been before, when these distinguished persons had been intermingled with the mass of citizens.¹ Thucydides himself was eminent as a speaker, inferior only to Periklēs, — perhaps hardly inferior even to him. We are told that in reply to a question put to him by Archidamus, whether Periklēs or he were the better wrestler, Thucydides replied: “Even when I throw him, he denies that he has fallen, gains his point, and talks over those who have actually seen him fall.”²

Such an opposition made to Periklēs, in all the full license which a democratical constitution permitted, must have been both efficient and embarrassing; but the pointed severance of the aristocratical chiefs, which Thucydides, son of Melesias, introduced, contributed probably at once to rally the democratical majority round Periklēs, and to exasperate the bitterness of party-conflict.³ As far as we can make out the grounds of the

¹ Compare the speech of Nikias, in reference to the younger citizens and partisans of Alkibiades sitting together near the latter in the assembly, — οἷς ἐγὼ ὄρων νῦν ἐνθάδε τῷ αὐτῷ ἀνδρὶ παρακελευστοῦς καθήμενους φοβούμεναι, καὶ τοῖς πρεσβυτέροις ἀντιπαρακελεύουσαι μὴ κατασχυνθῆναι, εἰ τις παρακάθηται τῷνδε, etc. (Thucyd. vi, 13.) See also Aristophanes, Ekklesiaz. 298, seq., about partisans sitting near together.

² Plutarch, Periklēs, c. 8. Ὅταν ἐγὼ καταβάλω παλαίων, ἐκεῖνος ἀντιλέγων ὡς οὐ πεπτωκε, νικά, καὶ μεταπείθει τοὺς ὄρωντας.

³ Plutarch, Periklēs, c. 11. ἡ δ' ἐκείνων ἡμιλλὰ καὶ φιλοτιμία τῶν ἀνδρῶν θαυματούτην τομὴν τεμόυσα τῆς πόλεως, τὸ μὲν δῆμον, τὸ δ' ὀλίγους ἐποίει καλεῖσθαι.

opposition, it turned partly upon the pacific policy of Periklēs towards the Persians, partly upon his expenditure for home ornament. Thucydides contended that Athens was disgraced in the eyes of the Greeks, by having drawn the confederate treasure from Delos to her own acropolis, under pretence of greater security, and then employing it, not in prosecuting war against the Persians,¹ but in beautifying Athens by new temples and costly statutes. To this Periklēs replied, that Athens had undertaken the obligation, in consideration of the tribute-money, to protect her allies and keep off from them every foreign enemy, — that she had accomplished this object completely at the present, and retained a reserve sufficient to guarantee the like security for the future; — that, under such circumstances, she owed no account to her allies of the expenditure of the surplus, but was at liberty to expend it for purposes useful and honorable to the city. In this point of view it was an object of great public importance to render Athens imposing in the eyes both of the allies and of Hellas generally, by improved fortifications, — by accumulated ornaments, sculptural and architectural, — and by religious festivals, — frequent, splendid, musical, and poetical.

Such was the answer made by Periklēs in defence of his policy against the opposition headed by Thucydides. And as far as we can make out the ground taken by both parties, the answer was perfectly satisfactory. For when we look at the very large sum which Periklēs continually kept in reserve in the treasury, no one could reasonably complain that his expenditure for ornamental purposes was carried so far as to encroach upon the exigencies of defence. What Thucydides and his partisans appear to have urged, was, that this common fund should still

¹ Plutarch, Periklēs, c. 12. διαβάλλον ἐν ταῖς ἐκκλησίαις βοῶντες, ὡς ὁ μὲν δῆμος ἀδοξεῖ καὶ κακῶς ἀκούει τὰ κοινὰ τῶν Ἑλλήνων χρήματα πρὸς αὐτὴν ἐκ Δήλου μεταγαγόν, ἢ δ' εἰσεσθὶν αὐτῷ πρὸς τοὺς ἐγκαλοῦντας εὐπρεπεστάτη τῶν προφάσεων, δισσάντα τοὺς βαρβάρους ἐκείθιν ἀνελθεῖν καὶ φυλάττειν ἐξ ἐχνοῦ τὰ κοινὰ, ταύτην ἀνῆρχε Περικλῆς, etc.

Compare the speech of the Lesbians, and their complaints against Athens, at the moment of their revolt in the fourth year of the Peloponnesian war (Thucyd. iii, 10); where a similar accusation is brought forward, — ἐπεὶ δὲ ἑώραμεν αὐτοὺς (the Athenians) τὴν μὲν τοῦ Μηδοῦ ἐχθρὰν ἀνιέντας, τὴν δὲ τῶν συμμάχων ἐπύλωσιν ἐπαγαμένους, etc.

continue to be spent in aggressive warfare against the Persian king, in Egypt and elsewhere, — conformably to the projects pursued by Kimon during his life.¹ But Periklēs was right in contending that such outlay would have been simply wasteful; of no use either to Athens or her allies, though risking all the chances of distant defeat, such as had been experienced a few years before in Egypt. The Persian force was already kept away, both from the waters of the Ægean and the coast of Asia, either by the stipulations of the treaty of Kallias, or — if that treaty be supposed apocryphal — by a conduct practically the same as those stipulations would have enforced. The allies, indeed, might have had some ground of complaint against Periklēs, either for not reducing the amount of tribute required from them, seeing that it was more than sufficient for the legitimate purposes of the confederacy, or for not having collected their positive sentiment as to the disposal of it. But we do not find that this was the argument adopted by Thucydides and his party, nor was it calculated to find favor either with aristocrats or democrats, in the Athenian assembly.

Admitting the injustice of Athens — an injustice common to both the parties in that city, not less to Kimon than to Periklēs — in acting as despot instead of chief, and in discontinuing all appeal to the active and hearty concurrence of her numerous allies, we shall find that the schemes of Periklēs were at the same time eminently Pan-Hellenic. In strengthening and ornamenting Athens, in developing the full activity of her citizens, in providing temples, religious offerings, works of art, solemn festivals, all of surpassing attraction, — he intended to exalt her into something greater than an imperial city with numerous dependent allies. He wished to make her the centre of Grecian feeling, the stimulus of Grecian intellect, and the type of strong democratical patriotism combined with full liberty of individual taste and aspiration. He wished not merely to retain the adherence of the subject states, but to attract the admiration and spontaneous deference of independent neighbors, so as to procure for Athens a moral ascendancy much beyond the range of her direct power. And he succeeded in elevating the city to

¹ Plutarch, Periklēs, c. 20.

a visible grandeur,¹ which made her appear even much stronger than she really was, — and which had the farther effect of softening to the minds of the subjects the humiliating sense of obedience; while it served as a normal school, open to strangers from all quarters, of energetic action even under full license of criticism, — of elegant pursuits economically followed, — and of a love for knowledge without enervation of character. Such were the views of Periklēs in regard to his country, during the years which preceded the Peloponnesian war, as we find them recorded in his celebrated Funeral Oration, pronounced in the first year of that war, — an exposition forever memorable of the sentiment and purpose of Athenian democracy, as conceived by its ablest president.

So bitter, however, was the opposition made by Thucydides and his party to this projected expenditure, — so violent and pointed did the scission of aristocrats and democrats become, — that the dispute came after no long time to that ultimate appeal which the Athenian constitution provided for the case of two opposite and nearly equal party-leaders, — a vote of ostracism. Of the particular details which preceded this ostracism, we are not informed; but we see clearly that the general position was such as the ostracism was intended to meet. Probably the vote was proposed by the party of Thucydides, in order to procure the banishment of Periklēs, the more powerful person of the two, and the most likely to excite popular jealousy. The challenge was accepted by Periklēs and his friends, and the result of the voting was such that an adequate legal majority condemned Thucydides to ostracism.² And it seems that the majority must have been very decisive, for the party of Thucydides was completely broken by it: and we hear of no other single individual equally formidable as a leader of opposition, throughout all the remaining life of Periklēs.

¹ Thucyd. i. 10.

² Plutarch, Periklēs, c. 11-14. Τέλος δὲ πρὸς τὸν Θουκυδίδην εἰς ἀγῶνα γὰρ τὸν ἰσχυρὸν καταστήσει καὶ διακινδυνεύσας, ἑκείνου μὲν ἐξέβαλε, κατέχευε δὲ τὴν ἀντιπαρισταμένην ταύραν. See, in reference to the principle of the ostracism, a remarkable incident at Magnesia, between two political rivals, Krémēs and Hermias; also the just reflections of Montesquieu, Esprit des Loix, xxvi, c. 17; xxix, c. 7.

The ostracism of Thucydides apparently took place about two years¹ after the conclusion of the thirty years' truce, — 443–442 B.C., — and it is to the period immediately following that the great Periklean works belong. The southern wall of the acropolis had been built out of the spoils brought by Kimon from his Persian expeditions; but the third of the long walls connecting Athens with the harbor was the proposition of Periklēs, at what precise time we do not know. The long walls originally completed — not long after the battle of Tanagra, as has already been stated — were two, one from Athens to Peiræus, another from Athens to Phalærum: the space between them was broad, and if in the hands of an enemy, the communication with Peiræus would be interrupted. Accordingly, Periklēs now induced the people to construct a third or intermediate wall, running parallel with the first wall to Peiræus, and within a short distance² — seemingly near one furlong — from it: so that the communication between the city and the port was placed beyond all possible interruption, even assuming an enemy to have got within the Phaleric wall. It was seemingly about this time, too, that the splendid docks and arsenal in Peiræus, alleged by Isokratēs to have cost one thousand talents, were constructed;³ while the town itself of Peiræus was laid out anew with straight streets intersecting at right angles. Apparently, this was something new in Greece, — the towns generally, and Athens itself in particular, having been built without any symmetry, or width, or continuity of streets:⁴ and Hippodamus the Milesian, a man of considerable attainments in the physical philosophy of the age, derived much renown as the earliest town architect, for

¹ Plutarch, Periklēs, c. 16: the indication of time, however, is vague.

² Plato, Gorgias, p. 455, with Scholia; Plutarch, Periklēs, c. 13; Forchhammer, Topographie von Athen, in Kieler Philologische Studien, pp. 279–282.

³ Isokratēs, Orat. vii; Areopagit. p. 153, c. 27.

⁴ See Dikæarchus, Vit. Græcæ, Fragm. ed. Fuhr. p. 140: compare the description of Platæa in Thucydides, ii. 3.

All the older towns now existing in the Grecian islands are put together in this same manner, — narrow, muddy, crooked ways, — few regular continuous lines of houses: see Ross, Reisen in den Griechischen Inseln, Letter xxvii, vol. ii, p. 20.

having laid out the Peiræus on a regular plan. The market-place, or one of them at least, permanently bore his name, — the Hippodamian agora.¹ At a time when so many great architects were displaying their genius in the construction of temples, we are not surprised to hear that the structure of towns began to be regularized also: moreover, we are told that the new colonial town of Thurii, to which Hippodamus went as a settler, was also constructed in the same systematic form as to straight and wide streets.²

The new scheme upon which the Peiræus was laid out, was not without its value as one visible proof of the naval grandeur of Athens. But the buildings in Athens and on the acropolis formed the real glory of the Periklean age. A new theatre, termed the Odeon, was constructed for musical and poetical representations at the great Panathenaic solemnity; next, the splendid temple of Athênē, called the Parthenon, with all its masterpieces of decorative sculpture and reliefs; lastly, the costly portals erected to adorn the entrance of the acropolis, on the western side of the hill, through which the solemn processions on festival days were conducted. It appears that the Odeon and the Parthenon were both finished between 445 and 437 B.C.: the Propylæa somewhat later, between 437 and 431 B.C., in which latter year the Peloponnesian war began.³ Progress was also made in restoring or reconstructing the Erechtheion, or ancient temple of Athênē Polias, the patron goddess of the city, — which had been burnt in the invasion of Xerxes; but the breaking out of the Peloponnesian war seems to have prevented the completion of this, as well as of the great temple of Dēmeter, at Eleusis, for the celebration of the Eleusinian mysteries, — that of Athênē, at Sunium, — and that of Nemesis, at Rhamnus. Nor was the sculpture less memorable than the architecture: three statues of Athênē, all by the hand of Pheidias, decorated the acropolis, — one colossal, forty-seven feet high, of ivory, in the Parthenon,⁴ — a second of bronze, called the Lemnian Athênē,

¹ Aristotle, Politic. ii. 5, 1; Xenophon, Hellen. ii. 4, 1; Harpokration, v, ἱπποδάμια.

² Diodor, xii, 9.

³ Leake, Topography of Athens, Append. ii and iii, pp. 328–336. 2d edit.

⁴ See Leake, Topography of Athens, 2d ed. p. 111, Germ. transl. ©

— a third of colossal magnitude, also in bronze, called Athênê Promachos, placed between the Propylæa and the Parthenon, and visible from afar off, even to the navigator approaching Peiræus by sea.

It is not, of course, to Periklēs that the renown of these splendid productions of art belongs: but the great sculptors and architects by whom they were conceived and executed, belonged to that same period of expanding and stimulating Athenian democracy which called forth a similar creative genius in oratory, in dramatic poetry, and in philosophical speculation. One man especially, of immortal name, — Pheidias, — born a little before the battle of Marathon, was the original mind in whom the sublime ideal conceptions of genuine art appear to have dis-engaged themselves from that hardness of execution and adherence to a consecrated type, which marked the efforts of his predecessors.¹ He was the great director and superintendent of all those decorative additions whereby Periklēs imparted to Athens a majesty such as had never before belonged to any Grecian city: the architects of the Parthenon and the other buildings — Iktinus, Kallikratēs, Korœbus, Mnesiklēs, and others — worked under his superintendence: and he had, besides, a school of pupils and subordinates to whom the mechanical part of his labors was confided. With all the great additions which Pheidias made to the grandeur of Athens, his last and greatest achievement was out of Athens, — the colossal statue of Zeus, in the great temple of Olympia, executed in the years immediately preceding the Peloponnesian war. The effect produced by this stupendous work, sixty feet high, in ivory and gold, embodying in visible majesty some of the grandest conceptions of Grecian poetry and religion, upon the minds of all beholders for many centuries successively, — was such as never has been, and probably never will be, equalled in the annals of art, sacred or profane.

Considering these prodigious achievements in the field of art only as they bear upon Athenian and Grecian history, they are

Müller (*De Pindici Vita*, p. 18) mentions no less than eight celebrated statues of Athênê, by the hand of Pheidias, — four in the acropolis of Athens.

¹ Plutarch, *Periklēs*, c. 13-15; O. Müller, *De Pindici Vita*, pp. 34-60, also his work, *Archæologie der Kunst*, sects. 108-113.

phenomena of extraordinary importance. When we read the profound impression which they produced upon Grecian spectators of a later age, we may judge how immense was the effect upon that generation which saw them both begun and finished. In the year 480 B.C., Athens had been ruined by the occupation of Xerxes: since that period, the Greeks had seen, first, the rebuilding and fortifying of the city on an enlarged scale, — next, the addition of Peiræus with its docks and magazines, — thirdly, the junction of the two by the long walls, thus including the most numerous concentrated population, wealth, arms, ships, etc., in Greece,¹ — lastly, the rapid creation of so many new miracles of art, — the sculptures of Pheidias as well as the paintings of the Thasian painter, Polygnôtus, in the temple of Theseus, and in the portico called Pækilê. Plutarch observes² that the celerity with which the works were completed was the most remarkable circumstance connected with them; and so it probably might be, in respect to the effect upon the contemporary Greeks. The gigantic strides by which Athens had reached her maritime empire were now immediately succeeded by a series of works which stamped her as the imperial city of Greece, gave to her an appearance of power even greater than the reality, and especially put to shame the old-fashioned simplicity of Sparta.³ The cost was doubtless prodigious, and could only have been borne at a time when there was a large treasure in the acropolis, as well as a considerable tribute annually coming in: if we may trust a computation which seems to rest on plausible grounds, it cannot have been much less than three thousand talents in the aggregate, — about six hundred and ninety thousand pounds.⁴

¹ Thucyd. i. 80. *καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἅπασιν ἀρίστα ἐξιστενται, πλούτῳ τε ἰδίῳ καὶ δημοσίῳ καὶ ναυτῶν καὶ ἵππων καὶ ὀπλοῦν, καὶ ὀλίγῳ ὅσος οὐκ ἐν ἄλλῳ ἐν γὰρ ἡμεῖς Ἑλληνικῶν ἐσμέν*, etc.

² Plutarch, *Periklēs*, c. 13.

³ Thucyd. i. 10.

⁴ See Leake, *Topography of Athens*, Append. iii. p. 329. 2d ed. Germ. transl. Colonel Leake, with much justice, contends that the amount of two thousand and twelve talents, stated by Harpokratōn out of Philochorus as the cost of the Propylæa alone, must be greatly exaggerated. Mr. Wilkins (*Atheniensia*, p. 84) expresses the same opinion; remarking that the transport of marble from Pentelikus to Athens is easy and on a descending road.

Demetrius Phalereus (ap. Cæsar. de Officiis, ii, 17) blamed Periklēs for

The expenditure of so large a sum was, of course, the source of great private gain to the contractors, tradesmen, merchants, artisans of various descriptions, etc., concerned in it: in one way or another, it distributed itself over a large portion of the whole city. And it appears that the materials employed for much of the work were designedly of the most costly description, as being most consistent with the reverence due to the gods: marble was rejected as too common for the statue of Athênê, and ivory employed in its place;¹ while the gold with which it was surrounded weighed not less than forty talents.² A large expenditure for such purposes, considered as pious towards the gods, was at the same time imposing in reference to Grecian feeling, which regarded with admiration every variety of public show and magnificence, and repaid by grateful deference the rich men who indulged in it. Periklès knew well that the visible splendor of the city, so new to all his contemporaries, would cause her great real power to appear even greater than its reality, and would thus procure for her a real, though unacknowledged influence — perhaps even an ascendancy — over all cities of the Grecian name. And it is certain that even among those who most hated and feared her, at the outbreak of the Peloponnesian war, there prevailed a powerful sentiment of involuntary deference.

A step taken by Periklès, apparently not long after the commencement of the thirty years' truce, evinces how much this ascendancy was in his direct aim, and how much he connected it with views both of harmony and usefulness for Greece generally. He prevailed upon the people to send envoys to every city of the Greek name, great and small, inviting each to appoint deputies for a congress to be held at Athens. Three points were to be discussed in this intended congress. 1. The restitution of those temples which had been burnt by the Persian invaders. 2. The fulfilment of such vows, as on that occasion had been made to the gods. 3. The safety of the sea and of maritime commerce for all. Twenty elderly Athenians were sent round

the large sum expended upon the Propylæa; nor is it wonderful that he uttered this censure, if he had been led to rate the cost of them at two thousand and twelve talents.

¹ Valer. Maxim., i. 7. 2.

² Thucyd. i. 13.

to obtain the convocation of this congress at Athens, — a Pan-Hellenic congress for Pan-Hellenic purposes. But those who were sent to Bœotia and Peloponnesus completely failed in their object, from the jealousy, noway astonishing, of Sparta and her allies: of the rest we hear nothing, for this refusal was quite sufficient to frustrate the whole scheme.¹ It is to be remarked that the dependent allies of Athens appear to have been summoned just as much as the cities perfectly autonomous; so that their tributary relation to Athens was not understood to degrade them. We may sincerely regret that such congress did not take effect, as it might have opened some new possibilities of converging tendency and alliance for the dispersed fractions of the Greek name, — a comprehensive benefit, to which Sparta was at once incompetent and indifferent, but which might, perhaps, have been realized under Athens, and seems in this case to have been sincerely aimed at by Periklès. The events of the Peloponnesian war, however, extinguished all hopes of any such union.

The interval of fourteen years, between the beginning of the thirty years' truce and that of the Peloponnesian war, was by no means one of undisturbed peace to Athens. In the sixth year of that period occurred the formidable revolt of Samos.

That island appears to have been the most powerful of all the allies of Athens,² — more powerful even than Chios or Lesbos, and standing on the same footing as the two latter; that is, paying no tribute-money, — a privilege when compared with the body of the allies, — but furnishing ships and men when called upon, and retaining, subject to this condition, its complete autonomy, its oligarchical government, its fortifications, and its military force. Like most of the other islands near the coast, Samos

¹ Plutarch, Periklès, c. 17. Plutarch gives no precise date, and O. Müller (De Phidiæ Vitâ, p. 9) places these steps for convocation of a congress before the first war between Sparta and Athens and the battle of Tanagra, — i. e., before 460 B.C. But this date seems to me improbable: Thebes was not yet renovated in power, nor had Bœotia as yet recovered from the fruits of her alliance with the Persians; moreover, neither Athens nor Periklès himself seem to have been at that time in a situation to conceive so large a project; which suits in every respect much better for the later period, after the thirty years' truce, but before the Peloponnesian war.

² Thucyd. i. 115; viii. 76. Plutarch, Periklès, c. 28.

possessed a portion of territory on the mainland, between which and the territory of Milêtus, lay the small town of Priênê, one of the twelve original members contributing to the Pan-Ionic solemnity. Respecting the possession of this town of Priênê, a war broke out between the Samians and Milesians, in the sixth year of the thirty years' truce (B.C. 440-439): whether the town had before been independent, we do not know, but in this war the Milesians were worsted, and it fell into the hands of the Samians. The defeated Milesians, enrolled as they were among the tributary allies of Athens, complained to her of the conduct of the Samians, and their complaint was seconded by a party in Samos itself opposed to the oligarchy and its proceedings. The Athenians required the two disputing cities to bring the matter before discussion and award at Athens, with which the Samians refused to comply: whereupon an armament of forty ships was despatched from Athens to the island, and established in it a democratical government; leaving in it a garrison, and carrying away to Lemnos fifty men and as many boys from the principal oligarchical families, to serve as hostages. Of these families, however, a certain number retired to the mainland, where they entered into negotiations with Pissuthnes, the satrap of Sardis, to procure aid and restoration. Obtaining from him seven hundred mercenary troops, and passing over in the night to the island, by previous concert with the oligarchical party, they overcame the Samian democracy as well as the Athenian garrison, who were sent over as prisoners to Pissuthnes. They were farther lucky enough to succeed in stealing away from Lemnos their own recently deposited hostages, and they then proclaimed open revolt against Athens, in which Byzantium also joined. It seems re-

¹ Thucyd. i. 115; Plutarch. Periklès, c. 25. Most of the statements which appear in this chapter of Plutarch — over and above the concise narrative of Thucydides — appear to be borrowed from exaggerated party stories of the day. We need make no remark upon the story, that Periklès was induced to take the side of Milêtus against Samos, by the fact that Aspasia was a native of Milêtus. Nor is it at all more credible that the satrap Pissuthnes, from good-will towards Samos, offered Periklès ten thousand golden staters as an inducement to spare Samos. It may perhaps be true, however, that the Samian oligarchy, and those wealthy men whose children were likely to be taken as hostages, tried the effect of large bribes upon the mind of Periklès, to prevail upon him not to alter the government.

markable, that though, by such a proceeding, they would of course draw upon themselves the full strength of Athens, yet their first step was to resume aggressive hostilities against Milêtus, whither they sailed with a powerful naval force of seventy ships (twenty of them carrying troops aboard).

Immediately on the receipt of this grave intelligence, a fleet of sixty triremes — probably all that were in complete readiness — was despatched to Samos under ten generals, two of whom were Periklès himself and the poet Sophoklès,² both seemingly included among the ten ordinary strategi of the year. But it was necessary to employ sixteen of these ships, partly in summoning contingents from Chios and Lesbos, to which islands Sophoklès went in person;³ partly in keeping watch off the coast of Karia for the arrival of the Phœnician fleet, which report stated to be approaching; so that Periklès had only forty-four ships remaining in his squadron. Yet he did not hesitate to attack the Samian fleet of seventy ships on its way back from Milêtus, near the island of Tragia, and was victorious in the action. Presently, he was reinforced by forty ships from Athens, and by twenty-five from Chios and Lesbos, so as to be able to disembark at Samos, where he overcame the Samian land-force, and blocked up the harbor with a portion of his fleet, surrounding the city on the land-side with a triple wall. Meanwhile, the Samians had sent Stesagoras with five ships to press the coming of the Phœnician fleet, and the report of their approach became again so prevalent that Periklès felt obliged to take sixty ships, out of the total one hundred and twenty-five, to watch for them off the coast of Kaunos and Karia, where he remained for about fourteen days. The Phœnician fleet⁴ never came, though Diodorus affirms that it was actually on its voyage.

¹ Thucyd. i. 114, 115.

² Strabo, xiv. p. 638; Schol. Aristeidès, t. iii, p. 485, Dindorf.

³ See the interesting particulars recounted respecting Sophoklès by the Chian poet, Ion, who met and conversed with him during the course of this expedition (Athenæus, xiii, p. 603). He represents the poet as uncommonly pleasing and graceful in society, but noway distinguished for active capacity. Sophoklès was at this time in peculiar favor, from the success of his tragedy, *Antigonê*, the year before. See the chronology of these events discussed and elucidated in Bœckh's preliminary Dissertation to the *Antigonê*, c. 6-9.

⁴ Diodor. xi, 27.

Pissuthnes certainly seems to have promised, and the Samians to have expected it: but I incline to believe that, though willing to hold out hopes and encourage revolt among the Athenian allies, the satrap, nevertheless, did not choose openly to violate the convention of Kallias, whereby the Persians were forbidden to send a fleet westward of the Chelidonian promontory. The departure of Periklēs, however, so much weakened the Athenian fleet off Samos, that the Samians, suddenly sailing out of their harbor in an opportune moment, at the instigation and under the command of one of their most eminent citizens, the philosopher Melissus, — surprised and ruined the blockading squadron, and gained a victory over the remaining fleet, before the ships could be fairly got out to sea.¹ For fourteen days they remained masters of the sea, carrying in and out all that they thought proper: nor was it until the return of Periklēs that they were again blocked up. Reinforcements, however, were now multiplied to the blockading squadron, — from Athens, forty ships, under Thucydides,² Agnon, and Phormion, and twenty under Tlepole-

¹ Plutarch, Periklēs, c. 26. Plutarch seems to have had before him accounts respecting this Samian campaign, not only from Ephorus, Stesimbrotus, and Duris, but also from Aristotle: and the statements of the latter must have differed thus far from Thucydides, that he affirmed Melissus the Samian general to have been victorious over Periklēs himself, which is not to be reconciled with the narrative of Thucydides.

The Samian historian, Duris, living about a century after this siege, seems to have introduced many falsehoods respecting the cruelties of Athens: see Plutarch, *l. c.*

² It appears very improbable that this Thucydides can be the historian himself. If it be Thucydides son of Melēsias, we must suppose him to have been restored from ostracism before the regular time, — a supposition indeed now inadmissible in itself, but which there is nothing else to countenance. The author of the Life of Sophoklēs, as well as most of the recent critics, adopt this opinion.

On the other hand, it may have been a third person named Thucydides; for the name seems to have been common, as we might guess from the two words of which it is compounded. We find a third Thucydides mentioned viii, 92, — a native of Pharsalus: and the biographer, Marcellinus seems to have read of many persons so called (*Θουκυδίδαι πολλοί*, p. xvi, ed. Arnold). The subsequent history of Thucydides son of Melēsias, is involved in complete obscurity. We do not know the incident to which the remarkable passage in Aristophanēs (*Acharn* 703) alludes. — compare

mus and Antiklēs, besides thirty from Chios and Lesbos, — making altogether near two hundred sail. Against this overwhelming force, Melissus and the Samians made an unavailing attempt at resistance, but were presently quite blocked up, and remained so for nearly nine months, until they could hold out no longer. They then capitulated, being compelled to raze their fortifications, to surrender all their ships of war, to give hostages for future good conduct, and to make good by stated instalments the whole expense of the enterprise, said to have reached one thousand talents. The Byzantines, too, made their submission at the same time.¹

Two or three circumstances deserve notice respecting this revolt, as illustrating the existing condition of the Athenian empire. First, that the whole force of Athens, together with the contingents from Chios and Lesbos, was necessary in order to crush it, so that even Byzantium, which joined in the revolt, seems to have been left unassailed. Now, it is remarkable that none of the dependent allies near Byzantium, or anywhere else, availed themselves of so favorable an opportunity to revolt also: a fact which seems plainly to imply that there was little positive discontent then prevalent among them. Had the revolt spread to other cities, probably Pissuthnes might have realized his promise of bringing in the Phœnician fleet, which would have been a serious calamity for the Ægean Greeks, and was only kept off by the unbroken maintenance of the Athenian empire.

Next, the revolted Samians applied for aid, not only to Pissuthnes, but also to Sparta and her allies; among whom, at a

Vespæ, 946: nor can we confirm the statement which the Scholiast cites from Idomeneus, to the effect that Thucydides was banished and fled to Artaxerxes: see Bergk. *Reliq. Com. Att.* p. 61.

¹ Thucyd. i, 117; Diodor. xii, 27, 28; Isokratēs, *De Permutat. Or.* xv sect. 118; Cornel. Nepos, *Vit. Timoth.* c. 1.

The assertion of Ephorus (see Diodorus, xii, 28, and Ephori *Fragm.* 117 ed. Marx, with the note of Marx) that Periklēs employed battering machines against the town, under the management of the Klazomenian Artemon, was called in question by Herakleides Ponticus, on the ground that Artemon was a contemporary of Anakreon, near a century before: and Thucydides represents Periklēs to have captured the town altogether by blockade.

special meeting, the question of compliance or refusal was formally debated. Notwithstanding the thirty years' truce then subsisting, of which only six years had elapsed, and which had been noway violated by Athens, — many of the allies of Sparta voted for assisting the Samians: what part Sparta herself took, we do not know, — but the Corinthians were the main and decided advocates for the negative. They not only contended that the truce distinctly forbade compliance with the Samian request, but also recognized the right of each confederacy to punish its own recusant members, and this was the decision ultimately adopted, for which the Corinthians afterwards took credit, in the eyes of Athens, as the chief authors.¹ Certainly, if the contrary policy had been pursued, the Athenian empire might have been in great danger, the Phœnician fleet would probably have been brought in also, and the future course of events might have been greatly altered.

Again, after the reconquest of Samos, we should assume it almost as a matter of certainty, that the Athenians would renew the democratical government which they had set up just before the revolt. Yet, if they did so, it must have been again overthrown, without any attempt to uphold it on the part of Athens. For we hardly hear of Samos again, until twenty-seven years afterwards, towards the latter division of the Peloponnesian war, in 412 B.C., and it then appears with an established oligarchical government of *geomoroi*, or landed proprietors, against which the people make a successful rising during the course of that year.² As Samos remained, during the interval between 439 B.C. and 412 B.C., unfortified, deprived of its fleet, and enrolled among the tribute-paying allies of Athens, — and as it, nevertheless, either retained or acquired its oligarchical government; so we may conclude that Athens cannot have systematically interfered to democratize by violence the subject-allies, in cases where the natural tendency of parties ran towards oligarchy. The condition of Lesbos at the time of its revolt, hereafter to be related, will be found to confirm this conclusion.³

¹ Thucyd. i. 40, 41.

² Thucyd. viii. 21.

³ Compare Wachsmuth, *Hellenische Alterthumskunde*, sect. 58, vol. ii. p. 82.

On returning to Athens after the reconquest of Samos, Periklēs was chosen to pronounce the funeral oration over the citizens slain in the war, to whom, according to custom, solemn and public obsequies were celebrated in the suburb called Kerameikos. This custom appears to have been introduced shortly after the Persian war,¹ and would doubtless contribute to stimulate the patriotism of the citizens, especially when the speaker elected to deliver it was of the personal dignity as well as the oratorical powers of Periklēs. He was twice public funeral orator by the choice of the citizens: once after the Samian success, and a second time in the first year of the Peloponnesian war. His discourse on the first occasion has not reached us;² but the second has been fortunately preserved, in substance at least, by Thucydides, who also briefly describes the funeral ceremony, — doubtless the same on all occasions. The bones of the deceased warriors were exposed in tents three days before the ceremony, in order that the relatives of each might have the opportunity of bringing offerings: they were then placed in coffins of cypress, and carried forth on carts to the public burial-place at the Kerameikos; one coffin for each of the ten tribes, and one empty couch, formally laid out, to represent those warriors whose bones had not been discovered or collected. The female relatives of each followed the carts, with loud wailings, and after them a numerous procession both of citizens and strangers. So soon as the bones had been consigned to the grave, some distinguished citizen,

¹ See Westermann, *Geschichte der Barbarei in Griechenland und Rom*; Diodor. xi. 33; Dionys. Hal. A. R. v. 17.

Periklēs, in the funeral oration preserved by Thucydides (ii. 35–40), begins by saying — *Οἱ μὲν πατὴρ τοῦ σώματος ἐπιφύονται ἀπὸ τῶν αὐτῶν τῶν προσκυμένων τῶν ὁσίων τῶν λόγων τῶνδε*, etc.

The Scholiast, and other commentators — K. F. Weber and Westermann among the number — make various guesses as to what celebrated man is here designated as the introducer of the custom of a funeral harangue. The Scholiast says, Solon: Weber fixes on Kimon: Westermann, on Aristeidēs: another commentator on Themistoklēs. But we may reasonably doubt whether any one very celebrated man is specially indicated by the words *τῶν προσκυμένων*. To commend the introducer of the practice is nothing more than a phrase for commending the practice itself.

² Some fragments of it seem to have been preserved, in the time of Aristotle: see his treatise *De Rhetoricā* i. 7; iii. 10, 3.

specially chosen for the purpose, mounted at elevated stage, and addressed to the multitude an appropriate discourse. Such was the effect produced by that of Periklēs after the Samian expedition, that, when he had concluded, the audience present testified their emotion in the liveliest manner, and the women especially crowned him with garlands, like a victorious athlete.¹ Only Elpinikē, sister of the deceased Kimon, reminded him that the victories of her brother had been more felicitous, as gained over Persians and Phenicians, and not over Greeks and kinsmen. And the contemporary poet Ion, the friend of Kimon, reported what he thought an unseemly boast of Periklēs, — to the effect that Agamemnon had spent ten years in taking a foreign city, while *he* in nine months had reduced the first and most powerful of all the Ionic communities.² But if we possessed the actual speech pronounced, we should probably find that he assigned all the honor of the exploit to Athens and her citizens generally, placing their achievement in favorable comparison with that of Agamemnon and his host, — not himself with Agamemnon.

Whatever may be thought of this boast, there can be no doubt that the result of the Samian war not only rescued the Athenian empire from great peril,³ but rendered it stronger than ever while the foundation of Amphipolis, which was effected two years afterwards, strengthened it still farther. Nor do we hear, during the ensuing few years, of any farther tendencies to disaffection among its members, until the period immediately before the Peloponnesian war. The feeling common among them towards Athens, seems to have been neither attachment nor hatred, but simple indifference and acquiescence in her supremacy. Such amount of positive discontent as really existed among them, arose, not from actual hardships suffered, but from the general political instinct of the Greek mind, — desire of separate auto-

¹ Compare the enthusiastic demonstrations which welcomed Brasidas at Skiōne (Thucyd. iv, 121).

² Plutarch, Periklēs, c. 28; Thucyd. ii, 34.

³ A short fragment remaining from the comic poet Eupolis (Κέλαρες, Fr. xvi, p. 493, ed. Meineke), attests the anxiety at Athens about the Samian war, and the great joy when the island was reconquered: compare Aristophan. Vesp. 283.

nomy for each city; which manifested itself in each, through the oligarchical party, whose power was kept down by Athens, and was stimulated by the sentiment communicated from the Grecian communities without the Athenian empire. According to that sentiment, the condition of a subject-ally of Athens was treated as one of degradation and servitude: and in proportion as fear and hatred of Athens became more and more predominant among the allies of Sparta, they gave utterance to the sentiment more and more emphatically, so as to encourage discontent artificially among the subject-allies of the Athenian empire. Possessing complete mastery of the sea, and every sort of superiority requisite for holding empire over islands, Athens had yet no sentiment to appeal to in her subjects, calculated to render her empire popular, except that of common democracy, which seems at first to have acted without any care on her part to encourage it, until the progress of the Peloponnesian war made such encouragement a part of her policy. And had she even tried sincerely to keep up in the allies the feeling of a common interest, and the attachment to a permanent confederacy, the instinct of political separation would probably have baffled all her efforts. But she took no such pains, — with the usual morality that grows up in the minds of the actual possessors of power, she conceived herself entitled to exact obedience as her right; and some of the Athenian speakers in Thucydides go so far as to disdain all pretence of legitimate power, even such as might fairly be set up, resting the supremacy of Athens on the naked plea of superior force.¹ As the allied cities were mostly under democracies, — through the indirect influence rather than the systematic dictation of Athens, — yet each having its own internal aristocracy in a state of opposition; so the movements for revolt against Athens originated with the aristocracy or with some few citizens apart: while the people, though sharing more or less in the desire for autonomy, had yet either a fear of their own aristocracy or a sympathy with

Thucyd. iii, 37; ii, 63. See the conference, at the island of Melos in the sixteenth year of the Peloponnesian war (Thucyd. v, 89, *seq.*) between the Athenian commissioners and the Melians. I think, however, that this conference is less to be trusted as based in reality, than the speeches in Thucydides generally, — of which more hereafter.

Athens, which made them always backward in revolting, sometimes decidedly opposed to it. Neither Periklēs nor Kleon, indeed, lay stress on the attachment of the people as distinguished from that of the Few, in these dependent cities; but the argument is strongly insisted on by Diodorus,¹ in the discussion respecting Mitylênê after its surrender: and as the war advanced, the question of alliance with Athens or Sparta became more and more identified with the internal preponderance of democracy or oligarchy in each.² We shall find that in most of those cases of actual revolt where we are informed of the preceding circumstances, the step is adopted or contrived by a small number of oligarchical malecontents, without consulting the general voice; while in those cases where the general assembly is consulted beforehand, there is manifested indeed a preference for autonomy, but nothing like a hatred of Athens or decided inclination to break with her. In the case of Mitylênê,³ in the fourth year of the war, it was the aristocratical government which revolted, while the people, as soon as they obtained arms, actually declared in favor of Athens: and the secession of Chios, the greatest of all the allies, in the twentieth year of the Peloponnesian war, even after all the hardships which the allies had been called upon to bear in that war, and after the ruinous disasters which Athens had sustained before Syracuse, — was both prepared beforehand and accomplished by secret negotiations of the Chian oligarchy, not only without the concurrence, but against the inclination, of their own people.⁴ In like manner, the revolt of Thasos would not have occurred, had not the Thasian democracy been previ-

¹ Thucyd. iii, 47. Νῦν μὲν γὰρ ἡμῖν ὁ δῆμος ἐν ἀπασασι ταῖς πόλεσιν εἶνος ἐστὶ, καὶ ἡ οὐ συναρίσται τοῖς ὀλίγοις, ἢ ἐκ διασφύ. ἢ παρὰ τὸς ἀποστήσαντι πόλει εὐθὺς, etc.

² See the striking observations of Thucydides, iii. 82, 83; Aristotel Politic. v, 6, 9.

³ Thucyd. iii, 27.

⁴ Thucyd. viii, 9-14. He observes, also, respecting the Thasian oligarchy just set up in lieu of the previous democracy by the Athenian oligarchical conspirators who were then organizing the revolution of the Four Hundred at Athens, — that they immediately made preparations for revolting from Athens, — ξυνέβη δ' αὖ αὖτις μάλιστα ἡ ἐκείνων, τὴν πόλιν τε ἀκινδύνως διαθεῖναι, καὶ τὴν ἐκείνων πρὸς ἡμᾶς καταλελεῖσθαι (viii, 64).

ously subverted by the Athenian Peisander and his oligarchical confederates. So in Akanthus, in Amphipolis, in Mendê, and those other Athenian dependencies which were wrested from Athens by Brasidas, we find the latter secretly introduced by a few conspirators, while the bulk of the citizens do not hail him at once as a deliverer, like men sick of Athenian supremacy: they acquiesce, not without debate, when Brasidas is already in the town, and his demeanor, just as well as conciliating, soon gains their esteem: but neither in Akanthus nor in Amphipolis would he have been admitted by the free decision of the citizens, if they had not been alarmed for the safety of their friends, their properties, and their harvest, still exposed in the lands without the walls.¹ These particular examples warrant us in affirming, that though the oligarchy in the various allied cities desired eagerly to shake off the supremacy of Athens, the people were always backward in following them, sometimes even opposed, and hardly ever willing to make sacrifices for the object. They shared the universal Grecian desire for separate autonomy,² felt the Athenian empire as an extraneous pressure which they would have been glad to shake off, whenever the change could be made with safety: but their condition was not one of positive hardship, nor did they overlook the hazardous side of such a change, — partly from the coercive hand of Athens, partly from new enemies against whom Athens had hitherto protected them, and not least, from their own oligarchy. Of course, the different allied cities were not all animated by the same feelings, some being more averse to Athens than others.

The particular modes in which Athenian supremacy was felt as a grievance by the allies appear to have been chiefly three. 1. The annual tribute. 2. The encroachments, exactions, or perhaps plunder, committed by individual Athenians, who would often take advantage of their superior position, either as serving in the naval armaments, as invested with the function of inspectors as placed in garrison, or as carrying on some private speculation. 3. The obligation under which the allies were placed, of

¹ Thucyd. iv, 86, 88, 106, 123.

² See the important passage, Thucyd. viii, 48.

bringing a large proportion of their judicial trials to be settled before the dikasteries at Athens.

As to the tribute, I have before remarked that its amount had been but little raised from its first settlement down to the beginning of the Peloponnesian war, at which time it was six hundred talents yearly: it appears to have been reviewed, and the apportionment corrected, in every fifth year, at which period the collecting officers may probably have been changed; but we shall afterwards find it becoming larger and more burdensome. The same gradual increase may probably be affirmed respecting the second head of inconvenience, — vexation caused to the allies by individual Athenians, chiefly officers of armaments, or powerful citizens.¹ Doubtless this was always more or less a real grievance, from the moment when the Athenians became despots in place of chiefs, but it was probably not very serious in extent until after the commencement of the Peloponnesian war, when revolt on the part of the allies became more apprehended, and when garrisons, inspectors, and tribute-gathering ships became more essential in the working of the Athenian empire.

But the third circumstance above noticed — the subjection of the allied cities to the Athenian dikasteries — has been more dwelt upon as a grievance than the second, and seems to have been unduly exaggerated. We can hardly doubt that the beginning of this jurisdiction exercised by the Athenian dikasteries dates with the synod of Delos, at the time of the first formation of the confederacy. It was an indispensable element of that confederacy, that the members should forego their right of private war among each other, and submit their differences to peaceable arbitration, — a covenant introduced even into alliances much less intimate than this was, and absolutely essential to the efficient maintenance of any common action against

¹ Xenophon, *Repub. Athen.* iii. 5. πλὴν αἱ τάξεις τοῦ φόρου· τοῦτο δὲ γίνεται ὡς τὰ πολλὰ δι' ἑτοῦς πεμπτον.

² Xenophon, *Repub. Athen.* i. 14. Περὶ δὲ τῶν συμμάχων, οἱ ἐκπλέοντες· συκοφαντοῦσιν, ὡς δοκοῦσι, καὶ μισοῦσι· τοὺς χρηστοὺς, etc.

Who are the persons designated by the expression *οἱ ἐκπλέοντες*, appear to be specified more particularly a little farther on (i. 18); it means the generals, the officers, the envoys, etc. sent forth by Athens.

Persia.¹ Of course, many causes of dispute, public as well as private, must have arisen among these wide-spread islands and seaports of the Ægean, connected with each other by relations of fellow-feeling, of trade, and of common apprehensions, the synod of Delos, composed of the deputies of all, was the natural board of arbitration for such disputes, and a habit must thus have been formed, of recognizing a sort of federal tribunal, — to decide peaceably how far each ally had faithfully discharged its duties, both towards the confederacy collectively, and towards other allies with their individual citizens separately, — as well as to enforce its decisions and punish refractory members, pursuant to the right which Sparta and her confederacy claimed and exercised also.² Now from the beginning, the Athenians were the guiding and enforcing presidents of this synod, and when it gradually died away, they were found occupying its place as well as clothed with its functions. It was in this manner that their judicial authority over the allies appears first to have begun, as the confederacy became changed into an Athenian empire, — the judicial functions of the synod being transferred

¹ See the expression in Thucydides (v. 27) describing the conditions required when Argos was about to extend her alliances in Peloponnesus. The conditions were two. 1. That the city should be autonomous. 2. Next, that it should be willing to submit its quarrels to equitable arbitration. — ἡτις αὐτονομία τε ἐστὶ, καὶ δίκας ἴσας καὶ ὁμοίας δίδωσι.

In the oration against the Athenians, delivered by the Syracusan Hermokratēs at Kamarina. Athens is accused of having enslaved her allies partly on the ground that they neglected to perform their military obligations, partly because they made war upon each other (Thucyd. vi. 76), partly also on other specious pretences. How far this charge against Athens is borne out by the fact, we can hardly say; in all those particular examples which Thucydides mentions of subjugation of allies by Athens, there is a cause perfectly definite and sufficient. — not a mere pretence devised by Athenian ambition.

² According to the principle laid down by the Corinthians shortly before the Peloponnesian war, — τοὺς προσήκοντας ἐνμάχους αὐτὸν τιτὰ κολάζειν (Thucyd. i. 40-43).

The Lacedæmonians, on preferring their accusation of treason against Themistoklēs, demanded that he should be tried at Sparta, before the common Hellenic synod which held its sitting there, and of which Athens was then a member: that is, the Spartan confederacy, or alliance, — ἐπὶ τοῦ κοινού συνεδρίου τῶν Ἑλλήνων (Diodor. xi. 55).

along with the common treasure to Athens, and doubtless much extended. And on the whole, these functions must have been productive of more good than evil to the allies themselves, especially to the weakest and most defenceless among them.

Among the thousand towns which paid tribute to Athens, — taking this numerical statement of Aristophanes, not in its exact meaning, but simply as a great number, — if a small town, or one of its citizens, had cause of complaint against a larger, there was no channel except the synod of Delos, or the Athenian tribunal, through which it could have any reasonable assurance of fair trial or justice. It is not to be supposed that all the private complaints and suits between citizen and citizen, in each respective subject town, were carried up for trial to Athens: yet we do not know distinctly how the line was drawn between matters carried up thither and matters tried at home. The subject cities appear to have been interdicted from the power of capital punishment, which could only be inflicted after previous trial and condemnation at Athens: ¹ so that the latter reserved to herself the cognizance of most of the grave crimes, — or what may be called "the higher justice" generally. And the political accusations preferred by citizen against citizen, in any subject city, for alleged treason, corruption, non-fulfilment of public duty, etc., were doubtless carried to Athens for trial, — perhaps the most important part of her jurisdiction.

But the maintenance of this judicial supremacy was not intended by Athens for the substantive object of amending the administration of justice in each separate allied city: it went rather to regulate the relations between city and city, — between citizens of different cities, — between Athenian citizens or officers, and any of these allied cities with which they had relations. — between each city itself, as a dependent government with contending political parties, and the imperial head, Athens. All these were problems which imperial Athens was called on to solve, and the best way of solving them would have been through some common synod emanating from all the allies: putting this aside, we shall find that the solution provided by Athens was

¹ Antipho, De Cæde Herodis, c. 7, p. 135. ὁ οὐδὲ πόλει ἐξεστίν, ἄντι Ἀθηναίων οὐδένα θανάτῳ ζημιῶσαι.

perhaps the next best, and we shall be the more induced to think so, when we compare it with the proceedings afterwards adopted by Sparta, when she had put down the Athenian empire. Under Sparta, the general rule was, to place each of the dependent cities under the government of a dekadarchy or oligarchical council of ten among its chief citizens, together with a Spartan harmost, or governor, having a small garrison under his orders. It will be found, when we come to describe the Spartan maritime empire, that these arrangements exposed each dependent city to very great violence and extortion, while, after all, they solved only a part of the problem: they served only to maintain each separate city under the dominion of Sparta, without contributing to regulate the dealings between the citizens of one and those of another, or to bind together the empire as a whole. Now the Athenians did not, as a system, place in their dependent cities, governors analogous to the harmosts, though they did so occasionally under special need; but their fleets and their officers were in frequent relation with these cities: and as the principal officers were noways indisposed to abuse their position, so the facility of complaint, constantly open to the Athenian popular dikastery, served both as redress and guarantee against misrule of this description. It was a guarantee which the allies themselves sensibly felt and valued, as we know from Thucydides: the chief source from whence they had to apprehend evil was the Athenian officials and principal citizens, who could misemploy the power of Athens for their own private purposes, — but they looked up to the "Athenian Demos as a chastener of such evil-doers and as a harbor of refuge to themselves."¹ If

¹ Thucyd. viii. 48. Τοῦτε τε καλοὺς καὶ κακοὺς ὀνομαζομένους οὐκ ἐλάσω αὐτοὺς (that is, the subject-allies) νομίζειν σοῖσι πράγματα παρέξιν τοῦ δήμου, ποριστὰς ὄντας καὶ ἐσηγητὰς τῶν κακῶν τῷ δήμῳ, ἐξ ὧν τὰ πλείω αὐτοὺς ὠφελείσθαι· καὶ τὸ μὲν ἐπ' ἐκείνοις εἶναι, καὶ ἄκριτοι ἂν καὶ βιαιότερον ἀποδύησκειν, τὸν τε δῆμον σφῶν τε καταφυγὴν εἶναι καὶ ἐκείνων σωφρονιστὴν. Καὶ ταῦτα παρ' αὐτῶν τῶν ἔργων ἐπισταμέναι τὰς πόλεις σαφῶς αὐτοὺς εἰδέναι, ὅτι οὕτω νομίζουσι. This is introduced as the deliberate judgment of the Athenian commander Phrynichus, whom Thucydides greatly commends for his sagacity, and with whom he seems in this case to have concurred.

Xenophon (Rep. Ath. i. 14. 15) affirms that the Athenian officers on service passed many unjust sentences upon the oligarchical party in the allied cities.

the popular dikasteries at Athens had not been thus open, the allied cities would have suffered much more severely from the captains and officials of Athens in their individual capacity. And the maintenance of political harmony, between the imperial city and the subject ally, was insured by Athens through the jurisdiction of her dikasteries with much less cost of injustice and violence than by Sparta; for though oligarchical partisans might sometimes be unjustly condemned at Athens, yet such accidental wrong was immensely overpassed by the enormities of the Spartan harmosts and dekadarchies, who put numbers to death without any trial at all.

So again, it is to be recollected that Athenian private citizens, not officially employed, were spread over the whole range of the empire as kleruchs, proprietors, or traders; of course, therefore, disputes would arise between them and the natives of the subject cities, as well as among these latter themselves, in cases where both parties did not belong to the same city. Now in such cases the Spartan imperial authority was so exercised as to afford little or no remedy, since the action of the harmost or the dekadarchy was confined to one separate city; while the Athenian dikasteries, with universal competence and public trial, afforded the only redress which the contingency admitted. If a Thasian citizen believed himself aggrieved by the historian Thucydides, either as commander of the Athenian fleet off the station, or as proprietor of gold mines in Thrace, he had his remedy against the latter

— fines, sentences of banishment, capital punishments; and that the Athenian people, though they had a strong public interest in the prosperity of the allies, in order that their tribute might be larger, nevertheless thought it better that any individual citizen of Athens should pocket what he could out of the plunder of the allies, and leave to the latter nothing more than was absolutely necessary for them to live and work, without any superfluity, such as might tempt them to revolt.

That the Athenian officers on service may have succeeded too often in unjust peculation at the cost of the allies, is probable enough; but that the Athenian people were pleased to see their own individual citizens so enriching themselves is certainly not true. The large jurisdiction of the dikasteries was intended, among other effects, to open to the allies a legal redress against such misconduct on the part of the Athenian officers: and the passage above cited from Thucydides proves that it really produced such an effect.

by accusation before the Athenian dikasteries, to which the most powerful Athenian was amenable not less than the meanest Thasian. To a citizen of any allied city, it might be an occasional hardship to be sued before the courts at Athens, but it was also often a valuable privilege to him to be able to sue before those courts others whom else he could not have reached. He had his share both of the benefit and of the hardship. Athens, if she robbed her subject-allies of their independence, at least gave them in exchange the advantage of a central and common judiciary authority; thus enabling each of them to enforce claims of justice against the rest, in a way which would not have been practicable, to the weaker at least, even in a state of general independence.

Now Sparta seems not even to have attempted anything of the kind with regard to her subject-allies, being content to keep them under the rule of a harmost, and a partisan oligarchy; and we read anecdotes which show that no justice could be obtained at Sparta, even for the grossest outrages committed by the harmost, or by private Spartans out of Laconia. The two daughters of a Boeotian named Skedasus, of Leuktra in Boeotia, had been first violated and then slain by two Spartan citizens: the son of a citizen of Oreus, in Eubœa, had been also outraged and killed by the harmost Aristodemos;¹ in both cases the fathers went to Sparta to lay the enormity before the ephors and other authorities, and in both cases a deaf ear was turned to their complaints. But such crimes, if committed by Athenian citizens or officers, might have been brought to a formal exposure before the public sitting of the dikastery, and there can be no doubt that both would have been severely punished: we shall see hereafter that an enormity of this description, committed by the Athenian general Pachês, at Mitylênê, cost him his life before the Athenian dikasts.² Xenophon, in the dark and one-sided representation which he gives of the Athenian democracy, remarks, that if the subject-allies had not been made amenable to justice, at Athens, they would have cared little for the people of Athens, and would

¹ Plutarch, Pelopidas, c. 20; Plutarch, Amator. Narrat. c. 3, p. 778

² See *infra*, chap. 49.

have paid court only to those individual Athenians — generals, trierarchs, or envoys — who visited the islands on service; but under the existing system, the subjects were compelled to visit Athens either as plaintiffs or defendants, and were thus under the necessity of paying court to the bulk of the people also, — that is, to those humbler citizens out of whom the dikasteries were formed; they supplicated the dikasts in court for favor or lenient dealing.¹ However true this may be, we must remark that it was a lighter lot to be brought for trial before the dikastery, than to be condemned without redress by the general on service, or to be forced to buy off his condemnation by a bribe; and, moreover, that the dikastery was open not merely to receive accusations against citizens of the allied cities, but also to entertain the complaints which they preferred against others.

Assuming the dikasteries at Athens to be ever so defective as tribunals for administering justice, we must recollect that they were the same tribunals under which every Athenian citizen held his own fortune or reputation, and that the native of any subject city was admitted to the same chance of justice as the native of Athens. Accordingly, we find the Athenian envoy at Sparta, immediately before the Peloponnesian war, taking peculiar credit to the imperial city on this ground for equal dealing with her subject-allies. "If our power (he says) were to pass into other hands, the comparison would presently show how moderate we are in the use of it: but as regards us, our very moderation is unfairly turned to our disparagement rather than to our praise. For even though we put ourselves at disadvantage in matters litigated with our allies, and though we have appointed such matters to be judged among ourselves and under laws equal

¹ Xenophon, Rep. Athen. i, 18. Πρὸς δὲ τοῖς, εἰ μὲν μὴ ἐπὶ δίκας ἦσαν οὐ σύμμαχοι, τοὺς ἐκπλέοντας Ἀθηναίων ἐτιμῶν ἢ μόνους, τοὺς τε στρατηγούς καὶ τοὺς τριηράρχους καὶ πρέσβεις· νῦν δ' ἡνάγκασται τὸν δῆμον κατακτείνειν τῶν Ἀθηναίων εἰς ἕκαστος τῶν συμμάχων, γινώσκων ὅτι δεῖ μὲν ἀδικομένων Ἀθηναίους δίκην δοῦναι καὶ λαβεῖν, οὐκ ἐν ἄλλοις τινα, ἀλλ' ἐν τῷ δήμῳ, ὅς ἐστι ἡ νόμος Ἀθηνῶν. Καὶ ἀντιβολῆσαι ἀναγκάζεται ἐν ταῖς δικαστηρίοις, καὶ εἰσιόντός του, ἐπὶ μισθνεύσθαι τῆς χειρὸς. Διὰ τοῦτο οὖν οἱ σύμμαχοι ἀνίσχονται τοῦ δήμου ὥς Ἀθηναίων καθεστῶσι μάλιστα.

to both parties, we are represented as animated by nothing better than a love of litigation."¹ "Our allies (he adds) would com-

¹ Thucyd. i, 76, 77. Ἄλλους γ' ἂν οὖν οἴομεθα τὰ ἡμέτερα λαβόντας δεῖξαι ἂν μάλιστα εἰ τι μετριάζομεν· ἡμῖν δὲ καὶ ἐκ τοῦ ἐπικεικούς ἀδοξία τὸ πλεον ἢ ἔπαινος οὐκ εἰκότως περιέστη. Καὶ ἔλασσούμενοι γὰρ ἐν ταῖς ξυμβολαίαις πρὸς τοὺς ξυμμάχους δίκαις, καὶ παρ' ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς ἐν τοῖς ὁμοίοις νόμοις ποιήσαντες τὰς κρίσεις, φιλοδικεῖν δοκοῦμεν, etc.

I construe *ξυμβολαίαις δίκαις* as connected in meaning with *ξυμβόλαια* and not with *ξυμβόλαια* — following Duker and Bloomfield in preference to Poppo and Gölter: see the elaborate notes of the two latter editors. *Δίκαι* ἀπὸ *ξυμβόλων* indicated the arrangements concluded by special convention between two different cities, by consent of both, for the purpose of determining controversies between their respective citizens: they were something essentially apart from the ordinary judicial arrangements of either state. Now what the Athenian orator here insists upon is exactly the contrary of this idea: he says, that the allies were admitted to the benefit of Athenian trial and Athenian laws, in like manner with the citizens themselves. The judicial arrangements by which the Athenian allies were brought before the Athenian dikasteries cannot, with propriety, be said to be *δίκαι* ἀπὸ *ξυμβόλων*; unless the act of original incorporation into the confederacy of Delos is to be regarded as a *ξύμβολον*, or agreement, — which in a large sense it might be, though not in the proper sense in which *δίκαι* ἀπὸ *ξυμβόλων* are commonly mentioned. Moreover, I think that the passage of Antipho (De Cæde Herodis, p. 745) proves that it was the citizens of places *not* in alliance with Athens, who litigated with Athenians according to *δίκαι* ἀπὸ *ξυμβόλων*, — not the allies of Athens while they resided in their own native cities: for I agree with the interpretation which Boeckh puts upon this passage, in opposition to Platner and Schömann (Boeckh, Public Econ. of Athens, book iii, ch. xvi. p. 403, Eng. transl.; Schömann, Der Attisch. Prozess, p. 778; Platner, Prozess und Klagen bei den Attikern, ch. iv. 2, pp. 110–112, where the latter discusses both the passages of Antipho and Thucydides).

The passages in Demosthenes Orat. de Halones. c. 3, pp. 98, 99: and Andokides cont. Alkibiad. c. 7, p. 121 (I quote this latter oration, though it is undoubtedly spurious, because we may well suppose the author of it to be conversant with the nature and contents of *ξύμβολα*), give us a sufficient idea of these judicial conventions, or *ξύμβολα*, — special and liable to differ in each particular case. They seem to me essentially distinct from that systematic scheme of proceeding whereby the dikasteries of Athens were made cognizant of all, or most, important controversies among or between the allied cities, as well as of political accusations.

M. Boeckh draws a distinction between the *autonomous* allies (Chios and Lesbos, at the time immediately before the Peloponnesian war) and the *subject*-allies: "the former class (he says) retained possession of unlimited

plain less if we made open use of our superior force with regard to them; but we discard such maxims, and deal with them upon

jurisdiction, whereas the latter were compelled to try all their disputes in the courts of Athens." Doubtless this distinction would prevail to a certain degree, but how far it was pushed we can hardly say. Suppose that a dispute took place between Chios and one of the subject islands, or between an individual Chian and an individual Thasian; would not the Chian plaintiff sue, or the Chian defendant be sued, before the Athenian dikastery? Suppose that an Athenian citizen or officer became involved in dispute with a Chian, would not the Athenian dikastery be the competent court, whichever of the two were plaintiff or defendant? Suppose a Chian citizen or magistrate to be suspected of fomenting revolt, would it not be competent to any accuser, either Chian or Athenian, to indict him before the dikastery at Athens? Abuse of power, or peculation, committed by Athenian officers at Chios, must of course be brought before the Athenian dikasteries, just as much as if the crime had been committed at Thasos or Naxos. We have no evidence to help us in regard to these questions; but I incline to believe that the difference in respect to judicial arrangement, between the autonomous and the subject-allies, was less in degree than M. Boeckh believes. We must recollect that the arrangement was not all pure hardship to the allies.—the liability to be prosecuted was accompanied with the privilege of prosecuting for injuries received.

There is one remark, however, which appears to me of importance for understanding the testimonies on this subject. The Athenian empire, properly so called, which began by the confederacy of Delos after the Persian invasion, was completely destroyed at the close of the Peloponnesian war, when Athens was conquered and taken. But after some years had elapsed, towards the year 377 B. C., Athens again began to make maritime conquests to acquire allies, to receive tribute, to assemble a synod, and to resume her footing of something like an imperial city. But her power over her allies, during this second period of empire, was nothing like so great as it had been during the first, between the Persian and Peloponnesian wars: nor can we be at all sure that what is true of the second is also true of the first. Now I think it probable, that those statements of the grammarians, which represent the allies as carrying on *δικας ἀπὸ συμβόλων* in ordinary practice with the Athenians, may really be true about the second empire or alliance. Bekker *Anecdota*, p. 436. *Ἀθηναῖοι ἀπὸ συμβόλων ἐδίκασον τοῖς ὑπηκόοις*: οὕτως Ἀριστοτέλης. Pollux, viii, 63. *Ἀπὸ συμβόλων δὲ δίκη ἦν, ὅτε οἱ σύμμαχοι ἐδικάζοντο*. Also Hesychius, i, 489. The statement here ascribed to Aristotle may very probably be true about the second alliance, though it cannot be held true for the first. In the second, the Athenians may really have had *σύμβολα*, or special conventions for judicial business, with many of their principal allies, instead of making Athens the authoritative centre, and heit to the Delian synod, as they did during the first. It is to be remarked, however, that Harpokration, in the explanation which he gives of *σύμβολα*

an equal footing: and they are so accustomed to this, that they think themselves entitled to complain at every trifling disappointment of their expectations.¹ They suffered worse hardships under the Persians before our empire began, and they would suffer worse under you (the Spartans), if you were to succeed in conquering us and making our empire yours." History bears out the boast of the Athenian orator, both as to the time preceding and following the empire of Athens.² And an Athenian citizen, indeed, might well regard it, not as a hardship, but as a privilege, that subject-allies should be allowed to sue him before the dikastery, and to defend themselves before the same tribunal, either in case of wrong done to him, or in case of alleged treason to the imperial authority of Athens: they were thereby put upon a level with himself. Still more would he find reason to eulogize the universal competence of these dikasteries in providing a common legal authority for all disputes of the numerous distinct communities of the empire, one with another, and for the safe navigation and general commerce of the Ægean. That complaints were raised against it among the subject-allies, is noway surprising: for the empire of Athens generally was inconsistent with that separate autonomy to which every town thought itself entitled,—and this was one of its prominent and constantly operative institutions, as well as a striking mark of dependence to the subordinate communities. Yet we may safely affirm, that if empire was to be maintained at all, no way of maintaining it could be found at once less oppressive and more beneficial than the superintending competence of the dikasteries,—a system not taking its rise in the mere "love of litigation," if, indeed, we are to reckon this a real feature in the Athenian character, which I shall take another opportunity of examining, much less in those

treats them in a perfectly general way, as conventions for settlement of judicial controversy between city and city, without any particular allusion to Athens and her allies. Compare Heffter, *Athenäische Gerichtsverfassung* §§ 1, 3, p. 91.

¹ Thucyd. i, 77. *Οἱ δὲ (the allies) ἐλθισμένον πρὸς ἡμᾶς ἀπὸ τῶν ἰσθμῶν ὁμιλεῖν*, etc.

² Compare Isokratēs. Or. iv, Panegyric. pp. 62–66, sects. 116–133: and Or. xii, Panathenaic. pp. 247–254, sects. 72–111: Or. viii, De Pace, p. 178 sect. 119, seqq.; Plutarch. Lysand. c. 13: Cornel Nepos, Lysand. c. 2, 3.

petty collateral interests indicated by Xenophon,¹ such as the increased customs duty, rent of houses, and hire of slaves at Peiræus, and the larger profits of the heralds, arising from the influx of suitors. It was nothing but the power, originally inherent in the confederacy of Delos, of arbitration between members and enforcement of duties towards the whole, — a power inherited by Athens from that synod, and enlarged to meet the political wants of her empire; to which end it was essential, even in the view of Xenophon himself.² It may be that the dikastery was not always impartial between Athenian citizens privately, or the Athenian commonwealth collectively, and the subject-allies, — and in so far the latter had good reason to complain; but on the other hand, we have no ground for suspecting it of deliberate or standing unfairness, or of any other defects than such as were inseparable from its constitution and procedure, whoever might be the parties under trial.

We are now considering the Athenian empire as it stood before the Peloponnesian war; before the increased exactions and the multiplied revolts, to which that war gave rise, — before the cruelties which accompanied the suppression of those revolts, and which so deeply stained the character of Athens, — before that aggravated fierceness, mistrust, contempt of obligation, and rapacious violence, which Thucydides so emphatically indicates as having been infused into the Greek bosom by the fever of an all-pervading contest.³ There had been before this time many revolts of the Athenian dependencies, from the earliest at Naxos down to the latest at Samos: all had been successfully suppressed, but in no case had Athens displayed the same unre-

¹ Xenophon, *Repub. Ath.* i, 17.

² Xenophon, *Repub. Ath.* i, 16. He states it as one of the advantageous consequences, which induced the Athenians to bring the suits and complaints of the allies to Athens for trial — that the prytaneia, or fees paid upon entering a cause for trial, became sufficiently large to furnish all the pay for the dikasts throughout the year.

But in another part of his treatise (iii, 2, 3), he represents the Athenian dikasteries as overloaded with judicial business, much more than they could possibly get through; inasmuch that there were long delays before causes could be brought on for trial.³ It could hardly be any great object, therefore, to multiply complaints artificially, in order to make fees for the dikasts.

³ See his well-known comments on the seditions at Korkyra, iii, 82, 83.

lenting rigor as we shall find hereafter manifested towards Mitylênê, Skiônê, and Mêlos. The policy of Periklês, now in the plenitude of his power at Athens, was cautious and conservative, averse to forced extension of empire as well as to those increased burdens on the dependent allies which such schemes would have entailed, and tending to maintain that assured commerce in the Ægean by which all of them must have been gainers, — not without a conviction that the contest must arise sooner or later between Athens and Sparta, and that the resources as well as the temper of the allies must be husbanded against that contingency. If we read in Thucydides the speech of the envoy from Mitylênê¹ at Olympia, delivered to the Lacedæmonians and their allies in the fourth year of the Peloponnesian war, on occasion of the revolt of the city from Athens, — a speech imploring aid and setting forth the strongest case against Athens which the facts could be made to furnish, — we shall be surprised how weak the case is, and how much the speaker is conscious of its weakness. He has nothing like practical grievances and oppressions to urge against the imperial city, — he does not dwell upon enormity of tribute, unpunished misconduct of Athenian officers, hardship of bringing causes for trial to Athens, or other sufferings of the subjects generally, — he has nothing to say except that they were defenceless and degraded subjects, and that Athens held authority over them without and against their own consent: and in the case of Mitylênê, not so much as this could be said, since she was on the footing of an equal, armed, and autonomous ally. Of course, this state of forced dependence was one which the allies, or such of them as could stand alone, would naturally and reasonably shake off whenever they had an opportunity:² but the negative evidence, derived from the speech of the Mitylenæan orator, goes far to make out the point contended for by the Athenian speaker at Sparta immediately before the war, — that, beyond the fact of such forced dependence, the allies had little practically to complain of. A city like Mitylênê, moreover,

Thucyd. iii, 11-14.

¹ So the Athenian orator Diodotus puts it in his speech deprecating the extreme punishment about to be inflicted on Mitylênê — *ἦν τινα ἐλεύθερον καὶ διὰ ἀρχαίαν εἰκότως πρὸς αὐτονομίαν ἀποστάντε χειρὶ νότωμεθα*, etc. (Thucyd. iii, 46.)

would be strong enough to protect itself and its own commerce without the help of Athens: but to the weaker allies, the breaking up of the Athenian empire would have greatly lessened the security both of individuals and of commerce, in the waters of the Ægean, and their freedom would thus have been purchased at the cost of considerable positive disadvantages.¹

¹ It is to be recollected that the Athenian empire was essentially a *government of dependencies*; Athens, as an imperial state, exercising authority over subordinate governments. To maintain beneficial relations between two governments, one supreme, the other subordinate, and to make the system work to the satisfaction of the people in the one as well as of the people in the other, has always been found a problem of great difficulty. Whoever reads the instructive volume of Mr. G. C. Lewis (*Essay on the Government of Dependencies*), and the number of instances of practical misgovernment in this matter which are set forth therein, will be inclined to think that the empire of Athens over her allies makes comparatively a creditable figure. It will, most certainly, stand full comparison with the government of England, over dependencies, in the last century; as illustrated by the history of Ireland, with the penal laws against the Catholics; by the Declaration of Independence, published in 1776, by the American colonies, setting forth the grounds of their separation; and by the pleadings of Mr. Burke against Warren Hastings.

A statement and legal trial alluded to by Mr. Lewis (p. 367), elucidates farther, two points not unimportant on the present occasion: 1. The illiberal and humiliating vein of sentiment which is apt to arise in citizens of the supreme government towards those of the subordinate. 2. The protection which English jury-trial, nevertheless, afforded to the citizens of the dependency against oppression by English officers.

"An action was brought, in the court of Common Pleas, in 1773, by Mr. Anthony Fabrigas, a native of Minorca, against General Mostyn, the governor of the island. The facts proved at the trial were, that Governor Mostyn had arrested the plaintiff, imprisoned him, and transported him to Spain, without any form of trial, on the ground that the plaintiff had presented to him a petition for redress of grievances, in a manner which he deemed improper. Mr. Justice Gould left it to the jury to say, whether the plaintiff's behavior was such as to afford a just conclusion that he was about to stir up sedition and mutiny in the garrison, or whether he meant no more than earnestly to press his suit and obtain a redress of grievances. If they thought the latter, the plaintiff was entitled to recover in the action. The jury gave a verdict for the plaintiff with £3,000 damages. In the following term, an application was made for a new trial, which was refused by the whole court.

"The following remarks of the counsel for Governor Mostyn, on this trial, contain a plain and native statement of the doctrine, that a dependency is to be governed, not for its own interest, but for that of the dominant state. 'Gentlemen

Nearly the whole of the Grecian world, putting aside Italian, Sicilian, and African Greeks, was at this time included either in the alliance of Lacedæmon or in that of Athens, so that the truce of thirty years insured a suspension of hostilities everywhere. Moreover, the Lacedæmonian confederates had determined by majority of votes to refuse the request of Samos for

of the jury,' said the counsel, 'it will be time for me now to take notice of another circumstance, notorious to all the gentlemen who have been settled in the island, that the natives of Minorca are but ill-affected to the English, and to the English government. It is not much to be wondered at. They are the descendants of Spaniards; and they consider Spain as the country to which they ought naturally to belong: it is not at all to be wondered at that they are indisposed to the English, whom they consider as their conquerors. — Of all the Minorquins in the island, the plaintiff perhaps stands singularly and eminently the most seditious, turbulent, and dissatisfied subject to the crown of Great Britain that is to be found in Minorca. Gentlemen, he is, or chooses to be called, the patriot of Minorca. Now patriotism is a very pretty thing among ourselves, and we owe much to it: we owe our liberties to it; but we should have but little to value, and we should have but little of what we now enjoy, were it not for our trade. And for the sake of our trade, it is not fit that we should encourage patriotism in Minorca; for it is there destructive of our trade, and there is an end to our trade in the Mediterranean, if it goes there. But here it is very well; for the body of the people in this country will have it: they have demanded it, — and in consequence of their demands, they have enjoyed liberties which they will transmit to their posterity, — and it is not in the power of this government to deprive them of it. But they will take care of all our conquests abroad. If that spirit prevailed in Minorca, the consequence would be the loss of that country, and of course of our Mediterranean trade. We should be sorry to set all our slaves free in our plantations.'

The prodigious sum of damages awarded by the jury, shows the strength of their sympathy with this Minorquin plaintiff against the English officer. I doubt not that the feeling of the dikastery at Athens was much of the same kind, and often quite as strong; sincerely disposed to protect the subject-allies against misconduct of Athenian trierarchs, or inspectors.

The feelings expressed in the speech above cited would also often find utterance from Athenian orators in the assembly; and it would not be difficult to produce parallel passages, in which these orators imply discontent on the part of the allies to be the natural state of things, such as Athens could not hope to escape. The speech here given shows that such feelings arise, almost inevitably, out of the uncomfortable relation of two governments, one supreme and the other subordinate. They are not the product of peculiar cruelty and oppression on the part of the Athenian democracy, as Mr. Mitford and so many others have sought to prove.

aid in her revolt against Athens: whereby it seemed established, as practical international law, that neither of these two great aggregate bodies should intermeddle with the other, and that each should restrain or punish its own disobedient members.¹ Of this refusal, which materially affected the course of events, the main advisers had been the Corinthians, in spite of that fear and dislike of Athens which prompted many of the allies to vote for war.² The position of the Corinthians was peculiar; for while Sparta and her other allies were chiefly land-powers, Corinth had been from early times maritime, commercial, and colonizing, — she had been indeed once the first naval power in Greece, along with Ægina; but either she had not increased it at all during the last forty years, or, if she had, her comparative naval importance had been entirely sunk by the gigantic expansion of Athens. The Corinthians had both commerce and colonies, — Leukas, Anaktorium, Ambrakia, Korkyra, etc., along or near the coast of Epirus: they had also their colony Potidaea, situated on the isthmus of Pallênê, in Thrace, and intimately connected with them: and the interest of their commerce made them extremely averse to any collision with the superior navy of the Athenians. It was this consideration which had induced them to resist the impulse of the Lacedæmonian allies towards war on behalf of Samos: for though their feelings, both of jealousy and hatred against Athens were even now strong,³ arising greatly out of the struggle a few years before for the acquisition of Megara to the Athenian alliance, — prudence indicated that, in a war against the first naval power in Greece, they were sure to be the greatest losers. So long as the policy of Corinth pointed towards peace, there was every probability that war would be avoided, or at least accepted only in a case of grave necessity, by the Lacedæmonian alliance. But a contingency, distant as well as unexpected, which occurred about five years

See the important passage already adverted to in a prior note.

Thucyd. i, 40. οὐδὲ γὰρ ἡμεῖς Σαμίων ἀποστατῶν ψήφον προσεδίμεθα, ἐναντίαν ὑμῖν, τῶν ἄλλων Πελοποννησίων διχα ἐψηφισμένων εἰ χρη αὐτοῖς ἔαρειν, φανερώς δὲ ἀντειπομεν τοὺς προσηκόντας ἐνυμμάχους εἶτόν τινα κολύζειν.

¹ Thucyd. i. 33

³ Thucyd. i, 42.

after the revolt of Samos, reversed all these chances, and not only extinguished the dispositions of Corinth towards peace, but even transformed her into the forward instigator of war.

Amidst the various colonies planted from Corinth along the coast of Epirus, the greater number acknowledged on her part an hegemony, or supremacy.¹ What extent of real power and interference this acknowledgment implied, in addition to the honorary dignity, we are not in a condition to say; but the Corinthians were popular, and had not carried their interference beyond the point which the colonists themselves found acceptable. To these amicable relations, however, the powerful Korkyra formed a glaring exception, having been generally at variance, sometimes in the most aggravated hostility, with its mother-city, and withholding from her even the accustomed tributes of honorary and filial respect. It was amidst such relations of habitual ill-will between Corinth and Korkyra, that a dispute grew up respecting the city of Epidamnus, known afterwards, in the Roman times, as Dyrrachium, hard by the modern Durazzo, — a colony founded by the Korkyræans on the coast of Illyria, in the Ionic gulf, considerably to the north of their own island. So strong was the sanctity of Grecian custom in respect to the foundation of colonies, that the Korkyræans, in spite of their enmity to Corinth, had been obliged to select the ækist, or founder-in-chief of Epidamnus, from that city, — a citizen of Herakleid descent, named Phalius, — along with whom there had also come some Corinthian settlers: so that Epidamnus, though a Korkyraean colony, was nevertheless a recognized granddaughter, if the expression may be allowed, of Corinth, the recollection of which was perpetuated by the solemnities periodically celebrated in honor of the ækist.²

Founded on the isthmus of an outlying peninsula on the sea-coast of the Illyrian Taulantii, Epidamnus was at first very prosperous, and acquired a considerable territory as well as a numerous population. But during the years immediately preceding the period which we have now reached, it had been exposed to great reverses: internal sedition between the oligarchy

¹ Thucyd. i, 38. ἡγεμονίης τε εἶναι καὶ τοῖς εἰκότα θάναται, οὐκ αἰσχύνην.

² Thucyd. i, 24, 25.

and the people, aggravated by attacks from the neighboring Illyrians, had crippled its power: and a recent revolution, in which the people put down the oligarchy, had reduced it still farther, — since the oligarchical exiles, collecting a force and allying themselves with the Illyrians, harassed the city grievously both by sea and land. The Epidamnian democracy was in such straits as to be forced to send to Korkyra for aid: their envoys sat down as suppliants at the temple of Hêrê, cast themselves on the mercy of the Korkyræans, and besought them to act both as mediators with the exiled oligarchy and as auxiliaries against the Illyrians. Though the Korkyræans themselves, democratically governed, might have been expected to sympathize with these suppliants and their prayers, yet their feeling was decidedly opposite: for it was the Epidamnian oligarchy who were principally connected with Korkyra, from whence their forefathers had emigrated, and where their family burial-places as well as their kinsmen were still to be found: while the demos, or small proprietors and tradesmen of Epidamnus, may perhaps have been of miscellaneous origin, and at any rate had no visible memorials of ancient lineage in the mother-island. Having been refused aid from Korkyra, and finding their distressed condition insupportable, the Epidamnians next thought of applying to Corinth: but as this was a step of questionable propriety, their envoys were directed first to take the opinion of the Delphian god. His oracle having given an unqualified sanction, they proceeded to Corinth with their mission; describing their distress as well as their unavailing application at Korkyra, — tendering Epidamnus to the Corinthians as to its arkists and chiefs, with the most urgent entreaties for immediate aid to preserve it from ruin, — and not omitting to insist on the divine sanction just obtained. It was found easy to persuade the Corinthians, who, looking upon Epidamnus as a joint colony from Corinth and Korkyra, thought themselves not only authorized, but bound, to undertake its defence, a resolution much prompted by their ancient feud against Korkyra. They speedily organized an expedition, consisting partly of intended new settlers, partly

¹ Thucyd. i. 26. ἤλθοι γὰρ ἐς τὴν Κόρινθον οἱ τῶν Ἐπιδαμνίων σὺν ἄλλοις τε ἀποδελκύντες καὶ ἐγγενεῖς ἐν προσηλῶσι καὶ ἰδοὺ τοὺς πόλιν κατὰ χεῖρα

of a protecting military force, — Corinthian, Leukadian, and Ambrakiôtic: which combined body, in order to avoid opposition from the powerful Korkyræan navy, was marched by land as far as Apollônia, and transported from thence by sea to Epidamnus.¹

The arrival of such a reinforcement rescued the city for the moment, but drew upon it a formidable increase of peril from the Korkyræans, who looked upon the interference of Corinth as an infringement of their rights, and resented it in the strongest manner. Their feelings were farther inflamed by the Epidamnian oligarchical exiles, who, coming to the island with petition for succor, and appeals to the tombs of their Korkyræan ancestors, found a ready sympathy. They were placed on board a fleet of twenty-five triremes, afterwards strengthened by a farther reinforcement, which was sent to Epidamnus with the insulting requisition that they should be forthwith restored, and the newcomers from Corinth dismissed. No attention being paid to these demands, the Korkyræans commenced the blockade of the city with forty ships, and with an auxiliary land-force of Illyrians, — making proclamation that any person within, citizen or not, might depart safely if he chose, but would be dealt with as an enemy if he remained. How many persons profited by this permission we do not know: but at least enough to convey to Corinth the news that their troops in Epidamnus were closely besieged. The Corinthians immediately hastened the equipment of a second expedition, — sufficient not only for the rescue of the place, but to surmount that resistance which the Korkyræans were sure to offer. In addition to thirty triremes, and three thousand hoplites, of their own, they solicited aid both in ships and money from many of their allies: eight ships fully manned were furnished by Megara, four by Palês, in the island of Kephallenia, five by Epidauros, two by Træzen, one by Hermionê, ten by Leukas, and eight by Ambrakia, — together with pecuniary contributions from Thebes, Phlius, and Elis. They farther proclaimed a public invitation for new settlers to Epidamnus, promising equal political rights to all; an option being allowed to any one who wished to become a settler without being ready

¹ Thucyd. i. 26.

to depart at once, to insure future admission by depositing the sum of fifty Corinthian drachmas. Though it might seem that the prospects of these new settlers were full of doubt and danger, such was the confidence entertained in the metropolitan protection of Corinth, that many were found as well to join the fleet, as to pay down the deposit for the liberty of future junction.

All these proceedings on the part of Corinth, though undertaken with intentional hostility towards Korkyra, had not been preceded by any formal proposition, such as was customary among Grecian states, — a harshness of dealing arising not merely from her hatred towards Korkyra, but also from the peculiar political position of that island, which stood alone and isolated, not enrolled either in the Athenian or in the Lacedæmonian alliance. The Korkyraans, well aware of the serious preparation now going on at Corinth, and of the union among so many cities against them, felt themselves hardly a match for it alone, in spite of their wealth and their formidable naval force of one hundred and twenty triremes, inferior only to that of Athens. They made an effort to avert the storm by peaceable means, prevailing upon some mediators from Sparta and Sikyon to accompany them to Corinth; where, while they required that the forces and settlers recently despatched to Epidamnus should be withdrawn, denying all right on the part of Corinth to interfere in that colony, — they at the same time offered, if the point were disputed, to refer it for arbitration either to some impartial Peloponnesian city, or to the Delphian oracle; such arbiter to determine to which of the two cities Epidamnus as a colony really belonged, and the decision to be obeyed by both. They solemnly deprecated recourse to arms, which, if persisted in, would drive them as a matter of necessity to seek new allies such as they would not willingly apply to. To this the Corinthians answered, that they could entertain no proposition until the Korkyraan besieging force was withdrawn from Epidamnus: whereupon the Korkyraans rejoined that they would withdraw it at once, provided the new settlers and the troops sent by Corinth were removed at the same time. Either there ought to be this reciprocal retirement, or the Korkyraans would acquiesce in

the *statu quo* on both sides, until the arbiters should have decided.¹

Although the Korkyraans had been unwarrantably harsh in rejecting the first supplication from Epidamnus, yet in their propositions made at Corinth, right and equity were on their side. But the Corinthians had gone too far, and assumed an attitude too decidedly aggressive, to admit of listening to arbitration, and accordingly, so soon as their armament was equipped, they set sail for Epidamnus, despatching a herald to declare war formally against the Korkyraans. As soon as the armament, consisting of seventy triremes, under Aristeus, Kallikratès, and Timanor, with two thousand five hundred hoplites, under Archemimus and Isarchidas, had reached Cape Aktium, at the mouth of the Ambrakian gulf, it was met by a Korkyraan herald in a little boat forbidding all further advance, — a summons of course unavailing, and quickly followed by the appearance of the Korkyraan fleet. Out of the one hundred and twenty triremes which constituted the naval establishment of the island, forty were engaged in the siege of Epidamnus, but all the remaining eighty were now brought into service; the older ships being specially repaired for the occasion. In the action which ensued, they gained a complete victory, destroying fifteen Corinthian ships, and taking a considerable number of prisoners. And on the very day of the victory, Epidamnus surrendered to their besieging fleet, under covenant that the Corinthians within it should be held as prisoners, and that the other new-comers should be sold as slaves. The Corinthians and their allies did not long keep the sea after their defeat, but retired home, while the Korkyraans remained undisputed masters of the neighboring sea. Having erected a trophy on Leukimmê, the adjoining promontory of their island, they proceeded, according to the melancholy practice of Grecian warfare, to kill all their prisoners, — except the Corinthians, who were carried home and detained as prizes of great value for purposes of negotiation. They next began to take vengeance on those allies of Corinth, who had lent assistance to the recent expedition: they ravaged the territory of Leukas, burned Kyllênê, the seaport of Elia,

¹ Thucyd. i, 28.

and inflicted so much damage that the Corinthians were compelled towards the end of the summer to send a second armament to Cape Aktium, for the defence of Leukas, Anaktorium, and Ambrakia. The Korkyræan fleet was again assembled near Cape Leukimmê, but no farther action took place, and at the approach of winter both armaments were disbanded.¹

Deeply were the Corinthians humiliated by their defeat at sea, together with the dispersion of the settlers whom they had brought together; and though their original project was frustrated by the loss of Epidamnus, they were only the more bent on complete revenge against their old enemy Korkyra. They employed themselves, for two entire years after the battle, in building new ships and providing an armament adequate to their purposes: and in particular, they sent round not only to the Peloponnesian seaports, but also to the islands under the empire of Athens, in order to take into their pay the best class of seamen. By such prolonged efforts, ninety well-manned Corinthian ships were ready to set sail in the third year after the battle: and the entire fleet, when reinforced by the allies, amounted to not less than one hundred and fifty sail: twenty-seven triremes from Ambrakia, twelve from Megara, ten from Elis, as many from Leukas, and one from Anaktorium. Each of these allied squadrons had officers of its own, while the Corinthian Xenokleides and four others were commanders-in-chief.²

But the elaborate preparations going on at Corinth were no secret to the Korkyræans, who well knew, besides, the numerous allies which that city could command, and her extensive influence throughout Greece. So formidable an attack was more than they could venture to brave, alone and unaided. They had never yet enrolled themselves among the allies either of Athens or of Lacedæmon: it had always been their pride and policy to maintain a separate line of action, which, by means of their wealth, their power, and their very peculiar position, they had hitherto been enabled to do with safety. That they had been able so to proceed with safety, however, was considered both by friends and enemies as a peculiarity belonging to their island; from whence we may draw an inference how little the islands in the

¹ Thucyd. i, 29, 30

² Thucyd. i, 31-46.

Ægean, now under the Athenian empire, would have been able to maintain any real independence, if that empire had been broken up. But though Korkyra had been secure in this policy of isolation up to the present moment, such had been the increase and consolidation of forces elsewhere throughout Greece, that even she could pursue it no longer. To apply for admission into the Lacedæmonian confederacy, wherein her immediate enemy exercised paramount influence, being out of the question, she had no choice except to seek alliance with Athens. That city had as yet no dependencies in the Ionic gulf; she was not of kindred lineage, nor had she had any previous amicable relations with the Dorian Korkyra. But if there was thus no previous fact or feeling to lay the foundation of alliance, neither was there anything to forbid it: for in the truce between Athens and Sparta, it had been expressly stipulated, that any city, not actually enrolled in the alliance of either, might join the one or the other at pleasure.¹ While the proposition of alliance was thus formally open either for acceptance or refusal, the time and circumstances under which it was to be made rendered it full of grave contingencies to all parties; and the Korkyræan envoys, who now for the first time visited Athens, for the purpose of making it, came thither with doubtful hopes of success, though to their island the question was one of life or death.

According to the modern theories of government, to declare war, to make peace, and to contract alliances, are functions proper to be intrusted to the executive government apart from the representative assembly. According to ancient ideas, these were precisely the topics most essential to submit for the decision of the full assembly of the people: and in point of fact they were so submitted, even under governments only partially democratical; much more, of course, under the complete democracy of Athens. The Korkyræan envoys, on reaching that city, would first open their business to the strategî, or generals of the state, who would appoint a day for them to be heard before the public assembly, with full notice beforehand to the citizens. The mission was no secret, for the Korkyræans had themselves intimated their intention at Corinth, at the time when they proposed reference

¹ Thucyd. i, 35-40.

of the quarrel to arbitration: and even without such notice, the political necessity of the step was obvious enough to make the Corinthians anticipate it. Lastly, their *proxeni* at Athens, Athenian citizens who watched over Corinthian interests, public and private, in confidential correspondence with that government, — and who, sometimes by appointment, sometimes as volunteers, discharged partly the functions of ambassadors in modern times, would communicate to them the arrival of the Korkyraean envoys. So that, on the day appointed for the latter to be heard before the public assembly, Corinthian envoys were also present to answer them and to oppose the granting of their prayer.

Thucydides has given in his history the speeches of both; that is, speeches of his own composition, but representing in all probability the substance of what was actually said, and of what he perhaps himself heard. Though pervaded throughout by the peculiar style and harsh structure of the historian, these speeches are yet among the plainest and most business-like in his whole work, bringing before us thoroughly the existing situation; which was one of doubt and difficulty, presenting reasons of considerable force on each of the opposite sides. The Korkyraeans, after lamenting their previous improvidence, which had induced them to defer seeking alliance until the hour of need arrived, presented themselves as claimants for the friendship of Athens, on the strongest grounds of common interest and reciprocal usefulness. Though their existing danger and want of Athenian support was now urgent, it had not been brought upon them in an unjust quarrel, or by disgraceful conduct: they had proposed to Corinth a fair arbitration respecting Epidamnus, and their application had been refused, — which showed where the right of the case lay; moreover, they were now exposed single-handed, not to Corinth alone, whom they had already vanquished, but to a formidable confederacy, organized under her auspices, including choice mariners hired even from the allies of Athens. In granting their prayer, Athens would, in the first place, neutralize this misemployment of her own mariners, and would, at the same time, confer an indelible obligation, protect the cause of right, and secure to herself a most important reinforcement. For, next to her own, the Korkyraean naval force was the most powerful in

Greece, and this was now placed within her reach: if, by declining the present offer, she permitted Korkyra to be overcome, that naval force would pass to the side of her enemies: for such were Corinth and the Peloponnesian alliance, — and such they would soon be openly declared. In the existing state of Greece, a collision between that alliance and Athens could not long be postponed: and it was with a view to this contingency that the Corinthians were now seeking to seize Korkyra along with her naval force.¹ The policy of Athens, therefore, imperiously called upon her to frustrate such a design, by now assisting the Korkyraeans. She was permitted to do this by the terms of the thirty years' truce: and although some might contend that, in the present critical conjuncture, acceptance of Korkyra was tantamount to a declaration of war with Corinth, yet the fact would falsify such predictions; for Athens would so strengthen herself that her enemies would be more than ever unwilling to attack her. She would not only render her naval force irresistibly powerful, but would become mistress of the communication between Sicily and Peloponnesus, and thus prevent the Sicilian Dorians from sending reinforcements to the Peloponnesians.²

To these representations on the part of the Korkyraeans, the Corinthian speakers made reply. They denounced the selfish and iniquitous policy pursued by Korkyra, not less in the matter of Epidamnus, than in all former time, — which was the real reason why she had ever been ashamed of honest allies. Above all things, she had always acted undutifully and wickedly towards Corinth, her mother-city, to whom she was bound by those ties of colonial allegiance which Grecian morality recognized, and

¹ Thucyd. i. 33. Τὸν Λακωνικὸν ποταμὸν τὴν ἐπιτορὴν πολέμειοντας, καὶ τὸν Κορινθίων δυνάμενοι παρ' αὐτοῖς καὶ τὴν ἐχθρὸν ὄντας καὶ προκαταλαμβάνοντας ἡμᾶς καὶ ἐς τὴν ἐπιτορὴν ἐπιχειροῦν, ἵνα μὴ τῷ κοινῷ εἴσῃ καὶ αὐτοὶ μὴ ἀλλ' ἑλθὼν σῶσιν, etc.

² Thucyd. i. 32-36.

The description given by Herodotus (vii, 168: compare Diodor. xi, 15), of the duplicity of the Korkyraeans when solicited to aid the Grecian cause at the time of the invasion of Xerxes, seems to imply that the unfavorable character of them, given by the Corinthians, coincided with the general impression throughout Greece.

Respecting the prosperity and insolence of the Korkyraeans, see Aristotle apud Zenob. Proverb. iv, 49.

which the other Corinthian colonies cheerfully obeyed.¹ Epidamnus was not a Korkyræan, but a Corinthian colony, and the Korkyræans, having committed wrong in besieging it, had proposed arbitration without being willing to withdraw their troops while arbitration was pending: they now impudently came to ask Athens to become accessory after the fact in such injustice. The provision of the thirty years' truce might seem indeed to allow Athens to receive them as allies: but that provision was not intended to permit the reception of cities already under the tie of colonial allegiance elsewhere, — still less the reception of cities engaged in an active and pending quarrel, where any countenance to one party in the quarrel was necessarily a declaration of war against the opposite. If either party had a right to involve the aid of Athens on this occasion, Corinth had a better right than Korkyra: for the latter had never had any transactions with the Athenians, while Corinth was not only still under covenant of amity with them, through the thirty years' truce, — but had also rendered material service to them by dissuading the Peloponnesian allies from assisting the revolted Samos. By such dissuasion, the Corinthians had upheld the principle of Grecian international law, that each alliance was entitled to punish its own refractory members: they now called upon Athens to respect this principle, by not interfering between Corinth and her colonial allies,² especially as the violation of it would recoil inconveniently upon Athens herself, with her numerous dependencies. As for the fear of an impending war

¹ Thucyd. i, 38. ἀποικὶαι δὲ ὅσας ἀφίστασιν τε διὰ πάντας καὶ τὴν πόλιν ἴσι, λέγοντες ὡς οὐκ ἐπὶ τῷ κακῷ πάσχειν ἐκπεμφθείησαν. ἡμεῖς δὲ οὐδ' αὐτοὶ φάμεν ἐπὶ τῷ ὑπὸ τούτων ὑβρίζεσθαι κατοικίσαι, ἀλλ' ἐπὶ τῷ ἡγεμόνες τε εἶναι καὶ τὰ εἰκότα θαυμάζεσθαι· αἱ γοῦν ἄλλαι ἀποικίαι τιμῶσιν ἡμᾶς, καὶ μάλιστα ὑπὸ ἀποίκων στεργόμενα.

This is a remarkable passage in illustration of the position of the metropolis in regard to her colony. The relation was such as to be comprised under the general word *hegemony*: superiority and right to command on the one side, inferiority with duty of reverence and obedience on the other, — limited in point of extent, though we do not know where the limit was placed, and varying probably in each individual case. The Corinthians sent annual magistrates to Potidaea, called Epidemiurgi (Thucyd. i, 56).

² Thucyd. i, 40. φανερώς δὲ ἀντιστοίχον τοὺς προσήκοντας ξυμμεχεῖν αὐτὸν τινα κολλάειν.

between the Peloponnesian alliance and Athens, such a contingency was as yet uncertain, — and might possibly never occur at all, if Athens dealt justly, and consented to conciliate Corinth on this critical occasion: but it would assuredly occur if she refused such conciliation, and the dangers thus entailed upon Athens would be far greater than the promised naval coöperation of Korkyra would compensate.¹

Such was the substance of the arguments urged by the contending envoys before the Athenian public assembly, in this momentous debate. For two days did the debate continue, the assembly being adjourned over to the morrow: so considerable was the number of speakers, and probably also the divergence of their views. Unluckily, Thucydides does not give us any of these Athenian discourses, — not even that of Periklēs, who determined the ultimate result. Epidamnus, with its disputed question of metropolitan right, occupied little of the attention of the Athenian assembly: but the Korkyræan naval force was indeed an immense item, since the question was, whether it should stand on their side or against them, — an item which nothing could counterbalance except the dangers of a Peloponnesian war. "Let us avoid this last calamity (was the opinion of many) even at the sacrifice of seeing Korkyra conquered, and all her ships and seamen in the service of the Peloponnesian league." "You will not really avoid it, even by that great sacrifice (was the reply of others): the generating causes of war are at work, — and it will infallibly come, whatever you may determine respecting Korkyra: avail yourselves of the present opening, instead of being driven ultimately to undertake the war at great comparative disadvantage." Of these two views, the former was at first decidedly preponderant in the assembly;² but they gradually came round to the latter, which was conformable to the steady conviction of Periklēs. It was, however, resolved to take

¹ Thucyd. i, 37-43.

² Thucyd. i, 44. Ἀθηναῖοι δὲ ἀκούσαντες ἀμφοτέρων, γενομένης καὶ δεκάκλησιος, τῇ μὲν προτέρᾳ οὐχ ἦσσαν τῶν Κορινθίων ἀπεδέξαντο τοὺς λόγους, ἐν δὲ τῇ ὑστεραίᾳ μετέγνωσαν, etc.

Οὐχ ἦσσαν, in the language of Thucydides, usually has the positive meaning of *more*.

a sort of middle course, so as to save Korkyra, and yet, if possible, to escape violation of the existing truce and the consequent Peloponnesian war. To comply with the request of the Korkyrans, by adopting them unreservedly as allies, would have laid the Athenians under the necessity of accompanying them in an attack of Corinth, if required, — which would have been a manifest infringement of the truce. Accordingly, nothing more was concluded than an alliance for purposes strictly defensive, to preserve Korkyra and her possessions in case they were attacked: nor was any greater force equipped to back this resolve than a squadron of ten triremes, under Lacedæmonius, son of Kimon. The smallness of this force would satisfy the Corinthians that no aggression was contemplated against their city, while it would save Korkyra from ruin, and would in fact feed the war so as to weaken and cripple the naval force of both parties,¹ — which was the best result that Athens could hope for. The instructions to Lacedæmonius and his two colleagues were express: not to engage in fight with the Corinthians unless they were actually approaching Korkyra, or some Korkyran possession, with a view to attack: but in that case to do his best on the defensive.

The great Corinthian armament of one hundred and fifty sail soon took its departure from the gulf, and reached a harbor on the coast of Epirus, at the cape called Cheimerium, nearly opposite to the southern extremity of Korkyra: they there established a naval station and camp, summoning to their aid a considerable force from the friendly Epirotic tribes in the neighborhood. The Korkyran fleet of one hundred and ten sail, under Meikiadês and two others, together with the ten Athenian ships, took station at one of the adjoining islands called Sybota, while the land force and one thousand Zakynthian hoplites were posted on the Korkyran Cape Leukimmê. Both sides prepared for battle: the Corinthians, taking on board three days' provisions, sailed by night from Cheimerium, and encountered in

¹ Thucyd. i. 44. Plutarch (Periklês, c. 29) ascribes the smallness of the squadron despatched under Lacedæmonius to a petty spite of Periklês against that commander, as the son of his old political antagonist, Kimon. From whomsoever he copied this statement, the motive assigned seems quite unworthy of credit.

the morning the Korkyran fleet advancing towards them, distributed into three squadrons, one under each of the three generals, and having the ten Athenian ships at the extreme right. Opposed to them were ranged the choice vessels of the Corinthians, occupying the left of their aggregate fleet: next came the various allies, with Megarians and Ambrakiots on the extreme right. Never before had two such numerous fleets, both Grecian, engaged in battle; but the tactics and manœuvring were not commensurate to the numbers. The decks were crowded with hoplites and bowmen, while the rowers below, on the Korkyran side at least, were in great part slaves: the ships, on both sides, being rowed forward so as to drive in direct impact, prow against prow, were grappled together, and a fierce hand-combat was then commenced between the troops on board of each, as if they were on land, — or rather, like boarding-parties: all upon the old-fashioned system of Grecian sea-fight, without any of those improvements which had been introduced into the Athenian navy during the last generation. In Athenian naval attack, the ship, the rowers, and the steersman, were of much greater importance than the armed troops on deck: by strength and exactness of rowing, by rapid and sudden change of direction, by feints calculated to deceive, the Athenian captain sought to drive the sharp beak of his vessel, not against the prow, but against the weaker and more vulnerable parts of his enemy, — side, oars, or stern. The ship thus became in the hands of her crew the real weapon of attack, which was first to disable the enemy and leave him unmanageable on the water: and not until this was done did the armed troops on deck begin their operations.¹ Lacedæmonius, with his ten armed ships, though forbidden by his instructions to share in the battle, lent as much aid as he could by taking station at the extremity of the line, and by making motions as if about

¹ Πελοποννησίου ἀπὸ πύρου — to turn the naval battle into a land-battle on shipboard, was a practice altogether repugnant to Athenian feeling, as we see remarked also in Thucyd. iv. 14: compare also vii. 61.

The Corinthian and Syracusan ships ultimately came to counteract the Athenian manœuvring by constructing their prows with increased solidity and strength, and forcing the Athenian vessel to a direct shock, which its weaker prow was unable to bear (Thucyd. vii. 36).

to attack; while his seamen had full leisure to contemplate what they would despise as the lubberly handling of the ships on both sides. All was confusion after the battle had been joined; the ships on both sides became entangled, the oars broken and unmanageable, orders could neither be heard nor obeyed, and the individual valor of the hoplites and bowmen on deck was the decisive point on which victory turned.

On the right wing of the Corinthians, the left of the Korkyræans was victorious; their twenty ships drove back the Ambrakiot allies of Corinth, and not only pursued them to the shore, but also landed and plundered the tents. Their rashness in thus keeping so long out of the battle proved incalculably mischievous, the rather as their total number was inferior: for their right wing, opposed to the best ships of Corinth, was after a hard struggle thoroughly beaten. Many of the ships were disabled, and the rest obliged to retreat as they could, — a retreat which the victorious ships on the other wing might have protected, had there been any effective discipline in the fleet, but which now was only imperfectly aided by the ten Athenian ships under Lacedæmonius. These Athenians, though at first they obeyed the instructions from home, in abstaining from actual blows, yet, — when the battle became doubtful, and still more, when the Corinthians were pressing their victory, — could no longer keep aloof, but attacked the pursuers in good earnest, and did much to save the defeated Korkyræans. As soon as the latter had been pursued as far as their own island, the victorious Corinthians returned to the scene of action, which was covered with disabled and water-logged ships, their own and their enemies, as well as with seamen, soldiers, and wounded men, either helpless aboard the wrecks, or keeping above water as well as they could, — among them many of their own citizens and allies, especially on their defeated right wing. Through these disabled vessels they sailed, not attempting to tow them off, but looking only to the crews aboard, and making some of them prisoners, but putting the greater number to death: some even of their own allies were thus slain, not being easily distinguishable. They then picked up their own dead bodies as well as they could, and transported them to Sybota, the nearest point of the coast of Epirus; after which they again mustered their fleet, and returned to resume

the attack against the Korkyræans on their own coast. The latter got together as many of their ships as were seaworthy, together with the small reserve which had remained in harbor, in order to prevent at any rate a landing on the coast: and the Athenian ships, now within the strict letter of their instructions, prepared to coöperate with full energy in the defence. It was already late in the afternoon: but the Corinthian fleet, though their paean had already been shouted for attack, were suddenly seen to back water instead of advancing; presently they headed round, and sailed directly away to the Epirotic coast. Nor did the Korkyræans comprehend the cause of this sudden retreat, until at length it was proclaimed that an unexpected relief of twenty fresh Athenian ships was approaching, under Glaukon and Andokidès, which the Corinthians had been the first to desery, and had even believed to be the forerunners of a larger fleet. It was already dark when these fresh ships reached Cape Leukimmè, having traversed the waters covered with wrecks and dead bodies; and at first the Korkyræans even mistook them for enemies. The reinforcement had been sent from Athens, probably after more accurate information of the comparative force of Corinth and Korkyra, under the impression that the original ten ships would prove inadequate for the purpose of defence, — an impression more than verified by the reality.

Though the twenty Athenian ships were not, as the Corinthians had imagined, the precursors of a larger fleet, they were found sufficient to change completely the face of affairs. In the preceding action, the Korkyræans had had seventy ships sunk or disabled, — the Corinthians only thirty, — so that the superiority of numbers was still on the side of the latter, who were, however, encumbered with the care of one thousand prisoners, eight hundred of them slaves, captured, not easy either to lodge or to guard in the narrow accommodations of an ancient trireme. Even apart from this embarrassment, the Corinthians were in no temper to hazard a second battle against thirty Athenian ships, in addition to the remaining Korkyræan: and when their enemies

¹ Thucyd. i. 51. διὰ τῶν νεκρῶν καὶ ναυαγίων προσκομισθεῖσαι κατέπλεον ἐν τῷ στρατόπεδον.

sailed across to offer them battle on the Epirotic coast, they not only refused it, but thought of nothing but immediate retreat, — with serious alarm lest the Athenians should now act aggressively, treating all amicable relations between Athens and Corinth as practically extinguished by the events of the day before. Having ranged their fleet in line, not far from shore, they tested the dispositions of the Athenian commanders by sending forward a little boat with a few men to address to them the following remonstrance, — the men carried no herald's staff (*we* should say, no flag of truce), and were therefore completely without protection against an enemy. "Ye act wrongfully, Athenians (they exclaimed), in beginning the war and violating the truce; for ye are using arms to oppose us in punishing our enemies. If it be really your intention to hinder us from sailing against Korkyra, or anywhere else that we choose, in breach of the truce, take first of all us who now address you, and deal with us as enemies." It was not the fault of the Korkyraeans that this last idea was not instantly realized: for such of them as were near enough to hear, instigated the Athenians by violent shouts to kill the men in the boat. But the latter, far from listening to such an appeal, dismissed them with the answer: "We neither begin the war nor break the truce, Peloponnesians; we have come simply to aid these Korkyraeans, our allies. If ye wish to sail anywhere else, we make no opposition: but if ye are about to sail against Korkyra, or any of her possessions, we shall use our best means to prevent you." Both the answer, and the treatment of the men in the boat, satisfied the Corinthians that their retreat would be unopposed, and they accordingly commenced it as soon as they could get ready, staying, however, to erect a trophy at Sybota, on the Epirotic coast, in commemoration of their advantage on the preceding day. In their voyage homeward, they surprised Anaktorium, at the mouth of the Ambrakiotic gulf, which they had hitherto possessed jointly with the Korkyraeans; planting in it a reinforcement of Corinthian settlers as guarantee for future fidelity. On reaching Corinth, the armament was disbanded, and the great majority of the prisoners taken — eight hundred slaves — were sold; but the remainder, two hundred and fifty in number, were detained and treated with peculiar kindness. Many of them were of the first and richest families of

the island, and the Corinthians designed to gain them over, so as to make them instruments for effecting a revolution in the island. The calamitous incidents arising from their return will appear in a future chapter.

Thus relieved from all danger, the Korkyraeans picked up the dead bodies and the wrecks which had floated during the night on to their island, and even found sufficient pretence to erect a trophy, chiefly in consequence of their partial success on the left wing. In truth, they had been only rescued from ruin by the unexpected coming of the last Athenian ships: but the last result was as triumphant to them as it was disastrous and humiliating to the Corinthians, who had incurred an immense cost, and taxed all their willing allies, only to leave their enemy stronger than she was before. From this time forward they considered the thirty years' truce as broken, and conceived a hatred, alike deadly and undisguised, against Athens; so that the latter gained nothing by the moderation of her admirals in sparing the Corinthian fleet off the coast of Epirus. An opportunity was not long wanting for the Corinthians to strike a blow at their enemy, through one of her wide-spread dependencies.

On the isthmus of that lesser peninsula called Pellênê, which forms the westernmost of the three prongs of the greater peninsula called Chalkidikê, between the Thermaic and the Strymonic gulfs, was situated the Dorian town of Potidæa, one of the tributary allies of Athens, but originally colonized from Corinth, and still maintaining a certain metropolitan allegiance towards the latter: insomuch that every year certain Corinthians were sent thither as magistrates, under the title of Epidemiurgi. On various points of the neighboring coast, also, there were several small towns belonging to the Chalkidians and Bottiæans, enrolled in like manner in the list of Athenian tributaries. The neighboring inland territory, Mygdonia and Chalkidikê,¹ was held by the Macedonian king Perdikkas, son of that Alexander who had

¹ See the geographical Commentary of Gatterer upon Thrace, embodied in Poppo, Prolegg. ad Thucyd. vol. ii, ch. 29.

The words *τὰ ἐπὶ Θράκης* — *τὰ ἐπὶ Θράκης χώρια* (Thucyd. ii, 29) denote generally the towns in Chalkidikê, — places in the direction or in the skirts of Thrace, rather than parts of Thrace itself.

taken part, fifty years before, in the expedition of Xerxes. These two princes appear gradually to have extended their dominions, after the ruin of Persian power in Thrace by the exertions of Athens, until at length they acquired all the territory between the rivers Axios and Strymon. Now Perdikkas had been for some time the friend and ally of Athens; but there were other Macedonian princes, his brother Philip and Derdas, holding independent principalities in the upper country,¹ apparently on the higher course of the Axios near the Pæonian tribes, with whom he was in a state of dispute. These princes having been accepted as the allies of Athens, Perdikkas from that time became her active enemy, and it was from his intrigues that all the difficulties of Athens on that coast took their first origin. The Athenian empire was much less complete and secure over the seaports on the mainland than over the islands:² for the former were always more or less dependent on any powerful land-neighbor, sometimes more dependent on him than upon the mistress of the sea; and we shall find Athens herself cultivating assiduously the favor of Sitalkes and other strong Thracian potentates, as an aid to her dominion over the seaports.³ Perdikkas immediately began to incite and aid the Chalkidians and Bottiæans to revolt from Athens, and the violent enmity against the latter, kindled in the bosoms of the Corinthians by the recent events at Korkyra, enabled him to extend the same projects to Potidæa. Not only did he send envoys to Corinth in order to

¹ Thucyd. i, 57; ii, 100.

² See two remarkable passages illustrating this difference, Thucyd. iv, 120-122.

³ Thucyd. ii, 29-98. Isokratēs has a remarkable passage on this subject in the beginning of Or. v, ad Philippum, sects. 5-7. After pointing out the imprudence of founding a colony on the skirts of the territory of a powerful potentate, and the excellent site which had been chosen for Kyrânê, as being near only to feeble tribes, — he goes so far as to say that the possession of Amphipolis would be injurious rather than beneficial to Athens, because it would render her dependent upon Philip, from his power of annoying her colonists, — just as she had been dependent before upon Medokus, the Thracian king, in consequence of her colonists in the Chersonese, — ἀναγκασθῆσμεθα τῇ αὐτῇ εὐνοίαν ἔχειν τοῖς σοῖς πρᾶγμασι διὰ τοῦς ἐνταῦθα (at Amphipolis) κατοικοῦντας, οἷον περ εἶχονεν Μηδόκῳ τῷ ἐν τῇ χερσονήσῳ γεωργοῦντας.

concert measures for provoking the revolt of Potidæa, but also to Sparta, instigating the Peloponnesian league to a general declaration of war against Athens.¹ And he farther prevailed on many of the Chalkidian inhabitants to abandon their separate small towns on the sea-coast, for the purpose of joint residence at Olynthus, which was several stadia from the sea. Thus that town, as well as the Chalkidian interest, became much strengthened, while Perdikkas farther assigned some territory near Lake Bolbê to contribute to the temporary maintenance of the concentrated population.

The Athenians were not ignorant both of his hostile preparations and of the dangers which awaited them from Corinth after the Korkyræan sea-fight; immediately after which they sent to take precautions against the revolt of Potidæa; requiring the inhabitants to take down their wall on the side of Pellênê, so as to leave the town open on the side of the peninsula, or on what may be called the seaside, and fortified only towards the mainland, — requiring them farther both to deliver hostages and to dismiss the annual magistrates who came to them from Corinth. An Athenian armament of thirty triremes and one thousand hoplites, under Archestratus and ten others, despatched to act against Perdikkas in the Thermaic gulf, was directed at the same time to enforce these requisitions against Potidæa, and to repress any dispositions to revolt among the neighboring Chalkidians. Immediately on receiving these requisitions, the Potidæans sent envoys both to Athens, for the purpose of evading and gaining time, — and to Sparta, in conjunction with Corinth, in order to determine a Lacedæmonian invasion of Attica, in the event of Potidæa being attacked by Athens. From the Spartan authorities they obtained a distinct affirmative promise, in spite of the thirty years' truce still subsisting: at Athens they had no success, and they accordingly openly revolted (seemingly about midsummer, 432 B.C.), at the same time that the armament under Archestratus sailed. The Chalkidians and Bottiæans revolted at the same time, at the express instigation of Corinth, accompanied by solemn oaths and promises of assistance.² Archestratus with his fleet, on reaching the Thermaic gulf, found them all in pro-

¹ Thucyd. i, 56-57.

² Thucyd. v, 30.

claimed enmity, but was obliged to confine himself to the attack of Perdikkas in Macedonia, not having numbers enough to admit of a division of his force. He accordingly laid siege to Therma, in coöperation with the Macedonian troops from the upper country, under Philip and the brothers of Derdas; after taking that place, he next proceeded to besiege Pydna. But it would probably have been wiser had he turned his whole force instantly to the blockade of Potidaea; for during the period of more than six weeks that he spent in the operations against Therma, the Corinthians conveyed to Potidaea a reinforcement of sixteen hundred hoplites and four hundred light-armed, partly their own citizens, partly Peloponnesians, hired for the occasion, — under Aristeus, son of Adeimantus, a man of such eminent popularity, both at Corinth and at Potidaea, that most of the soldiers volunteered on his personal account. Potidaea was thus put into a state of complete defence shortly after the news of its revolt reached Athens, and long before any second armament could be sent to attack it. A second armament, however, was speedily sent forth, — forty triremes and two thousand Athenian hoplites, under Kallias, son of Kalliades,¹ with four other commanders, — who, on reaching the Thermaic gulf, joined the former body at the siege of Pydna. After prosecuting the siege in vain for a short time, they found themselves obliged to patch up an accommodation on the best terms they could with Perdikkas, from the necessity of commencing immediate operations against Aristeus and Potidaea. They then quitted Macedonia, first crossing by sea from Pydna to the eastern coast of the Thermaic gulf, — next attacking, though without effect, the town of Berœa, — and then marching by land along the eastern coast of the gulf, in the direction of Potidaea. On the third day of easy march, they reached the seaport called Gigonus, near which they encamped.²

¹ Kallias was a young Athenian of noble family, who had paid the large sum of one hundred minæ to Zeno of Elea, the philosopher, for rhetorical, philosophical, and sophistical instruction (Plato, *Alkibiadês*, i. c. 31, p. 119).

² Thucyd. i. 61. The statement of Thucydides presents some geographical difficulties which the critics have not adequately estimated. Are we to assume as certain, that the *Berœa* here mentioned must be the Macedonian town of that name, afterwards so well known, distant from the sea westward one hundred and sixty stadia, or nearly twenty English miles (see

In spite of the convention concluded at Pydna, Perdikkas, whose character for faithlessness we shall have more than one

Tafel, *Historia Thessalonica*, p. 58), on a river which flows into the Haliakmon, and upon one of the lower ridges of Mount Bermius?

The words of Thucydides here are — "Ἐπεὶτα δὲ ξυμβαλὼν ποιησάμενοι καὶ ξυμμαχῶν ἀναγκῶν πρὸς τὸν Περδίκκαν, ὡς αὐτοὺς κατήπειγεν ἡ Ποτίδαια καὶ ἡ Ἀριστεὺς πρὸς τὸν πόλιν, ἀπανίστανται ἐκ τῆς Μακεδονίας, καὶ ἀεκόμενοι ἐν Βεροῖαν κεικίθην ἐπιστρέφοντες, καὶ πειράσαντες πρῶτον τοῦ χωρίου καὶ οὐχ ἔχοντες, ἐπανέγοντο κατὰ γῆν πρὸς τὴν Ποτίδαιαν — ἅμα δὲ νῆες παρέπλουν ἐξ ὁδοῦ κοντα."

The natural route from Pydna to Potidaea (observes Dr. Arnold in his note) lay along the coast; and Berœa was quite out of the way, at some distance to the westward, near the foot of the Bermian mountains. But the hope of surprising Berœa induced the Athenians to deviate from their direct line of march; then, after the failure of this treacherous attempt, they returned again to the sea-coast, and continued to follow it till they arrived at Gigonus.

I would remark upon this: 1. The words of Thucydides imply that Berœa was *not* in Macedonia, but *out* of it (see Poppo, *Proleg. ad Thucyd.* vol. ii. pp. 408–418). 2. He uses no expression which in the least implies that the attempt on Berœa on the part of the Athenians was *treacherous*, that is, contrary to the convention just concluded; though, had the fact been so, he would naturally have been led to notice it, seeing that the deliberate breach of the convention was the very first step which took place after it was concluded. 3. What can have induced the Athenians to leave their fleet and march near twenty miles inland to Mount Bermius and Berœa, to attack a Macedonian town which they could not possibly hold, — when they cannot even stay to continue the attack on Pydna, a position maritime, useful, and tenable, — in consequence of the pressing necessity of taking immediate measures against Potidaea? 4. If they were compelled by this latter necessity to patch up a peace on any terms with Perdikkas, would they immediately endanger this peace by going out of their way to attack one of his forts? Again, Thucydides says, "that, proceeding by slow land-marches, they reached Gigonus, and encamped on the third day." — κατ' ὀλίγον δὲ πρὸς τριταίῳ ἀφίκοντο ἐς Γίγωνον καὶ ἐστράτοπεδίσαντο. The computation of time must here be made either from Pydna or from Berœa; and the reader who examines the map will see that neither from the one nor the other — assuming the Berœa on Mount Bermius — would it be possible for an army to arrive at Gigonus on the third day, marching round the head of the gulf, with easy days' marches; the more so, as they would have to cross the rivers Lydias, Axius, and Echeidôrus, all not far from their mouths, — or, if these rivers could not be crossed, to get on board the fleet and reland on the other side.

This clear mark of time laid down by Thucydides, — even apart from

occasion to notice, was now again on the side of the Chalkidians, and sent two hundred horse to join them, under the command of

the objections which I have just urged in reference to Berœa on Mount Bermius, — made me doubt whether Dr. Arnold and the other commentators have correctly conceived the operations of the Athenian troops between Pydna and Gigônus. The *Berœa* which Thucydides means cannot be more distant from Gigônus, at any rate, than a third day's easy march, and therefore cannot be the Berœa on Mount Bermius. But there was another town named Berœa, either in Thrace or in Emathia, though we do not know its exact site (see Wassi ad Thucyd. i, 61; Steph. Byz. v, Βέρης; Tafel, Thessalonica, Index). This other Berœa, situated somewhere between Gigônus and Therma, and out of the limits of that Macedonia which Perdikkas governed, may probably be the place which Thucydides here indicates. The Athenians, raising the siege of Pydna, crossed the gulf on shipboard to Berœa, and after vainly trying to surprise that town, marched along by land to Gigônus. Whoever inspects the map will see that the Athenians would naturally employ their large fleet to transport the army by the short transit across the gulf from Pydna (see Livy, xlv, 10), and thus avoid the fatiguing land-march round the head of the gulf. Moreover, the language of Thucydides would seem to make the land-march begin at Berœa and not at Pydna, — ἀπανίστανται ἐκ τῆς Μακεδονίας, καὶ ἀφικόμενοι ἐς Βέρειαν κάκιστον ἐπιστρέψαντες, καὶ περὶ πάντας πρώτον τοῦ χωρίου καὶ οὐχ ἔλθοντες, ἐπορεύοντο κατὰ γῆν πρὸς Ποτιδαίαν — ἀμα δὲ νῆες παρέπλεον ἐβδόμηκοντα. Κατ' ὀλίγον δὲ προσιόντες τριταῖοι ἀφίκοντο ἐς Γίγονον καὶ ἐστρατοπεδεύσαντο. The change of tense between ἀπανίστανται and ἐπορεύοντο, — and the connection of the participle ἀφικόμενοι with the latter verb, — seems to divide the whole proceeding into two distinct parts; first, departure from Macedonia to Berœa, as it would seem, by sea. — next, a land-march from Berœa to Gigônus, of three short days.

This is the best account, as it strikes me, of a passage, the real difficulties of which are imperfectly noticed by the commentators.

The site of Gigônus cannot be exactly determined, since all that we know of the towns on the coast between Potidæa and Æneia, is derived from their enumerated names in Herodotus (vii, 123); nor can we be absolutely certain that he has enumerated them all in the exact order in which they were placed. But I think that both Col. Leake and Kiepert's map place Gigônus too far from Potidæa; for we see, from this passage of Thucydides, that it formed the camp from which the Athenian general went forth immediately to give battle to an enemy posted between Olynthus and Potidæa; and the Scholiast says of Gigônus, — οὐ πολὺ ἀπέχον Ποτιδαίας: and Stephan. Byz. Γίγωνες, πόλις Θράκης προσεχῆς τῇ Παλλήνῃ.

See Colonel Leake, Travels in Northern Greece, vol. iii, ch. xxxi, p. 452

Iolaus. Aristeus posted his Corinthians and Potidæans on the isthmus near Potidæa, providing a market without the walls, in order that they might not stray in quest of provisions: his position was on the side towards Olynthus, — which was about seven miles off, but within sight, and in a lofty and conspicuous situation. He here awaited the approach of the Athenians, calculating that the Chalkidians from Olynthus would, upon the hoisting of a given signal, assail them in the rear when they attacked him. But Kallias was strong enough to place in reserve his Macedonian cavalry and other allies as a check against Olynthus; while with his Athenians and the main force he marched to the isthmus and took position in front of Aristeus. In the battle which ensued, Aristeus and the chosen band of Corinthians immediately about him were completely successful, breaking the troops opposed to them, and pursuing for a considerable distance: but the remaining Potidæans and Peloponnesians were routed by the Athenians and driven within the walls. On returning from pursuit, Aristeus found the victorious Athenians between him and Potidæa, and was reduced to the alternative either of cutting his way through them into the latter town, or of making a retreating march to Olynthus. He chose the former as the least of two hazards, and forced his way through the flank of the Athenians,

That excellent observer calculates the march, from Berœa on Mount Bermius to Potidæa, as being one of four days, about twenty miles each day. Judging by the map, this seems lower than the reality; but admitting it to be correct, Thucydides would never describe such a march as κατ' ὀλίγον δὲ προσιόντες τριταῖοι ἀφίκοντο ἐς Γίγονον: it would be a march rather rapid and fatiguing, especially as it would include the passage of the rivers. Nor is it likely, from the description of this battle in Thucydides (i. 62), that Gigônus could be anything like a full day's march from Potidæa. According to his description, the Athenian army advanced by three very easy marches; then arriving at Gigônus, they encamp, being now near the enemy, who on their side are already encamped, expecting them, — προσδεχόμενοι τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ἐστρατοπεδεύοντο πρὸς Ὀλύνθου ἐν τῷ ἰσθμῷ: the imperfect tense indicates that they were already there at the time when the Athenians took camp at Gigônus; which would hardly be the case if the Athenians had come by three successive marches from Berœa on Mount Bermius.

I would add, that it is no more wonderful that there should be one Berœa in Thrace and another in Macedonia, than that there should be one Methone in Thrace and another in Macedonia (Steph. B. Μεθώνη).

wading into the sea in order to turn the extremity of the Potidæan wall, which reached entirely across the isthmus, with a mole running out at each end into the water: he effected this daring enterprise and saved his detachment, though not without considerable difficulty and some loss. Meanwhile, the auxiliaries from Olynthus, though they had begun their march on seeing the concerted signal, had been kept in check by the Macedonian horse, so that the Potidæans had been beaten and the signal again withdrawn, before they could make any effective diversion: nor did the cavalry on either side come into action. The defeated Potidæans and Corinthians, having the town immediately in their rear, lost only three hundred men, while the Athenians lost one hundred and fifty, together with the general Kallias.¹

The victory was, however, quite complete, and the Athenians, after having erected their trophy, and given up the enemy's dead for burial, immediately built their blockading wall across the isthmus, on the side of the mainland, so as to cut off Potidæa from all communication with Olynthus and the Chalkidians. To make the blockade complete, a second wall across the isthmus was necessary, on the other side towards Pallênê: but they had not force enough to detach a completely separate body for this purpose, until after some time they were joined by Phormio with sixteen hundred fresh hoplites from Athens. That general, landing at Aphytis, in the peninsula of Pallênê, marched slowly up to Potidæa, ravaging the territory in order to draw out the citizens to battle: but the challenge not being accepted, he undertook, and finished without obstruction, the blockading wall on the side of Pallênê, so that the town was now completely inclosed, and the harbor watched by the Athenian fleet. The wall once finished, a portion of the force sufficed to guard it, leaving Phormio at liberty to undertake aggressive operations against the Chalkidic and Bottiæan townships. The capture of Potidæa was now only a question of more or less time, and Aristæus, in order that the provisions might last longer, proposed to the citizens to choose a favorable wind, get on shipboard, and break out suddenly from the harbor, taking their chance of eluding the Athenian fleet, and leaving only five hundred defenders behind:

¹ Thucyd. i, 62, 63.

though he offered himself to be among those left behind, he could not determine the citizens to so bold an enterprise, and he therefore sallied forth in the way proposed with a small detachment, in order to try and procure relief from without, — especially some aid or diversion from Peloponnesus. But he was able to accomplish nothing beyond some partial warlike operations among the Chalkidians,¹ and a successful ambushade against the citizens of Sermylus, which did nothing for the relief of the blockaded town: it had, however, been so well-provisioned that it held out for two whole years, — a period full of important events elsewhere.

From these two contests between Athens and Corinth, first indirectly at Korkyra, next distinctly and avowedly at Potidæa, sprung those important movements in the Lacedæmonian alliance which will be recounted in the next chapter.

CHAPTER XLVIII.

FROM THE BLOCKADE OF POTIDÆA DOWN TO THE END OF THE FIRST YEAR OF THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR.

EVEN before the recent hostilities at Korkyra and Potidæa, it had been evident to reflecting Greeks that the continued observance of the thirty years' truce was very uncertain, and that the mingled hatred, fear, and admiration, which Athens inspired throughout Greece, would prompt Sparta and the Spartan confederacy to seize the first favorable opening for breaking down the Athenian power. That such was the disposition of Sparta, was well understood among the Athenian allies, however considerations of prudence and general slowness in resolving might postpone the moment of carrying it into effect. Accordingly, not only the Samians when they revolted had applied to the Spartan

¹ Thucyd. i, 65.

confederacy for aid, which they appear to have been prevented from obtaining chiefly by the pacific interests then animating the Corinthians, — but also the Lesbians had endeavored to open negotiations with Sparta for a similar purpose, though the authorities — to whom alone the proposition could have been communicated, since it remained secret and was never executed — had given them no encouragement.¹ The affairs of Athens had been administered under the ascendancy of Periklēs, without any view to extension of empire or encroachment upon others, though with constant view to the probabilities of war, and with anxiety to keep the city in a condition to meet it: but even the splendid internal ornaments, which Athens at that time acquired, were probably not without their effect in provoking jealousy on the part of other Greeks as to her ultimate views. The only known incident, wherein Athens had been brought into collision with a member of the Spartan confederacy prior to the Korkyræan dispute, was the decree passed in regard to Megara, — prohibiting the Megarians, on pain of death, from all trade or intercourse as well with Athens as with all ports within the Athenian empire. This prohibition was grounded on the alleged fact, that the Megarians had harbored runaway slaves from Athens, and had appropriated and cultivated portions of land upon the border; partly land, the property of the goddesses of Eleusis, — partly a strip of territory disputed between the two states, and therefore left by mutual understanding in common pasture without any permanent inclosure.² In reference to this latter point,

¹ Thucyd. iii, 2-13. This proposition of the Lesbians at Sparta must have been made before the collision between Athens and Corinth at Korkyra.

² Thucyd. i, 139. ἐπικαλοῦντες ἐπεμασίαν Μεγαρεῖσι τῆς γῆς τῆς ἑρᾶς καὶ τῆς ἀορίστου, etc. Plutarch, Periklēs, c. 30; Schol. ad Aristophan. Pac. 609.

I agree with Gölter that two distinct violations of right are here imputed to the Megarians: the one, that they had cultivated land, the property of the goddesses at Eleusis, — the other, that they had appropriated and cultivated the unsettled pasture land on the border. Dr. Arnold's note takes a different view, less correct, in my opinion: "The land on the frontier was consecrated to prevent it from being inclosed: in which case the boundaries might have been a subject of perpetual dispute between the two countries," etc. Compare Thucyd. v, 42, about the border territory round Panaktum.

the Athenian herald, Anthemokritus had been sent to Megara to remonstrate, but had been so rudely dealt with, that his death shortly afterwards was imputed as a crime to the Megarians.¹ We may well suppose that ever since the revolt of Megara, fourteen years before, which caused to Athens an irreparable mischief, the feeling prevalent between the two towns had been one of bitter enmity, manifesting itself in many ways, but so much exasperated by recent events as to provoke Athens to a signal revenge.² Exclusion from Athens and all the ports in her empire, comprising nearly every island and seaport in the Ægean, was so ruinous to the Megarians, that they loudly complained of it at Sparta, representing it as an infraction of the thirty years'

¹ Thucydides (i, 139), in assigning the reasons of this sentence of exclusion passed by Athens against the Megarians, mentions only the two allegations here noticed, — wrongful cultivation of territory, and reception of runaway slaves. He does not allude to the herald, Anthemokritus: still less does he notice that gossip of the day, which Aristophanēs and other comedians of this period turn to account in fastening the Peloponnesian war upon the personal sympathies of Periklēs, namely, that first, some young men of Athens stole away the courtesan, Simætha, from Megara: next, the Megarian youth revenged themselves by stealing away from Athens "two engaging courtezans," one of whom was the mistress of Periklēs; upon which the latter was so enraged that he proposed the sentence of exclusion against the Megarians (Aristoph. Acharn. 501-516; Plutarch, Periklēs, c. 30).

Such stories are chiefly valuable as they make us acquainted with the political scandal of the time. But the story of the herald, Anthemokritus, and his death, cannot be altogether rejected. Though Thucydides, not mentioning the fact, did not believe that the herald's death had really been occasioned by the Megarians: yet there probably was a popular belief at Athens to that effect, under the influence of which the deceased herald received a public burial near the Thriasian gate of Athens, leading to Eleusis: see Philippi Epistol. ad Athen. ap. Demosthen. p. 159, R.; Pausan. i, 36, 3; iii, 4, 2. The language of Plutarch (Periklēs, c. 30) is probably literally correct, — "the herald's death appeared to have been caused by the Megarians," — αἰτία τῶν Μεγαρέων ἀποθανεῖν ἔδοξε. That neither Thucydides, nor Periklēs himself, believed that the Megarians had really caused his death, is pretty certain: otherwise, the fact would have been urged when the Lacedæmonians sent to complain of the sentence of exclusion, — being a deed so notoriously repugnant to all Grecian feeling.

² Thucyd. i, 67. Μεγαροῖς, δηλοῦντες μὲν καὶ ἑτεραὶ οὐκ ὀλίγα διαφύλαττα δὲ, καὶ μάλιστα τὴν εἰρησύναν τῶν ἐν τῇ Ἀθηναίων ἀρχῇ, etc.

truce; though it was undoubtedly within the legitimate right of Athens to enforce, — and was even less harsh than the systematic expulsion of foreigners by Sparta, with which Perikles compared it.

These complaints found increased attention after the war of Korkyra and the blockade of Potidæa by the Athenians. The sentiments of the Corinthians towards Athens had now become angry and warlike in the highest degree: nor was it simply resentment for the past which animated them, but also the anxiety farther to bring upon Athens so strong a hostile pressure as should preserve Potidæa and its garrison from capture. Accordingly, they lost no time in endeavoring to rouse the feelings of the Spartans against Athens, and in inducing them to invite to Sparta all such of the confederates as had any grievances against that city. Not merely the Megarians but several other confederates, appeared there as accusers; while the Æginetans, though their insular position made it perilous for them to appear, made themselves vehemently heard through the mouths of others, complaining that Athens withheld from them that autonomy to which they were entitled under the truce.¹

According to the Lacedæmonian practice, it was necessary first that the Spartans themselves, apart from their allies, should de-

¹ Thucyd. i. 67. *ἄλλοις δὲ κῆρυ ἀνταγορεύει κατὰ τὰς σπονδὰς.* O. Müller (Æginet. p. 180) and Gölter in his note, think that the *truce* (or *covenant* generally) here alluded to is, not the thirty years' truce, concluded fourteen years before the period actually present, but the ancient alliance against the Persians, solemnly ratified and continued after the victory of Platæa. Dr. Arnold, on the contrary, thinks that the thirty years' truce is alluded to, which the Æginetans interpreted (rightly or not) as entitling them to independence.

The former opinion might seem to be countenanced by the allusion to Ægina in the speech of the Thebans (iii. 64); but on the other hand, if we consult i. 115, it will appear possible that the wording of the thirty years' truce may have been general, as, — *Ἀποδοῦναι δὲ Ἀθηναίων ὅσα ἔχουσιν Πελοποννησίων*: at any rate, the Æginetans may have pretended that, by the same rule as Athens gave up Nisæa, Pegæ, etc., she ought also to renounce Ægina.

However, we must recollect that the one plea does not exclude the other: the Æginetans may have taken advantage of *both* in enforcing their prayer for interference. This seems to have been the idea of the Scholiast when he says — *κατὰ τὴν συνθήκην τῶν σπονδῶν.*

side whether there existed a sufficient case of wrong done by Athens against themselves or against Peloponnesus, — either in violation of the thirty years' truce, or in any other way. If the determination of Sparta herself were in the negative, the case would never even be submitted to the vote of the allies; but if it were in the affirmative, then the latter would be convoked to deliver their opinion also: and assuming that the majority of votes coincided with the previous decision of Sparta, the entire confederacy stood then pledged to the given line of policy, — if the majority was contrary, the Spartans would stand alone, or with such only of the confederates as concurred. Each allied city, great or small, had an equal right of suffrage. It thus appears that Sparta herself did not vote as a member of the confederacy, but separately and individually as leader, — and that the only question ever submitted to the allies was, whether they would or would not go along with her previous decision. Such was the course of proceeding now followed: the Corinthians, together with such other of the confederates as felt either aggrieved or alarmed by Athens, presented themselves before the public assembly of Spartan citizens, prepared to prove that the Athenians had broken the truce, and were going on in a course of wrong towards Peloponnesus.¹ Even in the oligarchy of Sparta, such a question as this could only be decided by a general assembly of Spartan citizens, qualified both by age, by regular contribution to the public mess, and by obedience to Spartan discipline. To the assembly so constituted the deputies of the various allied cities addressed themselves, each setting forth his case against Athens. The Corinthians chose to reserve themselves to the last, after the assembly had been previously inflamed by the previous speakers.

Of this important assembly, on which so much of the future fate of Greece turned, Thucydides has preserved an account unusually copious. First, the speech delivered by the Corinthian envoys. Next, that of some Athenian envoys, who happening to be at the same time in Sparta on some other matters, and being

¹ Thucyd. i. 67. *κατὰ δὲ τὴν ἐλθόντες τῶν Ἀθηναίων ὅτι σπονδὰς τε λελεικοῦσιν ἐν καὶ ἀδικοῦσιν τὴν Πελοπόννησον.* The change of tense in these two verbs is to be noticed.

present in the assembly so as to have heard the speeches both of the Corinthians and of the other complainants, obtained permission from the magistrates to address the assembly in their turn. Thirdly, the address of the Spartan king Archidamus, on the course of policy proper to be adopted by Sparta. Lastly, the brief, but eminently characteristic, address of the ephor Sthenelaidas, on putting the question for decision. These speeches, the composition of Thucydides himself, contain substantially the sentiments of the parties to whom they are ascribed: neither of them is distinctly a reply to that which has preceded, but each presents the situation of affairs from a different point of view.

The Corinthians knew well that the audience whom they were about to address had been favorably prepared for them, — for the Lacedæmonian authorities had already given an actual promise to them and to the Potidæans at the moment before Potidæa revolted, that they would invade Attica. So great was the revolution in sentiment of the Spartans, since they had declined lending aid to the much more powerful island of Lesbos, when it proposed to revolt, — a revolution occasioned by the altered interests and sentiments of Corinth. Nor were the Corinthians ignorant that their positive grounds of complaint against Athens, in respect of wrong or violation of the existing truce, were both few and feeble. Neither in the dispute about Potidæa nor about Korkyra, had Athens infringed the truce or wronged the Peloponnesian alliance. In both, she had come into collision with Corinth, singly and apart from the confederacy: she had a right, both according to the truce and according to the received maxims of international law, to lend defensive aid to the Korkyræans at their own request, — she had a right also, according to the principles laid down by the Corinthians themselves on occasion of the revolt of Samos, to restrain the Potidæans from revolting. She had committed nothing which could fairly be called an aggression: indeed the aggression, both in the case of Potidæa and in that of Korkyra, was decidedly on the side of the Corinthians: and the Peloponnesian confederacy could only be so far implicated as it was understood to be bound to espouse the separate quarrels, right or wrong, of Corinth. All this was well known to the Corinthian envoys: and accordingly we find that, in their speech

at Sparta, they touch but lightly, and in vague terms, on positive or recent wrongs. Even that which they do say completely justifies the proceedings of Athens about the affair of Korkyra, since they confess without hesitation the design of seizing the large Korkyræan navy for the use of the Peloponnesian alliance: while in respect of Potidæa, if we had only the speech of the Corinthian envoy before us without any other knowledge, we should have supposed it to be an independent state, not connected by any permanent bonds with Athens, — we should have supposed that the siege of Potidæa by Athens was an unprovoked aggression upon an autonomous ally of Corinth,¹ — we should never have imagined that Corinth had deliberately instigated and aided the revolt of the Chalkidians as well as of the Potidæans against Athens. It might be pretended that she had a right to do this, by virtue of her undefined metropolitan relations with Potidæa: but at any rate, the incident was not such as to afford any decent pretext for charge against the Athenians, either of outrage towards Corinth,² or of wrongful aggression against the Peloponnesian confederacy.

To dwell much upon specific allegations of wrong, would not have suited the purpose of the Corinthian envoy; for against such, the thirty years' truce expressly provided that recourse should be had to amicable arbitration, — to which recourse he never once alludes. He knew that, as between Corinth and Athens, war had already begun at Potidæa; and his business, throughout nearly all of a very emphatic speech is, to show that the Peloponnesian confederacy, and especially Sparta, is bound to take instant part in it, not less by prudence than by duty. He employs the most animated language to depict the ambition, the unwearied activity, the personal effort abroad as well as at home, the quick resolves, the sanguine hopes never dashed by failure, — of Athens; as contrasted with the cautious, home-keeping, indolent, scrupulous routine of Sparta. He reproaches the

¹ Thucyd. i. 68. οὐ γὰρ ἂν Κέρκυραν τε ὑπολαβόντες βίᾳ ἡμῶν εἶχον, αἰεὶ Ποτιδαίαν ἐπολιόρουν, ὧν τὸ μὲν ἐπικαιρότατον χώριον πρὸς τὰ ἐπὶ Θράκης ἀποχρῆσθαι, ἡ δὲ ναυτικὴν ἂν μέγιστον παρέσχε Πελοποννησίοις.

² Thucyd. i. 68. ἐν οἷς προσήκει ἡμᾶς οὐχ ἥκιστα εἰπεῖν, ὅσῳ καὶ μέγιστον ἡγκλήματα ἔχομεν, ὑπὸ τῶν Ἀθηναίων ὑβριζόμενοι, ὑπὸ δὲ ὑμῶν ἀμελούμενοι.

Spartans with their backwardness and timidity, in not having repressed the growth of Athens before she reached this formidable height, — especially in having allowed her to fortify her city after the retreat of Xerxes, and afterwards to build the long walls from the city to the sea.¹ The Spartans, he observes, stood alone among all Greeks, in the notable system of keeping down an enemy not by acting, but delaying to act, — not arresting his growth, but putting him down when his force was doubled. Falsely, indeed, had they acquired the reputation of being sure, when they were in reality merely slow : in resisting Xerxes, as in resisting Athens, they had always been behindhand, disappointing and leaving their friends to ruin, — while both these enemies had only failed of complete success through their own mistakes.

After half apologizing for the tartness of these reproofs, — which, however, as the Spartans were now well-disposed to go to war forthwith, would be well-timed and even agreeable, — the Corinthian orator vindicates the necessity of plain-speaking by the urgent peril of the emergency, and the formidable character of the enemy who threatened them. “ You do not reflect (he says) how thoroughly different the Athenians are from yourselves. *They* are innovators by nature ; sharp both in devising, and in executing what they have determined : *you* are sharp only in keeping what you have got, in determining on nothing beyond, and in doing even less than absolute necessity requires.² *They* again dare beyond their means, run risks beyond their own judgment, and keep alive their hopes even in desperate circumstances : *your*

¹ Thucyd. i. 69.

² Thucyd. i. 69. ὅτι οὐ γὰρ οἱ Ἕλληνες, ὡς Λακεδαιμόνιοι, οὐ τῇ δουλείᾳ τῶν ἄλλων τῇ ἀεὶ ἐπὶ τὴν ἀντιπαράθεσιν καὶ μόνον οὐκ ἀρχομένην τὴν αἰτίαν τῶν ἐχθρῶν, ἀπλοῦς καὶ διὰ, καταλόγου. Καὶ τοὶ Ἕλληες ἀσφαλεῖς εἶναι, ὡς ἂν ὁ λόγος τοῦ ἐργον ἐκράτει· τὸν τε γὰρ Μήδων, etc.

³ Thucyd. i. 70. Οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἐκαστοὶ καὶ ἐπιχειροῦσιν ὅξεις καὶ ἐπιτελέσαι ἐργῶν ὅς ἂν γνῶσιν· ἡμεῖς δὲ τοῖς ἐπιχειροῦσιν τε σωζόμεναι καὶ ἐργῶν οὐδὲ τὰναγκαῖα ἐξιστάμεναι.

The meaning of the word *ὅξεις* — sharp — when applied to the latter half of the sentence, is in the nature of a sarcasm. But this is suitable to the character of the speech. Goller supposes some such word as *καυελ* instead of *ὅξεις*, to be understood : but we should thereby both depart from the more obvious syntax, and weaken the general meaning.

peculiarity is, that your performance comes short of your power, — you have no faith even in what your judgment guarantees, — when in difficulties, you despair of all escape. *They* never hang back, — *you* are habitual laggards : they love foreign service, — you cannot stir from home : for they are always under the belief that their movements will lead to some farther gain, while you fancy that new projects will endanger what you have already. When successful, they make the greatest forward march ; when defeated, they fall back the least. Moreover, they task their bodies on behalf of their city as if they were the bodies of others, — while their minds are most of all their own, for exertion in her service.¹ When their plans for acquisition do not come successfully out, they feel like men robbed of what belongs to them : yet the acquisitions when realized appear like trifles compared with what remains to be acquired. If they sometimes fail in an attempt, new hopes arise in some other direction to supply the want : for with them alone the possession and the hope of what they aim at is almost simultaneous, from their habit of quickly executing all that they have once resolved. And in this manner do they toil throughout all their lives amidst hardship and peril, disregarding present enjoyment in the continual thirst for increase, — knowing no other festival recreation except the performance of active duty, — and deeming inactive repose a worse condition than fatiguing occupation. To speak the truth in two words : such is their inborn temper, that they will neither remain at rest themselves, nor allow rest to others.²

“ Such is the city which stands opposed to you, Lacedæmonians, — yet ye still hang back from action. . . . Your continual scruples and apathy would hardly be safe, even if ye had neigh-

¹ Thucyd. i. 70. ἐπὶ δὲ τοῖς μὲν σωμασιν ἀλλοτριωτάτοις ὑπὲρ τῆς πόλεως χαίρουσι, τῇ γὰρ αὐτῇ οἰκιστάτῃ ἐς τὸ πρῶτον ἐπὶ αὐτῇ.

It is difficult to convey, in translation, the antithesis between ἀλλοτριωτάτοις and οἰκιστάτῃ — not without a certain conceit, which Thucydides is occasionally fond of.

² Thucyd. i. c. καὶ τὰτα μετὰ πόνων πάντα καὶ κινδύνων δὲ ὅλοι τοῦ σώματος μοχθήσει, καὶ ἀπολαύουσιν ἐλαχίστα τῶν ἐπαρχόντων, διὰ τὸ αἰεὶ ἐκτάσθαι καὶ μήτε ἑρπην ἄλλο τι ἡγήσασθαι ἢ τοῦ δεινὰ πράξαι, ξυμφορὰν δὲ οὐχ ἥσσον ἡσυχίαν ἀπαραμύονα ἢ ἀσχολίαν ἐπιπόνον· ὥστε εἰ τις αὐτοὺς ξυνελὼν φαίη περνεῖν ἐπὶ τῷ μῆτε αὐτοὺς ἔχειν ἡσυχίαν μῆτε τοὺς ἄλλους ἀνθρώπους ἴην ὅπως ἂν εἴποι.

bors like yourselves in character: but as to dealings with Athens, your system is antiquated and out of date. In politics as in art, it is the modern improvements which are sure to come out victorious: and though unchanged institutions are best, if a city be not called upon to act,—yet multiplicity of active obligations requires multiplicity and novelty of contrivance.¹ It is through these numerous trials that the means of Athens have acquired so much more new development than yours."

The Corinthians concluded by saying, that if, after so many previous warnings, now repeated for the last time, Sparta still refused to protect her allies against Athens,—if she delayed to perform her promise made to the Potidæans, of immediately invading Attica,—they, the Corinthians, would forthwith look for safety in some new alliance, and they felt themselves fully justified in doing so. They admonished her to look well to the case, and to carry forward Peloponnesus with undiminished dignity as it had been transmitted to her from her predecessors.²

Such was the memorable picture of Athens and her citizens, as exhibited by her fiercest enemy, before the public assembly at Sparta. It was calculated to impress the assembly, not by appeal to recent or particular misdeeds, but by the general system of unprincipled and endless aggression which was imputed to Athens during the past,—and by the certainty held out that the same system, unless put down by measures of decisive hostility, would be pushed still farther in future to the utter ruin of Peloponnesus. And to this point did the Athenian envoy—staying in Sparta about some other negotiation, and now present in the assembly—address himself in reply, after having asked and obtained permission from the magistrates. The empire of Athens was now of such standing that the younger men present had no personal knowledge of the circumstances under which it had grown up: and what was needed as information for them would be impressive as a reminder even to their seniors.³

¹ Thucyd. i, 71. ἀρχαιοτρόπα ἡμῶν τὰ ἐπιτηδεύματα πρὸς αὐτοῖς ἔστιν. Ἄνάγκη δ', ὥσπερ τέχνης, αἰεὶ τὰ ἐπιγιγνόμενα κρατεῖν· καὶ ἡσυχάζουσιν μὲν πόλεις τὰ ἀκίνητα νόμιμα ἀριστερά, πρὸς πολλὰ δὲ ἀναγκαζομένοις ἰέναι, πολλὰ καὶ τῆς ἐπιτεχνήσεως δεῖ.

² Thucyd. i, 72

³ Thucyd. i, 71

He began by disclaiming all intention of defending his native city against the charges of specific wrong or alleged infractions of the existing truce: this was no part of his mission, nor did he recognize Sparta as a competent judge in disputes between Athens and Corinth. But he nevertheless thought it his duty to vindicate Athens against the general character of injustice and aggression imputed to her, as well as to offer a solemn warning to the Spartans against the policy towards which they were obviously tending. He then proceeded to show that the empire of Athens had been honorably earned and amply deserved,—that it had been voluntarily ceded, and even pressed upon her,—and that she could not abdicate it without imperiling her own separate existence and security. Far from thinking that the circumstances under which it was acquired needed apology, he appealed to them with pride as a testimony of the genuine Hellenic patriotism of that city which the Spartan congress now seemed disposed to run down as an enemy.¹ He then dwelt upon the circumstances attending the Persian invasion, setting forth the superior forwardness and the unflinching endurance of Athens, in spite of ungenerous neglect from Sparta and the other Greeks,—the preponderance of her naval force in the entire armament,—the directing genius of her general Themistoklès, complimented even by Sparta herself,—and the title of Athens to rank on that memorable occasion as the principal saviour of Greece. This alone ought to save her empire from reproach: but this was not all,—for that empire had been tendered to her by the pressing instance of the allies, at a time when Sparta had proved herself both incompetent and unwilling to prosecute the war against Persia.² By simple exercise of the constraining force inseparable from her presidential obligations, and by the

¹ Thucyd. i. 73. ῥηθήσεται δὲ οὐ παρατήσειας μᾶλλον ἔνεκα ἢ μαρτυρίον, καὶ δηλώσειας πρὸς οἷαν ἡμῖν πόλιν μὴ εὖ βουλευομένοις ὁ ἄγων καταστήσεται.

² Thucyd. i. 75. Ἀρ' ἄξιον ἔσμεν, ὦ Λακεδαιμόνιοι, καὶ προθυμίας ἔνεκα τῆς εἰσεκαὶ γνώμης συνεισεως, ἀρχὴς γε ἧς ἔχομεν τοῖς Ἑλλήσι μὴ οὕτως ἀγαθὴν ἐπιφύοντως διακείσθαι; καὶ γὰρ αὐτὴν τήνδε ἐλάβομεν οὐ βιασάμενοι, ἀλλ' ὅμων μὲν οὐκ ἐθέλησαντων παραμείνα· πρὸς τὰ ὑπόλοιπα τοῦ βαρβάρου. ἡμῖν δὲ προσελθόντων τῶν συμμάχων, καὶ αὐτῶν δεηθέντων ἡγεμόνας καταστῆναι ἐξ αὐτοῦ δὲ τοῦ ἔργου κατηναγκάσθημεν τὸ πρῶτον προαγαγεῖν αὐτὴν ἐς τόδε· αἰετὰ μὲν ὑπὸ δέοντος, ἔπειτα δὲ καὶ τιμῆς ὕστερον καὶ ὠφελείας.

reduction of various allies who revolted, Athens had gradually become unpopular, while Sparta too had become her enemy instead of her friend. To relax her hold upon her allies would have been to make them the allies of Sparta against her; and thus the motive of fear was added to those of ambition and revenue, in inducing Athens to maintain her imperial dominion by force. In her position, no Grecian power either would or could have acted otherwise: no Grecian power, certainly not Sparta, would have acted with so much equity and moderation, or given so little ground of complaint to her subjects. Worse they *had* suffered, while under Persia; worse they *would* suffer, if they came under Sparta, who held her own allies under the thralldom of an oligarchical party in each city; and if they hated Athens, this was only because subjects always hated the *present* dominion, whatever that might be.¹

Having justified both the origin and the working of the Athenian empire, the envoy concluded by warning Sparta to consider calmly, without being hurried away by the passions and invectives of others, before she took a step from which there was no retreat, and which exposed the future to chances such as no man on either side could foresee. He called on her not to break the truce mutually sworn to, but to adjust all differences, as Athens was prepared to do, by the amicable arbitration which that truce provided. Should she begin war, the Athenians would follow her lead and resist her, calling to witness those gods under whose sanction the oaths were taken.²

The facts recounted in the preceding chapters will have shown, that the account given by the Athenian envoy at Sparta, of the origin and character of the empire exercised by his city, though doubtless the account of a partisan, is in substance correct and equitable; the envoys of Athens had not yet learned to take the tone which they assumed in the sixteenth and seventeenth years

¹ Thucyd. i. 77.

² Thucyd. i. 78. ἡμεῖς δὲ ἐν οὐδεμίᾳ πᾶσι τοιαύτη ἀμάρτυα ὄντες, οὐτ' αὐτοὶ ὅτι ὑμᾶς ὁρῶντες, λέγομεν ὑμῖν, ἕως ἴτι ἀνδραγῆτος ἀμφοτέρους ἢ ἐξουλίᾳ, σπονδὰς μὴ λύειν μηδὲ παραβαίνειν τοὺς ὅρκους, τὰ δὲ διάφορα δίκῃ λύεσθαι κατὰ τὴν ξυνηγμένην· ἢ θεοὺς τοὺς ὅρκους μωρῶς ποιούμενοι, πειρᾶσθαι ἐθέλει μιννεσθαι πλείων ἀρχόντας ταύτην ἢ ἂν ἐγγράσσει.

of the coming war, at Melos and Kamarina. At any time previous to the affair of Korkyra, the topics insisted upon by the Athenian would probably have been profoundly listened to at Sparta. But now the mind of the Spartans was made up. Having cleared the assembly of all "strangers," and even all allies, they proceeded to discuss and determine the question among themselves. Most of their speakers held but one language,¹ — expatiating on the wrongs already done by Athens, and urging the necessity of instant war. There was, however, one voice, and that a commanding voice, raised against this conclusion: the ancient and respected king Archidamus opposed it.

The speech of Archidamus is that of a deliberate Spartan, who, setting aside both hatred to Athens and blind partiality to allies, looks at the question with a view to the interests and honor of Sparta only, — not, however, omitting her imperial as well as her separate character. The preceding native speakers, indignant against Athens, had probably appealed to Spartan pride, treating it as an intolerable disgrace that almost the entire land-force of Dorian Peloponnesus should be thus bullied by one single Ionic city, and should hesitate to commence a war which one invasion of Attica would probably terminate. As the Corinthians had tried to excite the Spartans by well-timed taunts and reproaches, so the subsequent speakers had aimed at the same objects by panegyric upon the well-known valor and discipline of the city. To all these arguments Archidamus set himself to reply. Invoking the experience of the elders his contemporaries around him, he impressed upon the assembly the grave responsibility, the uncertainties, difficulties, and perils, of the war into which they were hurrying without preparation.² He reminded them of the wealth, the population, greater than that of any other Grecian city, the naval force, the cavalry, the hoplites, the large foreign dominion of Athens, — and then asked by what means they proposed to put her down?³ Ships, they had

¹ Thucyd. i. 79. καὶ τῶν μὲν πλείονων ἐπὶ τὸ αὐτὸ αἰ γινώμαι ἐφίεον, ὁδῶν τε Ἀθηναίων ἤδη, καὶ πολέμητα εἶναι ἐν τάχει.

² Thucyd. i. 80.

³ Thucyd. i. 80. πῶς δὲ ἀνδρῶν, αἱ γὰρ τε ἰκταὶ ἰσχυραὶ καὶ κέραι· πόλεις.

few; trained seamen, yet fewer; wealth, next to none. They could indeed invade and ravage Attica, by their superior numbers and land-force: but the Athenians had possessions abroad sufficient to enable them to dispense with the produce of Attica, while their great navy would retaliate the like ravages upon Peloponnesus. To suppose that one or two devastating expeditions into Attica would bring the war to an end, would be a deplorable error: such proceedings would merely enrage the Athenians, without impairing their real strength, and the war would thus be prolonged, perhaps, for a whole generation.¹ Before they determined upon war, it was absolutely necessary to provide more efficient means for carrying it on; and to multiply their allies, not merely among the Greeks, but among foreigners also: while this was in process, envoys ought to be sent to Athens to remonstrate and obtain redress for the grievances of the allies. If the Athenians granted this, — which they very probably would do, when they saw the preparations going forward, and when the ruin of the highly-cultivated soil of Attica was held over them *in terrorem* without being actually consummated, — so much the better: if they refused, in the course of two or three years war might be commenced with some hopes of success. Archidamus reminded his countrymen that their allies would hold *them* responsible for the good or bad issue of what was now determined;² admonishing them, in the true spirit of a conservative Spartan, to cling to that cautious policy which had been ever the characteristic of the state, despising both taunts on their tardiness and panegyric on their valor. "We, Spartans, owe both our bravery and our prudence to our admirable public discipline: it makes us warlike, because the sense of shame is most closely connected with discipline, as valor is with the sense of shame: it makes us prudent, because our training keeps us too ignorant to set ourselves above our own institutions, and holds us

ἐμπειρότατοί εἰσι, καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἅπασιν ἄριστα ἐξήρτωνται, πλούτῳ τε ἰδίῳ καὶ δημοσίῳ καὶ ναυσὶ καὶ ἵπποις καὶ ὀπλοῖς, καὶ ὀχλῳ, ὅσος οὐκ ἐν ἄλλῳ ἐνί γε χωρίῳ Ἑλληνικῷ ἐστίν, ἐτι δὲ καὶ ξυμμαχούς πολλοὺς φόρου ὑποτελεῖς ἔχουσι, πῶς χρὴ πρὸς τοὺτους βρόδιῳ πόλεμον ἄρασθαι, καὶ τινι πιστεύσαντας ἀπαρσκειν εἰσιχθῆναι.

¹ Thucyd. i, 81. δέδοικα δὲ μᾶλλον μὴ καὶ τοῖς παισὶν αὐτὸν ὑπολίπωμεν, &c.

² Thucyd. i, 82, 83

under sharp restraint so as not to disobey them.¹ And thus, not being otherwise in unprofitable accomplishments, we Spartans are not given to disparage our enemy's strength in clever speech, and then meet him with short-comings in reality: we think that the capacity of neighboring states is much on a par, and that the chances in reserve for both parties are too uncertain to be discriminated beforehand by speech. We always make real preparations against our enemies, as if they were proceeding wisely on their side: we must count upon security through our own precautions, not upon the chance of their errors. Indeed, there is no great superiority in one man as compared with another: he is the stoutest who is trained in the severest trials. Let us, for our parts, not renounce this discipline, which we have received from our fathers, and which we still continue, to our very great profit: let us not hurry on, in one short hour, a resolution upon which depend so many lives, so much property, so many cities, and our own reputation besides. Let us take time to consider, since our

¹ Thucyd. i, 84. Πολεμικοὶ τε καὶ εὐβουλοὶ διὰ τὸ εὐκοσμον γιγνόμεθα, τὸ μὲν, ὅτι αἰδῶς σωφροσύνης πλεῖστον μετέχει, ἀσχύνης δὲ εὐψυχία· εὐβουλοὶ δὲ, ἀμεινότερον τῶν νόμων τῆς ὑπεροφίας παιδευόμενοι, καὶ ξὺν χαλεπότητι σωφρονέστερον ἢ ὥστε αὐτῶν ἀνηκουστεῖν· καὶ μὴ, τὰ ἀχρεῖα ξυνετοὶ ἄγαθόντες, τὰς τῶν πολέμιων παρασκευὰς λόγῳ καλῶς μεμφόμενοι, ἀνομοίως ἔργα ἐπιτελεῖν, νομίζοντες δὲ τὰς τε διανοίας τῶν πέλας παραπλησίους εἶναι, καὶ τὰς προσπιπτούσας τύχας οὐ λόγῳ διαμετᾶς.

In the construction of the last sentence, I follow Haack and Poppo, in preference to Götter and Dr. Arnold.

The wording of this part of the speech of Archidamus is awkward and obscure, though we make out pretty well the general sense. It deserves peculiar attention, as coming from a king of Sparta, personally, too, a man of superior judgment. The great points of the Spartan character are all brought out. 1. A narrow, strictly-defined, and uniform range of ideas. 2. Compression of all other impulses and desires, but an increased sensibility to their own public opinion. 3. Great habits of endurance as well as of submission.

The way in which the features of Spartan character are deduced from Spartan institutions, as well as the pride which Archidamus expresses in the ignorance and narrow mental range of his countrymen, are here remarkable. A similar championship of ignorance and narrow-mindedness is not only to be found among those who deride the literary and oratorical tastes of the Athenian democracy (see Aristophanes, Ran. 1070: compare Xenophon, Memorab. i, 2, 9-49), but also in the speech of Kleon (Thucyd. ii, 37).

strength puts it fully in our power to do so. Send envoys to the Athenians on the subject of Potidaea, and of the other grievances alleged by our allies, — and that too, the rather as they are ready to give us satisfaction: against one who offers satisfaction, custom forbids you to proceed, without some previous application, as if he were a proclaimed wrong-doer. But, at the same time, make preparation for war; such will be the course of policy at once the best for your own power and the most terror-striking to your enemies."¹

The speech of Archidamus was not only in itself full of plain reason and good sense, but delivered altogether from the point of view of a Spartan; appealing greatly to Spartan conservative feeling and even prejudice. But in spite of all this, and in spite of the personal esteem entertained for the speaker, the tide of feeling in the opposite direction was at that moment irresistible. Sthenelaidas — one of the five ephors, to whom it fell to put the question for voting — closed the debate; and his few words mark at once the character of the man, the temper of the assembly, and the simplicity of speech, though without the wisdom of judgment, for which Archidamus had taken credit to his countrymen.

• I don't understand (he said) these long speeches of the Athenians. They have praised themselves abundantly, but they have never rebutted what is laid to their charge, — that they are guilty of wrong against our allies and against Peloponnesus. Now, if in former days they were good men against the Persians, and are now evil-doers against us, they deserve double punishment, as having become evil-doers instead of good.² But *we* are the same now as we were then: we know better than to sit still while our allies are suffering wrong: we shall not adjourn our aid while they cannot adjourn their sufferings.³ Others have in

¹ Thucyd. i, 84, 85.

² Compare a similar sentiment in the speech of the Thebans against the Plataeans (Thucyd. iii, 67).

³ Thucyd. i, 86. ἡμεῖς δὲ οὕτοί καὶ τότε καὶ νῦν ἐσμέν, καὶ τοὺς θυμὰς ἔχοντες, ἃν σωφρονώμεν, οὐ περισφομεθα ἀδικουμένους, οὐδὲ μελλήσμε τιμωρεῖν· οἱ δὲ οὐκέτι μέλλοντες κακῶς πάσχειν.

There is here a play upon the word μέλλειν, which it is not easy to preserve in a translation.

abundance wealth, ships, and horses, — but *we* have good allies, whom we are not to abandon to the mercy of the Athenians: nor are we to trust our redress to arbitration and to words, when our wrongs are not confined to words. We must help them speedily and with all our strength. Nor let any one tell us that we can with honor deliberate when we are actually suffering wrong, — it is rather for those who intend to do the wrong, to deliberate well beforehand. Resolve upon war then, Lacedæmonians, in a manner worthy of Sparta: suffer not the Athenians to become greater than they are: let us not betray our allies to ruin, but march, with the aid of the gods, against the wrong-doers."

With these few words, so well calculated to defeat the prudential admonitions of Archidamus, Sthenelaidas put the question for the decision of the assembly, — which, at Sparta, was usually taken neither by show of hands nor by deposit of balls in an urn, but by cries analogous to the Aye or No of the English House of Commons, — the presiding ephor declaring which of the cries predominated. On this occasion the cry for war was manifestly the stronger: yet Sthenelaidas affected inability to determine which of the two cries was the louder, in order that he might have an excuse for bringing about a more impressive manifestation of sentiment and a stronger apparent majority, — since a portion of the minority would probably be afraid to show their real opinions as individuals openly. He accordingly directed a division, like the Speaker of the English House of Commons, when his decision in favor of aye or no is questioned by any member: "Such of you as think that the truce has been violated, and that the Athenians are doing us wrong, go to *that* side; such as think the contrary, to the other side." The assembly accordingly divided, and the majority was very great on the warlike side of the question.

The first step of the Lacedæmonians, after coming to this important decision was, to send to Delphi and inquire of the oracle whether it would be beneficial to them to undertake the war: the answer brought back (Thucydides seems hardly certain that

¹ Thucyd. i, 87. βουλήμενος αὐτοὺς φανερώς ἀποδείκνυνμένους· ἣν γνώμη ἐκ τῆς πολέμειν μᾶλλον ὀρμήσαι, etc.

it was really given¹) was, — that if they did their best they would be victorious, and that the god would help them, invoked or uninvoked. They at the same time convened a general congress of their allies at Sparta, for the purpose of submitting their recent resolution to the vote of all.

To the Corinthians, in their anxiety for the relief of Potidæa, the decision of this congress was not less important than that which the Spartans had just taken separately: and they sent round envoys to each of the allies, entreating them to authorize war without reserve. Through such instigations, acting upon the general impulse then prevalent, the congress came together in a temper decidedly warlike: most of the speakers were full of invective against Athens, and impatient for action, while the Corinthians, waiting as before to speak the last, wound up the discussion by a speech well calculated to insure a hearty vote. Their former speech had been directed to shame, exasperate, and alarm the Lacedæmonians: this point had now been carried, and they had to enforce, upon the allies generally, the dishonor as well as the impolicy of receding from a willing leader. The cause was one in which all were interested, the inland states not less than the maritime, for both would find themselves ultimately victims of the encroaching despot city: whatever efforts were necessary for the war, ought cheerfully to be made, since it was only through war that they could arrive at a secure and honorable peace. There were good hopes that this might soon be attained, and that the war would not last long, — so decided was the superiority of the confederacy, in numbers, in military skill, and in the equal heart and obedience of all its members.² The

¹ Thucyd. i, 118. ὁ δὲ ἀνείλεν αὐτοῖς, ὡς λέγεται, etc.

² Thucyd. i, 120, 121. Κατὰ πολλὰ δὲ ἡμῖς εἰκὸς ἐπικρατῆσαι, πρῶτον μὲν πλήθει προύχοντος καὶ ἐμπειρίας πολεμικῆς, ἔπειτα ὁμοίως πάντας ἐν τῷ παραγγελλόμενῳ ἰόντας.

I conceive that the word ὁμοίως here alludes to the equal interest of all the confederates in the quarrel, as opposed to the Athenian power, which was composed partly of constrained subjects, partly of hired mercenaries: to both of which points, as weaknesses in the enemy, the Corinthian orator goes on to allude. The word ὁμοίως here designates the same fact as Periklēs, in his speech at Athens (i, 141), mentions under the words πάντες ἰσόψηφοι: the Corinthian orator treats it as an advantage to have all con-

naval superiority of Athens depended chiefly upon hired seamen, — and the confederacy, by borrowing from the treasuries of Delphi and Olympia, would soon be able to overbid her, take into pay her best mariners, and equal her equipment at sea: they would excite revolt among her allies, and establish a permanent fortified post for the ruin of Attica. To make up a common fund for this purpose, was indispensably necessary; for Athens was far more than a match for each of them single-handed, and nothing less than hearty union could save them all from successive enslavement, — the very supposition of which was intolerable to Peloponnesian freemen, whose fathers had liberated Greece from the Persian. Let them not shrink from endurance and sacrifice in such a cause, — it was their hereditary pride to purchase success by laborious effort. The Delphian god had promised them his coöperation; and the whole of Greece would sympathize in the cause, either from fear of the despotism of Athens, or from hopes of profit. They would not be the first to break the truce, for the Athenians had already broken it, as the declaration of the Delphian god distinctly implied. Let them lose no time in sending aid to the Potidæans, a Dorian population now besieged by Ionians, as well as to those other Greeks whom Athens had enslaved. Every day the necessity for effort was becoming stronger, and the longer it was delayed, the more painful it would be when it came. "Be ye persuaded then, (concluded the orator), that this city, which has constituted herself despot of Greece, has her position against all of us alike, some for present rule, others for future conquest: let us assail and subdue her, that we may dwell securely ourselves hereafter, and may emancipate those Greeks who are now in slavery."¹

If there were any speeches delivered at this congress in opposition to the war, they were not likely to be successful in a cause wherein even Archidamus had failed. After the Corinthian had

federates equal and hearty in the cause: Periklēs, on the contrary, looking at the same fact from the Athenian point of view, considers it as a disadvantage, since it prevented unity of command and determination.

Poppo's view of this passage seems to me erroneous.

The same idea is reproduced, c. 124. εἰπερ βεβαίωταρον τὸ ταῦτα ἐνυμέροντα καὶ πόλεσι καὶ ἰδιώταις εἶναι, etc.

¹ Thucyd. i 123, 124.

concluded, the question was put to the deputies of every city, great and small, indiscriminately and the majority decided for war.¹ This important resolution was adopted about the end of 432 B.C., or the beginning of January 431 B.C.: the previous decision of the Spartans separately may have been taken about two months earlier, in the preceding October or November 432 B.C.

Reviewing the conduct of the two great Grecian parties at this momentous juncture, with reference to existing treaties and positive grounds of complaint, it seems clear that Athens was in the right. She had done nothing which could fairly be called a violation of the thirty years' truce: and for such of her acts as were alleged to be such, she offered to submit them to that amicable arbitration which the truce itself prescribed. The Peloponnesian confederates were manifestly the aggressors in the contest; and if Sparta, usually so backward, now came forward in a spirit so decidedly opposite, we are to ascribe it partly to her standing fear and jealousy of Athens, partly to the pressure of her allies, especially of the Corinthians. Thucydides, recognizing these two as the grand determining motives, and indicating the alleged infractions of truce as simple occasions or pretexts, seems to consider the fear and hatred of Athens as having contributed more to determine Sparta than the urgency of her allies.² That the extraordinary aggrandizement of Athens, during the period immediately succeeding the Persian invasion, was well calculated to excite alarm and jealousy in Peloponnesus, is indisputable: but if we take Athens as she stood in 432 B.C., it deserves notice that she had neither made, nor, so far as we know, tried to make, a single new acquisition during the whole fourteen years which had elapsed since the conclusion of the thirty years' truce;³ —

¹ Thucyd. i. 125. καὶ τὸ πλῆθος ἐψηφίσαντο πόλεμιν. It seems that the decision was not absolutely unanimous.

² Thucyd. i. 88. 'Εψηφίσαντο δὲ οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι τὰς σπονδὰς λελίσθαι καὶ πόλεμιν εἶναι, οὐ τοσοῦτον τῶν συμμάχων πεισθέντες τοῖς λόγοις, ὅσον φοβούμενοι τοὺς Ἀθηναίους, μὴ ἔτι μείζον ἐκδηθῶσιν, ὁρῶντες αὐτοῖς τὰ πολλὰ τῆς Ἑλλάδος ἐποχείρια ἤδη ὄντα: compare also c. 23 and 118.

³ Plutarch's biography of Periklēs is very misleading, from its inattention to chronology, ascribing to an earlier time feelings and tendencies which

and, moreover, that that truce marked an epoch of signal humiliation and reduction of her power. The triumph which Sparta and the Peloponnesians then gained, though not sufficiently complete to remove all fear of Athens, was yet great enough to inspire them with the hope that a second combined effort would subdue her. This mixture of fear and hope was exactly the state of feeling out of which war was likely to grow, — and we see that even before the quarrel between Corinth and Korkyra, sagacious Greeks everywhere anticipated war as not far distant:¹ it was near breaking out even on occasion of the revolt of Samos,² and peace was then preserved partly by the commercial and nautical interests of Corinth, partly by the quiescence of Athens. But the quarrel of Corinth and Korkyra, which Sparta might have appeased beforehand had she thought it her interest to do so, — and the junction of Korkyra with Athens, — exhibited the latter as again in a career of aggrandizement, and thus again brought into play the warlike feelings of Sparta; while they converted Corinth from the advocate of peace into a clamorous organ of war. The revolt of Potidaea, — fomented by Corinth, and encouraged by Sparta in the form of a positive promise to invade

really belong to a later. Thus he represents (c. 20) the desire for acquiring possession of Sicily, and even of Carthage and the Tyrrhenian coast, as having become very popular at Athens even before the revolt of Megara and Eubœa, and before those other circumstances which preceded the thirty years' truce: and he gives much credit to Periklēs for having repressed such unmeasured aspirations. But ambitious hopes directed towards Sicily could not have sprung up in the Athenian mind until after the beginning of the Peloponnesian war. It was impossible that they could make any step in that direction until they had established their alliance with Korkyra, and this was only done in the year before the Peloponnesian war, — done too, even then, in a qualified manner, and with much reserve. At the first outbreak of the Peloponnesian war, the Athenians had nothing but fears, while the Peloponnesians had large hopes of aid, from the side of Sicily. While it is very true, therefore, that Periklēs was eminently useful in discouraging rash and distant enterprises of ambition generally, we cannot give him the credit of keeping down Athenian desires of acquisition in Sicily, or towards Carthage. — if, indeed, this latter ever was included in the catalogue of Athenian hopes, — for such desires were hardly known until after his death, in spite of the assertion again repeated by Plutarch, Alkibiadēs, c. 17.

¹ Thucyd. i. 33-36.

² Thucyd. i. 40, 41.

Attica, — was, in point of fact, the first distinct violation of the truce, and the initiatory measure of the Peloponnesian war: nor did the Spartan meeting, and the subsequent congress of allies at Sparta, serve any other purpose than to provide such formalities as were requisite to insure the concurrent and hearty action of numbers, and to clothe with imposing sanction a state of war already existing in reality, though yet unproclaimed. The sentiment in Peloponnesus at this moment was not the fear of Athens, but the hatred of Athens, — and the confident hope of subduing her. And indeed such confidence was justified by plausible grounds: men might well think that the Athenians would never endure the entire devastation of their highly cultivated soil, — or at least that they would certainly come forth to fight for it in the field, which was all that the Peloponnesians desired. Nothing except the unparalleled ascendancy and unshaken resolution of Perikles, induced the Athenians to persevere in a scheme of patient defence, and to trust to that naval superiority which the enemies of Athens, save and except the judicious Archidamus, had not yet learned fully to appreciate. Moreover, the confident hopes of the Peloponnesians were materially strengthened by the wide-spread sympathy in favor of their cause, proclaiming, as it did, the intended liberation of Greece from a despot city.¹

To Athens, on the other hand, the coming war presented itself in a very different aspect; holding out scarcely any hope of possible gain, and the certainty of prodigious loss and privation, — even granting, that, at this heavy cost, her independence and union at home, and her empire abroad, could be upheld. By Periklēs, and by the more long-sighted Athenians, the chance of unavoidable war was foreseen even before the Korkyraean dispute.² But Periklēs was only the first citizen in a democracy, esteemed, trusted, and listened to, more than any one else by the body of the citizens, but warmly opposed in most of his measures, under the free speech and latitude of individual action which reigned at Athens, — and even bitterly hated by many active political opponents. The formal determination of the Lacedæmonians, to declare war, must of course have been made known at Athens

¹ Thucyd. ii, 8.

² Thucyd. i, 45; Plutarch, Periklēs. c. 8.



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by those Athenian envoys, who had entered an unavailing protest against it in the Spartan assembly. No steps were taken by Sparta to carry this determination into effect until after the congress of allies and their pronounced confirmatory vote. Nor did the Spartans even then send any herald, or make any formal declaration. They despatched various propositions to Athens, not at all with a view of trying to obtain satisfaction, or of providing some escape from the probability of war; but with the contrary purpose, — of multiplying demands, and enlarging the grounds of quarrel.¹ Meanwhile, the deputies retiring home from the congress to their respective cities, carried with them the general resolution for immediate warlike preparations to be made, with as little delay as possible.²

The first requisition addressed by the Lacedæmonians to Athens was a political manœuvre aimed at Periklēs, their chief opponent in that city. His mother, Agaristē, belonged to the great family of the Alkmæonids, who were supposed to be under an inextinguishable hereditary taint, in consequence of the sacrilege committed by their ancestor Megaklēs, nearly two centuries before, in the slaughter of the Kylonian suppliants near the altar of the Venerable Goddesses.³ Ancient as this transaction was, it still had sufficient hold on the mind of the Athenians to serve as the basis of a political manœuvre: about seventy-seven years before, shortly after the expulsion of Hippias from Athens, it had been so employed by the Spartan king Kleomenēs, who at that time exacted from the Athenians a clearance of the ancient sacrilege, to be effected by the banishment of Kleisthenēs, the founder of the democracy, and his chief partisans. This demand, addressed by Kleomenēs to the Athenians, at the instance of Isagoras, the rival of Kleisthenēs,⁴ had been then obeyed, and had served well the purposes of those who sent it; a similar blow was now aimed

¹ Thucyd. i. 126. ἐν ταύτῳ δὲ ἐπιδείκνυτο τῷ χρόνῳ πρὸς τοὺς Ἀθηναίους
καὶ κλέματα ποιοῦμενοι, ὅπως εὐρίσκον ὅτι μεγίστη πρόφασις
εἴη ἐς τὸ πόλεμεῖν, ἣν μὴ τι ἰσακούωσι.

² Thucyd. i. 125.

³ See the account of the Kylonian troubles, and the sacrilege which followed, in vol. iii. of this History, ch. x, p. 110.

⁴ See Herodot. v. 70: compare vi. 131; Thucyd. i. 126; and vol. iv, ch. xxi, p. 163 of this History.

criticism, — that the most distinguished Athenians of all ages and characters, Sokratês among the number, visited her, and several of them took their wives along with them to hear her also. The free citizen women of Athens lived in strict and almost oriental recluseness, as well after being married as when single: everything which concerned their lives, their happiness, or their rights, was determined or managed for them by male relatives: and they seem to have been destitute of all mental culture and accomplishments. Their society presented no charm nor interest, which men accordingly sought for in the company of the class of women called hetæræ, or courtezans, literally female companions; who lived a free life, managed their own affairs, and supported themselves by their powers of pleasing. These women were numerous, and were doubtless of every variety of personal character: but the most distinguished and superior among them, such as Aspasia and Theodotê,¹ appear to have been the only women in Greece, except the Spartan, who either inspired strong passion or exercised mental ascendancy.

Periklês had been determined in his choice of a wife by those family considerations which were held almost obligatory at Athens, and had married a woman very nearly related to him, by whom he had two sons, Xanthippus and Paralus. But the marriage, having never been comfortable, was afterwards dissolved by mutual consent, according to that full liberty of divorce which the Attic law permitted; and Periklês concurred with his wife's male relations, who formed her legal guardians, in giving her a way to another husband.² He then took Aspasia to live with him,

bringing contempt upon the real accusation against the Megarians, — the purpose for which Aristophanês produces it. This is one of the many errors in respect to Grecian history, arising from the practice of construing passages of comedy as if they were serious and literal facts.

¹ The visit of Sokratês with some of his friends to Theodotê, his dialogue with her, and the description of her manner of living, is among the most curious remnants of Grecian antiquity, on a side very imperfectly known to us (Xenophon, Memorab. iii, 11).

Compare the citations from Eubulus and Antiphanês, the comic writers, *apud* Athenæum, xiii, p. 571, illustrating the differences of character and behavior between some of these hetæræ and others, — and Athenæ. xiii, p. 589.

² Plutarch, Periklês, c. 24. *Εἶτα τῆς συμβίβωσος οὐκ εἴσης αὐτοῖς ἀριστῆς*

had a son by her, who bore his name, and continued ever afterwards on terms of the greatest intimacy and affection with her. Without adopting those exaggerations which represent Aspasia as having communicated to Periklês his distinguished eloquence, or even as having herself composed orations for public delivery, we may well believe her to have been qualified to take interest and share in that literary and philosophical society which frequented the house of Periklês, and which his unprincipled son Xanthippus, — disgusted with his father's regular expenditure, as withholding from him the means of supporting an extravagant establishment, — reported abroad with exaggerating calumnies and turned into derision. It was from that worthless young man, who died of the Athenian epidemic during the lifetime of Periklês, that his political enemies and the comic writers of the day were mainly furnished with scandalous anecdotes to assail the private habits of this distinguished man.¹ The comic writers attacked him for alleged intrigues with different women, but the name of Aspasia they treated as public property, without any mercy or reserve: she was the Omphalê, the Deianeira, or the Hêrê, to this great Hêraklês or Zeus of Athens. At length one of these comic writers, Hermippus, not contented with scenic attacks, indicted her before the dikastery for impiety, as participant in the philosophical discussions held, and the opinions professed, in the society of Periklês, by Anaxagoras and others. Against Anaxagoras himself, too, a similar indictment is said to have been preferred, either by Kleon or by Thucydidês, son of Melesias, under a general resolution recently passed in the public assembly, at the instance of Diopethês. And such was the sensitive antipathy of the Athenian public, shown afterwards fatally in the case of Sokratês, and embittered in this instance by all the artifices of political faction, against philosophers whose opinions conflicted with the received religious dogmas, that Periklês did not dare to place Anaxagoras on his trial: the latter retired from Athens, and the sentence of banishment was passed against him in his absence.² But he himself defended Aspasia before

ἐκείνην μὲν ἐτέρῳ βουλομένην συνεξέδωκεν, αὐτὸς δὲ Ἀσπασίαν λαβὼν ἐν γαίῃ διαφερόντως.

¹ Plutarch, Periklês, c. 13. 86.

² This seems the more probable story: but there are differences of state

the dikastery: in fact, the indictment was as much against him as against her: one thing alleged against her, and also against Pheidias, was, the reception of free women to facilitate the intrigues of Periklēs. He defended her successfully, and procured a verdict of acquittal: but we are not surprised to hear that his speech was marked by the strongest personal emotions, and even by tears.¹ The dikasts were accustomed to such appeals to their sympathies, sometimes even to extravagant excess, from ordinary accused persons: but in Perikles, so manifest an outburst of emotion stands out as something quite unparalleled: for constant self-mastery was one of the most prominent features in his character.² And we shall find him near the close of his political life, when he had become for the moment unpopular with the Athenian people, distracted as they were at the moment with the terrible sufferings of the pestilence, — bearing up against their unmerited anger not merely with dignity, but with a pride of conscious innocence and desert which rises almost into defiance; insomuch that the rhetor Dionysius, who criticizes the speech of Periklēs as if it were simply the composition of Thucydides, censures that historian for having violated dramatic propriety by a display of insolence where humility would have been becoming.³

It appears, also, as far as we can judge amidst very imperfect data, that the trial of the great sculptor Pheidias, for alleged embezzlement in the contract for his celebrated gold and ivory statue of Athênē,⁴ took place nearly at this period. That statue had been finished and dedicated in the Parthenon in 437 B.C., since which period Pheidias had been engaged at Olympia, in his last and great masterpiece, the colossal statue of the Olym-

ment and uncertainties upon many points: compare Plutarch, Periklēs, c. 16-32; Plutarch Nikias, c. 23; Diogen. Laërt. ii, 12, 13. See also Schaubach, Fragment. Anaxagoræ, pp. 47-52.

¹ Plutarch, Periklēs, c. 32.

² Plutarch, Periklēs, c. 7, 36-39.

³ Thucyd. ii, 60, 61: compare also his striking expressions, c. 65; Dionys. Halikarn. De Thucydid. Judic. c. 44, p. 924.

⁴ Plutarch, Periklēs, c. 31. Φειδίας — ἐργόλαβος τοῦ ἀγάλματος.

This tale, about protecting Pheidias under the charge of embezzlement, was the story most widely in circulation against Periklēs — ἡ χειρίστη αἰτία πείσων, ἔχουσα δὲ πλείστους μάρτυρας (Plutarch, Periklēs, c. 31).

pian Zeus. On his return to Athens from the execution of this work, about 433 or 432 B.C., the accusation of embezzlement was instituted against him by the political enemies of Perikles.¹ A slave of Pheidias, named Menon, planted himself as a suppliant at the altar, professing to be cognizant of certain facts which proved that his master had committed peculation. Motion was made to receive his depositions, and to insure to his person the protection of the people; upon which he revealed various statements impeaching the pecuniary probity of Pheidias, and the latter was put in prison, awaiting the day for his trial before the dikastery. The gold employed and charged for in the statue, however, was all capable of being taken off and weighed, so as to verify its accuracy, which Periklēs dared the accusers to do. Besides the charge of embezzlement, there were other circumstances which rendered Pheidias unpopular: it had been discovered that, in the reliefs on the frieze of the Parthenon, he had introduced the portraits both of himself and of Periklēs in conspicuous positions. It seems that Pheidias died in prison before the day of trial; and some even said, that he had been poisoned by the enemies of Periklēs, in order that the suspicions against the latter, who was the real object of attack, might be aggravated. It is said also that Drakontidēs proposed and carried a decree in the public assembly, that Periklēs should be called on to give an account of the money which he had expended, and that the dikasts, before whom the account was rendered, should give their suffrage in the most solemn manner from the altar: this latter provision was modified by Agnon, who, while proposing that the dikasts should be fifteen hundred in number, retained the vote by pebbles in the urn according to ordinary custom.²

If Periklēs was ever tried on such a charge, there can be no doubt that he was honorably acquitted: for the language of Thucydides respecting his pecuniary probity is such as could never have been employed if a verdict of guilty on a charge of peculation had ever been publicly pronounced. But we cannot be certain that he ever was tried: indeed, another accusation

¹ See the Dissertation of O. Müller (De Phidiae Vita, c. 17, p. 35), who lays out the facts in the order in which I have given them.

² Plutarch, Periklēs, c. 13-32.

urged by his enemies, and even by Aristophanês, in the sixth year of the Peloponnesian war, implies that no trial took place for it was alleged that Periklês, in order to escape this danger, "blew up the Peloponnesian war," and involved his country in such confusion and peril as made his own aid and guidance indispensably necessary to her: especially that he passed the decree against the Megarians by which the war was really brought on.¹ We know enough, however, to be certain that such a supposition is altogether inadmissible. The enemies of Periklês were far too eager, and too expert in Athenian political warfare, to have let him escape by such a stratagem: moreover, we learn from the assurance of Thucydidês, that the war depended upon far deeper causes, — that the Megarian decree was in no way the real cause of it, — that it was not Periklês, but the Peloponnesians, who brought it on, by the blow struck at Potidæa.

¹ Aristophan. *Pac.* 587–603: compare *Acharn.* 512; Ephorus, ap. Diodor. xii. 38–40; and the Scholia on the two passages of Aristophanês; Plutarch, *Periklês*, c. 32.

Diodorus (as well as Plutarch, *Alkibiad.* c. 7) relates another tale, that Alkibiadês once approached Periklês when he was in evident low spirits and embarrassment, and asked him the reason: Periklês told him that the time was near at hand for rendering his accounts, and that he was considering how this could be done: upon which Alkibiadês advised him to consider rather how he could evade doing it. The result of this advice was that Periklês plunged Athens into the Peloponnesian war: compare Aristophan. *Nub.* 855, with the Scholia, — and Ephorus, *Fragm.* 118, 119. ed. Marx, with the notes of Marx.

It is probable enough that Ephorus copied the story, which ascribes the Peloponnesian war to the accusations against Pheidias and Periklês, from Aristophanês or other comic writers of the time. But it deserves remark, that even Aristophanês is not to be considered as certifying it. For if we consult the passage above referred to in his comedy *Pax*, we shall find that, first, Hermês tells the story about Pheidias, Periklês, and the Peloponnesian war; upon which both Trygæus, and the Chorus, remark that *they never heard a word of it before*: that it is quite *new* to them.

Tryg. Ταῦτα τοίνυν, μὰ τὸν Ἀπόλλω, ἧδ' ἐπεύσμεν οὐδένος,
οὐδ' ὅπως αὐτῇ (Εἰρήνῃ) προσήκει Φειδίας ἡκητόη.

Chorus. Οὐδ' ἔγωγε, πλὴν γε νυνί.

If Aristophanês had stated the story over so plainly, his authority could only have been taken as proving that it was a part of the talk of the time: but the lines just cited make him as much a contradicting as an affirming witness.

All that we can make out, amidst these uncertified allegations, is, that in the year or two immediately preceding the Peloponnesian war, Periklês was hard pressed by the accusations of political enemies, — perhaps even in his own person, but certainly in the persons of those who were most in his confidence and affection.¹ And it was in this turn of his political position that the Lacedæmonians sent to Athens the above-mentioned requisition, that the ancient Kylonian sacrilege might be at length cleared out; in other words, that Periklês and his family might be banished. Doubtless, his enemies, as well as the partisans of Lacedæmon at Athens, would strenuously support this proposition: and the party of Lacedæmon at Athens was always strong, even during the middle of the war: to act as proxenus to the Lacedæmonians was accounted an honor even by the greatest Athenian families.² On this occasion, however, the manœuvre did not succeed, nor did the Athenians listen to the requisition for banishing the sacrilegious Alkmæônids. On the contrary, they replied that the Spartans, too, had an account of sacrilege to clear off; for they had violated the sanctuary of Poseidon, at Cape Tænarus, in dragging from it some helot suppliants to be put to death, — and the sanctuary of Athênê Chalkiœkus at Sparta, in blocking up and starving to death the guilty regent Pausanias. To require that Laconia might be cleared of these two acts of sacrilege, was the only answer which the Athenians made to the demand sent for the banishment of Periklês.³ Probably, the actual effect of that demand was, to strengthen him in the public esteem:⁴ very different from the effect of the same manœuvre when practised before by Kleomenês against Kleisthenês.

¹ It would appear that not only Aspasia and Anaxagoras, but also the musician and philosopher Damon, the personal friend and instructor of Periklês, must have been banished at a time when Periklês was old, — perhaps somewhere near about this time. The passage in Plato, *Alkibiadês*, i. c. 30, p. 118, proves that Damon was in Athens, and intimate with Periklês, when the latter was of considerable age — καὶ νῦν ἐπὶ τηλικούτοις ὡν Δάμωνι σύνεστιν αὐτοῦ τούτου ἕνεκα.

Damon is said to have been ostracized, — perhaps he was tried and condemned to banishment: for the two are sometimes confounded.

² See Thucyd. v. 43; vi. 89.

³ Thucyd. i. 128, 135, 139.

⁴ Plutarch, *Perikl.* c. 33.

Other Spartan envoys shortly afterwards arrived, with fresh demands. The Athenians were now required: 1. To withdraw their troops from Potidaea. 2. To replace Ægina in its autonomy. 3. To repeal the decree of exclusion against the Megarians. It was upon the latter that the greatest stress was laid; an intimation being held out that war might be avoided if such repeal were granted. We see plainly, from this proceeding, that the Lacedæmonians acted in concert with the anti-Periklêan leaders at Athens. To Sparta and her confederacy the decree against the Megarians was of less importance than the rescue of the Corinthian troops now blocked up in Potidaea: but on the other hand, the party opposed to Periklès would have much better chance of getting a vote of the assembly against him on the subject of the Megarians: and this advantage, if gained, would serve to enfeeble his influence generally. No concession was obtained, however, on either of the three points: even in respect to Megara, the decree of exclusion was vindicated and upheld against all the force of opposition. At length the Lacedæmonians—who had already resolved upon war, and had sent these envoys in mere compliance with the exigencies of ordinary practice, not with any idea of bringing about an accommodation—sent a third batch of envoys with a proposition, which at least had the merit of disclosing their real purpose without disguise. Rhamphias and two other Spartans announced to the Athenians the simple injunction: “The Lacedæmonians wish the peace to stand; and it *may* stand, if you will leave the Greeks autonomous.” Upon this demand, so very different from the preceding, the Athenians resolved to hold a fresh assembly on the subject of war or peace, to open the whole question anew for discussion, and to determine, once for all, on a peremptory answer.¹

The last demands presented on the part of Sparta, which went to nothing less than the entire extinction of the Athenian empire,—combined with the character, alike wavering and insin-

¹ Thucyd. i, 39. It rather appears, from the words of Thucydides, that these various demands of the Lacedæmonians were made by *one* embassy, joined by new members arriving with fresh instructions, but remaining during a month or six weeks, between January and March 431 B.C., installed in the house of the proxenus of Sparta at Athens: compare Xenophon Hellenic. v, 4 22.

cere, of the demands previously made, and with the knowledge that the Spartan confederacy had pronounced peremptorily in favor of war,—seemed likely to produce unanimity at Athens, and to bring together this important assembly under the universal conviction that war was inevitable. Such, however, was not the fact. The reluctance to go to war was sincere amidst the large majority of the assembly; while among a considerable portion of them it was so preponderant, that they even now reverted to the opening which the Lacedæmonians had before held out about the anti-Megarian decree, as if that were the chief cause of war. There was much difference of opinion among the speakers, several of whom insisted upon the repeal of this decree, treating it as a matter far too insignificant to go to war about, and denouncing the obstinacy of Periklès for refusing to concede such a trifle.² Against this opinion Periklès entered his protest, in an harangue decisive and encouraging, which Dionysius of Halikarnassus ranks among the best speeches in Thucydides: the latter historian may probably himself have heard the original speech.

“I continue, Athenians, to adhere to the same conviction, that we must not yield to the Peloponnesians,—though I know that men are in one mood when they sanction the resolution to go to war, and in another when actually in the contest,—their judgments then depending upon the turn of events. I have only to repeat now what I have said on former occasions,—and I adjure you who follow my views to adhere to what we jointly resolve, though the result should be partially unfavorable: or else, not to take credit for wisdom in the event of success.² For it is very

¹ Thucyd. i, 139; Plutarch. Periklès. c. 31.

² Thucyd. i, 140. *ἔδειχται γὰρ τὰς ἐννοίας τῶν πραγμάτων οὐχ ἴσους ἀνθρώποις χαρῆσαι ἢ καὶ τὰς δυνάμεις τοῦ ἀνθρώπου διωπερ καὶ τὴν τεχνην ὅσα ἂν πᾶσι λόγον ἐνδὲξ, εὐδαιμον αἰτιάσθαι.* I could have wished, in the translation, to preserve the play upon the words *ἀμαθῶς χαρῆσαι*, which Thucydides introduces into this sentence, and which seems to have been agreeable to his taste. *Ἀμαθῶς*, when referred to *ἐννοίας*, is used in a passive sense by no means common.—“in a manner which cannot be learned, departing from all reasonable calculation.” *Ἀμαθῶς*, when referred to *δυνάμεις*, bears its usual meaning.—“ignorant, deficient in learning or in reason.”

possible that the contingencies of events may depart more from all reasonable track than the counsels of man: such are the unexpected turns which we familiarly impute to fortune. The Lacedæmonians have before now manifested their hostile aims against us, but on this last occasion more than ever. While the truce prescribes that we are to give and receive amicable satisfaction for our differences, and each to retain what we possess, — they not only have not asked for such satisfaction, but will not receive it when tendered by us: they choose to settle complaints by war and not by discussion: they have got beyond the tone of complaint, and are here already with that of command. For they enjoin us to withdraw from Potidæa, to leave Ægina free, and to rescind the decree against the Megarians: nay, these last envoys are even come to proclaim to us, that we must leave all the Greeks free. Now let none of you believe, that we shall be going to war about a trifle, if we refuse to rescind the Megarian decree, — which they chiefly put forward, as if its repeal would avert the war, — let none of you take blame to yourselves as if we had gone to war about a small matter. For this small matter contains in itself the whole test and trial of your mettle: if ye yield it, ye will presently have some other greater exaction put upon you, like men who have already truckled on one point from fear: whereas if ye hold out stoutly, ye will make it clear to them that they must deal with you more upon a footing of equality.”¹

Periklēs then examined the relative strength of parties and the chances of war. The Peloponnesians were a self-working population, with few slaves, and without wealth, either private or public; they had no means of carrying on distant or long-continued war: they were ready to expose their persons, but not at all ready to contribute from their very narrow means:² in a border-war, or a single land battle, they were invincible, but for systematic warfare against a power like Athens, they had neither competent headship, nor habits of concert and punctuality, nor money to profit

¹ Thucyd. i, 140.

² Thucyd. i, 141. αὐτουργοί τε γὰρ εἰσι Πελοποννήσιοι, καὶ οὔτε ἰδίᾳ οὔτε ἐν κοινῷ χρήματά ἐστιν αὐτοῖς· ἐπεὶ αὖτε χρόνιῳ πολέμῳ καὶ διαποντίῳ ἄνευ σοι, διὰ τὸ βραχέως αὐτοὶ ἐπὶ ἀλλήλους ὑπὸ πενίας ἐπιφέρειν.

by opportunities, always rare and accidental, for successful attack. They might, perhaps, establish a fortified post in Attica, but it would do little serious mischief; while at sea, their inferiority and helplessness would be complete, and the irresistible Athenian navy would take care to keep it so. Nor would they be able to reckon on tempting away the able foreign seamen from Athenian ships by means of funds borrowed from Olympia or Delphi:¹ for besides that the mariners of the dependent islands would find themselves losers even by accepting a higher pay, with the certainty of Athenian vengeance afterwards, — Athens herself would suffice to man her fleet in case of need, with her own citizens and metics: she had within her own walls steersmen and mariners better as well as more numerous than all Greece besides. There was but one side on which Athens was vulnerable: Attica unfortunately was not an island, — it was exposed to invasion and ravage. To this the Athenians must submit, without committing the imprudence of engaging a land battle to avert it: they had abundant lands out of Attica, insular as well as continental, to supply their wants, and they could in their turn, by means of their navy, ravage the Peloponnesian territories, whose inhabitants had no subsidiary lands to recur to.²

“Mourn not for the loss of land and houses (continued the orator): reserve your mourning for men: houses and land acquire not men, but men acquire them.”³ Nay, if I thought I could prevail upon you, I would exhort you to march out and ravage them yourselves, and thus show to the Peloponnesians that, for them at least, ye will not truckle. And I could exhibit many further grounds for confidently anticipating success, if ye will only be

¹ Thucyd. i, 143. εἴτε καὶ κινήσαντες τῶν Ὀλυμπίαισι ἢ Δελφοῖς χρημάτων πᾶσι μισθῷ πειρώμενοι ἡμῶν ὑπολαβεῖν τοὺς ξένους τῶν ναυτῶν, μὴ ἴσταν μὲν ἡμῶν ἀντιπάλους, δεδαντων αὐτῶν τε καὶ τῶν μετοίκων, δεινὸν ἂν ἦεν εἴτε τοδο τε ἴσταται, καὶ, ὅπερ κράτιστον, κυβερνήτας ἔχομεν πολίτας καὶ τὴν ἄλλην ἐπημεσίαν πλείους καὶ ἀμείνους ἢ πᾶσα ἡ ἄλλη Ἑλλάς.

This is in reply to those hopes which we know to have been conceived by the Peloponnesian leaders, and upon which the Corinthian speaker in the Peloponnesian congress had dwelt (i. 121). Doubtless Periklēs would be informed of the tenor of all these public demonstrations at Sparta.

² Thucyd. 141, 142, 143.

³ Thucyd. 143. τὴν τε ἀλόγησάν μὴ οἰκίων καὶ γῆς ποιεῖσθαι, ἀλλὰ τὰς σωμάτων· οἱ γὰρ ταῦτα τοῖς ἀνδράσι, ἀλλ’ οἱ ἄνδρες ταῦτα κτῶνται.

willing not to aim at increased dominion when we are in the midst of war, and not to take upon ourselves new self-imposed risks; for I have ever been more afraid of our own blunders than of the plans of our enemy.¹ But these are matters for future discussion, when we come to actual operations: for the present let us dismiss these envoys with the answer: That we will permit the Megarians to use our markets and harbors, if the Lacedæmonians on their side will discontinue their (*xenelasy* or) summary expulsions of ourselves and our allies from their own territory,—for there is nothing in the truce to prevent either one or the other: that we will leave the Grecian cities autonomous, if we *had* them as autonomous at the time when the truce was made,—and as soon as the Lacedæmonians shall grant to *their* allied cities autonomy such as each of them shall freely choose, not such as is convenient to Sparta: that while we are ready to give satisfaction according to the truce, we will not begin war, but will repel those who do begin it. Such is the reply at once just and suitable to the dignity of this city. We ought to make up our minds that war is inevitable: the more cheerfully we accept it, the less vehement shall we find our enemies in their attack: and where the danger is greatest, there also is the final honor greatest, both for a state and for a private citizen. Assuredly our fathers, when they bore up against the Persians,—having no such means as we possess to start from, and even compelled to abandon all that they did possess,—both repelled the invader and brought matters forward to our actual pitch, more by advised operation than by good fortune, and by a daring courage greater than their real power. We ought not to fall short of them: we must keep off our enemies in every way, and leave an unimpaired power to our successors.²

These animating encouragements of Periklēs carried with them the majority of the assembly, so that answer was made to the envoys, such as he recommended, on each of the particular points in debate. It was announced to them, moreover, on the general

¹ Thucyd. i. 144. πολλὰ δὲ καὶ ἄλλα ἔχω ἐς ἐλπίδα τοῦ περιέσεσθαι, ἢ ἐθέλητε ἀρχὴν τε μὴ ἐπικτάσθαι ἅμα πολεμοῦντες, καὶ κινδύνους ἀνδραμύτους καὶ προστίθεσθαι· μᾶλλον γὰρ περὶ ὁρμήαι τὰς οἰκίας, ἢ μὴ ἀναρτίας ἢ τὰς ἐναντίων διανοίας.

² Thucyd. i. 143, 144.

question of peace or war, that the Athenians were prepared to discuss all the grounds of complaint against them, pursuant to the truce, by equal and amicable arbitration,—but that they would do nothing under authoritative demand.¹ With this answer the envoys returned to Sparta, and an end was put to negotiation.

It seems evident, from the account of Thucydides, that the Athenian public was not brought to this resolution without much reluctance, and great fear of the consequences, especially destruction of property in Attica: and that a considerable minority took opposition on the Megarian decree,—the ground skilfully laid by Sparta for breaking the unanimity of her enemy, and strengthening the party opposed to Periklēs. But we may also decidedly infer from the same historian,—especially from the proceedings of Corinth and Sparta, as he sets them forth,—that Athens could not have avoided the war without such an abnegation, both of dignity and power as no nation under any government will ever submit to, and as would have even left her without decent security for her individual rights. To accept the war tendered to her, was a matter not merely of prudence but of necessity: the tone of exaction assumed by the Spartan envoys would have rendered concession a mere evidence of weakness and fear. As the account of Thucydides bears out the judgment of Periklēs on this important point,² so it also shows us that Athens was not less in the right upon the received principles of international dealing. It was not Athens, as the Spartans³ them

¹ Thucyd. i. 145. καὶ τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους ἀπεκρίναντο τῇ ἐκείνων γνώμῃ καθ' ἑκάστην ὥς ἔδρασαν, καὶ τὰ ξυμπὰν αἰδὲν κίλινοντο ποιεῖν, δικὴν δὲ κατὰ τὰς ξυμπῆκας ἐτοιμοὶ εἶναι διαλύεσθαι περὶ τῶν ἐγκλημάτων ἐπὶ ἰσῇ καὶ ἰσότητι.

² In spite of the contrary view taken by Plutarch. Periklēs, c. 31: comparison of Perikl. and Fab. Max. c. 3.

³ Thucyd. iv. 21. Οἱ μὲν οὖν Λακεδαιμόνιοι τοσούτα εἶπον, νομίζοντες τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ἐν τῷ πρῶν χρόνῳ σπονδῶν ἐπιθυμεῖν, σφῶν δὲ ἐναντίον μείων καλῆεσθαι, δεδομένης δὲ εἰρήνης ἀσμένως δεξέσθαι τε καὶ τοὺς ἑαυτῶν ἀποδωπεῖν.

See also an important passage (vii, 18) about the feelings of the Spartans. The Spartans thought, says Thucydides, ἐν τῷ προτέρῳ πολέμῳ (the beginning of the Peloponnesian war) σφέτερον τὸ παλαιόνημα μᾶλλον γενέσθαι, ὅτι τε ἐς Πλαταιῶν ἦλθον Οἰχάριοι ἐν σπονδαῖς καὶ εἰρημένον ἐν

selves afterwards came to feel, but her enemies, who broke the provisions of the truce, by encouraging the revolt of Potidæa, and by promising invasion of Attica: it was not Athens, but her enemies, who, after thus breaking the truce, made a string of exorbitant demands, in order to get up as good a case as possible for war.¹ The case made out by Periklēs, justifying the war on grounds both of right and prudence, is in all its main points borne out by the impartial voice of Thucydides. And though it is perfectly true, that the ambition of Athens had been great, and the increase of her power marvellous, during the thirty-five years between the repulse of Xerxes and the thirty years' truce, — it is not less true that by that truce she lost very largely, and that she acquired nothing to compensate such loss during the fourteen years between the truce and the Korkyræan alliance. The policy of Periklēs had not been one of foreign aggrandizement, or of increasing vexation and encroachment towards other Grecian powers: even the Korkyræan alliance was noway courted by him, and was in truth accepted with paramount regard to the obligations of the existing truce: while the circumstances out of which that alliance grew, testify a more forward ambition on the part of Corinth than on that of Athens, to appropriate to herself the Korkyræan naval force. It is common to ascribe the Peloponnesian war to the ambition of Athens, but this is a partial view of the case. The aggressive sentiment, partly fear, partly hatred, was on the side of the Peloponnesians, who were not ignorant that Athens desired the continuance of peace, but were resolved not to let her stand as she was at the conclusion of the thirty years' truce; it was their purpose to attack her and break down her empire, as dangerous, wrongful, and anti-Hellenic. The war was thus partly a contest of principle, involving the popular proclamation of the right of every Grecian state to autonomy, against Athens: partly a contest of power, wherein Spartan and Corinthian ambition was not less conspicuous, and far more aggressive in the beginning, than Athenian.

ταῖς πρότερον ξινηταῖς ὅπλα μὴ ἐπιτίθειν ἢν δίκας θέλωσι δοῦναι, αὐτοὶ οὐκ ὀψήκουσιν ἐς δίκας προκαλουμένων τῶν Ἀθηναίων· καὶ διὰ τοῦτο εἰκότως δυστυχεῖν τε ἐνέμιζον, etc.

¹ Thucyd. i, 126. ὅπως σφίσις ὅτι μεγίστη πρόφασις εἴη τοῦ πολεμεῖν

Conformably to what is here said, the first blow of the war was struck, not by Athens, but against her. After the decisive answer given to the Spartan envoys, taken in conjunction with the previous proceedings, and the preparations actually going on among the Peloponnesian confederacy, — the truce could hardly be said to be still in force, though there was no formal proclamation of rupture. A few weeks passed in restricted and mistrustful intercourse; though individuals who passed the borders did not think it necessary to take a herald with them, as in time of actual war. Had the excess of ambition been on the side of Athens compared with her enemies, this was the time for her to strike the first blow, carrying with it of course great probability of success, before their preparations were completed. But she remained strictly within the limits of the truce, and the disastrous series of mutual aggressions, destined to tear in pieces the entrails of Hellas, was opened by her enemy and her neighbor.

The little town of Plataea, still hallowed by the memorable victory over the Persians, as well as by the tutelary consecration received from Pausanias, was the scene of this unforeseen enterprise. It stood in Bœotia, immediately north of Kithærôn; on the borders of Attica on one side, and of the Theban territory on the other, from which it was separated by the river Asôpus: the distance between Plataea and Thebes being about seventy stadia, or a little more than eight miles. Though Bœotian by descent, the Plataeans were completely separated from the Bœotian league, and in hearty alliance, as well as qualified communion of civil rights, with the Athenians, who had protected them against the bitter enmity of Thebes, for a period of time now nearly three generations. But in spite of this long prescription, the Thebans, as chiefs of the Bœotian league, still felt themselves wronged by the separation of Plataea: and an oligarchical faction of wealthy Plataeans espoused their cause,² with a

¹ Thucyd. i, 146. ἐπεμύγνυντο δ' ἄλλοις ἐν αὐταῖς καὶ παρ' ἀλλήλους ἐφοίτων, ἀκηρέκτως μὲν, ἀνυπόπτως δ' οὐ· σπονδῶν γὰρ ἐγγυσις τὰ γενόμενα ἦν, καὶ πρόφασις τοῦ πολεμεῖν.

² Thucyd. ii, 2. βουλευόμενοι ἰδίας ἐνεκα δυνάμεως ἀνδρας τε τῶν πολιτῶν τοὺς σφίσις ἐπενεντίους διαφθεῖραι, καὶ τὴν πόλιν τοῖς Θηβαίοις τροσποιῆσαι· also iii, 65. ἀνδρες οἱ πρῶτοι καὶ χρήμασι καὶ γένει, etc.

view of subverting the democratical government of the town, of destroying its leaders, their political rivals, and of establishing an oligarchy with themselves as the chiefs. Naukleidēs, and others of this faction, entered into a secret conspiracy with Eurymachus and the oligarchy of Thebes: to both it appeared a tempting prize, since war was close at hand, to take advantage of this ambiguous interval, before watches had been placed, and the precautions of a state of war commenced, and to surprise the town of Plataea in the night: moreover, a period of religious festival was chosen, in order that the population might be most completely off their guard.¹ Accordingly, on a rainy night towards the close of March 431 B.C.,² a body of rather more than three hundred Theban hoplites, commanded by two of the Boeotarchs, Pythangelus, and Diemporus, and including Eurymachus in the ranks, presented themselves at the gate of Plataea during the first sleep of the citizens: Naukleidēs and his partisans opened the gate and conducted them to the agora, which they reached and occupied in military order without the least resistance. The best part of the Theban military force was intended to arrive at Plataea by break of day, in order to support them.³

¹ Thucyd. iii. 56.

² Thucyd. ii. 2. *ἀμα ἔπε ἄρχοντες* — seems to indicate a period rather before than after the first of April: we may consider the bisection of the Thucydidean year into *αὐρος* and *χειμῶν* as marked by the equinoxes. His summer and winter are each a half of the year (Thucyd. v. 20), though Poppo erroneously treats the Thucydidean winter as only four months (Poppo, Proleg. i. c. v. p. 72, and ad Thucyd. ii. 2: see F. W. Ulrich, Beiträge zur Erklärung des Thukydides, p. 32, Hamburg, 1846).

³ Thucyd. ii. 2-5. *οἱ αὖτε οἱ δὲ τὸν ἀγορὴν τὰ δόπλα... καὶ ἀνέπεν ὁ κήρυξ, εἰς τὴν ἀγορὴν κατὰ τὰ πάτρια τῶν πάντων Βοιωτῶν ξιμαρχίην, τίθεσθαι παρ' αὐτοῖς τὰ δόπλα.*

Dr. Arnold has a note upon this passage, explaining *τίθεσθαι*, or *θίεσθαι* τὰ δόπλα, to mean, "piling the arms" or getting rid of their spears and shields by piling them all in one or more heaps. He says: "The Thebans, therefore, as usual on a halt, proceeded to pile their arms, and by inviting the Plataeans to come and pile theirs with them, they meant that they should come in arms from their several houses to join them, and thus naturally pile their spears and shields with those of their friends, to be taken up together with theirs, whenever there should be occasion either to march or to fight." The same explanation of the phrase had before been given

Naukleidēs and his friends, following the instincts of political antipathy, were eager to conduct the Thebans to the houses of their opponents, the democratical leaders, in order that the latter might be seized or despatched. But to this the Thebans would not consent: believing themselves now masters of the town, and certain of a large reinforcement at daylight, they thought they could overawe the citizens into an apparently willing acquiescence in their terms, without any actual violence: they wished, moreover, rather to soften and justify, than to aggravate, the gross public wrong already committed. Accordingly their herald was directed to invite, by public proclamation, all Plataeans who were willing to return to their ancient sympathies of race, and to the

by Wesseling and Larcher, ad Herodot. ix. 52; though Bähr on the passage is more satisfactory.

Both Poppo and Gölter also sanction Dr. Arnold's explanation: yet I cannot but think that it is unsuitable to the passage before us, as well as to several other passages in which *τίθεσθαι τὰ δόπλα* occurs: there may be other passages in which it will suit, but as a general explanation it appears to me inadmissible. In most cases, the words mean "*armati consistere*," — to ground arms, — to maintain rank, resting the spear and shield (see Xenoph. Hellen. ii. 4, 12) upon the ground. In the incident now before us, the Theban hoplites enter Plataea, a strange town, with the population decidedly hostile, and likely to be provoked more than ever by this surprise, add to which, that it is pitch dark, and a rainy night. Is it likely, that the first thing which they do will be to pile their arms? The darkness alone would render it a slow and uncertain operation to resume the arms: so that when the Plataeans attacked them, as they did, quite suddenly and unexpectedly, and while it was yet dark, the Thebans would have been — upon Dr. Arnold's supposition — altogether defenceless and unarmed (see ii. 3. *προσιβὰλον τε εἰς θύρας — οἱ Πλαταιῆς — καὶ ἐκ χειρὸς ἦσαν κατὰ τὰ χόρς*) which certainly they were not. Dr. Arnold's explanation may suit the case of the soldier in camp, but certainly not that of the soldier in presence of an enemy, or under circumstances of danger: the difference of the two will be found illustrated in Xenophon. Hellenic. ii. 4, 5, 6.

Nor do the passages referred to by Dr. Arnold himself bear out his interpretation of the phrase *τίθεσθαι τὰ δόπλα*. That interpretation is, moreover, not conveniently applicable either to Thucyd. vii. 3, or viii. 25, — decidedly inapplicable to iv. 68 (*θησόμενον τὰ δόπλα*), in the description of the night attack on Megara, very analogous to this upon Plataea, — and not less decidedly inapplicable to two passages of Xenophon's Anabasis, i. 5, 14; iv. 3, 7.

Schneider, in the Lexicon appended to his edition of Xenophon's Anabasis, has a long but not very distinct article upon *τίθεσθαι τὰ δόπλα*.

Bœotian confederacy, that they should come forth and take action as brethren in the armed ranks of the Thebans. And the Plataeans, suddenly roused from sleep by the astounding news that their great enemy was master of the town, supposed amidst the darkness that the number of assailants was far greater than the reality: so that in spite of their strong attachment to Athens, they thought their case hopeless, and began to open negotiations. But as they soon found out, in spite of the darkness, as the discussion proceeded, that the real numbers of the Thebans were not greater than could be dealt with, — they speedily took courage and determined to attack them; establishing communication with each other by breaking through the walls of their private houses, in order that they might not be detected in moving about in the streets or ways,¹ — and forming barricades with wagons across such of these ways as were suitable. A little before day-break, when their preparations were fully completed, they sallied forth from their houses to the attack, and immediately came to close quarters with the Thebans. The latter, still fancying themselves masters of the town, and relying upon a satisfactory close to the discussions when daylight should arrive, now found themselves surprised in their turn, and under great disadvantages: for they had been out all night under a heavy rain, — they were in a town which they did not know, with narrow, crooked, and muddy ways, such as they would have had difficulty in

¹ Thucyd. ii, 3. ἔδοκει οὖν ἐπιχειρητὰ εἶναι, καὶ συνέλκοντο διαμεικνόμενοι τοὺς κοινούς τοίχους παρ' ἀλλήλους, ὅπως μὴ διὰ τῶν οὐδὲν φανεροῦ ὄσιν ἰόντες, ἀμάξας δὲ ἀντὶ τῶν ἱπποδρόμων ἐς τὰς ὁδοὺς καθίστασαν, ἐν αὐτῇ τείχεος ἢ καὶ τὰλλα ἐξήρτων, etc.

I may be permitted to illustrate this by a short extract from the letter of M. Marrast, mayor of Paris, to the National Assembly, written during the formidable insurrection of June 25, 1848, in that city, and describing the proceedings of the insurgents: "Dans la plupart des rues longues, étroites et couvertes de barrières qui vont de l'Hotel de Ville à la Rue St. Antoine, la garde nationale mobile, et la troupe de ligne, ont dû faire le siège de chaque maison; et ce qui rendait l'œuvre plus périlleuse, c'est que les insurgés avaient établi, de chaque maison à chaque maison, des communications intérieures qui reliaient les maisons entre elles, en sorte qu'ils pouvaient se rendre, comme par une allée couverte, d'un point éloigné jusqu'au centre d'une suite de barricades qui les protégeaient." (Lettre publiée dans le Journal, le National, June 26, 1848).

finding even by daylight. Nevertheless, on finding themselves suddenly assailed, they got as well as they could into close order, and repelled the Plataeans two or three times: but the attack was still repeated, with loud shouts, while the women also screamed, and howled, and threw tiles from the flat-roofed houses, until at length the Thebans became dismayed and broken. But flight was not less difficult than resistance; for they could not find their way out of the city, and even the gate by which they entered, the only one open, had been closed by a Plataean citizen, who thrust into it the point of a javelin in place of the peg whereby the bar was commonly held fast. Dispersed about the city, and pursued by men who knew every inch of the ground, some ran to the top of the wall, and jumped down on the outside, most of them perished in the attempt, — a few others escaped through an unguarded gate, by cutting through the bar with a hatchet which a woman gave to them, — while the greater number of them ran into the open doors of a large barn or building in conjunction with the wall, mistaking these doors for an approach to the town-gate. They were here blocked up without the chance of escape, and the Plataeans at first thought of setting fire to the building: but at length a convention was concluded, whereby they, as well as all the other Thebans in the city, agreed to surrender at discretion.¹

Had the reinforcements from Thebes arrived at the expected hour, this disaster would have been averted. But the heavy rain and dark night retarded their whole march, while the river Asopus was so much swollen as to be with difficulty fordable: so that before they reached the gates of Plataea, their comrades within were either slain or captured. Which fate had befallen them, the Thebans without could not tell: but they immediately resolved to seize what they could find, persons as well as property, in the Plataean territory, — no precautions having been taken as yet to guard against the perils of war by keeping within the walls, — in order that they might have something to exchange for such Thebans as were prisoners. Before this step could be executed, however, a herald came forth from the town to remonstrate with them upon their unholy proceeding in having

¹ Thucyd. ii 3, 4.

flagrantly violated the truce, and especially to warn them not to do any wrong without the walls. If they retired without inflicting farther mischief, their prisoners within should be given up to them; if otherwise, these prisoners would be slain immediately. A convention having been concluded and sworn to on this basis, the Thebans retired without any active measures. Such at least was the Theban account of what preceded their retirement: but the Plataeans gave a very different statement; denying that they had made any categorical promise or sworn any oath, — and affirming that they had engaged for nothing, except to suspend any decisive step with regard to the prisoners until discussion had been entered into to see if a satisfactory agreement could be concluded.

As Thucydides records both of these statements, without intimating to which of the two he himself gave the preference, we may presume that both of them found credence with respectable persons. The Theban story is undoubtedly the most probable: but the Plataeans appear to have violated the understanding, even upon their own construction of it. For no sooner had the Thebans retired, than they (the Plataeans) hastily brought in their citizens and the best of their movable property within the walls, and then slew all their prisoners forthwith; without even entering into the formalities of negotiation. The prisoners thus put to death, among whom was Eurymachus himself, were one hundred and eighty in number.¹

¹ Thucyd. ii. 5, 6; Herodot. vii. 233. Demosthenes (cont. Neæram, c. 25, p. 1379, agrees with Thucydides in the statement that the Plataeans slew their prisoners. From whom Diodorus borrowed his inadmissible story, that the Plataeans gave up their prisoners to the Thebans, I cannot tell (Diodor. xii. 41, 42).

The passage in this oration against Neæra is also curious, both as it agrees with Thucydides on many points, and as it differs from him on several others: in some sentences, even the words agree with Thucydides (ὁ γὰρ Ἀσωπὸς ποταμὸς μέγας ἵππες, καὶ δαβύρα οἱ ῥήδων ἦν, etc.: compare Thucyd. ii. 2); while on other points there is discrepancy. Demosthenes — or the Pseudo-Demosthenes — states that Archidamus, king of Sparta, planned the surprise of Plataea. — that the Plataeans only discovered, when morning dawned, the small real number of the Thebans in the town, — that the larger body of Thebans, when they at last did arrive near Plataea after the great delay in their march, were forced to retire by the numerous

On the first entrance of the Theban assailants at night, a messenger had started from Plataea to carry the news to Athens: a second messenger followed him to report the victory and capture of the prisoners, as soon as it had been achieved. The Athenians sent back a herald without delay, enjoining the Plataeans to take no step respecting the prisoners until consultation should be had with Athens. Periklēs doubtless feared what turned out to be the fact: for the prisoners had been slain before his messenger could arrive. Apart from the terms of the convention, and looking only to the received practice of ancient warfare, their destruction could not be denounced as unusually cruel, though the Thebans, when fortune was in their favor, chose to designate it as such; — but impartial contemporaries would notice, and the Athenians in particular would deeply lament, the glaring impolicy of the act. For Thebes, the best thing of all would of course be to get back her captured citizens forthwith: but next to that, the least evil would be to hear that they had been put to death. In the hands of the Athenians and Plataeans, they would have been the means of obtaining from her much more valuable sacrifices than their lives, considered as a portion of Theban power, were worth: so strong was the feeling of sympathy for imprisoned citizens, several of them men of rank and importance, — as may be seen by the past conduct of Athens after the battle of Koroneia, and by that of Sparta, hereafter to be recounted, after the taking of Sphakteria. The Plataeans, obeying the simple instinct of wrath and vengeance, threw away this great political advantage, which the more long-sighted Periklēs would gladly have turned to account.

At the time when the Athenians sent their herald to Plataea, they also issued orders for seizing all Bœotians who might be found in Attica; while they lost no time in sending forces to provision Plataea, and placing it on the footing of a garrison

force arriving from Athens, and that the Plataeans then destroyed their prisoners in the town. Demosthenes mentions nothing about any convention between the Plataeans and the Thebans without the town, respecting the Theban prisoners within.

On every point on which the narrative of Thucydides differs from that of Demosthenes, that of the former stands out as the most coherent and credible.

¹ Thucyd. iii. 66.

town, removing to Athens the old men and sick, with the women and children. No complaint or discussion, respecting the recent surprise, was thought of by either party: it was evident to both that the war was now actually begun, — that nothing was to be thought of except the means of carrying it on, — and that there could be no farther personal intercourse except under the protection of heralds.¹ The incident at Plataea, striking in all its points, wound up both parties to the full pitch of warlike excitement. A spirit of resolution and enterprise was abroad everywhere, especially among those younger citizens, yet unacquainted with the actual bitterness of war, whom the long truce but just broken had raised up; and the contagion of high-strung feeling spread from the leading combatants into every corner of Greece, manifesting itself partly in multiplied oracles, prophecies, and religious legends adapted to the moment;² a recent earthquake at Delos, too, as well as various other extraordinary physical phenomena, were construed as prognostics of the awful struggle impending, — a period fatally marked not less by eclipses, earthquakes, drought, famine, and pestilence, than by the direct calamities of war.³

An aggression so unwarrantable as the assault on Plataea tended doubtless to strengthen the unanimity of the Athenian assembly, to silence the opponents of Periklēs, and to lend additional weight to those frequent exhortations,⁴ whereby the great statesman was wont to sustain the courage of his countrymen. Intelligence was sent round to forewarn and hearten up the numerous allies of Athens, tributary as well as free: the latter, with the exception of the Thessalians, Akarnanians, and Messenians at Naupaktus, were all insular, — Chians, Lesbians, Korkyraeans, and Zakynthians: to the island of Kephallenia also they sent envoys, but it was not actually acquired to their alliance until a few months afterwards.⁵ With the Akarnanians, too, their connection had only been commenced a short time before, reem-

¹ Thucyd. ii, 1-6.

² Thucyd. ii, 7, 8. ἡ τε ἄλλη Ἑλλάς πᾶσα μετέωρος ἦν, ζυγισσῶν τῶν πρώτων πόλεων.

³ Thucyd. i, 23.

⁴ Thucyd. ii, 13. ὅπερ καὶ πρότερον, etc., ἔλεγε δὲ καὶ ἄλλα, οἷον περὶ Περικλῆος ἐς ἀπόδειξιν τοῦ περιέσεσθαι τῷ πόλεμῳ.

⁵ Thucyd. ii, 7, 22, 30.

ingly during the preceding summer, arising out of the circumstances of the town of Argos in Amphiloehia. That town, situated on the southern coast of the Ambrakian gulf, was originally occupied by a portion of the Amphiloehi, a non-Hellenic tribe, whose lineage apparently was something intermediate between Akarnanians and Epirots. Some colonists from Ambrakia, having been admitted as co-residents with the Amphiloehian inhabitants of this town, presently expelled them, and retained the town with its territory exclusively for themselves. The expelled inhabitants, fraternizing with their fellow tribes around as well as with the Akarnanians, looked out for the means of restoration; and in order to obtain it, invited the assistance of Athens. Accordingly, the Athenians sent an expedition of thirty triremes, under Phormio, who, joining the Amphiloehians and Akarnanians, attacked and carried Argos, reduced the Ambrakiots to slavery, and restored the town to the Amphiloehians and Akarnanians. It was on this occasion that the alliance of the Akarnanians with Athens was first concluded, and that their personal attachment to the Athenian admiral, Phormio, commenced.¹

The numerous subjects of Athens, whose contributions stood embodied in the annual tribute, were distributed all over and around the Ægean, including all the islands north of Krete, with the exception of Melos and Thera.² Moreover, the elements of force collected in Athens itself, were fully worthy of the metropolis of so great an empire. Periklēs could make a report to his countrymen of three hundred triremes fit for active service; twelve hundred horsemen and horse-bowmen; sixteen hundred bowmen; and the great force of all, not less than twenty-nine thousand hoplites, — mostly citizens, but in part also metics.

¹ Thucyd. ii, 68. The time at which this expedition of Phormio and the capture of Argos happened, is not precisely marked by Thucydides. But his words seem to imply that it was before the commencement of the war, as Poppo observes. Phormio was sent to Chalkidike about October or November 432 B.C. (i, 64): and the expedition against Argos probably occurred between that event and the naval conflict of Korkyraeans and Athenians against Corinthians with their allies, Ambrakiots included, — which conflict had happened in the preceding spring.

² Thucyd. ii, 9.

The chosen portion of these hoplites, both as to age and as to equipment, were thirteen thousand in number; while the remaining sixteen thousand, including the elder and younger citizens and the metics, did garrison-duty on the walls of Athens and Peiræus, — on the long line of wall which connected Athens both with Peiræus and Phalærum, — and in the various fortified posts both in and out of Attica. In addition to these large military and naval forces, the city possessed in the acropolis, an accumulated treasure of coined silver amounting to not less than six thousand talents, or about one million four hundred thousand pounds, derived from annual laying by of tribute from the allies and perhaps of other revenues besides: the treasure had at one time been as large as nine thousand seven hundred talents, or about two million two hundred and thirty thousand pounds, but the cost of the recent religious and architectural decorations at Athens, as well as at the siege of Potidaea, had reduced it to six thousand. Moreover, the acropolis and the temples throughout the city were rich in votive offerings, deposits, sacred plate, and silver implements for the processions and festivals, etc., to an amount estimated at more than five hundred talents; while the great statue of the goddess recently set up by Pheidias in the Parthenon, composed of ivory and gold, included a quantity of the latter metal not less than forty talents in weight, — equal in value to more than four hundred talents of silver, — and all of it so arranged that it could be taken off from the statue at pleasure. In alluding to these sacred valuables among the resources of the state, Periklēs spoke of them only as open to be so applied in case of need, with the firm resolution of replacing them during the first season of prosperity, just as the Corinthians had proposed to borrow from Delphi and Olympia. Besides the hoard thus actually in hand, there came in a large annual revenue, amounting, under the single head of tribute from the subject allies, to six hundred talents, equal to about one hundred and thirty-eight thousand pounds; besides all other items,¹ making up a general total of at least one thousand talents, or about two hundred and thirty thousand pounds.

To this formidable catalogue of means for war were to be

¹ Thucyd. ii, 13; Xenophon, Anab. vii, 4.

added other items not less important, but which did not admit of being weighed and numbered; the unrivalled maritime skill and discipline of the seamen, — the democratical sentiment, alike fervent and unanimous, of the general mass of citizens, — and the superior development of directing intelligence. And when we consider that the enemy had indeed on his side an irresistible land-force, but scarcely anything else, — few ships, no trained seamen, no funds, no powers of combination or headship, — we may be satisfied that there were ample materials for an orator like Periklēs to draw an encouraging picture of the future. He could depict Athens as holding Peloponnesus under siege by means of her navy and a chain of insular posts;¹ and he could guarantee success² as the sure reward of persevering, orderly, and well-considered exertion, combined with firm endurance under a period of temporary but unavoidable suffering; and combined too with another condition hardly less difficult for Athenian temper to comply with, — abstinence from seductive speculations of distant enterprise, while their force was required by the necessities of war near home.³ But such prospects were founded upon a long-sighted calculation, looking beyond immediate loss, and therefore likely to take less hold of the mind of an ordinary citizen, — or at any rate, to be overwhelmed for the moment by the pressure of actual hardship. Moreover, the best which Periklēs could promise was a successful resistance, — the unimpaired maintenance of that great empire to which Athens had become accustomed; a policy purely conservative, without any stimulus from the hope of positive acquisition, — and not only without the sympathy of other states, but with feelings of simple acquiescence on the part of most of her allies, — of strong hostility everywhere else.

On all these latter points the position of the Peloponnesian alliance was far more encouraging. So powerful a body of con-

¹ Thucyd. ii, 7. ὡς βεβαίως περὶ τὴν Πελοπόννησον καταπολεμήσονται, ἢ 90. περὶ τὴν Πελοπόννησον πολιορκούντες.

² Thucyd. ii, 65. τοσούτον τῷ Περικλέϊ ἐπερίσσεισε τότε ἀφ' ὧν αὐτὸς πρόβλεπε, καὶ πάντῃ ἀν' ἡραδίως περιγενέσθαι τῶν Πελοποννησίων αὐτῶν τῷ πολέμῳ.

³ Thucyd. i, 144. ἢν ἐθέλητε ἀρχὴν τε μὴ ἐπικτῆσθαι ἡμᾶ πολέμου, καὶ κινδύνους ἀνθαιρέτους μὴ προστίθεσθαι.

federates had never been got together,—not even to resist Xerxes. Not only the entire strength of Peloponnesus—except Argelians and Achæans, both of whom were neutral at first, though the Achæan town of Pellênê joined even at the beginning, and all the rest subsequently—was brought together, but also the Megarians, Bœotians, Phocians, Opuntian Lokrians, Ambrakiots, Leukadians, and Anaktorians. Among these, Corinth, Megara, Sikyon, Pellênê, Elis, Ambrakia, and Leukas, furnished maritime force, while the Bœotians, Phocians, and Lokrians supplied cavalry. Many of these cities, however, supplied hoplites besides; but the remainder of the confederates furnished hoplites only. It was upon this latter force, not omitting the powerful Bœotian cavalry, that the main reliance was placed; especially for the first and most important operation of the war,—the devastation of Attica. Bound together by the strongest common feeling of active antipathy to Athens, the whole confederacy was full of hope and confidence for this immediate forward march,—so gratifying at once both to their hatred and to their love of plunder, by the hand of destruction laid upon the richest country in Greece,—and presenting a chance even of terminating the war at once, if the pride of the Athenians should be so intolerably stung as to provoke them to come out and fight. Certainty of immediate success, at the first outset, a common purpose to be accomplished and a common enemy to be put down, and favorable sympathies throughout Greece,—all these circumstances filled the Peloponnesians with sanguine hopes at the beginning of the war: and the general persuasion was, that Athens, even if not reduced to submission by the first invasion, could not possibly hold out more than two or three summers against the repetition of this destructive process.¹ Strongly did this confidence contrast with the proud and resolute submission to necessity, not without desponding anticipations of the result, which reigned among the auditors of Periklês.²

¹ Thucyd. vii, 28. ὅσον κατ' ἀρχὰς τοῦ πολέμου, οἱ μὲν ἐνιαυτὸν, οἱ δὲ δύο, οἱ δὲ τριῶν γὰρ ἐτῶν, οὐδεὶς πλεῖω χρόνον, ἐνόμιζον περιόισαι αὐτοὺς (the Athenians), εἰ οἱ Πελοποννήσιοι ἐσβύλοιεν ἐς τὴν ἑώραν: compare v, 14.

² Thucyd. vi, 11. διὰ τὸ παρὰ γνώμην αὐτῶν, πρὸς ἡμᾶς ἐφοβείσθαι.

But though the Peloponnesians entertained confident belief of carrying their point by simple land-campaign, they did not neglect auxiliary preparations for naval and prolonged war. The Lacedæmonians resolved to make up the naval force already existing among themselves and their allies to an aggregate of five hundred triremes; chiefly by the aid of the friendly Dorian cities on the Italian and Sicilian coast. Upon each of them a specific contribution was imposed, together with a given contingent; orders being transmitted to them to make such preparations silently without any immediate declaration of hostility against Athens, and even without refusing for the present to admit any single Athenian ship into their harbors.¹ Besides this, the Lacedæmonians laid their schemes for sending envoys to the Persian king, and to other barbaric powers,—a remarkable evidence of melancholy revolution in Grecian affairs, when that potentate, whom the common arm of Greece had so hardly repulsed a few years before, was now invoked to bring the Phœnician fleet again into the Ægean for the purpose of crushing Athens.

The invasion of Attica, however, without delay, was the primary object to be accomplished; and for that the Lacedæmonians issued circular orders immediately after the attempted surprise at Plataea. Though the vote of the allies was requisite to sanction any war, yet when that vote had once been passed, the Lacedæmonians took upon themselves to direct all the measures of execution. Two-thirds of the hoplites of each confederate city,—apparently two-thirds of a certain assumed rating, for which the city was held liable in the books of the confederacy, so that the Bœotians and others who furnished cavalry were not constrained to send two-thirds of their entire force of hoplites,—were summoned to be present on a certain day at the isthmus of Corinth, with provisions and equipment for an expedition of some length.²

τὰς πρώτας περιγεγενησθαι, καταρτίσαντες ἤδη καὶ τῆς Σικελίας ἰφίσσε. It is Nikias, who, in dissuading the expedition against Syracuse, reminds the Athenians of their past despondency at the beginning of the war.

¹ Thucyd. ii, 7. Diodorus says that the Italian and Sicilian allies were required to furnish two hundred triremes (xii, 41). Nothing of the kind seems to have been actually furnished.

² Thucyd. ii, 10-12.

On the day named, the entire force was found duly assembled, and the Spartan king Archidamus, on taking the command, addressed to the commanders and principal officers from each city a discourse of solemn warning as well as encouragement. His remarks were directed chiefly to abate the tone of sanguine overconfidence which reigned in the army. After adverting to the magnitude of the occasion, the mighty impulse agitating all Greece, and the general good wishes which accompanied them against an enemy so much hated,—he admonished them not to let their great superiority of numbers and bravery seduce them into a spirit of rash disorder. "We are about to attack (he said) an enemy admirably equipped in every way, so that we may be very certain that they will come out and fight,¹ even if they be not now actually on the march to meet us at the border, at least when they see us in their territory ravaging and destroying their property. All men exposed to any unusual indignity become incensed, and act more under passion than under calculation, when it is actually brought under their eyes: much more will the Athenians do so, accustomed as they are to empire, and to ravage the territory of others rather than to see their own so treated."

Immediately on the army being assembled, Archidamus sent Melësiippus as envoy to Athens to announce the coming invasion, being still in hopes that the Athenians would yield. But a resolution had been already adopted, at the instance of Periklēs, to receive neither herald nor envoy from the Lacedæmonians when once their army was on its march: so that Melësiippus was sent back without even being permitted to enter the city. He was ordered to quit the territory before sunset, with guides to accompany him and prevent him from addressing a word to any one. On parting from his guides at the border, Melësiippus exclaimed,²

¹ Thucyd. ii, 11. ὥστε χρηὴ καὶ πάντῃ ἐλπίζειν διὰ μάχης εἶναι αὐτοὺς, εἰ μὴ καὶ νῦν ὤρμηται, ἐν ᾧ οὕτω παρεσμέν, ἀλλ' ὅταν ἐν τῇ γῇ ὀρώσιν ἡμᾶς ἀγούντας τε καὶ τάκείνων φθείροντας.

These reports of speeches are of great value as preserving a record of the feelings and expectations of actors, apart from the result of events. What Archidamus so confidently anticipated, did not come to pass.

² Thucyd. ii, 12.

with a solemnity but too accurately justified by the event "This day will be the beginning of many calamities to the Greeks."

Archidamus, as soon as the reception of his last envoy was made known to him, continued his march from the isthmus into Attica,—which territory he entered by the road of Cēnoê, the frontier Athenian fortress of Attica towards Bœotia. His march was slow, and he thought it necessary to make a regular attack on the fort of Cēnoê, which had been put into so good a state of defence, that after all the various modes of assault, in which the Lacedæmonians were not skilful, had been tried in vain,¹—and after a delay of several days before the place,—he was compelled to renounce the attempt.

The want of enthusiasm on the part of the Spartan king,—his multiplied delays, first at the isthmus, next in the march, and lastly before Cēnoê,—were all offensive to the fiery impatience of the army, who were loud in their murmurs against him. He acted upon the calculation already laid down in his discourse at Sparta,²—that the highly cultivated soil of Attica was to be looked upon as a hostage for the pacific dispositions of the Athenians, who would be more likely to yield when devastation, though not yet inflicted, was nevertheless impending, and at their doors. In this point of view, a little delay at the border was no disadvantage; and perhaps the partisans of peace at Athens may have encouraged him to hope that it would enable them to prevail. Nor can we doubt that it was a moment full of difficulty to Periklēs at Athens. He had to proclaim to all the proprietors in Attica the painful truth, that they must prepare to see their lands and houses overrun and ruined; and that their persons, families, and movable property, must be brought in for safety either to Athens, or to one of the forts in the territory,—or carried across to one of the neighboring islands. It

¹ Thucyd. ii, 18. πᾶσαν ἰδέαν περᾶσαντες οὐκ ἰδύναντο ἔλκεν. The situation of Cēnoê is not exactly agreed upon by topographical inquirers: it was near Eleutherae, and on one of the roads from Attica into Bœotia (Harpokration, v, Οἶνον; Herodot. v, 74). Archidamus marched, probably from the isthmus over Geraneia, and fell into this road in order to receive the junction of the Bœotian contingent after it had crossed Kithæros.

² Thucyd. i, 82; ii, 18.

would, indeed, make a favorable impression when he told the Athenians that Archidamus was his own family friend, yet only within such limits as consisted with duty to the city: in case, therefore, the invaders, while ravaging Attica, should receive instruction to spare his own lands, he would forthwith make them over to the state as public property: nor was such a case unlikely to arise, if not from the personal feeling of Archidamus, at least from the deliberate manœuvre of the Spartans, who would seek thus to set the Athenian public against Periklēs, as they had tried to do before by demanding the banishment of the sacrilegious Alkmæonid race.¹ But though this declaration would doubtless provoke a hearty cheer, the lesson which he had to inculcate, not simply for admission as prudent policy, but for actual practice, was one revolting alike to the immediate interest, the dignity, and the sympathies of his countrymen. To see their lands all ravaged, without raising an arm to defend them, — to carry away their wives and families, and to desert and dismantle their country residences, as they had done during the Persian invasion, — all in the confidence of compensation in other ways and of remote ultimate success, — were recommendations which, probably, no one but Periklēs could have hoped to enjoin. They were, moreover, the more painful to execute, inasmuch as the Athenian citizens had very generally retained the habits of residing permanently, not in Athens, but in the various demes of Attica; many of which still preserved their temples, their festivals, their local customs, and their limited municipal autonomy, handed down from the day when they had once been independent of Athens.² It was but recently that the farming, the comforts, and the ornaments, thus distributed over Attica, had been restored from the ruin of the Persian invasion, and brought to a higher pitch of improvement than ever; yet the fruits of this labor, and the scenes of these local affections, were now to be again delib-

¹ Thucyd. ii, 13: compare Tacitus, *Histor. v*, 23. "Cerealis, insulam Batavorum hostiliter populatus, agros Civilis, *notā arte ducum*, intactos sinebat." Also Livy, ii, 39.

Justin affirms that the Lacedæmonian invaders actually did leave the lands of Periklēs uninjured, and that he made them over to the people (iii, 7). Thucydides does not say whether the case really occurred: see also Polyænus, i, 36.

² Thucyd. ii, 15, 16.

erately abandoned to a new aggressor, and exchanged for the utmost privation and discomfort. Archidamus might well doubt: whether the Athenians would nerve themselves up to the pitch of resolution necessary for this distressing step, when it came to the actual crisis; and whether they would not constrain Periklēs against his will to make propositions for peace. His delay on the border, and postponement of actual devastation, gave the best chance for such propositions being made; though as this calculation was not realized, the army raised plausible complaints against him for having allowed the Athenians time to save so much of their property.

From all parts of Attica the residents flocked within the spacious walls of Athens, which now served as shelter for the houseless, like Salamis, forty-nine years before: entire families with all their movable property, and even with the woodwork of their houses; the sheep and cattle were conveyed to Eubœa and the other adjoining islands.¹ Though a few among the fugitives obtained dwellings or reception from friends, the greater number were compelled to encamp in the vacant spaces of the city and Peiræus, or in and around the numerous temples of the city, — always excepting the acropolis and the eleusinion, which were at all times strictly closed to profane occupants; but even the ground called *the Pelasgikon*, immediately under the acropolis, which, by an ancient and ominous tradition, was interdicted to human abode,² was made use of under the present necessity. Many, too, placed their families in the towers and recesses of

¹ Thucyd. ii, 14.

² Thucyd. ii, 17. *καὶ τὸ Πελασγικὸν καλούμενον τὸ ὑπὸ τὴν ἀκρόπολιν, ὃ καὶ ἐπαρταὶ τε ἦν μὴ οἰκεῖν καὶ τι καὶ Πυθικοῦ μαντείου ἀκροτελεύτιον τοιούτῳ διεκώλυε, λέγον ὡς τὸ Πελασγικὸν ἀργὸν ἄμεινον, ὅμως ὑπὸ τῆς παραλήρημα ἀνάγκης ἐξοικήθη.*

Thucydides then proceeds to give an explanation of his own for this ancient prophecy, intended to save its credit, as well as to show that his countrymen had not, as some persons alleged, violated any divine mandate by admitting residents into the Pelasgikon. When the oracle said: "The Pelasgikon is better unoccupied," it did not mean to interdict the occupation of that spot, but to foretell that it would never be occupied until a time of severe calamity arrived. The necessity of occupying it grew only out of national suffering. Such is the explanation suggested by Thucydides.

the city walls,¹ or in sheds, cabins, tents, or even tubs, disposed along the course of the long walls to Peiræus. In spite of so serious an accumulation of losses and hardships, the glorious endurance of their fathers in the time of Xerxes was faithfully copied, and copied too under more honorable circumstances, since at that time there had been no option possible; whereas, the march of Archidamus might, perhaps, now have been arrested by submissions, ruinous indeed to Athenian dignity, yet not inconsistent with the security of Athens, divested of her rank and power. Such submissions, if suggested as they probably may have been by the party opposed to Perikles, found no echo among the suffering population.

After having spent several days before (Enos without either taking the fort or receiving any message from the Athenians, Archidamus marched onward to Eleusis and the Thriasian plain. — about the middle of June, eighty days after the surprise of Platea. His army was of irresistible force, not less than sixty thousand hoplites, according to the statement of Plutarch;² or of one hundred thousand, according to others: considering the number of constituent allies, the strong feeling by which they were prompted, and the shortness of the expedition combined with the chance of plunder, even the largest of these two numbers is not incredibly great, if we take it to include not hoplites only, but cavalry and light-armed also: but as Thucydides, though comparatively full in his account of this march, has stated no general total, we may presume that he had heard none upon which he could rely. As the Athenians had made no movement towards peace, Archidamus anticipated that they would come forth to meet him in the fertile plain of Eleusis and Thria, which was the first portion of territory that he sat down to ravage: but no Athenian force appeared to oppose him, except a detachment of cavalry, who were repulsed in a skirmish near the small lakes called Rheiti. Having laid waste this plain without any serious opposition, Archidamus did not think fit to

¹ Aristophanes, *Equites*, 789. ἀποστὰς ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν καὶ ἐν γυμνασίοις καὶ ἐν τοῖς οἴκοις. The philosopher Diogenes, in talking of his attack on the city, gives the same examples in his story of the city.

² Plutarch, *Perikles*, c. 20.

pursue the straight road which from Thria conducted directly to Athens across the ridge of Mount Ægaleos, but turned off to the westward, leaving that mountain on his right hand until he came to Krôpeia, where he crossed a portion of the line of Ægaleos over to Acharnae. He was here about seven miles from Athens, on a declivity sloping down into the plain which stretches westerly and northwesterly from Athens, and visible from the city walls: and he here encamped, keeping his army in perfect order for battle, but at the same time intending to damage and ruin the place and its neighborhood. Acharnae was the largest and most populous of all the demes in Attica, furnishing no less than three thousand hoplites to the national line, and flourishing as well by its corn, vines, and olives, as by its peculiar abundance of charcoal-burning from the forests of ilex on the neighboring hills: moreover, if we are to believe Aristophanes, the Acharnian proprietors were not merely sturdy "hearts of oak," but peculiarly vehement and irritable.¹ It illustrates the condition of a Grecian territory under invasion, when we find this great deme, which could not have contained less than twelve thousand free inhabitants of both sexes and all ages, with at least an equal number of slaves, completely deserted. Archidamus calculated that when the Athenians actually saw his troops so close to their city, carrying fire and sword over their wealthiest canton, their indignation would become uncontrollable, and they would march out forthwith to battle. The Acharnian proprietors especially, he thought, would be foremost in inflaming this temper, and insisting upon protection to their own properties, — or, if the remaining citizens refused to march out along with them, they would, after having been thus left undefended to ruin, become discontented and indifferent to the general weal.²

Though his calculation was not realized, it was, nevertheless, founded upon most rational grounds. What Archidamus antic-

¹ See the *Acharneis* of Aristophanes, represented in the sixth year of the Peloponnesian war, v, 34, 180, 254, etc.

πρεσβυταί τινες

Ἀχαρνικοὶ, στικτοὶ γέροντες, πρίνινοι,
ἀτεράμονες, Μαραθωνομάχαι, σφενδάμνινοι, etc.

² Thucyd. ii, 20.

ipated was on the point of happening, and nothing prevented it, except the personal ascendancy of Periklēs, strained to its very utmost. So long as the invading army was engaged in the Thriasian plain, the Athenians had some faint hope that it might — like Pleistoanax, fourteen years before — advance no farther into the interior: but when it came to Acharnæ, within sight of the city walls, — when the ravagers were actually seen destroying buildings, fruit-trees, and crops, in the plain of Athens, a sight strange to every Athenian eye except to those very old men who recollected the Persian invasion, — the exasperation of the general body of citizens rose to a pitch never before known. The Acharnians first of all, next the youthful citizens generally, — became madly clamorous for arming and going forth to fight. Knowing well their own great strength, but less correctly informed of the superior strength of the enemy, they felt confident that victory was within their reach. Groups of citizens were everywhere gathered together,¹ angrily debating the critical question of the moment; while the usual concomitants of excited feeling, — oracles and prophecies of diverse tenor, many of them, doubtless, promising success against the enemy at Acharnæ, — were eagerly caught up and circulated.

In this inflamed temper of the Athenian mind, Periklēs was naturally the great object of complaint and wrath. He was denounced as the cause of all the existing suffering: he was reviled as a coward for not leading out the citizens to fight, in his capacity of general: the rational convictions as to the necessity of the war and the only practicable means of carrying it on, which his repeated speeches had implanted, seemed to be altogether forgotten.² This burst of spontaneous discontent was, of course, fomented by the numerous political enemies of Periklēs, and particularly by Kleon,³ now rising into importance as an opposition-speaker; whose talent for invective was thus first exercised under the auspices of the high aristocratical party, as

¹ Thucyd. ii, 21. *κατὰ ξυστάσεις δὲ γινόμενοι ἐν πολλῇ ἱερᾷ ἦσαν*: compare Euripidēs, *Herakleidæ*, 416; and *Andromachē*, 1077.

² Thucyd. ii, 21. *παντὶ τε τρόπῳ ἀνυπόθεστο ἡ πόλις καὶ τὸν Περικλῆα ἐν ὀργῇ εἶχον, καὶ ὃν παρήνεσε πρότερον ἐμμένοντα σῶσαι, ἀλλὰ ἑλακίζον ἐν σφίσι, ἡγῶν δὲ οὐκ ἐπεξάγοι αἰτίων τε σφισιν ἐνομιζόντων τὰντῶν ὃν ἐπασχον*.

³ Plutarch, *Periklēs*, c. 33.

well as of an excited public. But no manifestations, however violent, could disturb either the judgment or the firmness of Periklēs. He listened, unmoved, to all the declarations made against him, and resolutely refused to convene any public assembly, or any meeting invested with an authorized character, under the present irritated temper of the citizens.¹ It appears that he, as general, or rather the board of ten generals, among whom he was one, must have been invested constitutionally with the power, not only of calling the *ekklesia* when they thought fit, but also of preventing it from meeting,² and of postponing even those regular meetings which commonly took place at fixed times, four times in the *prytany*. No assembly, accordingly, took place, and the violent exasperation of the people was thus prevented from realizing itself in any rash public resolution. That Periklēs should have held firm against this raging force, is but one among the many honorable points in his political character; but it is far less wonderful than the fact, that his refusal to call the *ekklesia* was efficacious to prevent the *ekklesia* from being held. The entire body of Athenians were now assembled within the walls, and if he refused to convoke the *ekklesia*, they might easily have met in the *Pnyx*, without him; for which it would not have been difficult at such a juncture to provide plausible justification. The inviolable respect which the Athenian people manifested on this occasion for the forms of their democratical constitution — assisted doubtless by their long-established esteem for Periklēs, yet opposed to an excitement alike intense and pervading, and to a demand apparently reasonable, in so far as regarded the calling of an assembly for discussion, — is one of the most memorable incidents in their history.

While Periklēs thus decidedly forbade any general march out for battle, he sought to provide as much employment as possible for the compressed eagerness of the citizens. The cavalry were

¹ Thucyd. ii, 22.

² See Schömann, *De Comitibus*, c. iv, p. 62. The *prytanes* (i. e. the fifty senators belonging to that tribe whose turn it was to preside at the time), as well as the *stratēgi*, had the right of convoking the *ekklesia*: see Thucyd. iv, 118, in which passage, however, they are represented as convoking it in conjunction with the *stratēgi*: probably a discretion on the point came gradually to be understood as vested in the latter.

sent out, together with the Thessalian cavalry their allies, for the purpose of restraining the excursions of the enemy's light troops, and protecting the lands near the city from plunder.¹ At the same time, he fitted out a powerful expedition, which sailed forth to ravage Peloponnesus, even while the invaders were yet in Attica.² Archidamus, after having remained engaged in the devastation of Acharnæ long enough to satisfy himself that the Athenians would not hazard a battle, turned away from Athens in a northwesterly direction towards the demes between Mount Brilëssus and Mount Parnës, on the road passing through Dekeleia. The army continued ravaging these districts until their provisions were exhausted, and then quitted Attica by the northwestern road near Orôpus, which brought them into Bœotia. The Oropians were not Athenians, but dependent upon Athens, and the district of Græa, a portion of their territory, was laid waste; after which, the army dispersed and retired back to their respective homes.³ It would seem that they quitted Attica towards the end of July, having remained in the country between thirty and forty days.

Meanwhile, the Athenian expedition under Karkinus, Prôteas, and Sokratês, joined by fifty Korkyræan ships, and by some other allies, sailed round Peloponnesus, landing in various parts to inflict damage, and among other places, at Methônê (Modon) on the southwestern peninsula of the Lacedæmonian territory.⁴

¹ Thucyd. ii, 22. The funeral monument of these slain Thessalians was among those seen by Pausanias near Athens, on the side of the Academy (Pausan. i, 29, 5).

² Diodorus (xii. 42) would have us believe, that the expedition sent out by Periklës, ravaging the Peloponnesian coast, induced the Lacedæmonians to hurry away their troops out of Attica. Thucydides gives no countenance to this, — nor is it at all credible.

³ Thucyd. ii, 23. The reading Γραικῶν, belonging to Γραία, seems preferable to Περραικῶν. Poppo and Gôller adopt the former, Dr. Arnold the latter. Græa was a small maritime place in the vicinity of Orôpus (Aristotel. ap. Stephan. Byz. v. Ταύρα), — known also now as an Attic deme belonging to the tribe Pandionis: this has been discovered for the first time by an inscription published in Professor Ross's work (Ueber die Deme von Attika, pp. 3-5). Orôpus was not an Attic deme; the Athenian citizens residing in it were probably enrolled as Γραικοί.

⁴ Thucyd. ii, 25; Plutarch, Periklës, c. 84; Justin, iii, 7, 5.

The place, neither strong nor well-garrisoned, would have been carried with little difficulty, had not Brasidas the son of Tellis, — a gallant Spartan now mentioned for the first time, but destined to great celebrity afterwards, — who happened to be on guard at a neighboring post, thrown himself into it with one hundred men by a rapid movement, before the dispersed Athenian troops could be brought together to prevent him. He infused such courage into the defenders of the place that every attack was repelled, and the Athenians were forced to reëmbark, — an act of prowess which procured for him the first public honors bestowed by the Spartans during this war. Sailing northward along the western coast of Peloponnesus, the Athenians landed again on the coast of Elis, a little south of the promontory called Cape Ichthys: they ravaged the territory for two days, defeating both the troops in the neighborhood and three hundred chosen men from the central Eleian territory. Strong winds on a harborless coast now induced the captains to sail with most of the troops round Cape Ichthys, in order to reach the harbor of Pheia on the northern side of it; while the Messenian hoplites, marching by land across the promontory, attacked Pheia and carried it by assault. When the fleet arrived, all were reëmbarked, — the full force of Elis being under march to attack them: they then sailed northward, landing on various other spots to commit devastation, until they reached Sollium, a Corinthian settlement on the coast of Akarnania. They captured this place, which they handed over to the inhabitants of the neighboring Akarnanian town of Palærus, — as well as Astakus, from whence they expelled the despot Euarchus, and enrolled the town as a member of the Athenian alliance. From hence they passed over to Kephallênia, which they were fortunate enough also to acquire as an ally of Athens without any compulsion, — with its four distinct towns, or districts, Palës, Kranii, Samê, and Pionê. These various operations took up near three months from about the beginning of July, so that they returned to Athens towards the close of September,¹ — the beginning of the winter half of the year, according to the distribution of Thucydides.

Nor was this the only maritime expedition of the summer

¹ Thucyd. ii, 25-29; Diodor. xii, 43, 44.

thirty more triremes, under Kleopompus, were sent through the Euripus to the Lokrian coast opposite to the northern part of Eubœa. Some disembarkations were made, whereby the Lokrian towns of Thronium and Alopê were sacked, and farther devastation inflicted: while a permanent garrison was planted, and a fortified post erected, in the uninhabited island of Atalanta, opposite to the Lokrian coast, in order to restrain privateers from Opus and the other Lokrian towns in their excursions against Eubœa.¹ It was farther determined to expel the Æginetan inhabitants from Ægina, and to occupy the island with Athenian colonists. This step was partly rendered prudent by the important position of the island midway between Attica and Peloponnesus; but a concurrent motive, and probably the stronger motive, was the gratification of ancient antipathy and revenge against a people who had been among the foremost in provoking the war and in inflicting upon Athens so much suffering. The Æginetans with their wives and children were all put on shipboard and landed in Peloponnesus, — where the Spartans permitted them to occupy the maritime district and town of Thyrea, their last frontier towards Argos: some of them, however, found shelter in other parts of Greece. The island was made over to a detachment of Athenian kleruchs, or citizen proprietors, sent thither by lot.²

To the sufferings of the Æginetans, which we shall hereafter find still more deplorably aggravated, we have to add those of the Megarians. Both had been most zealous in kindling the war, but upon none did the distress of war fall so heavily. Both probably shared the premature confidence felt among the Peloponnesian confederacy, that Athens could never hold out more than a year or two, — and were thus induced to overlook their own undefended position against her. Towards the close of September, the full force of Athens, citizens and metics, marched into the Megarid under Periklès, and laid waste the greater part of the territory: while they were in it, the hundred ships which had been circumnavigating Peloponnesus, having arrived at Ægina on their return, went and joined their fellow-citizens in

¹ Thucyd. ii, 26–32; Diodor. xii, 44.

² Thucyd. ii, 27

the Megarid, instead of going straight home. The junction of the two formed the largest Athenian force that had ever yet been seen together: there were ten thousand citizen hoplites, independent of three thousand others who were engaged in the siege of Potidæa, and three thousand metic hoplites, — besides a large number of light troops.¹ Against so large a force the Megarians could of course make no head, and their territory was all laid waste, even to the city walls. For several years of the war, the Athenians inflicted this destruction once, and often twice in the same year: a decree was proposed in the Athenian ekklesia by Charinus, though perhaps not carried, to the effect that the strategæ every year should swear, as a portion of their oath of office,² that they would twice invade and ravage the Megarid. As the Athenians at the same time kept the port of Nisæa blocked up, by means of their superior naval force and of the neighboring coast of Salamis, the privations imposed on the Megarians became extreme and intolerable.³ Not merely their corn and fruits, but even their garden vegetables near the city, were rooted up and destroyed, and their situation seems often to have been that of a besieged city hard pressed by famine. Even in the time of Pausanias, so many centuries afterwards, the miseries of the town during these years were remembered and communicated to him, being assigned as the reason why one of their most memorable statues had never been completed.⁴

To these various military operations of Athens during the course of this summer, some other measures of moment are to be added; and Thucydides also notices an eclipse of the sun which modern astronomical calculations refer to the third of August: had this eclipse happened three months earlier, immediately before the entrance of the Peloponnesians into Attica, it might

¹ Thucyd. ii, 31; Diodor. xii, 44.

² Plutarch, Periklès, c. 30.

³ See the striking picture in the *Acharneis* of Aristophanès (685–781) of the distressed Megarian selling his hungry children into slavery with their own consent: also Aristoph. *Pac.* 482.

The position of Megara, as the ally of Sparta and enemy of Athens, was uncomfortable in the same manner, — though not to the same intense pitch of suffering, — in the war which preceded the battle of *Leinæa*, near fifty years after this (Demosthen. *cont. Near.*, p. 1357, c. 12).

⁴ Pausan. i, 40, 3.

probably have been construed as an unfavorable omen, and caused the postponement of the scheme. Expecting a prolonged struggle, the Athenians now made arrangements for placing Attica in a permanent state of defence, both by sea and land; what these arrangements were, we are not told in detail, but one of them was sufficiently remarkable to be named particularly. They set apart one thousand talents out of the treasure in the acropolis as an inviolable reserve, not to be touched except on the single contingency of a hostile naval force about to assail the city, with no other means at hand to defend it. They further enacted, that if any citizen should propose, or any magistrate put the question, in the public assembly, to make any different application of this reserve, he should be punishable with death. Moreover, they resolved every year to keep back one hundred of their best triremes, and trierarchs to command and equip them, for the same special necessity.¹ It may be doubted whether this latter provision was placed under the same stringent sanction, or observed with the same rigor, as that concerning the money, which latter was not departed from until the twentieth year of the war, after all the disasters of the Sicilian expedition, and on the terrible news of the revolt of Chios. It was on that occasion that the Athenians first repealed the sentence of capital punishment against the proposer of this forbidden change, and next appropriated the money to meet the then imminent peril of the commonwealth.²

The resolution here taken about this sacred reserve, and the rigorous sentence interdicting contrary propositions, is pronounced by Mr. Mitford to be an evidence of the indelible barbarism of democratical government.³ But we must recollect, first, that the

¹ Thucyd. ii. 24.

² Thucyd. viii. 15.

³ Mitford, Hist. of Greece, ch. xiv. sect. 1. vol. iii. p. 100. "Another measure followed, which, taking place at the time when Thucydides wrote and Periklēs spoke, and while Periklēs held the principal influence in the administration, strongly marks both the inherent weakness and the indelible barbarism of democratical government. A decree of the people directed But so little confidence was placed in a decree so important, sanctioned only by the present will of that giddy tyrant, the multitude of Athens, against whose caprices, since the depression of the court of Areopagus, no balancing power remained. — that the denunciation of capr

sentence of capital punishment was one which could hardly by possibility come into execution; for no citizen would be so mad as to make the forbidden proposition, while this law was in force. Whoever desired to make it, would first begin by proposing to repeal the prohibitory law, whereby he would incur no danger, whether the assembly decided in the affirmative or negative; and if he obtained an affirmative decision, he would then, and then only, proceed to move the reappropriation of the fund. To speak the language of English parliamentary procedure, he would first move the suspension or abrogation of the standing order whereby the proposition was forbidden, — next, he would move the proposition itself: in fact, such was the mode actually pursued, when the thing at last came to be done.¹ But though the capital sentence could hardly come into effect, the proclamation of it *in terrorem* had a very distinct meaning. It expressed the deep and solemn conviction which the people entertained of the importance of their own resolution about the reserve, — it forewarned all assemblies and all citizens to come, of the danger of diverting it to any other purpose, — it surrounded the reserve with an artificial sanctity, which forced every man who aimed at the reappropriation to begin with a preliminary proposition, formidable on the very face of it, as removing a guarantee which previous assemblies had deemed of immense value, and opening the door to a contingency which they had looked upon as treasonable. The proclamation of a lighter punishment, or a simple prohibition without any definite sanction whatever, would neither have announced the same emphatic conviction, nor produced the same deterring effect. The assembly of 431 B.C. could not in any way enact laws which subsequent assemblies could not reverse; but it could so frame its enactments, in cases of peculiar solemnity, as to make its authority strongly felt upon the judgment of its successors, and to prevent them from entertaining motions for repeal, except under necessity at once urgent and

tal punishment was proposed against whosoever should propose, and whosoever should concur in (?) any decree for the disposal of that money to any other purpose, or in any other circumstances."

¹ Thucyd. viii. 15. τα δὲ χίλια ταλάντα, ὧν διὰ παντὸς τοῦ πολέμου ἐλάχοντο μὴ ἀφίσθαι εὐθὺς ἔλυσαν τὰς ἐπικειμένας ζημίας τῷ εἰπόντι ἡ ἐπιψηφίσαντι, ὑπὸ τῆς παρούσης ἐκπλήξεως, καὶ ἐψηφίσαντο κινεῖν.

obvious. Far from thinking that the law now passed at Athens displayed barbarism, either in the end or in the means, I consider it principally remarkable for its cautious and long-sighted view of the future, — qualities the exact reverse of barbarism. — and worthy of the general character of Periklês, who probably suggested it. Athens was just entering into a war which threatened to be of indefinite length, and was certain to be very costly. To prevent the people from exhausting all their accumulated fund, and to place them under a necessity of reserving something against extreme casualties, was an object of immense importance. Now the particular casualty, which Periklês, assuming him to be the proposer, named as the sole condition of touching this one thousand talents, might be considered as of all others the most improbable, in the year 431 B.C. So immense was then the superiority of the Athenian naval force, that to suppose it defeated, and a Peloponnesian fleet in full sail for Peiræus, was a possibility which it required a statesman of extraordinary caution to look forward to, and which it is truly wonderful that the people generally could have been induced to contemplate. Once tied up to this purpose, however, the fund lay ready for any other terrible emergency: and we shall find the actual employment of it incalculably beneficial to Athens, at a moment of the gravest peril, when she could hardly have protected herself without some such special resource. The people would scarcely have sanctioned so rigorous an economy, had it not been proposed to them at a period so early in the war that their available reserve was still much larger: but it will be forever to the credit of their foresight as well as constancy, that they should first have adopted such a precautionary measure, and afterwards adhered to it for nineteen years, under severe pressure for money, until at length a case arose which rendered farther abstinence really, and not constructively, impossible.

To display their force and take revenge by disembarking and ravaging parts of Peloponnesus, was doubtless of much importance to Athens during this first summer of the war: though it might seem that the force so employed was quite as much needed in the conquest of Potidæa, which still remained under blockade, — and of the neighboring Chalkidians in Thrace, still in revolt. It was during the course of this summer that a prospect opened

to Athens of subduing these towns, through the assistance of Sitalkes, king of the Odrysian Thracians. That prince had married the sister of Nymphodôrus, a citizen of Abdêra; who engaged to render him, and his son Sadokus, allies of Athens. Sent for to Athens and appointed proxenus of Athens at Abdêra, which was one of the Athenian subject allies, Nymphodôrus made this alliance, and promised, in the name of Sitalkês, that a sufficient Thracian force should be sent to aid Athens in the reconquest of her revolted towns: the honor of Athenian citizenship was at the same time conferred upon Sadokus.¹ Nymphodôrus farther established a good understanding between Perdikkas of Macedonia and the Athenians, who were persuaded to restore to him Therma, which they had before taken from him. The Athenians had thus the promise of powerful aid against the Chalkidians and Potidæans: yet the latter still held out, with little prospect of immediate surrender. Moreover, the town of Astakus, in Akarnania, which the Athenians had captured during the summer, in the course of their expedition round Peloponnesus, was recovered during the autumn by the deposed despot Euarchus, assisted by forty Corinthian triremes and one thousand hoplites. This Corinthian armament, after restoring Euarchus, made some unsuccessful descents both upon other parts of Akarnania and upon the island of Kephallênia: in the latter, they were entrapped into an ambushade, and obliged to return home with considerable loss.²

It was towards the close of this autumn also that Periklês, chosen by the people for the purpose, delivered the funeral oration at the public interment of those warriors who had fallen during the campaign. The ceremonies of this public token of respect have already been described in a former chapter, on occasion of the conquest of Samos: but that which imparted to the present scene an imperishable interest, was the discourse of the chosen statesman and orator; probably heard by Thucydides himself, and in substance reproduced. A large crowd of citizens and foreigners, of both sexes and all ages, accompanied the funeral procession from Athens to the suburb called the outer Kerameikus, where Periklês, mounted upon a lofty stage pre-

¹ Thucyd. i. 23.

² Thucyd. ii. 33.

pared for the occasion, closed the ceremony with his address. The law of Athens not only provided this public funeral and commemorative discourse, but also assigned maintenance at the public expense to the children of the slain warriors until they attained military age: a practice which was acted on throughout the whole war, though we have only the description and discourse belonging to this single occasion.¹

The eleven chapters of Thucydides which comprise this funeral speech are among the most memorable relics of antiquity; considering that under the language and arrangement of the historian, — always impressive, though sometimes harsh and peculiar, like the workmanship of a powerful mind, misled by a bad or an unattainable model, — we possess the substance and thoughts of the illustrious statesman. A portion of it, of course, is and must be common-place, belonging to all discourses composed for a similar occasion. Yet this is true only of a comparatively small portion: much of it is peculiar, and every way worthy of Periklēs, — comprehensive, rational, and full, not less of sense and substance than of earnest patriotism. It thus forms a strong contrast with the jejune, though elegant, rhetoric of other harangues, mostly² not composed for actual delivery; and

¹ Thucyd. ii. 34-45. Sometimes, also, the allies of Athens, who had fallen along with her citizens in battle, had a part in the honors of the public burial (Lysias, *Orat. Funebr.* c. 13).

² The critics, from Dionysius of Halikarnassus downward, agree, for the most part, in pronouncing the feeble *λόγος Ἐπιτάφιος*, ascribed to Demosthenēs, to be not really his. Of those ascribed to Plato and Lysias also, the genuineness has been suspected, though upon far less grounds. The Menexenus, if it be really the work of Plato, however, does not add to his fame: but the harangue of Lysias, a very fine composition, may well be his, and may, perhaps, have been really delivered, — though probably not delivered by him, as he was not a qualified citizen.

See the general instructions, in Dionys. Hal. *Ars Rhetoric.* c. 6, pp. 258-268, Reisk. on the contents and composition of a funeral discourse. — Lysias is said to have composed several. — Plutarch, *Vit. x. Orator.* p. 836.

Compare, respecting the funeral discourse of Periklēs, K. F. Weber, *Über die Stand-Rede des Perikles* (Darmstadt, 1827); Westermann, *Geschichte der Beredsamkeit in Griechenland und Rom.* sects. 35, 63, 64; Kutzou, *Periklēs, als Staatsman*, p. 158, sect. 12 (Grimma, 1834).

Dahlmann (*Historische Forschungen*, vol. i, p. 23) seems to think that the original oration of Periklēs contained a large sprinkling of mythical

deserves, in comparison with the funeral discourses remaining to us from Plato, and the pseudo-Demosthenēs, and even Lysias, the honorable distinction which Thucydides claims for his own history, — an ever-living possession, and not a mere show-piece for the moment.

In the outset of his speech, Periklēs distinguishes himself from those who had preceded him in the same function of public orator, by dissenting from the encomiums which it had been customary to bestow on the law enjoining these funeral harangues: he thinks that the publicity of the funeral itself, and the general demonstrations of respect and grief by the great body of citizens, tell more emphatically in token of gratitude to the brave dead, when the scene passes in silence, than when it is translated into the words of a speaker, who may easily offend, either by incompetency or by apparent feebleness, or perhaps even by unseasonable exaggeration. Nevertheless, the custom having been embodied in law, and elected as he has been by the citizens, he comes forward to discharge the duty imposed upon him in the best manner he can.¹

One of the remarkable features in this discourse is, its business-like, impersonal character: it is Athens herself who undertakes to commend and decorate her departed sons, as well as to hearten up and admonish the living.

After a few words on the magnitude of the empire, and on the glorious efforts as well as endurance whereby their forefathers and they had acquired it, — Periklēs proceeds to sketch the plan of life, the constitution, and the manners, under which such achievements were brought about.²

allusions and stories out of the antiquities of Athens, such as we now find in the other funeral orations above alluded to; but that Thucydides himself deliberately left them out in his report. But there seems no foundation for this suspicion. It is much more consonant to the superior tone of dignity which reigns throughout all this oration, to suppose that the mythical narratives and even the previous historical glories of Athens, never found any special notice in the speech of Periklēs, — nothing more than a general recognition, with an intimation that he does not dwell upon them at length because they were well known to his audience, — *μακρηγορεῖν ἐν εἰδύσει οἱ δουλομενός ἐστω* (ii. 36).

¹ Thucyd. ii. 35.

² Thucyd. ii. 36. *Ἀπὸ δὲ οἷας τε ἐπιτηδεύσεως ἤλθομεν ἐπ' αὐτὰ, καὶ μετ' οὗτας πολιτείας, καὶ τροπῶν ἐξ οἷων μεγάλα ἐγένετο, ταῦτα δηλώσας πρῶτον εἰμι, etc.*

"We live under a constitution such as noway to envy the laws of our neighbors, — ourselves an example to others, rather than mere imitators. It is called a democracy, since its permanent aim tends towards the many and not towards the few: in regard to private matters and disputes, the laws deal equally with every man: while looking to public affairs and to claims of individual influence, every man's chance of advancement is determined, not by party-favor but by real worth, according as his reputation stands in his own particular department: nor does poverty, or obscure station, keep him back,¹ if he really has the means of benefiting the city. And our social march is free, not merely in regard to public affairs, but also in regard to intolerance of each other's diversity of daily pursuits. For we are not angry with our neighbor for what he may do to please himself, nor do we ever put on those sour looks,² which, though they do no positive damage, are not the less sure to offend. Thus conducting our private social intercourse with reciprocal indulgence, we are restrained from wrong on public matters by fear and reverence of our magistrates for the time being, and of our laws, — especially such laws as are instituted for the protection of wrongful sufferers, and even such others as, though not written, are enforced by a common sense of shame. Besides this, we have provided for our minds numerous recreations from toil, partly by our customary solemnities of sacrifice and festival throughout the year, partly by the elegance of our private establishments, — the daily charm of which banishes the sense of discomfort. From the magnitude of our city, the products of the whole earth are brought to us, so that our enjoyment of foreign luxuries is as

¹In the Demosthenic or pseudo-Demosthenic Orat. Funeris, c. 8, p. 1397 — χρηστῶν ἐπιτηδευμάτων σιγήσεια: τῆς δὲ πλείστης ἰσχυρίας, etc.

²Thucyd. ii, 37. οὐδ' αὖ κατὰ πέναν, ἔχον δὲ τὰ ἀγαθὰν δρᾶσαι τὴν νότον, ἀξιώματος ἀφανεία κενώλῃται: compare Plato, Menexenus, c. 8.

³Thucyd. ii, 37. ἐλευθέρως δὲ τὰ τε πρὸς τὸ κοινὸν πολιτευόμεν, καὶ ἐς ἡν πρὸς ἀλλήλους τῶν καθ' ἡμέραν ἐπιτηδευμάτων ὑποψίαν, οὐ δὲ ὀργῆς τὸν πῆλας, εἰ καθ' ἡδονὴν τι δρᾷ, ἔχοντες, οὐδὲ ἀξίμιους μὲν, λυπηρὰς δὲ, τῇ ὀφειλῇ ἐχθηδόνας προστιθέμενοι. Ἀνεπαρξῶς δὲ τὰ ἴδια προσομιλοῦντες τὰ δημόσια διὰ δέος μάλιστα οὐ παρνομοίμεν, τῶν τε αὖ ἐν ἀρχῇ ὄντων ακροάσει καὶ τῶν νόμων, καὶ μάλιστα αὐτῶν ὅσοι τε ἐπ' ὀφελείᾳ τῶν ἀδικουμένων κείνται, καὶ ὅσοι ἀγραφῶν ὄντες αἰσχυνὴν ὁμολογουμένην φέρουσι.

much our own and assured as those which we grow at home. In respect to training for war, we differ from our opponents (the Lacedæmonians) on several material points. First, we lay open our city as a common resort: we apply no *xenêlasy* to exclude even an enemy either from any lesson or any spectacle, the full view of which he may think advantageous to him: for we trust less to manœuvres and quackery than to our native bravery, for warlike efficiency. Next, in regard to education, while the Lacedæmonians, even from their earliest youth, subject themselves to an irksome exercise for the attainment of courage, we, with our easy habits of life, are not less prepared than they, to encounter all perils within the measure of our strength. The proof of this is, that the Peloponnesian confederates do not attack us one by one, but with their whole united force; while we, when we attack them at home, overpower for the most part all of them who try to defend their own territory. None of our enemies has ever met and contended with our entire force; partly in consequence of our large navy, — partly from our dispersion in different simultaneous land-expeditions. But when they chance to be engaged with any part of it, if victorious, they pretend to have vanquished us all, — if defeated, they pretend to have been vanquished by all.

"Now, if we are willing to brave danger, just as much under an indulgent system as under constant toil, and by spontaneous courage as much as under force of law, — we are gainers in the end, by not vexing ourselves beforehand with sufferings to come, yet still appearing in the hour of trial not less daring than those who toil without ceasing.

"In other matters, too, as well as in these, our city deserves admiration. For we combine elegance of taste with simplicity of life, and we pursue knowledge without being enervated: we employ wealth, not for talking and ostentation, but as a real help

¹Thucyd. ii, 40. φιλοκαλοῦμεν γὰρ μετ' εὐτελείας, καὶ φιλοσοφοῦμεν ἀντὶ μαλακίας: πλείω τε ἔργον μᾶλλον καὶ ἢ λόγον κόμπω χρωμένα, καὶ τὸ πένεσθαι οἱχ ὁμολογεῖν τι αἰσχρὸν, ἀλλὰ μὴ διαφεύγειν ἔργῳ αἰσχίον.

The first strophe of the Chorus in Euripid. Medea, 824-841, may be compared with the tenor of this discourse of Periklēs: the praises of Attica are there dwelt upon, as a country too good to receive the guilty Medea.

in the proper season: nor is it disgraceful to any one who is poor to confess his poverty, though he *may* rather incur reproach for not actually keeping himself out of poverty. The magistrates who discharge public trusts fulfil their domestic duties also, — the private citizen, while engaged in professional business, has competent knowledge on public affairs: for we stand alone in regarding the man who keeps aloof from these latter, not as harmless, but as useless. Moreover, we always hear and pronounce on public matters, when discussed by our leaders, — or perhaps strike out for ourselves correct reasonings about them: far from accounting discussion an impediment to action, we complain only if we are not told what is to be done before it becomes our duty to do it. For, in truth, we combine in the most remarkable manner these two qualities, — extreme boldness in execution, with full debate beforehand on that which we are going about: whereas, with others, ignorance alone imparts boldness, — debate introduces hesitation. Assuredly, those men are properly to be regarded as the stoutest of heart, who, knowing most precisely both the terrors of war and the sweets of peace, are still not the less willing to encounter peril.

"In fine, I affirm that our city, considered as a whole, is the schoolmistress of Greece: while, viewed individually, we enable the same man to furnish himself out and suffice to himself in the greatest variety of ways, and with the most complete grace and refinement. This is no empty boast of the moment, but genuine reality: and the power of the city, acquired through the dispositions just indicated, exists to prove it. Athens alone, of all cities, stands forth in actual trial greater than her reputation: her enemy, when he attacks her, will not have his pride wounded by suffering defeat from feeble hands, — her subjects will not think themselves degraded as if their obedience were paid to an unworthy superior.² Having thus put forward our power, not

¹ Thucyd. ii, 41. *ξυνελών τε λόγῳ, τὴν τε πᾶσαν πόλιν τῆς Ἑλλάδος, παιδεύειν εἶναι, καὶ καθ' ἑκάστον δοκεῖν ἂν μοι τὸν αὐτὸν ἄνδρα παρ' ἡμῶν ἐπὶ πλείστον ἂν εἶδῃ καὶ μετὰ χαρίτων μάλιστα ἂν εὐτραπέλως τὸ σῶμα αὐτὰρ κες παρέχεσθαι.*

The abstract word *παιδεύειν*, in place of the concrete *παιδευτρία*, seems to soften the arrogance of the affirmation.

² Thucyd. ii, 41. *μὴν γὰρ τῶν τὴν ἀκοῆς καὶ ἴσως ἐν πλείονι ἔχοντα, καὶ*

uncertified, but backed by the most evident proofs, we shall be admired not less by posterity than by our contemporaries. Nor do we stand in need either of Homer or of any other panegyrist, whose words may for the moment please, while the truth when known would confute their intended meaning: we have compelled all land and sea to become accessible to our courage, and have planted everywhere imperishable monuments of our kindness as well as of our hostility.

"Such is the city on behalf of which these warriors have nobly died in battle, vindicating her just title to unimpaired rights: — and on behalf of which all of us here left behind must willingly toil. It is for this reason that I have spoken at length concerning the city, at once to draw from it the lesson that the conflict is not for equal motives between us and enemies who possess nothing of the like excellence, — and to demonstrate by proofs the truth of my encomium pronounced upon her."

Periklēs pursues at considerable additional length the same tenor of mixed exhortation to the living and eulogy of the dead; with many special and emphatic observations addressed to the relatives of the latter, who were assembled around and doubtless very near him. But the extract which I have already made is so long, that no farther addition would be admissible: yet it was impossible to pass over lightly the picture of the Athenian commonwealth in its glory, as delivered by the ablest citizen of the age. The effect of the democratical constitution, with its diffused and equal citizenship, in calling forth not merely strong attachment, but painful self-sacrifice, on the part of all Athenians, — is nowhere more forcibly insisted upon than in the words above cited of Periklēs, as well as in others afterwards: "Contemplating as you do daily before you the actual power of the state, and becoming passionately attached to it, when you conceive its full

ᾧν οὐτε τῶν πόλεων ἐπελθόντι ἀνίστασθαι ἔχει ὅθ' οἷον κακοπαθεῖ, οὐτε τῶν ἐπὶ τῶν κακοπαθόντων ὧν οὐκ ἐπ' ἀξίων ἀναχέται.

¹ Thucyd. ii, 42. *περὶ τοιαύτης οὖν πόλεως οὐδε τις γενναίως δικαιούντες ἢ ἀφαιρεθῆναι αὐτὴν μαχόμενοι ἐπέλεγεσθαι, καὶ τῶν λειπομένων πάντα τινὰ εἶκος ἐθέλειν ὑπὲρ αὐτῆς κινεῖν.*

I am not sure that I have rightly translated *ἀφαιρεθῆναι* *μὴ ἀφαιρεθῆναι* *εἶπεν*, — but neither Poppo, nor Gölher, nor Dr. Arnold, say anything about these words, which yet are not at all clear.

greatness, reflect that it was all acquired by men of daring, acquainted with their duty, and full of an honorable sense of shame in their actions,"¹ — such is the association which he presents between the greatness of the state as an object of common passion, and the courage, intelligence, and mutual esteem, of individual citizens, as its creating and preserving causes: poor as well as rich being alike interested in the partnership.

But the claims of patriotism, though put forward as essentially and deservedly paramount, are by no means understood to reign exclusively, or to absorb the whole of the democratical activity. Subject to these, and to those laws and sanctions which protect both the public and individuals against wrong, it is the pride of Athens to exhibit a rich and varied fund of human impulse, — an unrestrained play of fancy and diversity of private pursuit, coupled with a reciprocity of cheerful indulgence between one individual and another, and an absence even of those "black looks" which so much embitter life, even if they never pass into enmity of fact. This portion of the speech of Periklēs deserves peculiar attention, because it serves to correct an assertion, often far too indiscriminately made, respecting antiquity as contrasted with modern societies, — an assertion that the ancient societies sacrificed the individual to the state, and that only in modern times has individual agency been left free to the proper extent. This is preëminently true of Sparta: it is also true, in a great degree, of the ideal societies depicted by Plato and Aristotle: but it is pointedly untrue of the Athenian democracy, nor can we with any confidence predicate it of the major part of the Grecian cities.

I shall hereafter return to this point when I reach the times of the great speculative philosophers: in the mean time I cannot pass over this speech of Periklēs without briefly noticing the inference which it suggests, to negative the supposed exorbitant

¹ Thucyd. ii, 43. *την τῆς πόλεως δυνάμιν καὶ ταύτης ἔργῳ ἀποδείκνυται καὶ ἐραστὰς γεγονότους αὐτῆς, καὶ ὅταν ἴδῃν μεγάλη δόξῃ εἶναι, ἐνθουσιάζονται ὅτι τολμώντες καὶ χερσὶ σκοπόντες τὰ δεινὰ, καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἔργοις ἀσχετοῦνται ἄνδρες αὐτὰ ἐκτελεῖν, etc.*

Ἀσχετοῦνται: compare Demosthen. Orat. Funebris. c. 7, p. 1396. *Αἱ μὲν γὰρ διὰ τῶν ὀλίγων δυναστείας θεός μὲν ἐνιργάζονται τοῖς πολίταις, ἀσχετοῦνται δὲ παροιστάσιν.*

interference of the state with individual liberty, as a general fact among the ancient Greek republics. There is no doubt that he has present to his mind a comparison with the extreme narrowness and rigor of Sparta, and that therefore his assertions of the extent of positive liberty at Athens must be understood as partially qualified by such contrast. But even making allowance for this, the stress which he lays upon the liberty of thought and action at Athens, not merely from excessive restraint of law, but also from practical intolerance between man and man, and tyranny of the majority over individual dissenters in taste and pursuit, — deserves serious notice, and brings out one of those points in the national character upon which the intellectual development of the time mainly depended. The national temper was indulgent in a high degree to all the varieties of positive impulses: the peculiar promptings in every individual bosom were allowed to manifest themselves and bear fruit, without being suppressed by external opinion, or trained into forced conformity with some assumed standard: antipathies against any of them formed no part of the habitual morality of the citizen. While much of the generating causes of human hatred was thus rendered inoperative, and while society was rendered more comfortable, more instructive, and more stimulating, — all its germs of productive fruitful genius, so rare everywhere, found in such an atmosphere the maximum of encouragement. Within the limits of the law, assuredly as faithfully observed at Athens as anywhere in Greece, individual impulse, taste, and even eccentricity, were accepted with indulgence, instead of being a mark as elsewhere for the intolerance of neighbors or of the public. This remarkable feature in Athenian life will help us in a future chapter to explain the striking career of Sokratēs, and it farther presents to us, under another face, a great part of that which the censors of Athens denounced under the name of "democratical license." The liberty and diversity of individual life in that city were offensive to Xenophon,¹ Plato, and Aristotle, — attached either

¹ Compare the sentiment of Xenophon, the precise reverse of that which is here laid down by Periklēs, extolling the rigid discipline of Sparta, and denouncing the laxity of Athenian life (Xenophon, Memorab. iii, 5 15 iii, 12, 5). It is curious that the sentiment appears in this dialogue as well

to the monotonous drill of Sparta, or to some other ideal standard, which, though much better than the Spartan in itself, they were disposed to impress upon society with a heavy-handed uniformity. That liberty of individual action, not merely from the over-restraints of law, but from the tyranny of jealous opinion, such as Periklēs depicts in Athens, belongs more naturally to a democracy, where there is no select one or few to receive worship and set the fashion, than to any other form of government. But it is very rare even in democracies: nor can we dissemble the fact that none of the governments of modern times, democratical, aristocratical, or monarchical, presents any thing like the picture of generous tolerance towards social dissent, and spontaneity of individual taste, which we read in the speech of the Athenian statesman. In all of them, the intolerance of the national opinion cuts down individual character to one out of a few set types, to which every person, or every family, is constrained to adjust itself, and beyond which all exceptions meet either with hatred or with derision. To impose upon men such restraints either of law or of opinion as are requisite for the security and comfort of society, but to encourage rather than repress the free play of individual impulse subject to those limits, — is an ideal, which, if it was ever approached at Athens, has certainly never been attained, and has indeed comparatively been little studied or cared for in any modern society.

Connected with this reciprocal indulgence of individual diversity, was not only the hospitable reception of all strangers at Athens, which Periklēs contrasts with the xenelasy or jealous expulsion practised at Sparta, — but also the many-sided activity, bodily and mental, visible in the former, so opposite to that narrow range of thought, exclusive discipline of the body and never-ending preparation for war, which formed the system of the latter. His assertion that Athens was equal to Sparta, even in her own solitary excellence, — efficiency on the field of battle, — is doubtless untenable; but not the less impressive is his sketch of that multitude of concurrent impulses which at this same time agitated and impelled the Athenian mind, — the strength

in the mouth of the younger Periklēs (illegitimate son of the great Periklēs in a dialogue with Sokratēs.

of one not implying the weakness of the remainder: the relish for all pleasures of art and elegance, and the appetite for intellectual expansion, coinciding in the same bosom with energetic promptitude as well as endurance: abundance of recreative spectacles, yet noway abating the cheerfulness of obedience even to the hardest calls of patriotic duty: that combination of reason and courage which encountered danger the more willingly from having discussed and calculated it beforehand: lastly, an anxious interest as well as a competence of judgment in public discussion and public action, common to every citizen rich and poor, and combined with every man's own private industry. So comprehensive an ideal of many-sided social development, bringing out the energies for action and endurance, as well as those for enjoyment, would be sufficiently remarkable, even if we supposed it only existing in the imagination of a philosopher: but it becomes still more so when we recollect that the main features of it at least were drawn from the fellow-citizens of the speaker. It must be taken, however, as belonging peculiarly to the Athens of Periklēs and his contemporaries; nor would it have suited either the period of the Persian war, fifty years before, or that of Demosthenēs, seventy years afterwards. At the former period, the art, the letters, and the philosophy, were as yet backward, while even the active energy and democratical stimulus, though very powerful, had not been worked up to the pitch which they afterwards reached: at the latter period, although the intellectual manifestations of Athens subsist in full or even increased vigor, we shall find the personal enterprise and energetic spirit of her citizens materially abated. As the circumstances, which I have already recounted, go far to explain the previous upward movement, so those which fill the coming chapters, containing the disasters of the Peloponnesian war, will be found to explain still more completely the declining tendency shortly about to commence. Athens was brought to the brink of entire ruin, from which it is surprising that she recovered at all, — but noway surprising that she recovered at the expense of a considerable loss of personal energy in the character of her citizens.

And thus the season at which Periklēs delivered his discourse lends to it an additional and peculiar pathos. It was delivered

at a time when Athens was as yet erect and at her maximum for though her real power was, doubtless, much diminished, compared with the period before the thirty years' truce, yet the great edifices and works of art, achieved since then, tended to compensate that loss, in so far as the sense of greatness was concerned; and no one, either citizen or enemy, considered Athens as having at all declined. It was delivered at the commencement of the great struggle with the Peloponnesian confederacy, the coming hardships of which Periklēs never disguised either to himself or to his fellow-citizens, though he fully counted upon eventual success. Attica had been already invaded; it was no longer "the unwasted territory," as Euripidēs had designated it in his tragedy *Medea*,¹ represented three or four months before the march of Archidamus, — and a picture of Athens in her social glory was well calculated both to rouse the pride and nerve the courage of those individuals citizens, who had been compelled once, and would be compelled again and again, to abandon their country-residence and fields for a thin tent or confined hole in the city.²

¹ Euripidēs, *Medea*, 824. *ἡμεῖς γὰρ ἀποδίδωμεν τ'*, etc.

² The remarks of Dionysius Halikarnassus, tending to show that the number of dead buried on this occasion was so small, and the actions in which they had been slain so insignificant, as to be unworthy of so elaborate an harangue as this of Periklēs, — and finding fault with Thucydidēs on that ground, — are by no means well-founded or justifiable. He treats Thucydidēs like a dramatic writer putting a speech into the mouth of one of his characters, and he considers that the occasion chosen for this speech was unworthy. But though this assumption would be correct with regard to many ancient historians, and to Dionysius himself in his Roman history, — it is not correct with reference to Thucydidēs. The speech of Periklēs was a real speech, heard, reproduced, and doubtless dressed up, by Thucydidēs: if therefore more is said than the number of the dead or the magnitude of the occasion warranted, this is the fault of Periklēs, and not of Thucydidēs. Dionysius says that there were many other occasions throughout the war much more worthy of an elaborate funeral harangue, — especially the disastrous loss of the Sicilian army. But Thucydidēs could not have heard any of them, after his exile in the eighth year of the war: and we may well presume that none of them would bear any comparison with this of Periklēs. Nor does Dionysius at all appreciate the full circumstances of this first year of the war, — which, when completely felt, will be found to render the splendid and copious harangue of the great statesman eminently reasonable. See Dionys. II. de Thueyd. Judic. pp. 849–851.

Such calamities might, indeed, be foreseen: but there was one still greater calamity, which, though actually then impending could not be foreseen: the terrific pestilence which will be recounted in the coming chapter. The bright colors, and tone of cheerful confidence, which pervade the discourse of Periklēs, appear the more striking from being in immediate antecedence to the awful description of this distemper: a contrast to which Thucydidēs was, doubtless, not insensible, and which is another circumstance enhancing the interest of the composition.

CHAPTER XLIX.

FROM THE BEGINNING OF THE SECOND YEAR DOWN TO THE END OF THE THIRD YEAR OF THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR.

AT the close of one year after the attempted surprise of Plataea by the Thebans, the belligerent parties in Greece remained in an unaltered position as to relative strength. Nothing decisive had been accomplished on either side, either by the invasion of Attica, or by the flying descents round the coast of Peloponnesus: in spite of mutual damage inflicted, — doubtless, in the greatest measure upon Attica, — no progress was yet made towards the fulfilment of those objects which had induced the Peloponnesians to go to war. Especially, the most pressing among all their wishes — the relief of Potidæa — was noway advanced; for the Athenians had not found it necessary to relax the blockade of that city. The result of the first year's operations had thus been to disappoint the hopes of the Corinthians and the other ardent instigators of war, while it justified the anticipations both of Periklēs and of Archidamus.

A second devastation of Attica was resolved upon for the commencement of spring; and measures were taken for carrying it all over that territory, since the settled policy of Athens

not to hazard a battle with the invaders was now ascertained. About the end of March, or beginning of April, the entire Peloponnesian force — two-thirds from each confederate city, as before — was assembled under the command of Archidamus, and marched into Attica. This time they carried the work of systematic destruction, not merely over the Thriasian plain and the plain immediately near to Athens, as before; but also to the more southerly portions of Attica, down even as far as the mines of Laurium. They traversed and ravaged both the eastern and the western coast, remaining not less than forty days in the country. They found the territory deserted as before, all the population having retired within the walls.¹

In regard to this second invasion, Perikles recommended the same defensive policy as he had applied to the first; and, apparently, the citizens had now come to acquiesce in it, if not willingly, at least with a full conviction of its necessity. But a new visitation had now occurred, diverting their attention from the invader, though enormously aggravating their sufferings. A few days after Archidamus entered Attica, a pestilence, or epidemic sickness, broke out unexpectedly at Athens.

It appears that this terrific disorder had been raging for some time throughout the regions round the Mediterranean; having begun, as was believed, in Æthiopia, — thence passing into Egypt and Libya, and overrunning a considerable portion of Asia under the Persian government: about sixteen years before, too, there had been a similar calamity in Rome and in various parts of Italy. Recently, it had been felt in Lemnos and some other islands of the Ægean, yet seemingly not with such intensity as to excite much notice generally in the Grecian world: at length it passed to Athens, and first showed itself in the Peiræus. The progress of the disease was as rapid and destructive as its appearance had been sudden; whilst the extraordinary accumulation of people within the city and long walls, in consequence of the presence of the invaders in the country, was but too favorable to every form of contagion. Families crowded together in close cabins and places of temporary shelter,² — throughout a city constructed,

¹ Thucyd. ii, 47-55.

Thucyd. ii, 52; Diodor. xii, 45; Plutarch, Periklēs, c. 34. It is to be

like most of those in Greece, with little regard to the conditions of salubrity, — and in a state of mental chagrin from the forced abandonment and sacrifice of their properties in the country, transmitted the disorder with fatal facility from one to the other. Beginning as it did about the middle of April, the increasing heat of summer farther aided the disorder, the symptoms of which, alike violent and sudden, made themselves the more remarked because the year was particularly exempt from maladies of every other description.¹

Of this plague, — or, more properly, eruptive typhoid fever,²

remarked, that the Athenians, though their persons and movable property were crowded within the walls, had not driven in their sheep and cattle also, but had transported them over to Eubœa and the neighboring islands (Thucyd. ii, 14). Hence they escaped a serious aggravation of their epidemic: for in the accounts of the epidemics which desolated Rome under similar circumstances, we find the accumulation of great numbers of cattle, along with human beings, specified as a terrible addition to the calamity (see Livy, iii, 66; Dionys. Hal. Ant. Rom. x, 53: compare Niebuhr, Römisch. Gesch. vol. ii, p. 90).

¹ Thucyd. ii, 49. *Τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἔτος, ὡς ὁμολογεῖτο, ἐκ πάντων μάλιστα δὴ ἐκείνη ἀνοσον ἐς τὰς ἄλλας ἀσθενείας ἐτύχχανεν ὄν.* Hippokratēs, in his description of the epidemic fever at Thasos, makes a similar remark on the absence of all other disorders at the time (Epidem. i, 8, vol. ii, p. 640, ed. Littré).

² La description de Thucydide (observe M. Littré, in his introduction to the works of Hippokratēs, tom. i, p. 122), est tellement bonne qu'elle suffit pleinement pour nous faire comprendre ce que cette ancienne maladie a été; et il est fort à regretter que des médecins tels qu'Hippocrate et Galien n'aient rien écrit sur les grandes épidémies, dont ils ont été les spectateurs. Hippocrate a été témoin de cette peste racontée par Thucydide, et il ne nous en a pas laissé la description. Galien vit également la fièvre éruptive qui désola le monde sous Marc Aurèle, et qu'il appelle lui-même la longue peste. Cependant excepté quelques mots épars dans ses volumineux ouvrages, excepté quelques indications fugitives, il ne nous a rien transmis sur un événement médical aussi important; à tel point que si nous n'avions pas le récit de Thucydide, il nous seroit fort difficile de nous faire une idée de celle qu'a vue Galien, et qui est la même (comme M. Hecker s'est attaché à le démontrer) que la maladie connue sous le nom de Peste d'Athènes. C'étoit une fièvre éruptive différente de la variole, et éteinte aujourd'hui. On a cru en voir les traces dans les charbons (*ἀνθράκες*) des livres Hippocratiques."

Both Krauss (*Disquisitio de naturâ morbi Atheniensium*. Stuttgart, 1831, p. 36) and Hæser (*Historisch. Patholog. Untersuchungen* Dresden

distinct from, yet analogous to, the smallpox, — a description no less clear than impressive has been left by the historian Thucydides, himself, not only a spectator but a sufferer. It is not one of the least of his merits, that his notice of the symptoms, given at so early a stage of medical science and observation, is such as to instruct the medical reader of the present age, and to enable the malady to be understood and identified. The observations, with which that notice is ushered in, deserve particular attention. "In respect to this distemper (he says), let every man, physician or not, say what he thinks respecting the source from whence it may probably have arisen, and respecting the causes which he deems sufficiently powerful to have produced so great a revolution. But I, having myself had the distemper, and having seen others suffering under it, will state *what it actually was*, and will indicate, in addition, such other matters, as will furnish any man, who lays them to heart, with knowledge and the means of calculation beforehand, in case the same misfortune should ever again occur."¹ To record past facts, as a basis for rational pre-

1839, p. 50) assimilate the pathological phenomena specified by Thucydides to different portions of the *Επιδημία* of Hippokratēs. M. Littré thinks that the resemblance is not close or precise, so as to admit of the one being identified with the other. "Le tableau si frappant qu'en a tracé ce grand historien ne se reproduit pas certainement avec une netteté suffisante dans les brefs détails donnés par Hippocrate. La maladie d'Athènes avoit un type si tranché, que tous ceux qui en ont parlé ont dû le reproduire dans ses parties essentielles." (Argument aux 2^{me} Livre des Epidémies, Œuvres d'Hippocrate, tom. v. p. 64.) There appears good reason to believe that the great epidemic which prevailed in the Roman world under Marcus Aurelius — the Pestis Antoniniana — was a renewal of what is called the Plague of Athens.

¹ Thucyd. ii, 48. λεγέτω μὲν οὖν περὶ αὐτοῦ, ὡς ἕκαστος γινώσκει, καὶ ἰατρὸς καὶ ἰδιώτης, ἀφ' ὅτου εἰκὸς ἦν γενέσθαι αὐτὴν, καὶ τὰς αἰτίας ἀσπινὰς νομίζει τοσαύτης μεταβολῆς ἱκανὰς εἶναι δύναμιν ἐς τὸ μεταστῆσαι σκεῖν ἐγὼ δὲ οὐδὲν τε ἐγίγνετο λέξω, καὶ ἀφ' ὧν ἂν τις σκοπῶν, εἰ ποτε καὶ αὐτὸς ἐπιπέσοι, μάλιστα ἂν ἔχοι τι προειδὼς μὴ ἀγνοεῖν, ταῦτα δηλώσω, αὐτὸς τὴν νοσήσας καὶ αὐτὸς ἰδὼν ἄλλους πάσχοντας.

Demokritus, among others, connected the generation of these epidemics with his general system of atoms, atmospheric effluvia, and *εἰδῶλα*: see Plutarch, *Symposiac*. viii, 9, p. 733; Demokriti Fragment., ed. Mullach. lib. iv, p. 409.

The causes of the Athenian epidemic as given by Diodorus (xii, 58) —

vision in regard to the future, — the same sentiment which Thucydides mentions in his preface,¹ as having animated him to the composition of his history, — was at that time a duty so little understood, that we have reason to admire not less the manner in which he performs it in practice, than the distinctness with which he conceives it in theory. We may infer from his language that speculation in his day was active respecting the causes of this plague, according to the vague and fanciful physics and scanty stock of ascertained facts, which was all that could then be consulted. By resisting the itch of theorising from one of those loose hypotheses which then appeared plausibly to explain everything, he probably renounced the point of view from which most credit and interest would be derivable at the time: but his simple and precise summary of observed facts carries with it an imperishable value, and even affords grounds for imagining, that he was no stranger to the habits and training of his contemporary, Hippokratēs, and the other Asklepiads of Cos.²

unusual rains, watery quality of grain, absence of the Etesian winds, etc., may perhaps be true of the revival of the epidemic in the fifth year of the war, but can hardly be true of its first appearance; since Thucydides states that the year in other respects was unusually healthy, and the epidemic was evidently brought from foreign parts to Peiræus.

¹ Thucyd. i. 22.

² See the words of Thucydides, ii. 49. καὶ ἀποκαθάρσεις χολῆς πάσαι, ὅσαι ἐπὶ ἰατρῶν ἀντασσεύειν εἰσὶν, ἐπῆραν. — which would seem to indicate a familiarity with the medical terminology: compare also his allusion to the speculations of the physicians, cited in the previous note: and c. 51 — τὰ παση δασύτη θεωρητόματα, etc.

In proof how rare the conception was, in ancient times, of the importance of collecting and registering particular medical facts, I transcribe the following observations from M. Littré (Œuvres d'Hippocrate, tom. iv, p. 646. Remarques Retrospectives).

"Toutefois ce qu'il importe ici de constater, ce n'est pas qu'Hippocrate a observé de telle ou telle manière, mais c'est qu'il a eu l'idée de recueillir et de consigner des faits particuliers. En effet, rien, dans l'antiquité, n'a été plus rare que ce soin: outre Hippocrate, je ne connois qu'Erasistrate qui se soit occupé de relater sous cette forme les résultats de son expérience clinique. Ni Galien lui-même, ni Arétée, ni Soranus, ni les autres qui sont arrivés jusqu'à nous, n'ont suivi un aussi louable exemple. Les observations consignées dans la collection Hippocratique constituent la plus grande partie, à beaucoup près, de ce que l'antiquité a possédé en ce genre: et si, en commentant le travail d'Hippocrate, on l'avait un peu imité, nous

It is hardly within the province of an historian of Greece to repeat after Thucydides the painful enumeration of symptoms, violent in the extreme, and pervading every portion of the bodily system, which marked this fearful disorder. Beginning in Peiræus, it quickly passed into the city, and both the one and the other was speedily filled with sickness and suffering, the like of which had never before been known. The seizures were perfectly sudden, and a large proportion of the sufferers perished, after deplorable agonies, on the seventh or on the ninth day: others, whose strength of constitution carried them over this period, found themselves the victims of exhausting and incurable diarrhoea afterwards: with others again, after traversing both these stages, the distemper fixed itself in some particular member, the eyes, the genitals, the hands, or the feet, which were rendered permanently useless, or in some cases amputated, even where the patient himself recovered. There were also some whose recovery was attended with a total loss of memory, so that they no more knew themselves or recognized their friends. No treatment or remedy appearing, except in accidental cases, to produce any beneficial effect, the physicians or surgeons whose aid was invoked became completely at fault; while trying their accustomed means without avail, they soon ended by catching the malady themselves and perishing: nor were the charms and

aurons des matériaux à l'aide desquels nous prendrions une idée bien plus précise de la pathologie de ces siècles reculés. . . . Mais tout en exprimant ce regret et en reconnaissant cette utilité relative à nous autres modernes et véritablement considérable, il faut ajouter que l'antiquité avoit dans les faits et la doctrine Hippocratiques un aliment qui lui a suffi — et qu'une collection, même étendue, d'histoires particulières n'auroit pas alors modifié la médecine, du moins la médecine scientifique, essentiellement et au delà de la limite que comportoit la physiologie. Je pourrai montrer ailleurs que la doctrine d'Hippocrate et de l'école de Cos a été la seule solide, la seule fondée sur un aperçu vrai de la nature organisée; et que les sectes postérieures, méthodisme et pneumatisme, n'ont bâti leurs théories que sur des hypothèses sans consistance. Mais ici je me contente de remarquer, que la pathologie, en tant que science, ne peut marcher qu'à la suite de la physiologie, dont elle n'est qu'une des faces: et d'Hippocrate à Galien inclusivement, la physiologie ne fit pas assez de progrès pour rendre insuffisante la conception Hippocratique. Il en résulte, nécessairement, que la pathologie, toujours considérée comme science, n'auroit pu, par quelque procédé que ce fût, gagner que des corrections et des augmentations de détail."

incantations¹ to which the unhappy patient resorted, likely to be more efficacious. While some asserted that the Peloponnesians had poisoned the cisterns of water, others referred the visitation to the wrath of the gods, and especially to Apollo, known by hearers of the Iliad as author of pestilence in the Greek host before Troy. It was remembered that this Delphian god had promised the Lacedæmonians, in reply to their application immediately before the war, that he would assist them whether invoked or uninvoked, — and the disorder now raging was ascribed to the intervention of their irresistible ally: while the elderly men farther called to mind an oracular verse sung in the time of their youth: "The Dorian war will come, and pestilence along with it."² Under the distress which suggested, and was reciprocally

¹ Compare the story of Thaletas appeasing an epidemic at Sparta by his music and song (Plutarch, *De Musica*, p. 1146).

Some of the ancient physicians were firm believers in the efficacy of these charms and incantations. Alexander of Tralles says, that having originally treated them with contempt, he had convinced himself of their value by personal observation, and altered his opinion (ix, 4) — *ἐνταὶ γὰρ οἰονταὶ τοῖς τῶν γράφων ἀνθρώποις τοικεῖναι τὰς ἐπιδημίας, ὥσπερ καὶ γὰρ μέχρι πολλοῦ τῷ χρόνῳ διὰ τῶν τῶν ἐκείνων φαίνοντων ἐπιστάτην εἶναι δύναμιν ἐν αἰσῶσι*. See an interesting and valuable dissertation, *Origines Contagii*, by Dr. C. F. Marx (Stuttgart, 1824, p. 129).

The suffering Héraklēs, in his agony under the poisoned tunic, invokes the *αἰὶς* along with the *χειροτέχνης ἰατροῦ* (Sophoklēs, *Trachin.* 1005).

² Thucyd. ii, 54. *Φασκόντες οἱ πρεσβύτεροι πάσαι ἄδεσθαι* —

Ἡξεί Δωριακὸς πόλεμος, καὶ λοιμὸς ἀμ' αὐτῷ.

See also the first among the epistles ascribed to the orator Æschinēs, respecting a *λοιμὸς* in Delos.

It appears that there was a debate whether, in this Hexameter verse, *λοιμὸς* (famine) or *λοιμὸς* (pestilence) was the correct reading: and the probability is, that it had been originally composed with the word *λοιμὸς*, — for men might well fancy beforehand that *famine* would be a sequel of the Dorian war, but they would not be likely to imagine *pestilence* as accompanying it. Yet, says Thucydides, the reading *λοιμὸς* was held decidedly preferable, as best fitting to the actual circumstances (*οἱ γὰρ ἀνθρώποι πρὸς τὴν ἐπείσοχον τὴν μνήμην ἐποιεῖντο*). And "if (he goes on to say) there should ever hereafter come another Dorian war, and famine along with it, the oracle will probably be reproduced with the word *λοιμὸς* as part of it."

This deserves notice, as illustrating the sort of admitted license with which men twisted the oracles or prophecies, so as to hit the feelings of the actual moment.

aggravated by, these gloomy ideas, prophets were consulted, and supplications with solemn processions, were held at the temples, to appease the divine wrath.

When it was found that neither the priest nor the physician could retard the spread, or mitigate the intensity, of the disorder, the Athenians abandoned themselves to utter despair, and the space within the walls became a scene of desolating misery. Every man attacked with the malady at once lost his courage, — a state of depression, itself among the worst features of the case, which made him lie down and die, without the least attempt to seek for any preservatives. And though, at first, friends and relatives lent their aid to tend the sick with the usual family sympathies, yet so terrible was the number of these attendants who perished, "like sheep," from such contact, that at length no man would thus expose himself; while the most generous spirits, who persisted longest in the discharge of their duty, were carried off in the greatest numbers.¹ The patient was thus left to die alone and unheeded: sometimes all the inmates of a house were swept away one after the other, no man being willing to go near it: desertion on one hand, attendance on the other, both tended to aggravate the calamity. There remained only those who, having had the disorder and recovered, were willing to tend the sufferers. These men formed the single exception to the all-pervading misery of the time, — for the disorder seldom attacked any one twice, and when it did, the second attack was never fatal. Elate with their own escape, they deemed themselves out of the reach of all disease, and were full of compassionate kindness for others whose sufferings were just beginning. It was from them, too, that the principal attention to the bodies of deceased victims proceeded: for such was the state of dismay and sorrow, that even the nearest relatives neglected the sepulchral duties, sacred beyond all others in the eyes of a Greek. Nor is there any circumstance which conveys to us so vivid an idea of the prevalent agony and despair, as when we read, in the words of an eye-witness, that the deaths took place among this close-packed crowd

¹ Compare Diodor. xiv, 70, who mentions similar distresses in the Carthaginian army besieging Syracuse, during the terrible epidemic with which it was attacked in 395 B.C.; and Livy. xxv, 26 respecting the epidemic at Syracuse when it was besieged by Marcus and the Romans.

without the smallest decencies of attention,¹ — that the dead and the dying lay piled one upon another, not merely in the public roads, but even in the temples, in spite of the understood defilement of the sacred building, — that half-dead sufferers were seen lying round all the springs, from insupportable thirst, — that the numerous corpses thus unburied and exposed, were in such a condition, that the dogs which meddled with them died in consequence, while no vultures or other birds of the like habits ever came near. Those bodies which escaped entire neglect, were burnt or buried² without the customary mourning, and with unseemly carelessness. In some cases, the bearers of a body, passing by a funeral pile on which another body was burning, would put their own there to be burnt also;³ or perhaps, if the pile was prepared ready for a body not yet arrived, would deposit their own upon it, set fire to the pile, and then depart. Such indecent confusion would have been intolerable to the feelings of the Athenians, in any ordinary times.

To all these scenes of physical suffering, death, and reckless despair, was superadded another evil, which affected those who were fortunate enough to escape the rest. The bonds both of law and morality became relaxed, amidst such total uncertainty of every man both for his own life, and that of others. Men cared not to abstain from wrong, under circumstances in which punishment was not likely to overtake them, — nor to put a check upon their passions, and endure privations in obedience even to

¹ Thucyd. ii, 52. Οἰκῶν γὰρ οὐκ ὑπαρχουσῶν, ἀλλ' ἐν καλύβαις πνιγῆραις ἐπὶ ἑτοῖς διατωμένων, ὁ φόβος ἐγένετο οὐδενὶ κόσμῳ, ἀλλὰ καὶ νεκροὶ ἐπ' ἀλλήλοις ἀποσπένοντες ἔκειντο, καὶ ἐν ταῖς ὁδοῖς ἐκαλινδοῦντο καὶ περὶ τὰς κρήνας ἀποσπας ἡμιθνήτες, τοῦ ὕδατος ἐπιθυμίᾳ. Τὰ τε ἱερὰ ἐν οἷς ἐσκήννητο, νεκρῶν πληὰ ἦν, αὐτοῦ ἑναποσπένοντων· ὑπερβιαζομένου γὰρ τοῦ κακοῦ οἱ ἄνθρωποι οὐκ ἔχοντες ὅ, τι χεῖρονται, ἐς ὀλιγορίαν ἐτράποντο καὶ ἱερῶν καὶ δαίων ὁμοίως.

² Thucyd. ii, 50: compare Livy, xli, 21, describing the epidemic at Rome in 174 B.C. "Cadavera, intacta à canibus et vulturibus, tabes absumebat. eatisque constabat, nec illo, nec priore anno in tantâ strage boum homin- amque vulturium usquam visum."

³ Thucyd. ii, 52. From the language of Thucydides, we see that this was regarded at Athens as highly unbecoming. Yet a passage of Plutarch seems to show that it was very common, in his time, to burn several bodies on the same funeral pile (Plutarch, Synposiac. iii 4, p. 51).

their strongest conviction, when the chance was so small of their living to reap reward or enjoy any future esteem. An interval short and sweet, before their doom was realized — before they became plunged in the wide-spread misery which they witnessed around, and which affected indiscriminately the virtuous and the profligate — was all they looked to enjoy; embracing with avidity the immediate pleasures of sense, as well as such positive gains, however ill-gotten, as could be made the means of procuring them, and throwing aside all thought both of honor or of long-sighted advantage. Life and property were alike ephemeral, nor was there any hope left but to snatch a moment of enjoyment, before the outstretched hand of destiny should fall upon its victims.

The melancholy picture of society under the pressure of a murderous epidemic, with its train of physical torments, wretchedness, and demoralization, has been drawn by more than one eminent author, but by none with more impressive fidelity and conciseness than by Thucydides,¹ who had no predecessor, and nothing but the reality to copy from. We may remark that, amidst all the melancholy accompaniments of the time, there are no human sacrifices, such as those offered up at Carthage during pestilence to appease the anger of the gods, — there are no cruel persecutions against imaginary authors of the disease, such as those against the Untori (anointers of doors) in the plague of Milan in 1630.² Three years altogether did this calamity desolate Athens: continuously, during the entire second and third years of the war, — after which, followed a period of marked abatement for a year and a half; but it then revived again, and lasted for another year, with the same fury as at first. The pub-

¹ The description in the sixth book of Lucretius, translated and expanded from Thucydides, — that of the plague at Florence in 1348, with which the Decameron of Boccaccio opens, — and that of Defoe, in his *History of the Plague in London*, are all well known.

² "Carthaginenses, cum inter cetera mala etiam petere laborarent, cruentâ sacrorum religione, et scelere pro remedio, usi sunt: quippe homines ut victimas immolabant: pacem deorum sanguine eorum expositas, pro quorum vitâ Dii rogari maximè solent." (Justin. xviii. 6.)

For the facts respecting the plague of Milan and the Untori, see the interesting novel of Manzoni, *Promessi Sposi*, and the historical work of the same author, *Storia della Colonna Infame*.

lic loss, over and above the private misery, which this unexpected enemy inflicted upon Athens, was incalculable. Out of twelve hundred horsemen, all among the rich men of the state, three hundred died of the epidemic; besides four thousand and four hundred hoplites out of the roll formerly kept, and a number of the poorer population so great as to defy computation.¹ No efforts of the Peloponnesians could have done so much to ruin Athens, or to bring the war to a termination such as they desired: and the distemper told the more in their favor, as it never spread at all into Peloponnesus, though it passed from Athens to some of the more populous islands.² The Lacedæmonian army was withdrawn from Attica somewhat earlier than it would otherwise have been, for fear of taking the contagion.³

But it was while the Lacedæmonians were yet in Attica, and during the first freshness of the terrible malady, that Periklès equipped and conducted from Peiræus an armament of one hundred triremes, and four thousand hoplites to attack the coasts of Peloponnesus: three hundred horsemen were also carried in some horse-transports, prepared for the occasion out of old triremes. To diminish the crowd accumulated in the city, was doubtless of beneficial tendency, and perhaps those who went aboard, might consider it as a chance of escape to quit an infected home. But unhappily they carried the infection along with them, which desolated the fleet not less than the city, and crippled all its efforts. Reinforced by fifty ships of war from Chios and Lesbos, the Athenians first landed near Epidaurus in Peloponnesus, ravaging the territory, and making an unavailing attempt upon the city: next, they made like incursions on the more southerly portions of the Argolic peninsula. — Træzen, Halicis, and Hermionê; and lastly attacked and captured Prasiæ, on the eastern coast of Laconia. On returning to Athens, the same armament

¹ Thucyd. iii. 87. τοὶ δὲ ἄλλων δόλον ἀνέστηντο ἀπὸ τῆς ἀσθενείας. Diodorus makes them above 10,000 (xii. 58) freemen and slaves together, which must be greatly beneath the reality.

² Thucyd. ii. 54. τῶν ἄλλων χωρῶν τὰ πολυανθρώπωντα. He does not specify what places these were: perhaps Chios, but hardly Lesbos, otherwise the fact would have been noticed when the revolt of that island occurs.

³ Thucyd. ii. 57.

was immediately conducted, under Agnon and Kleopompus, to press the siege of Potidæa, the blockade of which still continued without any visible progress. On arriving there, an attack was made on the walls by battering engines, and by the other aggressive methods then practised; but nothing whatever was achieved. In fact, the armament became incompetent for all serious effort, from the aggravated character which the distemper here assumed, communicated by the soldiers fresh from Athens, even to those who had before been free from it at Potidæa. So frightful was the mortality, that out of the four thousand hoplites under Agnon, no less than ten hundred and fifty died in the short space of forty days. The armament was brought back in this melancholy condition to Athens, while the reduction of Potidæa was left, as before, to the slow course of blockade.¹

On returning from the expedition against Peloponnesus, Periklēs found his countrymen almost distracted² with their manifold sufferings. Over and above the raging epidemic, they had just gone over Attica and ascertained the devastations committed by the invaders throughout all the territory — except the Marathonian³ Tetrapolis and Dekeleia; districts spared, as we are told, through indulgence founded on an ancient legendary sympathy — during their long stay of forty days. The rich had found their comfortable mansions and farms, the poor their modest cottages, in the various demes, torn down and ruined. Death,⁴ sickness, loss of property, and despair of the future, now rendered the Athenians angry and intractable to the last degree; and they vented their feelings against Periklēs, as the cause, not merely of the war, but also of all that they were now enduring. Either with or without his consent, they sent envoys to Sparta to open negotiations for peace, but the Spartans turned a deaf ear to the proposition. This new disappointment rendered them still more furious against Periklēs, whose long-standing political enemies now doubtless found strong sympathy in their denuncia-

¹ Thucyd. ii. 56-58.

² Thucyd. ii. 59. ἡλλοτίζοντο τὰς γνώμας.

³ Diodor. xii. 45; Ister ap. Schol. ad Soph. Œdip. Colon. 689; Herodot. ix.

⁴ Thucyd. ii. 65. Ὁ μὲν δῆμος, ὅτι ἀπ' ἡλασάντων ἐρωμένιος, ἐσπέρητο καὶ τοῦτο νῦν οἱ δὲ δυνατόι, κατὰ κτήματα κατὰ τὴν χώραν οἰκονομίας τε καὶ πολιτείας καταλείπειν ἀποβληκότες.

tions of his character and policy. That unshaken and majestic firmness, which ranked first among his many eminent qualities, was never more imperiously required, and never more effectively manifested. In his capacity of stratēgus, or general, he convoked a formal assembly of the people, for the purpose of vindicating himself publicly against the prevailing sentiment, and recommending perseverance in his line of policy. The speeches made by his opponents, assuredly very bitter, are not given by Thucydides; but that of Periklēs himself is set down at considerable length, and a memorable discourse it is. It strikingly brings into relief both the character of the man and the impress of actual circumstances, — an impregnable mind, conscious not only of right purposes, but of just and reasonable anticipations, and bearing up with manliness, or even defiance, against the natural difficulty of the case, heightened by an extreme of incalculable misfortune. He had foreseen,¹ while advising the war originally, the probable impatience of his countrymen under its first hardships, but he could not foresee the epidemic by which that impatience had been exasperated into madness: and he now addressed them, not merely with unabated adherence to his own deliberate convictions, but also in a tone of reproachful remonstrance against their unmerited change of sentiment towards him, — seeking at the same time to combat that uncontrolled despair which, for the moment, overlaid both their pride and their patriotism. Far from humbling himself before the present sentiment, it is at this time that he sets forth his titles to their esteem in the most direct and unqualified manner, and claims the continuance of that which they had so long accorded, as something belonging to him by acquired right.

His main object, throughout this discourse, is to fill the minds of his audience with patriotic sympathy for the weal of the entire city, so as to counterbalance the absorbing sense of private woe. If the collective city flourishes, he argues, private misfortunes may at least be borne: but no amount of private prosperity will avail, if the collective city falls; a proposition literally true in ancient times, and under the circumstances of ancient warfare, though less true at present. "Distracted by domestic calamity.

¹ Thucyd. i. 140.

ye are now angry both with me, who advised you to go to war and with yourselves, who followed the advice. Ye listened to me, considering me superior to others in judgment, in speech, in patriotism, and in incorruptible probity,¹ — nor ought I now to be treated as culpable for giving such advice, when in point of fact the war was unavoidable, and there would have been still greater danger in shrinking from it. I am the same man, still unchanged, — but ye, in your misfortunes, cannot stand to the convictions which ye adopted when yet unhurt. Extreme and unforeseen, indeed, are the sorrows which have fallen upon you: yet, inhabiting as ye do a great city, and brought up in dispositions suitable to it, ye must also resolve to bear up against the utmost pressure of adversity, and never to surrender your dignity. I have often explained to you that ye have no reason to doubt of eventual success in the war, but I will now remind you, more emphatically than before, and even with a degree of ostentation suitable as a stimulus to your present unnatural depression, — that your naval force makes you masters, not only of your allies, but of the entire sea,² — one half of the visible field for action and employment. Compared with so vast a power as this, the temporary use of your houses and territory is a mere trifle, — an ornamental accessory not worth considering; and this, too, if ye preserve your freedom, ye will quickly recover. It was your fathers who first gained this empire, without any of the advantages which ye now enjoy; ye must not disgrace yourselves by losing what they acquired. Delighting as ye all do in the honor and empire enjoyed by the city, ye must not shrink from the toils whereby alone that honor is sustained: moreover, ye now fight, not merely for freedom instead of slavery, but for empire

¹ Thucyd. ii, 60. καίτοι μοι τοιοῦτο ἀνὴρ ὀργίζεσθαι, ὅς αὐδένος οἶομαι ἥσσαν εἶναι γνώαι τε τὰ δεόντα, καὶ ἐρμηνεύσαι τὰτα, φιλοπολὺς τε καὶ χρημάτων κρείσσων.

² Thucyd. ii, 62. δηλώσω δὲ καὶ τόδε, ὃ μοι δοκεῖτε αὐτ' αὐτοὶ πάποτε ἐνθυμηθῆναι ὑπάρχον ὑμῖν μεγέθους τιμὴ ἐς τὴν ἀρχὴν. οὐτ' ἐγὼ ἐν τοῖς πρὶν λόγοις· οὐδ' ἂν νῦν ἐχρησάμην κομπώδεστέραν ἔχοντι τὴν προσποίησιν, εἰ μὴ καταπεπληγμένους ὑμᾶς παρὰ τὸ εἶκος εὐρων. Οἴεσθε μὲν γὰρ τῶν συμμάχων μόνον ἄρχειν — ἐγὼ δὲ ἀποφαίρω δύο μερῶν τῶν ἐς χεῖρσιν θανεῖων, γῆς καὶ θαλάττης, τοῦ ἑτέρου ὑμῖς παντὸς κυριωτάτους ὄντας, ἐφ' ὧν τε νῦν νέμεσθε καὶ ἦν ἐπιπλεον βουληθῆτε.

against loss of empire, with all the perils arising out of imperial unpopularity. It is not safe for you now to abdicate, even if ye chose to do so; for ye hold your empire like a despotism, — unjust perhaps in the original acquisition, but ruinous to part with when once acquired. Be not angry with me, whose advice ye followed in going to war, because the enemy have done such damage as might be expected from them; still less on account of this unforeseen distemper: I know that this makes me an object of your special present hatred, though very unjustly, unless ye will consent to give me credit also for any unexpected good luck which may occur. Our city derives its particular glory from unshaken bearing up against misfortune: her power, her name, her empire of Greeks over Greeks, are such as have never before been seen: and if we choose to be great, we must take the consequence of that temporary envy and hatred which is the necessary price of permanent renown. Behave ye now in a manner worthy of that glory: display that courage which is essential to protect you against disgrace at present, as well as to guarantee your honor for the future. Send no farther embassy to Sparta, and bear your misfortunes without showing symptoms of distress."¹

The irresistible reason, as well as the proud and resolute bearing of this discourse, set forth with an eloquence which it was not possible for Thucydides to reproduce, — together with the age and character of Periklēs, — carried the assent of the assembled people; who, when in the Pnyx, and engaged according to habit on public matters, would for a moment forget their private sufferings in considerations of the safety and grandeur of Athens: possibly, indeed, those sufferings, though still continuing, might become somewhat alleviated when the invaders quitted Attica, and when it was no longer indispensable for all the population to confine itself within the walls. Accordingly, the assembly resolved that no farther propositions should be made for peace, and that the war should be prosecuted with vigor. But though the public resolution thus adopted showed the ancient habit of deference to the authority of Periklēs, the sentiments

¹ Thucyd. ii, 60–64. I give a general summary of this memorable speech, without setting forth its full contents, still less the exact words.

of individuals taken separately were still those of anger against him, as the author of that system which had brought them into so much distress. His political opponents — Kleon, Simmias, or Lakratidas, perhaps all three in conjunction — took care to provide an opportunity for this prevalent irritation to manifest itself in act, by bringing an accusation against him before the dikastery. The accusation is said to have been preferred on the ground of pecuniary malversation, and ended by his being sentenced to pay a considerable fine, the amount of which is differently reported, — fifteen, fifty, or eighty talents, by different authors.¹ The accusing party thus appeared to have carried

¹ Thucyd. ii. 65; Plato, Gorgias, p. 515, c. 71; Plutarch, Periklēs, c. 35; Diodor. xii. c. 38–45. About Simmias, as the vehement enemy of Periklēs, see Plutarch, Reipub. Ger. Præcept. p. 805.

Plutarch and Diodorus both state that Periklēs was not only fined, but also removed from his office of stratēgus. Thucydides mentions the fine, but not the removal: and his silence leads me to doubt the reality of the latter event altogether. For with such a man as Periklēs, a vote of removal would have been a penalty more marked and cutting than the fine: moreover, removal from office, though capable of being pronounced by vote of the public assembly, would hardly be inflicted as penalty by the dikastery.

I imagine the events to have passed as follows: The stratēgi, with most other officers of the commonwealth, were changed or reelected at the beginning of Hekatombæon, the first month of the Attic year; that is, somewhere about midsummer. Now the Peloponnesian army, invading Attica about the end of March or beginning of April, and remaining forty days, would leave the country about the first week in May. Periklēs returned from his expedition against Peloponnesus shortly after they left Attica; that is, about the middle of May (Thucyd. ii. 57); there still remained, therefore, a month or six weeks before his office of stratēgus naturally expired, and required renewal. It was during this interval (which Thucydides expresses by the words *ἐν τῷ ἐστρατηγεῖν*, ii. 59) that he convoked the assembly and delivered the harangue recently mentioned.

But when the time for a new election of stratēgi arrived, the enemies of Periklēs opposed his reelection, and brought a charge against him, in that trial of accountability to which every magistrate at Athens was exposed, after his period of office. They alleged against him some official misconduct in reference to the public money, and the dikastery visited him with a fine. His reelection was thus prevented, and with a man who had been so often reelected, this might be loosely called "taking away the office of general;" so that the language of Plutarch and Diodorus, as well as the silence of Thucydides, would, on this supposition, be justified.

their point, and to have disgraced, as well as excluded from reelection, the veteran statesman. But the event disappointed their expectations: the imposition of the fine not only satiated all the irritation of the people against him, but even occasioned a serious reaction in his favor, and brought back as strongly as ever the ancient sentiment of esteem and admiration. It was quickly found that those who had succeeded Periklēs as generals, neither possessed nor deserved in an equal degree, the public confidence, and he was accordingly soon reelected, with as much power and influence as he had ever in his life enjoyed.¹

But that life — long, honorable, and useful — had already been prolonged considerably beyond the sixtieth year, and there were but too many circumstances, besides the recent fine, which tended to hasten as well as to embitter its close. At the very moment when Periklēs was preaching to his countrymen, in a tone almost reproachful, the necessity of manful and unabated devotion to the common country, in the midst of private suffering, — he was himself among the greatest of sufferers, and most hardly pressed to set the example of observing his own precepts. The epidemic carried off not merely his two sons, the only two legitimate, Xanthippus and Paralus, but also his sister, several other relatives, and his best and most useful political friends. Amidst this train of domestic calamities, and in the funeral obsequies of so many of his dearest friends, he remained master of his grief, and maintained his habitual self-command, until the last misfortune, — the death of his favorite son Paralus, which left his house without any legitimate representative to maintain the family and the hereditary sacred rites. On this final blow, though he strove to command himself as before, yet, at the obsequies of the young man, when it became his duty to place a garland on the dead body, his grief became uncontrollable, and he burst out, for the first time of his life, into profuse tears and sobbing.²

In the midst of these several personal trials he received the intimation, through Alkibiadēs and some other friends, of the restored confidence of the people towards him, and of his reelection to the office of stratēgus: nor was it without difficulty

¹ Thucyd. ii. 65.

² Plutarch, Periklēs, c. 36.

that he was persuaded to present himself again at the public assembly, and resume the direction of affairs. The regret of the people was formally expressed to him for the recent sentence, — perhaps, indeed, the fine may have been repaid to him, or some evasion of it permitted, saving the forms of law, — in the present temper of the city; which was farther displayed towards him by the grant of a remarkable exemption from a law of his own original proposition. He had himself, some years before, been the author of that law, whereby the citizenship of Athens was restricted to persons born both of Athenian fathers and Athenian mothers, under which restriction several thousand persons, illegitimate on the mother's side, are said to have been deprived of the citizenship, on occasion of a public distribution of corn. Invidious as it appeared to grant, to Periklēs singly, an exemption from a law which had been strictly enforced against so many others, the people were now moved not less by compassion than by anxiety to redress their own previous severity. Without a legitimate heir, the house of Periklēs, one branch of the great Alkmaeonid gens by his mother's side, would be left deserted, and the continuity of the family sacred rites would be broken, — a misfortune painfully felt by every Athenian family, as calculated to wrong all the deceased members, and provoke their posthumous displeasure towards the city. Accordingly, permission was granted to Periklēs to legitimize, and to inscribe in his own gens and phratry his natural son by Aspasia, who bore his own name.²

It was thus that Periklēs was reinstated in his post of strategus, as well as in his ascendancy over the public councils, — seemingly about August or September, 430 B.C. He lived about one year longer, and seems to have maintained his influence as long as his health permitted. Yet we hear nothing of him after this moment, and he fell a victim, not to the violent symptoms of the epidemic, but to a slow and wearing fever;³

¹ See Plutarch, Demosthen. c. 27, about the manner of bringing about such an evasion of a fine: compare also the letter of M. Boeckh, in Meineke, Fragment. Comic. Græcor. ad Fragm. Eupolis. ii. 527.

² Plutarch, Periklēs, c. 37.

³ Plutarch (Perik. c. 38) treats the slow disorder under which he suffered as one of the forms of the epidemic: but this can hardly be correct, when we read the very marked character of the latter, as described by Thucydides

which undermined his strength as well as his capacity. To a friend who came to ask after him when in this disease, Periklēs replied by showing a charm or amulet which his female relations had hung about his neck, — a proof how low he was reduced, and how completely he had become a passive subject in the hands of others. And according to another anecdote which we read, yet more interesting and equally illustrative of his character, — it was during his last moments, when he was lying apparently unconscious and insensible, that the friends around his bed were passing in review the acts of his life, and the nine trophies which he had erected at different times for so many victories. He heard what they said, though they fancied that he was past hearing, and interrupted them by remarking: "What you praise in my life, belongs partly to good fortune, — and is, at best, common to me with many other generals. But the peculiarity of which I am most proud, you have not noticed, — no Athenian has ever put on mourning on my account."¹

Such a cause of self-gratulation, doubtless more satisfactory to recall at such a moment than any other, illustrates that long-sighted calculation, aversion to distant or hazardous enterprise, and economy of the public force, which marked his entire political career; a career long, beyond all parallel, in the history of Athens, — since he maintained a great influence, gradually swelling into a decisive personal ascendancy, for between thirty and forty years. His character has been presented in very different lights, by different authors, both ancient and modern, and our materials for striking the balance are not so good as we could wish. But his immense and long-continued ascendancy, as well as his unparalleled eloquence, are facts attested not less by his enemies than by his friends, — nay, even more forcibly by the former than by the latter. The comic writers, who hated him, and whose trade it was to deride and hunt down every leading political character, exhaust their powers of illustration in setting forth both the one and the other:² Telekleidēs, Kratinus, Eupolis,

¹ Plutarch, Periklēs, c. 38.

² Plutarch, Periklēs, c. 4, 8, 13, 16; Eupolis, *Διούκ.* Fragm. vi, p. 459, ed. Meineke. Cicero (*De Orator.* iii. 34; *Brutus.* 9–11) and Quintilian (ii, 16, 19; x. 1, 82) count only as witnesses at second-hand.

Aristophanês, all hearers and all enemies, speak of him like Olympian Zeus, hurling thunder and lightning, — like Heraklês and Achilles, — as the only speaker on whose lips persuasion sat, and who left his sting in the minds of his audience: while Plato the philosopher,¹ who disapproved of his political working, and of the moral effects which he produced upon Athens, nevertheless extols his intellectual and oratorical ascendancy: "his majestic intelligence," — in language not less decisive than Thucydides. There is another point of eulogy, not less valuable, on which the testimony appears uncontradicted: throughout his long career, amidst the hottest political animosities, the conduct of Periklês towards opponents was always mild and liberal.² The conscious self-esteem and arrogance of manner with which the contemporary poet Ion reproached him,³ contrasting it with the unpretending simplicity of his own patron Kimon, — though probably invidiously exaggerated, is doubtless in substance well founded, and those who read the last speech given above out of Thucydides, will at once recognize in it this attribute. His natural taste, his love of philosophical research, and his unwearied application to public affairs, all contributed to alienate him from ordinary familiarity, and to make him careless, perhaps improperly careless, of the lesser means of conciliating public favor.

But admitting this latter reproach to be well founded, as it seems to be, it helps to negative that greater and graver political crime which has been imputed to him, of sacrificing the permanent well-being and morality of the state to the maintenance of his own political power, — of corrupting the people by distributions of the public money. "He gave the reins to the people (in Plutarch's words⁴), and shaped his administration for their

¹ Plato, *Gorgias*, c. 71, p. 516; *Phædrus*, c. 54, p. 270. Περικλῆα, τὸν οὕτω μεγαλοπρεπῶς σοφὸν ἄνδρα. Plato, *Mens.* p. 94, B.

² Plutarch, *Periklês*, c. 10-39.

³ Plutarch, *Periklês*, c. 5.

⁴ Plutarch, *Periklês*, c. 11. Διο καὶ τότε μάλιστα τῷ δήμῳ τὰς ἡμέρας ἀνείχετο Περικλῆς ἐπολιτευόμενος πρὸς χάριν — αἱ μὲν τινα θύαν ποτηρυκὴν ἢ ἐστίασιν ἢ πομπῇν εἶναι μηχανωμένοι ἐν ἁστί, καὶ διαπαιδαγωγῶν οὐκ ἄμυνον ἡδοναῖς τὴν πόλιν — ἐξήκοντα δὲ τριήρεις καθ' ἑκάστον ἐνιαυτὸν ἐκπέμπων, ἐν αἷς πολλοὶ τῶν πολιτῶν ἐπλεον ὅκτω μηνῶν ἐμμεῖστοι, μελετῶντες ἅμα καὶ μαθητὴν τὴν ναυτικὴν ἐμπειρίαν.

Compare c. 9, where Plutarch states that Periklês, having no other means

immediate favor, by always providing at home some public spectacle, or festival, or procession, thus nursing up the city in elegant pleasures, — and by sending out every year sixty triremes, manned by citizen-seamen on full pay, who were thus kept in practice and acquired nautical skill." Now the charge here made against Periklês, and supported by allegations in themselves honorable rather than otherwise, — of a vicious appetite for immediate popularity, and of improper concessions to the immediate feelings of the people against their permanent interests, — is precisely that which Thucydides, in the most pointed manner denies; and not merely denies, but contrasts Periklês with his successors in the express circumstances that *they* did so, while *he* did not. The language of the contemporary historian¹ well deserves to be cited: "Periklês, powerful from dignity of character as well as from wisdom, and conspicuously above the least tinge of corruption, held back the people with a free hand, and was their real leader instead of being led by them. For not being a seeker of power from unworthy sources, he did not speak with any view to present favor, but had sufficient sense of dignity to contradict

of contending against the abundant private largesses of his rival, Kimon, resorted to the expedient of distributing the public money among the citizens, in order to gain influence; acting in this matter upon the advice of his friend, Demonidês, according to the statement of Aristotle.

¹ Thucyd. ii, 65. Ἐκείνος μὲν (Περικλῆς) δυνατὸς ὦν τῷ τε ἀξιώματι καὶ τῇ γνώμῃ, χρημάτων τε διαφανῶς ἀδωρότατος γενόμενος, κατεῖχε τὸ πλῆθος ἐλευθέρως, καὶ οὐκ ἤγετο μᾶλλον ὑπ' αὐτοῦ ἢ αὐτὸς ἔχει, διὰ τὸ μὴ κτώμενος ἐξ οὗ προσηκόντων τὴν δύναμιν πρὸς ἡδονὴν τι λαβεῖν, ἀλλ' ἔχων ἐπ' ἀξιώσει καὶ πρὸς ὀργὴν τι ἀντειπεῖν. Ὅποτε γὰρ αἰσθούτο τι αἰτούς παρὰ καιρὸν ἔθρει θαρσύνοντας, λέγων κατέπλησσει ἐπὶ τὸ φοβεῖσθαι· καὶ δεδιότας αὐτὸν ἀλόγως ἀντικαθίστη τάλιν ἐπὶ τὸ θαρσεῖν. Ἐγγετο δὲ λόγῳ μὲν δημοκρατία, ἐργῇ δὲ ὑπὸ τοῦ πρωτοῦ ἀνδρὸς ἀρχή. Οἱ δὲ ἑσπερον ἴσασιν αὐτοὶ μᾶλλον πρὸς ἀλλήλους ὄντες, καὶ δρεγόμενοι τοῦ πρώτου ἑκάστος γίνεσθαι, ἱεραποῦντο καθ' ἡδονὰς τῷ δήμῳ καὶ τὰ πράγματα ἐνδιδόναι. Ἐξ ὧν, ἄλλα τε πολλὰ, ὥς ἐν μεγάλῃ πόλει καὶ ἀρχὴν ἐχούσῃ, ἡμαρτήθη, καὶ ὁ ἐς Σικελίαν πλοῦς ὅς οὐ τοσούτου γνώμης ἀμάρτημα ἦν, etc. Compare Plutarch, *Nikias*, c. 3.

Ἀξίωσις and ἀξίωμα, as used by Thucydides, seem to differ in this respect: Ἀξίωσις signifies, a man's dignity, or pretensions to esteem and influence as felt and measured by himself; *his sense of dignity*; Ἀξίωμα means *his dignity*, properly so called; as felt and appreciated by others. See i, 37-61, 69.

them on occasion, even braving their displeasure. Thus, whenever he perceived them insolently and unseasonably confident, he shaped his speeches in such manner as to alarm and beat them down: when again he saw them unduly frightened, he tried to counteract it, and restore them confidence: so that the government was in name a democracy, but in reality an empire exercised by the first citizen in the state. But those who succeeded after his death, being more equal one with another, and each of them desiring preëminence over the rest, adopted the different course of courting the favor of the people, and sacrificing to that object even important state-interests. From whence arose many other bad measures, as might be expected in a great and imperial city, and especially the Sicilian expedition," etc.

It will be seen that the judgment here quoted from Thucydides contradicts, in the most unqualified manner, the reproaches commonly made against Periklès, of having corrupted the Athenian people by distributions of the public money, and by giving way to their unwise caprices, for the purpose of acquiring and maintaining his own political power. Nay, the historian particularly notes the opposite qualities, — self-judgment, conscious dignity, indifference to immediate popular applause or wrath, when set against what was permanently right and useful, — as the special characteristic of that great statesman. A distinction might indeed be possible, and Plutarch professes to note such distinction, between the earlier and the later part of his long political career: he began, so that biographer says, by corrupting the people in order to acquire power, but having acquired it, he employed it in an independent and patriotic manner, so that the judgment of Thucydides, true respecting the later part of his life, would not be applicable to the earlier. This distinction may be to a certain degree well founded, inasmuch as the power of opposing a bold and successful resistance to temporary aberrations of the public mind, necessarily implies an established influence, and can hardly ever be exercised even by the firmest politician during his years of commencement: he is at that time necessarily the adjunct of some party or tendency which he finds already in operation, and has to stand forward actively and assiduously before he can create for himself a separate personal influence. But while we admit the distinction to this extent,

there is nothing to warrant us in restricting the encomium of Thucydides exclusively to the later life of Periklès, or in representing the earlier life as something in pointed contrast with that encomium. Construing fairly what the historian says, he evidently did not so conceive the earlier life of Periklès. Either those political changes which are held by Plato, Aristotle, Plutarch, and others, to demonstrate the corrupting effect of Periklès and his political ascendancy, — such as the limitation of the functions of the Areopagus, as well as of the power of the magistrates, the establishment of the numerous and frequent popular dikasteries with regular pay, and perhaps also the assignment of pay to those who attended the ekklesia, the expenditure for public works, religious edifices and ornaments, the diobely (or distribution of two oboli per head to the poorer citizens at various festivals, in order that they might be able to pay for their places in the theatre), taking it as it then stood, etc., — did not appear to Thucydides mischievous and corrupting, as these other writers thought them; or else he did not particularly refer them to Periklès.

Both are true, probably, to some extent. The internal political changes at Athens, respecting the Areopagus and the dikasteries, took place when Periklès was a young man, and when he cannot be supposed to have yet acquired the immense personal ascendancy which afterwards belonged to him. Ephialtès in fact seems in those early days to have been a greater man than Periklès, if we may judge by the fact that he was selected by his political adversaries for assassination, — so that they might with greater propriety be ascribed to the party with which Periklès was connected, rather than to that statesman himself. But next, we have no reason to presume that Thucydides considered these changes as injurious, or as having deteriorated the Athenian character. All that he does say as to the working of Periklès on the sentiment and actions of his countrymen, is eminently favorable. He represents the presidency of that statesman as moderate, cautious, conservative, and successful; he describes him as uniformly keeping back the people from rash enterprises, and from attempts to extend their empire, — as looking forward to the necessity of a war, and maintaining the naval, military, and financial forces of the state in constant condition to stand it. —

as calculating, with long-sighted wisdom, the conditions on which ultimate success depended. If we follow the elaborate funeral harangue of Periklēs, which Thucydides, since he produces it at length, probably considered as faithfully illustrating the political point of view of that statesman, we shall discover a conception of democratical equality no less rational than generous; an anxious care for the recreation and comfort of the citizens, but no disposition to emancipate them from active obligation, either public or private, — and least of all, any idea of dispensing with such activity by abusive largesses out of the general revenue. The whole picture, drawn by Periklēs, of Athens, “as the school-mistress of Greece,” implies a prominent development of private industry and commerce, not less than of public citizenship and soldiership, — of letters, arts, and recreative varieties of taste.

Though Thucydides does not directly canvass the constitutional changes effected in Athens under Periklēs, yet everything which he does say leads us to believe that he accounted the working of that statesman, upon the whole, on Athenian power as well as on Athenian character, eminently valuable, and his death as an irreparable loss. And we may thus appeal to the judgment of an historian who is our best witness in every conceivable respect, as a valid reply to the charge against Periklēs, of having corrupted the Athenian habits, character, and government. If he spent a large amount of the public treasure upon religious edifices and ornaments, and upon stately works for the city, — yet the sum which he left untouched, ready for use at the beginning of the Peloponnesian war, was such as to appear more than sufficient for all purposes of defence, or public safety, or military honor. It cannot be shown of Periklēs that he ever sacrificed the greater object to the less, — the permanent and substantially valuable, to the transitory and showy, — assured present possessions, to the lust of new, distant, or uncertain conquests. If his advice had been listened to, the rashness which brought on the defeat of the Athenian Tolmidēs, at Korōneia in Bœotia, would have been avoided, and Athens might probably have maintained her ascendancy over Megara and Bœotia, which would have protected her territory from invasion, and given a new turn to the subsequent history. Periklēs is not to be treated as the author of the

Athenian character: he found it with its very marked positive characteristics and susceptibilities, among which, those which he chiefly brought out and improved were the best. The lust of expeditions against the Persians, which Kimon would have pushed into Egypt and Cyprus, he repressed, after it had accomplished all which could be usefully aimed at: the ambition of Athens he moderated rather than encouraged: the democratical movement of Athens he regularized, and worked out into judicial institutions, which became one of the prominent features of Athenian life, and worked, in my judgment, with a very large balance of benefit to the national mind as well as to individual security, in spite of the many defects in their direct character as tribunals. But that point in which there was the greatest difference between Athens, as Periklēs found it, and as he left it, is, unquestionably, the pacific and intellectual development, — rhetorical poetry, arts, philosophical research, and recreative variety. To which if we add, great improvement in the cultivation of the Attic soil, — extension of Athenian trade, — attainment and laborious maintenance of the maximum of maritime skill, attested by the battles of Phormio, — enlargement of the area of complete security by construction of the Long Walls, — lastly, the clothing of Athens in her imperial mantle, by ornaments, architectural and sculptural, — we shall make out a case of genuine progress realized during the political life of Periklēs, such as the evils imputed to him, far more imaginary than real, will go but a little way to alloy. How little, comparatively speaking, of the picture drawn by Periklēs in his funeral harangue of 431 B.C. would have been correct, if the harangue had been delivered over those warriors who fell at Tanagra, twenty-seven years before!

It has been remarked by M. Boeckh,¹ that Periklēs sacrificed the landed proprietors of Attica to the maritime interests and

¹ Boeckh, *Public Economy of Athens*, b. iii. ch. xv. p. 399, Eng. Trans.

Kutzen, in the second Beilage to his treatise, *Periklēs als Staatsmann* (pp. 169–200), has collected and inserted a list of various characters of Periklēs, from twenty different authors, English, French, and German. That of Wachsmuth is the best of the collection, — though even he appears to think that Periklēs is to blame for having introduced a set of institutions which none but himself could work well.

empire of Athens. This is of course founded on the destructive invasions of the country during the Peloponnesian war; for down to the commencement of that war the position of Attic cultivators and proprietors was particularly enviable: and the censure of M. Boeckh, therefore, depends upon the question, how far Periklēs contributed to produce, or had it in his power to avert, this melancholy war, in its results so fatal, not merely to Athens, but to the entire Grecian race. Now here again, if we follow attentively the narrative of Thucydides, we shall see that, in the judgment of that historian, not only Periklēs did not bring on the war, but he could not have averted it without such concessions as Athenian prudence, as well as Athenian patriotism peremptorily forbade: moreover, we shall see, that the calculations on which Periklēs grounded his hopes of success if driven to war, were, in the opinion of the historian, perfectly sound and safe. We may even go farther, and affirm, that the administration of Periklēs during the fourteen years preceding the war, exhibits a "moderation," to use the words of Thucydides,¹ dictated especially by anxiety to avoid raising causes of war; though in the months immediately preceding the breaking out of the war, after the conduct of the Corinthians at Potidaea, and the resolutions of the congress at Sparta, he resisted strenuously all compliance with special demands from Sparta, — demands essentially insincere, and in which partial compliance would have lowered the dignity of Athens without insuring peace. The stories about Phidias, Aspasia, and the Megarians, even if we should grant that there is some truth at the bottom of them, must, if we follow Thucydides, be looked upon at worst as concomitants and pretexts, rather than as real causes, of the war: though modern authors, in speaking of Periklēs, are but too apt to use expressions which tacitly assume these stories to be well founded.

Seeing then that Periklēs did not bring on, and could not have averted the Peloponnesian war, — that he steered his course in reference to that event with the long-sighted prudence of one

¹ Thucyd. ii. 65. μετρίως ἐξηγεῖτο. i. 144. δίκας δὲ ὅτι ἐθέλωμεν εἶναι κατὰ τὰς ξυνοδικίας, πόλεμν δὲ οὐκ ἀρξόμεν, ἀρχομένους δὲ ἀνυσσόμεν.

who knew that the safety and the dignity of imperial Athens were essentially interwoven, — we have no right to throw upon him the blame of sacrificing the landed proprietors of Attica. These might, indeed, be excused for complaining, where they suffered so ruinously; but the impartial historian, looking at the whole of the case, cannot admit their complaints as a ground for censuring the Athenian statesman.

The relation of Athens to her allies, the weak point of her position, it was beyond the power of Periklēs seriously to amend, probably also beyond his will, since the idea of political incorporation, as well as that of providing a common and equal confederate bond, sustained by effective federal authority between different cities, was rarely entertained even by the best Greek minds.¹ We hear that he tried to summon at Athens a congress of deputies from all cities of Greece, the allies of Athens included;² but the scheme could not be brought to bear, in consequence of the reluctance, noway surprising, of the Peloponnesians. Practically, the allies were not badly treated during his administration: and if, among the other bad consequences of the prolonged war, they, as well as Athens, and all other Greeks come to suffer more and more, this depends upon causes with which he is not chargeable, and upon proceedings which departed altogether from his wise and sober calculations. Taking him altogether, with his powers of thought, speech, and action, — his competence, civil and military, in the council as well as in the field, — his vigorous and cultivated intellect, and his comprehensive ideas of a community in pacific and many-sided development, — his incorruptible public morality, caution, and firmness, in a country where all those qualities were rare, and the union of them in the same individual of course much rarer, — we shall find him without a parallel throughout the whole course of Grecian history.

¹ Herodotus (i. 170) mentions that previous to the conquest of the twelve Ionic cities in Asia by Croesus, Thales had advised them to consolidate themselves all into one single city; government at Teos, and to reduce the existing cities to mere demes or constituent, fractional municipalities, — τὰς δὲ ἄλλας πόλεις αἰκισαμένους ὑπὸν ἑστέον νομίσαντας καταπερ εἰς ὅμοι εἶναι. It is remarkable to observe that Herodotus himself bestows his unqualified commendation on this idea.

² Plutarch, Periklēs, c. 17.

Under the great mortality and pressure of sickness at Athens, their operations of war naturally languished; while the enemies also, though more active, had but little success. A fleet of one hundred triremes, with one thousand hoplites on board, was sent by the Lacedæmonians under Knêmus to attack Zakynthus, but accomplished nothing beyond devastation of the open parts of the island, and then returned home. And it was shortly after this, towards the month of September, that the Ambrakiots made an attack upon the Amphilochian town called Argos, situated on the southern coast of the gulf of Ambrakia: which town, as has been recounted in the preceding chapter, had been wrested from them two years before by the Athenians, under Phormio, and restored to the Amphilochians and Akarnanians. The Ambrakiots, as colonists and allies of Corinth, were at the same time animated by active enmity to the Athenian influence in Akarnania, and by desire to regain the lost town of Argos. Procuring aid from the Chaonians, and some other Epirotic tribes, they marched against Argos, and after laying waste the territory, endeavored to take the town by assault, but were repulsed, and obliged to retire.¹ This expedition appears to have impressed the Athenians with the necessity of a standing force to protect their interest in those parts; so that in the autumn Phormio was sent with a squadron of twenty triremes to occupy Naupaktus, now inhabited by the Messenians, as a permanent naval station, and to watch the entrance of the Corinthian gulf.² We shall find in the events of the succeeding year ample confirmation of this necessity.

Though the Peloponnesians were too inferior in maritime force to undertake formal war at sea against Athens, their single privateers, especially the Megarian privateers from the harbor of Nisæa, were active in injuring her commerce,³ — and not merely the commerce of Athens, but also that of other neutral Greeks, without scruple or discrimination. Several merchantmen and fishing-vessels, with a considerable number of prisoners, were thus captured.⁴ Such prisoners as fell into the hands of the Lacedæ-

¹ Thucyd. ii. 68.

² Thucyd. ii. 69.

³ Thucyd. iii. 51.

⁴ Thucyd. ii. 67-69; Herodot. vii. 137. Respecting the Lacedæmonian privateering during the Peloponnesian war, compare Thucyd. v. 115: compare also Xenophon, Hellen. v. 1, 29.

monians, — even neutral Greeks as well as Athenians, — were all put to death, and their bodies cast into clefts of the mountains. In regard to the neutrals, this capture was piratical, and the slaughter unwarrantably cruel, judged even by the received practice of the Greeks, deficient as that was on the score of humanity: but to dismiss these neutral prisoners, or to sell them as slaves, would have given publicity to a piratical capture and provoked the neutral towns, so that the prisoners were probably slain as the best way of getting rid of them and thus suppressing evidence.¹

Some of these Peloponnesian privateers ranged as far as the southwestern coast of Asia Minor, where they found temporary shelter, and interrupted the trading-vessels from Phasêlis and Phenicia to Athens; to protect which, the Athenians despatched, in the course of the autumn, a squadron of six triremes under Melêsander. He was farther directed to insure the collection of the ordinary tribute from Athenian subject-allies, and probably to raise such contributions as he could elsewhere. In the prosecution of this latter duty, he undertook an expedition from the sea-coast against one of the Lykian towns in the interior, but his attack was repelled with loss, and he himself slain.²

An opportunity soon offered itself to the Athenians, of retaliating on Sparta for this cruel treatment of the maritime prisoners. In execution of the idea projected at the commencement of the war, the Lacedæmonians sent Anêristus and two others as envoys to Persia, for the purpose of soliciting from the Great King aids of money and troops against Athens; the dissensions among the Greeks thus gradually paving the way for him to

¹ Thucyd. ii. 67. Οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι ὑπερῆσαν, τοὺς ἐμπόρους οὓς ἔλαβον Ἀθηναίων καὶ τῶν συμμάχων ἐν ὁλκάσι περὶ Πελοπόννησον πλείοντας ἀποκτείναντες καὶ ἐς φαραγγὰς ἐσβυλόντες. Πάντας γὰρ δὴ κατ' ἀρχὰς τοῦ πολέμου οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι, ὅσους λάβοιεν ἐν τῇ θαλάσῃ, ὡς πολέμιους διέφθειρον, καὶ τοὺς μετὰ Ἀθηναίων ἐνυπολεμοῦντας καὶ τοὺς μὴδὲ μεθ' ἑτέρων.

The Lacedæmonian admiral Alkidas slew all the prisoners taken on board merchantmen off the coast of Ionia, in the ensuing year (Thucyd. iii. 32). Even this was considered extremely rigorous, and excited strong remonstrance; yet the mariners slain were not neutrals, but belonged to the subject-allies of Athens: moreover, Alkidas was in his flight, and obliged to make choice between killing his prisoners or setting them free.

² Thucyd. ii. 69.

regain his ascendancy in the Ægean. Timagoras of Tegea, together with an Argeian named Pollis, without any formal mission from his city, and the Corinthian Aristeus, accompanied them. As the sea was in the power of Athens, they travelled overland through Thrace to the Hellespont; and Aristeus, eager to leave nothing untried for the relief of Potidæa, prevailed upon them to make application to Sitalkês, king of the Odrysian Thracians. That prince was then in alliance with Athens, and his son Sadokus had even received the grant of Athenian citizenship: yet the envoys thought it possible not only to detach him from the Athenian alliance, but even to obtain from him an army to act against the Athenians and raise the blockade of Potidæa, — this being refused, they lastly applied to him for a safe escort to the banks of the Hellespont, in their way towards Persia. But Learchus and Ameiniades, then Athenian residents near the person of Sitaklês, had influence enough not only to cause rejection of these requests, but also to induce Sadokus, as a testimony of zeal in his new character of Athenian citizen, to assist them in seizing the persons of Aristeus and his companions in their journey through Thrace. Accordingly, the whole party were seized and conducted as prisoners to Athens, where they were forthwith put to death, without trial or permission to speak, — and their bodies cast into rocky chasms, as a reprisal for the captured seamen slain by the Lacedæmonians.¹

¹ Thucyd. ii, 67. Dr. Thirlwall (Hist. Greece, vol. iii. ch. 20, p. 129) says that "the envoys were sacrificed chiefly to give a decent color to the baseness of killing Aristeus, from whom the Athenians feared subsequent evil, in consequence of his ability and active spirit. I do not think this is fairly contained in the words of Thucydides. He puts in the foreground of Athenian motive, doubtless, fear from the future energy of Aristeus; but if that had been the only motive, the Athenians would probably have slain him singly without the rest: they would hardly think it necessary to provide themselves with "any decent color," in the way that Dr. Thirlwall suggests. Thucydides names the special feeling of the Athenians against Aristeus (in my judgment), chiefly in order to explain the extreme haste of the Athenian sentence of execution — ἀνδραπον — ἀκρίτως, etc.: they were under the influence of combined motives, — fear, revenge, retaliation.

The envoys here slain were sons of Sperthiês and Bulis, former Spartan heralds who had gone up to Xerxes at Susa to offer their heads as atonement for the previous conduct of the Spartans in killing the heralds of

Such revenge against Aristeus, the instigator of the revolt of Potidæa, relieved the Athenians from a dangerous enemy; and that blockaded city was now left to its fate. About midwinter it capitulated, after a blockade of two years, and after going through the extreme of suffering from famine, to such a degree that some of those who died were even eaten by the survivors. In spite of such intolerable distress, the Athenian generals, Xenophon son of Euripidês and his two colleagues, admitted them to favorable terms of capitulation, — permitting the whole population and the Corinthian allies to retire freely, with a specified sum of money per head, as well as with one garment for each man and two for each woman, — so that they found shelter among the Chalkidic townships in the neighborhood. These terms were singularly favorable, considering the desperate state of the city, which must very soon have surrendered at discretion: but the

Darius. Xerxes dismissed them unhurt, — so that the anger of Talthybius (the heroic progenitor of the family of heralds at Sparta) remained still unsatisfied: it was only satisfied by the death of their two sons, now slain by the Athenians. The fact that the two persons now slain were sons of those two (Sperthiês and Bulis) who had previously gone to Susa to tender their lives, — is spoken of as a "romantic and tragical coincidence." But there surely is very little to wonder at. The functions of herald at Sparta, were the privilege of a particular gens, or family: every herald, therefore, was *ex officio* the son of a herald. Now when the Lacedæmonians, at the beginning of this Peloponnesian war, were looking out for two members of the heraldis gens to send up to Susa, upon whom would they so naturally fix as upon the sons of those two men who had been to Susa before? These sons had doubtless heard their fathers talk a great deal about it, — probably with interest and satisfaction, since they derived great glory from the unaccepted offer of their lives in atonement. There was a particular reason why these two men should be taken, in preference to any other heralds, to fulfil this dangerous mission: and doubtless when they perished in it, the religious imagination of the Lacedæmonians would group all the series of events as consummation of the judgment inflicted by Talthybius in his anger (Herodot. vii, 135 — ὡς ἐξ ὄντι Λακεδαιμόνιοι).

It appears that Anêristus, the herald here slain, had distinguished himself personally in that capture of fishermen on the coast of Peloponnesus by the Lacedæmonians, for which the Athenians were now retaliating (Herodot. vii, 137). Though this passage of Herodotus is not clear, yet the sense here put upon it is the natural one, — and clearer (in my judgment) than that which O. Müller would propose instead of it (Dorians, ii, p. 437).

hardships, even of the army without, in the cold of winter, were very severe, and they had become thoroughly tired both of the duration and the expense of the siege. The cost to Athens had been not less than two thousand talents; since the assailant force had never been lower than three thousand hoplites, during the entire two years of the siege, and for a portion of the time considerably greater, — each hoplite receiving two drachmas *per diem*. The Athenians at home, when they learned the terms of the capitulation, were displeased with the generals for the indulgence shown, — since a little additional patience would have constrained the city to surrender at discretion: in which case the expense would have been partly made good by selling the prisoners as slaves, — and Athenian vengeance probably gratified by putting the warriors to death.¹ A body of one thousand colonists were sent from Athens to occupy Potidæa and its vacant territory.²

Two full years had now elapsed since the actual commencement of war, by the attack of the Thebans on Plataea; yet the Peloponnesians had accomplished nothing of what they expected. They had not rescued Potidæa, nor had their twice-repeated invasion, although assisted by the unexpected disasters arising from the epidemic, as yet brought Athens to any sufficient humiliation, — though perhaps the envoys which she had sent during the foregoing summer with propositions for peace, contrary to the advice of Periklēs, may have produced an impression that she could not hold out long. At the same time, the Peloponnesian allies had on their side suffered little damage, since the ravages inflicted by the Athenian fleet on their coast may have been nearly compensated by the booty which their invading troops gained in Attica. Probably by this time the public opinion in Greece had contracted an unhappy familiarity with the state of war, so that nothing but some decisive loss and humiliation on one side at least, if not on both, would suffice to terminate it. In this third spring, the Peloponnesians did not repeat their annual march into Attica, — deterred, partly, we may sup-

¹ Thucyd. ii, 70; iii, 17. However, the displeasure of the Athenians against the commanders cannot have been very serious, since Xenophon was appointed to command against the Chalkidians in the ensuing year.

² Diodor. xii. 46.

pose, by fear of the epidemic yet raging there, — but still more by the strong desire of the Thebans to take their revenge on Plataea.

To this ill-fated city, Archidamus marched forthwith, at the head of the confederate army. But no sooner had he entered and begun to lay waste the territory, than the Plataean heralds came forth to arrest his hand, and accosted him in the following terms: "Archidamus, and ye men of Lacedæmon, ye act wrong, and in a manner neither worthy of yourselves nor of your fathers, in thus invading the territory of Plataea. For the Lacedæmonian Pausanias, son of Kleombrotus, after he had liberated Greece from the Persians, in conjunction with those Greeks who stood forward to bear their share of the danger, offered sacrifice to Zeus Eleutherius, in the market-place of Plataea; and there, in presence of all the allies, assigned to the Plataeans their own city and territory to hold in full autonomy, so that none should invade them wrongfully, or with a view to enslave them: should such invasion occur, the allies present pledged themselves to stand forward with all their force as protectors. While your fathers made to us this grant, in consideration of our valor and forwardness in that perilous emergency, ye are now doing the precise contrary: ye are come along with our worst enemies, the Thebans, to enslave us. And we on our side now adjure you, calling to witness the gods who sanctioned that oath, as well as your paternal and our local gods, not to violate the oath by doing wrong to the Plataean territory, but to let us live on in that autonomy which Pausanias guaranteed."¹

Whereunto Archidamus replied: "Ye speak fairly, men of Plataea, if your conduct shall be in harmony with your words. Remain autonomous yourselves, as Pausanias granted, and help us to liberate those other Greeks, who, after having shared in the same dangers and sworn the same oath along with you, have now been enslaved by the Athenians. It is for their liberation and that of the other Greeks that this formidable outfit of war has been brought forth. Pursuant to your oaths, ye ought by rights, and we now invite you, to take active part in this object. But if ye cannot act thus, at least remain quiet, conformably to the

¹ Thucyd. ii, 71, 72.

Thucydides, illustrates forcibly the respectful reluctance with which the Lacedæmonians first brought themselves to assail this scene of the glories of their fathers. What deserves remark is, that their direct sentiment attaches itself, not at all to the Platean people, but only to the Platean territory; it is purely local, though it becomes partially transferred to the people, as tenants of this spot, by secondary association. It was, however, nothing but the long-standing antipathy¹ of the Thebans which induced Archidamus to undertake the enterprise; for the conquest of Platea was of no avail towards the main objects of the war, though its exposed situation caused it to be crushed between the two great contending forces in Greece.

Archidamus now commenced the siege forthwith, in full hopes that his numerous army, the entire strength of the Peloponnesian confederacy, would soon capture a place of no great size, and probably not very well fortified; yet defended by a resolute garrison of four hundred native citizens, with eighty Athenians: there was no one else in the town except one hundred and ten female slaves for cooking. The fruit-trees, cut down in laying waste the cultivated land, sufficed to form a strong palisade all round the town, so as completely to block up the inhabitants. Next, Archidamus, having abundance of timber near at hand in the forests of Kithæron, began to erect a mound up against a portion of the town wall, so as to be able to march up by an inclined plane, and thus take the place by assault. Wood, stones, and earth, were piled up in a vast heap, — cross palings of wood being carried on each side of it, in parallel lines at right angles to the town wall, for the purpose of keeping the loose mass of materials between them together. For seventy days and as many nights did the army labor at this work, without any intermission, taking turns for food and repose: and through such unremitting assiduity, the mound approached near to the height of the town wall. But as it gradually mounted up, the Plateans were not idle on their side: they constructed an additional wall of wood, which they planted on the top of their own town wall, so as to heighten the part over against the enemy's mound: sustaining it by brickwork behind, for which the neigh-

¹ Thucyd. iii. 68.

boring houses furnished materials: hides, raw as well as dressed, were suspended in front of it, in order to protect their workmen against missiles, and the woodwork against fire-carrying arrows.¹ And as the besiegers still continued heaping up materials, to carry their mound up to the height even of this recent addition, the Plateans met them by breaking a hole in the lower part of their town wall, and pulling in the earth from the lower portion of the mound; which thus gave way at the top and left a vacant space near the wall, until the besiegers filled it up by letting down quantities of stiff clay rolled up in wattled reeds, which could not be pulled away in the same manner. Again, the Plateans dug a subterranean passage from the interior of their town to the ground immediately under the mound, and thus carried away unseen the lower earth belonging to the latter; so that the besiegers saw their mound continually sinking down, in spite of fresh additions at the top, — yet without knowing the reason. Nevertheless, it was plain that these stratagems would be in the end ineffectual, and the Plateans accordingly built a new portion of town wall in the interior, in the shape of a crescent, taking its start from the old town wall on each side of the mound: the besiegers were thus deprived of all benefit from the mound, assuming it to be successfully completed; since when they had marched over it, there stood in front of them a new town wall to be carried in like manner.

Nor was this the only method of attack employed. Archidamus farther brought up battering engines, one of which greatly shook and endangered the additional height of wall built by the Plateans over against the mound; while others were brought to bear on different portions of the circuit of the town wall. Against these new assailants, various means of defence were used: the defenders on the walls threw down ropes, got hold of the head of the approaching engine, and pulled it by main force out of the right line, either upwards or sideways: or they prepared heavy wooden beams on the wall, each attached to both ends by long iron chains to two poles projecting at right angles from the wall, by means of which poles it was raised up and held aloft: so that at the proper moment, when the battering machine approached

Thucyd. ii. 75.

the wall, the chain was suddenly let go, and the beam fell down with great violence directly upon the engine and broke off its projecting beak.¹ However rude these defensive processes may seem, they were found effective against the besiegers, who saw themselves, at the close of three months' unavailing efforts, obliged to renounce the idea of taking the town in any other way than by the process of blockade and famine, — a process alike tedious and costly.²

Before they would incur so much inconvenience, however, they had recourse to one farther stratagem, — that of trying to set the town on fire. From the height of their mound, they threw down large quantities of fagots, partly into the space between the mound and the newly-built crescent piece of wall, — partly, as far as they could reach, into other parts of the city: pitch and other combustibles were next added, and the whole mass set on fire. The conflagration was tremendous, such as had never been before seen: a large portion of the town became unapproachable, and the whole of it narrowly escaped destruction. Nothing could have preserved it, had the wind been rather more favorable: there was indeed a farther story, of a most opportune thunder-storm coming to extinguish the flames, which Thucydides does not seem to credit.³ In spite of much partial damage, the town remained still defensible, and the spirit of the inhabitants unsubdued.

There now remained no other resource except to build a wall of circumvallation round Plataea, and trust to the slow process of famine. The task was distributed in suitable fractions among the various confederate cities, and completed about the middle of September, a little before the autumnal equinox.⁴ Two dis-

¹ The various processes, such as those here described, employed both for offence and defence in the ancient sieges, are noticed and discussed in Æneas Poliorctic. c. 33. seq.

² Thucyd. ii. 76.

³ Thucyd. ii. 77.

⁴ Thucyd. ii. 78. καὶ ἐπειδὴ πᾶν ἐξείργαστο περὶ Ἀρκτοῦρου ἐπιτολά, etc. at the period of the year when the star Arcturus rises immediately before sunrise, — that is, sometime between the 12th and 17th of September: see Göller's note on the passage. Thucydides does not often give any fixed marks to discriminate the various periods of the year, as we find it here done. The Greek months were all lunar months, or nominally so: the

first walls were constructed, with sixteen feet of *εὐκλείας* space all covered in, so as to look like one very thick wall: there were, moreover, two ditches, out of which the bricks for the wall had been taken, — one on the inside towards Plataea, and the other on the outside against any foreign relieving force. The interior covered space between the walls was intended to serve as permanent quarters for the troops left on guard, consisting half of Boeotians and half of Peloponnesians.¹

At the same time that Archidamus began the siege of Plataea, the Athenians on their side despatched a force of two thousand hoplites and two hundred horsemen, to the Chalkidic peninsula, under Xenophon son of Euripides (with two colleagues), the same who had granted so recently the capitulation of Potidæa. It was necessary doubtless, to convoy and establish the new colonists who were about to occupy the deserted site of Potidæa: moreover, the general had acquired some knowledge of the position and parties of the Chalkidic towns, and hoped to be able to act against them with effect. They first invaded the territory belonging to the Boeotian town of Spartolus, not without hopes that the city itself would be betrayed to them by intelligences within: but this was prevented by the arrival of an additional force from Olynthus, partly hoplites, partly peltasts. These peltasts, a species of troops between heavy-armed and light-armed, furnished with a pelta (or light shield), and short spear, or javelin, appear to have taken their rise among these Chalkidic Greeks, being equipped in a manner half Greek and half Thracian: we shall find them hereafter much improved and turned to account by some of the ablest Grecian generals. The Chalkidic hoplites are generally of inferior merit: on the other hand, their cavalry

names of months, as well as the practice of intercalation to rectify the calendar, varied from city to city: so that if Thucydides had specified the day of the Attic month Boëdromion (instead of specifying the rising of Arcturus) on which this work was finished, many of his readers would not have distinctly understood him. Hippokratēs also, in indications of time for medical purposes, employs the appearance of Arcturus and other stars.

¹ Thucyd. ii. 78; iii. 21. From this description of the double wall and covered quarters provided for what was foreknown as a long blockade, we may understand the sufferings of the Athenian troops (who probably had no double wall), in the two years' blockade of Potidæa, — and their readiness to grant an easy capitulation to the besieged: see a few pages above

and their peltasts are very good: in the action which now took place under the walls of Spartôlus, the Athenian hoplites defeated those of the enemy, but their cavalry and their light troops were completely worsted by the Chalkidic. These latter, still farther strengthened by the arrival of fresh peltasts from Olynthus, ventured even to attack the Athenian hoplites, who thought it prudent to fall back upon the two companies left in reserve to guard the baggage. During this retreat they were harassed by the Chalkidic horse and light-armed, who retired when the Athenians turned upon them, but attacked them on all sides when on their march; and employed missiles so effectively that the retreating hoplites could no longer maintain a steady order, but took to flight, and sought refuge at Potidæa. Four hundred and thirty hoplites, near one-fourth of the whole force, together with all three generals, perished in this defeat, and the expedition returned in dishonor to Athens.¹

In the western parts of Greece, the arms of Athens and her allies were more successful. The repulse of the Ambrakiots from the Amphiloehian Argos, during the preceding year, had only exasperated them and induced them to conceive still larger plans of aggression against both the Akarnanians and Athenians. In concert with their mother-city Corinth, where they obtained warm support, they prevailed upon the Lacedæmonians to take part in a simultaneous attack of Akarnania, by land as well as by sea, which would prevent the Akarnanians from concentrating their forces in any one point, and put each of their townships upon an isolated self-defence; so that all of them might be overpowered in succession, and detached, together with Kephallenia and Zakynthus, from the Athenian alliance. The fleet of Phormio at Naupaktus, consisting only of twenty triremes, was accounted incompetent to cope with a Peloponnesian fleet such as might be fitted out at Corinth. There was even some hope that the important station at Naupaktus might itself be taken, so as to expel the Athenians completely from those parts.

The scheme of operations now projected was far more comprehensive than anything which the war had yet afforded. The land-force of the Ambrakiots, together with their neighbors and

¹ Thucyd. ii, 79.

fellow-colonists the Leukadians and Anaktorians, assembled near their own city, while their maritime force was collected at Leukas, on the Akarnanian coast. The force at Ambrakia was joined, not only by Knêmus, the Lacedæmonian admiral, with one thousand Peloponnesian hoplites, who found means to cross over from Peloponnesus, eluding the vigilance of Phormio, — but also by a numerous body of Epirotic and Macedonian auxiliaries, collected even from the distant and northernmost tribes. A thousand Chaonians were present, under the command of Photyus and Nikanor, two annual chiefs chosen from the regal gens. Neither this tribe, nor the Thesprotians who came along with them, acknowledged any hereditary king. The Molcassians and Atintanes, who also joined the force, were under Sabylinthus, regent on behalf of the young prince Tharypas. There came, besides, the Paranæi, from the banks of the river Aôus under their king Orædus, together with one thousand Orestæ, a tribe rather Macedonian than Epirot, sent by their king Antiochus. Even king Perdikkas, though then nominally in alliance with Athens, sent one thousand of his Macedonian subjects, who, however, arrived too late to be of any use.¹ This large and diverse body of Epirotic invaders, a new phenomenon in Grecian history, and got together doubtless by the hopes of plunder, proves the extensive relations of the tribes of the interior with the city of Ambrakia, — a city destined to become in later days the capital of the Epirotic king Pyrrhus.

It had been concerted that the Peloponnesian fleet from Corinth should join that already assembled at Leukas, and act upon the coast of Akarnania at the same time that the land-force marched into that territory. But Knêmus finding the land-force united and ready, near Ambrakia, deemed it unnecessary to await the fleet from Corinth, and marched straight into Akarnania, through Limnæa, a frontier village territory belonging to the Amphiloehian Argos. He directed his march upon Stratus, — an interior town, and the chief place in Akarnania, — the capture of which would be likely to carry with it the surrender of the rest; especially as the Akarnanians, distracted by the presence of the ships at Leukas, and alarmed by the large body of

Thucyd. ii, 80.

invaders on their frontier, did not dare to leave their own separate homes, so that Stratus was left altogether to his own citizens. Nor was Phormio, though they sent an urgent message to him, in any condition to help them; since he could not leave Naupaktus unguarded, when the large fleet from Corinth was known to be approaching. Under such circumstances, Knêmus and his army indulged the most confident hopes of overpowering Stratus without difficulty. They marched in three divisions: the Epirots in the centre, — the Leukadians and Anaktorians on the right, — the Peloponnesians and Ambrakiots, together with Knêmus himself, on the left. So little expectation was entertained of resistance, that these three divisions took no pains to keep near or even in sight of each other. Both the Greek divisions, indeed, maintained a good order of march, and kept proper scouts on the look out; but the Epirots advanced without any care or order whatever; especially the Chaonians, who formed the van. These men, accounted the most warlike of all the Epirotic tribes, were so full of conceit and rashness, that when they approached near to Stratus, they would not halt to encamp and assail the place conjointly with the Greeks; but marched along with the other Epirots right forward to the town, intending to attack it single-handed, and confident that they should carry it at the first assault, before the Greeks came up, so that the entire glory would be theirs. The Stratians watched and profited by this imprudence. Planting ambuscades in convenient places, and suffering the Epirots to approach without suspicion near to the gates, they then suddenly sallied out and attacked them, while the troops in ambuscade rose up and assailed them at the same time. The Chaonians who formed the van, thus completely surprised, were routed with great slaughter; while the other Epirots fled, after but little resistance. So much had they hurried forward in advance of their Greek allies, that neither the right nor the left division were at all aware of the battle, until the flying barbarians, hotly pursued by the Akarnanians, made it known to them. The two divisions then joined, protected the fugitives, and restrained farther pursuit, — the Stratians declining to come to hand-combat with them until the other Akarnanians should arrive. They seriously annoyed the forces of Knêmus however, by distant slinging, in which the Akarnanians were

preëminently skilful; nor did Knêmus choose to persist in his attack under such discouraging circumstances. As soon as night arrived, so that there was no longer any fear of slingers, he retreated to the river Anapus, a distance of between nine and ten miles. Well aware that the news of the victory would attract other Akarnanian forces immediately to the aid of Stratus, he took advantage of the arrival of his own Akarnanian allies from (Eniade (the only town in the country which was attached to the Lacedæmonian interest), and sought shelter near their city. From thence his troops dispersed, and returned to their respective homes.¹

Meanwhile, the Peloponnesian fleet from Corinth, which had been destined to cooperate with Knêmus off the coast of Akarnania, had found difficulties in its passage, alike unexpected and insuperable. Mustering forty-seven triremes of Corinth, Sikyon, and other places, with a body of soldiers on board, and with accompanying store-vessels, — it departed from the harbor of Corinth, and made its way along the northern coast of Achaia. Its commanders, not intending to meddle with Phormio and his twenty ships at Naupaktus, never for a moment imagined that he would venture to attack a number so greatly superior: the triremes were, accordingly, fitted out more as transports for numerous soldiers than with any view to naval combat, — and with little attention to the choice of skilful rowers.²

Except in the combat near Korkyra, and there only partially, the Peloponnesians had never yet made actual trial of Athenian maritime efficiency, at the point of excellence which it had now reached: themselves retaining the old unimproved mode of fighting and of working ships at sea, they had no practical idea of the degree to which it had been superseded by Athenian training. Among the Athenians, on the contrary, not only the seamen generally had a confirmed feeling of their own superiority, — but Phormio especially, the ablest of all their captains, always familiarized his men with the conviction, that no Peloponnesian fleet,

¹ Thucyd. ii, 82; Diodor. xii, 48.

² Thucyd. ii, 83. οὐχ ὡς ἐπὶ ναυμαχίαν, ἀλλὰ στρατιωτικώτερον παρεσκευασμένοι: compare the speech of Knêmus, c. 87. The unskilfulness of the rowers is noticed (c. 84).

be its number ever so great, could possibly contend against them with success.¹ Accordingly, the Corinthian admirals, Machaon and his two colleagues, were surprised to observe that Phormio with his small Athenian squadron, instead of keeping safe in Naupaktus, was moving in parallel line with them and watching their progress until they should get out of the Corinthian gulf into the more open sea. Having advanced along the northern coast of Peloponnesus as far as Patræ in Achaia, they then altered their course, and bore to the northwest in order to cross over towards the Ætolian coast, in their way to Akarnania. In doing this, however, they perceived that Phormio was bearing down upon them from Chalkis and the mouth of the river Euenus, and they now discovered for the first time that he was going to attack them. Disconcerted by this incident, and not inclined for a naval combat in the wide and open sea, they altered their plan of passage, returned to the coast of Peloponnesus, and brought to for the night at some point near to Rhium, the narrowest breadth of the strait. Their bringing to was a mere feint intended to deceive Phormio, and induce him to go back for the night to his own coast: for, during the course of the night, they left their station, and tried to get across the breadth of the gulf, where it was near the strait, and comparatively narrow, before Phormio could come down upon them: and if the Athenian captain had really gone back to take night-station on his own coast, they would probably have got across to the Ætolian or northern coast without any molestation in the wide sea: but he watched their movements closely, kept the sea all night, and was thus enabled to attack them in mid-channel, even

¹ Thucyd. ii, 88. πρότερον μὲν γὰρ αὐτοῖς ἐλέγε (Phormio) καὶ προπαρεσκεύαζε τὰς γνώμας, ὡς οὐδὲν αὐτοῖς πλεόντος νῆων τῶν τούτων, ἢ ἐπιπλέον, ὅ, τι οὐχ ἐπομενέσιον αὐτοῖς ἔστι· καὶ οἱ στρατιῶται ἐκ πολλῶν ἐν σφίσιν αὐτοῖς τὴν ἀξιολογίαν ταύτην εἰλόμεσαν, μηδὲν αὖ ἐχλόν· Ἀθηναῖοι δ' οὐτεὶς Πελοποννησίων νῆων ἐποχωρεῖν.

This passage is not only remarkable as it conveys the striking persuasion entertained by the Athenians of their own naval superiority, but also as it discloses the frank and intimate communication between the Athenian captain and his seamen,—so strongly pervading and determining the feelings of the latter. Compare what is told respecting the Syracusan Hermokretēs, Xenoph. Hellen. i, 1, 36.

during the shorter passage near the strait, at the first dawn of morning.¹ On seeing his approach, the Corinthian admirals

¹ Thucyd. ii, 83. Ἐπειδὴ μὲντοι ἀντιπαραπλέοντας τε ἰώρων αὐτοὺς (that is, when the Corinthians saw the Athenian ships) παρὰ γῆν σφῶν κοιμωμένων, καὶ ἐκ Πατρῶν τῆς Ἀχαιῆς πρὸς τὴν ἀντιπείρας ἡπειρὸν διαβαλλόντων ἐπὶ Ἀκαρνανίας κατεῖδον τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ἀπὸ τῆς Χαλκίδος καὶ τοῦ Εὐήνου ποταμοῦ προσπλέοντας σοῖσι, καὶ οὐκ ἐλαθον νυκτὸς ὑφορμισάμενοι. οὕτω δὲ ἀναγκάζονται ναυμαχεῖν κατὰ μέσον τὸν ἡερθμόν.

There is considerable difficulty in clearly understanding what was here done, especially what is meant by the words οὐκ ἐλαθον νυκτὸς ὑφορμισάμενοι, which words the Scholiast construed as if the nominative case to ἐλαθον were οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι, whereas the natural structure of the sentence, as well as the probabilities of fact, lead the best commentators to consider οἱ Πελοποννησῖοι as the nominative case to that verb. The remark of the Scholiast, however, shows us, that the difficulty of understanding the sentence dates from ancient times.

Dr. Arnold — whose explanation is adopted by Poppo and Göller — says: "The two fleets were moving parallel to one another along the opposite shores of the Corinthian gulf. But even when they had sailed out of the strait at Rhium, the opposite shores were still so near, that the Peloponnesians hoped to cross over without opposition, if they could so far deceive the Athenians, as to the spot where they brought to for the night, as to induce them either to stop too soon, or to advance too far, that they might not be exactly opposite to them to intercept the passage. If they could lead the Athenians to think that they meant to advance in the night beyond Patræ, the Athenian fleet was likely to continue its own course along the northern shore, to be ready to intercept them when they should endeavor to run across to Akarnania. But the Athenians, aware that they had stopped at Patræ, stopped themselves at Chalkis, instead of proceeding further to the westward: and thus were so nearly opposite to them, that the Peloponnesians had not time to get more than half-way across, before they found themselves encountered by their watchful enemy."

This explanation seems to me not satisfactory, nor does it take account of all the facts of the case. The first belief of the Peloponnesians was, that Phormio would not dare to attack them at all: accordingly, having arrived at Patræ, they stretched from thence across the gulf to the mouth of the Euenus, — the natural way of proceeding according to ancient navigation, — going in the direction of Akarnania (ἐπὶ Ἀκαρνανίας). As they were thus stretching across, they perceived Phormio bearing down upon them from the Euenus: this was a surprise to them, and as they wished to avoid a battle in the mid-channel, they desisted from proceeding farther that day, in hopes to be able to deceive Phormio in respect of their night-station. They made a feint of taking night-station on the shore between Patræ and Rhium, near the narrow part of the strait; but, in

ranged their triremes in a circle with the prows outward, like the spokes of a wheel; the circle was made as large as it could

really, they "slipped anchor and put to sea during the night," as Mr. Bloomfield says, in hopes of getting across the shorter passage under favor of darkness, before Phormio could come upon them. That they must have done this is proved by the fact, that the subsequent battle was fought on the morrow in the mid-channel *very little after daybreak* (we learn this from what Thucydides says about the gulf-breeze, for which Phormio waited before he would commence his attack — *ὅταν ἀναγνῶναι τὴν πύλαν ἐκ τῆς γῆς γίνεσθαι ἐπὶ τῇ νύκτι*). If Phormio had returned to Chalkis, they would probably have succeeded; but he must have kept the sea all night, which would be the natural proceeding of a vigilant captain, determined not to let the Peloponnesians get across without fighting: so that he was upon them in the mid-channel immediately that day broke.

Putting all the statements of Thucydides together, we may be convinced that this is the way in which the facts occurred. But of the precise sense of *ἡθοιμασμένοι*, I confess I do not feel certain: Haack says, it means "clam appellere ad litus," but here, I think, that sense will not do: for the Peloponnesians did not wish, and could indeed hardly hope, to conceal from Phormio the spot where they brought to for the night, and to make him suppose that they brought to at some point of the shore west of Patræ, when in reality they passed the night in Patræ, — which is what Dr. Arnold supposes. The shore west of Patræ makes a bend to the southwest, — forming the gulf of Patras, — so that the distance from the northern, or Ætolian and Akarnanian, side of the gulf becomes for a considerable time longer and longer, and the Peloponnesians would thus impose upon themselves a longer crossing, increasing the difficulty of getting over with out a battle. But *ἡθοιμασμένοι* may reasonably be supposed to mean especially in conjunction with *ἐκ τῆς γῆς*, "taking up a simulated or imperfect night-station," in which they did not really intend to stay all night, and which could be quitted at short notice and with ease. The preposition *ἐπὶ*, in composition, would thus have the sense, not of *secrecy* (*clam*) but of *sham-performance*, or of mere going through the forms of an act for the purpose of making a false impression (like *ἐπιδίκεν*, Xenoph. Hell. iv. 72). Mr. Bloomfield proposes conjecturally *ἡθοιμασμένοι*, meaning, "that the Peloponnesians slipped their anchors in the night:" I place no faith in the conjecture, but I believe him to be quite right in supposing, that the Peloponnesians *did actually* slip their anchors in the night.

Another point remains to be adverted to. The battle took place *κατὰ στενὸν τὸν πορθμῶν*. Now we need not understand this expression to allude to the narrowest part of the sea, or the strait, strictly and precisely; that is, the line of seven stadia between Rhium and Antirrhium. But I think we must understand it to mean a portion of sea not far westward of the strait, where the breadth, though greater than that of the strait itself, is yet

be without leaving opportunity to the Athenian assailing ships to practise the manœuvre of the *diekplus*,¹ and the interior space was sufficient, not merely for the store-vessels, but also for five chosen triremes, who were kept as a reserve, to dart out when required through the intervals between the outer triremes.

In this position they were found and attacked shortly after daybreak, by Phormio, who bore down upon them with his ships in single file, all admirable sailors, and his own ship leading; all being strictly forbidden to attack until he should give the signal. He rowed swiftly round the Peloponnesian circle, nearing the prows of their ships as closely as he could, and making constant semblance of being about to come to blows. Partly from the intimidating effect of this manœuvre, altogether novel to the Peloponnesians, — partly from the natural difficulty, well known to Phormio, of keeping every ship in its exact stationary position, — the order of the circle, both within and without, presently became disturbed. It was not long before a new ally came to his aid, on which he fully calculated, postponing his actual attack until this favorable incident occurred. The strong land-breeze out of the gulf of Corinth, always wont to begin shortly

not so great as it becomes in the line drawn northward from Patræ. We cannot understand *πορθμῶν* (as Mr. Bloomfield and Poppo do, — see the note of the latter on the Scholia) to mean *trajectus* simply, that is to say, the passage across even the widest portion of the gulf of Patras: nor does the passage cited out of c. 86 require us so to understand it. *Πορθμῶν*, in Thucydides, means a strait, or narrow crossing of sea, and Poppo himself admits that Thucydides always uses it so: nor would it be reasonable to believe that he would cut the line of sea across the gulf, from Patræ to the mouth of the Euenus, a *πορθμῶν*. See the note of Göller, on this point.

¹ Thucyd. ii. 84. *ἀγέροντες ἐκ κρήνης*. The great object of the fast-sailing Athenian trireme was, to drive its beak against some weak part of the adversary's ship; the stern, the side, or the oars, — not against the beak, which was strongly constructed as well for defence as for offence. The Athenian, therefore, rowing through the intervals of the adversary's line, and thus getting in their rear, turned rapidly, and got the opportunity, before the ship of the adversary could change its position, of striking it either in the stern or some weak part. Such a manœuvre was called the *diekplus*. The success of it, of course, depended upon the extreme rapidity and precision of the movements of the Athenian vessel, so superior in this respect to its adversary, not only in the better construction of the ship, but the excellence of rowers and steersmen.

after daybreak, came down upon the Peloponnesian fleet with its usual vehemence, at a moment when the steadiness of their oars was already somewhat giving way, and forced their ships more than ever out of proper relation one to the other. The triremes began to run foul of each other, or become entangled with the store-vessels: so that in every ship the men aboard were obliged to keep pushing off their neighbors on each side with poles, — not without loud clamor and mutual reproaches, which prevented both the orders of the captain, and the cheering sound or song whereby the keleustês animated the rowers and kept them to time, from being at all audible. Moreover, the fresh breeze had occasioned such a swell, that these rowers, unskilful under all circumstances, could not get their oars clear of the water, and the pilots thus lost all command over their vessels.¹ The

¹ See Dr. Arnold's note upon this passage of Thucydides, respecting the keleustês and his functions: to the passages which he indicates as reference, I will add two more of Plautus, *Mercat.* iv, 2, 5, and *Asinaria*, iii, 1, 15.

When we conceive the structure of an ancient trireme, we shall at once see, first, how essential the keleustês was, to keep the rowers in harmonious action, — next, how immense the difference must have been between practised and unpractised rowers. The trireme had, in all, one hundred and seventy rowers, distributed into three tiers. The upper tier, called *thranitæ*, were sixty-two in number, or thirty-one on each side: the middle tier, or *zygitæ*, as well as the lowest tier, or *thalamitæ*, were each fifty-four in number, or twenty-seven on each side. Besides these, there were belonging to each trireme a certain number, seemingly about thirty, of supplementary oars (*κόραι περὶ πῶρα*), to be used by the *epibatæ*, or soldiers, serving on board, in case of rowers being killed, or oars broken. Each tier of rowers was distributed along the whole length of the vessel, from head to stern, or at least along the greater part of it; but the seats of the higher tiers were not placed in the exact perpendicular line above the lower. Of course, the oars of the *thranitæ*, or uppermost tier, were the longest: those of the *thalamitæ*, or lowest tier, the shortest: those of the *zygitæ*, of a length between the two. Each oar was rowed only by one man. The *thranitæ*, as having the longest oars, were most hardly worked and most highly paid. What the length of the oars was, belonging to either tier, we do not know: but some of the supplementary oars appear to have been about fifteen feet in length.

What is here stated, appears to be pretty well ascertained, chiefly from the inscriptions discovered at Athens a few years ago, so full of information respecting the Athenian marine, — and from the most instructive commentary appended to these inscriptions by M. Boeckh, *Seewesen der Athe-*

critical moment was now come, and Phormio gave the signal for attack. He first drove against and disabled one of the admiral's ships, — his comrades next assailed others with equal success, — so that the Peloponnesians, confounded and terrified, attempted hardly any resistance, but broke their order and sought safety in flight. They fled partly to Patræ, partly to Dymê, in Achaia, pursued by the Athenians; who, with scarcely the loss of a man, captured twelve triremes, took aboard and carried away almost the entire crews, and sailed off with them to Molykreium, or Antirrhium, the northern cape at the narrow mouth of the Corinthian gulf, opposite to the corresponding cape called Rhium in Achaia. Having erected at Antirrhium a trophy for the victory, dedicating one of the captive triremes to Poseidon, they returned to Naupaktus; while the Peloponnesian ships sailed along the shore from Patræ to Kyllênê, the principal port in the territory

ner, ch. ix, pp. 94, 104, 115. But there is a great deal still, respecting the equipment of an ancient trireme, unascertained and disputed.

Now there was nothing but the voice of the keleustês to keep these one hundred and seventy rowers all to good time with their strokes. With oars of different length, and so many rowers, this must have been no easy matter, and apparently quite impossible, unless the rowers were trained to act together. The difference between those who were so trained and those who were not, must have been immense. We may imagine the difference between the ships of Phormio and those of his enemies, and the difficulty of the latter in contending with the swell of the sea, — when we read this description of the ancient trireme.

About two hundred men, that is to say, one hundred and seventy rowers and thirty supernumeraries, mostly *epibatæ* or hoplites serving on board, besides the pilot, the man at the ship's bow, the keleustês, etc., probably some half dozen officers, formed the crew of a trireme: compare Herodot. viii. 17; vii. 184, where he calculates the thirty *epibatæ* over and above the two hundred. Dr. Arnold thinks that, at the beginning of the Peloponnesian war, the *epibatæ* on board an Athenian trireme were no more than ten: but this seems not quite made out: see his note on Thucyd. iii. 95.

The Venetian galleys in the thirteenth century were manned by about the same number of men. "Les galères Vénitiens du convoi de Flandre devaient être montées par deux cent hommes libres, dont 180 rameurs, et 12 archers. Les arcs ou balistes furent prescrits en 1333 pour toutes les galères de commerce armées." (Depping, *Histoire du Commerce entre le Levant et l'Europe*, vol. i, p. 163.)

of Elis. They were here soon afterwards joined by Knêmus, who passed over with his squadron from Leukas.¹

These two incidents, just recounted, with their details, — the repulse of Knêmus and his army from Stratus, and the defeat of the Peloponnesian fleet by Phormio, — afford ground for some interesting remarks. The first of the two displays the great inferiority of the Epirots to the Greeks, — and even to the less advanced portion of the Greeks, — in the qualities of order, discipline, steadiness, and power of cooperation for a joint purpose. Confidence of success with them is exaggerated into childish rashness, so that they despise even the commonest precautions either in march or attack; while the Greek divisions on their right and on their left are never so elate as to omit either. If, on land, we thus discover the inherent superiority of Greeks over Epirots involuntarily breaking out, — so in the sea-fight we are no less impressed with the astonishing superiority of the Athenians over their opponents: a superiority, indeed, noway inherent, such as that of Greeks over Epirots, but depending in this case on previous toil, training, and inventive talent, on the one side, compared with neglect and old-fashioned routine on the other. Nowhere does the extraordinary value of that seamanship, which the Athenians had been gaining by years of improved practice, stand so clearly marked as in these first battles of Phormio. It gradually becomes less conspicuous as we advance in the war, since the Peloponnesians improve, learning seamanship as the Russians, under Peter the Great, learned the art of war from the Swedes, under Charles the Twelfth, — while the Athenian triremes and their crews seem to become less choice and effective, even before the terrible disaster at Syracuse, and are irreparably deteriorated after that misfortune.

To none did the circumstances of this memorable sea-fight seem so incomprehensible as to the Lacedæmonians. They had heard, indeed, of the seamanship of Athens, but had never felt it, and could not understand what it meant: so they imputed the defeat to nothing but disgraceful cowardice, and sent indignant orders to Knêmus at Kyllênê, to take the command, equip a larger and better fleet, and repair the dishonor. Three Spartan

¹ Thucyd. ii, 84.

commissioners — Brasidas, Timokratês, and Lykophron — were sent down to assist him with their advice and exertions in calling together naval contingents from the different allied cities and by this means, under the general resentment occasioned by the recent defeat, a large fleet of seventy-seven triremes was speedily mustered at Panormus, — a harbor of Achaia near to the promontory of Rhium, and immediately within the interior gulf. A land-force was also collected at the same place ashore, to aid the operations of the fleet. Such preparations did not escape the vigilance of Phormio, who transmitted to Athens news of his victory, at the same time urgently soliciting reinforcements to contend with the increasing strength of the enemy. The Athenians immediately sent twenty fresh ships to join him: but they were induced by the instances of a Kretan named Nikias, their proxenus at Gortyn, to allow him to take the ships first to Krete, on the faith of his promise to reduce the hostile town of Kydonia. He had made this promise as a private favor to the inhabitants of Polichna, border enemies of Kydonia; but when the fleet arrived he was unable to fulfil it: nothing was effected except ravage of the Kydonian lands, and the fleet was long prevented by adverse winds and weather from getting away.¹ This ill-advised diversion of the fleet from its straight course to join Phormio is a proof how much the counsels of Athens were beginning to suffer from the loss of Periklês, who was just now in his last illness and died shortly afterwards. That liability to be seduced by novel enterprises and projects of acquisition, against which he so emphatically warned his countrymen,² was even now beginning to manifest its disastrous consequences.

Through the loss of this precious interval, Phormio now found himself, with no more than his original twenty triremes, opposed to the vastly increased forces of the enemy, — seventy-seven triremes, with a large force on land to back them: the latter, no mean help in ancient warfare. He took up his station

¹ Thucyd. ii, 85.

² Thucyd. i, 144. Πῶλλον δὲ καὶ ἄλλα ἔχω ἐς ἐλπίδα τοῦ περισσεῦσαι, ἢν ἐθέλητε ἀρχὴν τε μὴ ἐκτάσθαι ἅμα πόλεμόν τε, καὶ κινδύνους ἀνδραγμάτων μὴ προσποιεσθαι: μᾶλλον γὰρ πεφύδηται τὰς οἰκείας ἡμῶν ἀμαρτίας ἢ τὰς ὡν ἐναντίων διανοίας.

near the Cape Antirrhium, or the Molykric Rhium, as it was called, — the opposite cape to the Achaic Rhium: the line between them, seemingly about an English mile in breadth, forms the entrance of the Corinthian gulf. The Messenian force from Naupaktus attended him, and served on land. But he kept on the outside of the gulf, anxious to fight in a large and open breadth of sea, which was essential to Athenian manœuvring: while his adversaries on their side remained on the inside of the Achaic cape, from the corresponding reason, — feeling that to them the narrow sea was advantageous, as making the naval battle like to a land battle, effacing all superiority of nautical skill.¹ If we revert back to the occasion of the battle of Salamis, we find that narrowness of space was at that time accounted the best of all protections for a smaller fleet against a larger. But such had been the complete change of feeling, occasioned by the system of manœuvring introduced since that period in the Athenian navy, that amplitude of sea room is now not less coveted by Phormio than dreaded by his enemies. The improved practice of Athens had introduced a revolution in naval warfare.

For six or seven days successively, the two fleets were drawn out against each other, — Phormio trying to entice the Peloponnesians to the outside of the gulf, while they on their side did what they could to bring him within it.² To him, every day's postponement was gain, since it gave him a new chance of his reinforcements arriving: for that very reason, the Peloponnesian commanders were eager to accelerate an action, and at length resorted to a well-laid plan for forcing it on. But in spite of immense numerical superiority, such was the discouragement and reluctance, prevailing among their seamen, many of whom had been actual sufferers in the recent defeat, — that Knêmus and Brasidas had to employ emphatic exhortations; insisting on the favorable prospect before them. — pointing out that the late battle had been lost only by mismanagement and imprudence, which would be for the future corrected, — and appealing to the inherent bravery of the Peloponnesian warrior. They concluded by a hint, that while those who behaved well in the coming battle would receive due honor, the laggards would assuredly be pun-

¹ Thucyd. ii, 86-89. compare vii, 36-49.

² Thucyd. ii, 96

ished:¹ a topic rarely touched upon by ancient generals in their harangues on the eve of battle, and demonstrating conspicuously the reluctance of many of the Peloponnesian seamen, who had been brought to the fight again chiefly by the ascendancy and strenuous commands of Sparta. To this reluctance Phormio pointedly alluded, in the encouraging exhortations which he on his side addressed to his men: for they too, in spite of their habitual confidence at sea, strengthened by the recent victory, were dispirited by the smallness of their numbers. He reminded them of their long practice and rational conviction of superiority at sea, such as no augmentation of numbers, especially with an enemy conscious of his own weakness, could overbalance: and he called upon them to show their habitual discipline and quick apprehension of orders, and above all to perform their regular movements in perfect silence during the actual battle,² — useful in all matters of war, and essential to the proper conduct of a sea-fight. The idea of entire silence on board the Athenian ships while a sea-fight was going on, is not only striking as a feature in the picture, but is also one of the most powerful evidences of the force of self-control and military habits among these citizen-seamen.

The habitual position of the Peloponnesian fleet off Panormus was within the strait, but nearly fronting the breadth of it, — opposite to Phormio, who lay on the outer side of the strait, as well as off the opposite cape: in the Peloponnesian line, therefore, the right wing occupied the north, or northeast side towards Naupaktus. Knêmus and Brasidas now resolved to make a forward movement up the gulf, as if against that town, which was the main Athenian station; for they knew that Phormio would be under the necessity of coming to the defence of the place, and they hoped to pin him up and force him to action close under the

¹ Thucyd. ii, 87. Τῶν δὲ πρότερον ἡγεμόνων οὐ χεῖρον τὴν ἐπιχείρησιν ἡμεῖς παρορκεύομεν, καὶ οὐκ ἐνδύομεν πρόσασιν οὐδενὶ κακῷ γενέσθαι ἐν εἰ τις ἄρα καὶ βουλὴν ἔῃ, κολασθήσεται τῇ πρεπούσῃ ζημίᾳ, οἱ δὲ ἀγαθοὶ ταῖς ἀρεταῖς τοῖς προσήκουσιν ἀθλοῖς τῆς ἀρετῆς.

² Thucyd. ii, 89. Καὶ ἐν τῷ ἔργῳ κόσμον καὶ σιγὴν περὶ πλείστον ἡγεῖσθε, ὃ ἐς τε τὰ πολλὰ τῶν πολεμικῶν συμφέρεει καὶ ναυμαχία σὺν ἐκίστα, &c.

land, where Athenian manœuvring would be unavailing. Accordingly, they commenced this movement early in the morning, sailing in line of four abreast towards the northern coast of the inner gulf; the right squadron, under the Lacedæmonian Timokrates, was in the van, according to its natural position,¹ and care had been taken to place in it twenty of the best sailing ships since the success of the plan of action was known beforehand to depend upon their celerity. As they had foreseen, Phormio the moment he saw their movement, put his men on shipboard, and rowed into the interior of the strait, though with the greatest reluctance; for the Messenians were on land alongside of him, and he knew that Naupaktus, with their wives and families, and a long circuit of wall,² was utterly undefended. He ranged his ships in line of battle ahead, probably his own the leading ship; and sailed close along the land towards Naupaktus, while the Messenians marching ashore kept near to him. Both fleets were thus moving in the same direction, and towards the same point, the Athenian close along shore, the Peloponnesians somewhat farther off. The latter had now got Phormio into the

¹ Thucyd. ii, 90. ἐπὶ τεσσάρων ταξίμενοι τὰς ναῖς. Matthiæ in his Grammar (sect. 584), states that ἐπὶ τεσσάρων means "four deep," and cites this passage of Thucydides as an instance of it. But the words certainly mean here *four abreast*; though it is to be recollected that a column four abreast, when turned into line, becomes four deep.

² Thucyd. iii, 102.

³ Thucyd. ii, 90. Οἱ δὲ Πελοποννήσιοι, ἐπειδὴ αὐταῖς οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι οὐκ ἐπέπλεον ἐν τῷ κόλπῳ καὶ τὰ στεῖνα, βουλόμενοι ἰκόντας ἔσω προσηγαγεῖν αὐτοῖς, ἀναγκάμενοι ἅμα ἐν ἔπλεον, ἐπὶ τεσσάρων ταξίμενοι τὰς ναῖς, ἐπὶ τὴν Ναιπᾶκτον γῆν ἔσω ἐπὶ τοῦ κόλπου, δεξιῶ κέρη ἤγονάν τε, ὥσπερ καὶ ὠμίον· ἐπὶ δ' αὐτῷ ἴκοσι νῆας ἔταξαν τὰς ἀριστα πλεούσας, ὅπως, εἰ ἄρα νοήσεις ἐπὶ τὴν Ναιπᾶκτον πλεῖν ὁ Φορμίων καὶ αὐτὰς ἐπεβοηθῆεν ταντὴ ταμπέλει, μὴ διασπῆναι πλεοντα τῶν ἐπὶ πλεον σφῶν οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἔξω τοῦ ἐσπέρων κέρως, ἀλλ' αὐταῖς αἰ νῆς περικλῆσαν.

It will be seen that I have represented in the text the movement of the Peloponnesian fleet as directed ostensibly and to all appearance against Naupaktus: and I translate the words in the fourth line of the above passage—ἐπὶ τὴν Ναιπᾶκτον γῆν ἔσω ἐπὶ τοῦ κόλπου—as meaning "against the station of the Athenians up the gulf within," that is, against Naupaktus. Mr Bloomfield gives that meaning to the passage, though not to the words; but the Scholiast, Dr. Arnold, Poppo, and Gölher, all construe it differently, and maintain that the words τὰς ναῖς mean the Peloponnesian ships.

position which they wished, pinned up against the land, with no room for tactics. On a sudden the signal was given, and the

To my view, this latter interpretation renders the whole scheme of the battle confused and unintelligible; while with the other meaning it is perfectly clear, and all the circumstances fit in with each other.

Dr. Arnold does not seem even to admit that τὴν Ναιπᾶκτον γῆν can mean anything else but the coast of Peloponnesus. He says: "The Scholiast says that ἐπὶ is here used for πρὸς. It would be better to say that it has a mixed signification of motion towards a place and neighborhood to it: expressing that the Peloponnesians sailed towards their own land (i. e. towards Corinth, Sikyon, and Pellion, to which places the greater number of the ships belonged), instead of standing over to the opposite coast, which belonged to their enemies; and at the same time kept close upon their own land, in the sense of ἐπὶ with a dative case."

It appears to me that Dr. Arnold's supposition of Corinth and Sikyon as the meaning of τὴν Ναιπᾶκτον γῆν is altogether far-fetched and improbable. As a matter of fact, it would only be true of part of the confederate fleet, while it would be false with regard to ships from Elis, Leukas, etc. And if it had been true with regard to all, yet the distance of Corinth from the Peloponnesian station was so very great, that Thucydides would hardly mark *direction* by referring to a city so very far off. Then again, both the Scholiast and Dr. Arnold do great violence to the meaning of the preposition ἐπὶ with an accusative case, and cite no examples to justify it. What the sense of ἐπὶ is with an accusative case signifying locality, is shown by Thucydides in this very passage.—τὴν Ναιπᾶκτον γῆν ἐπὶ τὴν Ναιπᾶκτον τὸν ἄντικρυ τὸν ἄντικρυ, etc. (again, c. 85, ἐπὶ Κολωνίᾳ πλῆθος; and i. 29, ἐπὶ Ἐπιδάμῳ, etc.—ἐπὶ τῇ γῇ τῶν Περδικκῶν, i. 57), that is, against, or to go thereby with a hostile purpose. So sensible does the Scholiast seem to be of this, that he affirms ἐπὶ to be used instead of πρὸς. This is a most violent supposition, for nothing can be more different than the two phrases ἐπὶ τῇ γῇ and πρὸς τὴν γῆν. Dr. Arnold again assigns to ἐπὶ with an accusative case another sense, which he himself admits that it only has with a dative.

I make these remarks with a view to show that the sense which Dr. Arnold and others put upon the words of Thucydides,—ἐπὶ τὴν Ναιπᾶκτον γῆν,—departs from the usual, and even from the legitimate meaning of the words. But I have a stronger objection still. If that sense be admitted, it will be found quite inconsistent with the subsequent proceedings, as Thucydides describes; and any one who will look at the map in reading this chapter, will see plainly that the fact is so. If, as Dr. Arnold supposes, the Peloponnesian fleet kept close along the shore of Peloponnesus, what was there in their movements to alarm Phormio for the safety of Naupaktus, or to draw him so reluctantly into the strait? Or if we even grant this, and suppose that Phormio construed the movement along the coast

whole Peloponnesian fleet facing to the left, changed from column into line, and instead of continuing to sail along the coast, rowed

of Achaia to indicate designs against Naupaktus, and that he therefore came into the gulf and sailed along his own shore to defend the town, — still the Peloponnesians would be separated from him by the whole breadth of the gulf at that point; and as soon as they altered their line of direction for the purpose of crossing the gulf and attacking him, he would have the whole breadth of the gulf in which to take his measures for meeting them, so that instead of finding himself jammed up against the land, he would have been able to go out and fight them in the wide water, which he so much desired. The whole description given by Thucydides, of the sudden wheeling of the Peloponnesian fleet, whereby Phormio's ships were assailed, and nine of them cut off, shows that the two fleets must have been very close together when that movement was undertaken. If they had not been close, — if the Peloponnesians had had to row any considerable distance after wheeling, — all the Athenian ships might have escaped along shore without any difficulty. In fact, the words of Thucydides imply that both the two fleets, at the time when the wheel of the Peloponnesians was made, were sailing in parallel directions along the northern coast in the direction of Naupaktus, — ὅπως εἰ ἄρα νομίσας ἐπὶ τὴν Ναυπακτον αὐτοῖς πλεῖν ὁ Φορμίων καὶ αὐτὸς ἐπεβοηθῶν ταύτῃ παραπλεῖ, — "if he also, with a view to defend the place, should sail along that coast," (that is, if he, as well as they:) which seems to be the distinct meaning of the particle καὶ in this place.

Now if we suppose the Peloponnesian fleet to have sailed from its original station towards Naupaktus, all the events which follow become thoroughly perspicuous and coherent. I apprehend that no one would ever have entertained any other idea, except from the words of Thucydides, — ἐπλεον ἐπὶ τὴν ἑαυτῶν γῆν ἰσῶ ἐπὶ τοῦ κόλπου. Since the subject or nominative case of the verb ἐπλεον is οἱ Πελοποννήσιοι, it has been supposed that the word ἑαυτῶν must necessarily refer to the Peloponnesians; and Mr. Bloomfield, with whom I agree as to the signification of the passage, proposes to alter ἑαυτῶν into αὐτῶν. It appears to me that this alteration is not necessary, and that ἑαυτῶν may very well be construed so as to refer to the Athenians, not to the Lacedaemonians. The reflective meaning of the pronoun ἑαυτῶν is not necessarily thrown back upon the subject of the action immediately preceding it, in a complicated sentence where there is more than one subject and more than one action. Thus, for instance, in this very passage of Thucydides which I have transcribed, we find the word ἑαυτῶν a second time used, and used so that its meaning is thrown back, not upon the subject immediately preceding, but upon a subject more distant from it, — ἐπὶ δ' αὐτῷ (τῷ κίρατι) εἰκοσι ναὺς ἔταξαν τὰς ἀρίστα πλεούσας, ὅπως, εἰ ἄρα, μὴ διαφύγοιεν πλεοντα τὸν ἐπίπλουν σφῶν οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἔξω τοῦ ἑαυτῶν κέρως, ἀλλ' αὐταὶ αἰ

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rapidly with their prows shore-ward to come to close quarters with the Athenians. The right squadron of the Peloponnesians

νῆες περικλήσειαν. Now here the words τοῦ ἑαυτῶν κέρως, allude to the Peloponnesian fleet, not to the Athenians, which latter is the subject immediately preceding. Poppo and Göller both admit such to be the true meaning; and if this be admissible, there appears to me no greater difficulty in construing the words ἐπὶ τὴν ἑαυτῶν γῆν to mean, "the land of the Athenians," not "the land of the Peloponnesians." Ἑαυτῶν might have been more unambiguously expressed by ἐκείνων αὐτῶν; for the reflective signification embodied in αὐτῶν is here an important addition to the meaning: "Since the Athenians did not sail into the interior of the gulf and the narrow waters, the Peloponnesians, wishing to bring them in even reluctantly, sailed against the Athenians' own land in the interior."

Another passage may be produced from Thucydides, in which the two words ἑαυτοῦ and ἐκείνου are both used in the same sentence and designate the same person, ii, 13. Περικλῆς, ὑποσησας, ὅτι Ἀρχίδαμος αὐτῷ ξένος ὢν ἐτίχανε, μὴ πολλὰ κίς ἢ αὐτὸς ἰδίᾳ βουλόμενος χαρίζεσθαι τοὺς ἀγροὺς αὐτοῦ παραλίτῃ καὶ μὴ δηώσῃ, ἢ καὶ Λακεδαιμονίων κελευσάντων ἐπὶ διαβολῇ τῇ ἑαυτοῦ γίνηται τοῦτο, ὥσπερ καὶ τὰ ἄγῃ ἐλαύνειν προεῖπον ἕνεκα ἐκείνου προηρόευνε τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις ἐν τῇ ἐκκλησίᾳ ὅτι Ἀρχίδαμος μὲν οἱ ξένος εἴη, οὐ μέντοι ἐπὶ κακῷ γε τῆς πόλεως γένοιτο, τοὺς δ' ἀγροὺς τοὺς ἑαυτοῦ καὶ οἰκίας ἦν ἄρα μὴ δηώσωσιν οἱ πολέμιοι ὥσπερ καὶ τὰ τῶν ἄλλων, ἀφίσει αὐτὰ δημόσια εἶναι. Here ἑαυτοῦ and ἐκείνου (compare an analogous passage, Xenophon, Hellen. i, 1, 27) both refer to Periklēs; and ἑαυτοῦ is twice used, so that it reflects back not upon the subject of the action immediately preceding it, but upon another subject farther behind. Again, iv, 99. Οἱ δὲ Βοιωτοὶ ἀπεκρίναντο, εἰ μὲν ἐν τῇ Βοιωτίᾳ εἰσὶν (οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι), ἀπὸντας ἐκ τῆς ἑαυτῶν ἀποφρεσθαι τὰ σφέτερα· εἰ δ' ἐν τῇ ἐκείνων, αὐτοὺς γινώσκειν τὸ ποιεῖν. Here the use of ἑαυτῶν and ἐκείνων is remarkable. Ἑαυτῶν refers to the Boeotians, though the Athenians are the subject of the action immediately preceding; while ἐκείνων refers to the Athenians, in another case where they are the subject of the action immediately preceding. We should almost have expected to find the position of the two words reversed. Again, in iv, 57, we have — Καὶ τοὺτους μὲν οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἐβούλευσαντο καταθεσθαι ἐς τὰς νῆσους, καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους Κυθηρίους οἱ κοῦντας τὴν ἑαυτῶν ὁρὸν τέσσαρα ταλάντα φέρειν. Here ἑαυτῶν refers to the subject of the action immediately preceding — that is, to Κυθηρίους, not to Ἀθηναῖοι: but when we turn to another chapter, iii, 78: οἱ δὲ Ἀθηναῖοι φοβούμενοι τὸ πλῆθος καὶ τὴν περικύκλωσιν, ἀνδράσι μὲν οὐ προσέπιπτον οὐδὲ κατὰ μέσον ταῖς ἐφ' ἑαυτοὺς τεταγμέναις (ναυσὶ) — we find ἑαυτῶν thrown back upon the subject, not immediately preceding it. The same, iv, 47 — εἰ πού τις ἰδοὶ ἐχθρὸν ἑαυτοῦ, and ii, 95. Ὁ γὰρ Περδικκας αὐτῷ ὑποσχόμενος, εἰ Ἀθηναίοις τε διαλλάξειεν ἑαυτὸν (i. a. Perdikkas), κατ' ἀρχὰς τῷ πόλεμῳ πιεζόμενοι, etc.

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occupying the side towards Naupaktus, was especially charged with the duty of cutting off the Athenians from all possibility of escaping thither; and the best ships had been placed on the right for that important object. As far as the commanders were concerned, the plan of action completely succeeded; the Athenians were caught in a situation where resistance was impossible, and had no chance of escape except in flight. But so superior were they in rapid movement even to the best Peloponnesians, that eleven ships, the headmost out of the twenty, just found means to run by,¹ before the right wing of the enemy closed in upon the shore; and made the best of their way to Naupaktus. The

Compare also Homer, *Odyss.* xvii. 387. *Πρωχὼν δ' οἷα ἄν τις κῆλσαι, τριζοῦτα ἔαυτον;* and Xenophon, *Memorab.* iv. 2. 28; i. 6. 3; v. 2. 24; Anab. vii. 2. 10; 6. 43; *Hellen.* v. 2. 39.

It appears to me, that when we study the use of the pronoun *ἐαυτοῖς*, we shall see reason to be convinced that in the passage of Thucydides now before us, the phrase *οἱ Πελοποννήσιοι ἐπὶ τὴν ἐαυτῶν γῆν*, need not necessarily be referred to the Peloponnesian land, but may in perfect conformity with analogy be understood to mean the Athenian land. I am sure that, in so construing it, we shall not put so much violence upon the meaning as the Scholiast and Dr. Arnold have put upon the preposition *ἐπὶ*, when the Scholiast states that *ἐπὶ τὴν ἐαυτῶν γῆν* means the same thing as *παρὰ τὴν ἐαυτῶν γῆν*, and when Dr. Arnold admits this opinion, only adding a new meaning which does not usually belong to *ἐπὶ* with an accusative case.

An objection to the meaning which I propose may possibly be grounded on the word *νομισας*, applied to Phormio. If the Peloponnesian fleet was sailing directly towards Naupaktus, it may be urged, Phormio would not be said to *think* that they were going thither, but *to see* or *become aware* of it. But in reply to this we may observe, that the Peloponnesians never really intended to attack Naupaktus, though they directed their course towards it; they wished in reality to draw Phormio within the strait, and there to attack him. The historian, therefore, says with propriety, that Phormio would believe, and not that he would perceive, them to be going thither, since his belief would really be erroneous.

¹ Thucyd. ii. 90. How narrow the escape was, is marked in the words of the historian — *τῶν δὲ ἐνδεκα μὲν αἵπερ ἤγοντο ὑπεκφεύγοντες τὸ κέρας τῶν Πελοποννησίων καὶ τὴν ἐπιστροφὴν, εἰς τὴν εἰνεχωρίαν.*

The proceedings of the Syracusan fleet against that of the Athenians in the harbor of Syracuse, and the reflections of the historian upon them, illustrate this attack of the Peloponnesians upon the fleet of Phormio (*Thucyd.* vii. 36).

remaining nine ships were caught and driven ashore with serious damage, — their crews being partly slain, partly escaping by swimming. The Peloponnesians towed off one trireme with its entire crew, and some others empty; but more than one of them was rescued by the bravery of the Messenian hoplites, who, in spite of their heavy panoply, rushed into the water and got aboard them, fighting from the decks and driving off the enemy even after the rope had been actually made fast, and the process of dragging off had begun.¹

The victory of the Peloponnesians seemed assured, and while their left and centre were thus occupied, the twenty ships of their right wing parted company with the rest, in order to pursue the eleven fugitive Athenian ships which they had failed in cutting off. Ten of these got clear away into the harbor of Naupaktus, and there posted themselves in an attitude of defence near the temple of Apollo, before any of the pursuers could come near; while the eleventh, somewhat less swift, was neared by the Lacedæmonian admiral; who, on board a Leukadian trireme, pushed greatly ahead of his comrades, in hopes of overtaking at least this one prey. There happened to lie moored a merchant vessel, at the entrance of the harbor of Naupaktus; and the Athenian captain in his flight, observing that the Leukadian pursuer was for the moment alone, seized the opportunity for a bold and rapid manœuvre. He pulled swiftly round the merchant vessel, directed his trireme so as to meet the advancing Leukadian, and drove his beak against her midships with an impact so violent as to disable her at once; her commander, the Lacedæmonian admiral, Timokratēs, was so stung with anguish at this unexpected catastrophe, that he slew himself forthwith, and fell overboard into the harbor. The pursuing vessels coming up behind, too, were so astounded and dismayed by it, that the men, dropping their oars, held water, and ceased to advance; while some even found themselves half aground, from ignorance of the coast. On the other hand, the ten Athenian triremes in the harbor were beyond measure elated by the incident, so that a single word from Phormio sufficed to put them in active forward

¹ Compare the like bravery on the part of the Lacedæmonian hoplites at Pylus (*Thucyd.* iv. 14).

motion, and to make them strenuously attack the embarrassed enemy: whose ships, disordered by the heat of pursuit, and having beer just suddenly stopped, could not be speedily got again under way, and expected nothing less than renewed attack. First, the Athenians broke the twenty pursuing ships, on the right wing; next, they pursued their advantage against the left and centre, who had probably neared to the right; so that after a short resistance, the whole were completely routed, and fled across the gulf to their original station at Panormus.¹ Not only did the eleven Athenian ships thus break, terrify, and drive away the entire fleet of the enemy, with the capture of six of the nearest Peloponnesian triremes, — but they also rescued those ships of their own which had been driven ashore and taken in the early part of the action: moreover, the Peloponnesian crews sustained a considerable loss, both in killed and in prisoners.

Thus, in spite not only of the prodigious disparity of numbers, but also of the disastrous blow which the Athenians had sustained at first, Phormio ended by gaining a complete victory: a victory, to which even the Lacedæmonians were forced to bear testimony, since they were obliged to ask a truce for burying and collecting their dead, while the Athenians on their part picked up the bodies of their own warriors. The defeated party, however, still thought themselves entitled, in token of their success in the early part of the action, to erect a trophy on the Rhium of Achaia, where they also dedicated the single Athenian trireme which they had been able to carry off. Yet they were so com-

¹ Thucyd. ii, 92. It is sufficiently evident that the Athenians defeated and drove off not only the twenty Peloponnesian ships of the right or pursuing wing, — but also the left and centre. Otherwise, they would not have been able to recapture those Athenian ships which had been lost at the beginning of the battle. Thucydides, indeed, does not expressly mention the Peloponnesian left and centre as following the right in their pursuit towards Naupaktus. But we may presume that they partially did so, probably careless of much order, as being at first under the impression that the victory was gained. They were probably, therefore, thrown into confusion without much difficulty, when the twenty ships of the right were beaten and driven back upon them, — even though the victorious Athenian triremes were no more than eleven in number.

pletely discomfited, — and farther, so much in fear of the expected reinforcement from Athens, — that they took advantage of the night to retire, and sail into the gulf to Corinth: all except the Leukadians, who returned to their own home.

Nor was it long before the reinforcement actually arrived, after that untoward detention which had wellnigh exposed Phormio and his whole fleet to ruin. It confirmed his mastery of the entrance of the gulf and of the coast of Akarnania, where the Peloponnesians had now no naval force at all. To establish more fully the Athenian influence in Akarnania, he undertook during the course of the autumn an expedition, landing at Astakus, and marching into the Akarnanian inland country with four hundred Athenian hoplites and four hundred Messenians. Some of the leading men of Stratus and Koronta, who were attached to the Peloponnesian interest, he caused to be sent into exile, while the chief named Kynês, of Koronta, who seems to have been hitherto in exile, was reestablished in his native town. The great object was, to besiege and take the powerful town of Eniada, near the mouth of the Achelôus; a town at variance with the other Akarnanians, and attached to the Peloponnesians. But the great spread of the waters of the Achelôus rendered this siege impracticable during the winter, and Phormio returned to the station at Naupaktus. From hence he departed to Athens towards the end of the winter, carrying home both his prize-ships and such of his prisoners as were freemen. The latter were exchanged man for man against Athenian prisoners in the hands of Sparta.

After abandoning the naval contest at Rhium, and retiring to Corinth, Knemus and Brasidas were prevailed upon by the Megarians, before the fleet dispersed, to try the bold experiment of a sudden inroad upon Peiraus. Such was the confessed superiority of the Athenians at sea, that, while they guarded amply the coasts of Attica against privateers, they never imagined the possibility of an attack upon their own main harbor. Accordingly, Peiraus was not only unprotected by any chain across the entrance, but destitute even of any regular guard-ships manned and ready. The seamen of the retiring Pelopon-

nesian armament, on reaching Corinth, were immediately disembarked and marched, first across the isthmus, next to Megara, — each man carrying his sitting-cloth,¹ and his oar, together with the loop whereby the oar was fastened to the oar-hole in the side, and thus prevented from slipping. There lay forty triremes in Nisæa, the harbor of Megara, which, though old and out of condition, were sufficient for so short a trip; and the seamen immediately on arriving, launched these and got aboard. But such was the awe entertained of Athens and her power, that when the scheme came really to be executed, the courage of the Peloponnesians failed, though there was nothing to hinder them from actually reaching Peiræus: but it was pretended that the wind was adverse, and they contented themselves with passing across to the station of Budorum, in the opposite Athenian island of Salamis, where they surprised and seized the three guard-ships which habitually blockaded the harbor of Megara, and then landed upon the island. They spread themselves over a large part of Salamis, ravaged the properties, and seized men as well as goods. Fire-signals immediately made known this unforeseen aggression, both at Peiræus and at Athens, occasioning in both the extreme of astonishment and alarm; for the citizens in Athens, not conceiving distinctly the meaning of the signals, fancied that Peiræus itself had fallen into the hands of the enemy. The whole population rushed down to the Peiræus at break of day, and put to sea with all the triremes that were

¹ Thucyd. ii. 93. ἰδίαν δὲ λαβόντα τὸν ναυτικὸν ἑκάστης τῆς κοπῆς, καὶ τὸ ἑπηρεσιον, καὶ τὸν τροπώτην, etc. On these words there is an interesting letter of Dr. Bishop's published in the Appendix to Dr. Arnold's Thucydides, vol. i. His remarks upon ἑπηρεσιον are more satisfactory than those upon τροπώτην. Whether the fulcrum of the oar was formed by a thowell, or a notch, on the gunwale, or by a perforation in the ship's side, there must in both cases have been required — since it seems to have had nothing like what Dr. Bishop calls a *rod* — a thing to prevent it from slipping down towards the water, especially with the oars of the thranitæ, or upper tier of rowers, who pulled at so great an elevation, comparatively speaking, above the water. Dr. Arnold's explanation of τροπώτην is suited to the case of a boat, but not to that of a trireme. Dr. Bishop shows that the explanation of the purpose of the ἑπηρεσιον, given by the Scholiast, is not the true one.

ready against the Peloponnesians; but these latter, aware of the danger which menaced them, made haste to quit Salamis with their booty, and the three captured guard-ships. The lesson was salutary to the Athenians: from henceforward Peiræus was furnished with a chain across the mouth, and a regular guard, down to the end of the war.¹ Forty years afterwards, however, we shall find it just as negligently watched, and surprised with much more boldness and dexterity, by the Lacedæmonian captain Teledamas.²

As during the summer of this year, the Ambrakiots had brought down a numerous host of Epirotic tribes to the invasion of Akarmania, in conjunction with the Peloponnesians, — so during the autumn, the Athenians obtained aid against the Chalkidians of Thrace from a still more powerful barbaric prince, Sitalkês, king of the Odrysian Thracians. Amidst the numerous tribes, between the Danube and the Ægean sea, — who all bore the generic name of Thracians, though each had a special name besides, — the Odrysians were at this time the most warlike and powerful. The Odrysian king Têrês, father of Sitalkês, had made use of this power to subdue³ and render tributary a great number of these different tribes, especially those whose residence was in the plain rather than in the mountains. His dominion, the largest existing between the Ionian sea and the Euxine, extended from Abdêra, or the mouth of the Nestus, in the Ægean sea, to the mouth of the Danube in the Euxine; though it seems that this must be understood with deductions, since many intervening tribes, especially mountain tribes, did not acknowledge his authority. Sitalkês himself had invaded and conquered some of the Paonian tribes who joined the Thracians on the west, between the Axios and the Strymon.⁴ Dominion, in the sense of the Odrysian king, meant tribute, presents, and military force when required; and with the two former, at least, we may conclude that he was amply supplied, since his nephew and successor Sentes, under whom the revenue increased and attained its maximum, received four hundred talents annually in gold and silver as tribute, and the like sum in various presents, over and

¹ Thucyd. ii. 94.

² Thucyd. ii. 26, 95, 96.

³ Xenophon. Hellen. v. 1, 19.

⁴ Thucyd. ii. 99.

above many other presents of manufactured articles and ornaments. These latter came from the Grecian colonies on the coast, which contributed moreover largely to the tribute, though in what proportions we are not informed: even Grecian cities not in Thrace sent presents to forward their trading objects, as purchasers for the produce, the plunder, and the slaves, acquired by Thracian chiefs or tribes.¹ The residence of the Odrysians properly so called, and of the princes of that tribe now ruling over so many of the remaining tribes, appears to have been about twelve days' journey inland from Byzantium,² in the upper regions of the Hebrus and Strymon, south of Mount Hæmus, and northeast of Rhodopë. The Odrysian chiefs were connected by relationship more or less distant with those of the subordinate tribes, and by marriage even with the Scythian princes north of the Danube: the Scythian prince Ariapeithēs³ had married the daughter of the Odrysian Tērēs, the first who extended the dominion of his tribe over any considerable portion of Thrace.

The natural state of the Thracian tribes — in the judgment of Herodotus, permanent and incorrigible — was that of disunion and incapacity of political association; were such association possible, he says, they would be strong enough to vanquish every other nation, — though Thucydides considers them as far inferior to the Scythians. The Odrysian dominion had probably not reached, at the period when Herodotus made his inquiries, the same development which Thucydides describes in the third year of the Peloponnesian war, and which imparted to these tribes an union, partial indeed and temporary, but such as they never reached either before or afterwards. It has been already mentioned that the Odrysian prince Sitalkēs, had taken for his wife, or rather for one of his wives, the sister of Nymphodōrus, a

¹ See Xenophon, *Anab.* vii. 3, 16; 4. 2. Diodorus (xii. 50) gives the revenue of Sitalkēs as more than one thousand talents annually. This sum is not materially different from that which Thucydides states to be the annual receipt of Seuthes, successor of Sitalkēs. — revenue, properly so called, and presents, both taken together.

Traders from Parium, on the Asiatic coast of the Propontis, are among those who come with presents to the Odrysian king, Mēdokus (Xenophon *ut supra*)

² Xenoph. *Anab.* i. c.

³ Herodot. iv. 80.

Greek, cf Abdëra; by whose mediation he had been made the ally, and his son Sadokus even a citizen, of Athens, — and had been induced to promise that he would reconquer the Chalkidians of Thrace for the benefit of the Athenians,¹ — his ancient kinsmen, according to the mythe of Tereus as interpreted by both parties. At the same time, Perdikkas, king of Macedonia, had offended him by refusing to perform a promise made of giving him his sister in marriage, — a promise made as consideration for the interference of Sitalkēs and Nymphodōrus in procuring for him peace with Athens, at a moment when he was much embarrassed by civil dissensions with his brother Philip. The latter prince, ruling in his own name, and seemingly independent of Perdikkas, over a portion of the Macedonians along the upper course of the Axios, had been expelled by his more powerful brother, and taken refuge with Sitalkēs: he was now apparently dead, but his son Amyntas received from the Odrysian prince the promise of restoration. The Athenians had ambassadors resident with Sitalkēs, and they sent Agnon as special envoy to concert arrangements for his march against the Chalkidians, with which an Athenian armament was destined to coöperate. In treating with Sitalkēs, it was necessary to be liberal in presents, both to himself and to the subordinate chieftains who held power dependent upon him: nothing could be accomplished among the Thracians except by the aid of bribes,² and the Athenians were more

¹ Xenophon, *Anab.* vii. 2, 31; Thucyd. ii. 29; Aristophan. *Aves*, 366. Thucydides goes out of his way to refute this current belief. — a curious exemplification of ancient legend applied to the convenience of present politics.

² Thucyd. ii. 97. Φερος δὲ ἐκ πάσης τῆς βαρβαρῶν καὶ τῶν Ἑλληνίδων πόλεων, ὅσον προσήζαν ἐπὶ Σείατον, ὅς ἴσπερον Σιταλκῶν βασιλεύσας πλείστον δὴ ἐποίησε, τετρακοσίων τάλαντων μάλιστα δόματα, ἃ χρυσὸς καὶ ἀργυρὸς εἴη· καὶ δαρά οὐκ ἔλασσον τούτων χρυσοῦ τε καὶ ἀργύρου προσεφέρετο, χωρὶς δὲ ὅσα ἔφοντά τε καὶ ζεῖα, καὶ ἡ ἄλλη κατασκευὴ, καὶ οὐ μόνον αὐτῷ ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῖς παραδυναστεύουσιν καὶ γυναισὶν Ὀδρυσῶν· κατεστήσαντο γὰρ τοῦνάντιον τῆς Περσῶν βασιλείας τὸν ἴσην, ὅτι καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις θράξι, λαμβάνειν μᾶλλον ἢ δίδοναι, καὶ αἰσχύνοντο αἰτηθέντα μὴ δοῦναι ἢ αἰτήσαντα μὴ τυχεῖν· ὁμῶς δὲ κατὰ τὸ δυνάσθαι ἐπὶ πλέον αὐτῷ ἐχρήσαντο· οὐ γὰρ ἦν πράξαι οὐδὲν μὴ δίδοντα δαρά· ὥστε ἐπὶ μεγάλῃ λαμπρότητι ἔχοντες ἰσχύος.

This universal necessity of presents and bribes may be seen illustrated in the dealings of Xenophon and the Cyprian army with the Thracians

competent to supply this exigency than any other people in Greece. The joint expedition against the Chalkidians was finally resolved.

But the forces of Sitalkês, collected from many different portions of Thrace, were tardy in coming together. He summoned all the tribes under his dominion, between Hæmus, Rhodopê, and the two seas: the Getæ, between Mount Hæmus and the Danube, equipped like the Scythians, their neighbors on the other side of the river, with bow and arrow on horseback, also joined him, as well as the Agrianes, the Laai, and the other Paonian tribes subject to his dominion; lastly, several of the Thracian tribes called Dii, distinguished by their peculiar short swords, and maintaining a fierce independence on the heights of Rhodopê, were tempted by the chance of plunder, or the offer of pay, to flock to his standard. Altogether, his army amounted, or was supposed to amount, to one hundred and fifty thousand men, one third of it cavalry, who were for the most part Getæ and Odrysians proper. The most formidable warriors in his camp were the independent tribes of Rhodopê; but the whole host, alike numerous, warlike, predatory, and cruel, spread terror amidst all those who were within even the remote possibilities of its march.

Starting from the central Odrysian territory, and bringing with him Agnon and the other Athenian envoys, he first crossed the uninhabited mountain called Kerkinê, which divided the Paonians on the west from the Thracian tribes called Sinti and Madi on the east, until he reached the Paonian town or district called

πῆνη. Scythæ, described in the Anabasis, vii. chapters 1 and 2. It appears that even at that time, B.C. 401, the Odrysian dominion, though it had passed through disturbances and had been practically enfeebled, still extended down to the neighborhood of Byzantium. In commenting upon the venality of the Thracians, the Scholiast has a curious comparison with his own time — *καὶ οὐκ ἔν τι πρᾶται παρ' αὐτοῖς τὸν μὴ δοῦντα χρῆματα: ὅπερ καὶ νῦν ἐν Ῥωμαίοις*. The Scholiast here tells us that the venality in his time as to public affairs, in the Roman empire, was not less universal: of what century of the Roman empire he speaks, we do not know: perhaps about 500–600 A.D.

The contrast which Thucydides here draws between the Thracians and the Persians is also illustrated by what Xenophon says respecting the habits of the younger Cyrus; (Anabas. i. 9, 22); compare also the romance of the Cyropædia viii. 14, 31, 32.

Dobêrus;¹ it was here that many troops and additional volunteers reached him, making up his full total. From Dobêrus, probably marching down along one of the tributary streams of the Axios, he entered into that portion of Upper Macedonia, which lies along the higher Axios, and which had constituted the separate principality of Philip: the presence in his army of Amyntos son of Philip, induced some of the fortified places, Gortynia, Atalantê, and others, to open their gates without resistance, while Eidomenê was taken by storm, and Eurôpus in vain attacked. From hence, he passed still farther southward into Lower Macedonia, the kingdom of Perdikkas; ravaging the territory on both sides of the Axios even to the neighborhood of the towns Pella and Kyrrhus; and apparently down as far south as the mouth of the river and the head of the Thermaic gulf. Farther south than this he did not go, but spread his force over the districts between the left bank of the Axios and the head of the Strymonic gulf, — Mygdonia, Krestônia, and Anthemus, — while a portion of his army was detached to overrun the territory of the Chalkidians and Bottæans. The Macedonians under Perdikkas, renouncing all idea of contending on foot against so overwhelming a host, either fled or shut themselves up in the small number of fortified places which the country presented. The cavalry from Upper Macedonia, indeed, well armed and excellent, made some orderly and successful charges against the Thracians, lightly armed with javelins, short swords, and the pelta, or small shield, — but it was presently shut in, harassed on all sides by superior numbers, and compelled to think only of retreat and extrication.²

Luckily for the enemies of the Odrysian king, his march was not made until the beginning of winter, seemingly about November or December. We may be sure that the Athenians,

¹ See Gatterer (De Herodoti et Thucydidis Thraciâ), sects. 44–57; Poppo (Prolegom. ad Thucydidem), vol. ii. ch. 31, about the geography of this region, which is very imperfectly known, even in modern times. We can hardly pretend to assign a locality to these ancient names.

Thucydides, in his brief statements respecting this march of Sitalkês, speaks like one who had good information about the inland regions; as he was likely to have from his familiarity with the coasts, and resident proprietorship in Thrace (Thucyd. ii. 100; Herodot. v. 16).

² Thucyd. ii. 100; Xenophon, Memorab. iii. 9, 2.

when they concerted with him the joint attack upon the Chalkidians, intended that it should be in a better time of the year: having probably waited to hear that his army was in motion, and waited long in vain, they began to despair of his coming at all, and thought it not worth while to despatch any force of their own to the spot.¹ Some envoys and presents only were sent as compliments, instead of the cooperating armament; and this disappointment, coupled with the severity of the weather, the nakedness of the country, and the privations of his army at that season, induced Sitalkês soon to enter into negotiations with Perdikkas; who, moreover, gained over Seuthes, nephew of the Odrysian prince, by promising his sister Stratonikê in marriage, together with a sum of money, on condition that the Thracian host should be speedily withdrawn. This was accordingly done, after it had been distributed for thirty days over Macedonia: during eight of those days his detachment had ravaged the Chalkidic lands. But the interval had been quite long enough to diffuse terror all around: such a host of fierce barbarians had never before been brought together, and no one knew in what direction they might be disposed to carry their incursions. The independent Thracian tribes (Panaï, Odomantê, Drôî, and Dersai) in the plains on the northeast of the Strymon, and near Mount Pangeus, not far from Amphipolis, were the first to feel alarm lest Sitalkês should take the opportunity of trying to conquer them; on the other side, the Thessalians, Magnêtes, and other Greeks north of Thermopylæ, anticipated that he would carry his invasion farther south, and began to organize means for resisting him: even the general Peloponnesian confederacy heard with uneasiness of this new ally whom Athens was bringing into the field, perhaps against them. All such alarms were dissipated, when Sitalkês, after remaining thirty days, returned by the way he came, and the formidable avalanche was thus seen to melt away without falling on them. The faithless Perdikkas, on this occasion, performed his promise to Seuthes, having drawn upon himself much mischief by violating his previous similar promise to Sitalkês.²

Thucyd. ii. 101. ἐπειδὴ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι εἰ παύσανταί τις ναύαν, ἀπιστοῦντες αὐτὸν μὴ ἤξεον, etc.

² Thucyd. ii. 101.

CHAPTER L.

FROM THE COMMENCEMENT OF THE FOURTH YEAR OF THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR DOWN TO THE REVOLUTIONARY COM-MOTIONS AT KORKYRA.

THE second and third years of the war had both been years of great suffering with the Athenians, from the continuance of the epidemic, which did not materially relax until the winter of the third year (B.C. 429–428). It is no wonder that, under the pressure of such a calamity, their military efforts were enfeebled, although the victories of Phormio had placed their maritime reputation at a higher point than ever. To their enemies, the destructive effects of this epidemic—effects still felt, although the disorder itself was suspended during the fourth year of the war—afforded material assistance as well as encouragement to persevere; and the Peloponnesians, under Archidamus, again repeated during this year their invasion and ravage of Attica, which had been intermitted during the year preceding. As before, they met with no serious resistance: entering the country about the beginning of May, they continued the process of devastation until their provisions were exhausted.¹ To this damage the Athenians had probably now accustomed themselves: but they speedily received, even while the invaders were in their country, intelligence of an event far more embarrassing and formidable,—the revolt of Mitylenê and of the greater part of Lesbos.

This revolt, indeed, did not come even upon the Athenians wholly unawares; but the idea of it was of longer standing than they suspected, for the Mitylenæan oligarchy had projected it before the war, and had made secret application to Sparta for aid, but without success. Some time after hostilities broke out, they resumed the design, which was warmly promoted by the Bœotians, kinsmen of the Lesbians in Æolic lineage and dialect. The Mitylenæan leaders appear to have finally determined on revolt

¹ Thucyd. iii. 1.

during the preceding autumn or winter; but they thought it prudent to make ample preparations before they declared themselves openly: and, moreover, they took measures for constraining three other towns in Lesbos — Antissa, Eresus, and Pyrrha — to share their fortunes, to merge their own separate governments, and to become incorporated with Mitylênê. Methymna, the second town in Lesbos, situated on the north of the island, was decidedly opposed to them and attached to Athens. The Mityliæans built new ships, put their walls in an improved state of defence, carried out a mole in order to narrow the entrance of their harbor, and render it capable of being closed with a chain, despatched emissaries to hire Scythian bowmen and purchase corn in the Euxine, and took such other measures as were necessary for an effective resistance. Though the oligarchical character of their government gave them much means of secrecy, and above all, dispensed with the necessity of consulting the people beforehand, — still, measures of such importance could not be taken without provoking attention. Intimation was sent to the Athenians by various Mitylænæan citizens, partly from private feeling, partly in their capacity of *proxeni* (or *consuls*, to use a modern word which approaches to the meaning) for Athens, — especially by a Mitylænæan named Doxander, incensed with the government for having disappointed his two sons of a marriage with two orphan heiresses.¹ Not less communicative were the islanders of Tenedos, animated by ancient neighborly jealousy towards Mitylênê; so that the Athenians were thus forewarned both of the intrigues between Mitylênê and the Spartans and of her certain impending revolt unless they immediately interfered.²

¹ Aristotel. Politic. v, 2, 3. The fact respecting Doxander here mentioned is stated by Aristotle, and there is no reason to question its truth. But Aristotle states it in illustration of a general position, — that the private quarrels of principal citizens are often the cause of great misfortune to the commonwealth. He represents Doxander and his private quarrel as having brought upon Mitylênê the resentment of the Athenians and the war with Athens — Δοξανδρος — ἤρξε τῆς στάσεως, καὶ παρώτρυνε τοὺς Ἀθηναίους, πρόξενος ὢν τῆς πόλεως.

Having the account of Thucydides before us, we are enabled to say that this is an incorrect conception, as far as concerns the cause of the war, — though the fact in itself may be quite true.

² Thucyd. iii, 2.

This news seems to have become certain about February or March 428 B.C.: but such was then the dispirited condition of the Athenians, — arising from two years' suffering under the epidemic, and no longer counteracted by the wholesome remonstrances of Periklès, — that they could not at first bring themselves to believe what they were so much afraid to find true. Lesbos, like Chios, was their ally, upon an equal footing, still remaining under those conditions which had been at first common to all the members of the confederacy of Delos. Mitylênê paid no tribute to Athens: it retained its walls, its large naval force, and its extensive landed possessions on the opposite Asiatic continent: its government was oligarchical, administering all internal affairs without the least reference to Athens. Its obligations as an ally were, that, in case of war, it was held bound to furnish armed ships, whether in determinate number or not, we do not know: it would undoubtedly be restrained from making war upon Tenedos, or any other subject-ally of Athens: and its government or its citizens would probably be held liable to answer before the Athenian dikasteries, in case of any complaint of injury from the government or citizens of Tenedos or of any other ally of Athens, — these latter being themselves also accountable before the same tribunals, under like complaints from Mitylênê. That city was thus in practice all but independent, and so extremely powerful that the Athenians in their actual state of depression were fearful of coping with it, and therefore loth to believe the alarming intelligence which reached them. They sent envoys with a friendly message to persuade the Mitylænæans to suspend their proceedings, and it was only when these envoys returned without success that they saw the necessity of stronger measures. Ten Mitylænæan triremes, serving as contingent in the Athenian fleet, were seized, and their crews placed under guard: while Kleippides, then on the point of starting, along with two colleagues, to conduct a fleet of forty triremes round Peloponnesus, was directed to alter his destination and to proceed forthwith to Mitylênê.¹ It was expected that he would reach that town about the time of the approaching festival of Apollo Maloeis, celebrated in its neighborhood. — on which occasion the

¹ Thucyd. iii, 3.

whole Mitylenæan population was in the habit of going forth to the temple: so that the town, while thus deserted, might easily be surprised and seized by the fleet. In case this calculation should be disappointed, Kleippidēs was instructed to require that the Mitylenæans should surrender their ships of war and raze their fortifications, and, in case of refusal, to attack them immediately.

But the publicity of debate at Athens was far too great to allow such a scheme to succeed. The Mitylenæans had their spies in the city, and the moment the resolution was taken, one of them set off to communicate it at Mitylénē. Crossing over to Geræstus in Eubœa, he got aboard a merchantman on the point of departure, and reached Mitylénē with a favorable wind on the third day from Athens: so that when Kleippidēs arrived shortly afterwards, he found the festival adjourned and the government prepared for him. The requisition which he sent in was refused, and the Mitylenæan fleet even came forth from the harbor to assail him, but was beaten back with little difficulty: upon which, the Mitylenæan leaders, finding themselves attacked before their preparations were completed, and desiring still to gain time before they declared their revolt, opened negotiations with Kleippidēs, and prevailed on him to suspend hostilities until ambassadors could be sent to Athens, — protesting that they had no serious intention of revolting. This appears to have been about the middle of May, soon after the Lacedæmonian invasion of Attica. Kleippidēs was induced, not very prudently, to admit this proposition, under the impression that his armament was insufficient to cope with a city and island so powerful; and he remained moored off the harbor at the north of Mitylénē until the envoys, among whom was included one of the very citizens of Mitylénē who had sent to betray the intended revolt, but who had since changed his opinion, should return from Athens. Meanwhile the Mitylenæan government, unknown to Kleippidēs, and well aware that the embassy would prove fruitless, took advantage of the truce to send secret envoys to Sparta, imploring immediate aid: and on the arrival of the Lacedæmonian Meleas and the Theban Hermæondas, who had been despatched to Mitylénē earlier, but had only come in by stealth since the arrival of Kleippidēs, a second armée was sent along with them, carrying additional envoys to



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reiterate the solicitation. These arrivals and despatches were carried on without the knowledge of the Athenian admiral, chiefly in consequence of the peculiar site of the town, which had originally been placed upon a little islet divided from Lesbos by a narrow channel, or *euripus*, and had subsequently been extended across into the main island,—like Syracuse, and so many other Grecian settlements. It had consequently two harbors, one north, the other south of the town: Kleippidēs was anchored off the former, but the latter remained unguarded.¹

During the absence of the Mitylenæan envoys at Athens, reinforcements reached the Athenian admiral from Lemnos, Imbros, and some other allies, as well as from the Lesbian town of Methymna: so that when the envoys returned, as they presently did, with an unfavorable reply, war was resumed with increased vigor. The Mitylenæans, having made a general sally with their full military force, gained some advantage in the battle; yet, not feeling bold enough to maintain the field, they retreated back behind their walls. The news of their revolt, when first spread abroad, had created an impression unfavorable to the stability of the Athenian empire: but when it was seen that their conduct was irresolute, and their achievements disproportionate to their supposed power, a reaction of feeling took place,—and the Chians and other allies came in with increased zeal in obedience to the summons of Athens for reinforcements. Kleippidēs soon found his armament large enough to establish two separate camps, markets for provision, and naval stations, north and south of the town, so as to watch and block up both the harbors at once.² But he commanded little beyond the area of his camp, and was unable to invest the city by land; especially as the Mitylenæans had received reinforcements from An-

¹ Thucyd. iii, 3, 4: compare Strabo, xiii, p. 617; and Plehn, *Lesbiaca*, pp. 12-18.

Thucydides speaks of the spot at the mouth of the northern harbor as being called *Mala*, which was also undoubtedly the name of the southeastern promontory of Lesbos. We must therefore presume that there were two places on the seaboard of Lesbos which bore that name.

The easternmost of the two southern promontories of Peloponnesus was also called Cape *Malea*.

² Thucyd. iii, 6.

tissa, Pyrrha, and Eresus, the other towns of Lesbos which acted with them. They were even sufficiently strong to march against Methymna, in hopes that it would be betrayed to them by a party within; but this expectation was not realized, nor could they do more than strengthen the fortifications, and confirm the Mitylenæan supremacy, in the other three subordinate towns: in such manner that the Methymnæans, who soon afterwards attacked Antissa, were repulsed with considerable loss. In this undecided condition the island continued, until, somewhere about the month of August B.C. 428, the Athenians sent Pachês to take the command, with a reinforcement of one thousand hoplites, who rowed themselves thither in triremes. The Athenians were now in force enough not only to keep the Mitylenæans within their walls, but also to surround the city with a single wall of circumvallation, strengthened by separate forts in suitable positions. By the beginning of October, Mitylênê was thus completely blockaded, by land as well as by sea.¹

Meanwhile, the Mitylenæan envoys, after a troublesome voyage, reached Sparta a little before the Olympic festival, about the middle of June. The Spartans directed them to come to Olympia at the festival, where all the members of the Peloponnesian confederacy would naturally be present, — and there to set forth their requests, after the festival was concluded, in presence of all.² Thucydides has given us, at some length, his version of the speech wherein this was done. — a speech not a little remarkable. Pronounced as it was by men who had just revolted from Athens, having the strongest interest to raise indignation against her as well as sympathy for themselves, — and before an audience exclusively composed of the enemies of Athens, all willing to hear, and none present to refute, the bitterest calumnies against her, we should have expected a confident sense of righteous and well-grounded though perilous effort on the part of the Mitylenæans, and a plausible collection of wrongs and oppressions alleged against the common enemy. Instead of which, the speech is apologetic and embarrassed: the speaker not only does not allege any extortion or severe dealing from Athens towards the Mitylenæans, but even admits the fact that they had been treated

¹ Thucyd. iii, 18.

² Thucyd. iii, 9.

by her with marked honor;¹ and that, too, during a long period of peace, during which she stood less in awe of her allies generally, and would have had much more facility in realizing any harsh purposes towards them, than she could possibly enjoy now that the war had broken out, when their discontents would be likely to find powerful protectors.² According to his own showing, the Mitylenæans, while they had been perfectly well treated by Athens during the past, had now acquired, by the mere fact of war, increased security for continuance of the like treatment during the future. It is upon this ground of security for the future, nevertheless, that he rests the justification of the revolt, not pretending to have any subject of positive complaint. The Mitylenæans, he contends, could have no prospective security against Athens: for she had successively and systematically brought into slavery all her allies, except Lesbos and Chios, though all had originally been upon an equal footing: and there was every reason for fearing that she would take the first convenient opportunity of reducing the two last remaining to the same level, — the rather as their position was now one of privilege and exception, offensive to her imperial pride and exaggerated ascendancy. It had hitherto suited the policy of Athens to leave these two exceptions, as a proof that the other allies had justly incurred their fate, since otherwise Lesbos and Chios, having equal votes, would not have joined forces in reducing them:³ but

¹ Thucyd. iii, 10. *μηδὲ τῶν χειρῶν δοξαμένον εἶναι, εἰ ἐν τῇ εἰρήνῃ τι μᾶλλον ἢ νῦν ἐπὶ αὐτοῖς δυνάμεις ἀνίσταμεθα.*

The language in which the Mitylenæan envoys describe the treatment which their city had received from Athens, is substantially as strong as that which Kleon uses afterwards in his speech at Athens, when he reproaches them with their ingratitude. — Kleon says (iii, 39), *αἰτονομοὶ τε οἰκοκτεῖς, καὶ τιμωμένοι ἐς τὰ πρῶτα ἔφ' ἐμῶν, τοιαῦτα εἰργάσαντο*, etc.

² Thucyd. iii, 12. *οὐ μὲντοι ἐπὶ πολὺν γ' αἱ ἰδοκοῦμεν δυνεθῆναι (περιζήνυσσιν), εἰ μὴ ὁ πόλεμος ὅδε κατέστη, παραδείγμασι χρώμενοι τοῖς ἐς τοῦ, ἄλλους. Τίς οὖν αὐτῇ ἡ φιλία ἐγένετο ἢ ἐλευθερία πιστή, ἐν ᾗ παρὰ γνώμῃ ἀλλήλων ὑπεδιδόμεθα, καὶ οἱ μὲν ἡμᾶς ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ δεδιότες ἐθεράπειον ἡμῖς δὲ ἐκείνους ἐν τῇ ἡσυχίᾳ τὸ αὐτὸ ἐποιούμεεν.*

³ Thucyd. iii, 11. *Αὐτόνομοι δὲ ἐλείφθημεν οὐδ' ἄλλο τι ἢ ὅσον αὐτοῖς ἐς τὴν ἀρχὴν ἐπρεπεῖα τε λόγον, καὶ γνώμης μᾶλλον ἐφόδῳ ἢ ἰσχύος, τὰ πειράματα ἐφαίνετο καταληπτὰ. Ἄμα μὲν γὰρ μαρτυρῶν ἰχρύνετο, μὴ αἱ*

this policy was now no longer necessary, and the Mitylenæans, feeling themselves free only in name, were imperatively called upon by regard for their own safety to seize the earliest opportunity for emancipating themselves in reality. Nor was it merely regard for their own safety, but a farther impulse of Pan-Hellenic patriotism; a desire to take rank among the opponents, and not among the auxiliaries of Athens, in her usurpation of sovereignty over so many free Grecian states.¹ The Mitylenæans had, however, been compelled to revolt with preparations only half-completed, and had therefore a double claim upon the succor of Sparta, — the single hope and protectress of Grecian autonomy. And Spartan aid — if now lent immediately and heartily, in a renewed attack on Attica during this same year, by sea as well as by land — could not fail to put down the common enemy, exhausted as she was by pestilence as well as by the cost of three years' war, and occupying her whole maritime force, either in the siege of Mitylênê or round Peloponnesus. The orator concluded by appealing not merely to the Hellenic patriotism and sympathies of the Peloponnesians, but also to the sacred name of the Olympic Zeus, in whose precinct the meeting was held, that his pressing entreaty might not be disregarded.²

In following this speech of the orator, we see the plain confession that the Mitylenæans had no reason whatever to complain of the conduct of Athens towards themselves: she had respected alike their dignity, their public force, and their private security. This important fact helps us to explain, first, the indifference which the Mitylenæan people will be found to manifest in the revolt; next, the barbarous resolution taken by the Athenians after its suppression. The reasons given for the revolt are mainly two. 1. The Mitylenæans had no security that Athens would not degrade them into the condition of subject-allies like the rest. 2. They did not choose to second the ambition of Athens, and to become parties to a war, for the sake of maintaining an empire essentially offensive to Grecian political instincts. In both these two reasons there is force; and both touch the sore point of the

τούς γε ἰσοψηφούς ἄκουτας, εἰ μὴ τι ἠδίκουν οἷς ἐπησαν, ξυστῶ-
τεύειν.

¹ Thucyd. iii, 13.

² Thucyd. iii, 13, 14.

Athenian empire. That empire undoubtedly contradicted one of the fundamental instincts of the Greek mind, — the right of every separate town to administer its own political affairs apart from external control. The Peloponnesian alliance recognized this autonomy in theory, by the general synod and equal voting of all the members at Sparta, on important occasions; though it was quite true,¹ as Periklès urged at Athens, that in practice nothing more was enjoyed than an autonomy confined by Spartan leading-strings, — and though Sparta held in permanent custody hostages for the fidelity of her Arcadian allies, summoning their military contingents without acquainting them whither they were destined to march. But Athens proclaimed herself a despot, effacing the autonomy of her allies not less in theory than in practice: far from being disposed to cultivate in them any sense of a real common interest with herself, she did not even cheat them with those forms and fictions which so often appease discontent in the absence of realities. Doubtless, the nature of her empire, at once widely extended, maritime, and unconnected, or only partially connected, with kindred of race, rendered the forms of periodical deliberation difficult to keep up; at the same time that it gave to her as naval chief an ascendancy much more despotic than could have been exercised by any chief on land. It is doubtful whether she could have overcome — it is certain that she did not try to overcome — these political difficulties; so that her empire stood confessed as a despotism, opposed to the political instinct of the Greek mind; and the revolts against it, like this of Mitylênê, — in so far as they represented a genuine feeling, and were not merely movements of an oligarchical party against their own democracy, — were revolts of this offended instinct, much more than consequences of actual oppression. The Mitylenæans might certainly affirm that they had no security against being one day reduced to the common condition of subject-allies like the rest; yet an Athenian speaker, had he

¹ Thucyd. i, 144. Καὶ ὅταν κακείνοι (the Lacedæmonians) ταῖς αὐτῶν ἀποδοσι πόλεσι, μὴ σφίσι τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις ἐπιτηδείως αὐτονομείσθαι, ἀλλ' αὐτοῖς ἐκάστοις, ὡς βούλονται.

About the hostages detained by Sparta for the fidelity of her allies, see Thucyd. v, 54, 61.

been here present, might have made no mean reply to this portion of their reasoning; — he would have urged that, had Athens felt any dispositions towards such a scheme, she would have taken advantage of the fourteen years' truce to execute it; and he would have shown that the degradation of the allies by Athens, and the change in her position from president to despot had been far less intentional and systematic than the Mitylenæan orator affirmed.

To the Peloponnesian auditors, however, the speech of the latter proved completely satisfactory; the Lesbians were declared members of the Peloponnesian alliance, and a second attack upon Attica was decreed. The Lacedæmonians, foremost in the movement, summoned contingents from their various allies, and were early in arriving with their own at the isthmus: they there began to prepare carriages or trucks for dragging across the isthmus the triremes which had fought against Phormio, from the harbor of Lechæum into the Saronic gulf, in order to employ them against Athens. But the remaining allies did not answer to the summons, remaining at home occupied with their harvest; and the Lacedæmonians, sufficiently disappointed with this languor and disobedience, were still farther confounded by the unexpected presence of one hundred Athenian triremes off the coast of the isthmus. The Athenians, though their own presence at the Olympic festival was forbidden by the war, had doubtless learned more or less thoroughly the proceedings which had taken place there respecting Mitylênê. Perceiving the general belief entertained of their depressed and helpless condition, they determined to contradict this by a great and instant effort, and accordingly manned forthwith one hundred triremes, requiring the personal service of all men, citizens as well as metics; and excepting only the two richest classes of the Solonian census, *i. e.* the pentakosiomedimni, and the hippeis, or horsemen. With this prodigious fleet they made a demonstration along the isthmus in view of the Lacedæmonians, and landed in various parts of the Peloponnesian coast to inflict damage. At the same time, thirty other Athenian triremes, despatched sometime previously to Akarnania, under Asôpius, son of Phormio, landed at different openings in Laconia, for the same purpose; and this news reached the Lacedæmonians at the isthmus while the other great Athe-

nian fleet was parading before their eyes.¹ Amazed at so unexpected a demonstration of strength, they began to feel how much the Mitylenæans had misled them respecting the exhaustion of Athens, and how incompetent they were, especially without the presence of their allies, to undertake any joint effective movement by sea and land against Attica. They therefore returned home, resolving to send an expedition of forty triremes, under Alkidas, to the relief of Mitylênê itself; at the same time transmitting requisitions to their various allies, in order that these triremes might be furnished.²

Meanwhile, Asôpius, with his thirty triremes, had arrived in Akarnania, from whence all the ships except twelve were sent home. He had been nominated commander as the son of Phormio, who appears either to have died, or to have become unfit for service, since his victories of the preceding year; and the Akarnanians had preferred a special request that a son, or at least some relative of Phormio, should be invested with the command of the squadron; so beloved was his name and character among them. Asôpius, however, accomplished nothing of importance, though he again undertook conjointly with the Akarnanians a fruitless march against Gêniadæ. Ultimately, he was defeated and slain, in attempting a disembarkation on the territory of Leukas.³

The sanguine announcement made by the Mitylenæans at Olympia, that Athens was rendered helpless by the epidemic, had indeed been strikingly contradicted by her recent display; since, taking numbers and equipment together, the maritime force which she had put forth this summer, manned as it was by a higher class of seamen, surpassed all former years; although, in point of number only, it was inferior to the two hundred and fifty triremes which she had sent out during the first summer of the war.⁴ But the assertion that Athens was impoverished in

¹ Thucyd. iii. 7-16.

² Thucyd. iii. 15, 16.

³ Thucyd. iii. 7.

⁴ Thucyd. iii. 17. Καὶ κατὰ τὴν χάριν τούτων, ὅτι οἱ ἄλλοι ἐπὶ τῶν πλείστοις ἀφ' ἑαυτοῦ ἐκείνοι καὶ οὐκ ἐγγύς, παραπλήσια δὲ καὶ ἐν πλείστοις ἀρχαίων τοῦ πολέμου. Τῇ τε γὰρ Ἀττικῇ καὶ Εἰβάμῃ καὶ Σαλαμίνα ἑκατὸν ἑκάστησαν, καὶ πάλιν Περσικῇ καὶ ἑκατὸν ἴσαν, χωρὶς δὲ αἱ περὶ τὴν Ἀκάρναν καὶ τὴν Ἰωνίαν ἑκατὸν ἑκατὸν, ὥστε αἱ πᾶσαι ἀπὸ ἐγγύς.

finances was not so destitute of foundation: for the whole treasure in the acropolis, six thousand talents at the commencement of the war, was now consumed, with the exception of that reserve of one thousand talents which had been solemnly set aside against the last exigences of defensive resistance. This is not surprising, when we learn that every hoplite engaged for near two years and a half in the blockade of Potidæa, received two drachmas per day, one for himself and a second for an attendant: there were during the whole time of the blockade three thousand hoplites engaged there, — and for a considerable portion of the time, four thousand six hundred; besides the fleet, all the seamen of which received one drachma per day per man. Accordingly the Athenians were now for the first time obliged to raise a direct contribution among themselves, to the amount of two hundred talents, for the purpose of prosecuting the siege of Mitylênê: and they at the same time despatched Lysiklês with four colleagues, in command of twelve triremes, to collect money. What relation these money-gathering ships bore to the regular tribute paid by the subject-allies, or whether they were allowed to visit these latter, we do not know: in the present case, Lysiklês landed

εν ἐνὶ θέρει διακόσιαι καὶ πεντήκοντα. Καὶ τὰ χρήματα τοῦτο μάλιστα ἐπανάλωσε μετὰ Ποτιδαίας, etc.

I have endeavored to render as well as I can this obscure and difficult passage; difficult both as to grammar and as to sense, and not satisfactorily explained by any of the commentators, — if, indeed, it can be held to stand now as Thucydides wrote it. In the preceding chapter, he had mentioned that this fleet of one hundred sail was manned largely from the hoplite-class of citizens (iii, 16). Now we know from other passages in his work (see v, 8; vi, 31) how much difference there was in the appearance and efficiency of an armament, according to the class of citizens who served on it. We may then refer the word *καλῶς* to the excellence of outfit hence arising: I wish, indeed, that any instance could be produced of *καλῶς* in this sense, but we find the adjective *καλλιστος* (Thucyd. v, 60) *στρατόπεδον* γὰρ δὲ τοῦτο κάλλιστον Ἑλληνικὸν τῶν μέχρι τοῦδε ξυνηλθόν. In v, 8, Thucydides employs the word *ἀξίωμα* to denote the same meaning; and in vi, 31, he says: *παρασκευὴ γὰρ αὐτῇ πρώτη ἐκτελέσασα μίαν πόλιν δυνάμει Ἑλληνικῇ πολυτελεστάτῃ δὲ καὶ εὐπρεπεστάτῃ τῶν εἰς ἐκείνον τὸν χρόνον ἐγένετο*. It may be remarked that in that chapter too, he contrasts the expedition against Sicily with two other Athenian expeditions, equal to it in number, but inferior in equipment — the same comparison which I believe he means to take in this passage.

at Myus, near the mouth of the Mæander, and marched up the country to levy contributions on the Karian villages in the plain of that river: but he was surprised by the Karians, perhaps aided by the active Samian exiles at Anæa in the neighborhood, and slain, with a considerable number of his men.¹

While the Athenians thus held Mitylênê under siege, their faithful friends, the Plataeans, had remained closely blockaded by the Peloponnesians and Bœotians for more than a year, without any possibility of relief. At length, provisions began to fail, and the general, Eupompidês, backed by the prophet Theænetus, — these prophets² were often among the bravest soldiers in the army, — persuaded the garrison to adopt the daring but seemingly desperate resolution of breaking out over the blockading wall, and in spite of its guards. So desperate, indeed, did the project seem, that at the moment of execution, one half of the garrison shrank from it as equivalent to certain death: the other half, about two hundred and twelve in number, persisted and escaped. Happy would it have been for the remainder had they even perished in the attempt, and thus forestalled the more melancholy fate in store for them!

It has been already stated, that the circumvallation of Plataea was accomplished by a double wall and a double ditch, one ditch without the encircling walls, another between them and the town; the two walls being sixteen feet apart, joined together, and roofed all round, so as to look like one thick wall, and to afford covered quarters for the besiegers. Both the outer and inner circumference were furnished with battlements, and after every ten battlements came a roofed tower, covering the whole breadth of the double wall, — allowing a free passage inside, but none outside. In general, the entire circuit of the roofed wall was kept under watch night and day: but on wet nights the besiegers had so far relaxed their vigilance as to retire under cover of the towers, and leave the intermediate spaces unguarded: and it was upon this omission that the plan of escape was founded. The Plataeans prepared ladders of a proper height to scale the block

¹ Thucyd. iii. 19.

² Thucyd. iii, 20. Compare Xenophon, Hellen. ii. 4, 19, Herodot. ii. 37. Plutarch, Aratus, c. 25.

ading double wall, ascertaining its height by repeatedly counting the ranges of bricks, which were quite near enough for them to discern, and not effectually covered with whitewash. On a cold and dark December night, amidst rain, sleet, and a roaring wind, they marched forth from the gates, lightly armed, some few with shields and spears, but most of them with breastplates, javelins, and bows and arrows: the right foot was naked, and the left foot alone shod, so as to give to it a more assured footing on the muddy ground.¹ Taking care to sally out with the wind in their faces, and at such a distance from each other as to prevent any clattering of arms, they crossed the inner ditch and reached the foot of the wall without being discovered: the ladders, borne in the van, were immediately planted, and Ammeas, son of Korœbus, followed by eleven others, armed only with a short sword and breastplate, mounted the wall: others, armed with spears, followed him, their shields being carried and landed to them when on the top by comrades behind. It was the duty of this first company to master and maintain the two towers, right and left, so as to keep the intermediate space free for passing over. This was successfully done, the guards in both towers being surprised and slain, without alarming the remaining besiegers. and many of the Plataeans had already reached the top of the wall, when the noise of a tile accidentally knocked down by one of them, betrayed what was passing. Immediately a general clamor was raised, alarm was given, and the awakened garrison rushed up from beneath to the top of the wall, yet not knowing where the enemy was to be found; a perplexity farther increased by the Plataeans in the town, who took this opportunity of making a false attack on the opposite side. Amidst such confusion and darkness, the blockading detachment could not tell where to di-

¹ Thucyd. iii. 22. Dr. Arnold, in his note, construes this passage as if the right or bare foot were the *least* likely to slip in the mud, and the left or shod foot the *most* likely. The Scholiast and Wasse maintain the opposite opinion, which is certainly the more obvious sense of the text, though the sense of Dr. Arnold would also be admissible. The naked foot is very liable to slip in the mud, and might easily be rendered less liable, by sandals, or covering particularly adapted to that purpose. Besides, Wasse remarks justly, that the warrior who is to use his *right* arm requires to have his *left* foot firmly planted.

rect their blows, and all remained at their posts, except a reserve of three hundred men, kept constantly in readiness for special emergencies, who marched out and patrolled the outside of the ditch to intercept any fugitives from within. At the same time, fire-signals were raised to warn their allies at Thebes, — but here again the Plataeans in the town had foreseen and prepared fire-signals on their part, which they hoisted forthwith, in order to deprive this telegraphic communication of all special meaning.¹

Meanwhile, the escaping Plataeans, masters of the two adjoining towers, — on the top of which some of them mounted, while others held the doorway through, so as to repel with spears and darts all approach of the blockaders, — prosecuted their flight without interruption over the space between, shoving down the battlements in order to make it more level and plant a greater number of ladders. In this manner they all successively got over and crossed the outer ditch; every man, immediately after crossing, standing ready on the outer bank, with bow and javelin, to repel assailants and maintain safe passages for his comrades in the rear. At length, when all had descended, there remained the last and greatest difficulty, — the escape of those who occupied the two towers and kept the intermediate portion of wall free: yet even this was accomplished successfully and without loss. The outer ditch was, however, found embarrassing. — so

¹ Thucyd. iii. 22. *οἱ πυκτοὶ τε ἔπειτα ἐς τὰς Θήβας πορεύοντο*, etc. It would seem by this statement that the blockaders must have been often in the habit of transmitting intelligence to Thebes by means of fire-signals; each particular combination of lights having more or less of a special meaning. The Plataeans had observed this, and foresaw that the same means would be used on the night of the outbreak, to bring assistance from Thebes forthwith. If they had not observed it *before*, they could not have prepared for the moment when the new signal would be hoisted, so as to confound its meaning — *ὅπως ἀπαρῇ τὰ σημεῖα η. . .*

Compare iii. 80. I agree with the general opinion stated in Dr. Arnold's note respecting these fire-signals, and even think that it might have been sustained more strongly.

² Non enim (observes Cicero, in the fifth oration against Verres c. 36), sicut erat nuper consuetudo, praedonum adventum, significabat *ignis et specula tabulas aut tumulo*: sed flamma ex ipso incendio navium et calamitatem accepit et periculum reliquum nuntiabat.

full of water from the rain as to be hardly fordable, yet with thin ice on it also, from a previous frost: for the storm, which in other respects was the main help to their escape, here retarded their passage of the ditch by an unusual accumulation of water. It was not, however, until all had crossed except the defenders of the towers, — who were yet descending and scrambling through, — that the Peloponnesian reserve of three hundred were seen approaching the spot with torches. Their unshielded right side was turned towards the ditch, and the Plateans, already across and standing on the bank, immediately assailed them with arrows and javelins, — in which the torches enabled them to take tolerable aim, while the Peloponnesians on their side could not distinguish their enemies in the dark, and had no previous knowledge of their position. They were thus held in check until the rearmost Plateans had surmounted the difficulties of the passage: after which the whole body stole off as speedily as they could, taking at first the road towards Thebes, while their pursuers were seen with their torch-lights following the opposite direction, on the road which led by the heights called Dryos-Kephalaë to Athens: after having marched about three quarters of a mile on the road to Thebes, leaving the chapel of the Hero Androkratēs on their right hand, the fugitives quitted it, and striking to the eastward towards Erythræ and Hysiaë, soon found themselves in safety among the mountains which separate Boeotia from Attica at that point; from whence they passed into the glad harbor and refuge of Athens.¹

Two hundred and twelve brave men thus emerged to life and liberty, breaking loose from that impending fate which too soon overtook the remainder, and preserving for future times the genuine breed and honorable traditions of Plataea. One man alone was taken prisoner at the brink of the outer ditch, while a few, who had enrolled themselves originally for the enterprise, lost courage and returned in despair even from the foot of the inner wall; telling their comrades within that the whole band had perished. Accordingly, at daybreak, the Plateans within sent out a herald to solicit a truce for burial of the dead bodies, and

¹ Thucyd. iii. 24. Diodorus (xii. 56) gives a brief summary of these facts, without either novelty or liveliness.

it was only by the answer made to this request, that they learned the actual truth. The description of this memorable outbreak exhibits not less daring in the execution than skill and foresight in the design; and is the more interesting, inasmuch as the men who thus worked out their salvation were precisely the bravest men, who best deserved it.

Meanwhile, Pachēs and the Athenians kept Mitylênê closely blocked up, the provisions were nearly exhausted, and the besieged were already beginning to think of capitulation, — when their spirits were raised by the arrival of the Lacedæmonian envoy Salæthus, who had landed at Pyrrha on the west of Lesbos, and contrived to steal in through a ravine which obstructed the continuity of the blockading wall, — about February 427 B.C. He encouraged the Mitylênæans to hold out, assuring them that a Peloponnesian fleet under Alkidas was on the point of setting out to assist them, and that Attica would be forthwith invaded by the general Peloponnesian army. His own arrival, also, and his stay in the town, was in itself no small encouragement: we shall see hereafter, when we come to the siege of Syracuse by the Athenians, how much might depend upon the presence of one single Spartan. All thought of surrender was accordingly abandoned, and the Mitylênæans awaited with impatience the arrival of Alkidas, who started from Peloponnesus at the beginning of April, with forty-two triremes; while the Lacedæmonian army at the same time invaded Attica, in order to keep the attention of Athens fully employed. Their ravages on this occasion were more diligent, searching, and destructive to the country than before, and were continued the longer because they awaited the arrival of news from Lesbos. But none reached them, their stock of provisions was exhausted, and the army was obliged to break up.¹

The news, when it did arrive, proved very unsatisfactory.

Salæthus and the Mitylênæans had held out until their provisions were completely exhausted, but neither relief, nor tidings, reached them from Peloponnesus. At length, even Salæthus became convinced that no relief would come; he projected, therefore, as a last hope, a desperate attack upon the Athenians

¹ Thucyd. ii. 25, 26.

and their wall of blockade. For this purpose, he distributed full panoplies among the mass of the people, or commons, who had hitherto been without them, having at best nothing more than bows or javelins.¹ But he had not sufficiently calculated the consequences of this important step. The Mitylenæan multitude, living under an oligarchical government, had no interest whatever in the present contest, which had been undertaken without any appeal to their opinion. They had no reason for aversion to Athens, seeing that they suffered no practical grievance from the Athenian alliance: and we shall find hereafter that even among the subject-allies — to say nothing of a privileged ally like Mitylênê — the bulk of the citizens were never forward, sometimes positively reluctant, to revolt. The Mitylenæan oligarchy had revolted, in spite of the absence of practical wrongs, because they desired an uncontrolled town-autonomy as well as security for its continuance: but this was a feeling to which the people were naturally strangers, having no share in the government of their own town, and being kept dead and passive, as it was the interest of the oligarchy that they should be, in respect to political sentiment. A Grecian oligarchy might obtain from its people quiet submission under ordinary circumstances, but if ever it required energetic effort, the genuine devotion under which alone such effort could be given, was found wanting. Accordingly, the Mitylenæan demos, so soon as they found themselves strengthened and ennobled by the possession of heavy armor, refused obedience to the orders of Salaethus for marching out and imperiling their lives in a desperate struggle. They were under the belief — not unnatural under the secrecy of public affairs habitually practised by an oligarchy, but which, assuredly, the Athenian demos would have been too well informed to entertain — that their governors were starving them, and had concealed stores of provisions for themselves. Accordingly, the first use which they made of their arms was, to demand that these concealed stores should be brought out and fairly apportioned to all, threatening, unless their demand was complied with at once, to enter into negotiations with the Athenians, and surrender the city

¹ Thucyd. iii. 27. ὁ Σαλαέτις, καὶ αὐτὸς οὐκ ἐπαρκεῖσθαι τὰς ἐπὶ τῇ πόλει ὀπλῆς τὸν δῆμον, προτίθει ἑλπίδα, ὡς ἐπὶ τῶν τοῦ Ἀθηναίου.

The ruling Mitylenæans, unable to prevent this, but foreseeing that it would be their irretrievable ruin, preferred the chance of negotiating themselves for a capitulation. It was agreed with Pachês, that the Athenian armament should enter into possession of Mitylênê; that the fate of its people and city should be left to the Athenian assembly, and that the Mitylenæans should send envoys to Athens to plead their cause: until the return of these envoys, Pachês engaged that no one should be either killed, or put in chains, or sold into slavery. Nothing was said about Salaethus, who hid himself as well as he could in the city. In spite of the guarantee received from Pachês, so great was the alarm of those Mitylenæans who had chiefly instigated the revolt, that when he actually took possession of the city, they threw themselves as suppliants upon the altars for protection; but being induced, by his assurances, to quit their sanctuary, were placed in the island of Tenedos until answer should be received from Athens.¹

Having thus secured possession of Mitylênê, Pachês sent round some triremes to the other side of the island, and easily captured Antissa. But before he had time to reduce the two remaining towns of Pyrrha and Eresus, he received news which forced him to turn his attention elsewhere.

To the astonishment of every one, the Peloponnesian fleet of Alkidas was seen on the coast of Ionia. It ought to have been there much earlier, and had Alkidas been a man of energy, it would have reached Mitylênê even before the surrender of the city. But the Peloponnesians, when about to advance into the Athenian waters and brave the Athenian fleet, were under the same impressions of conscious weakness and timidity — especially since the victories of Phormio in the preceding year — as that which beset land-troops who marched up to attack the Lacedæmonian heavy-armed.² Alkidas, though unobstructed by the Athenians, who were not aware of his departure, — though pressed to hasten forward by Lesbian and Ionian exiles on board, and aided by expert pilots from those Samian exiles who

¹ Thucyd. iii. 28.

² Thucyd. iv. 34. τῇ γὰρ ἡμῶν δεδονημένοι ὡς ἐπὶ Λακεδαιμονίων.

had established themselves at Anæa,¹ on the Asiatic continent, and acted as zealous enemies of Athens, — nevertheless, instead of sailing straight to Lesbos, lingered first near Peloponnesus, next at the island of Delos, making capture of private vessels with their crews; until at length, on reaching the islands of Ikarus and Mykonos, he heard the unwelcome tidings that the besieged town had capitulated. Not at first crediting the report, he sailed onward to Embaton, in the Erythraean territory on the coast of Asia Minor, where he found the news confirmed. As only seven days had elapsed since the capitulation had been concluded, Teutiaplus, an Eleian captain in the fleet, strenuously urged the daring project of sailing on forthwith, and surprising Mitylênê by night in its existing unsettled condition: no preparation would have been made for receiving them, and there was good chance that the Athenians might be suddenly overpowered, the Mitylenæans again armed, and the town recovered.

Such a proposition, which was indeed something more than daring, did not suit the temper of Alkidas. Nor could he be induced by the solicitation of the exiles to fix and fortify himself either in any port of Ionia, or in the Æolic town of Kymê, so as to afford support and countenance to such subjects of the Athenian empire as were disposed to revolt; though he was confidently assured that many of them would revolt on his proclamation, and that the satrap Pissuthnês of Sardis would help him to defray the expense. Having been sent for the express purpose of relieving Mitylênê, Alkidas believed himself interdicted from any other project, and determined to return to Peloponnesus at once, dreading nothing so much as the pursuit of Pachês and the Athenian fleet. From Embaton, accordingly, he started on his return, coasting southward along Asia Minor as far as Ephesus. But the prisoners taken in his voyage were now an encumbrance to his flight; and their number was not inconsiderable, since all the merchant-vessels in his route had approached the fleet without suspicion, believing it to be Athenian: a Peloponnesian fleet near the coast of Ionia was as yet something unheard of and incredible. To get rid of his prisoners, Alkidas stopped at Myonnêsus, near Teos, and there put to death the

¹ Thucyd. iv, 75.

greater number of them, — a barbarous proceeding, which excited lively indignation among the neighboring Ionic cities to which they belonged; insomuch that when he reached Ephesus, the Samian exiles dwelling at Anæa, who had come forward so actively to help him, sent him a spirited remonstrance, reminding him that the slaughter of men neither engaged in war, nor enemies, nor even connected with Athens, except by constraint, was disgraceful to one who came forth as the liberator of Greece, — and that, if he persisted, he would convert his friends into enemies, not his enemies into friends. So keenly did Alkidas feel this animadversion, that he at once liberated the remainder of his prisoners, several of them Chians; and then started from Ephesus, taking his course across sea towards Krete and Peloponnesus. After much delay off the coast of Krete from stormy weather, which harassed and dispersed his fleet, he at length reached in safety the harbor of Kyllênê in Elis, where his scattered ships were ultimately reunited.¹

Thus inglorious was the voyage of the first Peloponnesian admiral who dared to enter that *Mare clausum* which passed for a portion of the territory of Athens.² But though he achieved little, his mere presence excited everywhere not less dismay than astonishment: for the Ionic towns were all unfortified, and Alkidas might take and sack any one of them by sudden assault, even though unable to hold it permanently. Pressing messages reached Pachês from Erythræ and from several other places, while the Athenian triremes called Paralus and Salaminia, the privileged vessels which usually carried public and sacred deputations, had themselves seen the Peloponnesian fleet anchored at Ikarus, and brought him the same intelligence. Pachês, having his hands now free by the capture of Mitylênê, set forth immediately in pursuit of the intruder, whom he chased as far

¹ Thucyd. iii. 32, 33-69.

² Thucyd. v. 56. Ἀργεῖοι δ' ἔλθοντες παρ' Ἀθηναίους ἐπικαίανσι ὅτι, γεγραμμένον ἐν ταῖς σπονδαῖς διὰ τῆς ἐαυτῶν ἐκάστους ἢ ἐπὶ πώλε-
υστος δύναι, ἑσσεῖαν κατὰ θάλασσαν (Λακεδαιμονίους) παραλεῦσαι.

We see that the sea is here reckoned as a portion of the Athenian territory; and even the portion of sea near to Peloponnesus, -- much more, that on the coast of Ionia.

the island of Patmos. It was there a certain that Alkidas had finally disappeared from the eastern waters and the Athenian admiral, though he would have rejoiced to meet the Peloponnesian fleet in the open sea, accounted it fortunate that they had not taken up a position in some Asiatic harbor, — in which case it would have been necessary for him to undertake a troublesome and tedious blockade, besides all the chances of revolt among the Athenian dependencies. We shall see how much, in this respect, depended upon the personal character of the Lacedæmonian commander, when we come hereafter to the expedition of Brasidas.

On his return from Patmos to Mitylène, Pachês was induced to stop at Notium by the solicitations of some exiles. Notium was the port of Kolophon, from which it was some little distance, as Peiræus was from Athens.²

About three years before, a violent internal dissension had taken place in Kolophon, and one of the parties, invoking the aid of the Persian Itamanes (seemingly one of the generals of the satrap Pissuthnês), had placed him in possession of the town; whereupon the opposite party, forced to retire, had established itself separately and independently at Notium. But the Kolophonians who remained in the town soon contrived to procure a party in Notium, whereby they were enabled to regain possession of it, through the aid of a body of Arcadian mercenaries in the service of Pissuthnês. These Arcadians formed a standing garrison at Notium, in which they occupied a separate citadel, or fortified space, while the town became again attached as harbor to Kolophon. A considerable body of exiles, however, expelled on that occasion, now invoked the aid of Pachês to reinstate them, and to expel the Arcadians. On reaching the place, the Athenian general prevailed upon Hippias, the Arcadian captain, to come forth to a parley, under the promise that, if nothing mutually satisfactory could be settled, he would again replace him, "safe and sound," in the fortification. But no sooner had the Arcadian come forth to this parley, than Pachês, causing him to be detained under guard, but without fetters or ill-usage, immediately

¹ Thucyd. iii. 33.

² The dissensions between Notium and Kolophon are noticed by Aristot. Politic. v. 3. 2.

attacked the fortification while the garrison were relying on the armistice, carried it by storm, and put to death both the Arcadians and the Persians who were found within. Having got possession of the fortification, he next brought Hippias again into it, "safe and sound," according to the terms of the convention, which was thus literally performed, and then immediately afterwards caused him to be shot with arrows and javelins. Of this species of fraud, founded on literal performance and real violation of an agreement, there are various examples in Grecian history; but nowhere do we read of a more flagitious combination of deceit and cruelty than the behavior of Pachês at Notium. How it was noticed at Athens, we do not know: but we may remark, not without surprise, that Thucydides recounts it plainly and calmly without a single word of comment.¹

Notium was separated from Kolophon, and placed in possession of those Kolophonians who were opposed to the Persian supremacy in the upper town. But as it had been down to this time a mere appendage of Kolophon and not a separate town, the Athenians soon afterwards sent ækists and performed for it the ceremonies of colonization according to their own laws and customs, inviting from every quarter the remaining exiles of Kolophon.² Whether any new settlers went from Athens itself, we do not know: but the step was intended to confer a sort of Hellenic citizenship, and recognized collective personality, on the new-born town of Notium; without which, neither its theory or solemn deputation would have been admitted to offer public sacrifice, nor its private citizens to contend for the prize, at Olympic and other great festivals.

Having cleared the Asiatic waters from the enemies of Athens, Pachês returned to Lesbos, reduced the towns of Pyrrha and Eresus, and soon found himself so completely master both of Mitylène and the whole island, as to be able to send home the larger part of his force; carrying with them as prisoners those Mitylenians who had been deposited in Tenedos, as well as others, prominently implicated in the late revolt, to the number altogether of rather more than a thousand. The Lacedæmonian

¹ Thucyd. iii. 34.

² Thucyd. iii. 34; C. A. Pertz. Colophonica, p. 36. (Göttingen 1848.)

Salæthus, being recently detected in his place of concealment, was included among the prisoners transmitted.

Upon the fate of these prisoners the Athenians had now to pronounce, and they entered upon the discussion in a temper of extreme wrath and vengeance. As to Salæthus, their resolution to put him to death was unanimous and immediate, nor would they listen to his promises, assuredly delusive, of terminating the blockade of Plataea, in case his life were spared. What to do with Mitylênê and its inhabitants was a point more doubtful, and was submitted to formal debate in the public assembly.

It is in this debate that Thucydides first takes notice of Kleon, who is, however, mentioned by Plutarch as rising into importance some few years earlier, during the lifetime of Periklês. Under the great increase of trade and population in Athens and Peiræus during the last forty years, a new class of politicians seem to have grown up, men engaged in various descriptions of trade and manufacture, who began to rival more or less in importance the ancient families of Attic proprietors. This change was substantially analogous to that which took place in the cities of mediæval Europe, when the merchants and traders of the various guilds gradually came to compete with, and ultimately supplanted, the patrician families in whom the supremacy had originally resided. In Athens, persons of ancient family and station enjoyed at this time no political privilege, and since the reforms of Ephialtês and Periklês, the political constitution had become thoroughly democratical. But they still continued to form the two highest classes in the Solonian census founded on property, — the pentakosiomedimni, and the hippeis, or knights: new men enriched by trade doubtless got into these classes, but probably only in minority, and imbibed the feeling of the class as they found it, instead of bringing into it any new spirit. Now an individual Athenian of this class, though without any legal title to preference, yet when he stood forward as candidate for political influence, continued to be decidedly preferred and welcomed by the social sentiment at Athens, which preserved in its spontaneous sympathies distinctions effaced from the political code.¹ Besides this place ready prepared for him in the public

¹ Thucyd. v. — Ἀλκιβιάδης — ἀνὴρ ἡλικίᾳ μὲν ὡς ἔτι τότε νέος, ὡς δὲ

sympathy, especially advantageous at the outset of political life, — he found himself farther borne up by the family connections, associations, and political clubs, etc., which exercised very great influence both on the politics and the judicature of Athens, and of which he became a member as a matter of course. Such advantages were doubtless only auxiliary, carrying a man up to a certain point of influence, but leaving him to achieve the rest by his own personal qualities and capacity. But their effect was nevertheless very real, and those who, without possessing them, met and buffeted him in the public assembly, contended against great disadvantages. A person of such low or middling station obtained no favorable presumptions or indulgence on the part of the public to meet him half-way, — nor had he established connections to encourage first successes, or help him out of early scrapes. He found others already in possession of ascendancy, and well-disposed to keep down new competitors; so that he had to win his own way unaided, from the first step to the last, by qualities personal to himself; by assiduity of attendance, by acquaintance with business, by powers of striking speech, and withal by unflinching audacity, indispensable to enable him to bear up against that opposition and enmity which he would incur from the high-born politicians, and organized party clubs, as soon as he appeared to be rising up into ascendancy.

The free march of political and judicial affairs raised up several such men, during the years beginning and immediately preceding the Peloponnesian war. Even during the lifetime of Periklês, they appear to have arisen in greater or less numbers: but the personal ascendancy of that great man, — who combined an aristocratical position with a strong and genuine democratical sentiment, and an enlarged intellect rarely found attached to either, — impressed a peculiar character on Athenian politics. The Athenian world was divided into his partisans and his opponents, among each of whom there were individuals high-born and low-born, — though the aristocratical party, properly so called, the majority of wealthy and high-born Athenians, either opposed or disliked him. It is about two years after his death that we

ἀλλ' ἡ πόλις, ἀξιώματι δὲ προγόνων τιμώμενος. Compare Xenophon, Memorabil. i. 2. 25: iii. 6, 1.

begin to hear of a new class of politicians: Eukratēs, the rope-seller; Kleon, the leather-seller; Lysiklēs, the sheep-seller; Hyperbolus, the lamp-maker;¹ the two first of whom must have been already well-known as speakers in the ekklesia, even during the lifetime of Periklēs. Among them all, the most distinguished was Kleon, son of Kleonētus.

Kleon acquired his first importance among the speakers against Periklēs, so that he would thus obtain for himself, during his early political career, the countenance of the numerous and aristocratic anti-Perikleans. He is described by Thucydides in general terms as a person of the most violent temper and character in Athens, — as being dishonest in his calumnies, and virulent in his invective and accusation.² Aristophanes, in his comedy of the Knights, reproduces these features, with others new and distinct, as well as with exaggerated details, comic, satirical, and contemptuous. His comedy depicts Kleon in the point of view in which he would appear to the knights of Athens, — a leather-dresser, smelling of the tan-yard, — a low-born brawler, terrifying opponents by the violence of his criminations, the loudness of his voice, the impudence of his gestures, — moreover, as venal in his politics, threatening men with accusations, and then receiving money to withdraw them; a robber of the public treasury, persecuting merit as well as rank, and courtting the favor of the assembly by the basest and most guilty cajolery. The general attributes set forth by Thucydides (apart from Aristophanes, who does not profess to write history), we may well accept; the powerful and violent invective of Kleon, often dishonest, together with his self-confidence and audacity in the public assembly. Men of the middling class, like Kleon and

¹ Aristophan. Equit. 130, seqq., and Scholia; Eupolis. Dem. Fram. xv. p. 466. ed. Meineke. See the remarks in Ranck, Commentat. de Vita Aristophanis, p. cccxxxiv, seqq.

² Thucyd. iii. 36. Κλέων — ὃν καὶ ἐς τὰ ἄλλα βλαψώτατος τῶν πολιτῶν καὶ τῷ ὄντι παραπονεῖν ἐν τῷ τότε τυραννιστάτος.

He also mentions Kleon a second time, two years afterwards, but in terms which also seem to imply a first introduction. — μάλιστα δὲ αἰτίαις ἐνίχε Κλέων ὁ Ἐλευσινεύων, ἀνὴρ δημαγωγὸς κατ' ἐκείνους τὸν χρόνον ὡς καὶ τῷ πλήθει πιθανώτατος. iv. 21-28. also v. 16. Κλέων — νομιστὴν καταφανέσσιμος ὃν εἶναι μακροχρόνιον καὶ ἀπαυτοτελέστερον διαβιλλῶν, etc.

Hyperbolus, who persevered in addressing the public assembly and trying to take a leading part in it, against persons of greater family pretension than themselves, were pretty sure to be men of more than usual audacity. Had they not possessed this quality, they would never have surmounted the opposition made to them: we may well believe that they had it to a displeasing excess, — and even if they had not, the same measure of self-assumption which in Alkibiadēs would be tolerated from his rank and station, would in them pass for insupportable impudence. Unhappily, we have no specimens to enable us to appreciate the invective of Kleon. We cannot determine whether it was more virulent than that of Demosthenēs and Æschinēs, seventy years afterwards, — each of those eminent orators imputing to the other the grossest impudence, calumny, perjury, corruption, loud voice, and revolting audacity of manner, in language which Kleon can hardly have surpassed in intensity of vituperation, though he doubtless fell immeasurably short of it in classical finish. Nor can we even tell in what degree Kleon's denunciations of the veteran Periklēs were fiercer than those memorable invectives against the old age of Sir Robert Walpole, with which Lord Chatham's political career opened. The talent for invective possessed by Kleon, employed first against Periklēs, would be counted as great impudence by the partisans of that illustrious statesman, as well as by impartial and judicious citizens; but among the numerous enemies of Periklēs, it would be applauded as a burst of patriotic indignation, and would procure for the orator that extraneous support at first which would sustain him until he acquired his personal hold on the public assembly.¹

By what degrees or through what causes that hold was gradually increased, we do not know; but at the time when the question of Mitylēnē came on for discussion, it had grown into a sort of ascendancy which Thucydides describes by saying that Kleon was "at that time by far the most persuasive speaker in the eyes of the people." The fact of Kleon's great power of speech, and his capacity

¹ Plutarch, Periklēs, c. 33. Ἐπειροῦτο δὲ καὶ Κλέων, ἡδὴ διὰ τῆς πρὸς ἐκείνους ὀργῆς τῶν πολιτῶν παρεννομενος εἰς τὴν δημαγωγίαν.

Periklēs was δηγητής αἰσῶνι Κλέωνι — in the words of the comic author Hermippus.

of handling public business in a popular manner, is better attested than anything else respecting him, because it depends upon two witnesses both hostile to him, — Thucydides and Aristophanes. The assembly and the dikastery were Kleon's theatre and holding-ground: for the Athenian people taken collectively in their place of meeting, and the Athenian people taken individually, were not always the same person and had not the same mode of judgment: Demos sitting in the Pnyx, was a different man from Demos at home.¹ The lofty combination of qualities possessed by Periklēs exercised ascendancy over both one and the other; but the qualities of Kleon swayed considerably the former without standing high in the esteem of the latter.

When the fate of Mitylênê and its inhabitants was submitted to the Athenian assembly, Kleon took the lead in the discussion. There never was a theme more perfectly suited to his violent temperament and power of fierce invective. Taken collectively, the case of Mitylênê presented a revolt as inexcusable and aggravated as any revolt could be: and we have only to read the grounds of it, as set forth by the Mitylenæan speakers themselves before the Peloponnesians at Olympia, to be satisfied that such a proceeding, when looked at from the Athenian point of view, would be supposed to justify, and even to require, the very highest pitch of indignation. The Mitylenæans admit, not only that they have no ground of complaint against Athens, but that they have been well and honorably treated by her, with special privilege. But they fear that she may oppress them in future: they hate the very principle of her empire, and eagerly instigate, as well as aid, her enemies to subdue her: they select the precise moment in which she has been worn down by a fearful pestilence, invasion, and cost of war. Nothing more than this would be required to kindle the most intense wrath in the bosom of an Athenian patriot: but there was yet another point which weighed as much as the rest, if not more: the revolt had been the first to invite a Peloponnesian fleet across the Ægean, and the first to proclaim, both to Athens and her allies, the precarious tenure of her empire.² The violent Kleon would on this occasion find in

¹ Aristophan. Equit. 750.

² Thucyd. iii. 36. προσφανεβάλετο οὐκ ἐλάχιστον τῆς ὁρμῆς, &c.

the assembly an audience hardly less violent than himself, and would easily be able to satisfy them that anything like mercy to the Mitylenæans was treason to Athens. He proposed to apply to the captive city the penalties tolerated by the custom of war in their harshest and fullest measure: to kill the whole Mitylenæan male population of military age, probably about six thousand persons, — and to sell as slaves all the women and children.¹ The proposition, though strongly opposed by Diodotus and others, was sanctioned and passed by the assembly, and a trireme was forthwith despatched to Mitylênê, enjoining Pachês to put it in execution.²

Such a sentence was, in principle, nothing more than a very rigorous application of the received laws of war. Not merely the reconquered rebel, but even the prisoner of war, apart from any special convention, was at the mercy of his conqueror, to be slain, sold, or admitted to ransom: and we shall find the Lacedæmonians carrying out the maxim without the smallest abatement towards the Plataean prisoners, in the course of a very short time. And doubtless the Athenian people, so long as they remained in assembly, under that absorbing temporary intensification of the common and predominant sentiment which springs from the mere fact of multitude, and so long as they were discussing the principle of the case, What had Mitylênê deserved? thought only of this view. Less than the most rigorous measure of war, they would conceive, would be inadequate to the wrong done by the Mitylenæans. But when the assembly broke up, — when the citizen, no longer wound up by sympathizing companions and animated speakers in the Pnyx, subsided into the comparative quiescence of individual life, — when the talk came to be, not about the propriety of passing such a resolution, but about the details of executing it, a sensible change and marked repentance became presently visible. We must also recollect, and it is a principle of no small moment in human affairs, especially among a democratical people

¹ I infer this total number from the fact that the number sent to Athens by Pachês, as foremost instigators, was rather more than one thousand (Thucyd. iii. 50). The total of ἡλικιωτά, or males of military age, must have been (I imagine) six times this number.

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² Thucyd. iii. 36.

like the Athenians, who stand charged with so many resolutions passed and afterwards unexecuted, that the sentiment of wrath against the Mitylenæans had been really in part discharged by the mere passing of the sentence, quite apart from its execution; just as a furious man relieves himself from overboiling anger by imprecations against others which he would himself shrink from afterwards realizing. The Athenians, on the whole the most humane people in Greece, — though humanity, according to our ideas, cannot be predicated of any Greeks, — became sensible that they had sanctioned a cruel and frightful decree, and the captain and seamen,¹ to whom it was given to carry, set forth on their voyage with mournful repugnance. The Mitylenæan envoys present in Athens, who had probably been allowed to speak in the assembly and plead their own cause, together with those Athenians who had been proxeni and friends of Mitylênê, and the minority generally of the previous assembly, soon discerned, and did their best to foster, this repentance; which became, during the course of the same evening, so powerful as well as so wide-spread, that the strategi acceded to the prayer of the envoys, and convoked a fresh assembly for the morrow to reconsider the proceeding. By so doing, they committed an illegality, and exposed themselves to the chance of impeachment: but the change of feeling among the people was so manifest as to overbear any such scruples.²

Though Thucydides had given us only a short summary, without any speeches, of what passed in the first assembly, — yet as to the second assembly, he gives us at length the speeches both of Kleon and Diodotus, the two principal orators of the first also. We may be sure that this second assembly was in all points one of the most interesting and anxious of the whole war;

¹ Thucyd. iii. 36. Καὶ τῇ ἰσότητι τῶν ἐκείνων ἐν αὐτοῖς καὶ αἰσχροῖς, ὧν τὸ βούλημα καὶ αἰὲρ ἐγγράφει, πολλὴν ἔχον διαφύλακτον μᾶλλον ἢ οὐ τοῖς αἰτίοις.

The feelings of the seamen in the trireme appointed to carry the order of execution, are a striking point of evidence in this case: τῆς προτέρας νεὸς οὐ σπονδὴν ἔκρινον, ἢ τῆς καὶ βάλαντος, etc. (iii. 50).

² Thucyd. iii. 36. As to the illegality, see Thucyd. vi. 14. which I think is good evidence to prove that there was illegality. I agree with Schömann on this point, in spite of the doubts of Dr. Arnold.

and though we cannot certainly determine what were the circumstances which determined Thucydides in his selection of speeches, yet this cause, as well as the signal defeat of Kleon, whom he disliked, may probably be presumed to have influenced him here. That orator came forward to defend his proposition passed on the preceding day, and denounced in terms of indignation the unwise tenderness and scruples of the people, who could not bear to treat their subject-allies, according to the plain reality, as men held only by naked fear. He dwelt upon the mischief and folly of reversing on one day what had been decided on the day preceding, — upon the guilty ambition of orators, who sacrificed the most valuable interests of the commonwealth either to pecuniary gains, or to the personal credit of speaking with effect, triumphing over rivals, and setting up their own fancies in place of fact and reality. He deprecated the mistaken encouragement given to such delusions by a public "wise beyond what was written," who came to the assembly, not to apply their good sense in judging of public matters, but merely for the delight of hearing speeches.¹ He restated the heinous and unprovoked wrong committed by the Mitylenæans, — and the grounds for inflicting upon them that maximum of punishment which "justice" enjoined. He called for "justice" against them; nothing less, but nothing more: warning the assembly that the imperial necessities of Athens essentially required the constant maintenance of a sentiment of fear in the minds of unwilling subjects, and that they must prepare to see their empire pass away if they suffered themselves to be guided either by compassion for those who, if victors, would have no compassion on them,² — or by unseasonable moderation towards those who would neither feel nor requite

¹ Thucyd. iii. 37. οἱ μὲν γὰρ τῶν τε νόμων σφοδρότεροι βούλονται φαίνεσθαι, τῶν τε ἀπὸ λεγομένων ἐς τὸ κοινὸν περιγίγνεσθαι. . . . οἱ δ' ἀπιστοῦντες τῇ λαυτῶν ξυνέσει ἀμαθέστεροι μὲν τῶν νόμων ἀξιούσιν εἶναι, ἀδυνατώτεροι δὲ τοῦ καλῶς εἰπόντος αἰμψασθαι λόγον.

Compare the language of Archidamus at Sparta in the congress, where he takes credit to the Spartans for being ἀμαθέστερον τῶν νόμων τῆς ὑπεροφίας παιδευόμενοι, etc. (Thucyd. i. 84) — very similar in spirit to the remarks of Kleon about the Athenians.

² Thucyd. iii. 40. μηδὲ τρισὶ τοῖς ἀσυμφωτάτοις τῇ ἀρχῇ, οἷα τω, καὶ ἰδονῇ λόγων, καὶ ἐπιεικείᾳ, ἀμαρτάνειν.

it, — or by the mere impression of seductive discourses. Justice against the Mitylenæans, not less than the strong political interests of Athens, required the infliction of the sentence decreed on the day preceding.¹

The harangue of Kleon is in many respects remarkable. If we are surprised to find a man, whose whole importance resided in his tongue, denouncing so severely the license and the undue influence of speech in the public assembly, we must recollect that Kleon had the advantage of addressing himself to the intense prevalent sentiment of the moment, — that he could, therefore, pass off the dictates of this sentiment as plain, downright, honest sense and patriotism; while the opponents, speaking against the reigning sentiment, and therefore driven to collateral argument, circumlocution, and more or less of manœuvre, might be represented as mere clever sophists, showing their talents in making the worse appear the better reason, — if not actually bribed, at least unprincipled, and without any sincere moral conviction. As this is a mode of dealing with questions both of public concern and of private morality, not less common at present than it was in the time of the Peloponnesian war, — to seize upon some strong and tolerably wide-spread sentiment among the public, to treat the dictates of that sentiment as plain common sense and obvious right, and then to shut out all rational estimate of coming good and evil as if it were unholy or immoral, or at best mere uncandid subtlety, — we may well notice a case in which Kleon employs it to support a proposition now justly regarded as barbarous.

Applying our modern views to this proposition, indeed, the prevalent sentiment would not only not be in favor of Kleon, but would be irresistibly in favor of his opponents. To put to death in cold blood some six thousand persons, would so revolt modern feelings, as to overbalance all considerations of past misconduct in the persons to be condemned. Nevertheless, the speech of Diodotus, who followed and opposed Kleon, not only contains no appeal to any such merciful predispositions, but even positively

¹ Thucyd. iii, 40. *πειθόμενοι δὲ ἑμοὶ τὰ τε δίκαια ἐς Μιτυληναίους καὶ τὰ εὐμορὰ ἅμα ποιήσετε· ἄλλως δὲ γνόντες τοῖς μὲν οὐ χαριεῖσθε, ὑμᾶς δὲ αὐτοὺς μᾶλλον δικαιώσετε.*

disclaims appealing to them: the orator deprecates, not less than Kleon, the influence of compassionate sentiment, or of a spirit of mere compromise and moderation.¹ He farther discards considerations of justice or the analogies of criminal judicature,² — and rests his opposition altogether upon reasons of public prudence, bearing upon the future welfare and security of Athens.

¹ Thucyd. iii, 48: compare the speech of Kleon. iii, 40. *ἡμεῖς δὲ γνόντες ἀμείνω τάδε εἶναι, καὶ μὴτε οἰκτῶ πλέον νείμαντες μὴτε ἐπεικεία, οἷς οὐδὲ ἐγὼ ἐὼ προσάγεσθαι, ἀπ' αὐτῶν δὲ τῶν παραινεμένων, etc.*

Dr. Arnold distinguishes *οἰκτος* (or *ἐλεος*) from *ἐπεικεία*, by saying that "the former is a feeling, the latter a habit: *οἰκτος*, pity or compassion, may occasionally touch those who are generally very far from being *ἐπεικεῖς* — mild or gentle. *Ἐπεικεία* relates to all persons. — *οἰκτος*, to particular individuals." The distinction here taken is certainly in itself just, and *ἐπεικεία* sometimes has the meaning ascribed to it by Dr. Arnold: but in this passage I believe it has a different meaning. The contrast between *οἰκτος* and *ἐπεικεία* — as Dr. Arnold explains them — would be too feeble, and too little marked, to serve the purpose of Kleon and Diodotus. *Ἐπεικεία* here rather means the disposition to stop short of your full rights; a spirit of fairness and adjustment; an abatement on your part likely to be requited by abatement on the part of your adversary: compare Thucyd. i, 76: iv, 19; v, 86; viii, 93.

² Thucyd. iii 44. *ἐγὼ δὲ παρήλθον οὐτε ἀντερῶν περὶ Μιτυληναίων οὐτε κατηγορήσων· οὐ γὰρ περὶ τῆς ἐκείνων ἀδικίας ἡμῖν ὁ ἀγὼν, εἰ σωφρονούμεν, ἀλλὰ περὶ τῆς ἡμετέρας ἐμβουλίας. . . . δίκαιότερος γὰρ ὢν αὐτοῦ (Κλέωνος) ὁ λόγος πρὸς τὴν νῦν ὑμετέραν ὀργὴν ἐς Μιτυληναίους, τάχα ἂν ἐπιστάσαιτο· ἡμεῖς δὲ οὐ δικαζόμεθα πρὸς αὐτοὺς, ὥστε τῶν δικαίων δεῖν, ἀλλὰ βουλευόμεθα περὶ αὐτῶν, ὅπως χρησίμως ἔξουσιν.*

So Mr. Burke, in his speech on Conciliation with America (Burke's Works, vol. iii, pp. 69–74), in discussing the proposition of prosecuting the acts of the refractory colonies as criminal: "The thing seems a great deal too big for my ideas of jurisprudence. It should seem, to my way of conceiving such matters, that there is a wide difference in reason and policy, between the mode of proceeding on the irregular conduct of scattered individuals, or even of bands of men who disturb order within the state, — and the civil dissensions which may from time to time agitate the several communities which compose a great empire. It looks to me to be narrow and pedantic, to apply the ordinary ideas of criminal justice to this great public contest. I do not know the method of drawing up an indictment against a whole people," etc. — "My consideration is narrow, confined, and wholly limited to the policy of the question."

He begins by vindicating¹ the necessity of reconsidering the resolution just passed, and insists on the mischief of deciding so important a question in haste or under strong passion; he enters a protest against the unwarrantable insinuations of corruption or self-conceit by which Kleon had sought to silence or discredit his opponents;² and then, taking up the question on the ground of public wisdom and prudence, he proceeds to show that the rigorous sentence decreed on the preceding day was not to be defended. That sentence would not prevent any other among the subject-allies from revolting, if they saw, or fancied that they saw, a fair chance of success; but it might perhaps drive them,³ if once embarked in revolt, to persist even to desperation, and bury themselves under the ruins of their city. While every means ought to be employed to prevent them from revolting, by precautions beforehand, it was a mistaken reckoning to try to deter them by enormity of punishment, inflicted afterwards upon such as were reconquered. In developing this argument, the speaker gives some remarkable views on the theory of punishment generally, and on the small addition obtained in the way of preventive effect even by the greatest aggravation of the suffering inflicted upon the condemned criminal. — views which might have passed as rare and profound even down to the last century.⁴ And he farther supports his argument by emphatically setting forth the impolicy of confounding the Mitylenæan Demos in the same punishment with their oligarchy: the revolt had been the act exclusively of the latter, and the former had not

¹ Thucyd. iii. 42.

² Thucyd. iii. 43.

³ Thucyd. iii. 45, 46.

⁴ Compare this speech of Diodotus with the views of punishment implied by Xenophon in his *Anabasis*, where he is describing the government of Cyrus the younger: —

"Nor can any man contend, that Cyrus suffered criminals and wrong-doers to laugh at him: he punished them with the most unmeasured severity (*ἀπειθείσασα πάντων ἱταρομίτη*). And you might often see along the frequented roads men deprived of their eyes, their hands, and their feet: so that in his government either Greek or barbarian, if he had no criminal purpose, might go fearlessly through and carry whatever he found convenient." (*Anabasis*, i. 9, 13.)

The severity of the punishment is, in Xenophon's mind, the measure both of its effects in deterring criminals, and of the character of the ruler inflicting it.

only taken no part in it, but, as soon as they obtained possession of arms, had surrendered the city spontaneously. In all the allied cities, it was the commons who were well-affected to Athens, and upon whom her hold chiefly depended against the doubtful fidelity of the oligarchies:¹ but this feeling could not possibly continue, if it were now seen that all the Mitylenæans indiscriminately were confounded in one common destruction. Diodotus concludes by recommending that those Mitylenæans whom Paches had sent to Athens as chiefs of the revolt, should be put upon their trial separately; but that the remaining population should be spared.²

This speech is that of a man who feels that he has the reigning and avowed sentiment of the audience against him, and that he must therefore win his way by appeals to their reason. The same appeals, however, might have been made, and perhaps had been made, during the preceding discussion, without success; but Diodotus knew that the reigning sentiment, though still ostensibly predominant, had been silently undermined during the last few hours, and that the reaction towards pity and moderation, which had been growing up under it, would work in favor of his arguments, though he might disclaim all intention of invoking its aid. After several other discourses, both for and against, — the assembly came to a vote, and the proposition of Diodotus was adopted; but adopted by so small a majority, that the decision seemed at first doubtful.³

But the trireme carrying the first vote had started the day before, and was already twenty-four hours on its way to Mitylenê. A second trireme was immediately put to sea, bearing the new decree; yet nothing short of superhuman exertions could enable it to reach the condemned city before the terrific sentence now on its way might be actually in course of execution. The Mitylenæan envoys stored the vessel well with provisions, promising

¹ Thucyd. iii. 47. *Νῆρ μιν γὰρ εἶναι ὁ δῆμος ἐν πάσαις ταῖς πόλεσιν εὐταγὲς ἔστι, καὶ ἡ οὐ ξυνασίσταται τοῖς ὀλίγοις, ἢ ἐὰν βιασθῇ, ὑπάρχει τοῖς ἀποστήσασσι πολέμιος εὐδύς, καὶ τῆς ἀντικατισταμένης πόλεως τὸ πλῆθος ξυμμαχὸν ἔχοντες ἐς πόλεμον ἐπέρχουσιν.*

² Thucyd. iii. 48.

³ Thucyd. iii. 49. *ἐγένοντο ἐν τῇ χειροτονίᾳ ἀγχώμαλοι, ἐκράτησε δ' ἡ τοῦ Διοδότου.*

large rewards to the crew if they arrived in time; and an intensity of effort was manifested, without parallel in the history of Athenian seamanship, — the oar being never once relaxed between Athens and Mitylênê, and the rowers merely taking turns for short intervals of rest, with refreshment of barley-meal steeped with wine and oil swallowed on their seats. Luckily, there was no unfavorable wind to retard them: but the object would have been defeated, if it had not happened that the crew of the first trireme were as slow and averse in the transmission of their rigorous mandate, as those of the second were eager for the delivery of the reprieve in time. And, after all, it came no more than just in time; the first trireme had arrived, the order for execution was actually in the hands of Pachês, and his measures were already preparing. So near was the Mitylenæan population to this wholesale destruction: so near was Athens to the actual perpetration of an enormity which would have raised against her throughout Greece a sentiment of exasperation more deadly than that which she afterwards incurred even from the proceedings at Melos, Skiône, and elsewhere. Had the execution been realized, the person who would have suffered most by it, and most deservedly, would have been the proposer, Kleon. For if the reaction in Athenian sentiment was so immediate and sensible after the mere passing of the sentence, far more violent would it have been when they learned that the deed had been irrevocably done, and when all its painful details were presented to their imaginations: and Kleon would have been held responsible as the author of that which had so disgraced them in their own eyes. As the case turned out, he was fortunate enough to escape this danger; and his proposition, to put to death those Mitylenæans whom Pachês had sent home as the active revolting party, was afterwards adopted and executed. It doubtless appeared so moderate after the previous decree passed but rescinded, as to be adopted with little resistance, and to provoke no after-
repentance: yet the men so slain were rather more than one thousand in number.²

Besides this sentence of execution, the Athenians razed the

¹ Thucyd. iii, 49. *παρὰ τοσούτοις καὶ ἡ Μιτυλήνη ἦλθε κινδύνου*

² Thucyd. iii, 50.

fortifications of Mitylênê, and took possession of all her ships of war. In lieu of tribute, they farther established a new permanent distribution of the land of the island; all except Methymna, which had remained faithful to them. They distributed it into three thousand lots, of which three hundred were reserved for consecration to the gods, and the remainder assigned to Athenian kleruchs, or proprietary settlers, chosen by lot among the citizens; the Lesbian proprietors still remaining on the land as cultivating tenants, and paying to the Athenian kleruch an annual rent of two minæ, near four pounds sterling, for each lot. We should have been glad to learn more about this new land-settlement than the few words of the historian suffice to explain. It would seem that two thousand seven hundred Athenian citizens, with their families must have gone to reside, for the time at least, in Lesbos, as kleruchs; that is, without abnegating their rights as Athenian citizens, and without being exonerated either from Athenian taxation, or from personal military service. But it seems certain that these men did not continue long to reside in Lesbos: and we may even suspect that the kleruchic allotment of the island must have been subsequently abrogated. There was a strip on the opposite mainland of Asia, which had hitherto belonged to Mitylênê; this was now separated from that town, and henceforward enrolled among the tributary subjects of Athens.¹

¹ Thucyd. iii, 50; iv, 52. About the Lesbian kleruchs, see Boeckh, *Public Econ. of Athens*, B. iii, c. 18; Wachsmuth, *Hell. Alt.* i, 2, p. 36. These kleruchs must originally have gone thither as a garrison, as M. Boeckh remarks; and may probably have come back, either all or a part, when needed for military service at home, and when it was ascertained that the island might be kept without them. Still, however, there is much which is puzzling in this arrangement. It seems remarkable that the Athenians, at a time when their accumulated treasure had been exhausted, and when they were beginning to pay direct contributions from their private property, should sacrifice five thousand four hundred minæ (ninety talents) annual revenue capable of being appropriated by the state, unless that sum were required to maintain the kleruchs as resident garrison for the maintenance of Lesbos. And as it turned out afterwards that their residence was not necessary, we may doubt whether the state did not convert the kleruchic grants into a public tribute, wholly or partially.

We may farther remark, that if the kleruch be supposed a citizen resident

To the misfortunes of Mitylênê belongs, as a suitable appendix, the fate of Pachês, the Athenian commander, whose perfidy at Notium has been recently recounted. It appears, that having contracted a passion for two beautiful free women at Mitylênê, Hellânis and Lamaxis, he slew their husbands, and got possession of them by force. Possibly, they may have had private friends at Athens, which must of course have been the case with many

at Athens, but receiving rent from his lot of land in some other territory. — the analogy between him and the Roman colonist fails. The Roman colonists, though retaining their privileges as citizens, were sent out to reside on their grants of land, and to constitute a sort of resident garrison over the prior inhabitants, who had been despoiled of a portion of territory to make room for them.

See, on this subject and analogy, the excellent Dissertation of Madwig: *De jure et conditione coloniarum Populi Romani quaestio historica*, — Madwig, Opuscul. Copenhag. 1834. Diss. viii. p. 246.

M. Boeckh and Dr. Arnold contend justly that at the time of the expedition of Athens against Syracuse and afterwards (Thucyd. vii. 57; viii. 23), there could have been but few, if any, Athenian kleruchs resident in Lesbos. We might even push this argument farther, and apply the same inference to an earlier period, the eighth year of the war (Thucyd. iv. 75), when the Mitylenæan exiles were so active in their aggressions upon Antandrus and the other towns, originally Mitylenæan possessions, on the opposite mainland. There was no force near at hand on the part of Athens to deal with these exiles except the *ἀρχηγόλοι* *ἄνδρες*, — had there been kleruchs at Mitylênê, they would probably have been able to defeat the exiles in their first attempts, and would certainly have been among the most important forces to put them down afterwards. — whereas Thucydides makes no allusion to them.

Farther, the oration of Antipho (De Cæde Herod. c. 13) makes no allusion to Athenian kleruchs, either as resident in the island, or even as absentee receiving the annual rent mentioned by Thucydides. The Mitylenæan citizen, father of the speaker of that oration, had been one of those implicated — as he says, unwillingly — in the past revolt of the city against Athens; since the deplorable termination of that revolt he had continued possessor of his Lesbian property, and continued also to discharge his obligations as well (choragic obligations — *χορηγία*) towards Mitylênê as (his obligations of pecuniary payment — *πίλη*) towards Athens. If the arrangement mentioned by Thucydides had been persisted in, this Mitylenæan proprietor would have paid nothing towards the city of Athens but merely a rent of two mîna to some Athenian kleruch, or citizen, which can hardly be reconciled with the words of the speaker as we find them in Antipho.

Mitylenæan families: at all events they repaired thither, bent on obtaining redress for this outrage, and brought their complaint against Pachês before the Athenian dikastery, in that trial of accountability to which every officer was liable at the close of his command. So profound was the sentiment which their case excited, in this open and numerous assembly of Athenian citizens, that the guilty commander, not waiting for sentence, slew himself with his sword in open court.¹

¹ See the Epigram of Agathias, 57, p. 377. Agathias, ed. Bonn.

Ἑλλανὶς τρυφικαῖρα, καὶ ἡ χαρίεσσα Λάμαξις,
ἦσθην μὲν πάτρας φέγγεα Λεσβιάδος
Ὅκκα δ' Ἀθηναίῃσι σὺν ὀλοασιν ἐνθάδε κίλσας
τὰν Μιτυλήναιαν γὰρ ἠλάπαξε Πάχης,
τὰν κοῦραν ὀδῶκος ἤρυσσας, τὼς δὲ συνεύνας
ἔκτανεν, ὡς τήνας τῇδε βιησόμενος.
Ταὶ δὲ κατ' Αἰγαίῳ ῥοὺν πλατὺ λαιτῖμα φιμωθῆν,
καὶ ποτὶ τὰν κραναὴν Μοῖρῶπιαν δραμῆθην,
Δάμω δ' ἀγγελέτην ἀλιτήμονος ἰργα Πάχητος
μέσφα μιν εἰς ὀλοὴν κῆρα συνηλασάτην.
Τοῖα μὲν, ὦ κοῦρα, πεπονθήκατον· ἂψ δ' ἐπὶ πάτρην
ἦκετον, ἐν δ' αὐτῇ κείσθον ἀποφθιμένα·
Εὐδὲ πόνων ἀπόνασθον, ἐπεὶ ποτὶ σῶμα συνεύνων
εἶδετον, ἱς κλεινὰς μνήμα σαρφροσύνας·
Ὑμνεῖσιν δ' ἐπὶ παντες ὁμόφρονες ἡραίνας,
πάτρας καὶ ποσσίων πῆματα τιταμύνας.

Plutarch (Nikias. 6: compare Plutarch, Aristides, c. 26) states the fact of Pachês having slain himself before the dikastery on occasion of his trial of accountability. Πάχητα τὸν ἔχοντα Λεσβίαν, ὡς, εἰθύνας δίδους τῆς στρατηγίας, ἐν αὐτῇ τῷ δικαστηρίῳ σπασόμενος ἑωὺς ἀνέβλεν ἑαυτὸν, etc.

The statement in Plutarch, and that in the Epigram, hang together so perfectly well, that each lends authority to the other, and I think there is good reason for crediting the Epigram. The suicide of Pachês, and that too before the dikasts, implies circumstances very different from those usually brought in accusation against a general on trial: it implies an intensity of anger in the numerous dikasts greater than that which acts of peculation would be likely to raise, and such as to strike a guilty man with insupportable remorse and humiliation. The story of Lamaxis and Hellânis would be just of a nature to produce this vehement emotion among the Athenian dikasts. Moreover, the words of the Epigram, — *μέσφα μιν εἰς ὀλοὴν κῆρα συνηλασάτην*, — are precisely applicable to a self-inflicted death. It would seem by the Epigram, moreover, that, even in the time of Agathias (A.D. 550 — the reign of Justinian), there must have been preserved at Mitylênê a sepulchral monument commemorating this incident.

The surrender of Plataea to the Lacedaemonians took place not long after that of Mitylène to the Athenians, — somewhat later in the same summer. Though the escape of one-half of the garrison had made the provisions last longer for the rest, still they had now come to be exhausted, and the remaining defenders were enfeebled and on the point of perishing by starvation. The Lacedaemonian commander of the blockading force, knowing their defenceless condition, could easily have taken the town by storm, had he not been forbidden by express orders from Sparta. For the Spartan government, calculating that peace might one day be concluded with Athens on terms of mutual cession of places acquired by war, wished to acquire Plataea, not by force but by capitulation and voluntary surrender, which would serve as an excuse for not giving it up: though such a distinction, between capture by force and by capitulation, not admissible in modern diplomacy, was afterwards found to tell against the Lacedaemonians quite as much as in their favor.¹ Acting upon these orders, the Lacedaemonian commander sent in a herald, summoning the Plataeans to surrender voluntarily, and submit themselves to the Lacedaemonians as judges, — with a stipulation "that the wrong-doers² should be punished, but that none should be punished unjustly." To the besieged, in their state of hopeless starvation, all terms were nearly alike, and they accordingly surrendered the city. After a few days' interval, during which they received nourishment from the blockading army, five persons arrived from Sparta to sit in judgment upon their fate, — one, Aristomenidas, a Herakleid of the regal family.³

The five Spartans having taken their seat as judges, doubtless in full presence of the blockading army, and especially with the Thebans, the great enemies of Plataea, by their side, — the prisoners taken, two hundred Plataeans and twenty-five Athenians were brought up for trial, or sentence. No accusation was pre-

Schneider (ad Aristotel. Politic. v. 3. 2) erroneously identifies this story with that of Doxander and the two *ἐπικληροί* whom he wished to obtain in marriage for his two sons.

¹ Thucyd. v. 17.

² Thucyd. iii. 52. προσπίπτει δ' αὐτοῖς κήρυκα λέγοντα, εἰ βούλονται παραδοῦναι τὴν πόλιν ἐκόντες τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις, καὶ δικαστέας ἐκείνοις χρησισθαι, τοὺς τε ἀδίκους κολάζειν παρὰ δίκην δὲ οὐδένα.

³ Pausan. iii. 9, 1.

ferred against them by any one: but the simple question was put to them by the judges: "Have you, during the present war, rendered any service to the Lacedaemonians or to their allies?" The Plataeans were confounded at a question alike unexpected and preposterous: it admitted but of one answer, — but before returning any categorical answer at all, they entreated permission to plead their cause at length. In spite of the opposition of the Thebans,¹ their request was granted: and Astymachus and Lakon, the latter proxenus of Sparta at Plataea, were appointed to speak on behalf of the body. Possibly, both these delegates may have spoken: if so, Thucydidēs has blended the two speeches into one.

A more desperate position cannot be imagined, for the interrogatory was expressly so framed as to exclude allusion to any facts preceding the Peloponnesian war, — but the speakers, though fully conscious how slight was their chance of success, disregarded the limits of the question itself, and while upholding with unshaken courage the dignity of their little city, neglected no topic which could touch the sympathies of their judges. After remonstrating against the mere mockery of trial and judgment to which they were submitted, they appealed to the Hellenic sympathies, and lofty reputation for commanding virtue, of the Lacedaemonians, — they adverted to the first alliance of Plataea with Athens, concluded at the recommendation of the Lacedaemonians themselves, who had then declined, though formally solicited, to undertake the protection of the town against Theban oppression. They next turned to the Persian war, wherein Plataean patriotism towards Greece was not less conspicuous than Theban treason,² — to the victory gained over the Persians on their soil, whereby it had become hallowed under the promises of Pausanias, and by solemn appeals to the local gods. From the Persian war, they passed on to the flagitious attack made by the Thebans on Plataea, in the midst of the truce,

¹ Thucyd. iii. 60. ἐπειδὴ καὶ ἐκείνοις παρὰ γνώμην τὴν αὐτῶν μακρότερος λόγος ἐδόθη τῆς πρὸς τὸ ἐρωτήμα ἀποκρίσεως, αὐτῶν here means the Thebans.

² See this point emphatically set forth in Oration xiv, called *Λόγος Πλαταιῶν*, of Isokratēs, p. 308, sect. 62.

The whole of that oration is interesting to be read in illustration of the renewed sufferings of the Plataeans near fifty years after this capture.

— nor did they omit to remind the judges of an obligation personal to Sparta, — the aid which they had rendered, along with the Athenians, to Sparta, when pressed by the revolt of the Helots at Ithôme. This speech is as touching as any which we find in Thucydides, and the skill of it consists in the frequency with which the hearers are brought back, time after time, and by well-managed transitions, to these same topics.¹ And such was the impression which it seemed to make on the five Lacedæmonian judges, that the Thebans near at hand found themselves under the necessity of making a reply to it: although we see plainly that the whole scheme of proceeding — the formal and insulting question, as well as the sentence destined to follow upon answer given — had been settled beforehand between them and the Lacedæmonians.

The Theban speakers contended that the Plataeans had deserved, and brought upon themselves by their own fault, the enmity of Thebes, — that they had stood forward earnestly against the Persians, only because Athens had done so too, and that all the merit, whatever it might be, which they had thereby acquired, was counterbalanced and cancelled by their having allied themselves with Athens afterwards for the oppression and enslavement of the Æginetans, and of other Greeks equally conspicuous for zeal against Xerxes, and equally entitled to protection under the promises of Pausanias. The Thebans went on to vindicate their nocturnal surprise of Plataea, by maintaining that they had been invited by the most respectable citizens of the town,² who were anxious only to bring back Plataea from its alliance with a stranger to its natural Bœotian home, — and

¹ Thucyd. iii, 54-59. Dionysius of Halikarnassus bestows especial commendation on the speech of the Plataean orator (De Thucyd. Hist. Judic. p. 921). Concurring with him as to its merits, I do not concur in the opinion which he expresses that it is less artistically put together than those other harangues which he considers inferior.

Mr. Mitford doubts whether these two orations are to be taken as approximating to anything really delivered on the occasion. But it seems to me that the means possessed by Thucydides for informing himself of what was actually said at this scene before the captured Plataea must have been considerable and satisfactory: I therefore place full confidence in them, as I do in most of the other harangues in his work, so far as the substance goes.

² Thucyd. iii, 65.

that they had abstained from anything like injurious treatment of the inhabitants, until constrained to use force in their own defence. They then reproached the Plataeans, in their turn, with that breach of faith whereby ultimately the Theban prisoners in the town had been put to death. And while they excused their alliance with Xerxes, at the time of the Persian invasion, by affirming that Thebes was then under a dishonest party-oligarchy, who took this side for their own factious purposes, and carried the people with them by force, — they at the same time charged the Plataeans with permanent treason against the Bœotian customs and brotherhood.¹ All this was farther enforced by setting forth the claims of Thebes to the gratitude of Lacedæmon, both for having brought Bœotia into the Lacedæmonian alliance, at the time of the battle of Koroneia, and for having furnished so large a portion of the common force in the war then going on.²

The discourse of the Thebans, inspired by bitter, and as yet unsatisfied hatred against Plataea, proved effectual: or rather it was superfluous, — the minds of the Lacedæmonians having before been made up. After the proposition twice made by Archidamus to the Plataeans, inviting them to remain neutral, and even offering to guarantee their neutrality, — after the solemn apologetic protest tendered by him upon their refusal, to the gods, before he began the siege, — the Lacedæmonians conceived themselves exonerated from all obligation to respect the sanctity of the place;³ looking upon the inhabitants as having voluntarily renounced their inviolability and sealed their own ruin. Hence

¹ Thucyd. iii, 66. τὰ πάντων Βοιωτῶν πάτρια — iii, 62. ἴσω τῶν ἄλλων Βοιωτῶν παραδιδόντες τὰ πάτρια.

² Thucyd. iii, 61-68. It is probable that the slaughter of the Theban prisoners taken in the town of Plataea was committed by the Plataeans in breach of a convention concluded with the Thebans: and on this point, therefore, the Thebans had really ground to complain. Respecting this convention, however, there were two conflicting stories, between which Thucydides does not decide: see Thucyd. ii, 3, 4, and this History, above, chap. xlviii.

³ Thucyd. iii, 68; ii, 74. To construe the former of these passages (iii, 68) as it now stands, is very difficult, if not impossible; we can only pretend to give what seems to be its substantial meaning.

the importance attached to that protest, and the emphatic detail with which it is set forth in Thucydides. The five judges, as their only reply to the two harangues, again called the Plataeans before them, and repeated to every one of them individually, the same question which had before been put: each one of them, as he successively replied in the negative,¹ was taken away and killed, together with the twenty-five Athenian prisoners. The women captured were sold as slaves: and the town and territory of Plataea were handed over to the Thebans, who at first established in them a few oligarchical Platæan exiles, together with some Megarian exiles, — but after a few months recalled this step, and blotted out Plataea as a separate town and territory, from the muster-roll of Hellas. They pulled down all the private buildings and employed the materials to build a vast barrack all round the Hieræum, or temple of Hêrê, two hundred feet in every direction, with apartments of two stories above and below; partly as accommodation for visitors to the temple, partly as an abode for the tenant-farmers or graziers who were to occupy the land. A new temple of one hundred feet in length, was also built in honor of Hêrê, and ornamented with couches, prepared from the brass and iron furniture found in the private houses of the Plataeans.² The Platæan territory was let out for ten years, as public property belonging to Thebes, and was hired by private Theban cultivators.

Such was the melancholy fate of Plataea, after sustaining a blockade of about two years.⁴ Its identity and local traditions

¹ Diodorus (xii. 56) in his meagre abridgment of the siege and fate of Plataea, somewhat amplifies the brevity and simplicity of the question as given by Thucydides.

² Thucyd. iii. 57. ἐμᾶς δὲ (you Spartans) καὶ ἐκ παντὸς τοῦ Ἑλληνικοῦ στρατοῦ διὰ Θηβαίων (Πλατᾶν) ἀξία λείπειται.

³ Thucyd. iii. 69.

⁴ Demosthenes — or the Pseudo-Demosthenes — in the oration against Neæra (p. 1380, c. 25), says that the blockade of Plataea was continued for ten years before it surrendered, — ἐπολιορκεῖν αὐτοὺς ὀκτὼ τείχεϊ περικυλισθέντες δέκα ἔτη. That the real duration of the blockade was only two years, is most certain: accordingly several eminent critics — Palmerius, Wasse, Duker, Taylor, Auger, etc., all with one accord confidently enjoin us to correct the text of Demosthenes from δέκα to δύο. "Redone fidenus δύο," says Duker.

seemed thus extinguished, and the sacrifices, in honor of the deceased victors who had fought under Pausanias, suspended, — which the Platæan speakers had urged upon the Lacedæmonians as an impiety not to be tolerated,¹ and which perhaps the latter would hardly have consented to under any other circumstances except from an anxious desire of conciliating the Thebans in their prominent antipathy. It is in this way that Thucydides explains the conduct of Sparta, which he pronounces to have been rigorous in the extreme.² And in truth it was more rigorous, considering only the principle of the case, and apart from the number of victims, than even the first unexecuted sentence of Athens against the Mitylenæans: for neither Sparta, nor even Thebes, had any fair pretence for considering Plataea as a revolted town, whereas Mitylênê was a city which had revolted under circumstances peculiarly offensive to Athens. Moreover, Sparta promised trial and justice to the Platæans on their surrender: Paches promised nothing to the Mitylenæans, except that their fate should be reserved for the decision of the Athenian people. This little city — interesting from its Hellenic patriotism, its grateful and tenacious attachments, and its unmerited suffering — now existed only in the persons of its citizens harbored at Athens: we shall find it hereafter restored, destroyed again, and finally again restored: so checkered was the fate of a little Grecian state swept away by the contending politics of the greater neighbors. The slaughter of the twenty-five Athe-

I have before protested against corrections of the text of ancient authors grounded upon the reason which all these critics think so obvious and so convincing; and I must again renew the protest here. It shows how little the principles of historical evidence have been reflected upon, when critics can thus concur in forcing dissentient witnesses into harmony, and in substituting a true statement of their own in place of an erroneous statement which one of these witnesses gives them. And in the present instance, the principle adopted by these critics is the less defensible, because the Pseudo-Demosthenes introduces a great many other errors and inaccuracies respecting Plataea, besides his mistake about the duration of the siege. The ten years' siege of Troy was constantly present to the imaginations of these literary Greeks.

¹ Thucyd. iii. 59.

² Thucyd. iii. 69. σχεδὸν δέ τι καὶ τὸ ξύμπαν περὶ Πλαταιῶν οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι οὕτως ἀποτετραμμένοι ἐγένοντο Θηβαίων ἔνεκα, νομίζοντες ἐς τὸν πόλεμον αὐτοὺς ἄρτι τότε καθιστάμενον ὠφελίμους εἶναι.

nian prisoners, like that of Salamis by the Athenians, was not beyond the rigor admitted and tolerated, though not always practised, on both sides, towards prisoners of war.

We have now gone through the circumstances, painfully illustrating the manners of the age, which followed on the surrender of Mitylênê and Plataea. We next pass to the west of Greece, — the island of Korkyra, — where we shall find scenes not less bloody, and even more revolting.

It has been already mentioned,¹ that in the naval combats between the Corinthians and Korkyraans during the year before the Peloponnesian war, the former had captured two hundred and fifty Korkyraan prisoners, men of the first rank and consequence in the island. Instead of following the impulse of blind hatred in slaughtering their prisoners, the Corinthians displayed, if not greater humanity, at least a more long-sighted calculation: they had treated the prisoners well, and made every effort to gain them over, with a view of employing them on the first opportunity to effect a revolution in the island, — to bring it into alliance with Corinth,² and disconnect it from Athens. Such an opportunity appears first to have occurred during the winter or spring of the present year, while both Mitylênê and Plataea were under blockade; probably about the time when Alkidas departed for Ionia, and when it was hoped that not only Mitylênê would be relieved, but the neighboring dependencies of Athens excited to revolt, and her whole attention thus occupied in that quarter. Accordingly, the Korkyraan prisoners were then sent home from Corinth, nominally under a heavy ransom of eight hundred talents, for which those Korkyraan citizens who acted as proxeni to Corinth made themselves responsible; the proxeni, lending themselves thus to the deception, were doubtless participant in the entire design.

But it was soon seen in what form the ransom was really to be paid. The new-comers, probably at first heartily welcomed, after so long a detention, employed all their influence, combined with the most active personal canvass, to bring about a complete rupture of all alliance with Athens. Intimation being sent to

¹ See above, chap. xlvii.

² Thucyd. iii. 70: compare Diodor. xii. 57.

³ Thucyd. i. 55.

Athens of what was going on, an Athenian trireme arrived with envoys to try and defeat these manœuvres; while a Corinthian trireme also brought envoys from Corinth to aid the views of the opposite party. The mere presence of Corinthian envoys indicated a change in the political feeling of the island: but still more conspicuous did this change become, when a formal public assembly, after hearing both envoys, decided, — that Korkyra would maintain her alliance with Athens according to the limited terms of simple mutual defence originally stipulated;¹ but would at the same time be in relations of friendship with the Peloponnesians, as she had been before the Epidamnian quarrel. But the alliance between Athens and Korkyra had since become practically more intimate, and the Korkyraean fleet had aided the Athenians in the invasion of Peloponnesus;² accordingly, the resolution, now adopted, abandoned the present to go back to the past, — and to a past which could not be restored.

Looking to the war then raging between Athens and the Peloponnesians, such a declaration was self-contradictory: nor, indeed, did the oligarchical party intend it as anything else than a step to a more complete revolution, both foreign and domestic. They followed it up by a political prosecution against Peithias, the citizen of greatest personal influence among the people, who acted by his own choice as proxenus to the Athenians. They accused him of practising to bring Korkyra into slavery to Athens. What were the judicial institutions of the island, under which he was tried, we do not know: but he was acquitted of the charge; and he then revenged himself by accusing in his turn five of the richest among his oligarchical prosecutors, of the crime of sacrilege, — as having violated the sanctity of the sacred grove of Zeus and Alkinous, by causing stakes, for their vine-props, to be cut in it.³ This was an act distinctly forbidden by law, under

¹ Thucyd. i. 44.

² Thucyd. ii. 25.

³ Thucyd. iii. 70. φασκόν τιναίην χαρακας ἐκ τοῦ τε Διὸς τεμένους καὶ τοῦ Ἀλκίονος· ἡμεῖς δὲ καθ' ἑκάστην χαρακὰ ἐπὶ κείνῳ στατήρ.

The present tense *τιναίην* seems to indicate that they were going on habitually making use of the trees in the grove for this purpose. Probably it is this cutting and fixing of stakes to support the vines, which is meant by the word *χαρακισμός* in Pherekratês, Pers. ap. Athenæum, vi. p. 269.

The Oratio of Lysias (Or. vii.) against Nikomachus, *ἐπὶ τοῦ σηκοῦ*

penalty of a stater or four drachms for every stake so cut: but it is no uncommon phenomenon, even in societies politically better organized than Korkyra, to find laws existing and unrepealed, yet habitually violated, sometimes even by every one, but still oftener by men of wealth and power, whom most people would be afraid to prosecute: moreover, in this case, no individual was injured by the act, and any one who came forward to prosecute would incur the odium of an informer, — which probably Peithias might not have chosen to brave under ordinary circumstances, though he thought himself justified in adopting this mode of retaliation against those who had prosecuted him. The language of Thucydides implies that the fact was not denied nor is there any difficulty in conceiving that these rich men may have habitually resorted to the sacred property for vine-stakes. On being found guilty and condemned, they cast themselves as suppliants at the temples, and entreated the indulgence of being allowed to pay the fine by instalments: but Peithias, then a member of the (annual) senate, to whom the petition was referred, opposed it, and caused its rejection, leaving the law to take its course. It was moreover understood, that he was about to avail himself of his character of senator, — and of his increased favor, probably arising from the recent judicial acquittal, — to propose in the public assembly a reversal of the resolution recently passed, and a new resolution to recognize only the same friends and the same enemies as Athens.

Pressed by the ruinous fine upon the five persons condemned, as well as by the fear that Peithias might carry his point and thus completely defeat their project of Corinthian alliance, the oligarchical party resolved to carry their point by violence and murder. They collected a party armed with daggers, burst sud-

απολογία, will illustrate this charge made by Peithias at Korkyra. There were certain ancient olive-trees near Athens, consecrated and protected by law, so that the proprietors of the ground on which they stood were forbidden to grub them up, or to dig so near as to injure the roots. The speaker in that oration defends himself against a charge of having grubbed up one of these and sold the wood. It appears that there were public visitors whose duty it was to watch over these old trees: see the note of Markland on that oration, p. 270.

denly into the senate-house during full sitting, and there slew Peithias with sixty other persons, partly senators, partly private individuals: some others of his friends escaped the same fate by getting aboard the Attic trireme which had brought the envoys, and which was still in the harbor, but now departed forthwith to Athens. These assassins, under the fresh terror arising from their recent act, convoked an assembly, affirmed that what they had done was unavoidable to guard Korkyra against being made the slave of Athens, and proposed a resolution of full neutrality, both towards Athens and towards the Peloponnesians, — to receive no visit from either of the belligerents, except of a pacific character, and with one single ship at a time. And this resolution the assembly was constrained to pass, — it probably was not very numerous, and the oligarchical partisans were at hand in arms.¹ At the same time they sent envoys to Athens, to communicate the recent events with such coloring as suited their views, and to dissuade the fugitive partisans of Peithias from provoking any armed Athenian intervention, such as might occasion a counter-revolution in the island.² With some of the fugitives, representations of this sort, or perhaps the fear of compromising their own families, left behind, prevailed: but most of them, and the Athenians along with them, appreciated better both what had been done, and what was likely to follow. The oligarchical envoys, together with such of the fugitives as had been induced to adopt their views, were seized by the Athenians as conspirators, and placed in detention at Ægina; while a fleet of sixty Athenian triremes, under Eurymedon, was immediately fitted out to sail for Korkyra, — for which there was the greater necessity, as the Lacedæmonian fleet, under Alkidas, lately mustered at Kyllênê after its return from Ionia, was understood to be on the point of sailing thither.³

But the oligarchical leaders at Korkyra knew better than to rely on the chances of this mission to Athens, and proceeded in

¹ Thucyd. iii. 71. ὡς δὲ εἶπον, καὶ ἐπικυρώσαι ἡνάγκασαν τῇ γυναικί.

² Thucyd. iii. 71. καὶ τοὺς ἐκεί καταπνευστοὺς πείσονται ἡδὲν ἀνταρτήσεων προσποιεῖσθαι, ὅπως μὴ τις ἐπιστροφή γένηται.

³ Thucyd. iii. 80.

the execution of their conspiracy with that rapidity which was best calculated to insure its success. On the arrival of a Corinthian trireme, which brought ambassadors from Sparta, and probably also brought news that the fleet of Alkidas would shortly appear, — they organized their force, and attacked the people and the democratical authorities. The Korkyraean Demos were at first vanquished and dispersed; but during the night they collected together and fortified themselves in the upper parts of the town near the acropolis, and from thence down to the Hyllaic harbor, one of the two harbors which the town possessed; while the other harbor and the chief arsenal, facing the mainland of Epirus, was held by the oligarchical party, together with the market-place near to it, in and around which the wealthier Korkyraeans chiefly resided. In this divided state the town remained throughout the ensuing day, during which the Demos sent emissaries round the territory soliciting aid from the working slaves, and promising to them emancipation as a reward; while the oligarchy also hired and procured eight hundred Epirotic mercenaries from the mainland. Reinforced by the slaves, who flocked in at the call received, the Demos renewed the struggle on the morrow, more furiously than before. Both in position and numbers they had the advantage over the oligarchy, and the intense resolution with which they fought communicated itself even to the women, who, braving danger and tumult, took active part in the combat, especially by flinging tiles from the rooftops. Towards the afternoon, the people became decidedly victorious, and were even on the point of carrying by assault the lower town, together with the neighboring arsenal, both held by the oligarchy, — nor had the latter any other chance of safety except the desperate resource of setting fire to that part of the town, with the market-place, houses, and buildings all around it, their own among the rest. This proceeding drove back the assailants, but destroyed much property belonging to merchants in the warehouses, together with a large part of the town; indeed, had the wind been favorable the entire town would have been consumed. The people being thus victorious, the Corinthian trireme, together with most of the Epirotic mercenaries, thought it safer to leave the island; while the victors were still further strengthened on the ensuing morning by the arrival of the Athe-

nian admiral Nikostratus, with twelve triremes from Naupaktus,¹ and five hundred Messenian hoplites.

Nikostratus did his best to allay the furious excitement prevailing, and to persuade the people to use their victory with moderation. Under his auspices, a convention of amnesty and peace was concluded between the contending parties, save only ten proclaimed individuals of the most violent oligarchs, who were to be tried as ringleaders: these men of course soon disappeared, so that there would have been no trial at all, which seems to have been what Nikostratus desired. At the same time an alliance offensive and defensive was established between Korkyra and Athens, and the Athenian admiral was then on the point of departing, when the Korkyraean leaders entreated him to leave with them, for greater safety, five ships out of his little fleet of twelve, — offering him five of their own triremes instead. Notwithstanding the peril of this proposition to himself, Nikostratus acceded to it, and the Korkyraeans, preparing the five ships to be sent along with him, began to enroll among the crews the names of their principal enemies. To the latter this presented the appearance of sending them to Athens, which they accounted a sentence of death. Under this impression they took refuge as suppliants in the temple of the Dioskuri, where Nikostratus went to visit them and tried to reassure them by the promise that nothing was intended against their personal safety. But he found it impossible to satisfy them, and as they persisted in refusing to serve, the Korkyraean Demos began to suspect treachery. They took arms again, searched the houses of the recusants for arms, and were bent on putting some of them to death, if Nikostratus had not taken them under his protection. The principal men of the defeated party, to the number of about four hundred, took sanctuary in the temple and sacred ground of Hêrê; the leaders of the people, afraid that in this inviolable position they might still cause further insurrection in the city, opened a negotiation and prevailed upon them to be ferried across to the little island immediately opposite to the Heraeum: where they were kept under watch, with provisions regularly transmitted across to them, for four days.²

¹ Thucyd. iii, 74, 75.

² Thucyd. iii, 75, 76.

At the end of these four days, while the uneasiness of the popular leaders still continued, and Nikostratus still adjourned his departure, a new phase opened in this melancholy drama. The Peloponnesian fleet under Alkidas arrived at the road of Sybota on the opposite mainland, — fifty-three triremes in number, for the forty triremes brought back from Ionia had been reinforced by thirteen more from Leukas and Ambrakia, and the Lacedæmonians had sent down Brasidas as advising companion, — himself worth more than the new thirteen triremes, if he had been sent to supersede Alkidas, instead of bringing nothing but authority to advise.¹ Despising the small squadron of Nikostratus, then at Naupaktus, they were only anxious to deal with Korkyra before reinforcements should arrive from Athens: but the repairs necessary for the ships of Alkidas, after their disastrous voyage home, occasioned an unfortunate delay. When the Peloponnesian fleet was seen approaching from Sybota at break of day, the confusion in Korkyra was unspeakable: the Demos and the newly-emancipated slaves were agitated alike by the late terrible combat and by fear of the invaders, — the oligarchical party, though defeated, was still present and forming a considerable minority, and the town was half burnt. Amidst such elements of trouble, there was little authority to command, and still less confidence or willingness to obey. Plenty of triremes were indeed at hand, and orders were given to man sixty of them forthwith, — while Nikostratus, the only man who preserved the cool courage necessary for effective resistance, entreated the Korkyran leaders to proceed with regularity, and to wait till all were manned, so as to sail forth from the harbor in a body. He offered himself with his twelve Athenian triremes to go forth first alone, and occupy the Peloponnesian fleet, until the Korkyræan sixty triremes could all come out in full array to support him. He accordingly went forth with his squadron; but the Korkyræans, instead of following his advice, sent their ships out one by one and without any selection of crews. Two of them deserted forthwith to the enemy, while others presented the spectacle of crews fighting among themselves; even those which

¹ Thucyd. iii, 69-76.

actually joined battle came up by single ships, without the least order or concert.

The Peloponnesians, soon seeing that they had little to fear from such enemies, thought it sufficient to set twenty of their ships against the Korkyræans, while with the remaining thirty-three they moved forward to contend with the twelve Athenians. Nikostratus, having plenty of sea-room, was not afraid of this numerical superiority, — the more so, as two of his twelve triremes were the picked vessels of the Athenian navy, — the *Salaminia* and the *Paralus*.¹ He took care to avoid entangling himself with the centre of the enemy, and to keep rowing about their flanks; and as he presently contrived to disable one of their ships, by a fortunate blow with the beak of one of his vessels, the Peloponnesians, instead of attacking him with their superior numbers, formed themselves into a circle and stood on the defensive, as they had done in the first combat with Phormio in the middle of the strait at Rhium. Nikostratus (like Phormio) rowed round this circle, trying to cause confusion by feigned approach, and waiting to see some of the ships lose their places or run foul of each other, so as to afford him an opening for attack. And he might perhaps have succeeded, if the remaining twenty Peloponnesian ships, seeing the proceeding, and recollecting with dismay the success of a similar manœuvre in the former battle, had not quitted the Korkyræan ships, whose disorderly condition they despised, and hastened to join their comrades. The whole fleet of fifty-three triremes now again took the aggressive, and advanced to attack Nikostratus, who retreated before them, but backing astern and keeping the head of his ships towards the enemy. In this manner he succeeded in drawing them away from the town, so as to leave to most of the Korkyræan ships opportunity for getting back to the harbor; while such was the superior manœuvring of the Athenian triremes, that the Peloponnesians were never able to come up with him or force him to action. They returned back in the evening to Sybota, with no greater triumph

¹ These two triremes had been with Pachês at Lesbos (Thucyd. iii, 33); immediately on returning from thence, they must have been sent round to join Nikostratus at Naupaktus. We see in what constant service they were kept.

than their success against the Korkyraans, thirteen of whose triremes they carried away as prizes.¹

It was the expectation in Korkyra, that they would on the morrow make a direct attack — which could hardly have failed of success — on the town and harbor; and we may easily believe (what report afterwards stated), that Brasidas advised Alkidas to this decisive proceeding. And the Korkyraean leaders, more terrified than ever, first removed their prisoners from the little island to the Heraeum, and then tried to come to a compromise with the oligarchical party generally, for the purpose of organizing some effective and united defence. Thirty triremes were made ready and manned, wherein some even of the oligarchical Korkyraans were persuaded to form part of the crews. But the slackness of Alkidas proved their best defence: instead of coming straight to the town, he contented himself with landing in the island at some distance from it, on the promontory of Leukimnè: after ravaging the neighboring lands for some hours, he returned to his station at Sybota. He had lost an opportunity which never again returned: for on the very same night the fire-signals of Leukas telegraphed to him the approach of the fleet under Eurymedon from Athens, — sixty triremes. His only thought was now for the escape of the Peloponnesian fleet, which was in fact saved by this telegraphic notice. Advantage was taken of the darkness to retire close along the land as far as the isthmus which separates Leukas from the mainland, — across which isthmus the ships were dragged by hand or machinery, so that they might not fall in with or be descried by the Athenian fleet in sailing round the Leukadian promontory. From hence Alkidas made the best of his way home to Peloponnesus, leaving the Korkyraean oligarchs to their fate.²

That fate was deplorable in the extreme. The arrival of Eurymedon opens a third unexpected transition in this checkered narrative, — the Korkyraean Demos passing, abruptly and unexpectedly, from intense alarm and helplessness to elate and irresistible mastery. In the bosom of Greeks, and in a population seemingly amongst the least refined of all Greeks, — including too a great many slaves just emancipated against the will of

¹ Thucyd. iii, 77, 78-79.

² Thucyd. iii, 80.

their masters, and of course the fiercest and most discontented of all the slaves in the island, — such a change was but too sure to kindle a thirst for revenge almost ungovernable, as the only compensation for foregone terror and suffering. As soon as the Peloponnesian fleet was known to have fled, and that of Eurymedon was seen approaching, the Korkyraean leaders brought into the town the five hundred Messenian hoplites who had hitherto been encamped without; thus providing a resource against any last effort of despair on the part of their interior enemies. Next, the thirty ships recently manned, — and held ready, in the harbor facing the continent, to go out against the Peloponnesian fleet, but now no longer needed, were ordered to sail round to the other or Hyllaic harbor. Even while they were thus sailing round, some obnoxious men of the defeated party, being seen in public, were slain: but when the ships arrived at the Hyllaic harbor, and the crews were disembarked, a more wholesale massacre was perpetrated, by singling out those individuals of the oligarchical faction who had been persuaded on the day before to go aboard as part of the crews, and putting them to death.¹ Then came the fate of those suppliants, about four hundred in number, who had been brought back from the islet opposite, and were yet under sanctuary in the sacred precinct of the Heraeum. It was proposed to them to quit sanctuary and stand their trial; and fifty of them having accepted the proposition, were put on their trial, — all condemned, and all executed. Their execution took place, as it seems, immediately on the spot, and within actual view of the unhappy men still remaining in the sacred ground;²

¹ Thucyd. iii, 80, 81. Καὶ ἐκ τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει ἑταίρων ἐπέστησαν ἐκδεχόμενοι ἀπεχρῶσαν. It is certain that the reading ἀπεχρῶσαν here must be wrong: no satisfactory sense can be made out of it. The word substituted by Dr. Arnold is ἀνέχρῶσαν; that preferred by Gölter is ἀπεχρῶσαν; others recommend ἀπεχρῶσαν; Hermann adopts ἀπεχρῶσαν, and Dionysius, in his copy, read ἀνέχρῶσαν. I follow the meaning of the words proposed by Dr. Arnold and Gölter, which appear to be both equivalent to ἐκτείνον. This meaning is at least plausible and consistent; though I do not feel certain that we have the true sense of the passage.

² Thucyd. iii, 81. οἱ δὲ πολλοὶ τῶν ἑταίρων, ὅσοι οὐκ ἐπέσθησαν, ὡς ἔοικεν τὰς ἐχθρομένας, διεσέθεντο αὐτοὺς ἐν τῷ τερρῷ ἀλλήλους, etc. The meagre abridgment of Diodorus (xii, 57) in reference to these events in Korkyra, is hardly worth notice.

who, seeing that their lot was desperate, preferred dying by their own hands to starvation or the sword of their enemies. Some hung themselves on branches of the trees surrounding the temple, others helped their friends in the work of suicide, and, in one way or another, the entire band thus perished: it was probably a consolation to them to believe, that this desecration of the precinct would bring down the anger of the gods upon their surviving enemies.

Eurymedon remained with his fleet for seven days, during all which time the victorious Korkyraeans carried on a sanguinary persecution against the party who had been concerned in the late oligarchical revolution. Five hundred of this party contrived to escape by flight to the mainland; while those who did not, or could not flee, were slain wherever they could be found. Some received their death-wounds even on the altar itself,—others shared the same fate, after having been dragged away from it by violence. In one case, a party of murderers having pursued their victims to the temple of Dionysius, refrained from shedding their blood, but built up the doorway and left them to starve; as the Lacedaemonians had done on a former occasion respecting Pausanias. Such was the ferocity of the time, that in one case a father slew his own son. Nor was it merely the oligarchical party who thus suffered: the floodgates of private feud were also opened, and various individuals, under false charges of having been concerned in the oligarchical movements, were slain by personal enemies or debtors. This deplorable suspension of legal, as well as moral restraints, continued during the week of Eurymedon's stay,—a period long enough to satiate the fierce sentiment out of which it arose;¹ yet without any apparent effort on his part to soften the victors or protect the vanquished. We shall see farther reason hereafter to appreciate the baseness and want of humanity in his character: but had Nikostratus remained in command, we may fairly presume, judging by what he had done in the earlier part of the sedition, with very inferior force, that he would have set much earlier limits to the Kor-

¹ Thucyd. iii. 85. Οἱ μὲν οὖν κατὰ τὴν πόλιν Κορκυραῖοι τοιαύτας ἐργασίας ταῖς πρώταις ἐς ἄλλήλους ἐχρήσαντο, etc.

kyraean butchery: unfortunately, Thucydides tells us nothing at all about Nikostratus, after the naval battle of the preceding day.¹

We should have been glad to hear something about the steps taken in the way of restoration or healing, after this burst of murderous fury, in which doubtless the newly-emancipated slaves were not the most backward, and after the departure of Eurymedon. But here again Thucydides disappoints our curiosity. We only hear from him, that the oligarchical exiles who had escaped to the mainland were strong enough to get possession of the forts and most part of the territory there belonging to Korkyra; just as the exiles from Samos and Mitylênê became more or less completely masters of the Peræa or mainland possessions belonging to those islands. They even sent envoys to Corinth and Sparta, in hopes of procuring aid to accomplish their restoration by force: but their request found no favor, and they were reduced to their own resources. After harassing for some time the Korkyraeans in the island by predatory incursions, so as to produce considerable dearth and distress, they at length collected a band of Epirotic mercenaries, passed over to the island, and

¹ In reading the account of the conduct of Nikostratus, as well as that of Phormio, in the naval battles of the preceding summer, we contract a personal interest respecting both of them. Thucydides does not seem to have anticipated that his account would raise such a feeling in the minds of his readers, otherwise he probably would have mentioned something to gratify it. Respecting Phormio, his omission is the more remarkable; since we are left to infer, from the request made by the Akarnanians to have his son sent as commander, that he must have died or become disabled; yet the historian does not distinctly say so (iii. 7).

The Scholiast on Aristophanes (Pac. 347) has a story that Phormio was asked for by the Akarnanians, but that he could not serve in consequence of being at that moment under sentence for a heavy fine, which he was unable to pay: accordingly, the Athenians contrived a means of evading the fine, in order that he might be enabled to serve. It is difficult to see how this can be reconciled with the story of Thucydides, who says that the son of Phormio went instead of his father.

Compare Meineke, *Histor. Critic. Comic. Græc.* vol. i, p. 144, and *Fragment. Eupolid.* vol. ii, p. 527. Phormio was introduced as a chief character in the *Taξισοχοί* of Eupolis; as a brave, rough, straightforward soldier something like Lamachus in the *Acharnais* of Aristophanes.

there established a fortified position on the mountain called Istônê, not far from the city. They burned their vessels in order to cut off all hopes of retreat, and maintained themselves for near two years on a system of ravage and plunder which inflicted great misery on the island.¹ This was a frequent way whereby, of old, invaders wore out and mastered a city, the walls of which they found impregnable. The ultimate fate of these occupants of Istônê, which belongs to a future chapter, will be found to constitute a close suitable to the bloody drama yet unfinished in Korkyra.

Such a drama could not be acted, in an important city belonging to the Greek name, without producing a deep and extensive impression throughout all the other cities. And Thucydides has taken advantage of it to give a sort of general sketch of Grecian politics during the Peloponnesian war; violence of civil discord in each city, aggravated by foreign war, and by the contending efforts of Athens and Sparta, — the former espousing the democratical party everywhere; the latter, the oligarchical. The Korkyran sedition was the first case in which these two causes of political antipathy and exasperation were seen acting with full united force, and where the malignity of sentiment and demoralization flowing from such an union was seen without disguise. The picture drawn by Thucydides, of moral and political feeling under these influences, will ever remain memorable as the work of an analyst and a philosopher: he has conceived and described the perverting causes with a spirit of generalization which renders these two chapters hardly less applicable to other political societies, far distant both in time and place, — especially, under many points of view, to France between 1789 and 1799, — than to Greece in the fifth century before the Christian era. The deadly bitterness infused into intestine party contests by the accompanying dangers of foreign war and intervention of foreign enemies, — the mutual fears between political rivals, where each thinks that the other will forestall him in striking a mortal blow, and where constitutional maxims have ceased to carry authority either as restraint or as protection, — the superior popularity of the man who is most forward with the sword, or who runs down

¹ Thucyd. iii, 83.

his enemies in the most unmeasured language, coupled with the disposition to treat both prudence in action and candor in speech as if it were nothing but treachery or cowardice, — the exclusive regard to party ends, with the reckless adoption, and even admiring preference, of fraud or violence as the most effectual means, — the loss of respect for legal authority, as well as of confidence in private agreement, and the surrender even of blood and friendship to the overruling ascendancy of party-ties, — the perversion of ordinary morality, bringing with it altered signification of all the common words importing blame or approbation, — the unnatural predominance of the ambitious and contentious passions, overpowering in men's minds all real public objects, and equalizing for the time the better and the worse cause, by taking hold of democracy on one side and aristocracy on the other as mere pretences to sanctify personal triumph, — all these gloomy social phenomena, here indicated by the historian, have their causes deeply seated in the human mind, and are likely, unless the bases of constitutional morality shall come to be laid more surely and firmly than they have hitherto been, to recur from time to time, under diverse modifications, "so long as human nature shall be the same as it is now," to use the language of Thucydides himself.¹ He has described, with fidelity not

¹ Thucyd. iii, 82. γιγνόμενα μὲν καὶ ἀπὸ ἐσόμενα ὥς ἂν ἡ αὐτὴ φησὶ ἀνθρώπων ἢ, μᾶλλον δὲ καὶ ἡσυχαιότερα καὶ τοῖς ἰδίῃσι διαλλαχόμενα, ὥς ἂν ἕκαστος αὐτὰ μεταβολαὶ τῶν ξυμπετυχῶν εὐσπώσονται, etc.

The many obscurities and perplexities of construction which pervade these memorable chapters, are familiar to all readers of Thucydides, ever since Dionysius of Halikarnassus, whose remarks upon them are sufficiently severe (Judic. de Thucyd. p. 883). To discuss difficulties which the best commentators are sometimes unable satisfactorily to explain, is no part of the business of this work: yet there is one sentence which I venture to notice as erroneously construed by most of them, following the Scholiast.

Τὸ δ' ἐμπληκτικὸς ἔστιν ἄνθρωπος μοῖρᾳ προστετέθη, ἀσφαλείᾳ δὲ (Dr. Arnold and others read ἀσφάλεια in the dative) τὸ ἐπιβουλεύσασθαι, ἀποτροπῆς πρόφασις εἴλητος.

The Scholiast explains the latter half of this as follows: τὸ ἐπιπλοῦθ βουλεύσασθαι δι' ἀσφάλειαν πρόφασις ἀποτροπῆς ἐνομίζετο, — and this explanation is partly adopted by Poppo, Göller, and Dr. Arnold, with differences about ἀσφάλεια and ἐπιβουλεύσασθαι, but all agreeing about the word ἀποτροπή, so that the sentence is made to mean, in the words of Dr

inferior to his sketch of the pestilence at Athens, the symptoms of a certain morbid political condition, wherein the vehemence

Arnold: "But safely to concert measures against an enemy, was accounted but a decent pretence for declining the contest with him altogether."

Now the signification here assigned to ἀποτροπή is one which does not belong to it. Ἀποτροπή, in Thucydides as well as elsewhere, does not mean "tergiversation, or declining the contest:" it has an active sense and means, "the deterring, preventing, or dissuading another person from something which he might be disposed to do, — or the warding off of some threatening danger or evil:" the remarkable adjective ἀστροπαῖος is derived from it, and προτροπή, in rhetoric, is its contrary term. In Thucydides it is used in this active sense (iii, 45): compare also Plato, Legg. ix, c. 1, p. 853: Isokratēs, Areopagatic. Or. vii, p. 143, sect. 17; Æschinēs cont. Ktesiphon. c. 68, p. 442; Æschyl. Pers. 217; nor do the commentators produce any passage to sustain the passive sense which they assign to it in the sentence here under discussion, whereby they would make it equivalent to ἀναχωρεῖν — ἀναχώρησις — or ἐξαναχωρεῖν (Thucyd. iv, 28; v, 65). "a backing out."

Giving the meaning which they do to ἀποτροπή, the commentators are farther unavoidably embarrassed how to construe ἀσφάλεια δὲ τὸ ἐπιβουλεύσασθαι, as may be seen by the notes of Poppo, Göller, and Dr. Arnold. The Scholiast and Göller give to the word ἐπιβουλεύσασθαι the very unusual meaning of "repeated and careful deliberation," instead of its common meaning of "laying snares for another, concerting secret measures of hostility:" and Poppo and Dr. Arnold alter ἀσφάλεια into the dative case ἀσφαλειᾷ, which, if it were understood to be governed by προσετίθη, might make a fair construction, — but which they construe along with τὸ ἐπιβουλεύσασθαι, though the position of the particle δὲ, upon that supposition, appears to me singularly awkward.

The great difficulty of construing the sentence arises from the erroneous meaning attached to the word ἀποτροπή. But when we interpret that word "deterrence, or prevention," according to the examples which I have cited, the whole meaning of the sentence will become clear and consistent. Of the two modes of hurting a party-enemy — 1. violent and open attack; 2. secret manœuvre and conspiracy — Thucydides remarks first, what was thought of the one; next, what was thought of the other, in the perverted state of morality which he is discussing.

Τὸ δ' ἐμπλήκτως ὁρᾷ ἄνδρος μοῖρμ προσετίθη — ἀσφάλεια δὲ τὸ ἐπιβουλεύσασθαι, ἀποτροπῆς πρόφασις εὐλογος.

"Sharp and reckless attack was counted among the necessities of the manly character: secret conspiracy against an enemy was held to be safe precaution, — a specious pretence of preventing him from doing the like."

According to this construction, τὸ ἐπιβουλεύσασθαι is the subject; ἀσφάλεια belongs to the predicate and the concluding words, ἀποτροπῆς πρόφασις

of intestine conflict, instead of being kept within such limits as consists with the maintenance of one society among the contending parties, becomes for the time inflamed and poisoned with all the unscrupulous hostility of foreign war, chiefly from actual alliance between parties within the state and foreigners without. In following the impressive description of the historian, we have to keep in mind the general state of manners in his time, especially the cruelties tolerated by the laws of war, as compared with that greater humanity and respect for life which has grown up during the last two centuries in modern Europe. And we have farther to recollect that if he had been describing the effects of political fury among Carthaginians and Jews, instead of among his contemporary Greeks, he would have added to his list of horrors mutilation, crucifixion, and other refinements on simple murder.

The language of Thucydides is to be taken rather as a generalization and concentration of phenomena which he had observed among different communities, rather than as belonging altogether to any one of them. Nor are we to believe — what a superficial reading of his opening words might at first suggest — that the bloodshed in Korkyra was only the earliest, but by no means the worst, of a series of similar horrors spread over the Grecian world. The facts stated in his own history suffice to show that though the same causes which worked upon this unfortunate island became disseminated, and produced analogous mischiefs throughout many other communities, yet the case of Korkyra, as it was the first, so it was also the worst and most aggravated in point of intensity. Fortunately, the account of Thucydides enables us to understand it from beginning to end, and to appreciate the degree of guilt of the various parties implicated, which we can seldom do with certainty; because when once the interchange of violence has begun, the feelings arising out of the contest itself presently overpower in the minds of both parties the original cause of dispute, as well as all scruples

εἰς εὐλογος, are an epexegetis, or explanatory comment, upon ἀσφάλεια. Probably we ought to consider some such word as ἐνομίζετο to be understood, — just as the Scholiast understands that word for his view of the sentence.

as to fitness of means. Unjustifiable acts in abundance are committed by both, and in comparing the two, we are often obliged to employ the emphatic language which Tacitus uses respecting Otho and Vitellius: "*Deteriorem fore, quisquis vicisset;*" of two bad men, all that the Roman world could foresee was, that the victor, whichever he was, would prove the worst.

But in regard to the Korkyræan revolution, we can arrive at a more discriminating criticism. We see that it is from the beginning the work of a selfish oligarchical party, playing the game of a foreign enemy, and the worst and most ancient enemy of the island, — aiming to subvert the existing democracy and acquire power for themselves, and ready to employ any measure of fraud or violence for the attainment of these objects. While the democracy which they attack is purely defensive and conservative, the oligarchical movers, having tried fair means in vain, are the first to employ foul means, which later they find retorted with greater effect against themselves. They set the example of judicial prosecution against Peithias, for the destruction of a political antagonist; in the use of this same weapon, he proves more than a match for them, and employs it to their ruin. Next, they pass to the use of the dagger in the senate-house, against him and his immediate fellow-leaders, and to the wholesale application of the sword against the democracy generally. The Korkyræan Demos are thus thrown upon the defensive, and instead of the affections of ordinary life, all the most intense anti-social sentiments, — fear, pugnacity, hatred, vengeance, obtain unqualified possession of their bosoms; exaggerated too through the fluctuations of victory and defeat successively brought by Nikostratus, Alkidas, and Eurymedon. Their conduct as victors is such as we should expect under such maddening circumstances, from coarse men, mingled with liberated slaves; it is vindictive and murderous in the extreme, not without faithless breach of assurances given. But we must remember that they are driven to stand upon their defence, and that all their energies are indispensable to make that defence successful. They are provoked by an aggression no less guilty in the end than in the means, — an aggression, too, the more criminal, because, if we look at the state of the island at the time when the oligarchical captives

were restored from Corinth, there was no pretence for affirming that it had suffered, or was suffering, any loss, hardship, or disgrace, from its alliance with Athens. These oligarchical insurgents find the island in a state of security and tranquillity, — since the war imposed upon it little necessity for effort, — they plunge it into a sea of blood, with enormities as well as suffering on both sides, which end at length in their own complete extermination. Our compassion for their final misery must not hinder us from appreciating the behavior whereby it was earned.

In the course of a few years from this time, we shall have occasion to recount two political movements in Athens, similar in principle and general result to this Korkyræan revolution; exhibiting oligarchical conspirators against an existing and conservative democracy, with this conspiracy at first successful, but afterwards put down, and the Demos again restored. The contrast between Athens and Korkyra, under such circumstances, will be found highly instructive, especially in regard to the Demos, both in the hours of defeat and in those of victory. It will then be seen how much the habit of active participation in political and judicial affairs, — of open, conflicting discussion, discharging the malignant passions by way of speech, and followed by appeal to the vote, — of having constantly present, to the mind of every citizen, in his character of *dikast* or *ekklesiast*, the conditions of a pacific society, and the paramount authority of a constitutional majority, — how much all these circumstances, brought home as they were at Athens more than in any other democracy to the feelings of individuals, contributed to soften the instincts of intestine violence and revenge, even under very great provocation.

But the case of Korkyra, as well as that of Athens, different in so many respects, conspire to illustrate another truth, of much importance in Grecian history. Both of them show how false and impudent were the pretensions set up by the rich and great men of the various Grecian cities, to superior morality, superior intelligence, and greater fitness for using honorably and beneficially the powers of government, as compared with the mass of the citizens. Though the Grecian oligarchies, exercising powerful sway over fashion, and more especially over the meaning of

words, bestowed upon themselves the appellation of "the best men, the honorable and good, the elegant, the superior," etc., and attached to those without their own circle epithets of a contrary tenor, implying low moral attributes, — no such difference will be found borne out by the facts of Grecian history.¹ Abundance of infirmity, with occasional bad passions, was doubtless liable to work upon the people generally, often corrupting and misguiding even the Athenian democracy, the best apparently of all the democracies in Greece. But after all, the rich and great men were only a part of the people, and taking them as a class, apart from honorable individual exceptions, by no means the best part. If exempted by their position from some of the vices which beset smaller and poorer men, they imbibed from that same position an unmeasured self-importance, and an excess of personal ambition as well as of personal appetite, peculiar to themselves, not less anti-social in tendency, and operating upon a much grander scale. To the prejudices and superstitions belonging to the age, they were noway superior, considering them as a class; while their animosities among one another, virulent and unscrupulous, were among the foremost causes of misfortune in Grecian commonwealth, — and indeed many of the most exceptionable acts committed by the democracies, consisted in their allowing themselves to be made the tools of one aristocrat for the ruin of another. Of the intense party-selfishness which characterized them as a body, sometimes exaggerated into the strongest anti-popular antipathy, as we see in the famous oligarchical oath cited by Aristotle,² we shall find many illustrations as we advance in the history, but none more striking than this Korkyræan revolution.

¹ See the valuable preliminary discourse, prefixed to Welcker's edition of Theognis, page xxi, sect. 9, seq.

² Aristotel. Politic. v, 7, 19. Καὶ τὸ δῆμῳ ἐακόντως ἔσονται, καὶ ὁ ἄριστος ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἐκείνῳ.

CHAPTER LI.

FROM THE TROUBLES IN KORKYRA, IN THE FIFTH YEAR OF THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR, DOWN TO THE END OF THE SIXTH YEAR.

ABOUT the same time as the troubles of Korkyra occurred, Nikias, the Athenian general, conducted an armament against the rocky island of Minóa, which lay at the mouth of the harbor of Megara, and was occupied by a Megarian fort and garrison. The narrow channel, which separated it from the Megarian port of Nisæa, and formed the entrance of the harbor, was defended by two towers projecting out from Nisæa, which Nikias attacked and destroyed by means of battering machines from his ships. He thus cut off Minóa from communication on that side with the Megarians, and fortified it on the other side, where it communicated with the mainland by a lagoon bridged over with a causeway. Minóa, thus becoming thoroughly insulated, was more completely fortified and made an Athenian possession; since it was eminently convenient to keep up an effective blockade against the Megarian harbor, which the Athenians had hitherto done only from the opposite shore of Salamis.¹

Though Nikias, son of Nikeratus, had been for some time conspicuous in public life, and is said to have been more than once stratêgus along with Periklēs, this is the first occasion on which Thucydides introduces him to our notice. He was now one of the stratêgi, or generals of the commonwealth, and appears to have enjoyed, on the whole, a greater and more constant personal esteem than any citizen of Athens, from the present time down to his death. In wealth and in family he ranked among the first class of Athenians: in political character, Aristotle placed him, together with Thucydides son of Melêsias and Theramenes, above all other names in Athenian history, — seemingly even

¹ Thucyd. iii. 51. See the note of Dr. Arnold, and the plan embodied in his work, for the topography of Minóa, which has now ceased to be an island, and is a hill on the mainland near the shore.

above Periklēs.¹ Such a criticism, from Aristotle, deserves respectful attention, though the facts before us completely belie so lofty an estimate. It marks, however, the position occupied by Nikias in Athenian politics, as the principal person of what may be called the oligarchical party, succeeding Kimon and Thucydides, and preceding Theramenes. In looking to the conditions under which this party continued to subsist, we shall see that, during the interval between Thucydides (son of Melasias) and Nikias, the democratical forms had acquired such confirmed ascendancy, that it would not have suited the purpose of any politician to betray evidence of positive hostility to them, prior to the Sicilian expedition, and the great embarrassment in the foreign relations of Athens which arose out of that disaster. After that change, the Athenian oligarchs became emboldened and aggressive, so that we shall find Theramenes among the chief conspirators in the revolution of the Four Hundred: but Nikias represents the oligarchical party in its previous state of quiescence and torpidity, accommodating itself to a sovereign democracy, and existing in the form of common sentiment rather than of common purposes. And it is a remarkable illustration of the real temper of the Athenian people, that a man of this character, known as an oligarch but not feared as such, and doing his duty sincerely to the democracy, should have remained until his death the most esteemed and influential man in the city. He was a man of a sort of even mediocrity, in intellect, in education, and in oratory: forward in his military duties, and not only personally courageous in the field, but also competent as a general under ordinary circumstances: assiduous in the discharge of all political duties at home, especially in the post of strategus, or one of the ten generals of the state, to which he was frequently chosen and rechosen. Of the many valuable qualities combined in his predecessor Periklēs, the recollection of whom was yet fresh in

¹ Plutarch, Nikias, c. 2, 3.

² Καὶ τοὶ ἐγὼ καὶ τιμῶμαι ἐκ τοῦ τοιούτου (says Nikias, in the Athenian assembly, Thucyd. vi, 9) καὶ ἡσσαν ἑτέρων περὶ τῷ ἑαυτοῦ σώματι ὁρῶδω· νομίζων ὁμοίως ἀγαθὸν πολίτην εἶναι, ὅς ἂν καὶ τοῦ σώματος τι καὶ τῆς οὐσίας προνοήται.

The whole conduct of Nikias before Syracuse, under the most trying circumstances, more than bears out this boast.

the Athenian mind, Nikias possessed two, on which, most of all, his influence rested, — though, properly speaking, that influence belongs to the sum total of his character, and not to any special attributes in it: First, he was thoroughly incorruptible, as to pecuniary gains, — a quality so rare in Grecian public men of all the cities, that when a man once became notorious for possessing it, he acquired a greater degree of trust than any superiority of intellect could have bestowed upon him: next, he adopted the Periklean view as to the necessity of a conservative or stationary foreign policy for Athens, and of avoiding new acquisitions at a distance, adventurous risks, or provocation to fresh enemies. With this important point of analogy, there were at the same time material differences between them, even in regard to foreign policy. Periklēs was a conservative, resolute against submitting to loss or abstraction of empire, as well as refraining from aggrandizement: Nikias was in policy faint-hearted, averse to energetic effort for any purpose whatever, and disposed, not only to maintain peace, but even to purchase it by considerable sacrifices. Nevertheless, he was the leading champion of the conservative party of his day, always powerful at Athens: and as he was constantly familiar with the details and actual course of public affairs, capable of giving full effect to the cautious and prudential point of view, and enjoying unqualified credit for honest purposes, — his value as a permanent counsellor was steadily recognized, even though in particular cases his counsel might not be followed.

Besides these two main points, which Nikias had in common with Periklēs, he was perfect in the use of those minor and collateral modes of standing well with the people, which that great man had taken little pains to practise. While Periklēs attached himself to Aspasia, whose splendid qualities did not redeem, in the eyes of the public, either her foreign origin or her unchastity, the domestic habits of Nikias appear to have been strictly conformable to the rules of Athenian decorum. Periklēs was surrounded by philosophers, Nikias by prophets, — whose advice was necessary both as a consolation to his temperament, and as a guide to his intelligence under difficulties; one of them was constantly in his service and confidence, and his conduct appears to have been sensibly affected by the difference of character between

one prophet and another,¹ just as the government of Louis the Fourteenth, and other Catholic princes, has been modified by the change of confessors. To a life thus rigidly decorous and ultra-religious — both eminently acceptable to the Athenians — Nikias added the judicious employment of a large fortune with a view to popularity. Those liturgies — or expensive public duties under taken by rich men each in his turn, throughout other cities of Greece as well as in Athens — which fell to his lot were performed with such splendor, munificence, and good taste, as to procure for him universal encomiums; and so much above his predecessors as to be long remembered and extolled. Most of these liturgies were connected with the religious service of the state, so that Nikias, by his manner of performing them, displayed his zeal for the honor of the gods at the same time that he laid up for himself a store of popularity. Moreover, the remarkable caution and timidity — not before an enemy, but in reference to his own fellow-citizens — which marked his character, rendered him pre-eminently scrupulous as to giving offence or making personal enemies. While his demeanor towards the poorer citizens generally was equal and conciliating, the presents which he made were numerous, both to gain friends and to silence assailants. We are not surprised to hear that various bullies, whom the comic writers turn to scorn, made their profit out of this susceptibility, — but most assuredly Nikias as a public man, though he might occasionally be cheated out of money, was greatly assisted by the reputation which he thus acquired.

The expenses unavoidable in such a career, combined with strict personal honesty, could not have been defrayed except by another quality, which ought not to count as discreditable to Nikias, though in this too he stood distinguished from Periklēs. He was a careful and diligent money-getter; a speculator in the silver mines of Laurium, and proprietor of one thousand slaves, whom he let out for work in them, receiving a fixed sum per head for each: the superintending slaves who managed the details of

¹ Thucyd. vii, 50; Plutarch, Nikias. c. 4, 5, 23. Τῶ μὲντοι Νικίᾳ συνεπέθη τότε μηδὲ μάντιν ἔχειν ἐμπειρον· ὁ γὰρ συνεπέθης αὐτοῦ καὶ τὸ πολὺ τῆς δεισιδαιμονίας ἀφαιρῶν Στυλίου ἐτεύνηκε μικρὸν ἱαπρασθεν. This is suggested by Plutarch as an excuse for mistakes on the part of Nikias.

this business were men of great ability and high pecuniary value.¹ Most of the wealth of Nikias was held in this form, and not in landed property. Judging by what remains to us of the comic authors, this must have been considered as a perfectly gentleman-like way of making money: for while they abound with derision of the leather-dresser Kleon, the lamp-maker Hyperbolus, and the vegetable-selling mother to whom Euripidēs owes his birth, we hear nothing from them in disparagement of the slave-letter Nikias. The degree to which the latter was thus occupied with the care of his private fortune, together with the general moderation of his temper, made him often wish to abstract himself from public duty: but such unambitious reluctance, rare among the public men of the day, rather made the Athenians more anxious to put him forward and retain his services. In the eyes of the Pentakosiomedimni and the Hippeis, the two richest classes in Athens, he was one of themselves, — and on the whole, the best man, as being so little open to reproach or calumny, whom they could oppose to the leather-dressers and lamp-makers who often out-talked them in the public assembly. The hoplites, who despised Kleon, — and did not much regard even the brave, hardy, and soldierlike Lamachus, because he happened to be poor,² — respected in Nikias the union of wealth and family with honesty, courage, and carefulness in command. The maritime and trading multitude esteemed him as a decorous, honest, religious gentleman, who gave splendid choregies, treated the poorest men with consideration, and never turned the public service into a job for his own profit, — who, moreover, if he possessed no commanding qualities, so as to give to his advice imperative and irresistible authority, was yet always worthy of being consulted, and a steady safeguard against public mischief. Before the fatal Sicilian expedition, he had never commanded on any very serious or difficult enterprise, but what he had done had been accomplished successfully; so that he enjoyed the reputation of a for-

¹ Xenophon, Memorab. ii. 5, 2; Xenophon, De Vectigalibus, iv, 14.

² Thucyd. v, 7; Plutarch, Alkibiadēs, c. 21. Ὁ γὰρ Λάμαχος ἦν μετὰ τολεμικὸς καὶ ἀνδρώδης, ἀξίωμα δ' οὐ ποσὴν οὐδ' ὄγκος αὐτῷ διὰ πενίαν; compare Plutarch, Nikias c. 15.

tunate as well as a prudent commander.¹ He appears to have acted as proxenus to the Lacedaemonians at Athens; probably by his own choice, and among several others.

The first half of the political life of Nikias, — after the time when he rose to enjoy full consideration in Athens, being already of mature age, — was spent in opposition to Kleon; the last half, in opposition to Alkibiadēs. To employ terms which are not fully suitable to the Athenian democracy, but which yet bring to view the difference intended to be noted better than any others, Nikias was a minister or ministerial man, often actually exercising and always likely to exercise official functions, — Kleon was a man of the opposition, whose province it was to supervise and censure official men for their public conduct. We must divest these words of that sense which they are understood to carry in English political life, — a standing parliamentary majority in favor of one party: Kleon would often carry in the public assembly resolutions, which his opponents Nikias and others of like rank and position, — who served in the posts of strategus, ambassador, and other important offices designated by the general vote, were obliged against their will to execute. In attaining such offices they were assisted by the political clubs, or established conspiracies (to translate the original literally), among the leading Athenians, to stand by each other both for acquisition of office and for mutual insurance under judicial trial. These clubs, or hetæries, must without doubt have played a most important part in the practical working of Athenian politics, and it is much to be regretted that we are possessed of no details respecting them. We know that in Athens they were thoroughly oligarchical in disposition,² — while equality, or something near to it, in rank

¹ Thucyd. v. 16. Νίκιας πλείστα των τότε ἐθάρμηνεν ἐν στρατηγείοις, Νίκιας μὲν βουλευόμενος, ἐν ᾧ ἀπαύτως ἐν καὶ ἐξέωτο, διασώσασθαι τὴν εὐτυλίαν, etc. — vi. 17. ὡς ἔγωγε (Alkibiadēs) ἐτι ἀκμαῖω κατ' αἰτίας καὶ ἐ Νίκιας εὐτυχὲς ἦν δοκεῖ εἶναι, etc.

² Thucyd. viii. 54. Καὶ ὁ μὲν Πεισανδρὸς τὰς τε συνουσίας αἰτεῖτο ἐτιγχανόν προτίτοι ἐν τῇ πόλει, αἰτεῖτο καὶ ἄλλα, ἀπὸ τῶν ἐτελεύτων καὶ παρακληνόμενος ἵπτατο. Ἐστράτευτες καὶ κοινὴ βουλευόμενοι καταλύσαντο τὸν δῆμον, καὶ τὰλλα παρὰσκευάσαν, etc.

After having thus organized the hetæries, and brought them into coöperation for his revolutionary objects against the democracy, Peisander departed

and position must have been essential to the social harmony of the members: in some towns, it appears that such political associations existed under the form of gymnasia,¹ for the mutual exercise of the members, or of syssitia for joint banquets. At Athens they were numerous, and doubtless not habitually in friendship with each other, since the antipathies among different oligarchical men were exceedingly strong, and the union brought about between them at the time of the Four Hundred arose only out of common desire to put down the democracy, and lasted but a little while. But the designation of persons to serve in the capacity of strategus and other principal offices greatly depended upon them, — as well as the facility of passing through that trial of accountability to which every man was liable after his year of office. Nikias, and men generally of his rank and fortune, helped by these clubs, and lending help in their turn, composed what may be called the ministers, or executive individual functionaries of Athens: the men who acted, gave orders to individual men as to

from Athens to Samos: on his return, he finds that these hetæries have been very actively employed, and had made great progress towards the subversion of the democracy: they had assassinated the demagogue Androkles and various other political enemies, — οἱ δὲ ἀντὶ τὸν Πείσανδρον — ἦλθον ἐς τὰς Ἀθήνας, — καὶ καταλαμβάνουσι τὰ πλείστα τοῖς ἐταίροις προσφασμένα, etc. (viii. 65.)

The political ἐταίρεια to which Alkibiadēs belonged is mentioned in Isokratēs, De Bigis, Or. xvi. p. 348, sect. 6. λέγοντες ὅς ὁ πατήρ σύναγει τὴν ἐταίρειαν ἐπὶ νεωτέροις πράγμασι. Allusions to these ἐταίρειαι and to their well-known political and judicial purposes (unfortunately they are only allusions), are found in Plato, Theætet. e. 79, p. 173. σπουδαὶ δὲ ἐταίρειων ἐπ' ἀρχῆς, etc.: also Plato, Legg. ix. c. 3, p. 856; Plato, Republic, ii. c. 8, p. 365, where they are mentioned in conjunction with συνουσίαι — ἐπὶ γὰρ τοῖς λαισθηνοῦς ἐκείνοισι τε καὶ ἐταίρειας συνάζομεν — also in Pseudo-Andokidēs cont. Alkibiad. c. 2, p. 112. Compare the general remarks of Thucydides, iii. 82, and Demosthenēs cont. Stephan. ii. p. 1157.

Two Dissertations, by Messrs. Vischer and Büttner, collect the scanty indications respecting these hetæries, together with some attempts to enlarge and speculate upon them, which are more ingenious than trustworthy (Die Oligarchische Partei und die Hetairien in Athen. von W. Vischer. Basel, 1836; Geschichte der politischen Hetairien zu Athen. von Hermann Büttner. Leipzig, 1840).

¹ About the political workings of the Syssitia and Gymnasia, see Plato Legg. i. p. 636; Polybius, xx. 6.

specific acts, and saw to the execution of that which the senate and the public assembly resolved. Especially in regard to the military and naval force of the city, so large and so actively employed at this time, the powers of detail possessed by the strategî must have been very great and essential to the safety of the state.

While Nikias was thus in what may be called ministerial function Kleon was not of sufficient importance to attain the same, but was confined to the inferior function of opposition: we shall see in the coming chapter how he became as it were promoted, partly by his own superior penetration, partly by the dishonest artifice and misjudgment of Nikias and other opponents, in the affair of Sphakteria. But his vocation was now to find fault, to censure, to denounce; his theatre of action was the senate, the public assembly, the dikasteries; his principal talent was that of speech, in which he must unquestionably have surpassed all his contemporaries. The two gifts which had been united in Periklês — superior capacity for speech as well as for action — were now severed, and had fallen, though both in greatly inferior degree, the one to Nikias, the other to Kleon. As an opposition-man, fierce and violent in temper, Kleon was extremely formidable to all acting functionaries; and from his influence in the public assembly, he was doubtless the author of many important positive measures, thus going beyond the functions belonging to what is called opposition. But though the most effective speaker in the public assembly, he was not for that reason the most influential person in the democracy: his powers of speech in fact, stood out the more prominently, because they were found apart from that station, and those qualities which were considered, even at Athens, all but essential to make a man a leader in political life. To understand the political condition of Athens at this time, it has been necessary to take this comparison between Nikias and Kleon, and to remark, that though the latter might be a more victorious speaker, the former was the more guiding and influential leader; the points gained by Kleon were all noisy and palpable, sometimes however, without doubt, of considerable moment. — but the course of affairs was much more under the direction of Nikias.

It was during the summer of this year, the fifth of the war, —

B.C. 427, that the Athenians began operations on a small scale in Sicily; probably contrary to the advice both of Nikias and Kleon, neither of them seemingly favorable to these distant undertakings. I reserve, however, the series of Athenian measures in Sicily — which afterwards became the turning-point of the fortunes of the state — for a department by themselves. I shall take them up separately, and bring them down to the Athenian expedition against Syracuse, when I reach the date of that important event.

During the autumn of the same year, the epidemic disorder, after having intermitted for some time, resumed its ravages at Athens, and continued for one whole year longer, to the sad ruin both of the strength and the comfort of the city. And it seems that this autumn, as well as the ensuing summer, were distinguished by violent atmospheric and terrestrial disturbance. Numerous earthquakes were experienced at Athens, in Eubœa, in Boeotia, especially near Orchomenus. Sudden waves of the sea and unexampled tides were also felt on the coast of Eubœa and Lokris, and the islands of Atalantê and Peparêthus; the Athenian fort and one of the two guardships at Atalantê were partially destroyed. The earthquakes produced one effect favorable to Athens; they deterred the Lacedæmonians from invading Attica. Agis, king of Sparta, had already reached the isthmus for that purpose; but the repeated earthquakes were looked upon as an unfavorable portent, and the scheme was abandoned.¹

These earthquakes, however, were not considered as calculated to deter the Lacedæmonians from the foundation of Herakleia, a new colony near the strait of Thermopylæ. On this occasion, we hear of a branch of the Greek population not before mentioned during the war. The coast immediately north of the strait of Thermopylæ was occupied by the three subdivisions of the Malians, — Paralîi, Hierês, and Trachinians. These latter, immediately adjoining Mount Ceta on its north side, — as well as the Dorians, the little tribe properly so called, which was accounted the primitive hearth of the Dorians generally, who joined the same mountain-range on the south, — were both of

¹ Thucyd. iii, 87, 89, 90.

them harassed and plundered by the predatory mountaineers, probably Ætolians, on the high lands between them. At first, the Trachinians were disposed to throw themselves on the protection of Athens; but not feeling sufficiently assured as to the way in which she would deal with them, they joined with the Dorians in claiming aid from Sparta: in fact, it does not appear that Athens, possessing naval superiority only, and being inferior on land, could have given them effective aid. The Lacedæmonians eagerly embraced the opportunity, and determined to plant a strong colony in this tempting situation: there was wood in the neighboring regions for ship-building,¹ so that they might hope to acquire a naval position for attacking the neighboring island of Eubœa, while the passage of troops against the subject-allies of Athens in Thrace, would also be facilitated; the impracticability of such passage had forced them, three years before, to leave Potidæa to its fate. A considerable body of colonists, Spartans and Lacedæmonian Perioeci, was assembled under the conduct of three Spartan ækists, — Leon, Damagon, and Alkidas; the latter we are to presume, though Thucydides does not say so, was the same admiral who had met with such little success in Ionia and at Korkyra. Proclamation was farther made to invite the junction of all other Greeks as colonists, excepting by name Ionians, Achæans, and some other tribes not here specified. Probably the distinct exclusion of the Achæans must have been rather the continuance of ancient sentiment than dictated by any present reasons; since the Achæans were not now pronounced enemies of Sparta. A number of colonists, stated as not less than ten thousand, flocked to the place, having confidence in the stability of the colony under the powerful protection of Sparta; and a new town, of large circuit, was built and fortified under the name of Herakleia;² not far from the site of Trachis, about two miles and a quarter from the nearest point of

¹ Respecting this abundance of wood, as well as the site of Herakleia generally, consult Livy, xxxvi, 22.

² Diodor. xii, 59. Not merely was Héraklès the mythical progenitor of the Spartan kings, but the whole region near Ceta and Trachis was adorned by legends and heroic incidents connected with him: see the drama of the Trachiniae by Sophoklès.

the Maliae gulf, but about double that distance from the strait of Thermopylae. Near to the latter, and for the purpose of keeping effective possession of it, a port, with dock and accommodation for shipping, was constructed.

A populous city, established under Lacedæmonian protection in this important post, alarmed the Athenians, and created much expectation in every part of Greece: but the Lacedæmonian ækists were harsh and unskillful in their management, and the Thessalians, to whom the Trachinian territory was tributary, considered the colony as an encroachment upon their soil. Anxious to prevent its increase, they harassed it with hostilities from the first moment, while the Cetean assailants were not idle: and Herakleia, thus pressed from without, and misgoverned within, dwindled down from its original numbers and promise, barely maintaining its existence.¹ We shall find it in later times, however, revived, and becoming a place of considerable importance.

The main Athenian armament of this summer, consisting of sixty triremes, under Nikias, undertook an expedition against the island of Melos. Melos and Thera, both inhabited by ancient colonists from Lacedæmon, had never been from the beginning, and still refused to be, members of the Athenian alliance, or subjects of the Athenian empire. They thus stood out as exceptions to all the other islands in the Ægean, and the Athenians thought themselves authorized to resort to constraint and conquest; believing themselves entitled to command over all the islands. They might indeed urge, and with considerable plausibility, that the Melians now enjoyed their share of the protection of the Ægean from piracy, without contributing at all to the cost of it: but considering the obstinate reluctance and strong Lacedæmonian prepossessions of the Melians, who had taken no part in the war, and given no ground of offence to Athens, the attempt to conquer them by force could hardly be justified even as a calculation of gain and loss, and was a mere gratification to the pride of power in carrying out what, in modern days, we should call the principle of maritime empire. Melos and Thera formed awkward corners, which defaced the symmetry of a great propri-

¹ Thucyd. iii, 92, 93; Diodor. xi, 49; xii, 59.

etor's field;¹ and the former ultimately entailed upon Athens the heaviest of all losses, — a deed of blood which deeply dishonored her annals. On this occasion, Nikias visited the island with his fleet, and after vainly summoning the inhabitants, ravaged the lands, but retired without undertaking a siege. He then sailed away, and came to Orôpus, on the northeast frontier of Attica, bordering on Bœotia: the hoplites on board his ships landed in the night, and marched into the interior of Bœotia, to the vicinity of Tanagra. They were here met, according to signal raised, by a military force from Athens, which marched thither by land; and the joint Athenian army ravaged the Tanagran territory, gaining an insignificant advantage over its defenders. On retiring, Nikias reassembled his armament, sailed northward along the coast of Lokris with the usual ravages, and returned home without effecting anything farther.²

About the same time that he started, thirty other Athenian triremes, under Demosthenês and Prokles, had been sent round Peloponnesus to act upon the coast of Akarnania. In conjunction with the whole Akarnanian force, except the men of Ceniade, — with fifteen triremes from Korkyra, and some troops from Kephallenia and Zakynthus, — they ravaged the whole territory of Leukas, both within and without the isthmus, and confined the inhabitants to their town, which was too strong to be taken by anything but a wall of circumvallation and a tedious blockade. And the Akarnanians, to whom the city was especially hostile, were urgent with Demosthenês to undertake this measure forthwith, since the opportunity might not again recur, and success was nearly certain.

But this enterprising officer committed the grave imprudence of offending them on a matter of great importance, in order to attack a country of all others the most impracticable, — the interior of Ætolia. The Messenians of Naupaktus, who suffered from the depredations of the neighboring Ætolian tribes, inflamed his imagination by suggesting to him a grand scheme of opera-

¹ Horat. Sat. ii. 6. 8: —

O! si angulus iste

Proximus accedat, qui nunc denormat agellum!

² Thucyd. iii. 91.

tions,¹ more worthy of the large force which he commanded than the mere reduction of Leukas. The various tribes of Ætolians, — rude, brave, active, predatory, and unrivalled in the use of the javelin, which they rarely laid out of their hands, — stretched across the country from between Parnassus and Ceta to the eastern bank of the Achelôus. The scheme suggested by the Messenians was, that Demosthenês should attack the great central Ætolian tribes, — the Apodôti, Ophioneis, and Eurytânes: if they were conquered, all the remaining continental tribes between the Ambrakian gulf and Mount Parnassus might be invited or forced into the alliance of Athens, — the Akarnanians being already included in it. Having thus got the command of a large continental force,² Demosthenês contemplated the ulterior scheme of marching at the head of it on the west of Parnassus, through the territory of the Ozolian Lokrians, — inhabiting the north of the Corinthian gulf, friendly to Athens, and enemies to the Ætolians, whom they resembled both in their habits and in their fighting, — until he arrived at Kytinium, in Doris, in the upper portion of the valley of the river Kephissus. He would then easily descend that valley into the territory of the Phocians, who were likely to join the Athenians if a favorable opportunity occurred, but who might at any rate be constrained to do so. From Phocis, the scheme was to invade from the northward the conterminous territory of Bœotia, the great enemy of Athens: which might thus perhaps be completely subdued, if assailed at the same time from Attica. Any Athenian general, who could have executed this comprehensive scheme, would have acquired at home a high and well-merited celebrity. But Demosthenês had been ill-informed, both of the invincible barbarians and the pathless country comprehended under the name of Ætolia: some of

¹ Thucyd. iii. 95. Δημοσθένης δ' ἀναπέφεται κατὰ τὸν χρόνον τοῦτον ἐπὶ Μεσσηνίων ὡς καλὸν αὐτῷ στρατῶς τοσαύτης συνόλης, etc.

² Thucyd. iii. 95. τὸ ἄλλο ἡπειρωτικὸν τὸ ταῦτα. None of the tribes properly called Epirots, would be comprised in this expression: the name ἡπειρωταί is here a general name, not a proper name, as Poppo and Dr. Arnold remark. Demosthenês would calculate on getting under his orders the Akarnanians and Ætolians, and some other tribes besides; but what other tribes, it is not easy to specify: perhaps the Agræi, east of Ambrakia, among them.

the tribes spoke a language scarcely intelligible to Greeks, and even eat their meat raw, while the country has even down to the present time remained not only unconquered, but untraversed, by an enemy in arms.

Demosthenês accordingly retired from Leukas, in spite of the remonstrance of the Akarnanians, who not only could not be induced to accompany him, but went home in visible disgust. He then sailed with his other forces — Messenians, Kephallenians, and Zakynthians — to Oeneon, in the territory of the Ozolian Lokrians, a maritime township on the Corinthian gulf, not far eastward of Naupaktus, — where his army was disembarked, together with three hundred epibatæ (or marines) from the triremes, — including on this occasion, what was not commonly the case on shipboard,¹ some of the choice hoplites, selected all from young men of the same age, on the Athenian muster-roll. Having passed the night in the sacred precinct of Zeus Nemeus at Oeneon, memorable as the spot where the poet Hesiod was said to have been slain, he marched early in the morning, under the guidance of the Messenian Chromon, into

¹ Thucyd. iii. 98. The epibatæ, or soldiers serving on shipboard (marines), were more usually taken from the *thetes*, or the poorest class of citizens, furnished by the state with a panoply for the occasion, — not from the regular hoplites on the muster-roll. Maritime soldiery is, therefore, usually spoken of as something inferior: the present triremes of Demosthenês are noticed in the light of an exception (*ναυτικῆς καὶ θηταῶν στρατιᾶς*, Thucyd. vi. 21).

So among the Romans, service in the legions was accounted higher and more honorable than that of the *classarii milites* (Tacit. Histor. i. 87).

The Athenian epibatæ, though not forming a corps permanently distinct, correspond in function to the English marines, who seem to have been first distinguished permanently from other foot-soldiers about the year 1684. "It having been found necessary on many occasions to embark a number of soldiers on board our ships of war, and mere landsmen being at first extremely unhealthy, — and at first, until they had been accustomed to the sea, in a great measure unserviceable, — it was at length judged expedient to appoint certain regiments for that service, who were trained to the different modes of sea-fighting, and also made useful in some of those manœuvres of a ship where a great many hands were required. These, from the nature of their duty, were distinguished by the appellation of *maritime soldiers*, or marines." — (Grose's Military Antiquities of the English Army, vol. i, p. 186. (London, 1786.)

Ætolia: on the first day he took Potidania, on the second Krokyteium, on the third Teichium, — all of them villages unfortified and undefended, for the inhabitants abandoned them and fled to the mountains above. He was here inclined to halt and wait the junction of the Ozolian Lokrians, who had engaged to invade Ætolia at the same time, and were almost indispensable to his success, from their familiarity with Ætolian warfare and similarity of weapons. But the Messenians again persuaded him to advance without delay into the interior, in order that the villages might be separately attacked and taken before any collective force could be gathered together: and Demosthenês was so encouraged by having as yet encountered no resistance, that he advanced to Ægition, which he also found deserted, and captured without opposition.

Here however was the term of his good fortune. The mountains round Ægition were occupied not only by the inhabitants of that village, but also by the entire force of Ætolia, collected even from the distant tribes Bomiês and Kalliês, who bordered on the Maliae gulf. The invasion of Demosthenês had become known beforehand to the Ætoliens, who not only forewarned all their tribes of the approaching enemy, but also sent ambassadors to Sparta and Corinth to ask for aid.¹ However, they showed themselves fully capable of defending their own territory, without foreign aid: and Demosthenês found himself assailed, in his position at Ægition, on all sides at once, by these active highlanders, armed with javelins, pouring down from the neighboring hills. Not engaging in any close combat, they retreated when

¹ Thucyd. iii. 100. *Προπαρασκευάσαντες προτέρων ἐς τε Κόρινθον καὶ ἐς Λακεδαίμονα πρεσβείας — πείθουσιν ὥστε σφρασι πέμψαι στρατιὰν ἐπὶ Ναύπακτον ἢ τὴν τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἢ παρὰ ἑτέρας.*

It is not here meant, I think — as Gôller and Dr. Arnold suppose — that the Ætoliens sent envoys to Lacedæmon before there was any talk or thought of the invasion of Ætolia, simply in prosecution of the standing antipathy which they bore to Naupaktus: but that they had sent envoys immediately when they heard of the preparations for invading Ætolia, — yet before the invasion actually took place. The words *δὲ τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἐπαγωγὴν* show that this is the meaning.

The word *ἐπαγωγὴ* is rightly construed by Haack, against the Scholiast: "Because the Naupaktians were bringing in the Athenians to invade Ætolia."

the Athenians advanced forward to charge them, — resuming their aggression the moment that the pursuers, who could never advance far in consequence of the ruggedness of the ground, began to return to the main body. The small number of bowmen along with Demosthenês for some time kept their unshielded assailants at bay; but the officer commanding the bowmen was presently slain, and the stock of arrows became nearly exhausted; and what was still worse, Chromon, the Messenian, the only man who knew the country, and could serve as guide, was slain also. The bowmen became thus either ineffective or dispersed; while the hoplites exhausted themselves in vain attempts to pursue and beat off an active enemy, who always returned upon them, and in every successive onset thinned and distressed them more and more. At length the force of Demosthenês was completely broken, and compelled to take flight; but without beaten roads, without guides, and in a country not only strange to them, but impervious from continual mountain, rock, and forest. Many of them were slain in the flight by pursuers, superior not less in rapidity of movement than in knowledge of the country: some even lost themselves in the forest, and perished miserably in flames kindled around them by the Ætolians: and the fugitives were at length reassembled at Ceneon, near the sea, with the loss of Proklês, the colleague of Demosthenês in command, as well as of one hundred and twenty hoplites, among the best-armed and most vigorous in the Athenian muster-roll.¹ The remaining force was soon transported back from Naupaktus to Athens, but Demosthenês remained behind, being too much afraid of the displeasure of his countrymen to return at such a moment. It is certain that his conduct was such as justly to incur their displeasure; and that the expedition against Ætolia, alienating an established ally and provoking a new enemy, had been conceived with a degree of rashness which nothing but the unexpected favor of fortune could have counterbalanced.

The force of the new enemy whom his unsuccessful attack had raised into activity, soon made itself felt. The Ætolian envoys despatched to Sparta and Corinth found it easy to obtain the promise of a considerable force to join them in an expedition

¹ Thucyd. iii. 98

against Naupaktus: and about the month of Septemoer, a body of three thousand Peloponnesian hoplites, including five hundred from the newly-founded colony of Herakleia, was assembled at Delphi, under the command of Eurylochos, Makarius, and Menedemus. Their road of march to Naupaktus lay through the territory of the Ozolian Lokrians, whom they proposed either to gain over or to subdue. With Amphissa, the largest Lokrian township, and in the immediate neighborhood of Delphi, they had little difficulty, — for the Amphissians were in a state of feud with their neighbors on the other side of Parnassus, and were afraid that the new armament might become the instrument of Phocian antipathy against them. On the very first application, they joined the Spartan alliance, and gave hostages for their fidelity to it: moreover, they persuaded many other Lokrian petty villages — among others the Myoneis, who were masters of the most difficult pass on the road — to do the same. Eurylochos received from these various townships reinforcements for his army, as well as hostages for their fidelity, whom he deposited at Kytinium in Doris: and he was thus enabled to march through all the territory of the Ozolian Lokrians without resistance; except from Ceneon and Eupalion, both which places he took by force. Having arrived in the territory of Naupaktus, he was there joined by the full force of the Ætolians; and their joint efforts, after laying waste all the neighborhood, captured the Corinthian colony of Molykreion, which had become subject to the Athenian empire.¹

Naupaktus, with a large circuit of wall and thinly defended, was in the greatest danger, and would certainly have been taken, had it not been saved by the efforts of the Athenian Demosthenês, who had remained there ever since the unfortunate Ætolian expedition. Apprized of the coming march of Eurylochos, he went personally to the Akarnanians, and persuaded them to send a force to aid in the defence of Naupaktus: for a long time they turned a deaf ear to his solicitations, in consequence of the refusal to blockade Leukas, but they were at length induced to consent. At the head of one thousand Akarnanian hoplites, Demosthenês threw himself into Naupaktus; and Eurylochos

¹ Thucyd. iii. 101, 102

seeing that the town had thus been placed out of the reach of attack, abandoned all his designs upon it, — marching farther westward to the neighboring territories of Ætolia, Kalydon, Pleuron, and Proschium, near the Achelôus and the borders of Akarnania. The Ætolians, who had come down to join him for the common purpose of attacking Naupaktus, here abandoned him and retired to their respective homes. But the Ambrakiots, rejoiced to find so considerable a Peloponnesian force in their neighborhood, prevailed upon him to assist them in attacking the Amphiloehian Argos as well as Akarnania; assuring him that there was now a fair prospect of bringing the whole of the population of the mainland, between the Ambrakian and Corinthian gulfs, under the supremacy of Lacedæmon. Having persuaded Eurylochos thus to keep his forces together and ready, they themselves with three thousand Ambrakiot hoplites invaded the territory of the Amphiloehian Argos, and captured the fortified hill of Olpæ immediately bordering on the Ambrakian gulf, about three miles from Argos itself: this hill had been in former days employed by the Akarnanians as a place for public judicial congress of the whole nation.¹

This enterprise, communicated forthwith to Eurylochos, was the signal for movement on both sides. The Akarnanians marched with their whole force to the protection of Argos, and occupied a post called Krênæ in the Amphiloehian territory, hoping to be able to prevent Eurylochos from effecting his junction with the Ambrakiots at Olpæ. They at the same time sent urgent messages to Demosthenès at Naupaktus, and to the Athenian guard-squadron of twenty triremes under Aristotélès and Hierophon, entreating their aid in the present need, and inviting Demosthenès to act as their commander. They had forgotten their displeasure against him arising out of his recent refusal to blockade at Leukas, — for which they probably thought that he had been sufficiently punished by his disgrace in Ætolia; while they knew and esteemed his military capacity. In fact, the accident whereby he had been detained at Naupaktus, now worked fortunately for them as well as for him: it secured to them a commander whom all of them respected, obviating the jealousies

¹ Thucyd. iii. 102-105

among their own numerous petty townships, — it procured for him the means of retrieving his own reputation at Athens. Demosthenès, not backward in seizing this golden opportunity, came speedily into the Ambrakian gulf with the twenty Athenian triremes, conducting two hundred Messenian hoplites and sixty Athenian bowmen. He found the whole Akarnanian force concentrated at the Amphiloehian Argos, and was named general along with the Akarnanian generals, but in reality enjoying the whole direction of the operations.

He found also the whole of the enemy's force, both the three thousand Ambrakiot hoplites and the Peloponnesian division under Eurylochos, already united and in position at Olpæ, about three miles off. For Eurylochos, as soon as he was apprized that the Ambrakiots had reached Olpæ, broke up forthwith his camp at Proschium in Ætolia, knowing that his best chance of traversing the hostile territory of Akarnania consisted in celerity: the whole Akarnanian force, however, had already gone to Argos, so that his march was unopposed through that country. He crossed the Achelôus, marched westward of Stratus, through the Akarnanian townships of Phytia, Medeon, and Linnæa, then quitting both Akarnania and the direct road from Akarnania to Argos, he struck rather eastward into the mountainous district of Thyamus, in the territory of the Agræans, who were enemies of the Akarnanians. From hence he descended at night into the territory of Argos, and passed unobserved under cover of the darkness between Argos itself, and the Akarnanian force at Krênæ; so as to join in safety the three thousand Ambrakiots at Olpæ; to their great joy, — for they had feared that the enemy at Argos and Krênæ would have arrested his passage; and feeling their force inadequate to contend alone they had sent pressing messages home to demand large reinforcements for themselves and their own protection.¹

Demosthenès thus found an united and formidable enemy, superior in number to himself, at Olpæ, and conducted his troops from Argos and Krênæ to attack them. The ground was rugged and mountainous, and between the two armies lay a steep ravine which neither liked to be the first to pass, so that they lay for five

¹ Thucyd. iii. 105, 106, 107.

days inactive. If Herodotus had been our historian, he would probably have ascribed this delay to unfavorable sacrifices (which may probably have been the case), and would have given us interesting anecdotes respecting the prophets on both sides; but the more positive and practical genius of Thucydides merely acquaints us, that on the sixth day both armies put themselves in order of battle, — both probably tired of waiting. The ground being favorable for ambuscade, Demosthenes hid in a bushy dell four hundred hoplites and light-armed, so that they might spring up suddenly in the midst of the action upon the Peloponnesian left, which outflanked his right. He was himself on the right with the Messenians and some Athenians, opposed to Eurylochus on the left of the enemy: the Akarnanians, with the Amphilo-chian akontists, or darters, occupied his left, opposed to the Ambrakiot hoplites: Ambrakiots and Peloponnesians were, however, intermixed in the line of Eurylochus, and it was only the Mantineans who maintained a separate station of their own towards the left centre. The battle accordingly began, and Eurylochus with his superior numbers was proceeding to surround Demosthenes, when on a sudden the men in ambush rose up and set upon his rear. A panic seized his men, and they made no resistance worthy of their Peloponnesian reputation: they broke and fled, while Eurylochus, doubtless exposing himself with peculiar bravery in order to restore the battle, was early slain. Demosthenes, having near him his best troops, pressed them vigorously and their panic communicated itself to the troops in the centre so that all were put to flight and pursued to Olpæ. On the right of the line of Eurylochus, the Ambrakiots, the most warlike Greeks in the Epirotic regions, completely defeated the Akarnanians opposed to them, and carried their pursuit even as far as Argos. So complete, however, was the victory gained by Demosthenes over the remaining troops, that these Ambrakiots had great difficulty in fighting their way back to Olpæ, which was not accomplished without severe loss, and late in the evening. Among all the beaten troops, the Mantineans were those who best maintained their retreating order.¹ The loss in the army of

¹ Thucyd. iii, 107, 108: compare Polyænus, iii, 1.

Demosthenes was about three hundred: that of the opponents much greater, but the number is not specified.

Of the three Spartan commanders, two, Eurylochus and Makarius, had been slain: the third, Menedæus, found himself beleaguered both by sea and land, — the Athenian squadron being on guard along the coast. It would seem, indeed, that he might have fought his way to Ambrakia, especially as he would have met the Ambrakiot reinforcement coming from the city. But whether this were possible or not, the commander, too much dispirited to attempt it, took advantage of the customary truce granted for burying the dead, to open negotiations with Demosthenes and the Akarnanian generals, for the purpose of obtaining an unmolested retreat. This was peremptorily refused: but Demosthenes (with the consent of the Akarnanian leaders) secretly intimated to the Spartan commander and those immediately around him, together with the Mantineans and other Peloponnesian troops, — that if they chose to make a separate and surreptitious retreat, abandoning their comrades, no opposition would be offered: for he designed by this means, not merely to isolate the Ambrakiots, the great enemies of Argos and Akarnania, along with the body of miscellaneous mercenaries who had come under Eurylochus, but also to obtain the more permanent advantage of disgracing the Spartans and Peloponnesians in the eyes of the Epirotic Greeks, as cowards and traitors to military fellowship. The very reason which prompted Demosthenes to grant a separate facility of escape, ought to have been imperative with Menedæus and the Peloponnesians around him, to make them spurn it with indignation: yet such was their anxiety for personal safety, that this disgraceful convention was accepted, ratified, and carried into effect forthwith. It stands alone in Grecian history, as a specimen of separate treason in officers, to purchase safety for themselves by abandoning those under their command. Had the officers been Athenian, it would have been doubtless quoted as an example of the pretended faithlessness of democracy: but as it was the act of a Spartan commander in conjunction with many leading Peloponnesians, we can only remark upon it as a farther manifestation of that intra-Peloponnesian selfishness, and carelessness of obligation

towards extra-Peloponnesian Greeks, which we found so lamentably prevalent during the invasion of Xerxes; in this case indeed heightened by the fact that the men deserted were fellow-Dorians and fellow-soldiers, who had just fought in the same ranks.

As soon as the ceremony of burying the dead had been completed, Menedæus, and the Peloponnesians who were protected by this secret convention, stole away slyly and in small bands under pretence of collecting wood and vegetables; on getting to a little distance, they quickened their pace and made off, — much to the dismay of the Ambrakiots, who ran after them and tried to overtake them. The Akarnanians pursued, and their leaders had much difficulty in explaining to them the secret convention just concluded. Nor was it without some suspicions of treachery, and even personal hazard, from their own troops, that they at length caused the fugitive Peloponnesians to be respected; while the Ambrakiots, the most obnoxious of the two to Akarnanian feeling, were pursued without any reserve, and two hundred of them were slain before they could escape into the friendly territory of the Agræans.¹ To distinguish Ambrakiots from Peloponnesians, similar in race and dialect, was, however, no easy task, and much dispute arose in individual cases.

Unfairly as this loss fell upon Ambrakia, a far more severe calamity was yet in store for her. The large reinforcement from the city, which had been urgently invoked by the detachment at Olpæ, started in due course as soon as it could be got ready, and entered the territory of Amphiloehia about the time when the battle of Olpæ was fought, but ignorant of that misfortune, and hoping to arrive soon enough to stand by their friends. Their march was made known to Demosthenês, on the day after the battle, by the Amphiloehians; who, at the same time, indicated to him the best way of surprising them in the rugged and mountainous road along which they had to march, at the two conspicuous peaks called Idomenê, immediately above a narrow pass leading farther on to Olpæ. It was known beforehand, by the line of march of the Ambrakiots, that they would rest for the night at the lower of these two peaks, ready to march through

¹ Thucyd. iii, 111.

the pass on the next morning. On that same night, a detachment of Amphiloehians, under direction from Demosthenês, seized the higher of the two peaks; while that commander himself, dividing his forces into two divisions, started from his position at Olpæ in the evening after supper. One of these divisions, having the advantage of Amphiloehian guides in their own country, marched by an unfrequented mountain road to Idomenê; the other, under Demosthenês himself, went directly through the pass leading from Idomenê to Olpæ. After marching all night, they reached the camp of the Ambrakiots a little before daybreak, — Demosthenês himself with his Messenians in the van. The surprise was complete; the Ambrakiots were found still lying down and asleep, while even the sentinels, uninformed of the recent battle, — hearing themselves accosted in the Doric dialect by the Messenians, whom Demosthenês had placed in front for that express purpose, and not seeing very clearly in the morning twilight, mistook them for some of their own fellow-citizens coming back from the other camp. The Akarnanians and Messenians thus fell among the Ambrakiots sleeping and unarmed, and without any possibility of resistance. Large numbers of them were destroyed on the spot, and the remainder fled in all directions among the neighboring mountains, none knowing the roads and the country; it was the country of the Amphiloehians, subjects of Ambrakia, but subjects averse to their condition, and now making use of their perfect local knowledge and light-armed equipment, to inflict a terrible revenge on their masters. Some of the Ambrakiots became entangled in ravines, — others fell into ambuscades laid by the Amphiloehians. Others again, dreading most of all to fall into the hands of the Amphiloehians, barbaric in race as well as intensely hostile in feeling, and seeing no other possibility of escaping them, swam off to the Athenian ships cruising along the shore. There were but a small proportion of them who survived to return to Ambrakia.¹

The complete victory of Idomenê, admirably prepared by Demosthenês, was achieved with scarce any loss: and the Akarnanians, after erecting their trophy, despoiled the enemy's dead and carried off the arms thus taken to Argos.

¹ Thucyd. iii, 112.

On the morrow they were visited by a herald, coming from those Ambrakiots who had fled into the Agræan territory, after the battle of Olpæ, and the subsequent pursuit. He came with the customary request from defeated soldiers, for permission to bury their dead who had fallen in that pursuit. Neither he, nor those from whom he came, knew anything of the destruction of their brethren at Idomenê, — just as these latter had been ignorant of the defeat at Olpæ; while, on the other hand, the Akarnanians in the camp, whose minds were full of the more recent and capital advantage at Idomenê, supposed that the message referred to the men slain in that engagement. The numerous panoplies just acquired at Idomenê lay piled up in the camp, and the herald, on seeing them, was struck with amazement at the size of the heap, so much exceeding the number of those who were missing in his own detachment. An Akarnanian present asked the reason of his surprise, and inquired how many of his comrades had been slain, — meaning to refer to the slain at Idomenê. "About two hundred," the herald replied. "Yet these arms here show, not that number, but more than a thousand men." "Then they are not the arms of those who fought with us." "Nay, but they are; if ye were the persons who fought yesterday at Idomenê." "We fought with no one yesterday: it was the day before yesterday, in the retreat." "O, then ye have to learn, that *we* were engaged yesterday with these others, who were on their march as reinforcement from the city of Ambrakia."

The unfortunate herald now learned for the first time that the large reinforcement from his city had been cut to pieces. So acute was his feeling of mingled anguish and surprise, that he raised a loud cry of woe, and hurried away at once, without saying another word; not even prosecuting his request about the burial of the dead bodies, — which appears on this fatal occasion to have been neglected.¹

His grief was justified by the prodigious magnitude of the calamity, which Thucydides considers to have been the greatest that afflicted any Grecian city during the whole war prior to the peace of Nikias; so incredibly great, indeed, that though he had

¹ Thucyd. iii, 113.

learned the number slain, he declines to set it down, from fear of not being believed, — a scruple which we, his readers, have much reason to regret. It appears that nearly the whole adult military population of Ambrakia was destroyed, and Demosthenês was urgent with the Akarnanians to march thither at once: had they consented, Thucydides tells us positively that the city would have surrendered without a blow.¹ But they refused to undertake the enterprise, fearing, according to the historian, that the Athenians at Ambrakia would be more troublesome neighbors to them than the Ambrakiots. That this reason was operative, we need not doubt: but it can hardly have been either the single, or even the chief, reason; for, had it been so, they would have been equally afraid of Athenian coöperation in the blockade of Lenkas, which they had strenuously solicited from Demosthenês, and had quarrelled with him for refusing. Ambrakia was less near to them

¹ Thucyd. iii, 113. πῶτος γὰρ τοῦτο αὐτὸν πάλιν. Ἐλλογέμεται μάλιστα δὲ τὸν κατὰ τὸν πόλεμον τὸνδε ἔργον. Καὶ ἀρσενίων οὐκ ἔχοντων τῶν ἀποθανόντων, διότι ἀπασταὶ τὸ πλεῖστον λέγεται ἀποθνήσκειν, ὡς πρὸς τὸ μέγεθος τῆς πόλεως. Ἀμτράκιον αὐτὸν οὐδὲν ὅτι εἰ ἐλθόντες ἔσθον Ἀκαρνανί, καὶ Ἀμφικλοί, Ἀθηναίους καὶ Δημοσθένει πειθόμενοι, ἐκίχον, ἀπασταὶ αὖ εἶλον· οὐδὲ δὲ ἰδόντες, ἀλλ' οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἔχοντες αὐτὸν χυλίσαντες, ὥστε παροικεῖν ὥσι.

We may remark that the expression *κατὰ τὸν πόλεμον τὸνδε*, when it occurs in the first, second, third, or first half of the fourth Book of Thucydides, seems to allude to the first ten years of the Peloponnesian war, which ended with the peace of Nikias.

In a careful dissertation, by Franz Wolfgang Ulrich, analyzing the structure of the history of Thucydides, it is made to appear that the first, second, and third Books, with the first half of the fourth, were composed during the interval between the peace of Nikias and the beginning of the last nine years of the war, called the Dekeleian war; allowing for two passages in these early books which must have been subsequently introduced.

The later books seem to have been taken up by Thucydides as a separate work, continuing the former, and a sort of separate preface is given for them (v, 26). γράφει δὲ καὶ ταῦτα ὁ αὐτὸς Θουκυδίδης Ἀθηναῖος ἔξ, etc. It is in this later portion that he first takes up the view peculiar to him, of reckoning the whole twenty-seven years as one continued war only nominally interrupted (Ulrich, Beiträge zur Erklärung des Thukydides, pp. 85, 125, 138, etc. Hamburg, 1846).

Compare *ἐν τῷ πόλεμῳ τῷδε* (iii, 98), which in like manner means the war prior to the peace of Nikias.

than Leukas, and in its present exhausted state, inspired less fear: but the displeasure arising from the former refusal of Demosthenês had probably never been altogether appeased, nor were they sorry to find an opportunity of mortifying him in a similar manner.

In the distribution of the spoil, three hundred panoplies were first set apart as the perquisite of Demosthenês: the remainder were then distributed, one-third for the Athenians, the other two-thirds among the Akarnanian townships. The immense reserve, personally appropriated to Demosthenês, enables us to make some vague conjecture as to the total loss of Ambrakiots. The fraction of one-third, assigned to the Athenian people, must have been, we may imagine, six times as great, and perhaps even in larger proportion, than the reserve of the general: for the latter was at that time under the displeasure of the people, and anxious above all things to regain their favor, — an object which would be frustrated rather than promoted, if his personal share of the arms were not greatly disproportionate to the collective claim of the city. Reasoning upon this supposition, the panoplies assigned to Athens would be eighteen hundred, and the total of Ambrakiot slain, whose arms became public property, would be five thousand four hundred. To which must be added some Ambrakiots killed in their flight from Idomenê by the Amphiloehians, in dells, ravines, and by-places: probably those Amphiloehians, who slew them, would appropriate the arms privately, without bringing them into the general stock. Upon this calculation, the total number of Ambrakiot slain in both battles and both pursuits, would be about six thousand: a number suitable to the grave expressions of Thucydides, as well as to his statements, that the first detachment which marched to Olpæ was three thousand strong, and that the message sent home invoked as reinforcement the total force of the city. How totally helpless Ambrakia had become, is still more conclusively proved by the fact that the Corinthians were obliged shortly afterwards to send by land a detachment of three hundred hoplites for its defence.¹

The Athenian triremes soon returned to their station at Nau-

¹ Thucyd. iii. 114. Diodorus (xii. 60) abridges the narrative of Thucydides.

paktus, after which a convention was concluded between the Akarnanians and Amphiloehians on the one side, and the Ambrakiots and Peloponnesians — who had fled after the battle of Olpæ into the territory of Salynthius and the Agræi — on the other, insuring a safe and unmolested egress to both of the latter.¹ With the Ambrakiots a more permanent pacification was effected: the Akarnanians and Amphiloehians concluded with them a peace and alliance for one hundred years, on condition that they should surrender all the Amphiloehian territory and hostages in their possession, and should bind themselves to furnish no aid to Anaktorium, then in hostility to the Akarnanians. Each party, however, maintained its separate alliance, — the Ambrakiots with the Peloponnesian confederacy, the Akarnanians with Athens: it was stipulated that the Akarnanians should

¹ Thucyd. iii. 114. Ἀκαρνανίης δὲ καὶ Ἀμφίλοχοι, ἀπελθόντων Ἀθηναίων καὶ Δημοσθένους, τοῖς ὡς Σαλύνθιον καὶ Ἀγραίους καταφυγοῦσιν Ἀμπρακίους καὶ Πελοποννησίους ἀναχωρεῖν ἐπέεισαντο ἐξ Οἰνιαδῶν, οἵπερ καὶ μετανέστησαν παρὰ Σαλύνθιον.

This is a very difficult passage. Hermann has conjectured, and Poppo, Göller, and Dr. Arnold all approve, the reading παρὰ Σαλυνθίου instead of the two last words of this sentence. The passage might certainly be construed with this emendation, though there would still be an awkwardness in the position of the relative οἵπερ with regard to its antecedent, and in the position of the particle καὶ, which ought then properly to come after μετανέστησαν, and not before it. The sentence would then mean, that "the Ambrakiots and Peloponnesians, who had originally taken refuge with Salynthius, had moved away from his territory to Oeniadæ," from which place they were now to enjoy safe departure.

I think, however, that the sentence would construe equally well, or at least with no greater awkwardness, without any conjectural alteration of the text, if we suppose Οἰνιαδῶν to be not merely the name of the place, but the name of the inhabitants: and the word seems to be used in this double sense (Thucyd. ii. 100). As the word is already in the patronymic form, it would be difficult to deduce from it a new *nomen gentile*. Several of the Attic demes, which are in the patronymic form, present this same double meaning. If this supposition be admitted, the sentence will mean, that "safe retreat was granted to Ambrakiots and Peloponnesians from the Oeniadæ, who also — καὶ, that is, they as well as the Ambrakiots and Peloponnesians — went up to the territory of Salynthius." These Oeniadæ were enemies of the general body of Akarnanians (ii. 100), and they may well have gone thither to help in extricating the fugitive Ambrakiots and Peloponnesians.

not be required to assist the Ambrakiots against Athens, nor the Ambrakiots to assist the Akarnanians against the Peloponnesian league; but against all other enemies, each engaged to lend aid to the other.¹

To Demosthenês personally, the events on the coast of the Ambrakian gulf proved a signal good fortune, well-earned indeed by the skill which he had displayed. He was enabled to atone for his imprudence in the Ætolian expedition, and to reëstablish himself in the favor of the Athenian people. He sailed home in triumph to Athens, during the course of the winter, with his reserved present of three hundred panoplies, which acquired additional value from the accident, that the larger number of panoplies, reserved out of the spoil for the Athenian people, were captured at sea, and never reached Athens. Accordingly, those brought by Demosthenês were the only trophy of the victory, and as such were deposited in the Athenian temples, where Thucydides mentions them as still existing at the time when he wrote.²

It was in the same autumn that the Athenians were induced by an oracle to undertake the more complete purification of the sacred island of Delos. This step was probably taken to propitiate Apollo, since they were under the persuasion that the terrible visitation of the epidemic was owing to his wrath. And as it was about this period that the second attack of the epidemic, after having lasted a year, disappeared, — many of them probably ascribed this relief to the effect of their pious cares at Delos. All the tombs in the island were opened; the dead bodies were then exhumed, and reinterred in the neighboring island of Rheneia: and orders were given that for the future no deaths and no births should take place in the sacred island. Moreover, the ancient Delian festival — once the common point of meeting and solemnity for the whole Ionic race, and celebrated for its musical contests, before the Lydian and Persian conquests had

¹ Thucyd. iii, 114.

² Thucyd. iii, 114. Τα δὲ τῶν ἀνακείαμενα ἐν τοῖς Ἀττικοῖς ἱεροῖς Δημοσθένει ἐξηγήσαν, τριακοσίων πανοπλιῶν, καὶ ἄλων αὐτὰς κατέπλευνσε. Καὶ ἐγένετο ἅμα αὐτῷ μετὰ τὴν τῆς Αἰτωλίας ἐνφορὰν ἀπὸ ταύτης τῆς πράξεως ἄδεεστέρα ἢ καθόδου.

subverted the freedom and prosperity of Ionia — was now renewed. The Athenians celebrated the festival with its accompanying matches, even the chariot-race, in a manner more splendid than had ever been known in former times: and they appointed a similar festival to be celebrated every fourth year. At this period they were excluded both from the Olympic and the Pythian games, which probably made the revival of the Delian festival more gratifying to them. The religious zeal and munificence of Nikias was striking displayed at Delos.¹

CHAPTER LII.

SEVENTH YEAR OF THE WAR. — CAPTURE OF SPHAKTERIA.

THE invasion of Attica by the Lacedæmonians had now become an ordinary enterprise, undertaken in every year of the war except the third and sixth, and then omitted only from accidental causes; though the same hopes were no longer entertained from it as at the commencement of the war. During the present spring, Agis king of Sparta conducted the Peloponnesian army into the territory, seemingly about the end of April, and repeated the usual ravages.

It seemed, however, as if Korkyra were about to become the principal scene of the year's military operations: for the exiles of the oligarchical party, having come back to the island and fortified themselves on Mount Istônê, carried on war with so much activity against the Korkyraeans in the city, that distress and even famine reigned there; while sixty Peloponnesian triremes were sent thither to assist the aggressors. As soon as it became known at Athens how hardly the Korkyraeans in the city were pressed, orders were given to an Athenian fleet of forty triremes, about to sail for Sicily under Eurymedon and Sophoklês, to halt

¹ Thucyd. iii, 104; Plutarch. Nikias. c. 3, 4; Diodor. xii, 58.

in their voyage at Korkyra, and to lend whatever aid might be needed.¹ But during the course of this voyage, an incident occurred elsewhere, neither foreseen nor imagined by any one, which gave a new character and promise to the whole war, — illustrating forcibly the observations of Periklēs and Archidamus before its commencement, on the impossibility of calculating what turn events might take.²

So high did Demosthenēs stand in the favor of his countrymen, after his brilliant successes in the Ambrakian gulf, that they granted him permission, at his own request, to go aboard and to employ the fleet in any descent which he might think expedient on the coast of Peloponnesus. The attachment of this active officer to the Messenians at Naupaktus, inspired him with the idea of planting a detachment of them on some well-chosen maritime post in the ancient Messenian territory, from whence they would be able permanently to harass the Lacedæmonians and provoke revolt among the Helots, — the more so, from their analogy of race and dialect. The Messenians, active in privateering, and doubtless well acquainted with the points of this coast, all of which had formerly belonged to their ancestors, had probably indicated to him Pylus, on the southwestern shore. That ancient and Homeric name was applied specially and properly to denote the promontory which forms the northern termination of the modern bay of Navarino, opposite to the island of Sphagia, or Sphakteria; though in vague language the whole neighboring district seems also to have been called Pylus. Accordingly, in circumnavigating Laconia, Demosthenēs requested that the fleet might be detained at this spot long enough to enable him to fortify it, engaging himself to stay afterwards and maintain it with a garrison. It was an uninhabited promontory, about forty-five miles from Sparta; that is, as far distant as any portion of her territory, presenting rugged cliffs, and easy of defence both by sea and land: but its great additional recommendation, with reference to the maritime power of Athens, consisted in its overhanging the spacious and secure basin now called the bay of Navarino. That basin was fronted and protected by the islet called Sphakteria, or Sphagia, untrod-

¹ Thueyd. iv. 2, 3.

² Thueyd. i. 140; ii. 11.

den, untenanted, and full of wood, which stretched along the coast for about a mile and three quarters, leaving only two narrow entrances: one at its northern end, opposite to the position fixed on by Demosthenēs, so confined as to admit only two triremes abreast, — the other at the southern end, about four times as broad; while the inner water approached by these two channels was both roomy and protected. It was on the coast of Peloponnesus, a little within the northern or narrowest of the two channels, that Demosthenēs proposed to plant his little fort, — the ground being itself eminently favorable, and a spring of fresh water¹ in the centre of the promontory.²

¹ Thueyd. iv. 26.

² Topography of Sphakteria and Pylus. The description given by Thucydides, of the memorable incidents in or near Pylus and Sphakteria, is perfectly clear, intelligible, and consistent with itself, as to topography. But when we consult the topography of the scene as it stands now, we find various circumstances which cannot possibly be reconciled with Thucydides. Both Colonel Leake (*Travels in the Morea*, vol. i, pp. 402–415) and Dr. Arnold (*Appendix to the second and third volume of his Thucydides*, p. 444) have given plans of the coast, accompanied with valuable remarks.

The main discrepancy, between the statement of Thucydides and the present state of the coast, is to be found in the breadth of the two channels between Sphakteria and the mainland. The southern entrance into the bay of Navarino is now between thirteen hundred and fourteen hundred yards, with a depth of water varying from five, seven, twenty-eight, thirty-three fathoms; whereas Thucydides states it as being only a breadth adequate to admit eight or nine triremes abreast. The northern entrance is about one hundred and fifty yards in width, with a shoal or bar of sand lying across it on which there are not more than eighteen inches of water: Thucydides tells us that it afforded room for no more than two triremes, and his narrative implies a much greater depth of water, so as to make the entrance for triremes perfectly unobstructed.

Colonel Leake supposes that Thucydides was misinformed as to the breadth of the southern passage; but Dr. Arnold has on this point given a satisfactory reply, — that the narrowness of the breadth is not merely affirmed in the numbers of Thucydides, but is indirectly implied in his narrative, where he tells us that the Lacedæmonians intended to choke up both of them by triremes closely packed. Obviously, this expedient could not be dreamt of, except for a very narrow mouth. The same reply suffices against the doubts which Bloomfield and Poppo (*Comment.* p. 10) raise about the genuineness of the numerals *ὀκτώ* or *ἑννέα* in Thucydides; a doubt which merely transfers the supposed error from Thucydides to the writer of the MS.

But Eurymedon and Sophoklès decidedly rejected all proposition of delay; and with much reason, since they had been informed (though seemingly without truth) that the Peloponnesian fleet had actually reached Korkyra: they might well have remembered the mischief which had ensued three years before

Dr. Arnold has himself raised a still graver doubt; whether the island now called Sphagia be really the same as Sphakteria, and whether the bay of Navarino be the real harbor of Pylus. He suspects that the Pale-Navarino which has been generally understood to be Pylus, was in reality the ancient Sphakteria, separated from the mainland in ancient times by a channel at the north as well as by another at the southeast, — though now it is not an island at all. He farther suspects that the lake or lagoon called Lake of Osmyn Aga, north of the harbor of Navarino, and immediately under that which he supposes to have been Sphakteria, was the ancient harbor of Pylus, in which the sea-fight between the Athenians and Lacedæmonians took place. He does not, indeed, assert this as a positive opinion, but leans to it as the most probable, admitting that there are difficulties either way.

Dr. Arnold has stated some of the difficulties which beset this hypothesis (p. 447), but there was one which he has not stated, which appears to me the most formidable of all, and quite fatal to the admissibility of his opinion. If the Paleokastro of Navarino was the real ancient Sphakteria, it must have been a second island situated to the northward of Sphagia. There must therefore have been *two* islands close together off the coast and near the scene. Now if the reader will follow the account of Thucydides, he will see that there certainly was no more than *one* island, — Sphakteria, without any other near or adjoining to it; see especially c. 13: the Athenian fleet under Eurymedon, on first arriving, was obliged to go back some distance to the island of Prôtê, because *the island of Sphakteria* was full of Lacedæmonian hoplites: if Dr. Arnold's hypothesis were admitted, there would have been nothing to hinder them from landing on Sphagia itself. — the same inference may be deduced from c. 8. The statement of Pliny (H. N. iv, 12) that there were *tres Sphagiae* off Pylus, unless we suppose with Hardouin that two of them were mere rocks, appears to me inconsistent with the account of Thucydides.

I think that there is no alternative except to suppose that a great alteration has taken place in the two passages which separate Sphagia from the mainland, during the interval of two thousand four hundred years which separates us from Thucydides. The mainland to the south of Navarino must have been much nearer than it is now to the southern portion of Sphagia, while the northern passage also must have been then both narrower and clearer. To suppose a change in the configuration of the coast to this extent, seems noway extravagant: any other hypothesis which may be started will be found involved in much greater difficulty.

from the delay of the reinforcement sent to Phormio in some desultory operations on the coast of Krete. The fleet accordingly passed by Pylus without stopping: but a terrible storm drove them back and forced them to seek shelter in the very harbor which Demosthenès had fixed upon, — the only harbor anywhere near. That officer took advantage of this accident to renew his proposition, which however appeared to the commanders chimerical: there were plenty of desert capes round Peloponnesus, they said, if he chose to waste the resources of the city in occupying them,¹ — nor were they at all moved by his reasons in reply. Finding himself thus unsuccessful, Demosthenès presumed upon the undefined permission granted to him by the Athenian people, to address himself first to the soldiers, last of all to the taxiarchs, or inferior officers, and to persuade them to second his project, even against the will of the commanders. Much inconvenience might well have arisen from such clashing of authority: but it happened that both the soldiers and the taxiarchs took the same view of the case as their commanders, and refused compliance: nor can we be surprised at such reluctance, when we reflect upon the seeming improbability of being able to maintain such a post against the great real, and still greater supposed, superiority of Lacedæmonian land-force. It happened, however, that the fleet was detained there for some days by stormy weather: so that the soldiers, having nothing to do, were seized with the spontaneous impulse of occupying themselves with the fortification, and crowded around to execute it with all the emulation of eager volunteers. Having contemplated nothing of the kind on starting from Athens, they had neither tools for cutting stone, nor hods for carrying mortar:² accordingly, they were compelled to build their wall by collecting such pieces of rock or stones as they found, and putting them together as each happened to fit in: whenever mortar was needed, they brought it up on their backs bent inwards, with hands joined behind them to prevent it from slipping away. Such deficiencies were made up, however, partly by the unbounded

¹ Thucyd. iv, 3. The account, alike meagre and inaccurate, given by Diodorus, of these interesting events in Pylus and Sphakteria, will be found in Diodor. xii, 61-64.

² Thucyd. iv.

ardor of the soldiers, partly by the natural difficulties of the ground, which hardly required fortification except at particular points; the work was completed in a rough way in six days, and Demosthenês was left in garrison with five ships, while Eurymedon with the main fleet sailed away to Korkyra. The crews of the five ships, two of which, however, were sent away to warn Eurymedon afterwards, would amount to about one thousand in all: but there presently arrived two armed Messenian privateers, from which Demosthenês obtained a reinforcement of forty Messenian hoplites, together with a supply of wicker shields, though more fit for show than for use, wherewith to arm his rowers. Altogether, it appears that he must have had about two hundred hoplites, besides the half-armed seamen.¹

Intelligence of this attempt to plant, even upon the Lacedæmonian territory, the annoyance and insult of a hostile post, was soon transmitted to Sparta. — yet no immediate measures were taken to march to the spot; as well from the natural slowness of the Spartan character, strengthened by a festival which happened to be then going on, as from the confidence entertained that, whenever attacked, the expulsion of the enemy was certain. A stronger impression, however, was made by the news upon the Lacedæmonian army invading Attica, who were at the same time suffering from want of provisions, the corn not being yet ripe, and from an unusually cold spring; accordingly, Agis marched them back to Sparta, and the fortification of Pylus thus produced the effect of abridging the invasion to the unusually short period of fifteen days. It operated in like manner to the protection of Korkyra: for the Peloponnesian fleet, recently arrived thither, or still on its way, received orders immediately to return for the attack of Pylus. Having avoided the Athenian fleet by transporting the ships across the isthmus at Leukas, it reached Pylus about the same time as the Lacedæmonian land-force from Sparta, composed of the Spartans themselves and the neighboring Perioeki: for the more distant Perioeki, as well as the Pelopon-

¹ Thucyd. iv, 9. Demosthenês placed the *greater number* (τοὺς πολλοὺς) of his hoplites round the walls of his post, and selected *sixty* of them to march down to the shore. This implies a total which can hardly be less than two hundred.

nesian allies, being just returned from Attica, were summoned to come as soon as they could, but did not accompany this first march.¹

At the last moment, before the Peloponnesian fleet came in and occupied the harbor, Demosthenês detached two out of his five triremes to warn Eurymedon and the main fleet, and to entreat immediate succor: the remaining ships he hauled ashore under the fortification, protecting them by palisades planted in front, and preparing to defend himself in the best manner he could. Having posted the larger portion of his force, — some of them mere seamen without arms, and many only half-armed, — round the assailable points of the fortification, to resist attacks from the land-force, he himself, with sixty chosen hoplites and a few bowmen, marched out of the fortification down to the sea-shore. It was on that side that the wall was weakest, for the Athenians, confident in their naval superiority, had given themselves little trouble to provide against an assailant fleet. Accordingly, Demosthenês foresaw that the great stress of the attack would lie on the sea-side, and his only chance of safety consisted in preventing the enemy from landing; a purpose, seconded by the rocky and perilous shore, which left no possibility of approach for ships, except on a narrow space immediately under the fortification. It was here that he took post, on the water's edge, addressing a few words of encouragement to his men, and warning them that it was useless now to display acuteness in summing up perils which were but too obvious, — and that the only chance of escape lay in boldly encountering the enemy before they could set foot ashore; the difficulty of effecting a landing from ships in the face of resistance being better known to Athenian mariners than to any one else.²

With a fleet of forty-three triremes, under Thrasybulus, and a powerful land-force, simultaneously attacking, the Lacedæmonians had good hopes of storming at once a rock so hastily converted into a military post. But as they foresaw that the first attack might possibly fail, and that the fleet of Eurymedon would probably return, they resolved to occupy forthwith the island of Sphakteria, the natural place where the Athenian fleet would take station for the purpose of assisting the garrison ashore.

¹ Thucyd. iv, 8.

² Thucyd. iv, 10.

The neighboring coast on the mainland of Peloponnesus was both harborless and hostile, so that there was no other spot near, where they could take station. And the Lacedæmonian commanders reckoned upon being able to stop up, as it were mechanically, both the two entrances into the harbor, by triremes lashed together, from the island to the mainland, with their prows pointing outwards; so that they would be able at any rate, occupying the island as well as the two channels, to keep off the Athenian fleet, and to hold Demosthenês closely blocked up¹ on the rock of Pylus, where his provisions would quickly fail him. With these views, they drafted off by lot some hoplites from each of the Spartan lochi, accompanied as usual by Helots, and sent them across to Sphacteria; while their land-force and their fleet approached at once to attack the fortification.

Of the assault on the land-side, we hear little: the Lacedæmonians were proverbially unskilful in the attack of anything like a fortified place, and they appear now to have made little impression. But the chief stress and vigor of the attack came on the sea-side, as Demosthenês had foreseen. The landing-place, even where practicable, was still rocky and difficult, — and so narrow in dimensions, that the Lacedæmonian ships could only approach by small squadrons at a time; while the Athenians maintained their ground firmly to prevent a single man from setting foot on land. The assailing triremes rowed up with loud shouts and exhortations to each other, striving to get so placed as that the hoplites in the bow could effect a landing: but such were the difficulties arising partly from the rocks and partly from the defence, that squadron after squadron tried this in vain. Nor did even the gallant example of Brasidas procure for them any better success. That officer, commanding a trireme, and observing that some of the pilots near him were cautious in driving their ships close in shore for fear of breaking them against the rocks, indignantly called to them not to spare the planks of their vessels, when the enemy had insulted them by erecting a fort in the country: Lacedæmonians, he exclaimed, ought to carry the landing by force, even though their ships should be dashed

¹ Thucyd. iv, 8. τοὺς μὲν οὖν ἑσπλούς ταις ναυσὶν ἀντιπράροις βέβηκον κἀστὲν ἑυέλλον

to pieces, — nor ought the Peloponnesian allies to be backward in sacrificing their ships for Sparta, in return for the many services which she had rendered to them.¹ Foremost in performance as well as in exhortation, Brasidas constrained his own pilot to drive his ship close in, and advanced in person even on to the landing-steps for the purpose of leaping first ashore. But here he stood exposed to all the weapons of the Athenian defenders, who beat him back and pierced him with so many wounds, that he fainted away, and fell back into the bows, or foremost part of the trireme, beyond the rowers; while his shield, slipping away from the arm, dropped down and rolled overboard into the sea. His ship was obliged to retire, like the rest, without having effected any landing: and all these successive attacks from the sea, repeated for one whole day and a part of the next were repulsed by Demosthenês and his little band with victorious bravery. To both sides it seemed a strange reversal of ordinary relations;² that the Athenians, essentially maritime, should be fighting on land — and that, too, Lacedæmonian land — against the Lacedæmonians, the select land-warriors of Greece, now on ship-board, and striving in vain to compass a landing on their own shore. The Athenians, in honor of their success, erected a trophy, the chief ornament of which was the shield of Brasidas, which had been cast ashore by the water.

On the third day, the Lacedæmonians did not repeat their attack, but sent some of their vessels round to Asinê, in the Messenian gulf, for timber to construct battering machines; which they intended to employ against the wall of Demosthenês, on the side towards the harbor, where it was higher, and could not be assailed without machines, but where, at the same time, there was great facility in landing, — for their previous attack had been made on the side fronting the sea, where the wall was lower, but

¹ Thucyd. iv, 11, 12; Diodor. xii. Consult an excellent note of Dr. Arnold on this passage, in which he contrasts the looseness and exaggeration of Diodorus with the modest distinctness of Thucydides.

² Thucyd. iv, 12. ἐπὶ πολὺ γὰρ ἐποίει τῆς δόξης ἐν τῷ τότε, τοῖς μὲν ὑπηρετοῦσιν μάλιστα εἶναι καὶ τὰ περὶ ἀγαθιστοῦ, τοῖς δὲ θαλασσίοις τε καὶ ταῖς ναυσὶ πλείστον προέχειν.

the difficulties of landing insuperable.¹ But before these ships came back, the face of affairs was seriously changed by the unwelcome return of the Athenian fleet from Zakynthos, under Eurymedon, reinforced by four Chian ships, and some of the guardships at Naupaktus, so as now to muster fifty sail. The Athenian admiral, finding the enemy's fleet in possession of the harbor, and seeing both the island of Sphakteria occupied, and the opposite shore covered with Lacedæmonian hoplites,²—for the allies from all parts of Peloponnesus had now arrived,—looked around in vain for a place to land, and could find no other night-station except the uninhabited island of Prôtê, not very far distant. From hence he sailed forth in the morning to Pylus, prepared for a naval engagement,—hoping that perhaps the Lacedæmonians might come out to fight him in the open sea, but resolved, if this did not happen, to force his way in and attack the fleet in the harbor; the breadth of sea between Sphakteria and the mainland being sufficient to admit of nautical manoeuvre.³ The Lacedæmonian admirals, seemingly confounded by the speed of the Athenian fleet in coming back, never thought of sailing out of the harbor to fight, nor did they even realize their scheme of blocking up the two entrances of the harbor with triremes

¹ Thucyd. iv, 13. ἐλπίζοντες τὸ κατὰ τὸν λιμένα τεῖχος ὄντος μὲν ἔχειν, ἀποβάσεως δὲ μάλιστα οὐσης εἶναι μηχαναίς. See Poppo's note upon this passage.

² Thucyd. iv, 13. The Lacedæmonians παρασκευάζοντο, ἢ ἐσπλῆγ' εἰς. ὡς ἐν τῷ λιμένι ὅντι οἱ σμικρῶ ναυμαχῆσαντες.

The expression, "the harbor which was not small," to designate the spacious bay of Navarino, has excited much remark from Mr. Bloomfield and Dr. Arnold, and was indeed one of the reasons which induced the latter to suspect that the harbor meant by Thucydides was not the bay of Navarino, but the neighboring lake of Osmyn Aga.

I have already discussed that supposition in a former note: but in reference to the expression οἱ σμικρῶ, we may observe, first, that the use of negative expressions to convey a positive idea would be in the ordinary manner of Thucydides.

But farther, I have stated in a previous note that it is indispensable, in my judgment, to suppose the island of Sphakteria to have touched the mainland much more closely in the time of Thucydides than it does now. At that time, therefore, very probably, the basin of Navarino was not so large as we now find it.

closely lashed together. Both entrances were left open, though they determined to defend themselves within: but even here, so defective were their precautions, that several of their triremes were yet moored, and the rowers not fully aboard, when the Athenian admirals sailed in by both entrances at once to attack them. Most of the Lacedæmonian triremes, afloat, and in fighting trim, resisted the attack for a certain time, but were at length vanquished, and driven back to the shore, many of them with serious injury.¹ Five of them were captured and towed off, one with all her crew aboard, and the Athenians, vigorously pursuing their success, drove against such as took refuge on the shore, as well as those which were not manned at the moment when the attack began, and had not been able to get afloat or into action. Some of the vanquished triremes being deserted by their crews, who jumped out upon the land, the Athenians were proceeding to tow them off, when the Lacedæmonian hoplites on the shore opposed a new and strenuous resistance. Excited to the utmost pitch by witnessing the disgraceful defeat of their fleet, and aware of the cruel consequences which turned upon it,—they marched all armed into the water, seized the ships to prevent them from being dragged off, and engaged in a desperate conflict to battle the assailants: we have already seen a similar act of bravery, two years before, on the part of the Messenian hoplites accompanying the fleet of Phormio near Naupaktus.² Extraordinary daring and valor was here displayed on both sides, in the attack as well as in the defence, and such was the clamor and confusion, that neither the land skill of the Lacedæmonians, nor the sea skill of the Athenians, were of much avail: the contest was one of personal valor and considerable suffering on both sides. At length the Lacedæmonians carried their point, and saved all the ships ashore; none being carried away except those at first captured. Both parties thus separated: the Athenians retired to the fortress at Pylus, where they were doubtless hailed

¹ Thucyd. iv, 14. ἐτρωσαν μὲν πολλὰς, πέντε δ' ἔλαβον. We cannot in English speak of *wounding* a trireme,—though the Greek word is both lively and accurate, to represent the blow inflicted by the impinging beak of an enemy's ship.

² See above, in this History, chap.

with overflowing joy by their comrades, and where they erected a trophy for their victory, giving up the enemy's dead for burial, and picking up the floating wrecks and pieces.¹

But the great prize of the victory was neither in the five ships captured, nor in the relief afforded to the besieged at Pylus. It lay in the hoplites occupying the island of Sphakteria, who were now cut off from the mainland, as well as from all supplies. The Athenians, sailing round it in triumph, already looked upon them as their prisoners; while the Lacedæmonians on the opposite mainland, deeply distressed, but not knowing what to do, sent to Sparta for advice. So grave was the emergency, that the ephors came in person to the spot forthwith. Since they could still muster sixty triremes, a greater number than the Athenians, — besides a large force on land, and the whole command of the resources of the country, — while the Athenians had no footing on shore except the contracted promontory of Pylus, we might have imagined that a strenuous effort to carry off the imprisoned detachment across the narrow strait to the mainland would have had a fair chance of success. And probably, if either Demosthenes or Brasidas had been in command, such an effort would have been made. But Lacedæmonian courage was rather steadfast and unyielding than adventurous: and, moreover, the Athenian superiority at sea exercised a sort of fascination over men's minds, analogous to that of the Spartans themselves on land; so that the ephors, on reaching Pylus, took a desponding view of their position, and sent a herald to the Athenian generals to propose an armistice, in order to allow time for envoys to go to Athens and treat for peace.

To this Eurymedon and Demosthenes assented, and an armistice was concluded on the following terms: The Lacedæmonians agreed to surrender not only all their triremes now in the harbor, but also all the rest in their ports, altogether to the number of sixty; also, to abstain from all attack upon the fortress at Pylus, either by land or sea, for such time as should be necessary for the mission of envoys to Athens as well as for their return, both to be effected in an Athenian trireme provided for the purpose. The Athenians on their side engaged to desist from all hostilities

¹ Thucyd. iv. 13, 14.

during the like interval; but it was agreed that they should keep strict and unremitting watch over the island, yet without landing upon it. For the subsistence of the detachment in the island, the Lacedæmonians were permitted to send over every day two chœnikes of barley-meal in cakes, ready baked, two kotylæ of wine,¹ and some meat, for each hoplite, — together with half that quantity for each of the attendant Helots; but this was all to be done under the supervision of the Athenians, with peremptory obligation to send no secret additional supplies. It was, moreover, expressly stipulated that if any one provision of the armistice, small or great, were violated, the whole should be considered as null and void. Lastly, the Athenians engaged, on the return of the envoys from Athens, to restore the triremes in the same condition as they received them.

Such terms sufficiently attest the humiliation and anxiety of the Lacedæmonians; while the surrender of their entire naval force to the number of sixty triremes, which was forthwith carried into effect, demonstrates at the same time that they sincerely believed in the possibility of obtaining peace. Well aware that they were themselves the original beginners of the war, at a time when the Athenians desired peace, and that the latter had besides made fruitless overtures while under the pressure of the epidemic, they presumed that the same dispositions still prevailed at Athens, and that their present pacific wishes would be so gladly welcomed as to procure without difficulty the relinquishment of the prisoners in Sphakteria.²

The Lacedæmonian envoys, conveyed to Athens in an Athenian trireme, appeared before the public assembly to set forth their mission, according to custom, prefacing their address with

¹ Thucyd. iv. 16. The chœnix was equivalent to about two pints, English dry measure: it was considered as the usual daily sustenance for a slave. Each Lacedæmonian soldier had, therefore, double of this daily allowance, besides meat, in weight and quantity not specified: the fact that the quantity of meat is not specified, seems to show that they did not fear abuse in this item.

The kotyla contained about half a pint, English wine measure: each Lacedæmonian soldier had, therefore, a pint of wine daily. It was always the practice in Greece to drink the wine with a large admixture of water.

² Thucyd. iv. 21: compare vii. 18.

some apologies for that brevity of speech which belonged to their country. Their proposition was in substance a very simple one. "Give up to us the men in the island, and accept, in exchange for this favor, peace, with the alliance of Sparta." They enforced their cause, by appeals, well-turned and conciliatory, partly indeed to the generosity, but still more to the prudential calculation of Athens; explicitly admitting the high and glorious vantage-ground on which she was now placed, as well as their own humbled dignity and inferior position.¹ They, the Lacedæmonians, the first and greatest power in Greece, were now smitten by adverse fortune of war, — and that too without misconduct of their own, so that they were for the first time obliged to solicit an enemy for peace; which Athens had the precious opportunity of granting, not merely with honor to herself, but also in such manner as to create in their minds an ineffaceable friendship. And it became Athens to make use of her present good fortune while she had it, — not to rely upon its permanence, nor to abuse it by extravagant demands; her own imperial prudence, as well as the present circumstances of the Spartans, might teach her how unexpectedly the most disastrous casualties occurred. By granting what was now asked, she might make a peace which would be far more durable than if it were founded on the extorted compliances of a weakened enemy, because it would rest on Spartan honor and gratitude; the greater the previous enmity, the stronger would be such reactionary sentiment.² But if Athens should now refuse, and if, in the farther prosecution of the war, the men in Sphakteria should perish, — a new and inexpiable ground of quarrel,³ peculiar to Sparta herself, would

¹ Thucyd. iv, 18. γνῶτε δὲ καὶ ἐς τὰς ἡμετέρας εἶναι συμφορὰς ἀπιδόντες, etc. ² Thucyd. iv, 19.

³ Thucyd. iv, 20. ἡμῖν δὲ καλῶς, εἴπερ πότε, ἔχει ἀμφοτέροις ἡ ξυναλλαγὴ, πρὶν τι ἀνῆκεσθαι διὰ μέσου γενόμενον ἡμῶς καταλαβεῖν, ἐν ᾧ ἀνάγκη αἰδίου ὑμῖν ἔχθραν πρὸς τῇ κοινῇ καὶ ἰδίᾳ ἔχειν, ὑμᾶς δὲ στερηθῆναι ὧν νῦν προκαλούμεθα.

I understand these words κοινὴ and ἰδίᾳ agreeably to the explanation of the Scholiast, from whom Dr. Arnold, as well as Poppe and Göller, depart, in my judgment erroneously. The whole war had been begun in consequence of the complaints of the Peloponnesian allies, and of wrongs alleged to

be added to those already subsisting, which rather concerned Sparta as the chief of the Peloponnesian confederacy. Nor was it only the good-will and gratitude of the Spartans which Athens would earn by accepting the proposition tendered to her; she would farther acquire the grace and glory of conferring peace on Greece, which all the Greeks would recognize as her act. And when once the two preeminent powers, Athens and Sparta, were established in cordial amity, the remaining Grecian states would be too weak to resist what they two might prescribe.¹

Such was the language held by the Lacedæmonians in the assembly at Athens. It was discreetly calculated for their purpose, though when we turn back to the commencement of the war, and read the lofty declarations of the Spartan ephors and assembly respecting the wrongs of their allies and the necessity of extorting full indemnity for them from Athens, the contrast is indeed striking. On this occasion, the Lacedæmonians acted entirely for themselves and from consideration of their own necessities; severing themselves from their allies, and soliciting a special peace for themselves, with as little scruple as the Spartan general, Menelaus, during the preceding year, when he abandoned his Ambrakiot confederates after the battle of Olpæ, to conclude a separate capitulation with Demosthenes.

The course proper to be adopted by Athens in reference to the

have been done to them by Athens: Sparta herself had no ground of complaint, — nothing of which she desired redress.

Dr. Arnold translates it: "We shall hate you not only nationally, for the wound you have inflicted on Sparta: but also individually, because so many of us will have lost our near relations from your inflexibility." "The Spartan aristocracy (he adds) would feel it a personal wound to lose at once so many of its members, connected by blood or marriage with its principal families: compare Thucyd. v, 15."

We must recollect, however, that the Athenians could not possibly know at this time that the hoplites inclosed in Sphakteria belonged in great proportion to the first families in Sparta. And the Spartan envoys would surely have the diplomatic prudence to abstain from any facts or arguments which would reveal, or even suggest, to them so important a secret.

¹ Thucyd. iv, 20. ἡμῶν γὰρ καὶ ἡμῶν ταῦτα λεγόντων το γε ἄλλο Ἕλληνας ἴσate ὅτι ἐποδίστητον δὲ τὰ μέγιστα τμήσει.

Aristophanes, Pac. 1048. ἔξω σπεισμένους κοινῇ τῆς Ἑλλάδος ἄρχει.

proposition, however, was by no means obvious. In all probability, the trireme which brought the Lacedæmonian envoys also brought the first news of that unforeseen and instantaneous turn of events which had rendered the Spartans in Sphakteria certain prisoners, — so it was then conceived, — and placed the whole Lacedæmonian fleet in their power; thus giving a totally new character of the war. The sudden arrival of such prodigious intelligence, — the astounding presence of Lacedæmonian envoys, bearing the olive-branch, and in an attitude of humiliation, — must have produced in the susceptible public of Athens emotions of the utmost intensity; an elation and confidence such as had probably never been felt since the reconquest of Samos. It was difficult at first to measure the full bearings of the new situation, and even Periklēs himself might have hesitated what to recommend: but the immediate and dominant impression with the general public was, that Athens might now ask her own terms, as consideration for the prisoners in the island.¹ Of this reigning tendency Kleon² made himself the emphatic organ, as he had done three years before in the sentence passed on the Mitylenæans; a man who — like leading journals, in modern times — often appeared to guide the public because he gave vehement utterance to that which they were already feeling, and carried it out in its collateral bearings and consequences. On the present occasion, he doubtless spoke with the most genuine conviction; for he was full of the sentiment of Athenian force and Athenian imperial dignity, as well as disposed to a sanguine view of future chances. Moreover, in a discussion like that now opened, where there was much room for doubt, he came forward with a proposition at once plain and decisive. Reminding the Athenians of

¹ Thucyd. iv, 21.

² Thucyd. iv, 21. μάλιστα δὲ αὐτοῦς ἐνέχε Κλέων ὁ Κλεαινέτου, ἀνὴρ δημαγωγὸς κατ' ἐκείνου τὸν χρόνον ὡν καὶ τῷ δήμῳ πιθανώτατος· καὶ ἔπεισεν ἀποκρίνασθαι, etc.

This sentence reads like a first introduction of Kleon to the notice of the reader. It would appear that Thucydides had forgotten that he had before introduced Kleon on occasion of the Mitylenæan surrender, and that too in language very much the same, iii, 36. καὶ Κλέων ὁ Κλεαινέτου, — ὃν καὶ ἐς τὰ ἄλλα βιαϊότατος τῶν πολιτῶν, καὶ τῷ δήμῳ παρὰ πολλοὺς ἐν τῇ πόλει πιθανώτατος, etc.

the dishonorable truce of thirty years to which they had been compelled by the misfortunes of the time to accede, fourteen years before the Peloponnesian war, — Kleon insisted that now was the time for Athens to recover what she had then lost, — Nisæa, Pegæ, Træzen, and Achaia. He proposed that Sparta should be required to restore these to Athens, in exchange for the soldiers now blocked up in Sphakteria; after which a truce might be concluded for as long a time as might be deemed expedient.

This decree, adopted by the assembly, was communicated as the answer of Athens to the Lacedæmonian envoys, who had probably retired after their first address, and were now sent for again into the assembly, to hear it. On being informed of the resolution, they made no comment on its substance, but invited the Athenians to name commissioners, who might discuss with them freely and deliberately suitable terms for a pacification. Here, however, Kleon burst upon them with an indignant rebuke. He had thought from the first, he said, that they came with dishonest purposes, but now the thing was clear, — nothing else could be meant by this desire to treat with some few men apart from the general public. If they had really any fair proposition to make, he called upon them to proclaim it openly to all. But this the envoys could not bring themselves to do. They had probably come with authority to make certain concessions, but to announce these concessions forthwith would have rendered negotiation impossible, besides dishonoring them in the face of their allies. Such dishonor would be incurred, too, without any advantage, if the Athenians should after all reject the terms, which the temper of the assembly before them rendered but too probable. Moreover, they were totally unpractised in the talents for dealing with a public assembly, such discussions being so rare as to be practically unknown in the Lacedæmonian system. To reply to the denunciation of a vehement speaker like Kleon, required readiness of elocution, dexterity, and self-command, which they had had no opportunity of acquiring. They remained silent, — abashed by the speaker and intimidated by the temper of the assembly: their mission was thus terminated, and they were reconveyed in the trireme to Pylus.¹

¹ Thucyd. iv, 22

It is probable that if these envoys had been able to make an effective reply to Kleon, and to defend their proposition against his charge of fraudulent purpose, they would have been sustained by Nikias and a certain number of leading Athenians, so that the assembly might have been brought at least to try the issue of a private discussion between diplomatic agents on both sides. But the case was one in which it was absolutely necessary that the envoys should stand forward with some defence for themselves; which Nikias might effectively second, but could not originate: and as they were incompetent to this task, the whole affair broke down. We shall hereafter find other examples, in which the incapacity of Lacedæmonian envoys, to meet the open debate of Athenian political life, is productive of mischievous results. In this case, the proposition of the envoys to enter into treaty with select commissioners, was not only quite reasonable, but afforded the only possibility — though doubtless not a certainty — of some ultimate pacification: and the manœuvre whereby Kleon discredited it was a grave abuse of publicity, not unknown in modern, though more frequent in ancient, political life. Kleon probably thought that if commissioners were named, Nikias, Lachês, and other politicians of the same rank and color, would be the persons selected; persons whose anxiety for peace and alliance with Sparta would make them over-indulgent and careless in securing the interests of Athens: and it will be seen, when we come to describe the conduct of Nikias four years afterwards, that this suspicion was not ill-grounded.

Unfortunately Thucydides, in describing the proceedings of this assembly, so important in its consequences because it intercepted a promising opening for peace, is brief as usual, — telling us only what was said by Kleon and what was decided by the assembly. But though nothing is positively stated respecting Nikias and his partisans, we learn from other sources, and we may infer from what afterwards occurred, that they vehemently opposed Kleon, and that they looked coldly on the subsequent enterprise against Sphakteria as upon his peculiar measure.¹

It has been common to treat the dismissal of the Lacedæmonian envoys on this occasion as a peculiar specimen of democrat-

¹ Plutarch, Nikias, c. 7; Philochorus, Fragm. 105. ed. Didot.

ical folly. But, over-estimation of the prospective chances arising out of success, to a degree more extravagant than that of which Athens was now guilty, is by no means peculiar to democracy. Other governments, opposed to democracy not less in temper than in form, — an able despot like the emperor Napoleon, and a powerful aristocracy like that of England,¹ — have found success to the full as misleading. That Athens should desire to profit by this unexpected piece of good fortune, was perfectly reasonable: that she should make use of it to regain advantages which former misfortunes had compelled herself to surrender, was a feeling not unnatural. And whether the demand was excessive, or by how much, is a question always among the most embarrassing for any government — kingly, oligarchical, or democratical — to determine.

We may, however, remark that Kleon gave an impolitic turn to Athenian feeling, by directing it towards the entire and literal reacquisition of what had been lost twenty years before. Unless we are to consider his quadruple demand as a flourish, to be

¹ Let us read some remarks of Mr. Burke on the temper of England during the American war.

"You remember that in the beginning of this American war, you were greatly divided: and a very strong body, if not the strongest, opposed itself to the madness which every art and every power were employed to render popular, in order that the errors of the rulers might be lost in the general blindness of the nation. This opposition continued until after our great, but most unfortunate, victory at Long Island. Then all the mounds and banks of our constancy were borne down at once; and the frenzy of the American war broke in upon us like a deluge. This victory, which seemed to put an immediate end to all difficulties, perfected in us that spirit of domination which our unparalleled prosperity had but too long nurtured. We had been so very powerful, and so very prosperous, that even the humblest of us were degraded into the devices and follies of augs. We lost all measure between means and ends; and our headlong desires became our politics and our morals. All men who wished for peace, or retained any sentiments of moderation, were overborne or silenced: and this city (Bristol) was led by every artifice (and probably with the more management, because I was one of your members) to distinguish itself by its zeal for that fatal cause." Burke, Speech to the Electors of Bristol previous to the election (Works, vol. iii. p. 365).

Compare Mr. Burke's Letter to the Sheriff of Bristol, p. 174 of the same volume.

modified by subsequent negotiation, it seems to present some possibility, but little of long-sighted wisdom: for while, on the one hand, it called upon Sparta to give up much which was not in her possession and must have been extorted by force from allies, — on the other hand, the situation of Athens was not the same as it had been when she concluded the thirty years' truce; nor does it seem that the restoration of Achaia and Trœzen would have been of any material value to her. Nisæa and Pegæ — which would have been tantamount to the entire Megarid, inasmuch as Megara itself could hardly have been held with both its ports in the possession of an enemy — would, indeed, have been highly valuable, since she could then have protected her territory against invasion from Peloponnesus, besides possessing a port in the Corinthian gulf. And it would seem that if able commissioners had now been named for private discussion with the Lacedæmonian envoys, under the present urgent desire of Sparta, coupled with her disposition to abandon her allies, — this important point might possibly have been pressed and carried, in exchange for Sphacteria. Nay, even if such acquisition had been found impracticable, still, the Athenians would have been able to effect some arrangement which would have widened the breach, and destroyed the confidence, between Sparta and her allies; a point of great moment for them to accomplish. There was therefore every reason for trying what could be done by negotiation, under the present temper of Sparta; and the step, by which Kleon abruptly broke off such hopes, was decidedly mischievous.

On the return of the envoys without success to Pylus,¹ twenty days after their departure from that place, the armistice immediately terminated: and the Lacedæmonians redemanded the triremes which they had surrendered. But Eurymedon refused compliance with this demand, alleging that the Lacedæmonians had, during the truce, made a fraudulent attempt to surprise the rock of Pylus, and had violated the stipulations in other ways besides; while it stood expressly stipulated in the truce, that the violation by either side even of the least among its conditions, should cancel all obligation on both sides. Thucydides, without

¹ Thucyd. iv, 39.

distinctly giving his opinion, seems rather to imply, that there was no just ground for the refusal: though if any accidental want of vigilance had presented to the Lacedæmonians an opportunity for surprising Pylus, they would be likely enough to avail themselves of it, seeing that they would thereby drive off the Athenian fleet from its only landing-place, and render the continued blockade of Sphacteria impracticable. However the truth may be, Eurymedon persisted in his refusal, in spite of loud protests of the Lacedæmonians against his perfidy. Hostilities were energetically resumed: the Lacedæmonian army on land began again to attack the fortifications of Pylus, while the Athenian fleet became doubly watchful in the blockade of Sphacteria, in which they were reinforced by twenty fresh ships from Athens, making a fleet of seventy triremes in all. Two ships were perpetually rowing round the island in opposite directions, throughout the whole day; while at night, the whole fleet were kept on watch, except on the sea-side of the island in stormy weather.¹

The blockade, however, was soon found to be more full of privation in reference to the besiegers themselves, and more difficult of enforcement in respect to the island and its occupants, than had been originally contemplated. The Athenians were much distressed for want of water; they had only one really good spring in the fortification of Pylus itself, quite insufficient for the supply of a large fleet: many of them were obliged to scrape the shingle and drink such brackish water as they could find; while ships as well as men were perpetually afloat, since they could take rest and refreshment only by relays, successively landing on the rock of Pylus, or even on the edge of Sphacteria itself, with all the chance of being interrupted by the enemy, — there being no other landing-place,² and the ancient trireme affording no accommodation either for eating or sleeping. At first, all this was patiently borne, in the hopes that Sphacteria would speedily be starved out, and the Spartans forced to renew the request for

¹ Thucyd. iv, 23.

² Thucyd. iv, 25. τὸν πῶτον οὐκ ἔχοντων ἄρμον. This does not mean (as some of the commentators seem to suppose, see Poppo's note) that the Athenians had not plenty of sea-room in the harbor: it means, that they had no station ashore, except the narrow space of Pylus itself.

capitulation: but no such request came, and the Athenians in the fleet gradually became sick in body as well as impatient and angry in mind. In spite of all their vigilance, clandestine supplies of provisions continually reached the island, under the temptation of large rewards offered by the Spartan government. Able swimmers contrived to cross the strait, dragging after them by ropes skins full of linseed and poppy-seed mixed with honey; while merchant vessels, chiefly manned by Helots, started from various parts of the Laconian coast, selecting by preference the stormy nights, and encountering every risk in order to run their vessel with its cargo ashore on the sea-side of the island, at a time when the Athenian guardships could not be on the lookout.¹ They cared little about damage to their vessel in landing, provided they could get the cargo on shore; for ample compensation was insured to them, together with emancipation to every Helot who succeeded in reaching the island with a supply. Though the Athenians redoubled their vigilance, and intercepted many of these daring smugglers, still, there were others who eluded them: moreover, the rations supplied to the island by stipulation during the absence of the envoys in their journey to Athens had been so ample, that Epitadas the commander had been able to economize, and thus to make the stock hold out longer. Week after week passed without any symptoms of surrender, and the Athenians not only felt the present sufferings of their own position, but also became apprehensive for their own supplies, all brought by sea round Peloponnesus to this distant and naked shore. They began even to mistrust the possibility of thus indefinitely continuing the blockade against the contingencies of such violent weather, as would probably ensue at the close of summer. In this state of weariness and uncertainty, the active Demosthenes began to organize a descent upon the island, with the view of carrying it by force. He not only sent for forces from the neighboring allies, Zakynthus and Naupaktus, but also transmitted an urgent request to Athens that reinforcements might be furnished to him for the purpose, making known explicitly both the uncomfortable condition of the armament, and the unpromising chances of simple blockade.²

¹ Thucyd. iv, 26.

² Thucyd. iv, 27-29, 30.

The arrival of these envoys caused infinite mortification to the Athenians at home. Having expected to hear, long before, that Sphakteria had surrendered, they were now taught to consider even the ultimate conquest as a matter of doubt: they were surprised that the Lacedæmonians sent no fresh envoys to solicit peace, and began to suspect that such silence was founded upon well-grounded hopes of being able to hold out. But the person most of all discomposed was Kleon, who observed that the people now regretted their insulting repudiation of the Lacedæmonian message, and were displeased with him as the author of it; while, on the contrary, his numerous political enemies were rejoiced at the turn which events had taken, as it opened a means of effecting his ruin. At first, Kleon contended that the envoys had misrepresented the state of facts; to which the latter replied by entreating, that if their accuracy were mistrusted, commissioners of inspection might be sent to verify it; and Kleon himself, along with Theogenes, was forthwith named for this function.

But it did not suit Kleon's purpose to go as commissioner to Pylus, since his mistrust of the statement was a mere general suspicion, not resting on any positive evidence: moreover, he saw that the dispositions of the assembly tended to comply with the request of Demosthenes, and to despatch a reinforcing armament. He accordingly altered his tone at once: "If ye really believe the story (he said), do not waste time in sending commissioners, but sail at once to capture the men. It would be easy with a proper force, if our generals were *men* (here he pointed reproachfully to his enemy Nikias, then stratêgus¹), to sail and take the soldiers in the island. That is what *I* at least would do, if *I* were general." His words instantly provoked a hostile murmur from a portion of the assembly: "Why do you not sail then at once, if you think the matter so easy?" while Nikias, taking

¹ Thucyd. iv, 27. Καὶ ἐξ Νικίαν τὸν Νικηράτου στρατηγὸν ὄντα ἀπεσή-
μαινεν, ἔχθρος ὢν καὶ ἐπιτιμῶν—ῥῥῶδιον εἶναι παρασκευῇ, εἰ ἄνδρες εἴεν οἱ
στρατηγοί, πλεῖστας λαβεῖν τοὺς ἐν τῇ νήσῳ· καὶ αὐτὸς γ' ἂν, εἰ ἦρχε,
ποιῆσαι τοῦτο. Ὁ δὲ Νικίας τῶν τε Ἀθηναίων τι ὑποδοροβήσωντων ἐξ τῶν
Κλεωνα, ὅτι οὐ καὶ νῦν πλεῖ, εἰ ῥῥῶδιον γε αὐτῷ φαίνεται· καὶ ἅμα ἰρῶν
αὐτὸν ἐπιτιμῶντα, ἐκέλευεν ἡντινα βούλεται δυνάμιν λαβεῖν, τὸ ἐπὶ σφῶν
εἶναι, ἐπιχειρεῖν.

up this murmur, and delighted to have caught his political enemy in a trap, stood forward in person, and pressed him to set about the enterprise without delay; intimating the willingness of himself and his colleagues to grant him any portion of the military force of the city which he chose to ask for. Kleon at first closed with this proposition, believing it to be a mere stratagem of debate and not seriously intended: but so soon as he saw that what was said was really meant, he tried to back out, and observed to Nikias: "It is your place to sail: *you* are general, not I." Nikias only replied by repeating his exhortation, renouncing formally the command against Sphakteria, and calling upon the Athenians to recollect what Kleon had said, as well as to hold him to his engagement. The more Kleon tried to evade the duty, the louder and more unanimous did the cry of the assembly become that Nikias should surrender it to him, and that *he* should undertake it. At last, seeing that there was no possibility of receding, Kleon reluctantly accepted the charge, and came forward to announce his intention in a resolute address: "I am not at all afraid of the Lacedæmonians (he said): I shall sail without even taking with me any of the hoplites from the regular Athenian muster-roll, but only the Lemnian and Imbrian hoplites who are now here (that is, Athenian *kleruchs* or out-citizens who had properties in Lemnos and Imbros, and habitually resided there), together with some peltasts, brought from Ænos, in Thrace, and four hundred bowmen. With this force, added to what is already at Pylos, I engage in the space of twenty days either to bring the Lacedæmonians in Sphakteria hither as prisoners, or to kill them in the island." The Athenians — observes Thucydides — laughed somewhat at Kleon's looseness of tongue; but

¹ Thucyd. iv, 28. Ὅτι (Κλέων), τοῦ μὲν πρώτου οἰομένου αὐτὸν (Νικίαν) λόγῳ μόνον λανθάνει, ἐτοίμος ἔν, μῆκος δὲ τῷ ἑντι παραδωσέοντα ἀνεχώρει, καὶ οὐκ ἔφη αὐτὸς ἀλλ' ἐκείνου στρατηγεῖν, δέδωκεν ἤδη καὶ οὐκ ἂν οἰομένης οἱ αὐτὸν τοῦ μὲν ἐπαγαγέσθαι. Αἰσθὺς δὲ ὁ Νικίας ἐκείνῳ, καὶ ἐξίστατο τῆς ἐπὶ Πύλῳ ἀρχῆς, καὶ μάρτυρας τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις ἔπεισε. Οἱ δὲ, οἷον δόχλος φιλεῖ πείθειν, ὥς μάλ' ὁ Κλέων ἐπιφέρει τὸν πλὸν καὶ ἐξανεχώρει τὰ εἰρημνῆα, τὰς ἐπεκτείνοντο τῷ Νικίᾳ παραδιδόναι τὴν ἀρχὴν καὶ ἐκείνῳ ἐπεδύον τλῆιν. Ὡς οὐκ ἔχων ὅπως τῶν ἐνιμέμενων ἐτι ἐξαπαλᾷ, ἐξίστατο τὸν πλὸν, καὶ παρελθὼν οἷτε φοβεῖσθαι ἔφη Λακεδαιμόνιος, etc.

prudent men had pleasure in reflecting that one or other of the two advantages was now certain: either they would get rid of Kleon, which they anticipated as the issue at once most probable and most desirable, — or, if mistaken on this point, the Lacedæmonians in the island would be killed or taken.¹ The vote was accordingly passed for the immediate departure of Kleon, who caused Demosthenes to be named as his colleague in command, and sent intelligence to Pylos at once that he was about to start with the reinforcement solicited.

This curious scene, interesting as laying open the interior feeling of the Athenian assembly, suggests, when properly considered, reflections very different from those which have been usually connected with it. It seems to be conceived by most historians as a mere piece of levity or folly in the Athenian people, who are supposed to have enjoyed the excellent joke of putting an incompetent man against his own will at the head of this enterprise, in order that they might amuse themselves with his blunders: Kleon is thus contemptible, and the Athenian people ridiculous. Certainly, if that people had been disposed to conduct their public business upon such childish fancies as are here implied, they would have made a very different figure from that which history actually presents to us. The truth is, that in regard to Kleon's alleged looseness of tongue, which excited more or less of laughter among the persons present, there was no one really ridiculous except the laughers themselves: for the announcement which he made was so far from being extravagant, that it was realized to the letter, and realized, too, let us add, without any peculiar aid from unforeseen favorable accident. To show how much this is the case, we have only to contrast the jesters before the fact with the jesters after it. While the former deride Kleon as a promiser of extravagant and impossible results, we find Aristophanes, in his comedy of the Knights, about six

¹ Thucyd. iv, 28. Τοῖς δὲ Ἀθηναίοις ἐνέπεσε μὲν τι καὶ γέλωτος τῇ κοινῇ αἰσθῇ, ἀσμένους δ' ὅμως ἐγένετο τοῖς σώφροσι τῶν ἀνθρώπων, λογιζομένων δ' οὖν ἀγαθὸν τοῦ ἑτέρου τεύξεσθαι — ἢ Κλέωνος ἀπαλ' ἀγῆσθαι, ὃ μὲν ἄλλ' ἢ ἐλπίσει, ἢ σφαλεῖσι γνώμῃς Λακεδαιμόνιος σφίσι χειρώσασθαι.

months afterwards,¹ laughing at him as having achieved nothing at all, — as having cunningly put himself into the shoes of Demosthenês, and stolen away from that general the glory of taking Sphakteria, after all the difficulties of the enterprise had been already got over, and “the cake ready baked,” — to use the phrase of the comic poet. Both of the jests are exaggerations in opposite directions; but the last in order of time, if it be good at all against Kleon, is a galling sarcasm against those who derided Kleon as an extravagant boaster.

If we intend fairly to compare the behavior of Kleon with that of his political adversaries, we must distinguish between the two occasions: first, that in which he had frustrated the pacific mission of the Lacedæmonian envoys; next, the subsequent delay and dilemma which has been recently described. On the first occasion, his advice appears to have been mistaken in policy, as well as offensive in manner: his opponents, proposing a discussion by special commissioners as a fair chance for honorable terms of peace, took a juster view of the public interests. But the case was entirely altered when the mission for peace (wisely or unwisely) had been broken up, and when the fate of Sphakteria had been committed to the chances of war. There were then imperative reasons for prosecuting the war vigorously, and for employing all the force requisite to insure the capture of that island. And looking to this end, we shall find that there was nothing in the conduct of Kleon either to blame or to deride; while his political adversaries, Nikias among them, are deplorably

¹ Aristophanês, *Equit.* 54:—

.....καὶ πρῶν γ' ἔμοῦ
Μαζαν μεμαχότος ἐν Πύλῳ Λακωνικῇν,
Πανουργοτάτῃ πως περιδραμῶν, ἰφαρπύσας
Αὐτὸς παρέθηκε τὴν ἐπ' ἔμοῦ μεμαγμένην.

It is Demosthenês who speaks in reference to Kleon, — termed in that comedy the Paphlagonian slave of Demos.

Compare *v.* 391,

Κάτ' ἀνὴρ ἔδοξεν εἶναι, τᾷλλότριον ἀμῶν θέρως, etc.,

and 740–1197.

So far from cunningly thrusting himself into the post as general, Kleon did everything he possibly could to avoid the post, and was only forced into it by the artifices of his enemies. It is important to notice how little the jests of Aristophanês can be taken as any evidence of historical reality

timid, ignorant, and reckless of the public interest; seeking only to turn the existing disappointment and dilemma into a party opportunity for ruining him.

To grant the reinforcement asked for by Demosthenês was obviously the proper measure, and Kleon saw that the people would go along with him in proposing it: but he had at the same time good grounds for reproaching Nikias, and the other stratêgi, whose duty it was to originate that proposition, with their backwardness in remaining silent, and in leaving the matter to go by default, as if it were Kleon's affair and not theirs. His taunt: “This is what *I* would have done, if *I* were general,” was a mere phrase of the heat of debate, such as must have been very often used, without any idea on the part of the hearers of construing it as a pledge which the speaker was bound to realize: nor was it any disgrace to Kleon to decline a charge which he had never sought, and to confess his incompetence to command. The reason why he was forced into the post, in spite of his own unaffected reluctance, was not, as some historians would have us believe, because the Athenian people loved a joke, but from two feelings, both perfectly serious, which divided the assembly, — feelings opposite in their nature, but coinciding on this occasion to the same result. His enemies loudly urged him forward, anticipating that the enterprise under him would miscarry, and that he would thus be ruined: his friends, perceiving this manœuvre, but not sharing in such anticipations, and ascribing his reluctance to modesty, pronounced themselves so much the more vehemently on behalf of their leader, and repaid the scornful cheer by cheers of sincere encouragement. “Why do you not try your hand at this enterprise, Kleon, if you think it so easy? You will soon find that it is too much for you;” was the cry of his enemies: to which his friends would reply: “Yes, to be sure, try, Kleon: by all means, try: do not be backward; we warrant that you will come honorably out of it, and we will stand by you.” Such cheer and counter-cheer is precisely in the temper of an animated multitude, as Thucydides¹ states it, divided in feeling; and friends as well as enemies thus concurred to impose upon Kleon a compulsion not to be eluded. Of all the parties

¹ Thucyd. *iv.* 28. οἷον ὄχλος φέρεται ποιεῖν, etc.

here concerned those whose conduct is the most unpardonably disgraceful are Nikias and his oligarchical friends; who force a political enemy into a supreme command against his own strenuous protest, persuaded that he will fail so as to compromise the lives of many soldiers, and the destinies of the state on an important emergency, — but satisfying themselves with the idea that they shall bring him to disgrace and ruin.

It is to be remarked, that Nikias and his fellow strategi were backward on this occasion, partly because they were really afraid of the duty. They anticipated a resistance to the death at Sphacteria, such as that at Thermopylae: in which case, though victory might perhaps be won by a superior assailant force, it would not be won without much bloodshed and peril, besides an inexpiable quarrel with Sparta. If Kleon took a more correct measure of the chances, he ought to have credit for it, as one "*bene ausus rana contemnere*." And it seems probable, that if he had not been thus forward in supporting the request of Demosthenes for reinforcement, — or rather, if he had not been so placed that he was compelled to be forward, — Nikias and his friends would have laid aside the enterprise, and reopened negotiations for peace, under circumstances neither honorable nor advantageous to Athens. Kleon was in this manner one main author of the most important success which Athens obtained throughout the whole war.

On joining Demosthenes with his reinforcement, Kleon found every preparation for attack made by that general, and the soldiers at Pylus eager to commence such aggressive measures as would relieve them from the tedium of a blockade. Sphacteria had become recently more open to assault in consequence of an accidental conflagration of the wood, arising from a fire kindled by the Athenian seamen, while landing at the skirt of the island, and cooking their food: under the influence of a strong wind, most of the wood in the island had thus caught fire and been destroyed. To Demosthenes this was an accident especially welcome; for the painful experience of his defeat in the forest-covered hills of Ætolia had taught him how difficult it was for assailants to cope with an enemy whom they could not see, and who knew all the good points of defence in the country.¹ The

¹ Thucyd. iv, 30.

island being thus stripped of its wood, he was enabled to survey the garrison, to count their number, and to lay his plan of attack on certain data. He now, too, for the first time, discovered that he had underrated their real number, having before suspected that the Lacedaemonians had sent in rations for a greater total than was actually there. The island was occupied altogether by four hundred and twenty Lacedaemonian hoplites, out of whom more than one hundred and twenty were native Spartans, belonging to the first families in the city. The commander, Epitadas, with the main body, occupied the centre of the island, near the only spring of water which it afforded:¹ an advanced guard of thirty hoplites was posted not far from the sea-shore, in the end of the island farthest from Pylus; while the end immediately fronting Pylus, peculiarly steep and rugged, and containing even a rude circuit of stones, of unknown origin, which served as a sort of defence, was held as a post of reserve.²

Such was the prey which Kleon and Demosthenes were anxious to grasp. On the very day of the arrival of the former, they sent a herald to the Lacedaemonian generals on the mainland, inviting the surrender of the hoplites on the island, on condition of being simply detained under guard without any hardship, until a final pacification should take place. Of course the summons was refused; after which, leaving only one day for repose, the two generals took advantage of the night to put all their hoplites aboard a few triremes, making show as if they were merely commencing the ordinary nocturnal circumnavigation, so as to excite no suspicion in the occupants of the island. The entire body of Athenian hoplites, eight hundred in number, were thus disembarked in two divisions, one on each side of the island, a little before daybreak: the advanced guard of thirty Lacedaemonians, completely unprepared, were surprised even in their sleep and all slain.³ At the point of day, the entire remaining force from the seventy-two triremes was also disembarked, leaving on board only the thalassii, or lowest tier of rowers, and

¹ Colonel Leake gives an interesting illustration of these particulars in the topography of the island which may even now be verified (*Travels in Morea*, vol. i, p. 408).

² Thucyd. iv, 31.

³ Thucyd. iv, 32.

reserving only a sufficient number to man the walls of Pylus. Altogether, there could not have been less than ten thousand troops employed in the attack of the island, — men of all arms: eight hundred hoplites, eight hundred peltasts, eight hundred bowmen; the rest armed with javelins, slings, and stones. Demosthenes kept his hoplites in one compact body, but distributed the light-armed into separate companies of about two hundred men each, with orders to occupy the rising grounds all round, and harass the flanks and rear of the Lacedæmonians.¹

To resist this large force, the Lacedæmonian commander Epitadas had only three hundred and sixty hoplites around him; for his advanced guard of thirty men had been slain, and as many more must have been held in reserve to guard the rocky station in his rear: of the Helots who were with him, Thucydides says nothing, during the whole course of the action. As soon as he saw the numbers and disposition of his enemies, Epitadas placed his men in battle array, and advanced to encounter the main body of hoplites whom he saw before him. But the Spartan march was habitually slow:² moreover, the ground was rough and uneven, obstructed with stumps, and overlaid with dust and ashes, from the recently burnt wood, so that a march at once rapid and orderly was hardly possible: and he had to traverse the whole intermediate space, since the Athenian hoplites remained immovable in their position. No sooner had his march commenced, than he found himself assailed both in rear and flanks, especially in the right or unshielded flank, by the numerous companies of light-armed.³ Notwithstanding their extraordinary superiority of number, these men were at first awestricken at finding themselves in actual contest with Lacedæmonian hoplites:⁴ still, they began the fight, poured in their missile weapons, and so annoyed the march that the hoplites were obliged to halt, while Epitadas ordered the most active among them to spring out of their ranks and repel the assailants. But pursuers with spear and shield had little chance of overtaking men lightly clad and armed, who always retired, in whatever

¹ Thucyd. iv, 32.

² Thucyd. v, 71.

³ Thucyd. iv, 33.

⁴ Thucyd. iv, 33. ὥσπερ ὅτε πρῶτον ἀπεβαινον τῇ γυνήμῃ δεδογλωμένοι ὡς ἐπὶ Λακεδαιμονίους, etc.

direction the pursuit was commenced, had the advantage of difficult ground, redoubled their annoyance against the rear of the pursuers as soon as the latter retreated to resume their place in the ranks, and always took care to get round to the rear of the hoplites.

After some experience of the inefficacy of Lacedæmonian pursuit, the light-armed, becoming far bolder than at first, closed upon them nearer and more universally, with arrows, javelins, and stones, raising shouts and clamor that rent the air, rendering the word of command inaudible by the Lacedæmonian soldiers, who at the same time were almost blinded by the thick clouds of dust, kicked up from the recently spread wood-ashes.¹ Such method of fighting was one for which the Lykurgian drill made no provision, and the longer it continued the more painful did the embarrassment of the exposed hoplites become: their repeated efforts to destroy or even to reach nimble and ever-returning enemies, all proved abortive, whilst their own numbers were incessantly diminished by wounds which they could not return. Their only offensive arms consisted of the long spear and short sword usual to the Grecian hoplite, without any missile weapons whatever; nor could they even pick up and throw back the javelins of their enemies, since the points of these javelins commonly broke off and stuck in the shields, or sometimes even in the body which they had wounded. Moreover, the bows of the archers, doubtless carefully selected before starting from Athens, were powerfully drawn, so that their arrows may sometimes have pierced and inflicted wounds even through the shield or the helmet, — but at any rate, the stuffed doublet, which formed the only defence of the hoplite on his unshielded side, was a very inadequate protection against them.² Under this trying distress

¹ Thucyd. iv, 34: compare with this the narrative of the destruction of the Lacedæmonian mora near Lechaum, by Iphikratēs and the Peltastæ (Xenophon. Hellen. iv, 5, 11).

² Thucyd. iv, 34. Τὸ τε ἔργον ἐνταῦθα χαλεπὸν τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις καθίστατο· εὐτε γὰρ οἱ πῖλοι ἔσπεγον τὰ τοξεύματα, δорάτιά τε ἐν ὑποκέκλαστο βαλλομένων, εἶχον δὲ οὐδὲν σφίσιν αὐτοῖς χρήσασθαι, ἀποκεκλημένοι μὲν τῇ ὀφει τοῦ προορᾶν, ὑπὸ δὲ τῆς μείζονος βοῆς τῶν πολεμίων τὰ ἐν αὐτοῖς παραγελλόμενα οὐκ ἰσχυρόντες, κινδύνου δὲ παντάχου περιεστώτες, καὶ οὐκ ἔχοντες ἐλπίδα καθ' ὃ, τι χρησιμνομένους σωθῆναι.

did the Lacedæmonians continue for a long time, poorly provided for defence, and altogether helpless for aggression, — without being able to approach at all nearer to the Athenian hoplites. At length the Lacedæmonian commander, seeing that his position grew worse and worse, gave orders to close the ranks and retreat to the last redoubt in the rear: but this movement was not accomplished without difficulty, for the light-armed assailants became doubly clamorous and forward, and many wounded men, unable to move, or at least to keep in rank, were overtaken and slain.¹

A diminished remnant, however, reached the last post in safety, and they were here in comparative protection, since the ground was so rocky and impracticable that their enemies could not attack them either in flank or rear: though the position at any rate could not have been long tenable separately, inasmuch as the only spring of water in the island was in the centre, which they had just been compelled to abandon. The light-armed being now less available, Demosthenēs and Kleon brought up their eight hundred Athenian hoplites, who had not before been engaged; but the Lacedæmonians were here at home² with their weapons, and enabled to display their well-known superiority against opposing hoplites, especially as they had the advantage

There has been doubt and difficulty in this passage, even from the time of the Scholiasts. Some commentators have translated *πίλοι* *caps* or *hats*. — others, *padded cuirasses* of wool or felt, round the breast and back: see the notes of Duker, Dr. Arnold, Poppo, and Götter. That the word *πίλοι* is sometimes used for the helmet, or head-piece, is unquestionable, — sometimes even (with or without *χαλκός*) for a brazen helmet (see Aristophan. *Lysis*. 562; Antiphanēs ap. Athenæ. xi. p. 503); but I cannot think that on this occasion Thucydides would specially indicate the head of the Lacedæmonian hoplite as his chief vulnerable part. Dr. Arnold, indeed, offers a reason to prove that he might naturally do so: but in my judgment the reason is very insufficient.

Πίλοι means stuffed clothing of wool or felt, whether employed to protect head, body, or feet: and I conceive, with Poppo and others, that it here indicates the body-clothing of the Lacedæmonian hoplite; his body being the part most open to be wounded on the side undefended by the shield, as well as in the rear. That the word *πίλοι* will bear this sense may be seen in Pollux, vii. 171; Plato, *Timæus*, p. 74; and *Symposium*, p. 220, c. 35: respecting *πίλος* as applied to the foot-covering, — Bekker, *Chariklēs*, vol. ii. p. 376.

¹ Thucyd. iv. 35

² Thucyd. iv. 33. τῇ σφαιρίᾳ ἐμπειρίᾳ χρῆσασθαι, &c.

of higher ground against enemies charging from beneath. Although the Athenians were double their own numbers and withal yet unexhausted, they were repulsed in many successive attacks. The besieged maintained their ground in spite of all their previous fatigue and suffering, harder to be borne from the scanty diet on which they had recently subsisted. The struggle lasted so long that heat and thirst began to tell even upon the assailants, when the commander of the Messenians came to Kleon and Demosthenēs, and intimated that they were now laboring in vain; promising at the same time that if they would confide to him a detachment of light troops and bowmen, he would find his way round to the higher cliffs in the rear of the assailants.¹ He accordingly stole away unobserved from the rear, scrambling round over pathless crags, and by an almost impracticable footing on the brink of the sea, amidst approaches which the Lacedæmonians had left unguarded, never imagining that they could be molested in that direction. He suddenly appeared with his detachment on the higher peak above them, so that their position was thus commanded, and they found themselves, as at Thermopylæ, between two fires, without any hope of escape. Their enemies in front, encouraged by the success of the Messenians, pressed forward with increased ardor, until at length the courage of the Lacedæmonians gave way, and the position was carried.²

A few moments more, and they would have been all overpowered and slain, when Kleon and Demosthenēs, anxious to carry them as prisoners to Athens, constrained their men to halt, and proclaimed by herald an invitation to surrender, on condition of delivering up their arms and being held at the disposal of the Athenians. Most of them, incapable of farther effort, closed with the proposition forthwith, signifying compliance by dropping their shields and waving both hands above their heads. The battle being thus ended, Styphon the commander — originally only third in command, but now chief, since Epitadas had been slain, and the second in command, Hippagretēs, was lying disabled by wounds on the field — entered into conference with Kleon and Demosthenēs, and entreated permission to send across for orders to the Lacedæmonians on the mainland. The Athe

¹ Thucyd. iv. 36.

² Thucyd. iv. 37

nian commanders, though refusing this request, sent themselves and invited Lacedæmonian heralds over from the mainland, through whom communications were exchanged twice or three times between Styphon and the chief Lacedæmonian authorities. At length the final message came: "The Lacedæmonians direct you to take counsel for yourselves, but to do nothing disgraceful."¹ Their counsel was speedily taken; they surrendered themselves and delivered up their arms; two hundred and ninety-two in number, the survivors of the original total of four hundred and twenty. And out of these, no less than one hundred and twenty were native Spartans, some of them belonging to the first families in the city.² They were kept under guard during that night, and distributed on the morrow among the Athenian trierarchs to be conveyed as prisoners to Athens; while a truce was granted to the Lacedæmonians on shore, in order that they might carry across the dead bodies for burial. So careful had Epitadas been in husbanding the provisions, that some food was yet found in the island; though the garrison had subsisted for fifty-two days upon casual supplies, aided by such economies as had been laid by during the twenty days of the armistice, when food of a stipulated quantity was regularly furnished. Seventy-two days had thus elapsed, from the first imprisonment in the island to the hour of their surrender.³

The best troops in modern times would neither incur reproach, nor occasion surprise, by surrendering, under circumstances in all respects similar to this gallant remnant in Sphacteria. Yet in Greece the astonishment was prodigious and universal, when it was learned that the Lacedæmonians had consented to become prisoners:⁴ for the terror inspired by their name, and the deep-struck impression of Thermopylæ, had created a belief that they would endure any extremity of famine, and perish in the midst of any superiority of hostile force, rather than dream of giving up their arms and surviving as captives. The events of Sphak-

¹ Thucyd. iv. 38. Οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι κελύουσιν ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς περὶ ἑμῶν αὐτῶν βουλευέσθαι, μηδὲν αἰσχρὸν ποιοῦντας.

² Thucyd. iv. 38; v. 15.

³ Thucyd. iv. 39.

⁴ Thucyd. iv. 40. παρὰ γνώμην τε, δὴ μάλιστα τῶν κατὰ τὸν πόλεμον νοῦτο τοῖς Ἕλλησιν ἐγένετο, etc.

teria, shocking as they did this preconceived idea, discredited the military prowess of Sparta in the eyes of all Greece, and especially in those of her own allies. Even in Sparta itself, too, the same feeling prevailed, — partially revealed in the answer transmitted to Styphon from the generals on shore, who did not venture to forbid surrender, yet discountenanced it by implication: and it is certain that the Spartans would have lost less by their death than by their surrender. But we read with disgust the spiteful taunt of one of the allies of Athens (not an Athenian) engaged in the affair, addressed in the form of a question to one of the prisoners: "Have your best men then been all slain?" The reply conveyed an intimation of the standing contempt entertained by the Lacedæmonians for the bow and its chance-strokes in the line: "That would be a capital arrow which could single out the best man." The language which Herodotus puts into the mouth of Demaratus, composed in the early years of the Peloponnesian war, attests this same belief in Spartan valor: "The Lacedæmonians die, but never surrender."¹ Such impression was from henceforward, not indeed effaced, but sensibly enfeebled, and never again was it restored to its former pitch.

But the general judgment of the Greeks respecting the capture of Sphacteria, remarkable as it is to commemorate, is far less surprising than that pronounced by Thucydides himself. Kleon and Demosthenes returning with a part of the squadron and carrying all the prisoners, started from Sphacteria on the next day but one after the action, and reached Athens within twenty days after Kleon had left it. Thus, "the promise of Kleon, *insane as it was*, came true," observes the historian.²

¹ To adopt a phrase, the counterpart of that which has been ascribed to the *Vieille Garde* of the Emperor Napoleon's army; compare Herodot. vii. 104.

² Thucyd. iv. 39. Καὶ τοῦ Κλέωνος καὶ περ μανιώδης οὕσα ἡ ὑπόσχεσις ἀπὲβη· ἐντὸς γὰρ εἴκοσιν ἡμερῶν ἤγαγε τοὺς ἀνδρας, ὥσπερ ἐτίσθη.

Mr. Mitford, in recounting these incidents, after having said, respecting Kleon: "In a *very extraordinary train of circumstances* which followed, *his impudence and his fortune* (if, in the want of another, we may use that term) wonderfully favored him," goes on to observe, two pages farther:—

Men with arms in their hands have always the option between death and imprisonment, and Grecian opinion was only mistaken

"It however soon appeared, that though for a man like Kleon, unversed in military command, the undertaking was rash and the bragging promise abundantly ridiculous, yet the business was not so desperate as it was in the moment generally imagined: and in fact the folly of the Athenian people, in committing such a trust to such a man, far exceeded that of the man himself, whose impudence seldom carried him beyond the control of his cunning. He had received intelligence that Demosthenes had already formed the plan and was preparing for the attempt, with the forces upon the spot and in the neighborhood. Hence, his apparent moderation in the demand for troops; which he judiciously accommodated to the gratification of the Athenian people, by avoiding to require any Athenians. He farther showed his judgment, when the decree was to be passed which was finally to direct the expedition, by a request which was readily granted, that Demosthenes might be joined with him in the command." (Mitford, Hist. of Greece, vol. iii, ch. xv. sect. vii, pp. 250-253.)

It appears as if no historian could write down the name of Kleon without attaching to it some disparaging verb or adjective. We are here told in the same sentence that Kleon was an *impudent braggart* for promising the execution of the enterprise, — and yet that the enterprise itself was perfectly feasible. We are told in one sentence that he was rash and ridiculous for promising this, *unversed as he was in military command*: a few words farther, we are informed that he expressly requested that the most competent man to be found, Demosthenes, might be named his colleague. We are told of the *cunning* of Kleon, and that Kleon had received intelligence from Demosthenes, — as if this were some private communication to himself. But Demosthenes had sent no news to Kleon, nor did Kleon know anything which was not equally known to every man in the assembly. The *folly* of the people in committing the trust to Kleon is denounced, — as if Kleon had sought it himself, or as if his friends had been the first to propose it for him. If the folly of the people was thus great, what are we to say of the knavery of the oligarchical party, with Nikias at their head, who impelled the people into this folly, for the purpose of ruining a political antagonist, and who forced Kleon into the post against his own most unaffected reluctance? Against this manœuvre of the oligarchical party, neither Mr. Mitford nor any other historian says a word. When Kleon judges circumstances rightly, as Mr. Mitford allows that he did in this case, he has credit for nothing better than *cunning*.

The truth is, that the people committed no folly in appointing Kleon, for he justified the best expectations of his friends. But Nikias and his friends committed great knavery in proposing it, since they fully believed that he would fail. And, even upon Mr. Mitford's statement of the case, the opinion of Thucydides which stands at the beginning of this note is

in assuming as a certainty that the Lacedæmonians would choose the former. But Kleon had never promised to bring them home as prisoners: his promise was disjunctive, — that they should be either so brought home, or slain, within twenty days: and no sentence throughout the whole of Thucydides astonishes me so much as that in which he stigmatizes such an expectation as "insane." Here are four hundred and twenty Lacedæmonian hoplites, without any other description of troops to aid them, — without the possibility of being reinforced, — without any regular fortification, — without any narrow pass, such as that of Thermopylae, — without either a sufficient or a certain supply of food, — cooped up in a small open island less than two miles in length. Against them are brought ten thousand troops of diverse arms, including eight hundred fresh hoplites from Athens, and marshalled by Demosthenes, a man alike enterprising and experienced: for the talents as well as the presence and preparations of Demosthenes are a part of the data of the case, and the personal competence of Kleon to command alone, is foreign to the calculation. Now if, under such circumstances, Kleon engaged that this forlorn company of brave men should be either slain or taken prisoners, how could he be looked upon, I will not say as indulging in an insane boast, but even as overstepping the most cautious and mistrustful estimate of probability? Even to doubt of this result, much more to pronounce such an opinion as that of Thucydides, implies an idea not only of superhuman power in the Lacedæmonian hoplites, but of disgraceful cowardice on the part of Demosthenes and the assailants. Nor was the interval of twenty days, named by Kleon, at all extravagantly narrow, considering the distance of Athens from Pylus: for the attack of this petty island could not possibly occupy more than one or two days at the utmost, though the blockade of it might by various accidents have been prolonged, or might even, by some terrible storm, be altogether broken off. If, then, we carefully consider this promise made by Kleon in the assembly, we shall find that so far from

thoroughly unjustifiable: not less unjustifiable than the language of the modern historian about the "extraordinary circumstances," and the way in which Kleon was "favored by fortune." Not a single incident can be specified in the narrative to bear out these invidious assertions.

deserving the sentence pronounced upon it by Thucydides, of being a mad boast which came true by accident, it was a reasonable and even a modest anticipation of the future: reserving the only really doubtful point in the case, whether the garrison of the island would be ultimately slain or made prisoners. Demosthenes, had he been present at Athens instead of being at Pylus, would willingly have set his seal to the engagement taken by Kleon.

I repeat with reluctance, though not without belief, the statement made by one of the biographers of Thucydides,² that Kleon was the cause of the banishment of the latter as a general, and has therefore received from him harder measure than was due in his capacity of historian. But though this sentiment is not probably without influence in dictating the unaccountable judgment which I have just been criticizing, — as well as other opinions relative to Kleon, on which I shall say more in a future chapter, — I nevertheless look upon that judgment not as peculiar to Thucydides, but as common to him with Nikias and those whom we must call, for want of a better name, the oligarchical party of the time at Athens. And it gives us some measure of the prejudice and narrowness of vision which prevailed among that party at the present memorable crisis; so pointedly contrasting with the clear-sighted and resolute calculations, and the judicious conduct in action, of Kleon, who, when forced against his will into the post of general, did the very best which could be done in his situation, — he selected Demosthenes as colleague and heartily seconded his operations. Though the military attack of Sphakteria, one of the

¹ The jest of an unknown comic writer (probably Eupolis or Aristophanes, in one of the many lost dramas) against Kleon: "that he showed great powers of prophecy after the fact." (*Κλέων Προμηνεύει ἔσται μετὰ τὰ πρῶτα*, Lucian, *Prometheus*, c. 2,) may probably have reference to his proceedings about Sphakteria: if so, it is certainly undeserved.

In the letter which he sent to announce the capture of Sphakteria and the prisoners to the Athenians, it is affirmed that he began with the words — *Κλέων Ἀθηναίων τῇ Βουλῇ καὶ τῷ Δῆμῳ χαίρειν*. This was derided by Eupolis, and is even considered as a piece of insolence, though it is difficult to see why (Schol. ad Aristophan. *Plut.* 322; Bergk, *De Reliquiis Comædiæ Antiquæ*, p. 362).

² Vit. Thucydidis, p. xv, ed. Bekker.

ablest specimens of generalship in the whole war, and distinguished not less by the dextrous employment of different descriptions of troops, than by care to spare the lives of the assailants, — belongs altogether to Demosthenes, yet if Kleon had not been competent to stand up in the Athenian assembly and defy those gloomy predictions which we see attested in Thucydides, Demosthenes would never have been reinforced nor placed in condition to land on the island. The glory of the enterprise, therefore, belongs jointly to both: and Kleon, far from stealing away the laurels of Demosthenes (as Aristophanes represents, in his comedy of the *Knights*), was really the means of placing them on his head, though he at the same time deservedly shared them. It has hitherto been the practice to look at Kleon only from the point of view of his opponents, through whose testimony we know him: but the real fact is, that this history of the events of Sphakteria, when properly surveyed, is a standing disgrace to those opponents and no inconsiderable honor to him; exhibiting them as alike destitute of political foresight and of straightforward patriotism, — as sacrificing the opportunities of war, along with the lives of their fellow-citizens and soldiers, for the purpose of ruining a political enemy. It was the duty of Nikias, as stratêgus, to propose, and undertake in person if necessary, the reduction of Sphakteria: if he thought the enterprise dangerous, that was a good reason for assigning to it a larger military force, as we shall find him afterwards reasoning about the Sicilian expedition. — but not for letting it slip or throwing it off upon others.¹

The return of Kleon and Demosthenes to Athens, within the twenty days promised, bringing with them near three hundred Lacedæmonian prisoners, must have been by far the most triumphant and exhilarating event which had occurred to the Athenians throughout the whole war. It at once changed the prospects, position, and feelings of both the contending parties. Such a number of Lacedæmonian prisoners, especially one hundred and twenty Spartans, was a source of almost stupefaction to the general body of Greeks, and a prize of inestimable value to the captors. The return of Demosthenes in the preceding year from the Ambrakian gulf, when he brought with him three hun-

¹ Plutarch, *Nikias*, c. 8; Thucyd. v, 7.

dred Ambrakian panoplies, had probably been sufficiently triumphant: but the entry into Peiræus on this occasion from Sphakteria, with three hundred Lacedæmonian prisoners, must doubtless have occasioned emotions transcending all former experience; and it is much to be regretted that no description is preserved to us of the scene, as well as of the elate manifestations of the people when the prisoners were marched up from Peiræus to Athens. We should be curious, also, to read some account of the first Athenian assembly held after this event, — the overwhelming cheers heaped upon Kleon by his joyful partisans, who had helped to invest him with the duties of general, in confidence that he would discharge them well, — contrasted with the silence or retraction of Nikias, and the other humiliated political enemies. But all such details are unfortunately denied to us, though they constitute the blood and animation of Grecian history, now lying before us only in its skeleton.

The first impulse of the Athenians was to regard the prisoners as a guarantee to their territory against invasion:† they resolved to keep them securely guarded until the peace, but if, at any time before that event, the Lacedæmonian army should enter Attica, to bring forth the prisoners and put them to death in sight of the invaders. They were at the same time full of spirits in regard to the prosecution of the war, and became farther confirmed in the hope, not merely of preserving their power undiminished, but even of recovering much of what they had lost before the thirty years' truce. Pylus was placed in an improved state of defence, with the adjoining island of Sphakteria, doubtless as a subsidiary occupation: the Messenians, transferred thither from Naupaktus, and overjoyed to find themselves once more masters even of an outlying rock of their ancestral territory, began with alacrity to overrun and ravage Laconia, while the Helots, shaken by the recent events, manifested inclination to desert to them. The Lacedæmonian authorities, experiencing evils before unfelt and unknown, became sensibly alarmed lest such desertions should spread through the country. Reluctant as they were to afford obvious evidence of their embarrassments, they nevertheless brought themselves, probably under the pressure of the

† Thucyd iv. 41.



STATUETTE OF PALLAS ATHENÆ, FOUND IN 1870
Greece, vol. six.

friends and relatives of the Sphakterian captives, to send to Athens several missions for peace; but all proved abortive.¹ We are not told what they offered, but it did not come up to the expectations which the Athenians thought themselves entitled to indulge.

We, who now review these facts with a knowledge of the subsequent history, see that the Athenians could have concluded a better bargain with the Lacedæmonians during the six or eight months succeeding the capture of Sphakteria, than it was ever open to them to make afterwards; and they had reason to repent that they let slip the opportunity. Perhaps also Periklês, had he been still alive, might have taken the same prudent measure of the future, and might have had ascendancy enough over his countrymen to be able to arrest the tide of success at its highest point, before it began to ebb again. But if we put ourselves back into the situation of Athens during the autumn which succeeded the return of Kleon and Demosthenês from Sphakteria, we shall easily enter into the feelings under which the war was continued. The actual possession of the captives now placed Athens in a far better position than she had occupied at a time when they were only blocked up in Sphakteria, and when the Lacedæmonian envoys first arrived to ask for peace. She was now certain of being able to command peace with Sparta on terms at least tolerable, whenever she chose to invite it, — she had also a fair certainty of escaping the hardship of invasion. Next, and this was perhaps the most important feature of the case, the apprehension of Lacedæmonian prowess was now greatly lowered, and the prospects of success to Athens considered as prodigiously improved,² even in the estimation of impartial Greeks; much more in the eyes of the Athenians themselves. Moreover, the idea of a tide of good fortune, of the favor of the gods, now begun and likely to continue, of future success as a corollary from past, was one which powerfully affected Grecian calculations generally. Why not push the present good fortune, and try to regain the most important points lost before and by the thirty years' truce, especially in Megara and

¹ Thueyd. iv, 41: compare Aristophan. Equit. 648, with Schol.

² Thueyd iv, 79.

Boeotia, — points which Sparta could not concede by negotiation, since they were not in her possession? Though these speculations failed, as we shall see in the coming chapter, yet there was nothing unreasonable in undertaking them. Probably, the almost universal sentiment of Athens was at this moment warlike, — and even Nikias, humiliated as he must have been by the success in Sphakteria, would forget his usual caution in the desire of retrieving his own personal credit by some military exploit. That Demosthenes, now in full measure of esteem, would be eager to prosecute the war, with which his prospects of personal glory were essentially associated, just as Thucydides¹ observes about Brasidas on the Lacedæmonian side, can admit of no doubt. The comedy of Aristophanes, called the *Acharnians*, was acted about six months before the affair of Sphakteria, when no one could possibly look forward to such an event, — the comedy of the *Knights*, about six months after it.² Now, there is this remarkable difference between the two, — that while the former breathes the greatest sickness of war, and presses in every possible way the importance of making peace, although at that time Athens had an opportunity of coming even to a decent accommodation, — the latter, running down Kleon with unmeasured scorn and ridicule, talks in one or two places only of the hardships of war, and drops altogether that emphasis and repetition with which peace had been dwelt upon in the *Acharnians*, — although coming out at a time when peace was within the reach of the Athenians.

To understand properly the history of this period, therefore, we must distinguish various occasions which are often confounded. At the moment when Sphakteria was first blockaded, and when the Lacedæmonians first sent to solicit peace, there was a considerable party at Athens disposed to entertain the offer, and the ascendancy of Kleon was one of the main causes why it was

¹ Thucyd. v. 16.

² The *Acharnians* was performed at the festival of the *Lenææ*, at Athens, January, 425 B.C.; the *Knights*, at the same festival in the ensuing year, 424 B.C.

The capture of Sphakteria took place about July, B.C. 425: between the two dates above. See Mr. Clinton's *Fasti Hellenici*, ad ann.

rejected. But after the captives were brought home from Sphakteria, the influence of Kleon, though positively greater than it had been before, was no longer required to procure the dismissal of Lacedæmonian pacific offers and the continuance of the war: the general temper of Athens was then warlike, and there were very few to contend strenuously for an opposite policy. During the ensuing year, however, the chances of war turned out mostly unfavorable to Athens, so that by the end of that year she had become much more disposed to peace.¹ The truce for one year was then concluded, — but even after that truce was expired, Kleon still continued eager, and on good grounds, as will be shown hereafter, for renewing the war in Thrace, at a time when a large proportion of the Athenian public had grown weary of it. He was one of the main causes of that resumption of warlike operations, which ended in the battle of Amphipolis, fatal both to himself and to Brasidas. There were thus two distinct occasions on which the personal influence and sanguine character of Kleon seems to have been of sensible moment in determining the Athenian public to war instead of peace. But at the moment which we have now reached, that is, the year immediately following the capture of Sphakteria, the Athenians were all sufficiently warlike without him; probably Nikias himself as well as the rest.

It was one of the earliest proceedings of Nikias, immediately after the inglorious exhibition which he had made in reference to Sphakteria, to conduct an expedition, in conjunction with two colleagues, against the Corinthian territory: he took with him eighty triremes, two thousand Athenian hoplites, two hundred horsemen aboard of some horse transports, and some additional hoplites from Miletus, Andros, and Karystus.² Starting from Peiræus in the evening, he arrived a little before daybreak on a beach at the foot of the hill and village of Solygeia,³ about seven miles from Corinth, and two or three miles south of the isthmus.

¹ Thucyd. iv. 117; v. 14.

² Thucyd. iv. 42. Τοῦ δ' αὐτοῦ θέρους μετὰ ταῦτα ἐβόησε, etc.

³ See the geographical illustrations of this descent in Dr. Arnold's plan and note appended to the second volume of his *Thucydides*. — and in Colonel Leake, *Travels in Morea*, ch. xxviii. p. 235; xxix. p. 309.

The Corinthian troops, from all the territory of Corinth, within the isthmus, were already assembled at the isthmus itself to repel him; for intelligence of the intended expedition had reached Corinth some time before from Argos, with which latter place the scheme of the expedition may have been in some way connected. The Athenians having touched the coast during the darkness, the Corinthians were only apprized of the fact by fire-signals from Solygeia. Not being able to hinder the landing, they despatched forthwith half their forces, under Battus and Lykophron, to repel the invader, while the remaining half were left at the harbor of Kenchreæ, on the northern side of Mount Oneion, to guard the port of Krommyon, outside of the isthmus, in case it should be attacked by sea. Battus with one lochos of hoplites threw himself into the village of Solygeia, which was unfortified, while Lykophron conducted the remaining troops to attack the Athenians. The battle was first engaged on the Athenian right, almost immediately after its landing, on the point called Chersonesus. Here the Athenian hoplites, together with their Karystian allies, repelled the Corinthian attack, after a stout and warmly disputed hand-combat of spear and shield: but the Corinthians, retreating up to a higher point of ground, returned to the charge, and with the aid of a fresh lochos, drove the Athenians back to the shore and to their ships: from hence the latter again turned, and again recovered a partial advantage.¹ The battle was no less severe on the left wing of the Athenians: but here, after a contest of some length, the latter gained a more decided victory, greatly by the aid of their cavalry, — pursuing the Corinthians, who fled in some disorder to a neighboring hill and there took up a position.² The Athenians were thus victorious throughout the whole line, with the loss of about forty-seven men, while the Corinthians had lost two hundred and twelve, together with the general Lykophron. The victors erected their trophy, stripped the dead bodies, and buried their own dead.

¹ Thucyd. iv, 43.

² Thucyd. iv, 44. *ἰθὺς τοὺς ὅπλῃα*, — an expression which Dr. Arnold explains, here as elsewhere, to mean "piling the arms:" I do not think such an explanation is correct, even here: much less in several other places to which he alludes. See a note on the surprise of Plataea by the Thebans immediately before the Peloponnesian war.

The Corinthian detachment left at Kenchreæ could not see the battle, in consequence of the interposing ridge of Mount Oneium: but it was at last made known to them by the dust of the fugitives, and they forthwith hastened to help. Reinforcements also came both from Corinth and from Kenchreæ, and as it seemed, too, from the neighboring Peloponnesian cities, so that Nikias thought it prudent to retire aboard his ships, and halt upon some neighboring islands. It was here first discovered that two of the Athenians slain had not been picked up for burial; upon which he immediately sent a herald to solicit a truce, in order to procure these two missing bodies. We have here a remarkable proof of the sanctity attached to that duty; for the mere sending of the herald was tantamount to confession of defeat.¹

From hence Nikias sailed to Krommyon, where he ravaged the neighborhood for a few hours and rested for the night. On the next day he reembarked, sailed along the coast of Epidaurus, upon which he inflicted some damage in passing, and stopped at last on the peninsula of Methana, between Epidaurus and Trœzen.² On this peninsula he established a permanent garrison, drawing a fortification across the narrow neck of land which joined it to the Epidaurian peninsula. This was his last exploit, and he then sailed home: but the post at Methana long remained as a centre for pillaging the neighboring regions of Epidaurus, Trœzen, and Halieis.

While Nikias was engaged in this expedition, Eurymedon and Sophokles had sailed forward from Pylus with a considerable portion of that fleet which had been engaged in the capture of Sphakteria, to the island of Korkyra. It has been already stated that the democratical government at Korkyra had been suffering severe pressure and privation from the oligarchical fugitives, who had come back into the island with a body of barbaric auxiliaries, and established themselves upon Mount Istônê, not far from the city.³ Eurymedon and the Athenians joining the Korkyraeans in the city, attacked and stormed the post on Mount Istônê; while the vanquished, retiring first to a lofty and inaccessible peak, were forced to surrender themselves on terms to

¹ Platarch, Nikias, c. 6.

² Thucyd. i. 2-45.

³ Thucyd. iv, 45.

the Athenians. They abandoned their mercenary auxiliaries altogether, and only stipulated that they should themselves be sent to Athens, and left to the discretion of the Athenian people. Eurymedon, assenting to these terms, deposited the disarmed prisoners in the neighboring islet of Ptychia, under the distinct condition that, if a single man tried to escape, the whole capitulation should be null and void.¹

Unfortunately for these prisoners, the orders given to Eurymedon carried him onward straight to Sicily. It was irksome, therefore, to him to send away a detachment of his squadron to convey these men to Athens, — while the honors of delivering them there would be reaped, not by himself, but by the officer to whom they might be confided: and the Korkyraeans in the city, on their part, were equally anxious that the prisoners should not be sent to Athens; for their animosity against them was bitter in the extreme, and they were afraid that the Athenians might spare their lives, so that their hostility against the island might be again resumed. And thus a mean jealousy on the part of Eurymedon, combined with revenge and insecurity on the part of the victorious Korkyraeans, brought about a cruel catastrophe, paralleled nowhere else in Greece, though too well in keeping with the previous acts of the bloody drama enacted in this island.

The Korkyrean leaders, seemingly not without the privity of Eurymedon, sent across to Ptychia fraudulent emissaries under the guise of friends to the prisoners. These emissaries — assuring the prisoners that the Athenian commanders, in spite of the convention signed, were about to hand them over to the Korkyrean people for destruction — induced some of them to attempt escape in a boat prepared for the purpose. By concert, the boat was seized in the act of escaping, so that the terms of the capitulation were really violated: upon which Eurymedon handed over the prisoners to their enemies in the island, who imprisoned them all together in one vast building, under guard of hoplites. From this building they were drawn out in companies of twenty men each, chained together in couples, and compelled to march between two lines of hoplites marshalled on each side of the road

¹ Thucyd. iv, 46.

Those who loitered in the march were hurried on by whips from behind: as they advanced, their private enemies on both sides singled them out, striking and piercing them until at length they miserably perished. Three successive companies were thus destroyed, ere the remaining prisoners in the interior, who thought merely that their place of detention was about to be changed, suspected what was passing: at length they found it out, and one and all then refused either to quit the building or to permit any one else to enter. They at the same time piteously implored the intervention of the Athenians, if it were only to kill them, and thus preserve them from the cruelties of their merciless countrymen. The latter abstained from attempts to force the door of the building, but made an aperture in the roof, from whence they shot down arrows, and poured showers of tiles, upon the prisoners within; who sought at first to protect themselves, but at length abandoned themselves to despair, and assisted with their own hands in the work of destruction. Some of them pierced their throats with the arrows shot down from the roof: others hung themselves, either with cords from some bedding which happened to be in the building, or with strips torn and twisted from their own garments. Night came on, but the work of destruction, both from above and within, was continued without intermission, so that before morning all these wretched men perished, either by the hands of their enemies or by their own. At daybreak, the Korkyraeans entered the building, piled up the dead bodies on carts, and transported them out of the city: the exact number we are not told, but seemingly it cannot have been less than three hundred. The women who had been taken at Istónē along with these prisoners, were all sold as slaves.¹

Thus finished the bloody dissensions in this ill-fated island: for the oligarchical party were completely annihilated, the democracy was victorious, and there were no farther violences throughout the whole war.² It will be recollected that these deadly feuds began with the return of the oligarchical prisoners from Corinth, bringing along with them projects both of treason and of revolution: they ended with the annihilation of that party, in

¹ Thucyd. iv, 47, 48.

² Thucyd. iv, 48.

the manner above described; the interval being filled by mutual atrocities and retaliation, wherein of course the victors had most opportunity of gratifying their vindictive passions. Eurymedon, after the termination of these events, proceeded onward with the Athenian squadron to Sicily: what he did there will be described in a future chapter devoted to Sicilian affairs exclusively.

The complete prostration of Ambrakia during the campaign of the preceding year had left Anaktorium without any defence against the Akarnanians and Athenian squadron from Naupaktus. They besieged and took it during the course of the present summer;¹ expelling the Corinthian proprietors, and repopling the town and its territory with Akarnanian settlers from all the townships in the country.

Throughout the maritime empire of Athens matters continued perfectly tranquil, except that the inhabitants of Chios, during the course of the autumn, incurred the suspicion of the Athenians from having recently built a new wall to their city, as if it were done with the intention of taking the first opportunity to revolt.² They solemnly protested their innocence of any such designs, but the Athenians were not satisfied without exacting the destruction of the obnoxious wall. The presence on the opposite continent of an active band of Mitylenæan exiles, who captured both Rhœteium and Antandrus during the ensuing spring, probably made the Athenians more anxious and vigilant on the subject of Chios.³

The Athenian regular tribute-gathering squadron circulated among the maritime subjects, and captured, during the course of the present autumn, a prisoner of some importance and singularity. It was a Persian ambassador, Artaphernes, seized at Eion on the Strymon, in his way to Sparta with despatches from the Great King. He was brought to Athens, and his despatches, which were at some length, and written in the Assyrian character, were translated and made public. The Great King told the Lacedæmonians, in substance, that he could not comprehend what they meant; for that among the numerous envoys whom they had sent no two told the same story. Accordingly he desired them, if they wished to make themselves understood, to send some envoy

¹ Thucyd. iv. 49.² Thucyd. iv. 51.³ Thucyd. iv. 52.

with fresh and plain instructions to accompany Artaphernes.¹ Such was the substance of the despatch, conveying a remarkable testimony as to the march of the Lacedæmonian government in its foreign policy. Had any similar testimony existed respecting Athens, demonstrating that her foreign policy was conducted with half as much unsteadiness and stupidity, ample inferences would have been drawn from it to the discredit of democracy. But there has been no motive generally to discredit Lacedæmonian institutions, which included kingship in double measure, — two parallel lines of hereditary kings: together with an entire exemption from everything like popular discussion. The extreme defects in the foreign management of Sparta, revealed by the despatch of Artaphernes, seem traceable partly to an habitual faithlessness often noted in the Lacedæmonian character, partly to the annual change of ephors, so frequently bringing into power men who strove to undo what had been done by their predecessors, and still more to the absence of everything like discussion or canvass of public measures among the citizens. We shall find more than one example, in the history about to follow, of this disposition on the part of ephors, not merely to change the policy of their predecessors, but even to subvert treaties sworn and concluded by them: and such was the habitual secrecy of Spartan public business, that in doing this they had neither criticism nor discussion to fear. Brasidas, when he started from Sparta on the expedition which will be described in the coming chapter, could not trust the assurances of the Lacedæmonian executive without binding them by the most solemn oaths.²

The Athenians sent back Artaphernes in a trireme to Ephesus, and availed themselves of this opportunity for procuring access to the Great King. They sent envoys along with him, with the intention that they should accompany him up to Susa: but on reaching Asia, the news had just arrived that King Artaxerxes

¹ Thucyd. iv. 50. ἐν αἷς πολλῶν ἄλλων γεγραμμένων κεφάλαιον ἦν, πρὸς Λακεδαιμονίους, οὐκ εἰδέναι ὃ, τι βούλονται· πολλῶν γὰρ ἐλθόντων κρείσσειν οὐδένα ταῦτ' ἀλγεῖν· εἰ οὖν βούλονται σαφὲς λῆγειν, πέμψαι μετὰ τοῦ Πέρσου ἄνδρα, ὡς αὐτὸν.

² Thucyd. iv. 86. ὅρκους τε Λακεδαιμονίων καταβάν τὰ τέλη τοῖς μετὰ τοῖς ἡμέρῃς, ἢ μηνί, etc.

had recently died. Under such circumstances, it was not judged expedient to prosecute the mission, and the Athenians dropped their design.¹

Respecting the great monarchy of Persia, during this long interval of fifty-four years since the repulse of Xerxes from Greece, we have little information before us except the names of the successive kings. In the year 465 B.C. Xerxes was assassinated by Artabanus and Mithridates, through one of those plots of great household officers, so frequent in oriental palaces. He left two sons, or at least two sons present and conspicuous among a greater number, Darius and Artaxerxes. But Artabanus persuaded Artaxerxes that Darius had been the murderer of Xerxes, and thus prevailed upon him to revenge his father's death by becoming an accomplice in killing his brother Darius: he next tried to assassinate Artaxerxes himself, and to appropriate the crown. Artaxerxes however, apprized beforehand of the scheme, either slew Artabanus with his own hand or procured him to be slain and then reigned (known under the name of Artaxerxes Longimanus) for forty years, down to the period at which we are now arrived.²

Mention has already been made of the revolt of Egypt from the dominion of Artaxerxes, under the Libyan prince Inanes, actively aided by the Athenians. After a few years of success, this revolt was crushed and Egypt again subjugated, by the energy of the Persian general Megabyzus, with severe loss to the Athenian forces engaged. After the peace of Kallias, erroneously called the Kimonian peace, between the Athenians and the king of Persia, war had not been since resumed. We read in Ktesias, amidst various anecdotes seemingly collected at the court of Susa, romantic adventures ascribed to Megabyzus, his

¹ Thucyd. iv, 50; Diodor. xii, 64. The Athenians do not appear to have ever before sent envoys or courted alliance with the Great King; though the idea of doing so must have been noway strange to them, as we may see by the humorous scene of Pseudartabas in the *Acharneis* of Aristophanes, acted in the year before this event.

² Diodor. xi, 65; Aristotel. Polit. v, 8, 3; Justin, i, 1; Ktesias, Persica, c. 29, 30. It is evident that there were contradictory stories current respecting the plot to which Xerxes fell a victim: but we have no means of determining what the details were.

wife Amytis, his mother Amestris, and a Greek physician of Kos, named Apollonides. Zopyrus son of Megabyzus, after the death of his father, deserted from Persia and came as an exile to Athens.¹

At the death of Artaxerxes Longimanus, the family violence incident to a Persian succession were again exhibited. His son Xerxes succeeded him, but was assassinated, after a reign of a few weeks or months. Another son, Sogdianus, followed, who perished in like manner after a short interval.² Lastly, a third son, Ochus (known under the name of Darius Nothus), either abler or more fortunate, kept his crown and life between nineteen and twenty years. By his queen, the savage Parysatis, he was father to Artaxerxes Mnemon and Cyrus the younger, both names of interest in reference to Grecian history, to whom we shall hereafter recur.

CHAPTER LIII.

EIGHTH YEAR OF THE WAR.

THE eighth year of the war, on which we now touch, presents events of a more important and decisive character than any of the preceding. In reviewing the preceding years, we observe that though there is much fighting, with hardship and privation inflicted on both sides, yet the operations are mostly of a desultory character, not calculated to determine the event of the war. But the capture of Sphacteria and its prisoners, coupled with the surrender of the whole Lacedæmonian fleet, was an event full of consequences and imposing in the eyes of all Greece. It stimulated the Athenians to a series of operations, larger and more ambitious than anything which they had yet conceived

¹ Ktesias, Persica, c. 38-43; Herodot. iii, 80.

² Diodor. xii, 64-71; Ktesias, Persica, c. 44-46.

directed, not merely against Sparta in her own country, but also to the reconquest of that ascendancy in Megara and Boeotia which they had lost on or before the thirty years' truce. On the other hand, it intimidated so much both the Lacedæmonians, the revolted Chalkidic allies of Athens in Thrace, and Perdikkas, king of Macedonia, that between them the expedition of Brasidas, which struck so serious a blow at the Athenian empire, was concerted. This year is thus the turning-point of the war. If the operations of Athens had succeeded, she would have regained nearly as great a power as she enjoyed before the thirty years' truce: but it happened that Sparta, or rather the Spartan Brasidas, was successful, gaining enough to neutralize all the advantages derived by Athens from the capture of Sphakteria.

The first enterprise undertaken by the Athenians in the course of the spring was against the island of Kythêra, on the southern coast of Laconia. It was inhabited by Lacedæmonian Perioikî, and administered by a governor, and garrison of hoplites, annually sent thither. It was the usual point of landing for merchantmen from Libya and Egypt; and as it lay very near to Cape Malea, immediately over against the gulf of Gythium, — the only accessible portion of the generally inhospitable coast of Laconia, — the chance that it might fall into the hands of an enemy was considered as so menacing to Sparta, that some politicians are said to have wished the island at the bottom of the sea.¹ Nikias, in conjunction with Nikostratus and Autoklês,

¹ Thucyd. iv. 54; Herodot. vii. 235. The manner in which Herodotus alludes to the dangers which would arise to Sparta from the occupation of Kythêra by an enemy, furnishes one additional probability tending to show that his history was composed before the actual occupation of the island by Nikias, in the eighth year of the Peloponnesian war. Had he been cognizant of this latter event, he would naturally have made some allusion to it.

The words of Thucydides in respect to the island of Kythêra are the Lacedæmonians πολλὰν ἐπιτιμίαν ἔχουσιν· ὅτι γὰρ αὐτοῖς τὸν τε ἀπ' Αἰγύπτου καὶ Λιβύης ἐλκιδὼν προσβολή, καὶ λησταὶ ἅμα τὴν Λακωνικὴν ἴσσαν ἔλπειν ἐκ θαλάσσης, ἥπερ μόνον αὐτὸν τῶν κακουργείων παρὰ γὰρ ἀνέχει πρὸς τὸ Σικελικὸν καὶ Κρητικὸν πέλαγος.

I do not understand this passage, with Dr. Arnold and Götter to mean, that Laconia was unassailable by land, but very assailable by sea. It rather

conducted thither a fleet of sixty triremes, with two thousand Athenian hoplites, some few horsemen, and a body of allies, mainly Milesians. There were in the island two towns, — Kythêra and Skandeia: the former having a lower town close to the sea, fronting Cape Malea, and an upper town on the hill above; the latter, seemingly, on the south or west coast. Both were attacked at the same time by order of Nikias; ten triremes and a body of Milesian¹ hoplites disembarked and captured Skandeia; while the Athenians landed at Kythêra, and drove the inhabitants out of the lower town into the upper, where they speedily capitulated. A certain party among them had indeed secretly invited the coming of Nikias, through which intrigue easy terms were obtained for the inhabitants. Some few men, indicated by the Kytherians in intelligence with Nikias, were carried away as prisoners to Athens: but the remainder were left undisturbed, and enrolled among the tributary allies under obligation to pay four talents per annum; an Athenian garrison being placed at Kythêra for the protection of the island. From hence Nikias employed seven days in descents and inroads upon the coast, near Helos, Asinê, Aphrodisia, Kotyrta, and elsewhere. The Lacedæmonian force was disseminated in petty garrisons,

means that the only portion of the coast of Laconia where a maritime invader could do much damage, was in the interior of the Laconic gulf, near Helos, Gythium, &c., which is in fact the only plain portion of the coast of Laconia. The two projecting promontories, which end, the one in Cape Malea, the other in Cape Tænarus, are high, rocky, harborless, and afford very little temptation to a disembarking enemy. "The whole Laconian coast is high projecting cliff, where it fronts the Sicilian and Kretan seas," — πᾶσα ἀνέχει. The island of Kythêra was particularly favorable for facilitating descents on the territory near Helos and Gythium. The *Geography* of Laconia is noticed in Xenophon, Hellen. iv. 8, 7, where he describes the occupation of the island by Konon and Pharnabazus.

See Colonel Leake's description of this coast, and the high cliffs between Cape Matapan — Tænarus — and Kalamata, which front the Sicilian sea, as well as those eastward of Cape St. Angelo, or Malea, which front the Kretan sea (Travels in Morea, vol. i. ch. vii. p. 261: "tempestuous, rocky, unsheltered coast of Mesamania," ch. viii. p. 320; ch. vi. p. 205; Strabo, viii. p. 368; Pausan. iii. c. xxvi. 2).

¹ Thucyd. iv. 54. δισχιλίοις Μιλησίων ὀπλίταις. It seems impossible to believe that there could have been so many as two thousand Milesian hoplites: but we cannot tell where the mistake lies.

which remained each for the defence of its own separate post, without uniting to repel the Athenians, so that there was only one action, and that of little importance, which the Athenians deemed worthy of a trophy.

In returning home from Kythêra, Nikias first ravaged the small strip of cultivated land near Epidaurus Limêra, on the rocky eastern coast of Laconia, and then attacked the Æginetan settlement at Thyrea, the frontier strip between Laconia and Argolis. This town and district had been made over by Sparta to the Æginetans, at the time when they were expelled from their own island by Athens, in the first year of the war. The new inhabitants, finding the town too distant from the sea¹ for their maritime habits, were now employed in constructing a fortification close on the shore; in which work a Lacedæmonian detachment under Tantalus, on guard in that neighborhood, was assisting them. When the Athenians landed, both Æginetans and Lacedæmonians at once abandoned the new fortification. The former, with the commanding officer, Tantalus, occupied the upper town of Thyrea; but the Lacedæmonian troops, not thinking it tenable, refused to take part in the defence, and retired to the neighboring mountains, in spite of urgent entreaty from the Æginetans. The Athenians, immediately after landing, marched up to the town of Thyrea, and carried it by storm, burning or destroying everything within it: all the Æginetans were either killed or made prisoners, and even Tantalus, disabled by his wounds, became prisoner also. From hence the armament returned to Athens, where a vote was taken as to the disposal of the prisoners. The Kytherians brought home were distributed for safe custody among the dependent islands: Tantalus was retained along with the prisoners from Sphakteria; but a harder fate was reserved for the Æginetans; they were

¹ Thucyd. iv, 56. He states that Thyrea was ten stadia, or about a mile and one-fifth, distant from the sea. But Colonel Leake (*Travels in the Morea*, vol. ii, ch. xxii, p. 492), who has discovered quite sufficient ruins to identify the spot, affirms "that it is at least three times that distance from the sea."

This explains to us the more clearly why the Æginetans thought it necessary to build their new fort.

all put to death, victims to the long-standing apathy between Athens and Ægina. This cruel act was nothing more than a strict application of admitted customs of war in those days: had the Lacedæmonians been the victors, there can be little doubt that they would have acted with equal rigor.¹

The occupation of Kythêra, in addition to Pylus, by an Athenian garrison, following so closely upon the capital disaster in Sphakteria, produced in the minds of the Spartans feelings of alarm and depression such as they had never before experienced. Within the course of a few short months their position had completely changed from superiority and aggression abroad to insult and insecurity at home. They anticipated nothing less than incessant foreign attacks on all their weak points, with every probability of internal defection, from the standing discontent of the Helots: nor was it unknown to them, probably, that even Kythêra itself had been lost partly through betrayal. The capture of Sphakteria had caused peculiar sensations among the Helots, to whom the Lacedæmonians had addressed both appeals and promises of emancipation, in order to procure succor for their hoplites while blockaded in the island; and if the ultimate surrender of these hoplites had abated the terrors of Lacedæmonian prowess throughout all Greece, this effect had been produced to a still greater degree among the oppressed Helots. A refuge at Pylus, and a nucleus which presented some possibility of expanding into regenerated Messenia, were now before their eyes; while the establishment of an Athenian garrison at Kythêra opened a new channel of communication with the enemies of Sparta, so as to tempt all the Helots of daring temper to stand forward as liberators of their enslaved race.² The Lacedæmonians, habitually cautious at all times, felt now as if the tide of fortune had turned decidedly against them, and acted with confirmed mistrust and dismay, confining themselves to measures strictly defensive, and organizing a force of four hundred cavalry, together with a body of bowmen, beyond their ordinary establishment.

But the precaution which they thought it necessary to take in regard to the Helots, affords the best measure of their apprehensions at the moment, and exhibits, indeed, a refinement of fraud

¹ Thucyd. iv, 58; Diodor. xii 65

² Thucyd. iv, 41, 55 56

and cruelty rarely equalled in history. Wishing to single out from the general body such as were most high-couraged and valiant, the ephors made proclamation, that those Helots, who conceived themselves to have earned their liberty by distinguished services in war, might stand forward to claim it. A considerable number obeyed the call; probably many who had undergone imminent hazards during the preceding summer, in order to convey provisions to the blockaded soldiers in Sphacteria.¹ They were examined by the government, and two thousand of them were selected as fully worthy of emancipation; which was forthwith bestowed upon them in public ceremonial, with garlands, visits to the temples, and the full measure of religious solemnity. The government had now made the selection which it desired; presently every man among these newly-enfranchized Helots was made away with, no one knew how.² A stratagem at once

¹ Thucyd. iv, 80.

² Thucyd. iv, 80. Καὶ προκρίναντες ἐς διαχίλους, οἱ μὲν ἐστεφανώσαντο τε καὶ τὰ ἱερὰ περιήλθον ὡς ἡλευθέρωνται· οἱ δὲ οὐ πολλῷ ὕστερον ἤφαισαν τε αὐτοὺς, καὶ οἵδεις ἤσθετο ὅτῳ τρόπῳ ἕκαστος διέφθαρῃ; compare Diodor. xii, 67.

Dr. Thirlwall (History of Greece, vol. iii. ch. xxiii, p. 244, 2d edit. note) thinks that this assassination of Helots by the Spartans took place at some other time unascertained, and not at the time here indicated. I cannot concur in this opinion. It appears to me, that there is the strongest probable reason for referring the incident to the time immediately following the disaster in Sphacteria, which Thucydides so especially marks (iv, 41) by the emphatic words: Οἱ δὲ Λακεδαιμόνιοι ἀμαθὲς ὄντες ἐν τῷ πρῶν χρόνῳ ληστείας καὶ τοιούτων πόλεων, τῶν τε Ἑλλήνων ἀποπομπόντων καὶ φοβούμενοι μὴ καὶ ἐπὶ μακρότερον σφίσι τι νεωτερισθῇ τὰν κατὰ τὴν γῆραν, οὐ βρόδως ἔφερον. This was just after the Messenians were first established at Pylus, and began their incursions over Laconia, with such temptations as they could offer to the Helots to desert. And it was naturally just then that the fear, entertained by the Spartans of their Helots, became exaggerated to the maximum, leading to the perpetration of the act mentioned in the text. Dr. Thirlwall observes, "that the Spartan government would not order the massacre of the Helots at a time when it could employ them on foreign service." But to this it may be replied, that the capture of Sphacteria took place in July or August, while the expedition under Brasidas was not organized until the following winter or spring. There was therefore an interval of some months, during which the government had not yet formed the idea of employing the Helots on foreign service. And this interval is

so perfidious in the contrivance, so murderous in the purpose, and so complete in the execution, stands without parallel in Grecian history,—we might almost say, without a parallel in any history. It implies a depravity far greater than the rigorous execution of a barbarous customary law against prisoners of war or rebels, even in large numbers. The ephors must have employed numerous instruments, apart from each other, for the performance of this bloody deed; yet it appears that no certain knowledge could be obtained of the details; a striking proof of the mysterious efficiency of this Council of Five, surpassing even that of the Council of Ten at Venice, as well as of the utter absence of public inquiry or discussion.

It was while the Lacedæmonians were in this state of uneasiness at home, that envoys reached them from Perdikkas of Macedonia and the Chalkidians of Thrace, entreating aid against Athens; who was considered likely, in her present tide of success, to resume aggressive measures against them. There were, moreover, other parties, in the neighboring cities¹ subject to Athens, who secretly favored the application, engaging to stand forward in open revolt as soon as any auxiliary force should arrive to warrant their incurring the hazard. Perdikkas (who had on his hands a dispute with his kinsman Arrhibæus, prince of the Lynkestæ-Macedonians, which he was anxious to be enabled to close successfully) and the Chalkidians offered at the same time to provide the pay and maintenance, as well as to facilitate the transit, of the troops who might be sent to them; and what was of still greater importance to the success of the enterprise, they specially requested that Brasidas might be invested with the command.² He had now recovered from his wounds received at Pylus, and his reputation for adventurous valor, great as it was from positive desert, stood out still more conspicuously, because not a single other Spartan had as yet distinguished him-

quite sufficient to give a full and distinct meaning to the expression καὶ τότε (Thucyd. iv, 80) on which Dr. Thirlwall insists; without the necessity of going back to any more remote point of antecedent time.

¹ Thucyd. iv, 79.

² Thucyd. iv, 80. προῖθιμήθησαν δὲ καὶ οἱ Χαλκιδῆς ἄνδρα ἐν τε τῇ Σπάρτῃ δοκούντα διαστῆσαι εἶναι ἐς τὰ πάντα, etc.

self. His other great qualities, apart from personal valor, had not yet been shown, for he had never been in any supreme command. But he burned with impatience to undertake the operation destined for him by the envoys; although at this time it must have appeared so replete with difficulty and danger, that probably no other Spartan except himself would have entered upon it with the smallest hopes of success. To raise up embarrassments for Athens, in Thrace, was an object of great consequence to Sparta, while she also obtained an opportunity of sending away another large detachment of her dangerous Helots. Seven hundred of these latter were armed as hoplites and placed under the orders of Brasidas, but the Lacedæmonians would not assign to him any of their own proper forces. With the sanction of the Spartan name, with seven hundred Helot hoplites, and with such other hoplites as he could raise in Peloponnesus by means of the funds furnished from the Chalkidians, Brasidas prepared to undertake this expedition, alike adventurous and important.

Had the Athenians entertained any suspicion of his design, they could easily have prevented him from ever reaching Thrace. But they knew nothing of it until he had actually joined Perdikkas, nor did they anticipate any serious attack from Sparta, in this moment of her depression, much less an enterprise far bolder than any which she had ever been known to undertake. They were now elate with hopes of conquests to come on their own part, their affairs being so prosperous and promising that parties favorable to their interests began to revive, both in Megara and in Bœotia; while Hippokratês and Demosthenês, the two chief strategi for the year, were men of energy, well qualified both to project and execute military achievements.

The first opportunity presented itself in regard to Megara. The inhabitants of that city had been greater sufferers by the war than any other persons in Greece: they had been the chief cause of bringing down the war upon Athens, and the Athenians revenged upon them all the hardships which they themselves endured from the Lacedæmonian invasion. Twice in every year they laid waste the Megarid, which bordered upon their own territory; and that too with such destructive hands throughout its limited extent, that they intercepted all subsistence from the lands near the town, at the same time keeping the harbor

of Nisæa closely blocked up. Under such hard conditions the Megarians found much difficulty in supplying even the primary wants of life.¹ But their case had now, within the last few months, become still more intolerable by an intestine commotion in the city, ending in the expulsion of a powerful body of exiles, who seized and held possession of Pegæ, the Megarian port in the gulf of Corinth. Probably imports from Pegæ had been their chief previous resource against the destruction which came on them from the side of Athens; so that it became scarcely possible to sustain themselves, when the exiles in Pegæ not only deprived them of this resource, but took positive part in harassing them. These exiles were oligarchical, and the government in Megara had now become more or less democratical: but the privations in the city presently reached such a height, that several citizens began to labor for a compromise, whereby the exiles in Pegæ might be readmitted. It was evident to the leaders in Megara that the bulk of the citizens could not long sustain the pressure of enemies from both sides, but it was also their feeling that the exiles in Pegæ, their bitter political rivals, were worse enemies than the Athenians, and that the return of these exiles would be a sentence of death to themselves. To prevent this counter-revolution, they opened a secret correspondence with Hippokratês and Demosthenês, engaging to betray both Megara and Nisæa to the Athenians; though Nisæa, the harbor of Megara, about one mile from the city, was a separate fortress occupied by a Peloponnesian garrison, and by them exclusively, as well as the Long Walls, for the purpose of holding Megara fast to the Lacedæmonian confederacy.²

The scheme for surprise was concerted, and what is more remarkable, in the extreme publicity of all Athenian affairs, and in a matter to which many persons must have been privy, was kept secret, until the instant of execution. A large Athenian

¹ The picture drawn by Aristophanes (*Acharn.* 760) is a caricature but of suffering probably but too real.

² Thucyd. iv. 66. Strabo (ix. p. 391) gives eighteen stadia as the distance between Megara and Nisæa, Thucydides only eight. There appears sufficient reason to prefer the latter. see Reinganum, *Das alte Megaris* pp. 121-186.

force, four thousand hoplites and six hundred cavalry, was appointed to march at night by the high road through Eleusis to Megara: but Hippokratēs and Demosthenēs themselves went on ship-board from Peiræus to the island of Minoa, which was close against Nisæa, and had been for some time under occupation by an Athenian garrison. Here Hippokratēs concealed himself with six hundred hoplites, in a hollow space out of which brick earth had been dug, on the mainland opposite to Minoa, and not far from the gate in the Long Wall which opened near the junction of that wall with the ditch and wall surrounding Nisæa; while Demosthenēs, with some light-armed Plataeans and a detachment of active young Athenians, called Peripoli, and serving as the movable guard of Attica, in their first or second year of military service, placed himself in ambush in the sacred precinct of Arēs, still closer to the same gate.

To procure that the gate should be opened, was the task of the conspirators within. Amidst the shifts to which the Megarians had been reduced in order to obtain supplies, especially since the blockade of Minoa, predatory exit by night was not omitted. Some of these conspirators had been in the habit, before the intrigue with Athens was projected, of carrying out a small sculler-boat by night upon a cart, through this gate, by permission of the Peloponnesian commander of Nisæa and the Long Walls. The boat, when thus brought out, was carried down to the shore along the hollow of the dry ditch which surrounded the wall of Nisæa, then put to sea for some nightly enterprise, and was brought back again along the ditch before daylight in the morning; the gate being opened, by permission, to let it in. This was the only way by which any Megarian vessel could get to sea, since the Athenians at Minoa were complete masters of the harbor. On the night fixed for the surprise, this boat was carried out and brought back at the usual hour. But the moment that the gate in the Long Wall was opened to readmit it, Demosthenēs and his comrades sprang forward to force their way in; the Megarians along with the boat at the same time setting upon and killing the guards, in order to facilitate his entrance. This active and determined band were successful in mastering the gate, and keeping it open until the six hundred hoplites under Hippokratēs came up, and got into the

interior space between the Long Walls. They immediately mounted the walls on each side, every man as he came in, with little thought of order, to drive off or destroy the Peloponnesian guards; who, taken by surprise, and fancying that the Megarians generally were in concert with the enemy against them, — confirmed, too, in such belief by hearing the Athenian herald proclaim aloud that every Megarian who chose might take his post in the line of Athenian hoplites,¹ — made at first some resistance, but were soon discouraged, and fled into Nisæa. By a little after daybreak, the Athenians found themselves masters of all the line of the Long Walls, and under the very gates of Megara, — reinforced by the larger force which, having marched by land through Eleusis, arrived at the concerted moment.

Meanwhile, the Megarians within the city were in the greatest tumult and consternation. But the conspirators, prepared with their plan, had resolved to propose that the gates should be thrown open, and that the whole force of the city should be marched out to fight the Athenians: when once the gates should be open, they themselves intended to take part with the Athenians, and facilitate their entrance, — and they had rubbed their bodies over with oil in order to be visibly distinguished in the eyes of the latter. Their plan was only frustrated the moment before it was about to be put in execution, by the divulgence of one of their own comrades. Their opponents in the city, apprized of what was in contemplation, hastened to the gate, and intercepted the men rubbed with oil as they were about to open it. Without betraying any knowledge of the momentous secret which they had just learned, these opponents loudly protested against opening the gate and going out to fight an enemy for whom they had never conceived themselves, even in moments of greater strength, to be a match in the open field. While insisting only

¹ Thucyd. iv, 68. συνέτισσε γὰρ καὶ τὸν τῶν Ἀθηναίων κήρυκα ἄφ' ἑαυτοῦ γνώμης κηρύττει, τὸν βουλόμενον ἵνα Μεγαρίων μετὰ Ἀθηναίων θησόμενοι τὰ δόξα.

Here we have the phrase *τῶν Ἀθηναίων κήρυκα* employed in a case where Dr. Arnold's explanation of it would be eminently unsuitable. There could be no thought of *public arms* at a critical moment of actual fighting with result as yet doubtful.

on the public mischiefs of the measure, they at the same time planted themselves in arms against the gate, and declared that they would perish before they would allow it to be opened. For this obstinate resistance the conspirators were not prepared, so that they were forced to abandon their design and leave the gate closed.

The Athenian generals, who were waiting in expectation that it would be opened, soon perceived by the delay that their friends within had been baffled, and immediately resolved to make sure of Nisæa, which lay behind them; an acquisition important not less in itself, than as a probable means for the mastery of Megara. They set about the work with the characteristic rapidity of Athenians. Masons and tools in abundance were forthwith sent for from Athens, and the army distributed among themselves the wall of circumvallation round Nisæa in distinct parts. First, the interior space between the Long Walls themselves was built across, so as to cut off the communication with Megara; next, walls were carried out from the outside of both the Long Walls down to the sea, so as completely to inclose Nisæa, with its fortifications and ditch. The scattered houses which formed a sort of ornamented suburb to Nisæa, furnished bricks for this inclosing circle, or were sometimes even made to form a part of it as they stood, with the parapets on their roofs; while the trees were cut down to supply material wherever palisades were suitable. In a day and a half the work of circumvallation was almost completed, so that the Peloponnesians in Nisæa saw before them nothing but a hopeless state of blockade. Deprived of all communication, they not only fancied that the whole city of Megara had joined the Athenians, but they were moreover without any supply of provisions, which had been always furnished to them in daily rations from the city. Despairing of any speedy relief from Peloponnesus, they accepted easy terms of capitulation offered to them by the Athenian generals.¹ After delivering up their arms, each man among them was to be ransomed for a stipulated price; we are not told how much, but doubtless a moderate sum. The Lacedæmonian commander, and such other Lacedæmonians as might be in Nisæa, were, however, required

¹ Thucyd. iv, 63.

to surrender themselves as prisoners to the Athenians, to be held at their disposal. On these terms Nisæa was surrendered to the Athenians, who cut off its communication with Megara, by keeping the intermediate space between the Long Walls effectively blocked up, — walls, of which they had themselves, in former days, been the original authors.¹

Such interruption of communication by the Long Walls indicated in the minds of the Athenian generals a conviction that Megara was now out of their reach. But the town in its present distracted state, would certainly have fallen into their hands,² had it not been snatched from them by the accidental neighborhood and energetic intervention of Brasidas. That officer, occupied in the levy of troops for his Thracian expedition, was near Corinth and Sikyon, when he first learned the surprise and capture of the Long Walls. Partly from the alarm which the news excited among these Peloponnesian towns, partly from his own personal influence, he got together a body of two thousand seven hundred Corinthian hoplites, six hundred Sikyonian and four hundred Phliasian, besides his own small army, and marched with this united force to Tripodiskus, in the Megarid, half-way between Megara and Pægae, on the road over Mount Geraneia; having first despatched a pressing summons to the Boeotians to request that they would meet him at that point with reinforcements. He trusted by a speedy movement to preserve Megara, and perhaps

¹ Thucyd. i, 103; iv, 69. Καὶ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι, τὰ μακρὰ τεῖχη ἀπορρήξαντες ἀπὸ τῆς τῶν Μεγαρέων πόλεως καὶ τῆς Νισαίων παραλάβοντες, τὰλλα παρεσκήναζοντο.

I cannot think, with Poppo and Göller, that the participle ἀπορρήξαντες is to be explained as meaning that the Athenians PULLED DOWN the portion of the Long Walls near Megara. This may have been done, but it would be an operation of no great importance: for to pull down a portion of the wall would not bar the access from the city, which it was the object of the Athenians to accomplish. "They broke off" the communication along the road between the Long Walls from the city to Nisæa, by building across or barricading the space between: similar to what is said a little above, — διότι κοδομένη σάμινοι τὸ πρὸς Μεγαράς, etc. Diodorus (xii, 66) abridges Thucydides.

² Thucyd. iv, 73. εἰ μὲν γὰρ μὴ ὤσθησαν ἐλθόντες (Brasidas with his troops) οὐκ ἂν ἐν τύχῃ γένησθαι σφίσιν, ἀλλὰ σαφῶς ἂν ὥσπερ ἡ σιγήνται στερηθῆναι εὐθὺς τῆς πόλεως.

even Nisæa; but on reaching Tripodiskus in the night, he learned that the latter place had already surrendered. Alarmed for the safety of Megara, he proceeded thither by a night-march without delay. Taking with him only a chosen band of three hundred men, he presented himself, without being expected, at the gates of the city: entreating to be admitted, and offering to lend his immediate aid for the recovery of Nisæa. One of the two parties in Megara would have been glad to comply; but the other, knowing well that in that case the exiles in Pegæ would be brought back upon them, was prepared for a strenuous resistance, in which case the Athenian force, still only one mile off, would have been introduced as auxiliaries. Under these circumstances the two parties came to a compromise, and mutually agreed to refuse admittance to Brasidas. They expected that a battle would take place between him and the Athenians, and each calculated that Megara would follow the fortunes of the victor.¹

Returning back without success to Tripodiskus, Brasidas was joined there early in the morning by two thousand Boeotian hoplites and six hundred cavalry; for the Boeotians had been put in motion by the same news as himself, and had even commenced their march, before his messenger arrived, with such celerity as to have already reached Plataea.² The total force under Brasidas was thus increased to six thousand hoplites and six hundred cavalry, with whom he marched straight to the neighborhood of Megara. The Athenian light troops, dispersed over the plain, were surprised and driven in by the Boeotian cavalry; but the Athenian cavalry, coming to their aid, maintained a sharp action with the assailants, wherein, after some loss on both sides, a slight advantage remained on the side of the Athenians. They granted a truce for the burial of the Boeotian officer of cavalry, who was slain with some others. After this indecisive cavalry skirmish, Brasidas advanced with his main force into the plain, between Megara and the sea, taking up a position near to the Athenian hoplites, who were drawn up in battle array, hard by Nisæa and the Long Walls. He thus offered them battle if they chose it; but each party expected that the other would attack and each was unwilling to begin the attack on his own side.

¹ Thucyd. iv. 71.

² Thucyd. iv. 72.

Brasidas was well aware that, if the Athenians refused to fight, Megara would be preserved from falling into their hands, — which loss it was his main object to prevent, and which had in fact been prevented only by his arrival. If he attacked and was beaten, he would forfeit this advantage, — while, if victorious, he could hardly hope to gain much more. The Athenian generals on their side reflected, that they had already secured a material acquisition in Nisæa, which cut off Megara from their sea; that the army opposed to them was not only superior in number of hoplites, but composed of contingents from many different cities, so that no one city hazarded much in the action; while their own force was all Athenian, and composed of the best hoplites in Athens, which would render a defeat severely ruinous to the city: nor did they think it worth while to encounter this risk, even for the purpose of gaining possession of Megara. With such views in the leaders on both sides, the two armies remained for some time in position, each waiting for the other to attack: at length the Athenians, seeing that no aggressive movement was contemplated by their opponents, were the first to retire into Nisæa. Thus left master of the field, Brasidas retired in triumph to Megara, the gates of which were now opened without reserve to admit him.¹

The army of Brasidas, having gained the chief point for which it was collected, speedily dispersed, — he himself resuming his preparations for Thrace; while the Athenians on their side also returned home, leaving an adequate garrison for the occupation both of Nisæa and of the Long Walls. But the interior of Megara underwent a complete and violent revolution. While the leaders friendly to Athens, not thinking it safe to remain, fled forthwith and sought shelter with the Athenians,² the opposite party opened communication with the exiles at Pegæ and readmitted them into the city: binding them however, by the most solemn pledges, to observe absolute amnesty of the past and to study nothing but the welfare of the common city. The newcomers only kept their pledge during the interval which elapsed

¹ Thucyd. iv. 73.

² We find some of them afterwards in the service of Athens, employed as light-armed troops in the Sicilian expedition (Thucyd. vi. 43).

until they acquired power to violate it with effect. They soon got themselves placed in the chief commands of state, and found means to turn the military force to their own purposes. A review and examination of arms, of the hoplites in the city, having been ordered, the Megarian lochi were so marshalled and tutored as to enable the leaders to single out such victims as they thought expedient. They seized many of their most obnoxious enemies, some of them suspected as accomplices in the recent conspiracy with Athens: the men thus seized were subjected to the forms of a public trial, before that which was called a public assembly; wherein each voter, acting under military terror, was constrained to give his suffrage openly. All were condemned to death and executed, to the number of one hundred.¹ The constitution of Megara was then shaped into an oligarchy of the closest possible kind, a few of the most violent men taking complete possession of the government. But they must probably have conducted it with vigor and prudence for their own purposes, since Thucydides remarks that it was rare to see a revolution accomplished by so small a party, and yet so durable. How long it lasted, he does not mention. A few months after these incidents, the Megarians regained possession of their Long Walls, by capture from the Athenians,² to whom indeed they could have been of no material service, and levelled the whole line of them to the ground: but the Athenians still retained Nisæa. We may remark, as explaining in part the durability of this new government, that the truce concluded at the beginning of the ensuing year must have greatly lightened the difficulties of any government, whether oligarchical or democratical, in Megara.

The scheme for surprising Megara had been both laid and executed with skill, and only miscarried through an accident to which such schemes are always liable, as well as by the unexpected celerity of Brasidas. It had, moreover, succeeded so far

¹ Thucyd. iv, 74. οἱ δὲ ἐπειδὴ ἐν ταῖς ἀρχαῖς ἵκντο, καὶ ἐξ ὧν ὅπλων ἐποίησαντο, διαστήσαντες τοὺς λόχους, ἐκίλετο τὰς τε ἐχθρὰς καὶ οἱ ἐδόκουν μάλιστα συμπράξει τι πρὸς τῇ Ἀθηνᾶσιν, ἔλθας ὡς ἑκατὸν· καὶ τοῦτων περὶ ἀναγκασάντες τὸν δήμον, ᾤοντο φανεράν δι-
 ιτρέχειν, ὡς κατεγνώσκειαν, ἐκτείναν, καὶ ἐξ ἀλαφροῦ τὰ μάλιστα ἐπέστησαν τὴν πόλιν. καὶ πλείστον δὲ αὐτῶν ἐπ' ἐλαχίστων γεννη-
 ῖσι, ἐκαστοῦς μετὰστρεψι συμπαίοντι.

² Thucyd. iv, 109.

as to enable the Athenians to carry Nisæa, — one of the posts which they had surrendered by the thirty years' truce, and of considerable positive value to them: so that it counted on the whole as a victory, leaving the generals with increased encouragement to turn their activity elsewhere. Accordingly, very soon after the troops had been brought back from the Megarid,¹ Hippokratēs and Demosthenēs concerted a still more extensive plan for the invasion of Bœotia, in conjunction with some malcontents in the Bœotian towns, who desired to break down and democratize the oligarchical governments, and especially through the agency of a Theban exile named Ptæodōrus. Demosthenēs, with forty triremes, was sent round Peloponnesus to Naupaktus, with instructions to collect an Akarnanian force, to sail into the inmost recess of the Corinthian or Krissæan gulf, and to occupy Siphæ, a maritime town belonging to the Bœotian Thespiæ, where intel- ligences had been already established. On the same day, deter- mined beforehand, Hippokratēs engaged to enter Bœotia, with the main force of Athens, at the southeastern corner of the ter- ritory near Tanagra, and to fortify Delium, the temple of Apollo, on the coast of the Eubœan strait: while at the same time it was concerted that some Bœotian and Phocian malcontents should make themselves masters of Charoneia on the borders of Phocis. Bœotia would thus be assailed on three sides at the same moment, so that the forces of the country would be distracted and unable to cooperate. Internal movements were farther expected to take place in some of the cities, such as perhaps to establish democrati- cal governments and place them at once in alliance with the Athenians.

Accordingly, about the month of August, Demosthenēs sailed from Athens to Naupaktus, where he collected his Akarnanian allies, — now stronger and more united than ever, since the re- fractory inhabitants of Œniadæ had been at length compelled to join their Akarnanian brethren: moreover, the neighboring Agreans with their prince Salynthius were also brought into the Athenian alliance. On the appointed day, seemingly about the beginning of October, he sailed with a strong force of these allies

¹ Thucyd. iv, 76. εὐθὺς μετὰ τὴν ἐκ τῆς Μεγαρίδος ἀναχώρησιν, etc.

up to Siphæ, in full expectation that it would be betrayed to him. But the execution of this enterprise was less happy than that against Megara. In the first place, there was a mistake as to the day understood between Hippokratês and Demosthenês: in the next place, the entire plot was discovered and betrayed by a Phocian of Phanoteus (bordering on Charoneia) named Nicomachus, — communicated first to the Lacedæmonians and through them to the Bœotarchs. Siphæ and Charoneia were immediately placed in a state of defence, and Demosthenês, on arriving at the former place, found not only no party within it favorable to him, but a formidable Bœotian force which rendered attack unavailing: moreover, Hippokratês had not yet begun his march, so that the defenders had nothing to distract their attention from Siphæ.² Under these circumstances, not only was Demosthenês obliged to withdraw without striking a blow, and to content himself with an unsuccessful descent upon the territory of Sikyon,³ but all the expected internal movements in Bœotia were prevented from breaking out.

It was not till after the Bœotian troops, having repelled the attack by sea, had retired from Siphæ, that Hippokratês commenced his march from Athens to invade the Bœotian territory near Tanagra. He was probably encouraged by false promises from the Bœotian exiles, otherwise it seems remarkable that he should have persisted in executing his part of the scheme alone, after the known failure of the other part. It was, however, executed in a manner which implies unusual alacrity and confidence. The whole military population of Athens was marched into Bœotia, to the neighborhood of Delium, the eastern coast-extremity of the territory belonging to the Bœotian town of Tanagra; the expedition comprising all classes, not merely citizens, but also metics or resident non-freemen, and even non-resident strangers then by accident at Athens. Of course this statement must be understood with the reserve of ample guards left behind for the city: but besides the really effective force of seven thousand hoplites, and several hundred horsemen, there appear to have been not less than twenty-five thousand light-armed, half-armed

¹ Thucyd. iv. 77.

² Thucyd. iv. 101.

³ Thucyd. iv. 89.

or unarmed attendants accompanying the march.¹ The number of hoplites is here prodigiously great; brought together by general and indiscriminate proclamation, not selected by a special choice of the stratêgi out of the names on the muster-roll, as was usually the case for any distant expedition.² As to light-armed, there was at this time no trained force of that description at Athens, except a small body of archers. No pains had been taken to organize either darters or slingers: the hoplites, the horsemen, and the seamen, constituted the whole effective force of the city. Indeed, it appears that the Bœotians also were hardly less destitute than the Athenians of native darters and slingers, since those which they employed in the subsequent siege of Delium were in great part hired from the Malian gulf.³ To employ at one and the same time heavy-armed and light-armed, was not natural to any Grecian community, but was a practice which grew up with experience and necessity. The Athenian feeling, as manifested in the Persæ of Æschylus a few years after the repulse of Xerxes, proclaims exclusive pride in the spear and shield, with contempt for the bow: and it was only during this very year, when alarmed by the Athenian occupation of Pylus and Kythéra, that the Lacedæmonians, contrary to their previous

¹ Thucyd. iv. 93, 94. He states that the Bœotian *phloi* were above ten thousand, and that the Athenian *phloi* were *πολλὰ πλείους τῶν ἐναντίων*. We can hardly take this number as less than twenty-five thousand, *ψιλῶν καὶ ὁπλοῦν* (iv. 101).

The hoplites, as well as the horsemen, had their baggage and provision carried for them by attendants: see Thucyd. iii. 17; vii. 75.

² Thucyd. iv. 90. *ὅτι ἡ πλειοψηφία τῶν Ἀθηναίων πανδημεὶ, αὐτοὺς καὶ τοὺς ἀποστολὰς καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐκείνων, ἐπεὶ καὶ πλεονεξία* (iv. 94).

The meaning of the word *πανδημεὶ* is well illustrated by Nikias in his exhortation to the Athenian army near Syracuse, immediately antecedent to the first battle with the Syracusans. — *λεγγὲν ἢ μασσῇ*, as opposed to hoplites specially selected (vi. 68-69). — *ἄλλως τε καὶ πρὸς ἄνδρας πανδημεὶ τε ἀσπίδα καὶ ῥομφαία, καὶ ἄλ' ὅσα ἐκείνοις, ὡς καὶ ἡμεῖς — καὶ προσέτι Σικελιώτας, ἐπ'.*

When a special selection took place, the names of the hoplites chosen by the generals to take part in any particular service were written on boards according to their tribes: each of these boards was affixed publicly against the statue of the Heros Eponymus of the tribe to which it referred: *Αριστοφάνης, Ἐκείτης, 1869; Παρ. 1184, with Scholiast; Wachsmuth, Hellen. Alterthumsk. ii. p. 312.*

³ Thucyd. iv. 100.

custom, had begun to organize a regiment of archers.¹ The effective manner in which Demosthenês had employed the light-armed in Sphakteria against the Lacedaemonian hoplites, was well calculated to teach an instructive lesson as to the value of the former description of troops.

The Boeotian Delium,² which Hippokratês now intended to occupy and fortify, was a temple of Apollo, strongly situated and overhanging the sea, about five miles from Tanagra, and somewhat more than a mile from the border territory of Orôpus, — a territory originally Boeotian, but at this time dependent on Athens, and even partly incorporated in the political community of Athens, under the name of the Deme of Græa.³ Orôpus itself was about a day's march from Athens, by the road which led through Dekeleia and Sphendalê, between the mountains Parnês and Phelleus: so that as the distance to be traversed was so inconsiderable, and the general feeling of the time was that of confidence, it is probable that men of all ages, arms, and dispositions crowded to join the march, in part from mere curiosity and excitement. Hippokratês reached Delium on the day after he had started from Athens: on the succeeding day he began his work of fortification, which was completed, all hands aiding, and tools as well as workmen having been brought along with the army from Athens, in two days and a half. Having dug a ditch all round the sacred ground, he threw up the earth in a bank alongside of the ditch, planting stakes, throwing in fascines, and adding layers of stone and brick, to keep the work together, and make it into a rampart of tolerable height and firmness. The vines⁴ round the temple, together with the stakes which served

¹ Thucyd. iv, 55.

² Thucyd. iv, 90; Livy, xxxv, 51.

³ Dikæarch. *Bios 'Ellados*. Fragm. ed. Fuhr, pp. 142–230; Pausan. i, 34, 2; Aristotle ap. Stephan. Byz. v, 'Ὀρωπός. See also Col. Leake, Athens and the Demi of Attica, vol. ii, sect. iv, p. 123; Mr. Finlay, Oropus and the Diakria, p. 38; Ross, Die Deme von Attika, p. 6, where the Deme of Græa is verified by an inscription, and explained for the first time.

The road taken by the army of Hippokratês in the march to Delium, was the same as that by which the Lacedaemonian army in their first invasion of Attica had retired from Attica into Boeotia (Thucyd. ii, 23).

⁴ Dikæarchus (*Bios 'Ellados*, p. 142, ed. Fuhr.) is full of encomiums on

as supports to them, were cut to obtain wood; the houses adjoining furnished bricks and stone: the outer temple-buildings themselves also, on some of the sides, served as they stood to facilitate and strengthen the defence; but there was one side on which the annexed building, once a portico, had fallen down: and here the Athenians constructed some wooden towers as a help to the defenders. By the middle of the fifth day after leaving Athens, the work was so nearly completed, that the army quitted Delium, and began its march homeward, out of Boeotia; halting, after it had proceeded about a mile and a quarter, within the Athenian territory of Orôpus. It was here that the hoplites awaited the coming of Hippokratês, who still remained at Delium, stationing the garrison, and giving his final orders about future defence; while the greater number of the light-armed and unarmed, separating from the hoplites, and seemingly without any anticipation of the coming danger, continued their return-march to Athens.¹ Their position was probably about the western extremity of the plain of Orôpus, on the verge of the low heights between that plain and Delium.²

During these five days, however, the forces from all parts of Boeotia had time to muster at Tanagra: and their number was just completed as the Athenians were beginning their march

the excellence of the wine drunk at Tanagra, and of the abundant olive-plantations on the road between Orôpus and Tanagra.

Since tools and masons were brought from Athens to fortify Nisæa, about three months before (Thucyd. iv, 69), we may be pretty sure that similar apparatus was carried to Delium, though Thucydides does not state it.

¹ Thucyd. iv, 90. That the vines round the temple had supporting-stakes, which furnished the *σταυρούς* used by the Athenians, we may reasonably presume: the same as those *χαράκες* which are spoken of in Korkyra, iii, 70: compare Pollux, i, 162.

² "The plain of Oropus (observes Col. Leake) expands from its upper angle at *Oropó* towards the mouth of the Asopus, and stretches about five miles along the shore, from the foot of the hills of Markópulo on the east to the village of Khalkúki on the west, where begin some heights extending westward towards Dhillisi, the ancient Delium."—"The plain of Oropus is separated from the more inland plain of Tanagra by rocky gorges through which the Asopus flows." (Leake, Athens and the Demi of Attica vol. ii, sect. iv, p. 112.)

tified place, would lend his cordial aid to the Bœotian defence.¹

Finding his exhortations favorably received, Pagondas conducted the army by a rapid march to a position close to the Athenians. He was anxious to fight them before they should have retreated farther; and, moreover, the day was nearly spent,—it was already late in the afternoon. Having reached a spot where he was only separated from the Athenians by a hill, which prevented either army from seeing the other, he marshalled his troops in the array proper for fighting. The Theban hoplites, with their dependent allies, ranged in a depth of not less than twenty-five shields, occupied the right wing: the hoplites of Haliartus, Korôneia, Kōpa, and its neighborhood, were in the centre: those of Thespiæ, Tanagra, and Orchomenus, on the left; for Orchomenus, being the second city in Bœotia next to Thebes, obtained a second post of honor at the opposite extremity of the line. Each contingent adopted its own mode of marshalling the hoplites, and its own depth of files: on this point there was no uniformity, a remarkable proof of the prevalence of dissentient custom in Greece, and how much each town, even among confederates, stood apart as a separate unit.² Thucydides specifies only the prodigious depth of the Theban hoplites; respecting the rest, he merely intimates that no common rule was followed. There is another point also which he does not specify, but which, though we learn it only on the inferior authority of Diodorus, appears both true and important. The front ranks of the Theban heavy-armed were filled by three hundred select warriors, of distinguished bodily strength, valor, and discipline, who were accustomed to fight in pairs, each man being attached to his neighbor by a peculiar tie of intimate friendship. These pairs

¹ Thucyd. iv, 92.

² Thucyd. iv, 93. ἐπ' ἀσπίδας δὲ πέντε μὲν καὶ εἰκοσι Θηβαῖοι ἐτάξαντο, αἱ δὲ ἄλλοι ὡς ἕκαστοι ἔτυχον.

What is still more remarkable, in the battle of Mantinea, in 418 B.C. between the Lacedæmonians on one side and the Athenians, Argæians, Mantineians, etc., on the other, the different lochi or divisions of the Lacedæmonian army were not all marshalled in the same depth of files. Each lochage, or commander of the lochos, directed the depth of his own division (Thucyd. v, 68).

were termed the *heniochi* and *parabatai*, charioteers and companions; a denomination probably handed down from the Homeric times, when the foremost heroes really combated in chariots in front of the common soldiers, but now preserved after it had outlived its appropriate meaning.¹ This band, composed of the finest men in the various palæstræ of Thebes, and enjoying a peculiar training for the defence of the *kadmeia*, or citadel, was in after-days detached from the front ranks of the phalanx, and organized into a separate regiment under the name of the Sacred Lochus, or Band: we shall see how much it contributed to the short-lived military ascendancy of Thebes. On both flanks of this mass of Bœotian hoplites, about seven thousand in total number, were distributed one thousand cavalry, five hundred peltasts, and ten thousand light-armed or unarmed. The language of the historian seems to imply that the light-armed on the Bœotian side were something more effective than the mere multitude who followed the Athenians.

Such was the order in which Pagondas marched his army over the hill, halting them for a moment in front and sight of the Athenians, to see that the ranks were even, before he gave the word for actual charge.² Hippokrates, on his side, apprized

¹ Diodor. xii, 70. Προεμάχοντο δὲ πάντων αἱ παρ' ἐκείνοις Ἡνίοχοι καὶ Παραβάται καλούμενοι, ἄνδρες ἐπίλεκτοι τριακοσίοι. . . . Οἱ δὲ Θηβαῖοι διαφέροντες ταῖς τῶν σωματικῶν ῥωμαίαι, etc.

Compare Plutarch, Pelopidas, c. 18, 19.

² Thucyd. iv, 93. Καὶ ἐπειδὴ καὶ αὐτοῖς εἶχεν, ὑπερεφάνησαν (the Bœotians) τοῦ λόφου καὶ ἐγένετο τὰ ὅπλα τεταγμένοι ὥσπερ ἐμελλόν, etc.

I transcribe this passage for the purpose of showing how impossible it is to admit the explanation which Dr. Arnold, Poppo, and Gölter give of these words *ἐθίοντο τὰ ὅπλα* (see Notes ad Thucyd. ii, 2). They explain the words to mean, that the soldiers "piled their arms into a heap," disarmed themselves for the time. But the Bœotians, in the situation here described, cannot possibly have parted with their arms, they were just on the point of charging the enemy: immediately afterwards, Pagondas gives the word, the pæan for charging is sung, and the rush commences. Pagondas had, doubtless, good reason for directing a momentary halt, to see that his ranks were in perfectly good condition before the charge began. But to command his troops to "pile their arms" would be the last thing that he would think of.

while still at Delium, that the Boeotians had moved from Tanagra, first sent orders to his army to place themselves in battle array, and presently arrived himself to command them; leaving three hundred cavalry at Delium, partly as garrison, partly for the purpose of acting on the rear of the Boeotians during the battle. The Athenian hoplites were ranged eight deep along the whole line, — with the cavalry, and such of the light-armed as yet remained, placed on each flank. Hippokratēs, after arriving on the spot, and surveying the ground occupied, marched along the front of the line briefly encouraging his soldiers; who, as the battle was just on the Orópiian border, might fancy that they were not in their own country, and that they were therefore exposed without necessity. He, too, in a strain similar to that adopted by Pagondas, reminded the Athenians, that on either side of the border they were alike fighting for the defence of Attica, to keep the Boeotians out of it; since the Peloponnesians would never dare to enter the country without the aid of the Boeotian horse.¹ He farther called to their recollection the great name of Athens, and the memorable victory of Myronidēs, at Œenophyta, whereby their fathers had acquired possession of all Boeotia. But he had scarcely half-finished his progress along the line, when he was forced to desist by the sound of the Boeotian pæan. Pagondas, after a few additional sentences of encouragement, had given the word: the Boeotian hoplites were seen charging down the hill; and the Athenian hoplites, not less eager, advanced to meet them at a running step.²

In the interpretation of *τιταμῖται ὡς περὶ ἐμῶν*, I agree with the Scholiast, who understands *ἀντιπαρὶ* or *ἀντιπαρα* after *ἐμῶν* (compare Thucyd. v, 66), dissenting from Dr. Arnold and Gölter, who would not understand *παρὸς*; which, as it seems to me, makes a very awkward meaning, and is not sustained by the passage produced as parallel (viii, 51).

The infinitive verb, understood after *ἐμῶν*, need not necessarily be a verb actually occurring before; it may be a verb suggested by the general scope of the sentence: see *ἐμῶν*, iv, 123.

¹ Thucyd. iv, 95.

² Thucyd. iv, 95, 96. Καθίστατον δ' ἐς τὴν τάξιν καὶ ἤδη μελλόντων ξυνιέναι, Ἱπποκράτης ὁ στρατηγὸς ἐπιπαύων τὸ στρατόπεδον τῶν Ἀθηναίων παρεκελεύετο τι καὶ ἔλεγε ταῦτα. . . . Ταῦτα τοὶ Ἱπποκράτους παρακελευόμενον, καὶ μέχρι μὲν μισοῦ τοῦ στρατοπέδου ἐπελθόντος, τὸ δὲ πλέον οὐκί.

At the extremity of the line on each side, the interposition of ravines prevented the actual meeting of the two armies: but throughout all the rest of the line, the clash was formidable and the conduct of both sides resolute. Both armies, maintaining their ranks compact and unbroken, came to the closest quarters; to the contact and pushing of shields against each other.¹ On the left half of the Boeotian line, consisting of hoplites from Thespiæ, Tanagra, and Orchomenus, the Athenians were victorious. The Thespians, who resisted longest even after their comrades had given way, were surrounded and sustained the most severe loss from the Athenians; who in the ardor of success, while wheeling round to encircle the enemy, became disordered and came into conflict even with their own citizens, not recognizing them at the moment: some loss of life was the consequence.

While the left of the Boeotian line was thus worsted and driven back for protection to the right, the Thebans on that side gained decided advantage. Though the resolution and discipline of the Athenians was noway inferior, yet as soon as the action came to close quarters and to propulsion with shield and spear, the prodigious depth of the Theban column (more than triple of the depth of the Athenians, twenty-five against eight) enabled them to bear down their enemies by mere superiority of weight and mass. Moreover, the Thebans appear to have been superior to the Athenians in gymnastic training and acquired bodily force, as they were inferior both in speech and in intelligence. The chosen Theban warriors in the front rank were especially superior: but apart from such superiority, if we assume simple equality of individual strength and resolution on both sides,² it is plain that when

φάσαντος, οἱ Βοιωτοὶ παρακλινάμενον καὶ σῶσαν ὡς διὰ ταχίων καὶ ἰσχυρῶν Παρωγῶν, παλαιότερον ἐπύρεσαν ἐπὶ τοῦ λόφου, etc.

This passage contradicts what is affirmed by Dr. Arnold, Poppo, and Gölter, to have been a *general practice*, that the soldiers "piled their arms and always attended the speeches of their generals without them." (See his note ad Thucyd. iv, 91.)

¹ Thucyd. iv, 96. καρτερὰ μάχῃ καὶ ὀπισμῷ ἀσπίδων ξινεσθήκει, etc. Compare Xenophon, Cyropæd. vii, 1, 32.

² The proverbial expression of Βοιωτῶν ἐν, "the Boeotian sow," was ancient even in the town of Pindar (Olymp. vi, 90, with the Scholia and Boeckh's note); compare also Ephorus, Fragment 67, ed. Marx: Δικῆας

the two opposing columns came into conflict, shield against shield, the comparative force of forward pressure would decide the victory. This motive is sufficient to explain the extraordinary depth of the Theban column, which was increased by Epameinondas, half a century afterwards, at the battle of Leuktra, from a depth of twenty-five men to the still more astonishing depth of fifty: nor need we suspect the correctness of the text, with some critics, or suppose, with others, that the great depth of the Theban files arose from the circumstance that the rear ranks were too poor to provide themselves with armor.¹ Even in a depth of eight, which was that of the Athenian column in the present engagement,² and seemingly the usual depth in a battle, the spears of the four rear ranks could hardly have protruded sufficiently beyond the first line to do any mischief. The great use of all the ranks behind the first four, was partly to take the place of such of the foremost lines as might be slain, partly, to push forward the lines before them from behind. The greater the depth of the files, the more irresistible did this propelling force become: hence the Thebans at Delium, as well as at Leuktra, found their account in deepening the column to so remarkable a degree, to which we may fairly presume that their hoplites were trained beforehand.

The Thebans on the right thus pushed back³ the troops on the left of the Athenian line, who retired at first slowly, and for a short space, maintaining their order unbroken, so that the victory of the Athenians on their own right would have restored the battle, had not Pagondas detached from the rear two squad-

chus, *Bios 'Ελλάδος*, p. 143, ed. Fuhr; Plato, *Legg.* i. p. 636; and *Symposion*, p. 182, "pingues Thebanī et valentes," Cicero de Fato, iv. 7.

Xenophon (*Memorab.* iii. 5, 2. 15; iii. 12, 5: compare Xenoph. de Athen. Republ. i. 13) maintains the natural bodily capacity of Athenians to be equal to that of Bœotians, but deplors the want of *σωμασκήα*, or bodily training.

¹ See the notes of Dr. Arnold and Poppo, ad Thucyd. iv. 96.

² Compare Thucyd. v. 68; vi. 67.

³ Thucyd. iv. 96. Τὸ δὲ δεξιὸν, ἢ οἱ Θηβαῖοι ἦσαν, ἐκράτει τε τῶν Ἀθηναίων καὶ ὡσάμενοι κατὰ βραχὺ τὸ πρῶτον ἐπηκολούθουν.

The word ὡσάμενοι (compare iv. 35; vi. 70), exactly expresses the forward pushing of the mass of hoplites with shield and spear.

rons of cavalry; who, wheeling unseen round the hill behind, suddenly appeared to the relief of the Bœotian left, and produced upon the Athenians on that side, already deranged in their ranks by the ardor of pursuit, the intimidating effect of a fresh army arriving to reinforce the Bœotians. And thus, even on the right, the victorious portion of their line, the Athenians lost courage and gave way; while on the left, where they were worsted from the beginning, they found themselves pressed harder and harder by the pursuing Thebans: so that in the end, the whole Athenian army was broken, dispersed, and fled. The garrison of Delium, reinforced by three hundred cavalry, whom Hippokratēs had left there to assail the rear of the Bœotians during the action, either made no vigorous movement, or were repelled by a Bœotian reserve stationed to watch them. Flight having become general among the Athenians, the different parts of their army took different directions: the right sought refuge at Delium, the centre fled to Orôpus, and the left took a direction towards the high lands of Parnēs. The pursuit of the Bœotians was vigorous and destructive: they had an efficient cavalry, strengthened by some Lokrian horse who had arrived even during the action: their pel-tasts also, and their light-armed, would render valuable service against retreating hoplites.¹ Fortunately for the vanquished, the battle had begun very late in the afternoon, leaving no long period of daylight: this important circumstance saved the Athenian army from almost total destruction.² As it was, however, the general Hippokratēs, together with nearly one thousand hoplites, and a considerable number of light-armed and attendants, were slain; while the loss of the Bœotians, chiefly on their defeated left wing, was rather under five hundred hoplites. Some prisoners³ seem to have been made, but we hear little about them. Those who had fled to Delium and Orôpus were conveyed back by sea to Athens.

¹ Thucyd. iv. 96; Athenæus, v. p. 215. Diodorus (xii. 70) represents that the battle began with a combat of cavalry, in which the Athenians had the advantage. This is quite inconsistent with the narrative of Thucydides.

² Diodorus (xii. 70) dwells upon this circumstance.

³ Pyrilampēs is spoken of as having been wounded and taken prisoner in the retreat by the Thebans (Plutarch, De Genio Socratis, c. 11, p. 581). See also Thucyd. v. 35, where allusion is made to some prisoners.

The victors retired to Tanagra, after erecting their trophy, burying their own dead, and despoiling those of their enemies. An abundant booty of arms from the stripped warriors, long remained to decorate the temples of Thebes, and the spoil in other ways is said to have been considerable. Pagondas also resolved to lay siege to the newly-established fortress at Delium: but before commencing operations, — which might perhaps prove tedious, since the Athenians could always reinforce the garrison by sea, — he tried another means of attaining the same object. He despatched to the Athenians a herald, who, happening in his way to meet the Athenian herald, coming to ask the ordinary permission for burial of the slain, warned him that no such request would be entertained until the message of the Bœotian general had first been communicated, and thus induced him to come back to the Athenian commanders. The Bœotian herald was instructed to remonstrate against the violation of holy custom committed by the Athenians in seizing and fortifying the temple of Delium; wherein their garrison was now dwelling, performing numerous functions which religion forbade to be done in a sacred place, and using as their common drink the water especially consecrated to sacrificial purposes. The Bœotians therefore solemnly summoned them in the name of Apollo, and the gods inmates along with him, to evacuate the place, carrying away all that belonged to them: and the herald gave it to be understood, that, unless this summons were complied with, no permission would be granted to bury the dead.

Answer was returned by the Athenian herald, who now went to the Bœotian commanders, to the following effect: "The Athenians did not admit that they had hitherto been guilty of any wrong in reference to the temple, and protested that they would persist in respecting it for the future as much as possible. Their object in taking possession of it had been no evil sentiment towards the holy place, but the necessity of avenging the repeated invasions of Attica by the Bœotians. Possession of the territory, according to the received maxims of Greece, always carried along with it possession of temples therein situated, under obligation to fulfil all customary obligations to the resident god, as far as circumstances permitted. It was upon this maxim that the Bœotians had themselves acted when they took possession of

their present territory, expelling the prior occupants and appropriating the temples: it was upon the same maxim that the Athenians would act in retaining so much of Bœotia as they had now conquered, and in conquering more of it, if they could. Necessity compelled them to use the consecrated water — a necessity not originating in the ambition of Athens, but in prior Bœotian aggressions upon Attica, — a necessity which they trusted that the gods would pardon, since their altars were allowed as a protection to the involuntary offender, and none but he who sinned without constraint experienced their displeasure. The Bœotians were guilty of far greater impiety in refusing to give back the dead, except upon certain conditions connected with the holy ground, than the Athenians, who merely refused to turn the duty of sepulture into an unseemly bargain. Tell us unconditionally (concluded the Athenian herald) that we may bury our dead under truce, pursuant to the maxims of our forefathers. Do not tell us that we may do so on condition of going out of Bœotia, for we are no longer in Bœotia; we are in our own territory, won by the sword."

The Bœotian generals dismissed the herald with a reply short and decisive: "If you are in Bœotia, you may take away all that belongs to you, but only on condition of going out of it. If on the other hand you are in your own territory, you can take your own resolution without asking us."¹

In this debate, curious as an illustration of Grecian manners and feelings, there seems to have been special pleading and evasion on both sides. The final sentence of the Bœotians was good as a reply to the incidental argument raised by the Athenian herald, who had rested the defence of Athens in regard to the temple of Delium on the allegation that the territory was Athenian, not Bœotian, Athenian by conquest and by the right of the strongest, and had concluded by affirming the same thing about Oropia, the district to which the battle-field belonged. It was only this same argument, of actual superior force, which the Bœotians retorted, when they said: "If the territory to which your application refers is yours by right of conquest (*i. e.* if you are *de facto* masters of it, and are strongest within it), you can of course

¹ See the two difficult chapters, iv, 98, 99, in Thucydides.

do what you think best in it: you need not ask any truce at our hands; you can bury your dead without a truce."¹ The Bœotians knew that at this moment the field of battle was under guard by a detachment of their army,² and that the Athenians could not obtain the dead bodies without permission; but since the Athenian herald had asserted the reverse as a matter of fact, we can hardly wonder that they resented the production of such an argument; meeting it by a reply sufficiently pertinent in mere diplomatic fencing.

But if the Athenian herald, instead of raising the incidental point of territorial property, combined with an incautious definition of that which constituted territorial property, as a defence against the alleged desecration of the temple of Delium, had confined himself to the main issue, he would have put the Bœotians completely in the wrong. According to principles universally respected in Greece, the victor, if solicited, was held bound to grant to the vanquished a truce for burying his dead; to grant and permit it absolutely, without annexing any conditions. On this, the main point in debate, the Bœotians sinned against the most sacred international law of Greece, when they exacted the evacuation of the temple at Delium as a condition for consenting to permit the burial of the Athenian dead. Ultimately, after they had taken Delium, we shall find that they did grant it unconditionally; and we may doubt whether they would have ever persisted in refusing it, if the Athenian herald had pressed this one important principle separately and exclusively; and if he had not, by an unskilful plea in vindication of the right to occupy

¹ See the notes of Poppo, Gölter, Dr. Arnold, and other commentators, on these chapters.

Neither these notes, nor the Scholiast, seem to me in all parts satisfactory; nor do they seize the spirit of the argument between the Athenian herald and the Bœotian officers, which will be found perfectly consistent as a piece of diplomatic interchange.

In particular, they do not take notice that it is the Athenian herald who first raises the question, what is Athenian territory and what is Bœotian: and that he defines Athenian territory to be that in which the force of Athens is superior. The retort of the Bœotians refers to that definition; not to the question of rightful claim to any territory, apart from actual superiority of force.

² Thucyd. iv, 97.

and live at Delium, both exasperated their feelings, and furnished them with a collateral issue as a means of evading the main demand.¹

To judge this curious debate with perfect impartiality, we ought to add, in reference to the conduct of the Athenians in occupying Delium, that for an enemy to make special choice of a temple, as a post to be fortified and occupied, was a proceeding certainly rare, perhaps hardly admissible, in Grecian warfare. Nor does the vindication offered by the Athenian herald meet the real charge preferred. It is one thing for an enemy of superior force to overrun a country, and to appropriate everything within it, sacred as well as profane: it is another thing for a border enemy, not yet in sufficient force for conquering the whole, to convert a temple of convenient site into a regular garrisoned fortress, and make it a base of operations against the neighboring population. On this ground, the Bœotians might reasonably complain of the seizure of Delium: though I apprehend that no impartial interpreter of Grecian international custom would have thought them warranted in attaching it as a condition to their grant of the burial-truce when solicited.

All negotiation being thus broken off, the Bœotian generals prepared to lay siege to Delium, aided by two thousand Corinthian hoplites, together with some Megarians and the late Peloponnesian garrison of Nisæa, who joined after the news of the battle. Though they sent for darters and slingers, probably Eteans and Ætolians, from the Malian gulf, yet their direct attacks were at first all repelled by the garrison, aided by an Athenian squadron off the coast, in spite of the hasty and awkward defences by which alone the fort was protected. At length

¹ Thucydides, in describing the state of mind of the Bœotians, does not seem to imply that they thought this a good and valid ground, upon which they could directly take their stand; but merely that they considered it a fair diplomatic way of meeting the alternative raised by the Athenian herald; for *ἐπιπαιεῖς* means nothing more than this.

Οὐδ' αὖ ἐσπένδοντο δεῦτεν ὑπὲρ τῆς ἐκείνου (Ἀθηναίων): το δὲ ἐκ τῆς ἱερῆς (Βοιωτῶν) ἐξ ἑστέρας εἶναι ἀποκρίνασθαι, ἀπιοῦντας καὶ ἀπελαβεῖν ἢ ἀπαρτῆσαι.

The adverb *δεῦτεν* also marks the reference to the special question, as laid out by the Athenian herald.

they contrived a singular piece of fire-mechanism, which enabled them to master the place. They first sawed in twain a thick beam, pierced a channel through it long-ways from end to end, coated most part of the channel with iron, and then joined the two halves accurately together. From the farther end of this hollowed beam they suspended by chains a boiler, full of pitch, brimstone, and burning charcoal; lastly, an iron tube projected from the end of the interior channel of the beam, in a direction so as to come near to the boiler. Such was the machine, which, constructed at some distance, was brought on carts and placed close to the wall, near the palisading and the wooden towers. The Boeotians then applied great bellows to their own end of the beam, blowing violently with a close current of air through the interior channel, so as to raise an intense fire in the boiler at the other end. The wooden portions of the wall, soon catching fire, became untenable for the defenders, who escaped in the best way they could, without attempting farther resistance. Two hundred of them were made prisoners and a few slain; but the greater number got safely on shipboard. This recapture of Delium took place on the seventeenth day after the battle, during all which interval the Athenians slain had remained on the field unburied. Presently, however, arrived the Athenian herald to make fresh application for the burial-truce; which was now forthwith granted, and granted unconditionally.¹

Such was the memorable expedition and battle of Delium, a fatal discouragement to the feeling of confidence and hope which had previously reigned at Athens, besides the painful immediate loss which it inflicted on the city. Among the hoplites who took part in the vigorous charge and pushing of shields, the philosopher Sokratès is to be numbered. His bravery both in the battle and the retreat was much extolled by his friends, and doubtless with good reason: he had before served with credit in the ranks of the hoplites at Potidra, and he served also at Amphipolis: his patience under hardship and endurance of heat and cold being not less remarkable than his personal bravery. He and his friend Lachès were among those hoplites, who, in the retreat from Delium, instead of flinging away their arms and taking to flight,

¹ Thucyd. iv, 100-101

kept their ranks, their arms, and their firmness of countenance; insomuch that the pursuing cavalry found it dangerous to meddle with them, and turned to an easier prey in the disarmed fugitives. Alkibiadès also served at Delium in the cavalry, and helped to protect Sokratès in the retreat. The latter was thus exposing his life at Delium nearly at the same time when Aristophanès was exposing him to derision in the comedy of the Clouds, as a dreamer alike morally worthless and physically incapable.¹

Severe as the blow was which the Athenians suffered at Delium, their disasters in Thrace about the same time, or towards the close of the same summer and autumn, were yet more calamitous. I have already mentioned the circumstances which led to the preparation of a Lacedæmonian force intended to act against the Athenians in Thrace, under Brasidas, in concert with the Chalkidians, revolted subjects of Athens, and with Perdikkas of Macedonia. Having frustrated the Athenian designs against Megara (as described above),² Brasidas completed the levy of his division, — seventeen hundred hoplites, partly Helots, partly Dorian Peloponnesians, — and conducted them, towards the close of the summer, to the Lacedæmonian colony of Herakleia, in the Trachinian territory near the Maliaë gulf. To reach Macedonia and Thrace, it was necessary for him to pass through Thessaly, which was no easy task; for the war had now lasted so long that every state in Greece had become mistrustful of the transit of armed foreigners. Moreover, the mass of the Thessalian population were decidedly friendly to Athens, nor had he any sufficient means to force a passage: while, should he wait to apply for formal permission,

¹ See Plato (Symposium, c. 36, p. 221; Lachès, p. 181; Charmidès, p. 153; Apolog. Sokratis, p. 28), Strabo, ix, p. 403.

Plutarch, Alkibiadès, c. 7. We find it mentioned among the stories told about Sokratès in the retreat from Delium, that his life was preserved by the inspiration of his familiar daemon, or genius, which instructed him on one doubtful occasion which of two roads was the safe one to take (Cicero, de Divinat. i, 54; Plutarch, de Genio Sokratis, c. 11, p. 581).

The scepticism of Athenæus (v, p. 215) about the military service of Sokratès is not to be defended, but it may probably be explained by the exaggerations and falsehoods which he had read, ascribing to the philosopher superhuman gallantry.

² See above, page 378.

there was much doubt whether it would be granted, and perfect certainty of such delay and publicity as would put the Athenians on their guard. But though such was the temper of the Thessalian people, yet the Thessalian governments, all oligarchical, sympathized with Lacedæmon; and the federal authority or power of the tagus, which bound together the separate cities, was generally very weak. What was of still greater importance, the Macedonian Perdikkas, as well as the Chalkidians, had in every city powerful guests and partisans, whom they prevailed upon to exert themselves actively in forwarding the passage of the army.¹

To these men Brasidas sent a message at Pharsalus, as soon as he reached Herakleia; and Nikonidas, of Larissa, with other Thessalian friends of Perdikkas, assembling at Melitæa, in Achaia Phthiotis, undertook to escort him through Thessaly. By their countenance and support, combined with his own boldness, dexterity, and rapid movements, he was enabled to accomplish the seemingly impossible enterprise of running through the country, not only without the consent but against the feeling of its inhabitants, simply by such celerity as to forestall opposition. After traversing Achaia Phthiotis, a territory dependent on the Thessalians, Brasidas began his march from Melitæa through Thessaly itself, along with his powerful native guides. Notwithstanding all possible secrecy and celerity, his march became so far divulged, that a body of volunteers from the neighborhood, offended at the proceeding, and unfriendly to Nikonidas, assembled to oppose his progress down the valley of the river Enipeus. Reproaching him with wrongful violation of an independent territory, by the introduction of armed forces without permission from the general government, they forbade him to proceed farther. His only chance of making progress lay in disarming their opposition by fair words. His guides excused themselves by saying that the suddenness of his arrival had imposed upon them as his guests the obligation of conducting him through, without waiting to ask for formal permission: to offend their countrymen, however, was the farthest thing from their thoughts, and they would renounce the enterprise if the persons now assembled persisted in their requisition. The same conciliatory

¹ Thucyd. iv, 78.

tone was adopted by Brasidas himself. "He protested his strong feeling of respect and friendship for Thessaly and its inhabitants: his arms were directed against the Athenians, not against them: nor was he aware of any unfriendly relation subsisting between the Thessalians and Lacedæmonians, such as to exclude either of them from the territory of the other. Against the prohibition of the parties now before him, he could not possibly march forward, nor would he think of attempting it; but he put it to their good feeling whether they ought to prohibit him." Such conciliatory language was successful in softening the opponents and inducing them to disperse. But so afraid were his guides of renewed opposition in other parts, that they hurried him forward still more rapidly,¹ and he "passed through the country at a running pace without halting." Leaving Melitæa in the morning, he reached Pharsalus on the same night, encamping on the river Apidanus: thence he proceeded on the next day to Phakium, and on the day afterwards into Perrhæbia,² a territory adjoining to and dependent on Thessaly, under the mountain range of Olympus. Here he was in safety, so that his Thessalian guides left him; while the Perrhæbians conducted him over the pass of Olympus — the same over which the army of Xerxes had marched — to Dium, in Macedonia, in the territory of Perdikkas, on the northern edge of the mountain.³

¹ Thucyd. iv, 78. 'Ο δὲ, κελεύοντων τῶν ἀγωγῶν, πρὶν τι πλεονεκτήσῃαι τὸ κωλύσον, ἔχωρει οὐδὲν ἐπισχῶν δρόμῳ.

² The geography of Thessaly is not sufficiently known to enable us to verify these positions with exactness. That which Thucydides calls the Apidanus, is the river formed by the junction of the Apidanus and Enipeus. See Kiepert's map of ancient Thessaly (Colonel Leake, *Travels in Northern Greece*, ch. xlii, vol. iv, p. 470; and Dr. Arnold's note on this chapter of Thucydides).

We must suppose that Brasidas was detained a considerable time in parleying with the opposing band of Thessalians. Otherwise, it would seem that the space between Melitæa and Pharsalus would not be a great distance to get over in an entire day's march, considering that the pace was as rapid as the troops could sustain. The much greater distance between Larissa and Melitæa, was traversed in one night by Philip king of Macedon, the son of Demetrius, with an army carrying ladders and other aids for attacking a town, etc. (Polyb. v, 97.)

³ Thucyd. iv, 78.

The Athenians were soon apprized of this stolen passage, so ably and rapidly executed, in a manner which few other Greeks, certainly no other Lacedæmonian, would have conceived to be possible. Aware of the new enemy thus brought within reach of their possessions in Thrace, they transmitted orders thither for greater vigilance, and at the same time declared open war against Perdikkas;¹ but unfortunately without sending any efficient force, at the moment when timely defensive intervention was imperiously required. Perdikkas immediately invited Brasidas to join him in the attack of Arrhibæus, prince of the Macedonians, called Lynkestæ, or of Lynkus; a summons which the Spartan could not decline, since Perdikkas provided half of the pay and maintenance of the army, — but which he obeyed with reluctance, anxious as he was to commence operations against the allies of Athens. Such reluctance was still farther strengthened by envoys from the Chalkidians of Thrace, who, as zealous enemies of Athens, joined him forthwith, but discouraged any vigorous efforts to relieve Perdikkas from embarrassing enemies in the interior, in order that the latter might be under more pressing motives to conciliate and assist them. Accordingly Brasidas, though he joined Perdikkas, and marched along with the Macedonian army towards the territory of the Lynkestæ, was not only averse to active military operations, but even entertained with favor propositions from Arrhibæus, wherein the latter expressed his wish to become the ally of Lacedæmon, and offered to refer all his differences with Perdikkas to the arbitration of the Spartan general himself. Communicating these propositions to Perdikkas, Brasidas invited him to listen to an equitable compromise, admitting Arrhibæus into the alliance of Lacedæmon. But Perdikkas indignantly refused: "He had not called in Brasidas as a judge, to decide disputes between him and his enemies, but as an auxiliary, to put them down wherever he might point them out: and he protested against the iniquity of Brasidas in entering into terms with Arrhibæus, while the Lacedæmonian army was half paid and maintained by him," (Perdikkas.²) Notwithstanding such remonstrances, and even a hostile protest, Brasidas persisted in his intended conference with Arrhi-

¹ Thucyd. iv. 82.² Thucyd. iv. 83.

bæus, and was so far satisfied with the propositions made that he withdrew his troops without marching over the pass into Lynkus. Too feeble to act alone, Perdikkas loudly complained, and contracted his allowance for the future so as to provide for only one-third of the army of Brasidas instead of one-half.

To this inconvenience, however, Brasidas submitted, in haste to begin his march into Chalkidikê, and his operations jointly with the Chalkidians, for seducing or subduing the subject-allies of Athens. His first operation was against Akanthus, on the isthmus of the peninsula of Athos, the territory of which he invaded a little before the vintage, probably about the middle of September; when the grapes were ripe, but still out, and the whole crop of course exposed to ruin at the hands of an enemy superior in force: so important was it to Brasidas to have escaped the necessity of wasting another month in conquering the Lynkestæ. There was within the town of Akanthus a party in concert with the Chalkidians, anxious to admit him, and to revolt openly from Athens. But the mass of the citizens were averse to this step: and it was only by dwelling on the terrible loss from exposure of the crop without, that the anti-Athenian party could persuade them even to grant the request of Brasidas to be admitted singly,¹ so as to explain his purposes formally before the public assembly, which would take its own decision afterwards. "For a Lacedæmonian (says Thucydides) he was no mean speaker:" and if he is to have credit for that which we find written in Thucydides, such an epithet would be less than his desert. Doubtless, however, the substance of the speech is genuine: and it is one of the most interesting in Grecian history; partly as a manifesto of professed Lacedæmonian policy, partly because it had a great practical effect in determining, on an occasion of paramount importance, a multitude which, though unfavorably inclined to him, was not beyond the reach of argu-

Thucyd. iv. 84. Οἱ δὲ περὶ τοῦ δεῖσθαι αὐτὸν κατ' ἀλλή-
λεις ἐστασιάζον, οἱ τε μετὰ τῶν Χαλκιδέων ξυνεπάγοντε
καὶ ὁ δῆμος· ὥς δέ, δια τοῦ κάρπου τὸ δέος ἐτι ἐξω ὄντος
πεισθὲν τὰ πλῆθος ἐπὶ τοῦ Βρασίδου δεῖσθαι τε αὐτὸν αὐτοὶ καὶ ἀκούσαι
τας βουλευσασθαι δεῖται, etc.

ment. I give the chief points of the speech, without binding myself to the words.

"Myself and my soldiers have been sent, Akanthians, to realize the purpose which we proclaimed on beginning the war; that we took arms to liberate Greece from the Athenians. Let no man blame us for having been long in coming, or for the mistake which we made at the outset in supposing that we should quickly put down the Athenians by operations against Attica, without exposing you to any risk. Enough, that we are now here on the first opportunity, resolved to put them down if you will lend us your aid. To find myself shut out of your town, nay, to find that I am not heartily welcomed, astonishes me. We, Lacedæmonians, undertook this long and perilous march, in the belief that we were coming to friends eagerly expecting us; and it would indeed be terrible if you should now disappoint us, and stand out against your own freedom as well as that of other Greeks. Your example, standing high as you do both for prudence and power, will fatally keep back other Greeks, and make them suspect that I am wanting either in power to protect them against Athens, or in honest purpose. Now, in regard to power, my own present army was one which the Athenians, though superior in number, were afraid to fight near Nisæa; nor are they at all likely to send an equal force hither against me by sea. And in regard to my purpose, it is not one of mischief, but of liberation, the Lacedæmonian authorities having pledged themselves to me by the most solemn oaths, that every city which joins me shall retain its autonomy. You have therefore the best assurance both as to my purposes and as to my power; still less need you apprehend that I am come with factious designs, to serve the views of any particular men among you, and to remodel your established constitution to the disadvantage either of the many or of the few. That would be worse than foreign subjugation, so that we Lacedæmonians should be taking all this trouble to earn hatred instead of gratitude. We should play the part of unworthy traitors, worse even than that high-handed oppression of which we accuse the Athenians: we should at once violate our oaths and sin against our strongest political interests. Perhaps you may say, that though you wish me well, you desire for your parts to be let alone, and to stand aloof from

a dangerous struggle. You will tell me to carry my propositions elsewhere, to those who can safely embrace them, but not to thrust my alliance upon any people against their own will. If this should be your language, I shall first call your local gods and heroes to witness that I have come to you with a mission of good, and have employed persuasion in vain; I shall then proceed to ravage your territory and extort your consent, thinking myself justly entitled to do so, on two grounds. First, that the Lacedæmonians may not sustain actual damage from these good wishes which you profess towards me without actually joining, — damage in the shape of that tribute which you annually send to Athens. Next, that the Greeks generally may not be prevented by you from becoming free. It is only on the ground of common good, that we Lacedæmonians can justify ourselves for liberating any city against its own will; but as we are conscious of desiring only extinction of the empire of others, not acquisition of empire for ourselves, we should fail in our duty if we suffered you to obstruct that liberation which we are now carrying to all. Consider well my words, then: take to yourselves the glory of beginning the era of emancipation for Greece, save your own properties from damage, and attach an ever-honorable name to the community of Akanthus."¹

Nothing could be more plausible or judicious than this language of Brasidas to the Akanthians, nor had they any means of detecting the falsity of the assertion, which he afterwards repeated in other places besides,² that he had braved the forces of Athens at Nisæa with the same army as that now on the outside of the walls. Perhaps the simplicity of his speech and manner may even have lent strength to his assurances. As soon as he had retired, the subject was largely discussed in the assembly, with much difference of opinion among the speakers, and perfect freedom on both sides: and the decision, not called for until after a long debate, was determined partly by the fair promises of Brasidas, partly by the certain loss which the ruin of the vine-crop would entail. The votes of the citizens present being taken secretly, a majority resolved to accede to the proposi-

¹ Thucyd. iv, 85, 86, 87.

² Thucyd. iv, 108.

tions of Brasidas and revolt from Athens.¹ Exacting the renewal of his pledge and that of the Lacedæmonian authorities, for the preservation of full autonomy to every city which should join him, they received his army into the town. The neighboring city of Stageirus, a colony of Andros, as Akanthus also was, soon followed the example.²

There are few acts in history wherein Grecian political reason and morality appear to greater advantage than in this proceeding of the Akanthians. The habit of fair, free, and pacific discussion; the established respect to the vote of the majority; the care to protect individual independence of judgment by secret suffrage; the deliberate estimate of reasons on both sides by each individual citizen, all these main laws and conditions of healthy political action appear as a part of the confirmed character of the Akanthians. We shall not find Brasidas entering other towns in a way so creditable or so harmonious.

But there is another inference which the scene just described irresistibly suggests. It affords the clearest proof that the Akanthians had little to complain of as subject-allies of Athens, and that they would have continued in that capacity, if left to their own choice, without the fear of having their crop destroyed. Such is the pronounced feeling of the mass of the citizens: the party who desire otherwise are in a decided minority. It is only the combined effect of severe impending loss, and of tempting assurances held out by the worthiest representative whom Sparta ever sent out, which induces them to revolt from Athens: nor even then is the resolution taken without long opposition, and a large dissentient minority, in a case where secret suffrage insured free and genuine expression of preference from every individual. Now, it is impossible that the scene in Akanthus at this critical moment could have been of such a character, had the empire of Athens been practically odious and burdensome to the subject-allies, as it is commonly depicted. Had such been the fact: had the Akanthians felt that the imperial ascendancy of

¹ Thucyd. iv, 88. Οἱ δὲ Ἀκανῆες, πολλὰν λίσσιντων πρότερον ἐπ' αὐφ' ἑαυτῶν, καὶ οὐκ ἀναφ' ἑαυτῶν, διὰ τὸ ἐπαγ' ἑαυτῶν τὸν Βρασίδα καὶ περὶ τοῦ καρποῦ φόβῳ, ἔγνωσαν εἰ πλείονες ἂν πείσονται Ἀθηναίων.

² Thucyd. iv, 88; Diodor. xiv, 67.

Athens oppressed them with hardship or humiliation, from which their neighbors, the revolted Chalkidians in Olynthus and elsewhere, were exempt, they would have hailed the advent of Brasidas with that cordiality which he himself expected and was surprised not to find. The sense of present grievance, always acute and often excessive, would have stood out as their prominent impulse: nor would they have needed either intimidation or cajolery to induce them to throw open their gates to the liberator, who, in his speech within the town, finds no actual suffering to appeal to, but is obliged to gain over an audience evidently unwilling by alternate threats and promises.

As in Akanthus, so in most of the other Thracian subjects of Athens, the bulk of the citizens, though strongly solicited by the Chalkidians, manifest no spontaneous disposition to revolt from Athens. We shall find the party who introduce Brasidas to be a conspiring minority, who not only do not consult the majority beforehand, but act in such a manner as to leave no free option to the majority afterwards, whether they will ratify or reject: bring in a foreign force to overawe them and compromise them without their own consent in hostility against Athens. Now that which makes the events of Akanthus so important as an evidence, is, that the majority is not thus entrapped and compressed, but pronounces its judgment freely after ample discussion: the grounds of that judgment are clearly set forth to us, so as to show that hatred of Athens, if even it exists at all, is in no way a strong or determining feeling. Had there existed any such strong feeling among the subject-allies of Athens in the Chalkidic peninsula, there was no Athenian force now present to hinder them all from opening their gates to the liberator Brasidas by spontaneous majorities, as he himself encouraged by the sanguine promises of the Chalkidians, evidently expected that they would do. But nothing of this kind happened.

That which I before remarked in recounting the revolt of Mitylenæ, a privileged ally of Athens, is now confirmed in the revolt of Akanthus, a tributary and subject-ally. The circumstances of both prove that imperial Athens inspired no hatred, and occasioned no painful grievance, to the population of her subject-cities generally: the movements against her arose from party-minorities, of the same character as that Platæar

party which introduced the Theban assailants into Platæa at the commencement of the Peloponnesian war. There are of course differences of sentiment between one town and another; but the conduct of the towns generally demonstrates that the Athenian empire was not felt by them to be a scheme of plunder and oppression, as Mr. Mitford and others would have us believe. It is indeed true that Athens managed her empire with reference to her own feelings and interests, and that her hold was rather upon the prudence than upon the affection of her allies, except in so far as those among them who were democratically governed sympathized with her democracy: it is also true that restrictions in any form on the autonomy of each separate city were offensive to the political instincts of the Greeks: moreover, Athens took less and less pains to disguise or soften the real character of her empire, as one resting simply on established fact and superior force. But this is a different thing from the endurance of practical hardship and oppression, which, had it been real, would have inspired strong positive hatred among the subject allies, such as Brasidas expected to find universal in Thrace, but did not really find, in spite of the easy opening which his presence afforded.

The acquisition of Akanthus and Stageirus enabled Brasidas in no very long time to extend his conquests; to enter Argilus, and from thence to make the capital acquisition of Amphipolis.

Argilus was situated between Stageirus and the river Strymon, along the western bank of which river its territory extended. Along the eastern bank of the same river, — south of the lake which it forms under the name of Kerkinitis, and north of the town of Eion at its mouth, was situated the town and territory of Amphipolis, communicating with the lands of Argilus by the important bridge there situated. The Argilians were colonists from Andros, like Akanthus and Stageirus, and the adhesion of those two cities to Brasidas gave him opportunity to cultivate intelligences in Argilus, wherein there had existed a standing discontent against Athens, ever since the foundation of the neighboring city of Amphipolis.¹ The latter city had been established

¹ Thucyd. iv. 103. *τοῖς δὲ οἱ Ἀργίλιοι, ἰγγυς τε προσκοινοῦντες καὶ ἔτι ποτὶ τὴν Ἀθηναίων ἰσχύϊ ἐπὶ τὴν πόλιν καὶ ἐπὶ τὴν ἀκρόπολιν τῆς χωρῆς (Amphipolis)*

by the Athenian Agnon, at the head of a numerous body of colonists, on a spot belonging to the Edonian Thracians, called Ennea Hodoi, or Nine Ways, about five years prior to the commencement of the war (B.C. 437), after two previous attempts to colonize it, — one by Histieus and Aristagoras, at the period of the Ionic revolt, and a second by the Athenians about 465 B.C., both of which lamentably failed. So valuable, however, was the site, from its vicinity to the gold and silver mines near Mount Pangæus and to large forests of ship-timber, as well as for command of the Strymon, and for commerce with the interior of Thrace and Macedonia, that the Athenians had sent a second expedition under Agnon, who founded the city and gave it the name of Amphipolis. The resident settlers there, however, were only in small proportion Athenian citizens; the rest of mixed origin, some of them Argilian, a considerable number Chalkidians. The Athenian general Euklēs was governor in the town, though seemingly with no paid force under his command.

Among these mixed inhabitants a conspiracy was organized to betray the town to Brasidas, the inhabitants of Argilus as well as the Chalkidians each of them tampering with those of the same race who resided in Amphipolis; and the influence of Perdikkas, not inconsiderable, in consequence of the commerce of the place with Macedonia, was employed to increase the number of partisans. Of all the instigators, however, the most strenuous as well as the most useful were the inhabitants of Argilus. Amphipolis, together with the Athenians as its founders, had been odious to them from its commencement; and its foundation had doubtless abridged their commerce and importance as masters of the lower course of the Strymon. They had been long laying snares against the city, and the arrival of Brasidas now presented to them an unexpected chance of success. It was they who enabled him to accomplish the surprise, deferring proclamation of their own defection from Athens until they could make it subservient to his conquest of Amphipolis.

Starting with his army from Arnē in the Chalkidic peninsula, Brasidas arrived in the afternoon at Aulon and Bromiskus, near the channel whereby the lake Bolbē is connected with the sea: from hence, after his men had supped, he began his night-march to Amphipolis, on a cold and snowy night of November, or

Such easy conditions, when made known in the city, produced presently a sensible change of opinion among the citizens, proving acceptable both to Athenians and Amphipolitans, though on different grounds.¹ The properties of the citizens without, as well as many of their relatives, were all in the hands of Brasidas: no one counted upon the speedy arrival of reinforcement; and even if it did arrive, the city might be preserved, but the citizens without would still be either slain or made captive: a murderous battle would ensue, and perhaps, after all, Brasidas, assisted by the party within, might prove victorious. The Athenian citizens in Amphipolis, knowing themselves to be exposed to peculiar danger, were perfectly well pleased with his offer, as extricating them from a critical position and procuring for them the means of escape, with comparatively little loss; while the non-Athenian citizens, partakers in the same relief from peril, felt little reluctance in accepting a capitulation which preserved both their rights and their properties inviolate, and merely severed them from Athens, towards which city they felt, not hatred, but indifference. Above all, the friends and relatives of the citizens exposed in the out-region were strenuous in urging on the capitulation, so that the conspirators soon became bold enough to proclaim themselves openly, insisting upon the moderation of Brasidas and the prudence of admitting him. Euklēs found that the tone of opinion, even among his own Athenians, was gradually turned against him, nor could he prevent the acceptance of the terms, and the admission of the enemy into the city, on that same day.

No such resolution would have been adopted, had the citizens been aware how near at hand Thucydides and his forces were. The message despatched early in the morning from Amphipolis found him at Thasos with seven triremes; with which he instantly put to sea, so as to reach Eion at the mouth of the Strymon, within three miles of Amphipolis, on the same evening.

¹ Thucyd. iv. 106. *Οἱ δὲ πολλοὶ ἀκούσαντες ἀλλήλους ἐπὶ τῇ ἑστίασιν τὰς γνώσεις αὐτῶν.*

The word *ἀκούσαντες* seems to indicate both the chance of view, compared with what had been before, and the discrepancy introduced among the citizens.

He hoped to be in time for saving Amphipolis, but the place had surrendered a few hours before. He arrived, indeed, only just in time to preserve Eion; for parties in that town were already beginning to concert the admission of Brasidas, who would probably have entered it at daybreak the next morning. Thucydides, putting the place in a condition of defence, successfully repelled an attack which Brasidas made both by land and by boats on the river. He at the same time received and provided for the Athenian citizens who were retiring from Amphipolis.¹

The capture of this city, perhaps the most important of all the foreign possessions of Athens, and the opening of the bridge over the Strymon, by which even all her eastern allies became approachable by land, occasioned prodigious emotion throughout all the Grecian world. The dismay felt at Athens² was greater than had been ever before experienced: hope and joy prevailed among her enemies, and excitement and new aspirations became widely spread among her subject-allies. The bloody defeat at Delium, and the unexpected conquests of Brasidas, now again lowered the *prestige* of Athenian success, sixteen months after it had been so powerfully exalted by the capture of Sphakteria. The loss of reputation which Sparta had then incurred, was now compensated by a reaction against the unfounded terrors since conceived about the probable career of her enemy. It was not merely the loss of Amphipolis, serious as that was, which distressed the Athenians, but also their insecurity respecting the maintenance of their whole empire: they knew not which of their subject-allies might next revolt, in contemplation of aid from Brasidas, facilitated by the newly-acquired Strymonian bridge. And as the proceedings of

¹ Thucyd. iv. 105, 106; Diodor. xii. 68.

² Thucyd. iv. 108. *Ἐχόμενη δὲ τῆς Ἀμφιπόλεως, οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἐς μέγα δέμας κατέστησαν, &c.*

The prodigious importance of the site of Amphipolis, with its adjoining bridge forming the communication between the regions east and west of the Strymon, was felt not only by Philip of Macedon, as will hereafter appear, but also by the Romans after their conquest of Macedonia. Of the four regions into which the Romans distributed Macedonia, "pars prima (says Livy, xlv. 30) habet opportunitatem Amphipoleos, quæ objecta claudit omnes ab oriente sole in Macedoniam aditus."

that general counted in part to the credit of his country, it was believed that Sparta, now for the first time shaking off her languor,¹ had taken to herself the rapidity and enterprise once regarded as the exclusive characteristic of Athens. But besides all these chances of evil to the Athenians, there was another yet more threatening, the personal ascendancy and position of Brasidas himself. It was not merely the boldness, the fertility of aggressive resource, the quick movements, the power of stimulating the minds of soldiers, which lent efficiency to that general; but also his incorruptible probity, his good faith, his moderation, his abstinence from party-cruelty or jobbing, and from all intermeddling with the internal constitutions of the different cities, in strict adherence to that manifesto whereby Sparta had proclaimed herself the liberator of Greece. Such talents and such official worth had never before been seen combined. Set off as they were by the full brilliancy of successes such as were deemed incredible before they actually occurred, they inspired a degree of confidence and turned a tide of opinion towards this eminent man which rendered him personally one of the first powers in Greece. Numerous solicitations were transmitted to him at Amphipolis from parties among the subject-allies of Athens, in their present temper of large hopes from him and diminished fear of the Athenians: the anti-Athenian party in each was impatient to revolt, the rest of the population less restrained by fear.²

Of those who indulged in these sanguine calculations, many had yet to learn by painful experience that Athens was still but little abated in power: but her inaction during this important autumn had been such as may well explain their mistake. It might have been anticipated that, on hearing the alarming news of the junction of Brasidas with the Chalkidians, and Perdikkas so close upon their dependent allies, they would forthwith have sent a competent force to Thrace, which, if despatched at that time, would probably have obviated all the subsequent disasters.

¹ Thucyd. iv, 108. Τὸ δὲ μέγιστον, διὰ τὸ ἔδωκεν ἰσχυρὸν καὶ ἰσχυρὰ, καὶ ὅτι τὸ πρῶτον Λακεδαιμονίων ἔργων τῶν ἐμὲλλον περὶ τὴν θάλασσαν, κινδυνεύειν παντὶ τῷ πρῶτῳ ἐπὶ τῇ ἡμετέρῃ ἡσαν (the subject-allies of Athens)

² Thucyd. iv, 108.

So they would have acted at any other time, and perhaps even then, if Periklēs had been alive. But the news arrived just at the period when Athens was engaged in the expedition against Bœotia, which ended very shortly in the ruinous defeat of Delium. Under the discouragement arising from the death of the stratēgus, Hippokratēs, and one thousand citizens, the idea of a fresh expedition to Thrace would probably have been intolerable to Athenian hoplites: the hardships of a winter service in Thrace, as experienced a few years before in the blockade of Potidaea, would probably also aggravate their reluctance. In Grecian history, we must steadfastly keep in mind that we are reading about citizen soldiers, not about professional soldiers: and that the temper of the time, whether of confidence or dismay, modifies to an unspeakable degree all the calculations of military and political prudence. Even after the rapid successes of Brasidas, not merely at Akanthus and Stageirus, but even at Amphipolis, they sent only a few inadequate guards¹ to the points most threatened, thus leaving to their enterprising enemy the whole remaining winter for his operations, without hindrance. Without depreciating the merits of Brasidas, we may see that his extraordinary success was in great part owing to the no less extraordinary depression which at that time pervaded the Athenian public: a feeling encouraged by Nikias and other leading men of the same party, who were building upon it in order to get the Lacedæmonian proposals for peace accepted.

But while we thus notice the short-comings of Athens, in not sending timely forces against Brasidas, we must at the same time admit, that the most serious and irreparable loss which she sustained, that of Amphipolis, was the fault of her officers more than her own. Eukles, and the historian Thucydides, the two joint Athenian commanders in Thrace, to whom she had confided the defence of that important town, had means amply sufficient to place it beyond all risk of capture, if they had employed the most ordinary vigilance and precaution beforehand. That Thucydides became an exile immediately after this event, and

¹ Thucyd. iv, 108. Οἱ γὰρ Ἀθηναῖοι οὐλοῦντες ὡς ἐξ ὀλίγου καὶ ἐν χειμῶνι ἀπέπεμπον ἐς τὰς πόλεις, etc.

remained so for twenty years, is certain from his own statement and we hear, upon what in this case is quite sufficient authority, that the Athenians condemned him, probably Euklēs also, to banishment, on the proposition of Kleon.¹

In considering this sentence, historians² commonly treat Thucydides as an innocent man, and find nothing to condemn except the calumnies of the demagogue along with the injustice of the people. But this view of the case cannot be sustained, when we bring together all the facts even as indicated by Thucydides himself. At the moment when Brasidas surprised Amphipolis, Thucydides was at Thasos; and the event is always discussed as if he was there by necessity or duty; as if Thasos was his special mission. Now we know from his own statement that his command was not special or confined to Thasos: he was sent as joint commander along with Euklēs generally to Thrace, and

¹ Thucyd. v, 26. See the biography of Thucydides by Marcellinus, prefixed to all the editions, p. 19, ed. Arnold.

² I transcribe the main features from the account of Dr. Thirlwall, whose judgment coincides on this occasion with what is generally given (Hist. of Greece, ch. xxiii. vol. iii, p. 268).

On the evening of the same day Thucydides, with seven galleys which he happened to have with him at Thasos, when he received the despatch from Euklēs, sailed into the mouth of the Strymon, and learning the fall of Amphipolis proceeded to put Eion in a state of defence. His timely arrival saved the place, which Brasidas attacked the next morning, both from the river and the land, without effect: and the refugees who retired by virtue of the treaty from Amphipolis, found shelter at Eion, and contributed to its security. *The historian rendered an important service to his country: and it does not appear that human prudence and activity could have accomplished anything more under the same circumstances. Yet his unavoidable failure proved the occasion of a sentence, under which he spent twenty years of his life in exile: and he was only restored to his country in the season of her deepest humiliation by the public calamities. So much only can be gathered with certainty from his language: for he has not condescended to mention either the charge which was brought against him, or the nature of the sentence, which he may either have suffered, or avoided by a voluntary exile. A statement, very probable in itself, though resting on slight authority, attributes his banishment to Kleon's calumnies: that the irritation produced by the loss of Amphipolis should have been so directed against an innocent object, would perfectly accord with the character of the people and of the demagogue. Posterity has gained by the injustice of his contemporaries," etc.*

especially to Amphipolis.¹ Both of them were jointly and severally responsible for the proper defence of Amphipolis, with the Athenian empire and interests in that quarter such nomination of two or more officers, coordinate and jointly responsible, being the usual habit of Athens, wherever the scale or the area of military operations was considerable, instead of naming one supreme responsible commander, with subordinate officers acting under him and responsible to him. If, then, Thucydides "was stationed at Thasos," to use the phrase of Dr. Thirlwall, this was because he chose to station himself there, in the exercise of his own discretion.

Accordingly, the question which we have to put is, not whether Thucydides did all that could be done, after he received the alarming express at Thasos, which is the part of the case that he sets prominently before us, but whether he and Euklēs jointly took the best general measures for the security of the Athenian empire in Thrace; especially for Amphipolis, the first jewel of her empire. They suffer Athens to be robbed of that jewel, and how? Had they a difficult position to defend? Were they

¹ Thucyd. iv, 104. *Οἱ δ' ἑταῖροι τοῖς προδίδουσι* (that is, at Amphipolis) *κρατούντες τῷ πλήθει ὥστε μὴ αὐτίκα τὰς πύλας ἀνοίγεσθαι, πέμπουσι μετὰ Εὐκλείου τοῦ στρατηγοῦ, ὃς ἐκ τῶν Ἀθηναίων παρὴν αὐτοῖς φύλαξ τοῦ χωρίου, ἐπὶ τῶν ἑτέρων στρατηγῶν τῶν ἐπὶ Θράκης, Θουκυδίδην τὸν Ὀλύροῦ, ὃς ταδὲ ξυγγράψεν, ὄντα περὶ Θάσον (ἔστι δ' ἡ νῆσος, Παρων ἄποικια, ἀπικοῦσα τῆς Ἀμφιπόλεως ἡμισίας ἡμέρας μάλιστα πλοῦν) ἀλλήλους τε σφραγισθῆναι.*

Here Thucydides describes himself as "the other general along with Euklēs, of the region of or towards Thrace." There cannot be a clearer designation of the extensive range of his functions and duties.

I adopt here the reading *τῶν ἐπὶ Θράκης*, the genitive case of the well-known Thucydidean phrase *τὰ ἐπὶ Θράκης*, in preference to *τὸν ἐπὶ Θράκης*; which would mean in substance the same thing, though not so precisely, nor so suitably to the usual manner of the historian. Bloomfield, Bekker, and Götter have all introduced *τῶν* into the text, on the authority of various MSS.: Poppo and Dr. Arnold also both express a preference for it, though they still leave *τὸν* in the text.

Moreover, the words of Thucydides himself, in the passage where he mentions his own long exile, plainly prove that he was sent out as general not to Thasos, but to Amphipolis: (v, 26) *καὶ ξυνέβη μοι φεύγειν τὴν ἑμὴν τοῦ ἐτη εἰκοσι μετὰ τὴν ἐς Ἀμφίπολιν στρατηγίαν*, etc.

overwhelmed by a superior force? Were they distracted by simultaneous revolts in different places, or assailed by enemies unknown or unforeseen? Not one of these grounds for acquittal can be pleaded. First, their position was of all others the most defensible: they had only to keep the bridge over the Strymon adequately watched and guarded, or to retain the Athenian squadron at Eion, and Amphipolis was safe. Either one or the other of these precautions would have sufficed; both together would have sufficed so amply, as probably to prevent the scheme of attack from being formed. Next, the force under Brasidas was in no way superior, not even adequate to the capture of the inferior place Eion, when properly guarded, much less to that of Amphipolis. Lastly, there were no simultaneous revolts to distract attention, nor unknown enemies to confound a well-laid scheme of defence. There was but one enemy, in one quarter, having one road by which to approach; an enemy of surpassing merit, indeed, and eminently dangerous to Athens, but without any chance of success except from the omissions of the Athenian officers.

Now Thucydides and Euklēs both knew that Brasidas had prevailed upon Akanthus and Stageirus to revolt, and that too in such a way as to extend his own personal influence materially: they knew that the population of Argilus was of Andrian origin,¹ like that of Akanthus and Stageirus, and therefore peculiarly likely to be tempted by the example of those two towns. Lastly, they knew, and Thucydides himself tells us,² that this Argilian population — whose territory bordered on the Strymon and the western foot of the bridge, and who had many connections in Amphipolis — had been long disaffected to Athens, and especially to the Athenian possession of that city. Yet, having such foreknowledge, ample warning for the necessity of a vigilant defence, Thucydides and Euklēs withdraw, or omit, both the two precau-

¹ Compare Thucyd. iv. 84. 88. 103.

² Thucyd. iv. 103. *μάλιστα δὲ οἱ Ἀργίλιοι, ἔγγυς τε προσοικουμένους καὶ ἀεὶ πότε τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις ὄντες ὑποπτοὶ καὶ ἐπιβουλεύοντες τῷ χωρίῳ (Amphipolis) ἐπειδὴ παρέτυχεν ὁ καιρὸς καὶ Βρασίδας ἦλθεν, ἐπράξαν τὴν ἀκρίβειαν πρὸς τοὺς ἐμπολιτεύοντας ἐν αὐτῷ ὅπως ἐνδοθήσονται ἡ πόλις, etc.*

tions upon which the security of Amphipolis rested; precautions both of them obvious, either of them sufficient. The one leaves the bridge under a feeble guard,¹ and is caught so unprepared everywhere, that one might suppose Athens to be in profound peace; the other is found with his squadron, not at Eion, but at Thasos; an island out of all possible danger, either from Brasidas, who had no ships, or any other enemy. The arrival of Brasidas comes on both of them like a clap of thunder. Nothing more is required than this plain fact, under the circumstances, to prove their improvidence as commanders.

The presence of Thucydides on the station of Thrace was important to Athens, partly because he possessed valuable family connections, mining property, and commanding influence among the continental population round Amphipolis.² This was one main reason why he was named; the Athenian people confiding partly in his private influence, over and above the public force under his command, and looking to him, even more than to his colleague Euklēs, for the continued security of the town: instead of which they find that not even their own squadron under him is at hand near the vulnerable point, at the moment when the enemy comes. Of the two, perhaps, the conduct of Euklēs admits of conceivable explanation more easily than that of Thucydides. For it seems that Euklēs had no paid force in Amphipolis; only the citizen hoplites, partly Athenian, partly of other lineage. Doubtless, these men found it irksome to keep guard through the winter on the Strymonian bridge: and Euklēs might fancy that, by enforcing a large perpetual guard, he

¹ Thucyd. iv. 103. *ὀνλὰ κὴ δὲ τὴς βραχεῖα καθειστήκει, ἣν διαπεμνὸς ἀμείων ὁ Βρασίδας, ἀμὰ μὲν τῆς προδοσίας οὐσης, ἀμὰ δὲ καὶ χυδαίας ἀντοῦ καὶ ἀπροσδόκητος προσπείων, διέβη τὴν γέφυραν, etc.*

² Thucyd. iv. 105. *καὶ ἀπ' αὐτοῦ δύνασθαι ἐν τοῖς πρώτοις τῶν ἡπειρωτῶν, etc.*

Rotscher, in his *Life of Thucydides* (Leben des Thukydides, Göttingen, 1842. sect. 4, pp. 97-99), admits it to be the probable truth, that Thucydides was selected for this command expressly in consequence of his private influence in the region around. Yet this biographer still repeats the view generally taken, that Thucydides did everything which an able commander could do, and was most unjustly condemned.

ran the risk of making Athens unpopular: moreover, strict constancy of watch, night after night, when no actual danger comes, with an unpaid citizen force, is not easy to maintain. This is an insufficient excuse, but it is better than anything which can be offered on behalf of Thucydides; who had with him a paid Athenian force, and might just as well have kept it at Eion as at Thasos. We may be sure that the absence of Thucydides with his fleet, at Thasos, was one essential condition in the plot laid by Brasidas with the Argilians.

To say, with Dr. Thirlwall, that "human prudence and activity could not have accomplished more than Thucydides did, *under the same circumstances*," is true as matter of fact, and creditable as far as it goes. But it is wholly inadmissible as a justification, and meets only one part of the case. An officer in command is responsible, not only for doing most "*under the circumstances*," but also for the circumstances themselves, in so far as they are under his control; and nothing is more under his control than the position which he chooses to occupy. If the emperor Napoleon, or the duke of Wellington, had lost, by surprise of an enemy not very numerous, a post of supreme importance which they thought adequately protected, would they be satisfied to hear from a responsible officer in command: "Having no idea that the enemy would attempt any surprise, I thought that I might keep my force half a day's journey off from the post exposed, at another post which it was physically impossible for the enemy to reach; but, the moment I was informed that the surprise had occurred, I hastened to the scene, did all that human prudence and activity could do to repel the enemy; and though I found that he had already mastered the capital post of all, yet I beat him back from a second post which he was on the point of mastering also?" Does any one imagine that these illustrious chiefs, smarting under the loss of an inestimable position which alters the whole prospects of a campaign, would be satisfied with such a report, and would dismiss the officer with praises for his **vigor and bravery**, "*under the circumstances*?" They would most assuredly reply, that he had done right in coming back, **that his conduct after coming back had been that of a brave man, and that there was no impeachment on his courage.** But **they would at the same time add, that his want of judgment and**

foresight, in omitting to place the valuable position really exposed under sufficient guard beforehand, and leaving it thus open to the enemy, while he himself was absent in another place which was out of danger, and his easy faith that there would be no dangerous surprise, at a time when the character of the enemy's officer, as well as the disaffection of the neighbors (Argilus), plainly indicated that there *would* be, if the least opening were afforded, that these were defects meriting serious reproof, and disqualifying him from any future command of trust and responsibility. Nor can we doubt that the whole feeling of the respective armies, who would have to pay with their best blood the unhappy miscalculation of this officer, would go along with such a sentence; without at all suspecting themselves to be guilty of injustice, or of "directing the irritation produced by the loss against an innocent object."

The vehement leather-seller in the Pnyx, at Athens, when he brought forward what are called "his calumnies" against Thucydides and Euklês, as having caused, through culpable omission, a fatal and irreparable loss to their country, might perhaps state his case with greater loudness and acrimony; but it may be doubted whether he would say anything more really galling than would be contained in the dignified rebuke of an esteemed modern general to a subordinate officer under similar circumstances. In my judgment, not only the accusation against these two officers — I assume Euklês to have been included — was called for on the fairest *presumptive* grounds, which would be sufficient as a justification of the leather-seller Kleon, but the positive verdict of guilty against them was fully merited. Whether the banishment inflicted was a greater penalty than the case warranted, I will not take upon me to pronounce. Every age has its own standard of feeling for measuring what is a proper intensity of punishment: penalties which our grandfathers thought right and meet, would in the present day appear intolerably rigorous. But when I consider the immense value of Amphipolis to Athens, combined with the conduct whereby it was lost, I cannot think that there was a single Athenian, or a single Greek, who would deem the penalty of banishment too severe.

It is painful to find such strong grounds of official censure

against a man who, as an historian, has earned the lasting admiration of posterity, — my own, among the first and warmest. But in criticizing the conduct of Thucydides the officer, we are bound in common justice to forget Thucydides the historian. He was not known in the latter character, at the time when this sentence was passed: perhaps he never would have been so known, like the Neapolitan historian Colletta, if exile had not thrown him out of the active duties and hopes of a citizen. It may be doubted whether he ever went home from Eion to encounter the grief, wrath, and alarm, so strongly felt at Athens after the loss of Amphipolis. Condemned, either with or without appearance, he remained in banishment for twenty years: nor did he return to Athens until after the conclusion of the Peloponnesian war. Of this long exile, much is said to have been spent on his property in Thrace: yet he also visited most parts of Greece, enemies of Athens as well as neutral states. However much we may deplore such a misfortune on his account, mankind in general have, and ever will have, the strongest reason to rejoice at it. To this compulsory leisure we owe the completion, or rather the near approach to completion, of his history: nor is it less certain that the opportunities which an exile enjoyed of personally consulting neutrals and enemies, contributed much to form that impartial, comprehensive, Pan-Hellenic spirit, which reigns generally throughout his immortal work.

Meanwhile, Brasidas, installed in Amphipolis about the beginning of December, 424 B.C., employed his increased power only the more vigorously against Athens. His first care was to reconstitute Amphipolis; a task wherein the Macedonian Perdikkas, whose intrigues had contributed to the capture, came and personally assisted. That city was going through a partial secession and renovation of inhabitants, and was now moreover cut off from the port of Eion and the mouth of the river, which remained in the hands of the Athenians. Many new arrangements must have been required, as well for its internal polity as for its external defence. Brasidas took measures for building ships of war, in the lake above the city, in order to force the lower part of the river: but his most important step was to construct a

¹ Thucyd. v. 26

² Thucyd. iv. 104–108

palisade work,¹ connecting the walls of the city with the bridge. He thus made himself permanently master of the crossing of the Strymon, so as to shut the door by which he himself had entered, and at the same time to keep an easy communication with Argilus and the western bank of the Strymon. He also made some acquisitions on the eastern side of the river. Pittakus, prince of the neighboring Edonian-Thracian township of Myrkinus, had been recently assassinated by his wife Brauro, and by some personal enemies: he had probably been the ally of Athens, and his assassins now sought to strengthen themselves by courting the alliance of the new conqueror of Amphipolis. The Thasian continental colonies of Galepsus and Oesymé also declared their adhesion to him.

While he sent to Lacedæmon, communicating his excellent position as well as his large hopes, he at the same time, without waiting for the answer, began acting for himself, with all the allies whom he could get together. He marched first against the peninsula called Aktè, — the narrow tongue of land which stretches out from the neighborhood of Akanthus to the mighty headland called Mount Athos, — near thirty miles long, and between four and five miles for the most part in breadth.² The long, rugged, woody ridge, — covering this peninsula so as to leave but narrow spaces for dwelling or cultivation, or feeding of cattle, — was at this time occupied by many distinct petty communities, some of them divided in race and language. Sane, a colony from Andros, was situated in the interior gulf, called the Singitic gulf, between Athos and the Sithonian peninsula, near the Xerxæan canal: the rest of the Aktè was distributed among Bisaltians, Krestônians, and Edonians, all fractions of the Thracian name; Pelægiæans, or Tyrrhenians, of the race which had once occupied Lemnos and Imbros, and some Chalkidians. Some of these little communities spoke habitually two languages. Thysseus, Kleone, Obolpyktæ, and others, all submitted on the arrival

¹ This is the *palisade*, mentioned (x. 104) as existing a year and a half before the battle of Amphipolis. I shall say more respecting the topography of Amphipolis, when I come to describe that battle.

² See Grisebach, *Reise durch Rumelien und Brusa*, vol. i. th. viii, p. 226.

of Brasidas; but Sanê and Dion held out, nor could he bring them to terms even by ravaging their territory.

He next marched into the Sithonian peninsula, to attack Torônê, situated near the southern extremity of that peninsula, opposite to Cape Kanastræum, the extreme headland of the peninsula of Pallênê.¹

Torônê was inhabited by a Chalkidic population, but had not partaken in the revolt of the neighboring Chalkidians against Athens. A small Athenian garrison had been sent there, probably since the recent dangers, and were now defending it, as well as repairing the town-wall in various parts where it had been so neglected as to crumble down. They occupied as a sort of distinct citadel the outlying cape called Lékkythus, joining by a narrow isthmus the hill on which the city stood, and forming a port wherein lay two Athenian triremes as guardships. A small party in Torônê, without privy² or even suspicion of the rest, entered into correspondence with Brasidas, and engaged to provide for him the means of entering and mastering the town. Accordingly, he advanced by a night-march to the temple of the Dioskuri, Kastor and Pollux, within about a quarter of a mile of the town-gates, which he reached a little before daybreak, sending forward one hundred peltasts to be still nearer, and to rush upon the gate at the instant when signal was made from within. His Torónæan partisans, some of whom were already concealed on the spot, awaiting his arrival, made their final arrangements with him, and then returned into the town, conducting with them seven determined men from his army, armed only with daggers, and having Lysistratus of Olynthus as their chief: twenty men had been originally named for this service, but the danger appeared so extreme, that only seven of them were bold enough to go. This forlorn hope, enabled to creep in, through a small aperture in the wall towards the sea, were conducted silently up to the topmost watch-tower on the city hill, where they surprised and slew the guards, and set open a neighboring postern

¹ Thucyd. iv, 109.

² Thucyd. iv, 110. καὶ αὐτὸν ἀνδρες ὀλίγοι ἐπὶ ἡγὸν κρύφα, ἐπεισὶν ἵεντες τὴν πόλιν παραδοῦναι. iv, 113. Τῶν δὲ Τορώνæων γιγνομένη τοὺς ἀλλοτρίους τοὺς μὲν πολλοὺς, οὐδὲν εἶδός, ἰθὺς ἐκίτε, etc.

gate, looking towards Cape Kanastræum, as well as the great gate leading towards the agora. They then brought in the peltasts from without, who, impatient with the delay, had gradually stolen closely under the walls: some of these peltasts kept possession of the great gate, others were led round to the postern at the top, while the fire-signal was forthwith lighted to invite Brasidas himself. He and his men hastened forward towards the city at their utmost speed and with loud shouts, a terror-striking notice of his presence to the unprepared citizens. Admission was easy through the open gates, but some also clambered up by means of beams or a sort of scaffolding, which was lying close to the wall as a help to the workmen repairing it. And while the assailants were thus active in every direction, Brasidas himself conducted a portion of them, to assure himself of the high and commanding parts of the city.

So completely were the Torónæans surprised and thunder-struck, that hardly any attempt was made to resist. Even the fifty Athenian hoplites who occupied the agora, being found still asleep, were partly slain, and partly compelled to seek refuge in the separately-garrisoned cape of Lékkythus, whither they were followed by a portion of the Torónæan population; some from attachment to Athens, others from sheer terror. To these fugitives Brasidas addressed a proclamation, inviting them to return, and promising them perfect security, for person, property, and political rights: while at the same time he sent a herald with a formal summons to the Athenians in Lékkythus, requiring them to quit the place as belonging to the Chalkidians, but permitting them to carry away their property. They refused to evacuate the place, but solicited a truce of one day for the purpose of burying their slain. Brasidas granted them two days, which were employed both by them and by him in preparations for the defence and attack of Lékkythus: each party fortifying the houses on or near the connecting isthmus.

In the mean time he convened a general assembly of the Torónæan population, whom he addressed in the same conciliating and equitable language as he had employed elsewhere. "He had not come to harm either the city, or any individual citizen. Those who had let him in, ought not to be regarded as bad men or traitors, for they had acted with a view to the benefit and the

liberation of their city, not in order to enslave it, or to acquire profit for themselves. On the other hand, he did not think the worse of those who had gone over to Lékýthus, for their liking towards Athens: he wished them to come back freely; and he was sure that the more they knew the Lacedæmonians the better they would esteem them. He was prepared to forgive and forget previous hostility, but while he invited all of them to live for the future as cordial friends and fellow-citizens, he should also for the future hold each man responsible for his conduct, either as friend or as enemy."

On the expiration of the two days' truce, Brasidas attacked the Athenian garrison in Lékýthus, promising a recompense of thirty minæ to the soldier who should first force his way into it. Notwithstanding very poor means of defence, partly a wooden palisade, partly houses with battlements on the roof, this garrison repelled him for one whole day: on the next morning he brought up a machine, for the same purpose as that which the Boeotians had employed at Delium, to set fire to the wood-work. The Athenians on their side, seeing this fire-machine approaching, put up, on a building in front of their position, a wooden scaffolding, upon which many of them mounted, with casks of water and large stones to break it or to extinguish the flames. At last, the weight accumulated becoming greater than the scaffolding could support, it broke down with a prodigious noise; so that all the persons and things upon it rolled down in confusion. Some of these men were hurt, yet the injury was not in reality serious; had not the noise, the cries, and strangeness of the incident alarmed those behind, who could not see precisely what had occurred, to such a degree, that they believed the enemy to have already forced the defences. Many of them accordingly took to flight, and those who remained were insufficient to prolong the resistance successfully: so that Brasidas, perceiving the disorder and diminished number of the defenders, relinquished his fire-machine, and again renewed his attempt to carry the place by assault, which now fully succeeded. A considerable proportion of the Athenians and others in the fort escaped across the narrow gulf to the peninsula of Pallênê, by means of the two triremes and some merchant-vessels at hand: but every man found in it was put to death. Brasidas, thus master of the fort, and con-

sidering that he owed his success to the sudden rupture of the Athenian scaffolding, regarded this incident as a divine interposition, and presented the thirty minæ, which he had promised as a reward to the first man who broke in, to the goddess Athênê, for her temple at Lékýthus. He moreover consecrated to her the entire cape of Lékýthus; not only demolishing the defences, but also dismantling the private residences which it contained, so that nothing remained except the temple, with its ministers and appurtenances.

What proportion of the *Torônæans* who had taken refuge at Lékýthus had been induced to return by the proclamation of Brasidas, alike generous and politic, we are not informed. His language and conduct were admirably calculated to set this little community again in harmonious movement, and to obliterate the memory of past feuds. And above all, it inspired a strong sentiment of attachment and gratitude towards himself personally; a sentiment which gained strength with every successive incident in which he was engaged, and which enabled him to exercise a greater ascendancy than could ever be acquired by Sparta, and in some respects greater than had ever been possessed by Athens. It is this remarkable development of commanding individuality, animated throughout by straightforward public purposes, and binding together so many little communities who had few other feelings in common, which lends to the short career of this eminent man a romantic and even an heroic interest.

During the remainder of the winter Brasidas employed himself in setting in order the acquisitions already made, and in laying plans for farther conquests in the spring.² But the beginning of spring — or the close of the eighth year, and beginning of the ninth year of the war, as Thucydides reckons — brought with it a new train of events, which will be recounted in the following chapter.

¹ Thucyd. iv. 114, 115. *νομισας ἄλλω τινὶ τρόπῳ ἢ ἀνθρωπείῳ τὴν δόξαν κινέσθαι.*

² Thucyd. iv. 115.

CHAPTER LIV.

TRUCE FOR ONE YEAR. — RENEWAL OF WAR AND BATTLE OF AMPHIPOLIS. — PEACE OF NIKIAS.

THE eighth year of the war, described in the last chapter, had opened with sanguine hopes for Athens, and with dark promise for Sparta, chiefly in consequence of the memorable capture of Sphakteria towards the end of the preceding summer. It included, not to mention other events, two considerable and important enterprises on the part of Athens, against Megara and against Boeotia; the former plan, partially successful, the latter, not merely unsuccessful, but attended with a ruinous defeat. Lastly, the losses in Thrace, following close upon the defeat at Delium, together with the unbounded expectations everywhere entertained from the future career of Brasidas, had again seriously lowered the impression entertained of Athenian power. The year thus closed amidst humiliations the more painful to Athens, as contrasted with the glowing hopes with which it had begun.

It was now that Athens felt the full value of those prisoners whom she had taken at Sphakteria. With those prisoners, as Kleon and his supporters had said truly, she might be sure of making peace whenever she desired it.¹ Having such a certainty to fall back upon, she had played a bold game, and aimed at larger acquisitions during the past year; and this speculation, though not in itself unreasonable, had failed: moreover, a new phenomenon, alike unexpected by all, had occurred, when Brasidas broke open and cut up her empire in Thrace. Still, so great was the anxiety of the Spartans to regain their captives, who had powerful friends and relatives at home, that they considered the victories of Brasidas chiefly as a stepping-stone towards that object, and as a means of prevailing upon Athens to make peace. To his animated representations sent home from Amphipolis, setting forth the prospects of still farther success and entreating reinforcements, they had returned a discouraging reply, dictated in

¹ Thucyd. iv. 21.

no small degree by the miserable jealousy of some of their chiefs; ¹ who, feeling themselves cast into the shade, and looking upon his splendid career as an eccentric movement breaking loose from Spartan routine, were thus on personal as well as political grounds disposed to labor for peace. Such collateral motives, working upon the caution usual with Sparta, determined her to make use of the present fortune and realized conquests of Brasidas as a basis for negotiation and recovery of the prisoners; with out opening the chance of ulterior enterprises, which though they might perhaps end in results yet more triumphant, would unavoidably put in risk that which was now secure.² The history of the Athenians during the past year might, indeed, serve as a warning to deter the Spartans from playing an adventurous game.

¹ Thucyd. iv. 108. Ὁ δὲ ἐκ τῆς Λακεδαιμόνιοις ἐφεύμενος στρατιὴν τε προσ-
σπεύζοντες ἐκάλειν. . . . Ὁ δὲ Λακεδαιμόνιοι τὰ μὲν καὶ οὐδὲν ἀπὸ τῶν
πρωτῶν ἀνδρῶν οὐχ ὑπερέτησαν αὐτῷ, etc.

² Thucyd. iv. 117. Τὸν γὰρ δὴ ἄνδρα περὶ πλείονος ἐποιεῖντο κομίσασ-
θαι, ὥς ἔτι Βρασίδας εἰτιχεῖν καὶ ἑμῶν, ἐπὶ μῖζον χωρήσαντος αὐτοῦ καὶ
ἀντιπάλῃ καταστήσαντος, τῶν μὲν στίρισθαι, τοῖς δ' ἐκ τοῦ ἴσου ἀμυνόμενοι
κατένευσεν καὶ κρατῆσαι.

This is a perplexing passage, and the sense put upon it by the best commentators appears to me unsatisfactory.

Dr. Arnold observes: "The sense required must be something of this sort. If Brasidas were still more successful, the consequence would be that they would lose their men taken at Sphakteria, and after all would run the risk of not being finally victorious." To the same purpose, substantially Haack, Poppo, Giller, etc. But surely this is a meaning which cannot have been present to the mind of Thucydides. For how could the fact, of Brasidas being more successful, cause the Lacedæmonians to lose the chance of regaining their prisoners? The larger the acquisitions of Brasidas, the greater chance did the Lacedæmonians stand of getting back their prisoners, because they would have more to give up in exchange for them. And the meaning proposed by the commentators, inadmissible under all circumstances, is still more excluded by the very words immediately preceding in Thucydides: "The Lacedæmonians were above all things anxious to get back their prisoners, while Brasidas was yet in full success;" (for ὥς with ἐπὶ must mean substantially the same as ἔτι.) It is impossible immediately after this, that he can go on to say, "Yet if Brasidas became still more successful, they would lose the chance of getting the prisoners back." Poppo and Poppo, who notice this contradiction, profess to solve it by saying that if Brasidas pushed his successes farther, the Athenians would be

Ever since the capture of Sphakteria, the Lacedaemonians had been attempting, directly or indirectly, negotiations for peace

seized with such violence of hatred and indignation, that they would put the prisoners to death." Poppo supports this by appealing to iv, 41, which passage, however, will be found to carry no proof in the case: and the hypothesis is in itself inadmissible, put up to sustain an inadmissible meaning.

Next, as to the words ἀντίπαλα καταστήσαντος (ἐπὶ μείζον χωρήσαντος αὐτοῦ καὶ ἀντίπαλα καταστήσαντος); Goller translates these: "Postquam Brasidas in majus profecisset, et sua arma cum potestate Atheniensium acquisivit." To the same purpose also Haack and Poppo. But if this were the meaning, it would seem to imply, that Brasidas had, as yet, done nothing and gained nothing; that his gains were all to be made during the future. Whereas the fact is distinctly the reverse, as Thucydides himself has told us in the line preceding: Brasidas had already made immense acquisitions, — so great and serious, that the principal anxiety of the Lacedaemonians was to make use of what he had already gained as a means of getting back their prisoners, before the tide of fortune could turn against him.

Again, the last part of the sentence is considered by Dr. Arnold and other commentators as corrupt; nor is it agreed to what previous subject τοῖς δὲ is intended to refer.

So inadmissible, in my judgment, is the meaning assigned by the commentators to the general passage, that, if no other meaning could be found in the words, I should regard the whole sentence as corrupt in some way or other. But I think another meaning may be found.

I admit that the words ἐπὶ μείζον χωρήσαντος αὐτοῦ might signify, "if he should arrive at greater success;" upon the analogy of i, 17, and i, 118, ἐπὶ πλείστον ἐχωρήσαν δυνάμει — ἐπὶ μέγα ἐχωρήσαν δυνάμει. But they do not necessarily, nor even naturally, bear this signification. Χωρεῖν ἐπὶ (with accus. case) means to march upon, to aim at, to go at or go for (adopting an English colloquial equivalent), ἐχώρουν ἐπὶ τὴν ἀντικρὺν ἐλευθερίαν (Thucyd. viii, 64). The phrase might be used, whether the person of whom it was affirmed succeeded in his object or not. I conceive that in its place the words mean: "if Brasidas should go at something greater;" or he should aim at, "or march upon, greater objects;" without affirming the point, one way or the other, whether he would attain or miss what he aimed at.

Next, the words ἀντίπαλα καταστήσαντος do not refer, in my judgment, to the future gains of Brasidas, or to their magnitude and comparative avail in negotiation. The words rather mean: "if he should set out in open contest and hostility that which he had already acquired;" (thus exposing it to the chance of being lost,) "if he should put himself and his already-acquired gains in battle-front against the enemy." The meaning would be then substantially the same as καταστήσαντος ταῦτον ἀντίπαλον

and the recovery of the prisoners; their pacific dispositions being especially instigated by king Pleistoanax, whose peculiar

The two words here discussed are essentially obscure and elliptical, and every interpretation must proceed by bringing into light those ideas which they imperfectly indicate. Now, the interpretation which I suggest keeps quite as closely to the meaning of the two words as that of Haack and Goller; while it brings out a general sense, making the whole sentence, of which these two words form a part, distinct and instructive. The substantive, which would be understood along with ἀντίπαλα, would be τὰ πράγματα; or perhaps τὰ ἐπιτεύγματα, borrowed from the verb ἐπιτελεῖν, which immediately precedes.

In the latter part of the sentence, I think that τοῖς δὲ refers to the same subject as ἀντίπαλα: in fact, ἀπὸ τοῦ ἴσου ἀμυνόμενοι is only a fuller expression of the same general idea as ἀντίπαλα.

The whole sentence would then be construed thus: "For they were most anxious to recover their captives while Brasidas was yet in good fortune; while they were likely, if he should go at more, and put himself as he now stood into hostile contention, to remain deprived of their captives; and even in regard to their successes, to take the chance of danger or victory in equal conflict."

The sense here brought out is distinct and rational; and I think it lies fairly in the words. Thucydides does not intend to represent the Lacedaemonians as feeling that if Brasidas should really gain more than he had gained already, such further acquisition would be a disadvantage to them, and prevent them from recovering their captives. He represents them as referring the certainty of those acquisitions which Brasidas had already made, to the chance and hazard of his aiming at greater; which could not be done without endangering that which was now secure, and not only secure, but sufficient, if properly managed, to procure the restoration of the captives.

Poppo refers τοῖς δὲ to the Athenians; Goller refers it to the remaining Spartan military force, apart from the captives who were detained at Athens. The latter reference seems to me inadmissible, for τοῖς δὲ must signify some persons or things which have been before specified or indicated; and that which Goller supposes it to mean has not been before indicated. To refer it to the Athenians, with Poppo and Haack, in his second edition, we should have to look a great way back for the subject, and there is moreover, a difficulty in construing ἀμυνόμενοι with the dative case. Otherwise, this reference would be admissible: though I think it better to refer τοῖς δὲ to the same subject as ἀντίπαλα. In the phrase κινδυνεύειν, or κινδυνεύειναι, for there seems no sufficient reason why this old reading should be altered, καὶ καταστῆσαι, the particle καὶ has a disjunctive sense, of which there are analogous examples; see Kühner, Griechische Grammatik, sect. 726, signifying, substantially, the same as ἢ; and exar-

circumstances gave him a strong motive to bring the war to a close. He had been banished from Sparta, fourteen years before the commencement of the war, and a little before the thirty years' truce, under the charge of having taken bribes from the Athenians on occasion of invading Attica. For more than eighteen years, he lived in banishment, close to the temple of Zeus Lykaeus, in Arcadia; in such constant fear of the Lacedæmonians, that his dwelling-house was half within the consecrated ground.¹ But he never lost the hope of procuring restoration, through the medium of the Pythian priestess at Delphi, whom he and his brother Aristoklès kept in their pay. To every sacred legation which went from Sparta to Delphi, she repeated the same imperative injunction: "They must bring back the seed of (Hèraklès) the demi-god son of Zeus, from foreign land to their own: if they did not, it would be their fate to plough with a silver ploughshare." The command of the god, thus incessantly repeated and backed by the influence of those friends who supported Pleistoanax at home, at length produced an entire change of sentiment at Sparta. In the fourth or fifth year of the Peloponnesian war, the exile was recalled; and not merely recalled, but welcomed with unbounded honors, received with the same sacrifices and choric shows as those which were said to have been offered to the primitive kings, on the first settlement of Sparta.

As in the case of Kleomenès and Demaratus, however, it was not long before the previous intrigue came to be detected, or at least generally suspected and believed; to the great discredit of Pleistoanax, though he could not be again banished. Every successive public calamity which befell the state, the miscarriages of Alkidas, the defeat of Eurylochus in Amphiloehia, and above

plus even in Thucydides, in such phrases as *ταῦτα καὶ παλαιότερα* (i. 22, 143), *ταῦτα καὶ ἔτι ἀγριότερα τούτων*, v. 74; see Poppo's note on i. 22.

¹ Thucyd. v. 17. *ἵσταντο τῆς οἰκίας τοῦ ἱεροῦ τοῦ τοῦ Διὸς οἰκούντα φόβῳ τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων.*

² The reason was, that he might be in sanctuary at an instant's notice, and yet might be able to perform some of the common offices of life without profanation, which could not have been the case had the whole dwelling been within the sacred ground. (Dr. Arnold's note.)

all, the unprecedented humiliation in Sphaktèria, were imputed to the displeasure of the gods in consequence of the impious treachery of Pleistoanax. Suffering under such an imputation, this king was most eager to exchange the hazards of war for the secure march of peace, so that he was thus personally interested in opening every door for negotiation with Athens, and in restoring himself to credit by regaining the prisoners.¹

After the battle of Delium,² the pacific dispositions of Nikias, Lachès, and the philo-Laconian party, began to find increasing favor at Athens;³ while the unforeseen losses in Thrace, coming thick upon each other, each successive triumph of Brasidas apparently increasing his means of achieving more, tended to convert the discouragement of the Athenians into positive alarm. Negotiations appear to have been in progress throughout great part of the winter: and the continual hope that these might be brought to a close, combined with the impolitic aversion of Nikias and his friends to energetic military action, help to explain the unwonted apathy of Athens, under the pressure of such disgraces. But so much did her courage flag, towards the close of the winter, that she came to look upon a truce as her only means⁴ of preservation against the victorious progress of Brasidas. What the tone of Kleon now was, we are not directly informed: he would probably still continue opposed to the propositions of peace, at least indirectly, by insisting on terms more favorable than could be obtained. On this point, his political counsels would be wrong; but on another point, they would be much sounder and more judicious than those of his rival Nikias: for he would recommend a strenuous prosecution of hostilities by Athenian force against Brasidas in Thrace. At the present moment this was the most urgent political necessity of Athens, whether she entertained or rejected the views of peace: and the policy of Nikias, who cradled up the existing depression of the citizens by

¹ Thucyd. v. 17, 18.

² Thucyd. v. 15. *σφακτικῶν δ' αὐτῶν ἐπὶ τῷ Δηλίῳ παραχρῆμα οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι, γινώσκοντες μάλιστα ὅτι ἐνδεξομένους, ποιούντων τὴν ἐνισχυσιν, etc.*

³ Thucyd. iv. 118; v. 43.

⁴ Thucyd. iv. 117. *ταῖς ἀποσπασταῖς Ἀθηναίων μὲν οὐκ ἔτι τὸν Βρασίδαν οὐδὲν κρησπαστήσαι οὐδὲν πρὸς παρασκευάσασθαι καὶ ἡσυχίαν, etc.*

encouraging him to rely on the pacific inclinations of Sparta, was ill-judged and disastrous in its results, as the future will hereafter show.

Attempts were made by the peace-party both at Athens and Sparta to negotiate at first for a definitive peace: but the conditions of such a peace were not easy to determine, so as to satisfy both parties, and became more and more difficult, with every success of Brasidas. At length the Athenians, eager above all things to arrest his progress, sent to Sparta to propose a truce for one year, desiring the Spartans to send to Athens envoys with full powers to settle the terms: the truce would allow time and tranquillity for settling the conditions of a definitive treaty. The proposition of the truce for one year,¹ together with the first two articles ready prepared, came from Athens, as indeed we might have presumed even without proof; since the interest of Sparta was rather against it, as allowing to the Athenians the fullest leisure for making preparations against farther losses in Thrace. But her main desire was, not so much to put herself in condition to make the best possible peace, as to insure some peace which would liberate her captives: and she calculated that when once the Athenians had tasted the sweets of peace for one year, they would not again voluntarily impose upon themselves the rigorous obligations of war.²

In the month of March, 423 B.C., on the fourteenth day of the month Elaphebolion at Athens, and on the twelfth day of the month Gerastius at Sparta, a truce for one year was concluded and sworn, between Athens on one side, and Sparta, Corinth, Sikyon, Epidaurus, and Megara, on the other.³ The Spartans, instead of merely despatching plenipotentiaries to Athens as the Athenians had desired, went a step farther: in concurrence with the Athenian envoys, they drew up a form of truce, approved by

¹ This appears from the form of the truce in Thucyd. iv, 118; it is prepared at Sparta, in consequence of a previous proposition from Athens: in sect. 6. *οἱ δὲ ἱστίες, τέλος ἔχοντες ὡς ἔστιν, ἦσαν καὶ τότε ἡμῶν κείμεναι.*

² Thucyd. iv, 117. *καὶ γενναίητις ἀνὰ κέρως καὶ ταλαιπωρίας μάλλον ἐπιθυνοῦσιν (τοὺς Ἀθηναίους) αὐτοῖς πειρασμένους ἐναλλάγειναι, etc.*

³ Thucyd. iv, 119. The fourteenth of Elaphebolion, and the twelfth of Gerastius, designate the same day. The truce went ready-prepared from Sparta to Athens, together with envoys Spartan, Corinthian, Megarian.

themselves and their allies, in such manner that it only required to be adopted and ratified by the Athenians. The general principle of the truce was *uti possidetis*, and the conditions were in substance as follows:—

1. Respecting the temple at Delphi, every Greek shall have the right to make use of it honestly and without fear, pursuant to the customs of his particular city. The main purpose of this stipulation, prepared and sent verbatim from Athens, was to allow Athenian visitors to go thither, which had been impossible during the war, in consequence of the hostility of the Bœotians¹ and Phocians: the Delphian authorities also were in the interest of Sparta, and doubtless the Athenians received no formal invitation to the Pythian games. But the Bœotians and Phocians were no parties to the truce: accordingly the Lacedæmonians, while accepting the article and proclaiming the general liberty in principle, do not pledge themselves to enforce it by arms as far as the Bœotians and Phocians are concerned, but only to try and persuade them by amicable representations. The liberty of sacrificing at Delphi was at this moment the more welcome to the Athenians, as they seem to have fancied themselves under the displeasure of Apollo.²

2. All the contracting parties will inquire out and punish, each according to its own laws, such persons as may violate the property of the Delphian god.³ This article also is prepared at Athens, for the purpose seemingly of conciliating the favor of

Sikyonian, and Epidaurian. The truce was accepted by the Athenian assembly, and sworn to at once by all the envoys as well as by three Athenian strategæ (*σπεύσανθαι δὲ αὐτῶν καὶ τὰς πρεσβείας ἐν τῷ δήμῳ τὰς παραστάς*, iv, 118, 119); that day being fixed on as the commencement.

The lunar months in different cities were never in precise agreement.

¹ See Aristophan. Aves. 188.

² Thucyd. v, 1-32. They might perhaps believe that the occupation of Delium had given offence to Apollo.

³ Thucyd. iv, 118. *Ἡμεῖς δὲ τῶν χρημάτων τῶν ὡς ἐπιμελειεσθαι οὕτως τοὺς ἀδικούντας ἐξενήσομεν, etc.* Dr. Thirlwall (Hist. Gr. vol. iii ch. xxiii, p. 273) thinks that this article has reference to past appropriation of the Delphian treasure by the Peloponnesian alliance, for warlike purposes. Had such a reference been intended, we should probably have found the past participle, *τοὺς ἀδικήσαντας*: whereas the present participle, as it now stands, is perfectly general, designating acts future and contingent.

Apollō and the Delphians. The Lacedæmonians accept the article literally, of course.

3. The Athenian garrisons at Pylos, Kythéra, Nisæa, and Minoa, and Methana in the neighborhood of Træzen, are to remain as at present. No communication to take place between Kythéra and any portion of the mainland belonging to the Lacedæmonian alliance. The soldiers occupying Pylos shall confine themselves within the space between Buphras and Tomeus; those in Nisæa and Minoa, within the road which leads from the chapel of the hero Nisus to the temple of Poseidon, without any communication with the population beyond that limit. In like manner, the Athenians in the peninsula of Methana near Træzen, and the inhabitants of the latter city, shall observe the special convention concluded between them respecting boundaries.¹

4. The Lacedæmonians and their allies shall make use of the sea for trading purposes, on their own coasts, but shall not have liberty to sail in any ship of war, nor in any rowed merchant-vessel of tonnage equal to five hundred talents. [All war-ships were generally impelled by oar: they sometimes used sails, but never when wanted for fighting. Merchant-vessels seem generally to have sailed, but were sometimes rowed: the limitation of size is added, to insure that the Lacedæmonians shall not, under color of merchantmen, get up a warlike navy.]

5. There shall be free communication by sea as well as by land between Peloponnesus and Athens for herald or embassy with suitable attendants, to treat for a definitive peace or for the adjustment of differences.

6. Neither side shall receive deserters from the other, whether free or slave. [This article was alike important to both parties. Athens had to fear the revolt of her subject-allies, Sparta the desertion of Helots.]

7. Disputes shall be amicably settled, by both parties, according to their established laws and customs.

Such was the substance of the treaty prepared at Sparta, seemingly in concert with Athenian envoys, and sent by the Spartans to Athens for approval, with the following addition;

¹ Thucyd. iv, 118: see Poppe's note.

• if there be any provision which occurs to you, more honorable or just than these, come to Lacedæmon and tell us: for neither the Spartans nor their allies will resist any just suggestions. But let those who come, bring with them full powers to conclude, in the same manner as you desire of us. The truce shall be for one year."

By the resolution which Lachês proposed in the Athenian public assembly, ratifying the truce, the people farther decreed that negotiations should be open for a definitive treaty, and directed the stratêgi to propose to the next ensuing assembly, a scheme and principles for conducting the negotiations. But at the very moment when the envoys between Sparta and Athens were bringing the truce to final adoption, events happened in Thrace which threatened to cancel it altogether. Two days¹ after the important fourteenth of Elaphebolion, but before the truce could be made known in Thrace, Skiônê revolted from Athens to Brasidas.

Skiônê was a town calling itself Achaean, one of the numerous colonies which, in the want of an acknowledged mother city, traced its origin to warriors returning from Troy. It was situated in the peninsula of Pallênê (the westernmost of those three narrow tongues of land into which Chalkidikê branches out); continuous with the Eretrian colony Mendê. The Skiônæans, not without considerable dissent among themselves, proclaimed their revolt from Athens, under concert with Brasidas. He immediately crossed the gulf into Pallênê, himself in a little boat, but with a trireme close at his side; calculating that she would protect him against any small Athenian vessel, — while any Athenian trireme which he might encounter would attack his trireme, paying no attention to the little boat in which he himself was. The revolt of Skiônê was, from the position of the town, a more striking defiance of Athens than any of the preceding events. For the isthmus connecting Pallênê with the mainland was occupied by the town of Potidæa, a town assigned at the period of its capture seven years before to Athenian settlers, though probably containing some other residents besides. Moreover, the isthmus was so narrow, that the wall of Potidæa barred

¹ Thucyd. iv, 122.

it across completely from sea to sea: Pallênê was therefore a quasi-island, not open to the aid of land-force from the continent, like the towns previously acquired by Brasidas. The Skiônæans thus put themselves, without any foreign aid, into conflict against the whole force of Athens, bringing into question her empire not merely over continental towns, but over islands.

Even to Brasidas himself their revolt appeared a step of astonishing boldness. On being received into the city, he convened a public assembly, and addressed to them the same language which he had employed at Akanthus and Torônê, disavowing all party preferences as well as all interference with the internal politics of the town, and exhorting them only to unanimous efforts against the common enemy. He bestowed upon them at the same time the warmest praise for their courage. "They, though exposed to all hazards of islanders, had stood forward of their own accord to procure freedom,¹ without waiting like cowards to be driven on by a foreign force towards what was clearly their own good. He considered them capable of any measure of future heroism, if the danger now impending from Athens should be averted, and he should assign to them the very first post of honor among the faithful allies of Lacedæmon." This generous, straightforward, and animating tone of exhortation, appealing to the strongest political instinct of the Greek mind, the love of complete city autonomy, and coming from the lips of one whose whole conduct had hitherto been conformable to it, had proved highly efficacious in all the previous towns. But in Skiônê it roused the population to the highest pitch of enthusiasm:² it worked even upon the feelings of the dissentient minority, bringing them round to partake heartily in the movement: it produced a unanimous and exalted confidence which made them look forward cheerfully to all the desperate chances in which they had engaged themselves; and it produced at the same time, in still more unbounded manifestation, the same personal attachment and admiration as Brasidas inspired elsewhere. The Skiônæans not only voted to him publicly a golden crown, as the liberator of Greece, but when it

¹ Thucyd. iv. 120. ἡ πόλις αὐτὴν ἑλπίσας ἢ ὑποσώσας, etc.

² Thucyd. iv. 120. Καὶ οἱ μὲν Σκιωνῆες ἐπὶ πάντας τοὺς λόγους, καὶ ἀποσπασταί τε παρτὶ Λακεδαιμονίων, καὶ οἱς πρότερον αὐτὸν ἥρεσκε τοὺς πόλεμους, etc.

was placed on his head, the burst of individual sentiment and sympathy was the strongest of which the Grecian bosom was capable. "They crowded round him individually, and encircled his head with fillets, like a victorious athlete,"¹ says the historian. This remarkable incident illustrates what I observed before, that the achievements, the self-relying march, the straightforward politics and probity of this illustrious man, who in character was more Athenian than Spartan, yet with the good qualities of Athens predominant, inspired a personal emotion towards him such as rarely found its way into Grecian political life. The sympathy and admiration felt in Greece towards a victorious athlete was not merely an intense sentiment in the Grecian mind, but was, perhaps of all others, the most wide-spread and Pan-Hellenic. It was connected with the religion, the taste, and the love of recreation, common to the whole nation, while politics tended rather to disunite the separate cities: it was farther a sentiment at once familiar and exclusively personal. Of its exaggerated intensity throughout Greece the philosophers often complained, not without good reason; but Thucydides cannot convey a more lively idea of the enthusiasm and unanimity with which Brasidas was welcomed at Skiônê, just after the desperate resolution taken by the citizens, than by using this simile.

The Lacedæmonian commander knew well how much the utmost resolution of the Skiônæans was needed, and how speedily their insular position would draw upon them the vigorous invasion of Athens. He accordingly brought across to Pallênê a considerable portion of his army, not merely with a view to the defence of Skiônê, but also with the intention of surprising both Mendê and Potidæa, in both which places there were small parties of conspirators prepared to open the gates.

It was in this position that he was found by the commissioners who came to announce formally the conclusion of the truce for one year, and to enforce its provisions: Athenæus from Sparta,

¹ Thucyd. iv. 121. Καὶ δημοσίᾳ μὲν χρυσῇ στεφανῶν ἀνέδρασαν ὡς ἐλευθερωτὴν τὴν Ἑλλάδα, ἰδίᾳ τε ἑταίριον τε καὶ προσήχοντο ὥσπερ ἀθλητῇ.

Compare Plutarch, Periklēs, c. 28: compare also Krause (Olympia), sect 17, p. 162 (Wien, 1835). It was customary to place a fillet of cloth or linen on the head of the victors at Olympia, before putting on the olive wreath.

one of the three Spartans who had sworn to the treaty: Aristonymus, from Athens. The face of affairs was materially altered by this communication; much to the satisfaction of the newly-acquired allies of Sparta in Thrace, who accepted the truce forthwith, but to the great chagrin of Brasidas, whose career was thus suddenly arrested. But he could not openly refuse obedience, and his army was accordingly transferred from the peninsula of Pallênê to Torônê.

The case of Skiônê, however, immediately raised an obstruction, doubtless very agreeable to him. The commissioners who had come in an Athenian trireme, had heard nothing of the revolt of that place, and Aristonymus was astonished to find the enemy in Pallênê. But on inquiring into the case, he discovered that the Skiônæans had not revolted until two days after the day fixed for the commencement of the truce: accordingly, while sanctioning the truce for all the other cities in Thrace, he refused to comprehend Skiônê in it, sending immediate news home to Athens. Brasidas, protesting loudly against this proceeding, refused on his part to abandon Skiônê, which was peculiarly endeared to him by the recent scenes; and even obtained the countenance of the Lacedæmonian commissioners, by falsely asseverating that the city had revolted before the day named in the truce. Violent was the burst of indignation when the news sent home by Aristonymus reached Athens: nor was it softened, when the Lacedæmonians, acting upon the version of the case sent to them by Brasidas and Athenæus, despatched an embassy hither to claim protection for Skiônê, or at any rate to procure the adjustment of the dispute by arbitration or pacific decision. Having the terms of the treaty on their side, the Athenians were least of all disposed to relax from their rights in favor of the first revolting islanders. They resolved at once to undertake an expedition for the reconquest of Skiônê; and farther, on the proposition of Kleon, to put to death all the adult male inhabitants of that place as soon as it should have been reconquered. At the same time, they showed no disposition to throw up the truce generally; and the state of feeling on both sides tended to this result, that, while the war continued in Thrace, it was suspended everywhere else.¹

¹ Thucyd. iv, 122, 123.

Fresh intelligence soon arrived, carrying exasperation at Athens yet farther, of the revolt of Mendê, the adjoining town to Skiônê. Those Mendæans, who had laid their measures for secretly introducing Brasidas, were at first baffled by the arrival of the truce-commissioners; but they saw that he retained his hold on Skiônê, in spite of the provisions of the truce, and they ascertained that he was willing still to protect them if they revolted, though he could not be an accomplice, as originally projected, in the surprise of the town. Being, moreover, only a small party, with the sentiment of the population against them, they were afraid, if they now relinquished their scheme, of being detected and punished for the partial steps already taken, when the Athenians should come against Skiônê. They therefore thought it on the whole the least dangerous course to persevere. They proclaimed their revolt from Athens, constraining the reluctant citizens to obey them: the government seems before to have been democratical, but they now found means to bring about an oligarchical revolution along with the revolt. Brasidas immediately accepted their adhesion, and willingly undertook to protect them, professing to think that he had a right to do so, because they had revolted openly after the truce had been proclaimed. But the truce upon this point was clear, which he himself virtually admitted, by setting up as justification certain alleged matters in which the Athenians had themselves violated it. He immediately made preparation for the defence both of Mendê and Skiônê against the attack, which was now rendered more certain than before, conveying the women and children of those two towns across to the Chalkidic Olynthus, and sending thither as garrison

¹ Thucyd. iv, 123. Διὸ καὶ οἱ Μενδαῖοι μᾶλλον ἐτόλμησαν, τὴν τε τοῦ Βρασίδου γνώμην ὁρῶντες ἱστοίμην, καὶ ἅμα τῶν πρᾶσσόντων σφίσι δλίγων τε ὄντων, καὶ ὥς τότε ἐμίσσησαν οὐκέτι ἀνέντων, ἀλλὰ καταβίασαμένων παρὰ γνώμην τοῦς πολλοῦς, iv, 130. ὁ δῆμος εὐθὺς ἀναλαβὼν τὰ ὅπλα περιωργὴς ἐχώρει ἐπὶ τε Πελοποννησίους καὶ τοὺς τὰ ἐναντία σφίσι μετ' αὐτῶν πρᾶξαντας, etc.

The Athenians, after the conquest of the place, desire the Mendæans to be citizens as before, etc.

Mendê is another case in which the bulk of the citizens were averse to revolt from Athens, in spite of neighboring example.

five hundred Peloponnesian hoplites with three hundred Chian peltasts; the commander of which force, Polydamidas, took possession of the acropolis with his own troops separately.¹ Brasidas then withdrew himself with the greater part of his army, to accompany Perdikkas on an expedition into the interior against Arrhibæus and the Lynkestæ. On what ground, after having before entered into terms with Arrhibæus, he now became his active enemy, we are left to conjecture: probably his relations with Perdikkas, whose alliance was of essential importance, were such that this step was forced upon him against his will, or he may really have thought that the force under Polydamidas was adequate to the defence of Mendæ and Skionê; an idea which the unaccountable backwardness of Athens for the last six or eight months might well foster. Had he even remained, indeed, he could hardly have saved them, considering the situation of Pallênê and the superiority of Athens at sea; but his absence made their ruin certain.²

While Brasidas was thus engaged far in the interior, the Athenian armament under Nikias and Nikostratus reached Potidæa: fifty triremes, ten of them Chian; one thousand hoplites and six hundred bowmen from Athens; one thousand mercenary Thracians, with some peltasts from Methônê and other towns in the neighborhood. From Potidæa, they proceeded by sea to Cape Poseidonium, near which they landed for the purpose of attacking Mendê. Polydamidas, the Peloponnesian commander in the town, took post with his force of seven hundred hoplites, including three hundred Skionæans, upon an eminence near the city, strong and difficult of approach: upon which the Athenian generals divided their forces; Nikias, with sixty Athenian chosen hoplites, one hundred and twenty Methonean peltasts, and all the bowmen, tried to march up the hill by a side path and thus turn the position; while Nikostratus with the main army attacked it in front. But such were the extreme difficulties of the ground that both were repulsed: Nikias was himself wounded, and the division of Nikostratus was thrown into great disorder, narrowly escaping a destructive defeat. The Mendæans, however, evacuated the position in the night and retired into the city; while the Athe-

¹ Thucyd. iv. 120.

² Thucyd. iv. 123. 124.

nians, sailing round on the morrow to the suburb on the side of Skionê, ravaged the neighboring lands; and Nikias on the ensuing day carried his devastations still farther, even to the border of the Skionæan territory.

But dissensions had already commenced within the walls, and the Skionæan auxiliaries, becoming mistrustful of their situation, took advantage of the night to return home. The revolt of Mendê had been brought about against the will of the citizens by the intrigues and for the benefit of an oligarchical faction: moreover, it does not appear that Brasidas personally visited the town, as he had visited Skionê and the other revolted towns: had he come, his personal influence might have done much to soothe the offended citizens, and create some disposition to adopt the revolt as a fact accomplished, after they had once been compromised with Athens. But his animating words had not been heard, and the Peloponnesian troops whom he had sent to Mendê, were mere instruments to sustain the newly erected oligarchy and keep out the Athenians. The feelings of the citizens generally towards them were soon unequivocally displayed. Nikostratus with half of the Athenian force was planted before that gate of Mendê which opened towards Potidæa: in the neighborhood of that gate, within the city, was the place of arms and the chief station both of the Peloponnesians and of the citizens; and Polydamidas, intending to make a sally forth, was marshalling both of them in battle order, when one of the Mendæan Demos, manifesting with angry vehemence a sentiment common to most of them, told him, "that he would not sally forth, and did not choose to take part in the contest." Polydamidas seized hold of the man to punish him, when the mass of the armed Demos, taking part with their comrade, made a sudden rush upon the Peloponnesians. The latter, unprepared for such an onset, sustained at first some loss, and were soon forced to retreat into the acropolis; the rather, as they saw some of the Mendæans open the gates to the besiegers without, which induced them to suspect a preconcerted betrayal. No such concert, however, existed, though the besieging generals, when they saw the gates thus suddenly opened, soon comprehended the real position of affairs. But they found it impossible to restrain their soldiers, who pushed in forthwith, from plunder

ing the town; and they had even some difficulty in saving the lives of the citizens.¹

Mendé being thus taken, the Athenian generals desired the body of the citizens to resume their former government, leaving it to them to single out and punish the authors of the late revolt. What use was made of this permission, we are not told; but probably most of the authors had already escaped into the acropolis along with Polydamidas. Having erected a wall of circumvallation round the acropolis, joining the sea at both ends, and left a force to guard it, the Athenians moved away to begin the siege of Skiônê, where they found both the citizens and the Peloponnesian garrison posted on a strong hill, not far from the walls. As it was impossible to surround the town without being masters of this hill, the Athenians attacked it at once, and were more fortunate than they had been before Mendé; for they carried it by assault, compelling the defenders to take refuge in the town. After erecting their trophy, they commenced the wall of circumvallation. Before it was finished, the garrison who had been shut up in the acropolis of Mendé, got into Skiônê at night, having broken out by a sudden sally where the blockading wall around them joined the sea. But this did not hinder Nikias from prosecuting his operations, so that Skiônê was in no long time completely inclosed, and a division placed to guard the wall of circumvallation.²

Such was the state of affairs which Brasidas found on returning from the inland Macedonia. Unable either to recover Mendé or to relieve Skiônê, he was forced to confine himself to the protection of Torônê. Nikias, however, without attacking Torônê returned soon afterwards with his armament to Athens, leaving Skiônê under blockade.

The march of Brasidas into Macedonia had been unfortunate in every way, and nothing but his extraordinary gallantry rescued him from utter ruin. The joint force of himself and Perdikkas consisted of three thousand Grecian hoplites, Peloponnesian, Akanthian, and Chalkidian, with one thousand Macedonian and Chalkidian horse, and a considerable number of non-Hellenic auxiliaries. As soon as they had got beyond the mountain-pass

¹ Thucyd. iv. 130; Diodor. xii. 12.

² Thucyd. iv. 131.

into the territory of the Lynkestæ, they were met by Arrhibæus, and a battle ensued, in which that prince was completely worsted. They halted here for a few days, awaiting — before they pushed forward to attack the villages in the territory of Arrhibæus — the arrival of a body of Illyrian mercenaries, with whom Perdikkas had concluded a bargain.¹ At length Perdikkas became impatient to advance without them; while Brasidas, on the contrary, apprehensive for the fate of Mendé during his absence, was bent on returning back. The dissension between them becoming aggravated, they parted company and occupied separate encampments at some distance from each other, when both received unexpected intelligence which made Perdikkas as anxious to retreat as Brasidas. The Illyrians, having broken their compact, had joined Arrhibæus, and were now in full march to attack the invaders. The untold number of these barbarians was reported as overwhelming, and such was their reputation for ferocity as well as for valor, that the Macedonian army of Perdikkas, seized with a sudden panic, broke up in the night and fled without orders, hurrying Perdikkas himself along with them, and not even sending notice to Brasidas, with whom nothing had been concerted about the retreat. In the morning, the latter found Arrhibæus and the Illyrians close upon him, while the Macedonians were already far advanced in their journey homeward.

The contrast between the man of Hellas and of Macedonia, general as well as soldiers, was never more strikingly exhibited than on this critical occasion. The soldiers of Brasidas, though surprised as well as deserted, lost neither their courage nor their discipline: the commander preserved not only his presence of mind, but his full authority. His hoplites were directed to form in a hollow square, or oblong, with the light-armed and attendants in the centre, for the retreating march: youthful soldiers were posted either in the outer ranks, or in convenient stations, to run out swiftly and repel the assailing enemy; while Brasidas himself, with three hundred chosen men, formed the rear-guard.²

The short harangue which, according to a custom universal with Grecian generals, he addressed to his troops immediately before the enemy approached, is in many respects remarkable

¹ Thucyd. iv. 131.

² Thucyd. iv. 125.

ing the town; and they had even some difficulty in saving the lives of the citizens.¹

Mendé being thus taken, the Athenian generals desired the body of the citizens to resume their former government, leaving it to them to single out and punish the authors of the late revolt. What use was made of this permission, we are not told; but probably most of the authors had already escaped into the acropolis along with Polydamidas. Having erected a wall of circumvallation round the acropolis, joining the sea at both ends, and left a force to guard it, the Athenians moved away to begin the siege of Skiônê, where they found both the citizens and the Peloponnesian garrison posted on a strong hill, not far from the walls. As it was impossible to surround the town without being masters of this hill, the Athenians attacked it at once, and were more fortunate than they had been before Mendé; for they carried it by assault, compelling the defenders to take refuge in the town. After erecting their trophy, they commenced the wall of circumvallation. Before it was finished, the garrison who had been shut up in the acropolis of Mendé, got into Skiônê at night, having broken out by a sudden sally where the blockading wall around them joined the sea. But this did not hinder Nikias from prosecuting his operations, so that Skiônê was in no long time completely inclosed, and a division placed to guard the wall of circumvallation.²

Such was the state of affairs which Brasidas found on returning from the inland Macedonia. Unable either to recover Mendé or to relieve Skiônê, he was forced to confine himself to the protection of Torônê. Nikias, however, without attacking Torônê returned soon afterwards with his armament to Athens, leaving Skiônê under blockade.

The march of Brasidas into Macedonia had been unfortunate in every way, and nothing but his extraordinary gallantry rescued him from utter ruin. The joint force of himself and Perdikkas consisted of three thousand Grecian hoplites, Peloponnesian, Akanthian, and Chalkidian, with one thousand Macedonian and Chalkidian horse, and a considerable number of non-Hellenic auxiliaries. As soon as they had got beyond the mountain-pass

¹ Thu. yd. iv. 130; Diodor. xii. 72.

² Thucyd. iv. 131.

into the territory of the Lynkestæ, they were met by Arrhibæus, and a battle ensued, in which that prince was completely worsted. They halted here for a few days, awaiting — before they pushed forward to attack the villages in the territory of Arrhibæus — the arrival of a body of Illyrian mercenaries, with whom Perdikkas had concluded a bargain.¹ At length Perdikkas became impatient to advance without them; while Brasidas, on the contrary, apprehensive for the fate of Mendé during his absence, was bent on returning back. The dissension between them becoming aggravated, they parted company and occupied separate encampments at some distance from each other, when both received unexpected intelligence which made Perdikkas as anxious to retreat as Brasidas. The Illyrians, having broken their compact, had joined Arrhibæus, and were now in full march to attack the invaders. The untold number of these barbarians was reported as overwhelming, and such was their reputation for ferocity as well as for valor, that the Macedonian army of Perdikkas, seized with a sudden panic, broke up in the night and fled without orders, hurrying Perdikkas himself along with them, and not even sending notice to Brasidas, with whom nothing had been concerted about the retreat. In the morning, the latter found Arrhibæus and the Illyrians close upon him, while the Macedonians were already far advanced in their journey homeward.

The contrast between the man of Hellas and of Macedonia, general as well as soldiers, was never more strikingly exhibited than on this critical occasion. The soldiers of Brasidas, though surprised as well as deserted, lost neither their courage nor their discipline: the commander preserved not only his presence of mind, but his full authority. His hoplites were directed to form in a hollow square, or oblong, with the light-armed and attendants in the centre, for the retreating march: youthful soldiers were posted either in the outer ranks, or in convenient stations, to run out swiftly and repel the assailing enemy; while Brasidas himself, with three hundred chosen men, formed the rear-guard.²

The short harangue which, according to a custom universal with Grecian generals, he addressed to his troops immediately before the enemy approached, is in many respects remarkable

¹ Thucyd. iv. 131.

² Thucyd. iv. 125.

Though some were Akanthians, some Chalkidians, some Helots, he designates all by the honorable title of "Peloponnesians." Reassuring them against the desertion of their allies, as well as against the superior numbers of the advancing enemy, he invokes their native, homebred courage.¹ "Ye do not require the presence of allies to inspire you with bravery, nor do ye fear superior numbers of an enemy; for ye belong not to those political communities in which the larger number governs the smaller, but to those in which a few men rule subjects more numerous than themselves, having acquired their power by no other means than by superiority in battle." Next Brasidas tried to dissipate the prestige of the Illyrian name: his army had already vanquished the Lynkestæ, and these other barbarians were noway better. A nearer acquaintance would soon show that they were only formidable from the noise, the gestures, the clashing of arms, and the accompaniments of their onset; and that they were incapable of sustaining the reality of close combat, hand to hand. "They have no regular order (said he) such as to impress them with shame for deserting their post: flight and attack are with them in equally honorable esteem, so that there is nothing to test the really courageous man: their battle, wherein every man fights as he chooses, is just the thing to furnish each with a decent pretence for running away." "Repel ye their onset whenever it comes; and so soon as opportunity offers, resume your retreat in rank and order. Ye will soon arrive in a place of safety; and ye will be convinced that such crowds, when their enemy has stood to defy the first onset, keep aloof with empty menace and a parade of courage which never strikes; while if their enemy gives way, they show themselves smart and bold in running after him where there is no danger."²

¹ Thucyd. iv, 126. Ἀγανθοὺς γὰρ εἶναι τῶν προσηγμένων πόλεων, οὐ δὲ συμμάχων παρουσίαν ἐκείνῳ, ἀλλὰ δι' οἰκείαν ἀρετήν, καὶ μηδὲν πλῆθος φοβέσθαι ἑτέρων, οἳ γε (μηδὲ) ἀπὸ πολιτείων ταυοῦτων ἐκείτω, ἐν αἷσι οὐ πολλοὶ δόλων ἄρχουσιν, ἀλλὰ πλεόνων μάλλον ἐλασσόνων· οὐκ ἀλλὰ τίνος; ἰτησάμενοι τὴν δύναστίαν ἢ τῷ μάχόμενοι κρατεῖν.

² Thucyd. iv, 126. Οὐτε γὰρ τάς τε ἔχοντες ἀντιπαραστήσαντες ἂν λιπεῖν τινα χώραν βιαζόμενοι ἢ τε φυγὴ αὐτῶν καὶ ἡ ἑρπύς ἴσως ἔχουσα δοῖται τοῦ καλοῦ ἀνεξέλεγκτον· καὶ τὸ ἀνδρείον ἔχειν αἰσχυρῶς, οὐ μὲν γὰρ μάλιστα ἂν καὶ τροφᾶσιν τοῦ σώζεσθαι (se sauver) τινι προκρινόντως πορίσκει.

The superiority of disciplined and regimented force over disorderly numbers, even with equal undivided courage, is now a truth so familiar, that we require an effort of imagination to put ourselves back into the fifth century before the Christian era, when this truth was recognized only among the Hellenic communities; when the practice of all their neighbors — Illyrians, Thracians, Asiatics, Epirots, and even Macedonians — implied ignorance or contradiction of it. In respect to the Epirots, the difference between their military habits and those of the Greeks has been already noticed, having been repeatedly manifested in the memorable joint attack on the Akarnanian town of Stratus, in the second year of the war.¹ Both Epirots and Macedonians, however, are a step nearer to the Greeks than either Thracians, or these Illyrian barbarians against whom Brasidas was now about to contend, and in whose case the contrast comes out yet more forcibly. Nor is it merely the contrast between two modes of fighting which the Lacedæmonian commander impresses upon his soldiers: he gives what may be called a moral theory of the principles on which that contrast is founded, — a theory of large range and going to the basis of Grecian social life, in peace as well as in war. The sentiment in each individual man's bosom,

Σταδίς τε πῦρ καὶ ἀπὸ τοῦ προσηγμένου ἀπὸ αὐτῶν ἔρχεται, ἀλλὰ αὐτὸς οὐκ ἔχει, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἄλλοι καταστράτητοι. Ὁ ἱπποκρίτης ἐπαφροδίτου, καὶ τὰν ἀντιπαραστήσαντες ἂν λιπεῖν τινα χώραν βιαζόμενοι ἢ τε φυγὴ αὐτῶν καὶ ἡ ἑρπύς ἴσως ἔχουσα δοῖται τοῦ καλοῦ ἀνεξέλεγκτον· καὶ τὸ ἀνδρείον ἔχειν αἰσχυρῶς, οὐ μὲν γὰρ μάλιστα ἂν καὶ τροφᾶσιν τοῦ σώζεσθαι (se sauver) τινι προκρινόντως πορίσκει.

The word ἀλλοτρίως, which occurs twice in this chapter in regard to the Thracians, is very expressive and at the same time difficult to translate into any other language, — "what they seem on the point of doing, but never realize." See also i, 69.

The speech of the Roman consul Marius, in describing the Gauls, deserves to be compared: "Præter cornua, promissæ et rutilatæ comæ, vocatæ, ut prælongi gladii: ad hæc cœtus incuentium prælium, et ululatus et tripudia, et quæntium scuta in patriam quendam morem horrendum armorum et pitius: omnia de industria composita ad terrorem." (Livy, xxxviii, 17.)

¹ Thucyd. ii, 81. See above, chap. xlviii, of this History.

of a certain place which he has to fill and duties which he has to perform, combined with fear of the displeasure of his neighbors as well as of his own self-reproach if he shrinks back, but at the same time essentially bound up and reciprocating with the feeling that his neighbors are under corresponding obligations towards him, — this sentiment, which Brasidas invokes as the settled military creed of his soldiers in their ranks, was not less the regulating principle of their intercourse in peace as citizens of the same community. Simple as this principle may seem, it would have found no response in the army of Xerxes, or of the Thracian Sitalkês, or of the Gaul Brennus. The Persian soldier rushes to death by order of the Great King, perhaps under terror of a whip which the Great King commands to be administered to him: the Illyrian or the Gaul scorns such a stimulus, and obeys only the instigation of his own pugnacity, or vengeance, or love of blood, or love of booty, but recedes as soon as that individual sentiment is either satisfied or overcome by fear. It is the Greek soldier alone who feels himself bound to his comrades by ties reciprocal and indissoluble,¹ — who obeys neither the will of a king, nor his own individual impulse, but a common and imperative sentiment of obligation. — whose honor or shame is attached to his own place in the ranks, never to be abandoned nor overstepped. Such conceptions of military duty, established in the minds of these soldiers whom Brasidas addressed, will come to be farther illustrated when we describe the memorable Retreat of the Ten Thousand: at present, I merely indicate them as forming a part of that general scheme of morality, social and political as well as military, wherein the Greeks stood exalted above the nations who surrounded them.

But there is another point in the speech of Brasidas which deserves notice. He tells his soldiers: "Courage is your homebred property; for ye belong to communities wherein the small

¹ See the memorable remarks of Hippokratês and Aristotle on the difference in respect of courage between Europeans and Asiatics, as well as between Hellens and non-Hellens (Hippokratês, *De Aëre, Locis, et Aquis* c. 24, ed. Littré, sect. 116, *seq.*, ed. Petersen; Aristotle, *Politie*, vii, 6, 1-5) and the conversation between Xerxes and Demaratus (Herodot. vii. 103, 104).

number governs the larger, simply by reason of superior prowess in themselves and conquest by their ancestors." First, it is remarkable that a large proportion of the Peloponnesian soldiers, whom Brasidas thus addresses, consisted of Helots, the conquered race, not the conquerors: yet so easily does the military or regimental pride supplant the sympathies of race, that these men would feel flattered by being addressed as if they were themselves sprung from the race which had enslaved their ancestors. Next, we here see the right of the strongest invoked as the legitimate source of power, and as an honorable and ennobling recollection, by an officer of Dorian race, oligarchical politics, unperturbed intellect, and estimable character: and we shall accordingly be prepared, when we find a similar principle hereafter laid down by the Athenian envoys at Melos, to disallow the explanation of those who treat it merely as a theory invented by demagogues and sophists, upon one or other of whom it is common to throw the blame of all that is objectionable in Grecian politics or morality.

Having finished his harangue, Brasidas gave orders for retreat. As soon as his march began, the Illyrians rushed upon him with all the confidence and shouts of pursuers against a flying enemy, believing that they should completely destroy his army. But wherever they approached near the young soldiers specially stationed for the purpose, turned upon and beat them back with severe loss; while Brasidas himself, with his rear-guard of three hundred, was present everywhere rendering vigorous aid. When the Lynkestæ and Illyrians attacked, the army halted and repelled them, after which it resumed its retreating march. The barbarians found themselves so rudely handled, and with such unwonted vigor, — for they probably had had no previous experience of Grecian troops, — that after a few trials they desisted from meddling with the army in its retreat along the plain. They ran forward rapidly, partly in order to overtake the Macedonians under Perdikkas, who had fled before, partly to occupy the narrow pass, with high hills on each side, which formed the entrance into Lynkestis, and which lay in the road of Brasidas. When the latter approached this narrow pass, he saw the barbarians masters of it; several of them were already on the summits, and more were ascending to reinforce them, while a portion of

them were coming down upon his rear. Brasidas immediately gave orders to his chosen three hundred, to charge up the most assailable of the two hills, with their best speed, before it became more numerous occupied, not staying to preserve compact ranks. This unexpected and vigorous movement disconcerted the barbarians, who fled, abandoning the eminence to the Greeks, and leaving their own men in the pass exposed on one of their flanks.¹ The retreating army, thus master of one of the side hills, was enabled to force its way through the middle pass, and to drive away the Lynkestian and Illyrian occupants. Having got through this narrow outlet, Brasidas found himself on the higher ground, nor did his enemies dare to attack him farther: so that he was enabled to reach, even in that day's march, the first town or village in the kingdom of Perdikkas, called Armissa. So incensed were his soldiers with the Macedonian subjects of Perdikkas, who had fled on the first news of danger without giving them any notice, that they seized and appropriated all the articles of baggage, not inconsiderable in number, which happened to have been dropped in the disorder of a nocturnal flight; and they even unharnessed and slew the oxen out of the baggage carts.²

Perdikkas keenly resented this behavior of the troops of Brasidas, following as it did immediately upon his own quarrel with that general, and upon the mortification of his repulse from Lynkestis. From this moment he broke off his alliance with the Peloponnesians, and opened negotiations with Nikias, then engaged in constructing the wall of blockade round Skionê. Such was the general faithlessness of this prince, however, that Nikias

¹ Thucyd. iv, 128. It is not possible clearly to understand this passage without some knowledge of the ground to which it refers. I presume that the regular road through the defile, along which the main army of Brasidas passed, was long and winding, making the ascent to the top very gradual, but at the same time exposed on both sides from the heights above. The detachment of three hundred scaled the steep heights on one side, and drove away the enemy, thus making it impossible for him to remain any longer even in the main road. But I do not suppose, with Dr. Arnold, that the main army of Brasidas followed the three hundred, and "broke out of the valley by scaling one of its sides:" they pursued the main road, as soon as it was cleared for them.

² Thucyd. iv, 127, 128.

required as a condition of the alliance, some manifest proof of the sincerity of his intentions; and Perdikkas was soon enabled to afford a proof of considerable importance.¹

The relations between Athens and Peloponnesus, since the conclusion of the truce in the preceding March, had settled into a curious combination. In Thrace, war was prosecuted by mutual understanding, and with unabated vigor; but everywhere else the truce was observed. The main purpose of the truce, however, that of giving time for discussions preliminary to a definitive peace, was completely frustrated: nor does the decree of the Athenian people, which stands included in their vote sanctioning the truce, for sending and receiving envoys to negotiate such a peace, ever seem to have been executed.

Instead of this, the Lacedæmonians despatched a considerable reinforcement by land to join Brasidas; probably at his own request, and also instigated by hearing of the Athenian armament now under Nikias in Pallênê. But Ischagoras, the commander of the reinforcement, on reaching the borders of Thessaly, found all further progress impracticable, and was compelled to send back his troops. For Perdikkas, by whose powerful influence alone Brasidas had been enabled to pass through Thessaly, now directed his Thessalian guests to keep the new-comers off; which was far more easily executed, and was gratifying to the feelings of Perdikkas himself, as well as an essential service to the Athenians.² Ischagoras, however, with a few companions, but without his army, made his way to Brasidas, having been particularly directed by the Lacedæmonians to inspect and report upon the state of affairs. He numbered among his companions a few select Spartans of the military age, intended to be placed as harmosts or governors in the cities reduced by Brasidas: this was among the first violations, apparently often repeated afterwards, of the ancient Spartan custom, that none except elderly

¹ Thucyd. iv, 128-132. Some lines of the comic poet Hermippus are preserved (in the *Φορμόφοροι*, Meineke, *Fragm.* p. 407) respecting Sitalkês and Perdikkas. Among the presents brought home by Dionysus in his voyage, there is numbered "the itch from Sitalkês, intended for the Lacedæmonians, and many shiploads of lies from Perdikkas." *Καὶ παρὰ Περδικκὸν ψεύδη ναυσὶν πανὶ πολλαῖς.*

² Thucyd. iv, 132.

men, above the military age, should be named to such posts. Indeed, Brasidas himself was an illustrious departure from the ancient rule. The mission of these officers was intended to guard against the appointment of any but Spartans to such posts, for there were no Spartans in the army of Brasidas. One of the new-comers, Klearidas, was made governor of Amphipolis; another, Pasitelidas, of Toronê.¹ It is probable that these inspecting commissioners may have contributed to fetter the activity of Brasidas: and the newly-declared hostility of Perdikkas, together with disappointment in the non-arrival of the fresh troops intended to join him, much abridged his means. We hear of only one exploit performed by him at this time, and that too more than six months after the retreat from Macedonia, about January or February 422 B.C. Having established intelligence with some parties in the town of Potidaea, in the view of surprising it, he contrived to bring up his army in the night to the foot of the walls, and even to plant his scaling ladders, without

¹ Thucyd. iv, 132. Καὶ τῶν ἡβώτων αἱ τῶν παρατόμων ἀνδρῶν ἐξήγον ἐκ Σπάρτης, ὥστε τῶν πόλεων ἀρχοῦνται καθιστάμεναι καὶ μὴ τοῖς ἐν τευχόσιν ἐπιτρέπειν.

Most of the commentators translate *ἡβώτων*, "young men," which is not the usual meaning of the word; it signifies "men of military age," which includes both young and middle-aged. If we compare iv, 132 with iii, 36, v, 32, and v, 116, we shall see that *ἡβώτες* really has this larger meaning; compare also *μέχρι ἡβῆς* (ii, 46), which means, "until the age of military service commenced."

It is not therefore necessary to suppose that the men taken out by Ischagoras were very young, for example that they were below the age of thirty as Manso, O. Müller, and Göller would have us believe. It is enough that they were within the limits of the military age both ways.

Considering the extraordinary reverence paid to old age at Sparta, it is by no means wonderful that old men should have been thought exclusively fitted for such commands, in the ancient customs and constitution.

The extensive operations, however, in which Sparta became involved through the Peloponnesian war, would render it impossible to maintain such a maxim in practice: but at this moment, the step was still recognized as a departure from a received maxim, and is characterized as such by Thucydides under the term *παράνομον*.

I explain τοῖς ἐν τευχόσιν to refer to the case of men not Spartans being named to these posts: see in reference to this point, the stress which Brasidas lays on the fact that Klearidas was a Spartan, Thucyd. v, 9.

being discovered. The sentinel carrying and ringing the bell had just passed by on the wall, leaving for a short interval an unguarded space (the practice apparently being, to pass this bell round along the walls from one sentinel to another throughout the night), when some of the soldiers of Brasidas took advantage of the moment to try and mount. But before they could reach the top of the wall, the sentinel came back, alarm was given, and the assailants were compelled to retreat.¹

In the absence of actual war between the ascendent powers in and near Peloponnesus, during the course of this summer, Thucydides mentions to us some incidents which perhaps he would have omitted had there been great warlike operations to describe. The great temple of Hērê, between Mykenæ and Argos (nearer to the former, and in early times more intimately connected with it, but now an appendage of the latter, Mykenæ itself having been subjected and almost depopulated by the Argeians), enjoyed an ancient Pan-Hellenic reputation; the catalogue of its priestesses, seemingly with a statue or bust of each, was preserved or imagined through centuries of past time, real and mythical, beginning with the goddess herself or her immediate nominees. Chrysis, an old woman, who had been priestess there for fifty-six years, happened to fall asleep in the temple with a burning lamp near to her head: the fillet encircling her head took fire, and though she herself escaped unhurt, the temple itself, very ancient, and perhaps built of wood, was consumed. From fear of the wrath of the Argeians, Chrysis fled to Phlius, and subsequently thought it necessary to seek protection as a suppliant in the temple of Athênê Alea, at Tegea: Phacinis was appointed priestess in her place.² The temple was rebuilt on an adjoining spot by

¹ Thucyd. iv, 135.

² Thucyd. ii, 5; iv, 133; Pausan. ii, 17, 7; iii, 5, 6. Hellanikus (a contemporary of Thucydides, but somewhat older, coming in point of age between him and Herodotus) had framed a chronological series of these priestesses of Hērê, with a history of past events belonging to the supposed times of each. And such was the Pan-Hellenic importance of the temple at this time, that Thucydides, when he describes accurately the beginning of the Peloponnesian war, tells us, as one of his indications of time, that Chrysis had then been forty-eight years priestess at the Heræum. To

Eupolemus, of Argos, continuing as much as possible the antiquities and traditions of the former, but with greater splendor and magnitude: Pausanias, the traveller, who describes this temple as a visitor, near six hundred years afterwards, saw near it the remnant of the old temple which had been burned.

We hear farther of a war in Arcadia, between the two important cities of Mantinea and Tegea, each attended by its Arcadian allies, partly free, partly subject. In a battle fought between them at Laodikion, the victory was disputed, each party erected a trophy, each sent spoils to the temple of Delphi. We shall have occasion soon to speak farther of these Arcadian dissensions.

The Boeotians had been no parties to the truce sworn between Sparta and Athens in the preceding month of March, but they seem to have followed the example of Sparta in abstaining from hostilities *de facto*: and we may conclude that they acceded to the request of Sparta so far as to allow the transit of Athenian visitors and sacred envoys through Boeotia to the Delphian temple. The only actual incident which we hear of in Boeotia during this interval, is one which illustrates forcibly the harsh and ungenerous ascendancy of the Thebans over the inferior Boeotian cities.¹ The Thebans destroyed the walls of Thespie, and condemned the city to remain unfortified, on the charge of *attaching* tendencies. How far this suspicion was well founded we have no means of judging: but the Thespians, far from being dangerous at this moment, were altogether helpless, having lost the flower of their military force at the battle of Delium, where their station was on the defeated wing. It was this very helplessness brought upon them by their services to Thebes against Athens, which now both impelled and enabled the Thebans to enforce the rigorous sentence above mentioned.²

employ the series of Olympic prizes and Olympiads as a continuous distribution of time, was a practice which had not yet got footing.

The catalogue of these priestesses of Hêrê, beginning with mythical and descending to historical names, is illustrated by the inscription belonging to the temple of Halikarnassus in Boeckh, Corpus Inscr. No. 2655 see Boeckh's Commentary, and Preller, *Attika Fragmenta*, pp. 34, 46.

¹ Xenoph. *Memo.* lib. iii. §. 2.

² Thucyd. iv. 133.

But the month of March, or the Attic Elaphebolion, 422 B.C., the time prescribed for expiration of the one year's truce, had now arrived. It has already been mentioned that this truce had never been more than partially observed: Brasidas in Thrace had disregarded it from the beginning, and both the contracting powers had tacitly acquiesced in the anomalous condition, of war in Thrace coupled with peace elsewhere. Either of them had thus an excellent pretext for breaking the truce altogether; and as neither acted upon this pretext, we plainly see that the paramount feeling and ascendent parties, among both, tended to peace of their own accord, at that time. Nor was there anything except the interest of Brasidas, and of those revolted subjects of Athens to whom he had bound himself, which kept alive the war in Thrace. Under such a state of feeling, the oath taken to maintain the truce still seemed imperative on both parties, always excepting Thracian affairs. Moreover, the Athenians were to a certain degree soothed by their success at Mendê and Skionê, and by their acquisition of Perdikkas as an ally, during the summer and autumn of 423 B.C. But the state of sentiment between the contracting parties was not such as to make it possible to treat for any longer peace, or to conclude any new agreement, though neither were disposed to depart from that which had been already concluded.

The mere occurrence of the last day of the truce made no practical difference at first in this condition of things. The truce had expired: either party might renew hostilities; but neither actually did renew them. To the Athenians, there was this additional motive for abstaining from hostilities for a few months longer: the great Pythian festival would be celebrated at Delphi in July or the beginning of August, and as they had been excluded from that holy spot during all the interval between the beginning of the war and the conclusion of the one year's truce, their pious feelings seem now to have taken a peculiar longing towards the visits, pilgrimages, and festivals connected with it. Though the truce, therefore, had really ceased, no actual warfare took place until the Pythian games were over.

¹ This seems to me the most reasonable sense to put upon the much-debated passage of Thucyd. v. 1. Τοῦ δ' ἐπιγεγομένου θέρους αἱ μὲν

But though the actions of Athens remained unaltered, the talk at Athens became very different. Kleon and his supporters

ἐν αὐτοῖσι σπονδαὶ διαλύοντο μέχρι τῶν Πυθίων· καὶ ἐν τῇ ἐκείνῃ ἡμέρᾳ Ἀθηναῖοι Δηλίοις ἀνέστησαν ἐκ Δελφῶν; again, v. 2. Κλέων δὲ Ἀθηναίων πείσαι ἐς τὰ ἐπὶ Ὀρχοῦς χωρία ἐξέπλυνσε μετὰ τῇ ἐκείνῃ ἡμέρᾳ, etc.

Thucydides says here, that "the truce was dissolved;" the bond imposed upon both parties was untied, and both resumed their natural liberty. But he does not say that "hostilities recommenced" before the Pythia, as Goller and other critics affirm that he says. The interval between the 14th of the month Elaphebolion and the Pythian festival was one in which there was no binding truce any longer in force, and yet no actual hostilities. It was an *ἀνακωχὴ ἀσπονδίας*, to use the words of Thucydides, when he describes the relations between Corinth and Athens in the ensuing year (v. 32).

The word *ἐκείνη* here means, in my judgment, the truce proclaimed at the season of the Pythian festival, — quite distinct from the truce for one year which had expired a little while before. The change of the word in the course of one line from *σπονδαὶ* to *ἐκείνη* marks this distinction.

I agree with Dr. Arnold, dissenting both from M. Boeckh and from Mr. Clinton, in his conception of the events of this year. Kleon sailed on his expedition to Thrace after the Pythian holy truce, in the beginning of August: between that date and the end of September, happened the capture of Toronê and the battle of Amphipolis. But the way in which Dr. Arnold defends his opinion is not at all satisfactory. In the Dissertation appended to his second volume of Thucydides (p. 458) he says: "The words in Thucydides *ἐν αὐτοῖσι σπονδαὶ διαλύοντο μέχρι Πυθίων*, mean, as I understand them, 'that the truce for a year had lasted on till the Pythian games, and then ended;' that is, instead of expiring on the 14th of Elaphebolion, it had been *tacitly continued* nearly four months longer, till after midsummer: and it was not till the middle of Hecatombeion that Cleon was sent out to recover Amphipolis."

Such a construction of the word *διαλύοντο* appears to me inadmissible, nor is Dr. Arnold's defence of it, p. 454, of much value: *σπονδαὶ διαλύειν* is an expression well known to Thucydides (iv. 23; v. 36), "to dissolve the truce." I go along with Boeckh and Mr. Clinton in construing the words, except that I strike out what they introduce from their own imagination. They say: "The truce was ended, and the war again renewed, up to the time of the Pythian games." Thucydides only says "that the truce was dissolved;" he does not say "that the war was renewed." It is not at all necessary to Dr. Arnold's conception of the facts that the words should be translated as he proposes. His remarks also (p. 460) upon the relation of the Athenians to the Pythian games, appear to me just: but he does not advert to the fact, which would have strengthened materially what he there says, that the Athenians had been excluded from Delphi and from the Pythian festival between the commencement of the war and

renewed their instances to obtain a vigorous prosecution of the war, and renewed them with great additional strength of argument; the question being now open to considerations of political prudence, without any binding obligation.

"At this time (observes Thucydides) the great enemies of peace were, Brasidas on one side, and Kleon on the other: the former, because he was in full success and rendered illustrious by the war; the latter, because he thought that if peace were concluded, he should be detected in his dishonest politics, and be less easily credited in his criminations of others." As to Brasidas, the remark of the historian is indisputable: it would be wonderful, indeed, if he, in whom so many splendid qualities were brought out by the war, and who had moreover contracted obligations with the Thracian towns which gave him hopes and fears of his own, entirely apart from Lacedæmon, — it would be wonderful if the war and its continuance were not in his view the paramount object. In truth, his position in Thrace constituted an insurmountable obstacle to any solid or steady peace, independently of the dispositions of Kleon.

But the coloring which Thucydides gives to Kleon's support of the war is open to much greater comment. First, we may well raise the question, whether Kleon had any real interest in war, — whether his personal or party consequence in the city was at all enhanced by it. He had himself no talent or competence for warlike operations, which tended infallibly to place ascendancy in the hands of others, and to throw him into the shade. As to his power of carrying on dishonest intrigues with success, that must depend on the extent of his political ascendancy; while matter of crimination against others, assuming him to be careless of truth or falsehood, could hardly be wanting either in war or peace; and if the war brought forward unsuc-

the one year's truce. I conceive that the Pythian games were celebrated about July or August. In an earlier part of this History (ch. xxviii, vol. iv. p. 67), I said that they were celebrated in *autumn*; it ought rather to be "towards the end of summer."

¹ Thucyd. v. 16. Κλέων τε καὶ Βρασίδας, ὅτι περ ἀμφοτέρωθεν μελ᾽ ἑαυτῶν τῇ εἰρήνῃ, ὃ μὲν, διὰ τὸ εὐτυχεῖν τε καὶ τιμᾶσθαι ἐκ τῶν πόλεων, ὃ δὲ, γενομένης ἡσυχίας καταφανέστερος νομίζων ἂν εἶναι κακουργῶν καὶ ἀπιστίας διὰ τῶν πόλεων, etc.

successful generals open to his accusations, it would also throw up successful generals who would certainly outshine him, and would probably put him down. In the life which Plutarch has given us of Phokion, a plain and straightforward military man, we read that one of the frequent and criminative speakers of Athens, of character analogous to that which is ascribed to Kleon, expressed his surprise on hearing Phokion dissuade the Athenians from embarking in a new war: "Yes (said Phokion), I think it right to dissuade them; though I know well, that if there be war, I shall have command over you; if there be peace, you will have command over me."¹ This is surely a more rational estimate of the way in which war affects the comparative importance of the orator and the military officer, than that which Thucydides pronounces in reference to the interests of Kleon. Moreover, when we come to follow the political history of Syracuse, we shall find the demagogue Athenagoras ultra-pacific, and the aristocrat Hermokratēs far more warlike:² the former is afraid, not without reason, that war will raise into consequence energetic military leaders dangerous to the popular constitution. We may add, that Kleon himself had not been always warlike, he commenced his political career as an opponent of Periklēs, when the latter was strenuously maintaining the necessity and prudence of beginning the Peloponnesian war.³

But farther, if we should even grant that Kleon had a separate party-interest in promoting the war, it will still remain to be considered, whether, at this particular crisis, the employment of energetic warlike measures in Thrace was not really the sound and prudent policy for Athens. Taking Periklēs as the best judge of that policy, we shall find him at the outset of the war inculcating emphatically two important points: 1. To stand vigorously upon the defensive, maintaining unimpaired their maritime empire, "keeping their subject-allies well in hand," submitting patiently even to see Attica ravaged. 2. To abstain from trying to enlarge their empire or to make new conquests during the

¹ Plutarch, Phokion, c. 16.

² See the speeches of Athenagoras and Hermokratēs Thucyd. vi, 33-36.

³ Plutarch, Periklēs, c. 33-35.

war.¹ Consistently with this well-defined plan of action, Periklēs, had he lived, would have taken care to interfere vigorously and betimes to prevent Brasidas from making his conquests: had such interference been either impossible or accidentally frustrated, he would have thought no efforts too great to recover them. To maintain undiminished the integrity of the empire, as well as that impression of Athenian force upon which the empire rested, was his cardinal principle. Now it is impossible to deny that in reference to Thrace, Kleon adhered more closely than his rival Nikias to the policy of Periklēs. It was to Nikias, more than to Kleon, that the fatal mistake made by Athens in not interfering speedily after Brasidas first broke into Thrace is to be imputed: it was Nikias and his partisans, desirous of peace at almost any price, and knowing that the Lacedæmonians also desired it, who encouraged his countrymen, at a moment of great public depression of spirit, to leave Brasidas unopposed in Thrace, and rely on the chance of negotiation with Sparta for arresting his progress. The peace-party at Athens carried their point of the truce for a year, with the promise and for the express purpose of checking the farther conquests of Brasidas; also with the farther promise of maturing that truce into a permanent peace, and obtaining under the peace even the restoration of Amphipolis.

Such was the policy of Nikias and his party, the friends of peace and opponents of Kleon. And the promises which they thus held out might perhaps appear plausible in March 422 B.C., at the moment when the truce for one year was concluded. But the subsequent events had frustrated them in the most glaring manner, and had even shown the best reason for believing that no such expectations could possibly be realized while Brasidas was in unbroken and unopposed action. For the Lacedæmonians though seemingly sincere in concluding the truce on the basis of *ut possidetis*, and desiring to extend it to Thrace as well as elsewhere, had been unable to enforce the observance of it upon Brasidas, or to restrain him even from making new acquisitions,

¹ Thucyd. i, 142, 143, 144: i, 13. καὶ τὸ ναυτικὸν ἡπὶ ἰσχύουσιν ἐξα-
τάσσαι, τὰ τε τῶν ξυμμαχῶν διὰ χειρὸς ἔχειν—λέγων τὴν
ἰσχὺν αὐτοῖς ἀπὸ τούτων εἶναι τὸν λόγον τὸν τῆς προόδου, etc.

so that Athens never obtained the benefit of the truce, exactly in that region where she most stood in need of it. Only by the despatch of her armament to Skiônê and Mendê had she maintained herself in possession even of Pallênê. Now what was the lesson to be derived from this experience, when the Athenians came to discuss their future policy, after the truce was at an end? The great object of all parties at Athens was to recover the lost possessions in Thrace, especially Amphipolis. Nikias, still urging negotiations for peace, continued to hold out hopes that the Lacedæmonians would be willing to restore that place, as the price of their captives now at Athens; and his connection with Sparta would enable him to announce her professions even upon authority. But to this Kleon might make, and doubtless did make, a complete reply, grounded upon the most recent experience: "If the Lacedæmonians consent to the restitution of Amphipolis (he would say), it will probably be only with the view of finding some means to escape performance, and yet to get back their prisoners. But granting that they are perfectly sincere, they will never be able to control Brasidas, and those parties in Thrace who are bound up with him by community of feeling and interest; so that after all, you will give them back their prisoners on the faith of an equivalent beyond their power to realize. Look at what has happened during the truce! So different are the views and obligations of Brasidas in Thrace from those of the Lacedæmonians, that he would not even obey their order when they directed him to stand as he was, and to desist from farther conquest: much less will he obey them when they direct him to surrender what he has already got: least of all, if they enjoin the surrender of Amphipolis, his grand acquisition and his central point for all future effort. Depend upon it, if you desire to regain Amphipolis, you will only regain it by energetic employment of force, as has happened with Skiônê and Mendê: and you ought to put forth your strength for this purpose immediately, while the Lacedæmonian prisoners are yet in your hands, instead of waiting until after you shall have been deluded into giving them up, thereby losing all your hold upon Lacedæmon."

Such anticipations were fully verified by the result: for subsequent history will show that the Lacedæmonians, when they had bound themselves by treaty to give up Amphipolis, either would

not, or could not, enforce performance of their stipulation, even after the death of Brasidas: much less could they have done so during his life, when there was his great personal influence, strenuous will, and hopes of future conquest, to serve as increased obstruction to them. Such anticipations were also plainly suggested by the recent past: so that in putting them into the mouth of Kleon, we are only supposing him to read the lesson open before his eyes.

Now since the war-policy of Kleon, taken at this moment after the expiration of the one year's truce, may be thus shown to be not only more conformable to the genius of Periklès, but also founded on a juster estimate of events both past and future, than the peace-policy of Nikias, what are we to say to the historian, who, without refuting such presumptions, every one of which is deduced from his own narrative, nay, without even indicating their existence, merely tells us that "Kleon opposed the peace in order that he might cloke dishonest intrigues and find matter for plausible crimination?" We cannot but say of this criticism, with profound regret that such words must be pronounced respecting any judgment of Thucydidès, that it is harsh and unfair towards Kleon, and careless in regard to truth and the instruction of his readers. It breathes not that same spirit of honorable impartiality which pervades his general history: it is an interpolation by the officer whose improvidence had occasioned to his countrymen the fatal loss of Amphipolis, retaliating upon the citizen who justly accused him: it is conceived in the same tone as his unaccountable judgment in the matter of Sphacteria.

Rejecting on this occasion the judgment of Thucydidès, we may confidently affirm that Kleon had rational public grounds for urging his countrymen to undertake with energy the reconquest of Amphipolis. Demagogue and leather-seller though he was, he stands here honorably distinguished, as well from the tameness and inaction of Nikias, who grasped at peace with hasty credulity through sickness of the efforts of war, as from the restless movement and novelties, not merely unprofitable but ruinous, which we shall presently find springing up under the auspices of Alkibiadès. Periklès had said to his countrymen, at a time when they were enduring all the miseries of pestilence, and were in a state of despondency even greater than that which

prevailed in B.C. 422: "You hold your empire and your proud position, by the condition of being willing to encounter cost, fatigue, and danger: abstain from all views of enlarging the empire, but think no effort too great to maintain it unimpaired. To lose what we have once got is more disgraceful than to fail in attempts at acquisition."¹ The very same language was probably held by Kleon when exhorting his countrymen to an expedition for the reconquest of Amphipolis. But when uttered by him, it would have a very different effect from that which it had formerly produced when held by Periklēs, and different also from that which it would now have produced if held by Nikias. The entire peace-party would repudiate it when it came from Kleon; partly out of dislike to the speaker, partly from a conviction, doubtless felt by every one, that an expedition against Brasidas would be a hazardous and painful service to all concerned in it, general as well as soldiers; partly also from a persuasion, sincerely entertained at the time, though afterwards proved to be illusory by the result, that Amphipolis might really be got back through peace with the Lacedæmonians.

If Kleon, in proposing the expedition, originally proposed himself as the commander, a new ground of objection, and a very forcible ground, would thus be furnished. Since everything which Kleon does is understood to be a manifestation of some vicious or silly attribute, we are told that this was an instance of his absurd presumption, arising out of the success of Pylus, and persuading him that he was the only general who could put down Brasidas. But if the success at Pylus had really filled him with such overweening military conceit, it is most unaccountable that he should not have procured for himself some command during the year which immediately succeeded the affair at Sphakteria, the eighth year of the war: a season of most active warlike enterprise, when his presumption and influence arising out of the Sphakterian victory must have been fresh and glowing. As he

¹ Thucyd. ii. 63. Τῆς δὲ τοῦτοιοῦτο ἰδέσθαι τὸ τεταμένον ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀρχαίου, ὡς περ ἀπὸ τῆς ἀρχαίας, ἀρχαίας, καὶ μὴ ἀρχαίας τὸν πόλεον ἢ μὴ τῆς καὶ δὲ ἀρχαίας, etc. ii. 62, ἀπὸ τῆς ἀρχαίας, ἰδέσθαι τὸν πόλεον ἢ μὴ τῆς καὶ δὲ ἀρχαίας, etc. Contrast the tenor of the two speeches of Periklēs (Thucyd. i. 140-144; ii. 60-64) with the description which Thucydides gives of the simple "avoidance of risk" (τὸ ἀκύνειον) which characterized Nikias (v. 16).

obtained no command during this immediately succeeding period we may fairly doubt whether he ever really conceived such excessive personal presumption of his own talents for war, and whether he did not retain after the affair of Sphakteria the same character which he had manifested in that affair, reluctance to engage in military expeditions himself, and a disposition to see them commanded as well as carried on by others. It is by no means certain that Kleon, in proposing the expedition against Amphipolis, originally proposed to take the command of it himself: I think it at least equally probable, that his original wish was to induce Nikias or the strategē to take the command of it, as in the case of Sphakteria. Nikias, doubtless, opposed the expedition as much as he could: when it was determined by the people, in spite of his opposition, he would peremptorily decline the command for himself, and would do all he could to force it upon Kleon, or at least would be better pleased to see it under his command than under that of any one else. He would be not less glad to exonerate himself from a dangerous service than to see his rival entangled in it; and he would have before him the same alternative which he and his friends had contemplated with so much satisfaction in the affair of Sphakteria: either the expedition would succeed, in which case Amphipolis would be taken, or it would fail, and the consequence would be the ruin of Kleon. The last of the two was really the more probable at Amphipolis, as Nikias had erroneously imagined it to be at Sphakteria.

It is easy to see, however, that an expedition proposed under these circumstances by Kleon, though it might command a majority in the public assembly, would have a large proportion of the citizens unfavorable to it, and even wishing that it might fail. Moreover, Kleon had neither talents nor experience for commanding an army, and the being engaged under his command in fighting against the ablest officer of the time, could inspire no confidence to any man in putting on his armor. From all these circumstances united, political as well as military, we are not surprised to hear that the hoplites whom he took out with him went with much reluctance.¹ An ignorant general, with unwilling

¹ Thucyd. v. 7. καὶ οἰκοθεν ὡς ἄκοντες αὐτῷ ξυνηλθόν.

soldiers, many of them politically disliking him, stood little chance of wresting Amphipolis from Brasidas: but had Nikias or the strategoi done their duty, and carried the entire force of the city under competent command to the same object, the issue would probably have been different as to gain and loss; certainly very different as to dishonor.

Kleon started from Peiræus, apparently towards the beginning of August, with twelve hundred Athenian, Lemnian, and Imbrian hoplites, and three hundred horsemen, troops of excellent quality and condition: besides an auxiliary force of allies, number not exactly known, and thirty triremes. This armament was not of magnitude at all equal to the taking of Amphipolis; for Brasidas had equal numbers, besides all the advantages of the position. But it was a part of the scheme of Kleon, on arriving at Eion, to procure Macedonian and Thracian reinforcements before he commenced his attack. He first halted in his voyage near Skiônê, from which place he took away such of the hoplites as could be spared from the blockade. He next sailed across the gulf from Pallênê to the Sithonian peninsula, to a place called the Harbor of the Kolophonians, near Torônê.¹ Having here learned that neither Brasidas himself, nor any considerable Peloponnesian garrison were present in Torônê, he landed his forces and marched to attack the town, sending ten triremes at the same time round a promontory which separated the harbor of the Kolophonians from Torônê, to assail the latter place from seaward. It happened that Brasidas, desiring to enlarge the fortified circle of Torônê, had broken down a portion of the old wall, and employed the materials in building a new and larger wall inclosing the proasteion, or suburb: this new wall appears to have been still incomplete and in an imperfect state of defence. Pasi-

¹ The town of Torônê was situated near the extremity of the Sithonian peninsula, on the side looking towards Pallênê. But the territory belonging to the town comprehended all the extremity of the peninsula on both sides, including the terminating point Cape Ampelos. — *Ἀπὸ τῆς τοῦ Σιθωνίων ἀκρῆς* (Herodot. vii. 122). Herodotus calls the Singitic gulf *ἐκ τῆς Σιθωνίας τῆς ἀπὸ τοῦ Τόρονος* (vii. 122).

The ruins of Torônê, bearing the ancient name, and Kufô, a land-locked harbor near it, are still to be seen (Leake, *Travels in Northern Greece*, vol. iii. ch. xxiv, p. 119).

telidas, the Peloponnesian commander, resisted the attack of the Athenians as long as he could; but when already beginning to give way, he saw the ten Athenian triremes sailing into the harbor, which was hardly guarded at all. Abandoning the defence of the suburb, he hastened to repel these new assailants, but came too late, so that the town was entered from both sides at once. Brasidas, who was not far off, rendered aid with the utmost celerity, but was yet at five miles' distance from the city when he learned the capture, and was obliged to retire unsuccessfully. Pasielidas the commander, with the Peloponnesian garrison and the Toronean male population, were despatched as prisoners to Athens; while the Toronean women and children, by a fate but too common in those days, were sold as slaves.¹

After this not unimportant success, Kleon sailed round the promontory of Athos to Eion at the mouth of the Strymon, within three miles of Amphipolis. From hence, in execution of his original scheme, he sent envoys to Perdikkas, urging him to lend effective aid as the ally of Athens in the attack of Amphipolis, with his whole forces; and to Pollês the king of the Thracian Odomantes, inviting him also to come with as many Thracian mercenaries as could be levied. The Edonians, the Thracian tribe nearest to Amphipolis, took part with Brasidas: and the local influence of the banished Thucydîdês would no longer be at the service of Athens, much less at the service of Kleon. Awaiting the expected reinforcements, Kleon employed himself, first in an attack upon Stageirus in the Strymonic gulf, which was repulsed; next upon Galêpsus, on the coast opposite the island of Thasos, which was successful. But the reinforcements did not at once arrive, and being too weak to attack Amphipolis without them, he was obliged to remain inactive at Eion; while Brasidas on his side made no movement out of Amphipolis, but contented himself with keeping constant watch over the forces of Kleon, the view of which he commanded from his station on the hill of Kerdylion, on the western bank of the river-communication with Amphipolis by the bridge. Some days elapsed in such inaction on both sides; but the Athenian hoplites, becoming impatient of doing nothing, soon began to give vent to those feelings of

¹ Thucyd. v. 3.

dislike which they had brought out from Athens against their general, "whose ignorance and cowardice (says the historian) they contrasted with the skill and bravery of his opponent."¹ Athenian hoplites, if they felt such a sentiment, were not likely to refrain from manifesting it; and Kleon was presently made aware of the fact in a manner sufficiently painful to force him against his will into some movement; which, however, he did not intend to be anything else than a march for the purpose of surveying the ground all round the city, and a demonstration to escape the appearance of doing nothing, being aware that it was impossible to attack the place with any effect before his reinforcements arrived.

To comprehend the important incidents which followed, it is necessary to say a few words on the topography of Amphipolis, as far as we can understand it on the imperfect evidence before us. That city was placed on the left bank of the Strymon, on a conspicuous hill around which the river makes a bend, first in a southwesterly direction, then, after a short course to the southward, back in a southeasterly direction. Amphipolis had for its only artificial fortification one long wall, which began near the point northeast of the town, where the river narrows again into a channel, after passing through the lake Kerkinitis, ascended along the eastern side of the hill, crossing the ridge which connects it with Mount Pangæus, and then descended so as to touch the river again at another point south of the town; thus being, as it were, a string to the highly-bent bow formed by the river. On three sides therefore, north, west, and south, the city was defended only by the Strymon, and was thus visible without any intervening wall to spectators from the side of the sea (south), as well as from the side of the continent (or west and north).² At some

¹ Thucyd. v, 7. 'Ο δὲ Κλέων τῶς μὲν ἡσυχάζειν, ἐπειτα δὲ ἡναγκάσθαι ποιεῖναι ὅπερ Βρασίδας προσεδέχεται. Τῶν γὰρ στρατιωτῶν ἀχθόμενων μὲν τῇ ἑδρᾷ, ἀναλογιζομένων δὲ τὴν ἑκείνου ἡγεμονίαν, πρὸς οἷαν ἐμπειρίαν καὶ τόλμην μεθ' οἷας ἀντιπαραστήσει καὶ μάλα κίε γενήσεται, καὶ οἰκόνειν ὡς ἄκοντες αὐτῷ ξυνηλθόν, αἰστανόμενοι τοῦ θανάτου, καὶ οἱ πολλοὶ αὐτοῦς διὰ τὸ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ καθημένους θάψαι, ἀναμύων ἦν.

² Thucyd. iv, 102. 'Απὸ τῆς τῶν πόλεως ἢν Ἀμφίπολιν Ἀγνων ὠνόμασεν ἐστὶ ἐν' ἀμφότερα περικείμενος τοῦ Στρυμόνος, διὰ τὸ εὐτρεχεῖν αὐτὴν τελεῖ.

little distance below the point where the wall touched the river south of the city, was the bridge¹ a communication of great importance for the whole country, which connected the territory of Amphipolis.

μακρὰ ἀπολαβὴν ἐκ ποταμοῦ ἐς ποταμὸν, περιφανῇ ἐς θάλασσαν τε καὶ τὴν ἡπειρὸν ᾤκισεν.

¹ Ο καλλιγέφυρος ποταμὸς Στρυμόν. Euripid. Rhesus, 346.

I annex a plan which will convey some idea of the hill of Amphipolis and the circumjacent territory: compare the plan in Colonel Leake, *Travels in Northern Greece*, vol. iii, ch. xxv, p. 191, and that from Mr. Hawkins, which is annexed to the third volume of Dr. Arnold's *Thucydides*, combined with a Dissertation which appears in the second volume of the same work, p. 450. See also the remarks in Kutzén. *De Atheniensium imperio circa Strymonem*, ch. ii, pp. 18-21; Weissenborn. *Beiträge zu" genaueren Erforschung der alt-griechischen Geschichte*, pp. 152-156; Cousinéry. *Voyage dans la Macédoine*, vol. i, ch. iv, p. 124, *seq.*

Colonel Leake supposes the ancient bridge to have been at the same point of the river as the modern bridge; that is, north of Amphipolis, and a little westward of the corner of the lake. On this point I differ from him, and have placed it, with Dr. Arnold, near the southeastern end of the reach of the Strymon, which flows round Amphipolis. But there is another circumstance, in which Col. Leake's narrative corrects a material error in Dr. Arnold's Dissertation. Colonel Leake particularly notices the high ridge which connects the hill of Amphipolis with Mount Pangæus to the eastward (pp. 182, 183, 191-194), whereas Dr. Arnold represents them as separated by a deep ravine (p. 451): upon which latter supposition the whole account of Kleon's march and survey appears to me unintelligible.

The position which Thucydides gives to Amphipolis, "conspicuous both towards the sea and towards the land," which occasions some perplexity to the commentators, appears to me one of obvious propriety. Amphipolis was indeed situated on a hill; so were many other towns: but its peculiarity was, that on three sides it had no wall to interrupt the eye of the spectator: one of those sides was towards the sea.

Kutzén and Cousinéry make the long wall to be the segment of a curve highly bent, touching the river at both ends. But I agree with Weissenborn that this is inadmissible; and that the words "long wall" imply something near a straight direction.

¹ Ἀπὸ τῆς τῶν πόλεως ἢν Ἀμφίπολιν Ἀγνων ὠνόμασεν ἐστὶ ἐν' ἀμφότερα περικείμενος τοῦ Στρυμόνος, διὰ τὸ εὐτρεχεῖν αὐτὴν τελεῖ. This does not necessarily imply that the bridge was at any considerable distance from the extreme point where the long wall touched the river to the south: but this latter point was a good way off from the town properly so called, which occupied the higher slope of the hill. We are not to suppose that the whole space between the long wall and the river was covered by buildings.

olis with that of Argilus. On the western or right bank of the river, bordering it, and forming an outer bend corresponding to the bend of the river, was situated Mount Kerdylum: in fact, the course of the Strymon is here determined by these two steep eminences, Kerdylum on the west, and the hill of Amphipolis on the east, between which it flows. At the time when Brasidas first took the place, the bridge was totally unconnected with the long city wall; but during the intervening eighteen months, he had erected a palisade work — probably an earthen bank topped with a palisade — connecting the two. By means of this palisade, the bridge was thus at the time of Kleon's expedition comprehended within the fortifications of the city; and Brasidas, while keeping watch on Mount Kerdylum, could pass over whenever he chose into the city, without any fear of impediment.¹

¹ Thucyd. v, 10. Καὶ ὁ μὲν (Brasidas) κατὰ τὰς ἐπὶ τὸ σταύρωμα πύλας, καὶ τὰς πρῶτας τοῦ μακροῦ τείχους τότε ὅπου ἐξελθόντων, ἐθεὶ δρόμον τὴν ὁδὸν ταύτην εὐθείαν, ἥπερ νῦν, etc.

The explanation which I have here given to the word *σταύρωμα* is not given by any one else; but it appears to me the only one calculated to impart clearness and consistency to the whole narrative.

When Brasidas surprised Amphipolis first, the bridge was completely unconnected with the Long Wall, and at a certain distance from it. But when Thucydides wrote his history, there were a pair of *connecting walls* between the bridge and the fortifications of the city as they then stood — *ὅν καθεῖτο τείχη ὡς περ νῦν* (iv, 103): the whole fortifications of the city had been altered during the intermediate period.

Now the question is, was the Long Wall of Amphipolis connected or unconnected with the bridge, at the time of the conflict between Brasidas and Kleon? Whoever reads the narrative of Thucydides attentively will see, I think, that they must have been connected, though Thucydides does not in express terms specify the fact. For if the bridge had been detached from the wall, as it was when Brasidas surprised the place first, the hill of Kerdylum on the opposite side of the river would have been an unsafe position for him to occupy. He might have been cut off from Amphipolis by an enemy attacking the bridge. But we shall find him remaining quietly on the hill of Kerdylum with the perfect certainty of entering Amphipolis at any moment that he chose. If it be urged that the bridge, though unconnected with the Long Wall, might still be under a strong separate guard I reply, that on that supposition an enemy from Eion would naturally attack the bridge first. To have to defend a bridge completely detached from the city, simply by means of a large constant guard, would

In the march which Kleon now undertook, he went up to the top of the ridge which runs nearly in an easterly direction from Amphipolis to Mount Pangæus, in order to survey the city and its adjoining ground on the northern and northeastern side which he had not yet seen: that is, the side towards the lake, and towards Thrace,¹ which was not visible from the lower ground near Eion. The road which he was to take from Eion lay at a small distance eastward of the city long wall, and from the palisade which connected that wall with the bridge. But he had no expectation of being attacked in his march, the rather as Brasidas with the larger portion of his force was visible on Mount Kerdylum: moreover, the gates of Amphipolis were all shut, not a man was on the wall, nor were any symptoms

materially aggravate the difficulties of Brasidas. If it had been possible to attack the bridge separately from the city, something must have been said about it in describing the operations of Kleon, who is represented as finding nothing to meddle with except the fortifications of the town.

Assuming, then, that there was such a line of connection between the bridge and the Long Wall, added by Brasidas since the first capture of the place, I know no meaning so natural to give to the word *σταύρωμα*. No other distinct meaning is proposed by any one. There was, of course, a gate, or more than one, in the Long Wall, leading into the space inclosed by the palisade; through this gate Brasidas would enter the town when he crossed from Kerdylum. This gate is called by Thucydides *αἱ ἐπὶ τῷ σταύρωμα πύλας*. There must have been also a gate, or more than one, in the palisade itself leading into the space without: so that passengers or cattle traversing the bridge from the westward and going to Myrkinus (*s. g.*) would not necessarily be obliged to turn out of their way and enter the town of Amphipolis.

On the plan which I have here given, the line running nearly from north to south represents the Long Wall of Agnon, touching the river at both ends, and bounding as well as fortifying the town of Amphipolis on its eastern side.

The shorter line, which cuts off the southern extremity of this Long Wall, and joins the river immediately below the bridge, represents the *σταύρωμα*, or palisade: probably it was an earthen mound and ditch, with a strong palisade at the top.

By means of this palisade, the bridge was included in the fortifications of Amphipolis, and Brasidas could pass over from Mount Kerdylum into the city whenever he pleased.

¹ Thucyd. v, 7; compare Colonel Leake, *l. c.* p. 182; αὐτὸς ἐθεάτο τὸ λιμῶδες τὸν Στρυμόνα, καὶ τὴν νεκρὴν τῆς πόλεως ἐπὶ τῇ Θράκῃ, ὡς ἔχει.

of movement to be detected. As there was no evidence before him of intention to attack, he took no precautions, and marched in careless and disorderly array.¹ Having reached the top of the ridge, and posted his army on the strong eminence fronting the highest portion of the Long Wall, he surveyed at leisure the lake before him, and the side of the city which lay towards Thrace, or towards Myrkinus, Drabeskus, etc., thus viewing all the descending portion of the Long Wall northward towards the Strymon. The perfect quiescence of the city imposed upon and even astonished him: it seemed altogether undefended, and he almost fancied that, if he had brought battering-engines, he could have taken it forthwith.² Impressed with the belief that

¹ Thucyd. v. 7. Κατὰ θύαι δὲ μᾶλλον ἴσθ' ἀναβαινὲν τοῦ χωρίου, καὶ τὴν μετὰ παρασκευὴν περιμενεῖν, οὐχ ὡς τῷ ἀσφαλεῖ, ἢ ἀναγκάζεται, περισχησὼν, ἀλλ' ὡς κύκλῳ περιστὰς βίη ἀίρησιν τὴν πόλιν.

The words οὐχ ὡς τῷ ἀσφαλεῖ, etc., do not refer to μετὰ παρασκευῇ, as the Scholiast, with whom Dr. Arnold agrees, considers them, but to the general purpose and dispositions of Kleon. "He marched up, not like one who is abundantly provided with means of safety, in case of being put on his defence; but like one who is going to surround the city and take it at once."

Nor do these last words represent any real design conceived in the mind of Kleon (for Amphipolis from its locality *could not be really surrounded*), but are merely given as illustrating the careless confidence of his march from Eion up to the ridge: in the same manner as Herodotus describes the forward rush of the Persians before the battle of Plataea, to overtake the Greeks whom they supposed to be running away — καὶ οὗτοι μὲν βίῃ τε καὶ ἀνέλῳ ἐπὶ μισαν, ὡς ἀναρπασόμενοι τοῖς Ἕλλησι (ix. 59): compare viii. 28.

² Thucyd. v. 7. ὥστε καὶ μηχανὰς ἐπιπρὸς καταλῶν ἔχων, ἀναρτῆν ἰδοῦναι ὅτιν γὰρ ἂν τὴν πόλιν διὰ τὸ ἔσθιον.

I apprehend that the verb καταλῶν refers to the coming of the armament to Eion: analogous to what is said v. 2, κατελθόντες ἐς τὸν Τισσαφιδῶν λόφον: compare i. 51: iii. 4, etc. The march from Eion up to the ridge could not well be expressed by the word καταλῶν: but the arrival of the expedition at the Strymon, the place of its destination, might be so described. Battering-engines would be brought from nowhere else but from Athens.

Dr. Arnold interprets the word καταλῶν to mean that Kleon had first marched up to a higher point, and then descended from this point upon Amphipolis. But I contest the correctness of this assumption, as a matter of topography: it does not appear to me that Kleon ever reached any

there was no enemy prepared to fight, he took his time to survey the ground; while his soldiers became more and more relaxed and careless in their trim, some even advancing close up to the walls and gates.

But this state of affairs was soon materially changed. Brasidas knew that the Athenian hoplites would not long endure the tedium of absolute inaction, and he calculated that by affecting extreme backwardness and apparent fear, he should seduce Kleon into some incautious movement of which advantage might be taken. His station on Mount Kerdylum enabled him to watch the march of the Athenian army from Eion, and when he saw them pass up along the road outside of the Long Wall of Amphipolis,¹ he immediately crossed the river with his forces and entered the town. But it was not his intention to march out and offer them open battle; for his army, though equal in number to theirs, was extremely inferior in arms and equipment;² in which points the Athenian force now present was so admirably provided, that his own men would not think themselves a match for it, if the two armies faced each other in open field. He relied altogether on the effect of sudden, early and well-timed surprise, when the Athenians should have been thrown into a feeling of contemptuous security by an exaggerated show of impotence in their enemy.

Having offered the battle sacrifice at the temple of Athênê, Brasidas called his men together to address to them the usual encouragements prior to an engagement. After appealing to the Dorian pride of his Peloponnesians, accustomed to triumph over Ionians, he explained to them his design of relying upon a bold and sudden movement with comparatively small numbers, against the Athenian army when not prepared for it,³ when their courage

point higher than the summit of the hill and wall of Amphipolis. Besides, even if he had reached a higher point of the mountain, he could not well talk of "bringing down battering-machines from that point."

¹ Thucyd. v. 6. Βρασιδᾶς δὲ — ἀντεκάνθητό καὶ αὐτὸς ἐπὶ τῷ Κερδύλῳ ἵσθ' ὅτι τὸ χωρίον τοῦτο τῶν Ἀργείων, πρὶν τοῦ ποταμοῦ, οὐ τολὸν ἀπέχον τῆς Ἀμφιπόλεως, καὶ κατεφάινετο πάντα αὐτόθεν, ὥστε οὐκ ἐν ἰσοθύν αὐτόθεν ὁρμώμενος ὁ Κλέων τῷ στρατῷ, etc.

² Thucyd. v. 8.

³ Thucyd. v. 9. Τοὺς γὰρ ἑαυτῶν εἰκαζὼ καταβρονήσει τε ἡμῶν καὶ οὐκ ἐν ἰσότητι ὡς ἂν ἀπελθόντες αὐτοῖς ἐς μάχην, ἀναβῆναι τὸ ποδὸς ἐξ

was not wound up to battle pitch, and when, after carelessly mounting the hill to survey the ground, they were thinking only of quietly returning to quarters. He himself at the proper moment would rush out from one gate, and be foremost in conflict with the enemy: Klearidas, with that bravery which became him as a Spartan, would follow the example by sallying out from another gate: and the enemy, taken thus unawares, would probably make little resistance. For the Amphipolitans, this day and their own behavior would determine whether they were to be allies of Lacedæmon, or slaves of Athens, perhaps sold into captivity or even put to death as a punishment for their recent revolt.

These preparations, however, could not be completed in secrecy; for Brasidas and his army were perfectly visible while descending the hill of Kerdylum, crossing the bridge and entering Amphipolis, to the Athenian scouts without: moreover, so conspicuous was the interior of the city to spectators without, that the temple of Athênê, and Brasidas with its ministers around him, performing the ceremony of sacrifice, was distinctly recognized. The fact was made known to Kleon as he stood on the high ridge taking his survey, while at the same time those who had gone near to the gates reported that the feet of many horses and men were beginning to be seen under them, as if preparing for a sally.¹ He

χωρίον. καὶ νῦν ἀτάκτως κατὰ θῆαν τετραμμένους ἀλιγοῦσιν. Ἔως οὖν ἐπὶ ἀπαράσκευοι θαρσύνουσι, καὶ τοῦ ὑπαπύνααι πλέον ἢ τοῦ μένους, ἐξ ὧν ἐμοὶ φαίνονται, τὴν δαίνοιαν ἔχουσιν, ἐν τῷ ἀνείμηνω αὐτῶν τῆς γνώμης, καὶ πρὶν ξυνταχθῆναι μᾶλλον τὴν δόξαν, ἐγὼ μιν, etc.

The words *το ἀνείμηνω τῆς γνώμης* are full of significance in regard to ancient military affairs. The Grecian hoplites, even the best of them, required to be peculiarly *wound up* for a battle; hence the necessity of the harangue from the general which always preceded. Compare Xenophon's *o*logy of the manœuvres of Epameinondas before the battle of Mantinea, whereby he made the enemy fancy that he was not going to fight, and took down the preparation in the minds of their soldiers for battle: *ἔλ-σε μὲν οὖν πλείστον πολέμιων τὴν ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς πρὸς μάχην παρασκευὴν, etc* (Xenoph. Hellen. vii. 5, 22.)

¹ Thucyd. v. 10. Τῷ δὲ Κλέωνι, φανεροῦ γενομένου αὐτοῦ ἀπὸ τοῦ Κερ-
δυλίου καταβάντος καὶ ἐν τῇ πόλει ἐπιφανεῖ οὕτῃ ἐξῶθεν περὶ τοῦ ἱεροῦ τῆς
Ἀθηνᾶς θυομένου καὶ πάντα πρᾶσσοντος, ἀγγέλλεται (προέκεχωρήκει γὰρ

nimself went close to the gate, and satisfied himself of this circumstance: we must recollect that there was no defender on the walls, and no danger from missiles. Anxious to avoid coming to any real engagement before his reinforcements should arrive, he at once gave orders for retreat, which he thought might be accomplished before the attack from within could be fully organized; for he imagined that a considerable number of troops would be marched out, and ranged in battle order, before the attack was actually begun, not dreaming that the sally would be instantaneous, made with a mere handful of men. Orders having been proclaimed to wheel to the left, and retreat in column on the left flank towards Eion, Kleon, who was himself on the top of the hill with the right wing, waited only to see his left and centre actually in march on the road to Eion, and then directed his right also to wheel to the left and follow them.

The whole Athenian army were thus in full retreat, marching in a direction nearly parallel to the Long Wall of Amphipolis, with their right or unshielded side exposed to the enemy, when Brasidas, looking over the southernmost gates of the Long Wall with his small detachment ready marshalled near him, burst out into contemptuous exclamations on the disorder of their array.² "These men will not stand us; I see it by the quivering of their spears and of their heads. Men who reel about in that way, never stand an assailing enemy. Open the gates for me instantly, and let us sally out with confidence."

With that, both the gate of the Long Wall nearest to the palisade, and the adjoining gate of the palisade itself, were suddenly thrown open, and Brasidas with his one hundred and fifty choser

τότε κατὰ τὴν θῆαν) ὅτι ἡ τε στρατιὰ ἅπασα φανερὰ τῶν πολέμιων ἐν τῇ πόλει, etc.

Kleon did not himself see Brasidas sacrificing, or see the enemy's army within the city, others on the lower ground were better situated for seeing what was going on in Amphipolis, than he was while on the high ridge. Others saw it, and gave intimation to him.

² Thucyd. v. 10. Οἱ ἄνδρες ἡμᾶς οὐ μένουσι (q. μενοῦσιν ?)· δῆλοι δὲ τῶν τε δοράτων τῇ κινήσει καὶ τῶν κεφαλῶν οἷς γὰρ ἂν τοῦτο γινῆται, οὐκ εἰδῶσιν μένειν τοὺς ἐπιόντας.

This is a remarkable illustration of the regular movement of heads and spears which characterized a well-ordered body of Grecian hoplites.

soldiers issued out through them to attack the retreating Athenians. Running rapidly down the straight road which joined laterally the road towards Eion along which the Athenians were marching, he charged their central division on the right flank: their left wing had already got beyond him on the road towards Eion. Taken completely unprepared, conscious of their own disorderly array, and astounded at the boldness of their enemy, the Athenians of the centre were seized with panic, made not the least resistance, and presently fled. Even the Athenian left, though not attacked at all, instead of halting to lend assistance, shared the panic and fled in disorder. Having thus disorganized this part of the army, Brasidas passed along the line to press his attack on the Athenian right: but in this movement he was mortally wounded and carried off the field, unobserved by his enemies. Meanwhile Klearidas, sallying forth from the Thracian gate, had attacked the Athenian right on the ridge opposite to him, immediately after it began its retreat. But the soldiers on the Athe-

¹ Thucyd. v. 10. Καὶ ὁ μὲν, κατὰ τὰς ἐπὶ τὸ σταθρῶμα πύλας, καὶ τὰς πύλας τοῦ μακροῦ τειχοῦς τότε ὄντος ἐξελθὼν, εἶπε δρόμῳ τὴν ὁδὸν ταύτην εἰσέλαι, ἥτις νῦν κατὰ τὸ καρτερώτατον τοῦ χωρίου ἴσθις.

Brasidas and his men sallied forth by two different gates at the same time. One was the first gate in the Long Wall, which would be the first gate in order, to a person coming from the southward. The other was the gate upon the palisade (αἱ ἐπὶ τὸ σταθρῶμα πύλαι), that is, the gate in the Long Wall which opened from the town upon the palisade. The persons who sallied out by this gate would get out to attack the enemy by the gate in the palisade itself.

The gate in the Long Wall which opened from the town upon the palisade, would be that by which Brasidas himself with his army entered Amphipolis from Mount Kerdylum. It probably stood open at this moment when he directed the sally forth: that which had to be opened at the moment, was the gate in the palisade, together with the first gate in the Long Wall.

The last words cited in Thucydides — ἥτις νῦν κατὰ τὸ καρτερώτατον τοῦ χωρίου ἴσθις — are not intelligible without better knowledge of the topography than we possess. What Thucydides means by "the strongest point in the place," we cannot tell. We only understand that the trophy was erected in the road by which a person went up to that point. We must recollect that the expressions of Thucydides here refer to the ground as it stood sometime afterwards, not as it stood at the time of the battle between Kleon and Brasidas.

nian right had probably seen the previous movement of Brasidas against the other division, and though astonished at the sudden danger, had thus a moment's warning, before they were themselves assailed, to halt and take close rank on the hill. Klearidas here found a considerable resistance, in spite of the desertion of Kleon; who, more astonished than any man in his army by a catastrophe so unlooked for, lost his presence of mind and fled at once; but was overtaken by a Thracian peltast from Myrkinus and slain. His soldiers on the right wing, however, repelled two or three attacks in front from Klearidas, and maintained their ground, until at length the Chalkidian cavalry and the peltasts from Myrkinus, having come forth out of the gates, assailed them with missiles in flank and rear so as to throw them into disorder. The whole Athenian army was thus put to flight; the left hurrying to Eion, the men of the right dispersing and seeking safety among the hilly grounds of Pangæus in their rear. Their sufferings and loss in the flight, from the hands of the pursuing peltasts and cavalry, were most severe: and when they at last again mustered at Eion, not only the commander Kleon, but six hundred Athenian hoplites, half of the force sent out, were found missing.

So admirably had the attack been concerted, and so entire was its success, that only seven men perished on the side of the victors. But of those seven, one was the gallant Brasidas himself, who being carried into Amphipolis, lived just long enough to learn the complete victory of his troops and then expired. Great and bitter was the sorrow which his death occasioned throughout Thrace, especially among the Amphipolitans. He received, by special decree, the distinguished honor of interment within their city, the universal habit being to inter even the most eminent deceased persons in a suburb without the walls. All the allies attended his funeral in arms and with military honors: his tomb was encircled by a railing, and the space immediately fronting it

¹ It is almost painful to read the account given by Diodorus (xii. 73, 74) of the battle of Amphipolis, when one's mind is full of the distinct and admirable narrative of Thucydides, only defective by being too brief. It is difficult to believe that Diodorus is describing the same event; so totally different are all the circumstances, except that the Lacedæmonians at last gain the victory. To say, with Wesseling in his note, "Hæc non usquequaque conveniunt Thucydideis," is prodigiously below the truth.

was consecrated as the great agora of the city, which was remodelled accordingly. He was also proclaimed *ækist*, or founder, of Amphipolis, and as such, received heroic worship with annual games and sacrifices to his honor.¹ The Athenian Agnon, the real founder and originally recognized *ækist* of the city, was stripped of all his commemorative honors and expunged from the remembrance of the people: his tomb and the buildings connected with it, together with every visible memento of his name, being destroyed. Full of hatred as the Amphipolitans now were towards Athens, — and not merely of hatred, but of fear, since the loss which they had just sustained of their saviour and protector, — they felt repugnance to the idea of rendering farther worship to an Athenian *ækist*. Nor was it convenient to keep up such a religious link with Athens, now that they were forced to look anxiously to Lacedaemon for assistance. Klearidas, as governor of Amphipolis, superintended those numerous alterations in the city which this important change required, together with the erection of the trophy, just at the spot where Brasidas had first charged the Athenians; while the remaining armament of Athens, having obtained the usual truce and buried their dead, returned home without farther operations.

There are few battles recorded in history wherein the disparity and contrast of the two generals opposed has been so manifest, — consummate skill and courage on the one side against ignorance and panic on the other. On the singular ability and courage of Brasidas there can be but one verdict of unqualified admiration: but the criticism passed by Thucydides on Kleon, here as elsewhere, cannot be adopted without reserves. He tells us that Kleon undertook his march, from Eion up to the hill in front of Amphipolis, in the same rash and confident spirit with which he had

¹ Thucyd. v, 11. Aristotle, a native of Stageirus near to Amphipolis, cites the sacrifices rendered to Brasidas as an instance of institutions established by special and local enactment (*Ethic. Nikomach. v, 7*).

In reference to the aversion now entertained by the Amphipolitans to the continued worship of Agnon as their *ækist*, compare the discourse addressed by the Plataeans to the Lacedaemonians, pleading for mercy. The Thebans, if they became possessors of the Plataeids, would not continue the sacrifices to the gods who had granted victory at the great battle of Plataea, nor funeral mementos to the slain (Thucyd. iii, 58).

embarked on the enterprise against Pylus, in the blind confidence that no one would resist him.¹ Now I have already, in a former chapter, shown grounds for concluding that the anticipations of Kleon respecting the capture of Sphakteria, far from being marked by any spirit of unmeasured presumption, were sober and judicious, realized to the letter without any unlooked-for aid from fortune. Nor are the remarks, here made by Thucydides on that affair, more reasonable than the judgment on it in his former chapter; for it is not true, as he here implies, that Kleon expected no resistance in Sphakteria: he calculated on resistance, but knew that he had force sufficient to overcome it. His fault even at Amphipolis, great as that fault was, did not consist in rashness and presumption. This charge at least is rebutted by the circumstance, that he himself wished to make no aggressive movement until his reinforcements should arrive, and that he was only constrained, against his own will, to abandon his intended temporary inactivity during that interval, by the angry murmurs of his soldiers, who reproached him with ignorance and backwardness, the latter quality being the reverse of that with which he is branded by Thucydides.

When Kleon was thus driven to do something, his march up to the top of the hill, for the purpose of reconnoitring the ground, was not in itself unreasonable, and might have been accomplished in perfect safety, if he had kept his army in orderly array, prepared for contingencies. But he suffered himself to be completely out-generalled and overreached by that simulated consciousness of impotence and unwillingness to fight, which Brasidas took care to present to him. Among all military stratagems, this has perhaps been the most frequently practised with success against inexperienced generals, who are thrown off their guard and induced to neglect precaution, not because they are naturally more rash or presumptuous than ordinary men, but because nothing except either a high order of intellect, or special practice and training, will enable a man to keep steadily present to his mind

¹ Thucyd. v, 7. Καὶ ἐχρήσατο τῷ τρόπῳ, ὥπερ καὶ ἐς τὴν Πύλον εἰσυχίᾳς, ἐπιστενέει τι φρονεῖν· ἐς μάχην μὲν γὰρ οὐδὲ ἡλπίσεν οἱ ἐπεξίεναι οὐδένα, κατὰ θάνατον δὲ μᾶλλον ἰσὺν ἀναβαίνειν τοῦ χωρίου, καὶ τὴν αὐτὴν ἀσπίδα τρεῖς μῆνας, &c.

liabilities even real and serious, when there is no discernible evidence to suggest their approach; much more when there is positive evidence, artfully laid out by a superior enemy, to create belief in their absence. A fault substantially the same had been committed by Thucydides himself and his colleague Euklēs a year and a half before, when they suffered Brasidas to surprise the Strymonian bridge and Amphipolis: not even taking common precautions, nor thinking it necessary to keep the fleet at Eion. They were not men peculiarly rash and presumptuous, but ignorant and unpractised, in a military sense; incapable of keeping before them dangerous contingencies which they perfectly knew, simply because there was no present evidence of approaching explosion.

This military incompetence, which made Kleon fall into the trap laid for him by Brasidas, also made him take wrong measures against the danger, when he unexpectedly discovered at last that the enemy within were preparing to attack him. His fatal error consisted in giving instant order for retreat, under the vain hope that he could get away before the enemy's attack could be brought to bear.¹ An abler officer, before he commenced the retreating march so close to the hostile walls, would have taken care to marshal his men in proper array, to warn and address them with the usual harangue, and to wind up their courage to the fighting-point: for up to that moment they had no idea of being called upon to fight; and the courage of Grecian hoplites taken thus unawares while hurrying to get away in disorder visible both to themselves and their enemies, without any of the usual preliminaries of battle, was but too apt to prove deficient. To turn the right or unshielded flank to the enemy, was unavoidable, from the direction of the retreating movement; nor is it reasonable to blame Kleon for this, as some historians have done, or for causing his right wing to move too soon in following the lead of the left, as Dr. Arnold seems to think. The grand fault seems to have consisted in not waiting to marshal his men and prepare them for standing fight during their retreat. Let us add, however, and the remark, if it serves to explain Kleon's idea of being able to get away before he was actually assailed, counts

¹ Thucyd. v. 10. *ὁμοῦ φεύγοντες ἀπὸ τοῦ πύργου*, etc.

as a double compliment to the judgment as well as boldness of Brasidas, that no other Lacedæmonian general of that day perhaps, not even Demosthenēs, the most enterprising general of Athens, would have ventured upon an attack with so very small a band, relying altogether upon the panic produced by his sudden movement.

But the absence of military knowledge and precaution is not the worst of Kleon's faults on this occasion. His want of courage at the moment of conflict is yet more lamentable, and divests his end of that personal sympathy which would otherwise have accompanied it. A commander who has been out-generalled is under a double force of obligation to exert and expose himself, to the uttermost, in order to retrieve the consequences of his own mistakes. He will thus at least preserve his own personal honor, whatever censure he may deserve on the score of deficient knowledge and judgment.¹

What is said about the disgraceful flight of Kleon himself, must be applied, with hardly less severity of criticism, to the Athenian hoplites under him. They behaved in a manner altogether unworthy of the reputation of their city; especially the left wing, which seems to have broken and run away without waiting to be attacked. And when we read in Thucydides, that the men who thus disgraced themselves were among the best, and the best-armed hoplites in Athens; that they came out unwillingly under Kleon; that they began their scornful murmurs against him before he had committed any fault, despising him for backwardness when he was yet not strong enough to attempt anything serious, and was only manifesting a reasonable prudence in waiting the arrival of expected reinforcements; when we read this, we shall be led to compare the expedition against Amphipolis with former manœuvres respecting the attack of Sphakteria, and to discern other causes for its failure besides the military incompetence of the commander. These hoplites brought out with them from Athens the feelings prevalent among the political adversaries of Kleon. The expedition was proposed and carried by him, contrary to their wishes: they could not prevent it, but

¹ Contrast the brave death of the Lacedæmonian general Anaxibius, when he found himself out-generalled and surprised by the Athenian Iphikratēs (Xenoph. Hellen. iv. 8, 38).

their opposition enfeebled it from the beginning, kept within too narrow limits the force assigned to it, and was one main reason which frustrated its success.

Had Periklēs been alive, Amphipolis might perhaps still have been lost, since its capture was the fault of the officers employed to defend it. But if lost, it would probably have been attacked and recovered with the same energy as the revolted Samos had been, with the full force and the best generals that Athens could furnish. With such an armament under good officers, there was nothing at all impracticable in the reconquest of the place; especially as at that time it had no defence on three sides except the Strymon, and might thus be approached by Athenian ships on that navigable river. The armament of Kleon,¹ even if his reinforcements had arrived, was hardly sufficient for the purpose. But Periklēs would have been able to concentrate upon it the whole strength of the city, without being paralyzed by the contentions of political party: he would have seen as clearly as Kleon, that the place could only be recovered by force, and that its recovery was the most important object to which Athens could devote her energies.

It was thus that the Athenians, partly from political intrigue, partly from the incompetence of Kleon, underwent a disastrous defeat instead of carrying Amphipolis. But the death of Brasidas converted their defeat into a substantial victory. There remained no Spartan either like or second to that eminent man, either as a soldier or a conciliating politician; none who could replace him in the confidence and affection of the allies of Athens in Thrace; none who could prosecute those enterprising plans against Athens on her unshielded side, which he had first shown

¹ Amphipolis was actually thus attacked by the Athenians eight years afterwards, by ships on the Strymon, Thucyd. vii. 9. *Εἰς τῶν στρατῶν, ὅς Ἀθηναίων, μετὰ Περδικκῶν στρατηγῶν, ἐπὶ Ἀμφίπολιν θύρῃ πολλοῖς τῶν μὲν πόλιν οὐχ εἶλεν, ἐς δὲ τὸν Στρυμόνα περικουμίας τριήρεις ἐκ τοῦ ποταμοῦ ἐπολιόρκει, ὁρμώμενος ἐξ Ἰμραίου.* (In the eighteenth year of the war.) But the fortifications of the place seem to have been materially altered during the interval. Instead of one long wall, with three sides open to the river, it seems to have acquired a curved wall, only open to the river on a comparatively narrow space near to the lake; while this curved wall joined the bridge, southerly by means of a parallel pair of long walls with road between

to be practicable. The fears of Athens, and the hopes of Sparta, in respect to the future, disappeared alike with him. The Athenian generals, Phormio and Demosthenēs, had both of them acquired among the Akarnanians an influence personal to themselves, apart from their post and from their country: but the career of Brasidas, exhibited an extent of personal ascendancy and admiration, obtained as well as deserved, such as had never before been paralleled by any military chieftain in Greece: and Plato might well select him as the most suitable historical counterpart to the heroic Achilles.¹ All the achievements of Brasidas were his own individually, with nothing more than bare encouragement, sometimes even without encouragement, from his country. And when we recollect the strict and narrow routine in which as a Spartan he had been educated, so fatal to the development of everything like original thought or impulse, and so completely estranged from all experience of party or political discussion, we are amazed at his resource and flexibility of character, his power of adapting himself to new circumstances and new persons, and his felicitous dexterity in making himself the rallying-point of opposite political parties in each of the various cities which he acquired. The combination "of every sort of practical excellence," valor, intelligence, probity, and gentleness of dealing, which his character presented, was never forgotten among the subject-allies of Athens, and procured for other Spartan officers in subsequent years favorable presumptions, which their conduct was seldom found to realize.² At the time when Brasidas perished, in the flower of his age, he was unquestionably the first man in Greece; and though it is not given to us to predict what he would have become had he lived, we may be sure that the future course of the war would have been sensibly modified; perhaps even to the advantage of Athens, since she might have had sufficient occupation at home to keep her from the disastrous enterprise in Sicily.

Thucydides seems to take pleasure in setting forth the gallant exploits of Brasidas, from the first at Methônē to the last at Amphipolis, not less than the dark side of Kleon; both, though in different senses, the causes of his banishment. He never

Plato. *Sem.* i. 33. *ὅτι ἐκ τούτων πάντα ὁγαθός, etc.*

mentions the latter except in connection with some proceeding represented as unwise or discreditable. The barbarities which the offended majesty of empire thought itself entitled to practise in ancient times against dependencies revolted and reconquered, reach their maximum in the propositions against Mitylène and Skiônè: both of them are ascribed to Kleon by name as their author. But when we come to the slaughter of the Melians, equally barbarous, and worse in respect to grounds of excuse, inasmuch as the Melians had never been subjects of Athens, we find Thucydides mentioning the deed without naming the proposer.¹

Respecting the foreign policy of Kleon, the facts already narrated will enable the reader to form an idea of it as compared with that of his opponents. I have shown grounds for believing that Thucydides has forgotten his usual impartiality in criticizing this personal enemy; that in regard to Sphakteria, Kleon was really one main and indispensable cause of procuring for his country the greatest advantage which she obtained throughout the whole war; and that in regard to his judgment as advocating the prosecution of war, three different times must be distinguished: 1. After the first blockade of the hoplites in Sphakteria; 2. After the capture of the island; 3. After the expiration of the one year truce. On the earliest of those three occasions he was wrong, for he seems to have shut the door on all possibilities of negotiation, by his manner of dealing with the Lacedæmonian envoys. On the second occasion, he had fair and plausible grounds to offer on behalf of his opinion, though it turned out unfortunate: moreover, at that time, all Athens was warlike, and Kleon is not to be treated as the peculiar adviser of that policy. On the third and last occasion, after the expiration of the truce, the political counsel of Kleon was right, judicious, and truly Periklèan, much surpassing in wisdom that of his opponents. We shall see in the coming chapters how those opponents managed the affairs of the state after his death; how Nikias threw away the interests of Athens in the enforcement of the conditions of peace; how Nikias and Alkibiadès together shipwrecked the power of their country on the shores of Syracuse. And when we judge the demagogue Kleon in this

¹ Thucyd. v, 116.

comparison, we shall find ground for remarking that Thucydides is reserved and even indulgent towards the errors and vices of other statesmen, harsh only towards those of his accuser.

As to the internal policy of Kleon, and his conduct as a politician in Athenian constitutional life, we have but little trustworthy evidence. There exists, indeed, a portrait of him, drawn in colors broad and glaring, most impressive to the imagination, and hardly effaceable from the memory; the portrait in the "Knights" of Aristophanes. It is through this representation that Kleon has been transmitted to posterity, crucified by a poet who admits himself to have had a personal grudge against him, just as he has been commemorated in the prose of an historian whose banishment he had proposed. Of all the productions of Aristophanes, so replete with comic genius throughout, the "Knights" is the most consummate and irresistible; the most distinct in its character, symmetry, and purpose. Looked at with a view to the object of its author, both in reference to the audience and to Kleon, it deserves the greatest possible admiration, and we are not surprised to learn that it obtained the first prize. It displays the maximum of that which wit combined with malice can achieve, in covering an enemy with ridicule, contempt, and odium. Dean Swift would have desired nothing worse, even for Ditton and Whiston. The old man, Demos of Pnyx, introduced on the stage as personifying the Athenian people, — Kleon, brought on as his newly-bought Paphlagonian slave, who by coaxing, lying, impudent and false denunciation of others, has gained his master's ear, and heaps ill-usage upon every one else, while he enriches himself, — the Knights, or chief members of what we may call the Athenian aristocracy, forming the Chorus of the piece as Kleon's pronounced enemies, — the sausage-seller from the market-place, who, instigated by Nikias and Demosthenès along with these Knights, overdoes Kleon in all his own low arts, and supplants him in the favor of Demos; all this, exhibited with inimitable vivacity of expression, forms the masterpiece and glory of libellous comedy. The effect produced upon the Athenian audience when this piece was represented at the Lenaean festival, January B. C. 424, about six months after the capture of Sphakteria, with Kleon himself and most of the real

Knights present, must have been intense beyond what we can now easily imagine. That Kleon could maintain himself after this humiliating exposure, is no small proof of his mental vigor and ability. It does not seem to have impaired his influence, at least not permanently; for not only do we see him the most effective opponent of peace during the next two years, but there is ground for believing that the poet himself found it convenient to soften his tone towards this powerful enemy.

So ready are most writers to find Kleon guilty, that they are satisfied with Aristophanes as a witness against him: though no other public man, of any age or nation, has ever been condemned upon such evidence. No man thinks of judging Sir Robert Walpole, or Mr. Fox, or Mirabeau, from the numerous lampoons put in circulation against them: no man will take measure of a political Englishman from Punch, or of a Frenchman from the Charivari. The unrivalled comic merit of the "Knights" of Aristophanes is only one reason the more for distrusting the resemblance of its picture to the real Kleon. We have means too of testing the candor and accuracy of Aristophanes by his delineation of Sokratēs, whom he introduced in the comedy of "Clouds" in the year after that of the "Knights." As a comedy, the "Clouds" stands second only to the "Knights": as a picture of Sokratēs, it is little better than pure fancy: it is not even a caricature, but a totally different person. We may indeed perceive single features of resemblance; the bare feet, and the argumentative subtlety, belong to both; but the entire portrait is such, that if it bore a different name, no one would think of comparing it with Sokratēs, whom we know well from other sources. With such an analogy before us, not to mention what we know generally of the portraits of Periklēs by these authors, we are not warranted in treating the portrait of Kleon as a likeness, except on points where there is corroborative evidence. And we may add, that some of the hits against him, where we can accidentally test their pertinence, are decidedly not founded in fact; as, for example, where the poet accuses Kleon of having deliberately and cunningly robbed Demosthenēs of his laurels in the enterprise against Sphakteria.¹

¹ Aristophan. Equit. 55, 591, 710, etc. In one passage of the play, Kleon

In the prose of Thucydides, we find Kleon described as a dishonest politician, a wrongful accuser of others, the most violent of all the citizens:¹ throughout the verse of Aristophanes, these same charges are set forth with his characteristic emphasis, but others are also superadded; Kleon practises the basest artifices and deceptions to gain favor with the people, steals the public money, receives bribes, and extorts compositions from private persons by wholesale, and thus enriches himself under pretence of zeal for the public treasury. In the comedy of the Acharnians, represented one year earlier than the Knights, the poet alludes with great delight to a sum of five talents, which Kleon had been compelled "to disgorge": a present tendered to him by the insular subjects of Athens, if we may believe Theopompus, for the purpose of procuring a remission of their tribute, and which the Knights, whose evasions of military service he had exposed, compelled him to relinquish.²

But when we put together the different heads of indictment accumulated by Aristophanes, it will be found that they are not easily reconcilable one with the other; for an Athenian, whose temper led him to violent crimination of others, at the inevitable price of multiplying and exasperating personal enemies, would find it peculiarly dangerous, if not impossible, to carry on speculation for his own account. If, on the other hand, he took the latter turn, he would be inclined to purchase connivance from others even by winking at real guilt on their part, far from making himself conspicuous as a calumniator of innocence. We must therefore discuss the side of the indictment which is indicated in Thucydides; not Kleon, as truckling to the people and cheating for his own pecuniary profit (which is certainly not the character implied in his speech about the Mitylenæans, as given

is reproached with pretending to be engaged at Argos in measures for winning the alliance of that city, but in reality, under cover of this proceeding, carrying on clandestine negotiations with the Lacedæmonians (464). In two other passages, he is denounced as being the person who obstructs the conclusion of peace with the Lacedæmonians (790, 1390).

¹ Thucyd. v, 17; iii, 45. καταφανέστερος μὲν εἶναι κακουργῶν, καὶ ἀπιετότερος διαβάλλον — βιαίωτατος τῶν πολιτῶν.

² Aristophan. Acharn. 8, with the Scholiast. who quotes from Theopompus Theopompus, Fragment. 99, 100, 101, ed. Didot

to us by the historian),¹ but Kleon as a man of violent temper and fierce political antipathies, a bitter speaker, and sometimes dishonest in his calumnies against adversaries. These are the qualities which, in all countries of free debate, go to form what is called a great opposition speaker. It was thus that the elder Cato, "the universal biter, whom Persephonê was afraid even to admit into Hades after his death," was characterized at Rome, even by the admission of his admirers to some extent, and in a still stronger manner by those who were unfriendly to him, as Thucydides was to Kleon.² In Cato, such a temper was not

¹ The public speaking of Kleon was characterized by Aristotle and Theopompus (see Schol. ad Lucian. Timon, c. 30), not as wheedling, but as full of arrogance; in this latter point too like that of the elder Cato at Rome (Plutarch. Cato, c. 14). The derisive tone of Cato in his public speaking, too, is said to have been impertinent and disgusting (Plutarch, Reipub. Gerend. Præcept. p. 803, c. 7).

² An epigram which Plutarch (Cato, c. 1) gives us from a poet contemporary of Cato the Censor, describes him:—

Περὶ δὲν, παρδὰ κέρην, γλαυκώματον, οὐδὲ θανάτῳ
Πόρκου ἐν Ἰδῶν Περσεφόνῃ δέχεται.

Livy says, in an eloquent encomium on Cato (xxxix, 40): "Simulantes nimio plures et exercebant eum, et ipse exercebat eas: nec facile dixeris utrum magis presserit eum nobilitas, an ille agitaverit nobilitatem. Asperi procul dubio animi, et lingue acerbae et immodice libera fuit: sed invicta cupiditatibus animi et rigida innocentia: contemptor gratiae, divitiarum Hunc sicut omni vitâ, tum censuram petentem premebat nobilitas; coierantque candidati omnes ad deficiendum honore eum; non solum ut ipsi potius adipiscerentur, nec quia indignabantur novum hominem censorem videre; sed etiam quod tristem censuram, periculosamque multorum famæ, et ab læso a plerisque et heredi cupido, expectabant."

See also Plutarch (Cato, c. 15, 16: his comparison between Aristides and Cato, c. 2) about the prodigious number of accusations in which Cato was engaged, either as prosecutor or as party prosecuted. His bitter feud with the nobilitas is analogous to that of Kleon against the Hippeis.

I need hardly say that the comparison of Cato with Kleon applies only to domestic politics: in the military courage and energy for which Cato was distinguished, Kleon is utterly wanting, nor are we entitled to ascribe to him anything like the superiority of knowledge and general intelligence which we find recorded of Cato.

The expression of Cicero respecting Kleon: "turbulentum quidem civem, sed tamen eloquentem," (Cicero, Brutus, 7,) appears to be a translation of the epithets of Thucydides — διατρεφὴς — τῷ δήμῳ πιθανώτατος (iii 42).

inconsistent with a high sense of public duty. And Plutarch recounts an anecdote respecting Kleon, that, on first beginning his political career, he called his friends together, and dissolved his intimacy with them, conceiving that private friendships would distract him from his paramount duty to the commonwealth.¹

Moreover, the reputation of Kleon as a frequent and unmeasured accuser of others, may be explained partly by a passage of his enemy Aristophanes: a passage the more deserving of confidence as a just representation of fact, since it appears in a comedy (the "Frogs") represented (405 B.C.) fifteen years after the death of Kleon, and five years after that of Hyperbolus, when the poet had less motive for misrepresentations against either. In the "Frogs," the scene is laid in Hades, whither the god Dionysus goes, in the attire of Hēraklēs and along with his slave Xanthias, for the purpose of bringing up again to earth the deceased poet Euripides. Among the incidents, Xanthias, in the attire which his master had worn, is represented as acting with violence and insult towards two hostesses of eating-houses; consuming their substance, robbing them, refusing to pay when called upon, and even threatening their lives with a drawn sword. Upon which the women, having no other redress left, announce their resolution of calling, the one upon her protector Kleon, the other on Hyperbolus, for the purpose of bringing the offender to justice before the dikastery.² This passage shows us, if inferences on comic evidence are to be held as admissible, that Kleon and Hyperbolus became involved in accusations partly by helping poor persons who had been wronged to obtain justice before the dikastery. A rich man who had suffered injury might apply

The remarks made too by Latin critics on the style and temper of Cato's speeches, might almost seem to be a translation of the words of Thucydides about Kleon. Fronto said about Cato: "Concionatur Cato infeste, Gracchus turbulente, Tullius copiose. Jam in judiciis scit idem Cato triumphat Cicero, tumultuatur Gracchus." See Dübner's edition of Meyer's *Oratorum Romanorum Fragmenta*, p. 117 (Paris, 1837).

¹ Plutarch. Reip. Ger. Præcept. p. 806. Compare two other passages in the same treatise p. 805, where Plutarch speaks of the ἀπόστα καὶ οὐνετὴς of Kleon; and p. 812, where he says, with truth, that Kleon was not at all qualified to act as general in a campaign.

² Aristophan. Ran. 566-576.

so Antipho or some other rhetor for paid advice and aid as to the conduct of his complaint; but a poor man or woman would think themselves happy to obtain the gratuitous suggestion, and sometimes the auxiliary speech, of Kleon or Hyperbolus; who would thus extend their own popularity, by means very similar to those practised by the leading men in Rome.¹

But besides lending aid to others, doubtless Kleon was often also a prosecutor, in his own name, of official delinquents, real or alleged. That some one should undertake this duty was indispensable for the protection of the city; otherwise, the responsibility to which official persons were subjected after their term of office would have been merely nominal: and we have proof enough that the general public morality of these official persons, acting individually, was by no means high. But the duty was at the same time one which most persons would and did shun. The prosecutor, while obnoxious to general dislike, gained nothing even by the most complete success; and if he failed so much as not to procure a minority of votes among the dikasts, equal to one-fifth of the numbers present, he was condemned to pay a fine of one thousand drachms. What was still more serious, he drew upon himself a formidable mass of private hatred, from the friends, partisans, and the political club, of the accused party, extremely menacing to his own future security and comfort, in a community like Athens. There was therefore little motive to accept, and great motive to decline, the task of prosecuting on public grounds. A prudent politician at Athens would undertake it occasionally, and against special rivals, but he would carefully guard himself against the reputation of doing it frequently or by inclination, and the orators constantly do so guard themselves in those speeches which yet remain.

It is this reputation which Thucydides fastens upon Kleon, and which, like Cato the censor at Rome, he probably merited; from native acrimony of temper, from a powerful talent for invective

¹ Here again we find Cato the elder represented as constantly in the forum at Rome, lending aid of this kind, and espousing the cause of others who had grounds of complaint (Plutarch, Cato, c. 3), *πρωτὸν μὲν ἐς ἀγορὰν βαδίζει καὶ παρίσταται τοῖς δεομένοις, — τὸ δὲ μὲν θυμωσθαι καὶ φίλους ἔκαστον διὰ τῶν συνηγοριῶν* etc.

and from his position, both inferior and hostile to the Athenian knights, or aristocracy, who overshadowed him by their family importance. But in what proportion of cases his accusations were just or calumnious, the real question upon which a candid judgment turns, we have no means of deciding, either in his case or that of Cato. "To lash the wicked (observes Aristophanes himself¹) is not only no blame, but is even a matter of honor to the good." It has not been common to allow to Kleon the benefit of this observation, though he is much more entitled to it than Aristophanes. For the attacks of a poetical libeller admit neither of defence nor retaliation; whereas a prosecutor before the dikastery found his opponent prepared to reply or even to retort, and was obliged to specify his charge, as well as to furnish proof of it; so that there was a fair chance for the innocent man not to be confounded with the guilty.

The quarrel of Kleon with Aristophanes is said to have arisen out of an accusation which he brought against that poet² in the Senate of Five Hundred, on the subject of his second comedy, the "Babylonians," exhibited B.C. 426, at the festival of the urban Dionysia in the month of March. At that season many strangers were present at Athens, and especially many visitors and deputies from the subject-allies, who were bringing their annual tribute: and as the "Babylonians," (now lost,) like so many other productions of Aristophanes, was full of slashing ridicule, not only against individual citizens but against the functionaries and institutions of the city,³ Kleon instituted a complaint against it in the senate, as an exposure dangerous to the public

¹ Aristophan. Equit. 1271:—

*Δοιδόρῃσαι τοὺς πονηροὺς, οὐδὲν ἔστ' ἐπιφθονον,
Ἄλλὰ τιμὴ τοῖσι χρηστοῖς, ὅστις εὖ λογιζέται.*

² It appears that the complaint was made ostensibly against Kalistratus, in whose name the poet brought out the "Babylonians," (Schol. ad Arist. Vesp. 1284,) and who was of course the responsible party, though the real author was doubtless perfectly well known. The Knights was the first play brought out by the poet in his own name.

³ See Acharn. 377, with the Scholia, and the anonymous biography of Aristophanes.

Born Meineke (Aristoph. Fragm. Comic. Gr. vol. ii. p. 966) and Ranke (Commentat. de Aristoph. Vita, p. cccxxx) try to divine the plot of the "Babylonians;" but there is no sufficient information to assist them.

security before strangers and allies. We have to recollect that Athens was then in the midst of an embarrassing war; that the fidelity of her subject-allies was much doubted; that Lesbos, the greatest of her allies, had been reconquered only in the preceding year, after a revolt both troublesome and perilous to the Athenians. Under such circumstances, Kleon had good reason for thinking that a political comedy of the Aristophanic vein and talent tended to degrade the city in the eyes of strangers, even granting that it was innocuous when confined to the citizens themselves. The poet complains¹ that Kleon summoned him before the senate, with terrible threats and calumny; but it does not appear that any penalty was inflicted. Nor, indeed, had the senate competence to find him guilty or punish him except to the extent of a small fine: they could only bring him to trial before the dikastery, which in this case plainly was not done. He himself, however, seems to have felt the justice of the warning: for we find that three out of his four next following plays, before the Peace of Nikias, — the *Acharnians*, the *Knights*, and the *Wasps*, — were represented at the Lenæan festival,² in the month of January, a season when no strangers nor allies were present. Kleon was doubtless much incensed with the play of the *Knights*, and seems to have annoyed the poet either by bringing an indictment against him for exercising freemen's rights without being duly qualified, since none but citizens were allowed to appear and

¹ Aristoph. *Acharn.* 355-475.

² See the Arguments prefixed to these three plays; and *Acharn.* 475 Equit. 881.

It is not known whether the first comedy, entitled *The Clouds* (represented in the earlier part of B.C. 423, a year after the *Knights*, and a year before the *Wasps*), appeared at the Lenæan festival of January, or at the urban Dionysia in March. It was unsuccessful, and the poet partially altered it with the view to a second representation. If it be true that this second representation took place during the year immediately following (B.C. 422 see Mr. Clinton's *Fasti Hellenici*, ad ann. 422), it must have been at the urban Dionysia in March, just at the time when the truce for one year was coming to a close; for the *Wasps* was represented in that year at the Lenæan festival, and the same poet would hardly be likely to bring out two plays. The inference which Ranke draws from *Nubes* 310, that it was represented at the Dionysia, is not, however, very conclusive (Ranke, *Commentat. de Aristoph. Vita*, p. cexxi, prefixed to his edition of the *Plutus*)

act in the dramatic exhibitions, or by some other means which are not clearly explained. Nor can we make out in what way the poet met him, though it appears that finding less public sympathy than he thought himself entitled to, he made an apology without intending to be bound by it.¹ Certain it is, that his remaining plays subsequent to the *Knights*, though containing some few bitter jests against Kleon, manifest no second deliberate set against him.

The battle of Amphipolis removed at once the two most pronounced individual opponents of peace, Kleon and Brasidas. Athens too was more than ever discouraged and averse to prolonged fighting; for the number of hoplites slain at Amphipolis doubtless filled the city with mourning, besides the unparalleled disgrace now tarnishing Athenian soldiership. The peace-party under the auspices of Nikias and Lachês, relieved at once from the internal opposition of Kleon, as well as from the foreign enterprise of Brasidas, were enabled to resume their negotiations with Sparta in a spirit promising success. King Pleistoanax, and the Spartan ephors of the year, were on their side equally bent on terminating the war, and the deputies of all the allies were convoked at Sparta for discussion with the envoys of Athens. Such discussion was continued during the whole autumn and winter after the battle of Amphipolis, without any actual hostilities on either side. At first, the pretensions advanced were found very conflicting; but at length, after several debates, it was agreed to treat upon the basis of each party surrendering what had been

¹ See the obscure passage, *Vespæ*, 1285, *seqq.*: Aristoph. *Vita Anonymi*, p. xiii. ed. Bekker; Demosthen. cont. Meid. p. 532.

It appears that Aristophanês was of Æginetan parentage (*Acharn.* 629); so that the *γπαση ἐννεας* (indictment for undue assumption of the rights of an Athenian citizen) was founded upon a real fact. Between the time of the conquest of Ægina by Athens, and the expulsion of the native inhabitants in the first year of the Peloponnesian war (an interval of about twenty years), probably no inconsiderable number of Æginetans became intermingled or intermarried with Athenian citizens. Especially men of poetical talent in the subject-cities would find it their interest to repair to Athens: for came from Chios, and Achaus from Eretria; both tragic composers.

The comic author Eupolis seems also to have directed some taunts against the foreign origin of Aristophanês, if Meineke is correct in his interpretation of a passage (*Historia Comicor. Græc.* i. p. 111).

acquired by war. The Athenians insisted at first on the restoration of Plataea; but the Thebans replied that Plataea was theirs neither by force nor by treason, but by voluntary capitulation and surrender of the inhabitants. This distinction seems to our ideas somewhat remarkable, since the capitulation of a besieged town is not less the result of force than capture by storm. But it was adopted in the present treaty; and under it the Athenians, while foregoing their demand of Plataea, were enabled to retain Nisaea, which they had acquired from the Megarians, and Anaktorium and Sollium,¹ which they had taken from Corinth. To insure accommodating temper on the part of Athens, the Spartans held out the threat of invading Attica in the spring, and of establishing a permanent fortification in the territory: and they even sent round proclamation to their allies, enjoining all the details requisite for this step. Since Attica had now been exempt from invasion for three years, the Athenians were probably not insensible to this threat of renewal under a permanent form.

At the beginning of spring, about the end of March, 421 B.C., shortly after the urban Dionysia at Athens, the important treaty was concluded for the term of fifty years. The following were its principal conditions:—

1. All shall have full liberty to visit all the public temples of Greece, for purposes of private sacrifice, consultation of oracle, or public sacred mission. Every man shall be undisturbed both in going and coming. [The value of this article will be felt, when we recollect that the Athenians and their allies had been unable to visit the Olympic or Pythian festival since the beginning of the war.]

2. The Delphians shall enjoy full autonomy and mastery of their temple and their territory. [This article was intended to exclude the ancient claim of the Phocian confederacy to the

¹ Thucyd. v. 17-30. The statement in cap. 30 seems to show that this was the ground on which the Athenians were allowed to retain Sollium and Anaktorium. For if their retention of these two places had been distinctly and in terms at variance with the treaty, the Corinthians would doubtless have chosen this fact as the ostensible ground of their complaint: whereas they preferred to have recourse to a *πρόσχημα*, or sham plea.

management of the temple; a claim which the Athenians had once supported, before the thirty years' truce: but they had now little interest in the matter, since the Phocians were in the ranks of their enemies.]

3. There shall be peace for fifty years, between Athens and Sparta with their respective allies, with abstinence from mischief, either overt or fraudulent, by land as well as by sea.

4. Neither party shall invade for purposes of mischief the territory of the other, not by any artifice or under any pretence.

Should any subject of difference arise, it shall be settled by equitable means, and by oaths tendered and taken, in form to be hereafter agreed on.

5. The Lacedaemonians and their allies shall restore Amphipolis to the Athenians.

They shall farther *relinquish* to the Athenians Argilus, Stageirus, Akanthus, Skólus, Olynthus, and Spartólus. But these cities shall remain autonomous, on condition of paying tribute to Athens according to the assessment of Aristeidês. Any of their citizens who may choose to quit them shall be at liberty to do so, and to carry away his property. Nor shall the cities be counted hereafter either as allies of Athens or of Sparta, unless Athens shall induce them by amicable persuasions to become her allies, which she is at liberty to do if she can.

The inhabitants of Mekyberna, Sanê, and Singê, shall dwell independently in their respective cities, just as much as the Olynthians and Akanthians. [These were towns which adhered to Athens, and were still numbered as her allies; though they were near enough to be molested by Olynthus¹ and Akanthus, against which this clause was intended to insure them.]

¹ Compare v. 39 with v. 18, which seems to me to refute the explanation suggested by Dr. Arnold, and adopted by Poppo.

The use of the word ἀποδοῦναι in regard to the restoration of Amphipolis to Athens, and of the word παρῆδοσαν in regard to the *relinquishment* of the other cities, deserves notice. Those who drew up the treaty, which is worded in a very confused way, seem to have intended that the word παρῆδοσαν should apply both to Amphipolis and the other cities, but that the word ἀποδοῦναι should apply exclusively to Amphipolis. The word παρῆδοσαν is of course applicable to the restoration of Amphipolis, for that which

The Lacedæmonians and their allies shall also restore Panaktum to the Athenians.

6. The Athenians shall restore to Sparta Koryphasium, Kythêra, Methônê, Pteleum, Atalantê, with all the captives in their hands from Sparta or her allies. They shall farther release all Spartans or allies of Sparta now blocked up in Skiônê.

7. The Lacedæmonians and their allies shall also restore all the captives in their hands, from Athens or her allies.

8. Respecting Skiônê, Torônê, Sermylus, or any other town in the possession of Athens, the Athenians may take their own measures.

9. Oaths shall be exchanged between the contracting parties, according to the solemnities held most binding in each city respectively, and in the following words: "I will adhere to this convention and truce sincerely and without fraud." The oaths shall be annually renewed, and the terms of peace shall be inscribed on columns at Olympia, Delphi, and the Isthmus, as well as at Sparta and Athens.

10. Should any matter have been forgotten in the present convention, the Athenians and Lacedæmonians may alter it by mutual understanding and consent, without being held to violate their oaths.

These oaths were accordingly exchanged: they were taken by seventeen principal Athenians, and as many Spartans, on behalf of their respective countries, on the 26th day of the month Artemisius at Sparta, and on the 24th day of Elaphebolion at Athens, immediately after the urban Dionysia; Pleistolas being ephor eponymus at Sparta, and Alkæus archon eponymus at Athens.

is restored is of course *delivered up*. But it is remarkable that this word *παρέδοσαν* does not properly apply to the other cities: for they were not *delivered up* to Athens, they were only *relinquished*, as the clauses immediately following farther explain. Perhaps there is a little Athenian pride in the use of the word, first to intimate indirectly that the Lacedæmonians were to *deliver up* various cities to Athens, then to add words afterwards, which show that the cities were only to be *relinquished*, not *surrendered* to Athens.

The provision, for guaranteeing liberty of retirement and carrying away of property, was of course intended chiefly for the Amphipolitans, who would naturally desire to emigrate, if the town had been actually restored to Athens.

Among the Lacedæmonians swearing, are included the two kings Agis and Pleistoanax, the ephor Pleistolas, and perhaps other ephors, but this we do not know, and Tellis, the father of Brasidas. Among the Athenians sworn, are comprised Nikias, Lachês, Agnon, Lamachus, and Demosthenês.¹

Such was the peace — commonly known by the name of the Peace of Nikias — concluded in the beginning of the eleventh spring of the war, which had just lasted ten full years. Its conditions were put to the vote at Sparta, in the assembly of deputies from the Lacedæmonian allies, the majority of whom accepted them: which, according to the condition adopted and sworn to by every member of the confederacy,² made it binding upon all. There was, indeed, a special reserve allowed to any particular state in case of religious scruple, arising out of the fear of offending some of their gods or heroes, but, saving this reserve, the peace had been formally acceded to by the decision of the confederates. But it soon appeared how little the vote of the majority was worth, even when enforced by the strong pressure of Lacedæmon herself, when the more powerful members were among the dissentient minority. The Boeotians, Megarians, and Corinthians, all refused to accept it; nor does it seem that any deputies from the allies took the oath along with the Lacedæmonian envoys; though the truce for a year, two years before,³ had been sworn to by Lacedæmonian, Corinthian, Megarian, Sikyonian, and Epidaurian envoys.

The Corinthians were displeased because they did not recover SOLLUM and ANAKTORIUM; the Megarians, because they did not regain NISAA; the Boeotians, because they were required to surrender PANAKTUM. In spite of the urgent solicitations of Sparta, the deputies of all these powerful states not only denounced the

¹ Thucyd. v. 19.

² Thucyd. v. 17-30. *παρηγγισμένοι τε ἑστέων* (the Lacedæmonians said), *αἱ τοὺς* (the Corinthians) *τοὺς ἑκαστὸν καὶ ἑδὴ ἀδελφεὺν ὅτι ἐν δέχονται τὰς Ἀθηναίων σπονδὰς, ἐγγεμένον, κέρως εἶναι ὅτι ἐν τῷ πλείονος τῶν συμμάχων ψήφισσεται, ἢν μὴ τι θεῶν ἢ ἡρώων κώλυα ᾖ.*

³ Compare Thucyd. iv. 119; v. 19. Though the words of the peace stand *ὁμοῖαν κατὰ πόλιν* (v. 18), yet it seems that this oath was not *actually* taken by any of the allied cities; only by the Lacedæmonians themselves, upon the vote of the majority of the confederates (v. 17 compare v. 23).

peace as unjust, and voted against it in the general assembly of allies, but refused to accept it when the vote was carried, and went home to their respective cities for instructions.¹

Such were the conditions, and such the accompanying circumstances, of the Peace of Nikias, which terminated, or professed to terminate, the great Peloponnesian war, after a duration of ten years. Its consequences and fruits, in many respects such as were not anticipated by either of the concluding parties, will be seen in my next volume.

¹ Thucyd. v, 22


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
- I. LEGENDARY GREECE
- II. GRECIAN HISTORY TO THE REIGN
OF PEISISTRATUS AT ATHENS

BY
GEORGE GROTE, ESQ.

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VOLUME VII



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PART II.

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CHAPTER LV.

FROM THE PEACE OF NIKIAS TO THE OLYMPIC FESTIVAL OF OLYMPIAD NINETY.

My last chapter and last volume terminated with the peace called the Peace of Nikias, concluded in March 421 B.C., between Athens and the Spartan confederacy, for fifty years.

This peace — negotiated during the autumn and winter succeeding the defeat of the Athenians at Amphipolis, wherein both Kleon and Brasidas were slain — resulted partly from the extraordinary anxiety of the Spartans to recover their captives who had been taken at Sphakteria, partly from the discouragement of the Athenians, leading them to listen to the peace-party who acted with Nikias. The general principle adopted for the peace was, the restitution by both parties of what had been acquired by war, yet excluding such places as had been surrendered by capitulation: according to which reserve the Athenians, while prevented from recovering Plataea, continued to hold Nisaea, the harbor of Megara. The Lacedæmonians engaged to restore Amphipolis to Athens, and to relinquish their connection with the revolted allies of Athens in Thrace; that is, Argilus, Stageirus, Akanthus, Skólus, Olynthus, and Spartólus. These six cities, however, were not to be enrolled as allies of Athens unless they chose voluntarily to become so, but only to pay reg-

ularly to Athens the tribute originally assessed by Aristeidês, as a sort of recompense for the protection of the Ægean sea against private war or piracy. Any inhabitant of Amphipolis or the other cities, who chose to leave them, was at liberty to do so, and to carry away his property. Farther, the Lacedæmonians covenanted to restore Panaktum to Athens, together with all the Athenian prisoners in their possession. As to Skiônê, Torônê, and Sermylus, the Athenians were declared free to take their own measures. On their part, they engaged to release all captives in their hands, either of Sparta or her allies; to restore Pylus, Kythêra, Methônê, Pteleon, and Atalantê; and to liberate all the Peloponnesian or Brasidean soldiers now under blockade in Skiônê.

Provision was also made, by special articles, that all Greeks should have free access to the sacred Pan-Hellenic festivals, either by land or sea; and that the autonomy of the Delphian temple should be guaranteed.

The contracting parties swore to abstain in future from all injury to each other, and to settle by amicable decision any dispute which might arise.¹

Lastly, it was provided that if any matter should afterwards occur as having been forgotten, the Athenians and Lacedæmonians might by mutual consent amend the treaty as they thought fit. So prepared, the oaths were interchanged between seventeen principal Athenians and as many principal Lacedæmonians.

Earnestly bent as Sparta herself was upon the peace, and ratified as it had been by the vote of a majority among her confederates, still, there was a powerful minority who not only refused their assent but strenuously protested against its conditions. The Corinthians were discontented because they did not receive back Sollium and Anaktorium; the Megarians, because they did not regain Nisæa; the Bœotians, because Panaktum was to be restored to Athens: the Eleians also on some other ground which we do not distinctly know. All of them, moreover, took common offence at the article which provided that Athens and Sparta might, by mutual consent, and without consulting the allies, amend the treaty in any way that they thought proper.²

¹ Thucyd. v. 17-29.

² Thucyd. v. 18.

Though the peace was sworn, therefore, the most powerful members of the Spartan confederacy remained all recusant.

So strong was the interest of the Spartans themselves, however, that having obtained the favorable vote of the majority, they resolved to carry the peace through, even at the risk of breaking up the confederacy. Besides the earnest desire of recovering their captives from the Athenians, they were farther alarmed by the fact that their truce for thirty years concluded with Argos was just now expiring. They had indeed made application to Argos for renewing it, through Lichas the Spartan proxenus of that city. But the Argeians had refused, except upon the inadmissible condition that the border territory of Kynuria should be ceded to them: there was reason to fear therefore that this new and powerful force might be thrown into the scale of Athens, if war were allowed to continue.¹

Accordingly, no sooner had the peace been sworn than the Spartans proceeded to execute its provisions. Lots being drawn to determine whether Sparta or Athens should be the first to make the cessions required, the Athenians drew the favorable lot: an advantage so very great, under the circumstances, that Theophrastus affirmed Nikias to have gained the point by bribery. There is no ground for believing such alleged bribery; the rather, as we shall presently find Nikias gratuitously throwing away most of the benefit which the lucky lot conferred.²

The Spartans began their compliance by forthwith releasing all the Athenian prisoners in their hands, and despatching Ischagoras with two other envoys to Amphipolis and the Thracian towns. These envoys were directed to proclaim the peace as well as to enforce its observance upon the Thracian towns, and especially to command Klearidas, the Spartan commander in Amphipolis, that he should surrender the town to the Athenians. But on arriving in Thrace, these envoys met with nothing but unanimous opposition: and so energetic were the remonstrances of the Chalkidians, both in Amphipolis and out of it, that even Klearidas refused obedience to his own government, pretending that he was not strong enough to surrender the place against the

¹ Thucyd. v. 14, 22, 76.

² Plutarch. Nikias, c. 10.

resistance of the Chalkidians. Thus completely baffled, the envoys returned to Sparta, whither Klearidas thought it prudent to accompany them, partly to explain his own conduct, partly in hopes of being able to procure some modification of the terms. But he found this impossible, and he was sent back to Amphipolis with peremptory orders to surrender the place to the Athenians, if it could possibly be done; if that should prove beyond his force, then to come away, and bring home every Peloponnesian soldier in the garrison. Perhaps the surrender was really impracticable to a force no greater than that which Klearidas commanded, since the reluctance of the population was doubtless obstinate. At any rate, he represented it to be impracticable: the troops accordingly came home, but the Athenians still remained excluded from Amphipolis, and all the stipulations of the peace respecting the Thracian towns remained unperformed. Nor was this all. The envoys from the recusant minority (Corinthians and others), after having gone home for instructions, had now come back to Sparta with increased repugnance and protest against the injustice of the peace, so that all the efforts of the Spartans to bring them to compliance were fruitless.¹

The latter were now in serious embarrassment. Not having executed their portion of the treaty, they could not demand that Athens should execute hers: and they were threatened with the double misfortune of forfeiting the confidence of their allies without acquiring any one of the advantages of the treaty. In this dilemma they determined to enter into closer relations, and separate relations, with Athens, at all hazard of offending their allies. Of the enmity of Argos, if unaided by Athens, they had little apprehension; while the moment was now favorable for alliance with Athens, from the decided pacific tendencies reigning on both sides, as well as from the known philo-Laconian sentiment of the leaders Nikias and Lachês. The Athenian envoys had remained at Sparta ever since the swearing of the peace, awaiting the fulfilment of the conditions; Nikias or Lachês, one or both, being very probably among them. When they saw that Sparta was unable to fulfil her bond, so that the treaty seemed likely to be cancelled, they would doubtless encourage, and per-

¹ Thucyd. v, 21, 22.

haps may even have suggested, the idea of a separate alliance between Sparta and Athens, as the only expedient for covering the deficiency; promising that under that alliance the Spartan captives should be restored. Accordingly, a treaty was concluded between the two, for fifty years; not merely of peace, but of defensive alliance. Each party pledged itself to assist in repelling any invaders of the territory of the other, to treat them as enemies, and not to conclude peace with them without the consent of the other. This was the single provision of the alliance, with one addition, however, of no mean importance, for the security of Lacedæmon. The Athenians engaged to lend their best and most energetic aid in putting down any rising of the Helots which might occur in Laconia. Such a provision indicates powerfully the uneasiness felt by the Lacedæmonians respecting their serf-population: but at the present moment it was of peculiar value to them, since it bound the Athenians to restrain, if not to withdraw, the Messenian garrison of Pylos, planted there by themselves for the express purpose of provoking the Helots to revolt.

An alliance with stipulations so few and simple took no long time to discuss. It was concluded very speedily after the return of the envoys from Amphipolis, probably not more than a month or two after the former peace. It was sworn to by the same individuals on both sides; with similar declaration that the oath should be annually renewed, and also with similar proviso that Sparta and Athens might by mutual consent either enlarge or contract the terms, without violating the oath.¹ Moreover, the treaty was directed to be inscribed on two columns: one to be set up in the temple of Apollo at Amyklæ, the other in the temple of Athênê, in the acropolis of Athens.

The most important result of this new alliance was something

¹ Thucyd. v, 23. The treaty of alliance seems to have been drawn up at Sparta, and approved or concerted with the Athenian envoys; then sent to Athens, and there adopted by the people; then sworn to on both sides. The interval between this second treaty and the first (*οὐ πολλῷ ὕστερον*, v, 24), may have been more than a month; for it comprised the visit of the Lacedæmonian envoys to Amphipolis and the other towns of Thrace, the manifestation of resistance in those towns, and the return of Klearidas to Sparta to give an account of his conduct.

not specified in its provisions, but understood, we may be well assured, between the Spartan ephors and Nikias at the time when it was concluded. All the Spartan captives at Athens were forthwith restored.¹

Nothing can demonstrate more powerfully the pacific and acquiescent feeling now reigning at Athens, as well as the strong philo-Laconian inclinations of her leading men (at this moment Alkibiadēs was competing with Nikias for the favor of Sparta, as will be stated presently), than the terms of this alliance, which bound Athens to assist in keeping down the Helots, and the still more important after-proceeding, of restoring the Spartan captives. Athens thus parted irrevocably with her best card, and promised to renounce her second best, without obtaining the smallest equivalent beyond what was contained in the oath of Sparta to become her ally. For the last three years and a half, ever since the capture of Sphacteria, the possession of these captives had placed her in a position of decided advantage in regard to her chief enemy; advantage, however, which had to a certain extent been countervailed by subsequent losses. This state of things was fairly enough represented by the treaty of peace deliberately discussed during the winter, and sworn to at the commencement of spring, whereby a string of concessions, reciprocal and balancing, had been imposed on both parties. Moreover, Athens had been lucky enough in drawing lots to find herself enabled to wait for the actual fulfilment of such concessions by the Spartans, before she consummated her own. Now the Spartans had not as yet realized any one of their promised concessions: nay, more; in trying to do so, they had displayed such a want either of power or of will, as made it plain, that nothing short of the most stringent necessity would convert their promises into realities. Yet, under these marked indications, Nikias persuades his countrymen to conclude a second treaty which practically annuls the first, and which insures to the Spartans gratuitously all the main benefits of the first, with little or none of the correlative sacrifices. The alliance of Sparta could hardly be said to count as a consideration: for that alliance was at this moment, under the uncertain relations with Argos,

¹ Thucyd. v, 24.

not less valuable to Sparta herself than to Athens. There can be little doubt that, if the game of Athens had now been played with prudence, she might have recovered Amphipolis in exchange for the captives: for the inability of Klearidas to make over the place, even if we grant it to have been a real fact and not merely simulated, might have been removed by decisive coöperation on the part of Sparta with an Athenian armament sent to occupy the place. In fact, that which Athens was now induced to grant was precisely the original proposition transmitted to her by the Lacedæmonians four years before, when the hoplites were first inclosed in Sphacteria, but before the actual capture. They then tendered no equivalent, but merely said, through their envoys, "Give us the men in the island, and accept in exchange peace, together with our alliance."¹ At that moment there were some plausible reasons in favor of granting the proposition: but even then, the case of Kleon against it was also plausible and powerful, when he contended that Athens was entitled to make a better bargain. But *now*, there were no reasons in its favor, and a strong concurrence of reasons against it. Alliance with the Spartans was of no great value to Athens: peace was of material importance to her; but peace had been already sworn to on both sides, after deliberate discussion, and required now only to be carried into execution. That equal reciprocity of concession, which presented the best chance of permanent result, had been agreed on; and fortune had procured for her the privilege of receiving the purchase-money before she handed over the goods. Why renounce so advantageous a position, accepting in exchange a hollow and barren alliance, under the obligation of handing over her most precious merchandise upon credit, and upon credit as delusive in promise as it afterwards proved unproductive in reality? The alliance, in fact, prevented the peace from being fulfilled: it became, as Thucydides himself² admits, no peace, but a simple suspension of direct hostilities.

Thucydides states on more than one occasion, and it was the

¹ Thucyd. iv, 19. Λακεδαιμόνιοι δὲ ἡμᾶς προκαλοῦνται ἐς σπονδὰς καὶ διάλυσιν πολέμου, δίδόντες μὲν εἰρήνην καὶ συμμαχίαν καὶ ἄλλην φιλίαν πολλήν, καὶ οἰκειότητα ἐς ἀλλήλους ὑπάρχειν, ἀνταποδόντες δὲ τοὺς ἐκ τῆς νήσου ἄνδρας. ² Thucyd. v, 26. οὐκ εἰκὸς ὅν εἰρήνην αὐτὴν κριθῆναι, οἷα.

sentiment of Nikias himself, that at the moment of concluding the peace which bears his name, the position of Sparta was one of disadvantage and dishonor in reference to Athens;¹ alluding chiefly to the captives in the hands of the latter; for as to other matters, the defeats of Delium and Amphipolis, with the serious losses in Thrace, would more than countervail the acquisitions of Nisæa, Pylus, Kythêra, and Methônê. Yet so inconsiderate and short-sighted were the philo-Laconian leanings of Nikias and the men who now commanded confidence at Athens, that they threw away this advantage, suffered Athens to be cheated of all those hopes which they had themselves held out as the inducement for peace, and nevertheless yielded gratuitously to Sparta all the main points which she desired. Most certainly there was never any public recommendation of Kleon, as far as our information goes, so ruinously impolitic as this alliance with Sparta and surrender of the captives, wherein both Nikias and Alkibiadês concurred. Probably the Spartan ephors amused Nikias, and he amused the Athenian assembly, with fallacious assurances of certain obedience in Thrace, under alleged peremptory orders given to Klearidas. And now that the vehement leather-dresser, with his criminative eloquence, had passed away, replaced only by an inferior successor, the lamp-maker² Hyperbolus, and leaving the Athenian public under the undisputed guidance of citizens eminent for birth and station, descended from gods and heroes, there remained no one to expose effectively the futility of such assurances, or to enforce the lesson of simple and obvious prudence: "Wait, as you are entitled to wait, until the Spartans have performed the onerous part of their bargain, before you perform the onerous part of yours. Or, if you choose to relax in regard to some of the concessions which they have sworn to make, at any rate stick to the capital point of all, and lay before them the peremptory alternative — Amphipolis in exchange for the captives."

¹ Thucyd. v, 28. κατὰ γὰρ τὸν χρόνον : αὐτὸν ἢ τε Λακεδαιμόνων μάλιστα δὴ κακῶς ἤκουε καὶ ὑπερώφθη διὰ τὰς ξυμφορὰς. — (Νικίας) λέγων ἐν μὲν τῷ σφετέρῳ καλῶ (Athenian) ἐν δὲ τῷ ἐκείνων ἀπρεπεῖ (Lacedæmonian) τὸν πόλεμον ἀναβάλλεσθαι, etc. (v, 46) — Οἱς πρῶτον μὲν (to the Lacedæmonians) διὰ ξυμφορῶν ἢ ξύμβεσις, etc.

² Aristophan. Pac. 665-887.

The Athenians were not long in finding out how completely they had forfeited the advantage of their position, and their chief means of enforcement, by giving up the captives; which imparted a freedom of action to Sparta such as she had never enjoyed since the first blockade of Sphacteria. Yet it seems that under the present ephors Sparta was not guilty of any deliberate or positive act which could be called a breach of faith. She gave orders to Klearidas to surrender Amphipolis if he could; if not, to evacuate it, and bring the Peloponnesian troops home. Of course, the place was not surrendered to the Athenians, but evacuated; and she then considered that she had discharged her duty to Athens, as far as Amphipolis was concerned, though she had sworn to restore it, and her oath remained unperformed.¹ The other Thracian towns were equally deaf to her persuasions, and equally obstinate in their hostility to Athens. So also were the Bœotians, Corinthians, Megarians, and Eleians: but the Bœotians, while refusing to become parties to the truce along with Sparta, concluded for themselves a separate convention or armistice with Athens, terminable at ten days' notice on either side.²

In this state of things, though ostensible relations of peace and free reciprocity of intercourse between Athens and Peloponnesus were established, the discontent of the Athenians, and the remonstrances of their envoys at Sparta, soon became serious. The Lacedæmonians had sworn for themselves and their allies, yet the most powerful among these allies, and those whose enmity was most important to Athens, continued still recusant. Neither Panaktum, nor the Athenian prisoners in Bœotia, were yet restored to Athens; nor had the Thracian cities yet submitted to the peace. In reply to the remonstrances of the Athenian envoys, the Lacedæmonians affirmed that they had already surrendered all the Athenian prisoners in their own hands, and had withdrawn their troops from Thrace, which was, they said, all the intervention in their power, since they were not masters of Amphipolis, nor capable of constraining the Thracian cities against their will. As to the Bœotians and Corinthians, the Lacedæmonians went on

¹ Thucyd. v, 21-35.

² Thucyd. v, 32.

far as to profess readiness to take arms along with Athens,¹ for the purpose of constraining them to accept the peace, and even spoke about naming a day, after which these recusant states should be proclaimed as joint enemies, both by Sparta and Athens. But their propositions were always confined to vague words, nor would they consent to bind themselves by any written or peremptory instrument. Nevertheless, so great was their confidence either in the sufficiency of these assurances, or in the facility of Nikias, that they ventured to require from Athens the surrender of Pylus, or at least the withdrawal of the Messenian garrison with the Helot deserters from that place, leaving in it none but native Athenian soldiers, until farther progress should be made in the peace. But the feeling of the Athenians was now seriously altered, and they received this demand with marked coldness. None of the stipulations of the treaty in their favor had yet been performed, none even seemed in course of being performed: so that they now began to suspect Sparta of dishonesty and deceit, and deeply regretted their inconsiderate surrender of the captives.² Their remonstrances at Sparta, often repeated during the course of the summer, produced no positive effect: nevertheless, they suffered themselves to be persuaded to remove the Messenians and Helots from Pylus to Kephallenia, replacing them by an Athenian garrison.³

The Athenians had doubtless good reason to complain of Sparta. But the persons of whom they had still better reason to complain, were Nikias and their own philo-Laconian leaders; who had first accepted from Sparta promises doubtful as to execution, and next — though favored by the lot in regard to priority of cession, and thus acquiring proof that Sparta either would not or could not perform her promises — renounced all these advantages, and

¹ Thucyd. v, 35. λέγοντες αὐτὸς ὡς μετ' Ἀθηναίων τούτους, ἢν μὴ θέλωσι, κοινῇ ἀναγκάσουσι· χρόνους δὲ προὔθεντο ἀνευ ξυγγοαφῆς, ἐν οἷς χρὴν τοὺς μὴ ἐσιόντας ἀμφοτέροις πολεμίους εἶναι.

² Thucyd. v, 35. τούτων οὖν ὁρῶντες οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι οὐδὲν ἱργῶ γιγνόμενον, ὑπετόπενον τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους μηδὲν δίκαιον διανοεῖσθαι, ὥστε οὔτε Πύλον ἀπαιτούντων αὐτῶν ἀπεδίδοσαν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς ἐκ τῆς νήσου ἄνδρας μετεμέλουντο ἀποδεδωκότες, etc.

³ Thucyd. v, 35. πολλὰς δὲ καὶ πολλῶν λόγων γενομένων ἐν τῷ θέρει· οὕτω, etc.

procured for Sparta almost gratuitously the only boon for which she seriously cared. The many critics on Grecian history, who think no term too harsh for the demagogue Kleon, ought in fairness to contrast his political counsel with that of his rivals, and see which of the two betokens greater forethought in the management of the foreign relations of Athens. Amphipolis had been once lost by the improvident watch of Thucydides and Euklés: it was now again lost by the improvident concessions of Nikias.

So much was the Peloponnesian alliance unhinged by the number of states which had refused the peace, and so greatly was the ascendancy of Sparta for the time impaired, that new combinations were now springing up in the peninsula. It has already been mentioned that the truce between Argos and Sparta was just now expiring: Argos therefore was free, with her old pretensions to the headship of Peloponnesus, backed by an undiminished fulness of wealth, power, and population. Having taken no direct part in the late exhausting war, she had even earned money by lending occasional aid on both sides; ¹ while her military force was just now farther strengthened by a step of very considerable importance. She had recently set apart a body of a thousand select hoplites, composed of young men of wealth and station, to receive constant military training at the public expense, and to be enrolled as a separate regiment by themselves, apart from the other citizens.² To a democratical government like Argos, such

¹ Thucyd. v, 28. Aristophan. Pac. 467, about the Argeians, δειχθὲν μισθοφοροῦντες ἄλφειτα.

He characterizes the Argeians as anxious for this reason to prolong the war between Athens and Sparta. This passage, as well as the whole tenor of the play, affords ground for affirming that the Pax was represented during the winter immediately preceding the Peace of Nikias, about four or five months after the battle of Amphipolis and the death of Kleon and Brasidas: not two years later, as Mr. Clinton would place it, on the authority of a date in the play itself, upon which he lays too great stress.

² Thucyd. v, 67. Ἀργείων οἱ Χίλιοι λογάδες, οἷς ἡ πόλις ἐκ πολλοῦ ἀσκησιν τῶν ἐς τὸν πόλεμον δημοσίᾳ παρῆχε.

Diodorus (xii, 75) represents the first formation of this Thousand-regiment at Argos as having taken place just about this time, and I think he is here worthy of credit; so that I do not regard the expression of Thucydides ἐκ πολλοῦ as indicating a time more than two years prior to the battle of Mantinea. For Grecian military training, two years of constant practice would

an institution was internally dangerous, and pregnant with mischief, which will be hereafter described. But at the present moment, the democratical leaders of Argos seem to have thought only of the foreign relations of their city, now that her truce with Sparta was expiring, and that the disorganized state of the Spartan confederacy opened new chances to her ambition of regaining something like headship in Peloponnesus.

The discontent of the recusant Peloponnesian allies was now inducing them to turn their attention towards Argos as a new chief. They had mistrusted Sparta, even before the peace, well knowing that she had separate interests from the confederacy, arising from desire to get back her captives: in the terms of peace, it seemed as if Sparta and Athens alone were regarded, the interests of the remaining allies, especially those in Thrace, being put out of sight. Moreover, that article in the treaty of peace whereby it was provided that Athens and Sparta might by mutual consent add or strike out any article that they chose, without consulting the allies, excited general alarm, as if Sparta were meditating some treason in conjunction with Athens against the confederacy.¹ And the alarm, once roused, was still farther aggravated by the separate treaty of alliance between Sparta and Athens, which followed so closely afterwards, as well as by the restoration of the Spartan captives.

Such general displeasure among the Peloponnesian states at the unexpected combination of Athenians and Lacedæmonians, strengthened in the case of each particular state by private interests of its own, first manifested itself openly through the Corinthians. On retiring from the conferences at Sparta, — where the recent alliance between the Athenians and Spartans had just been made known, and where the latter had vainly endeavored to prevail upon their allies to accept the peace, — the Corinthians went straight to Argos to communicate what had passed, and to solicit interference. They suggested to the leading men in that

be a long time. It is not to be imagined that the Argeian democracy would have incurred the expense and danger of keeping up this select regiment during all the period of their long peace, just now coming to an end.

¹ Thucyd. v, 29. μή μετὰ Ἀθηναίων σφῆς βούλωνται Λακεδαιμόνιοι ἐκλωσθῆναι: compare Diodorus, xii, 75.

city, that it was now the duty of Argos to step forward as saviour of Peloponnesus, which the Lacedæmonians were openly betraying to the common enemy, and to invite for that purpose, into alliance for reciprocal defence, every autonomous Hellenic state which would bind itself to give and receive amicable satisfaction in all points of difference. They affirmed that many cities, from hatred of Sparta, would gladly comply with such invitation; especially if a board of commissioners in small number were named, with full powers to admit all suitable applicants; so that, in case of rejection, there might at least be no exposure before the public assembly in the Argeian democracy. This suggestion — privately made by the Corinthians, who returned home immediately afterwards — was eagerly adopted both by leaders and people at Argos, as promising to realize their long-cherished pretensions to headship. Twelve commissioners were accordingly appointed, with power to admit any new allies whom they might think eligible, except Athens and Sparta. With either of those two cities, no treaty was allowed without the formal sanction of the public assembly.¹

Meanwhile, the Corinthians, though they had been the first to set the Argeians in motion, nevertheless thought it right, before enrolling themselves publicly in the new alliance, to invite a congress of Peloponnesian malcontents to Corinth. It was the Mantineians who made the first application to Argos under the notice just issued. And here we are admitted to a partial view of the relations among the secondary and interior states of Peloponnesus. Mantineia and Tegea, being conterminous as well as the two most considerable states in Arcadia, were in perpetual rivalry, which had shown itself only a year and a half before in a bloody but indecisive battle.² Tegea, situated on the frontiers of Laconia, and oligarchically governed, was tenaciously attached to Sparta: while for that very reason, as well as from the democratical character of her government, Mantineia was less so, though she was still enrolled in and acted as a member of the Peloponnesian confederacy. She had recently conquered for herself³ a little empire in her own neighborhood, composed of

¹ Thucyd. v, 28.

² Thucyd. iv, 134.

³ Thucyd. v, 29. Τοῖς γὰρ Μαντινέσιον Ἰσθμίου καὶ Ἀρκαδίας κατεστράφη.

village districts in Arcadia, reckoned as her subject allies, and comrades in her ranks at the last battle with Tegea. This conquest had been made even during the continuance of the war with Athens; a period when the lesser states of Peloponnesus generally, and even subject-states as against their own imperial states, were under the guarantee of the confederacy, to which they were required to render their unpaid service against the common enemy; so that she was apprehensive of Lacedæmonian interference at the request and for the emancipation of these subjects, who lay, moreover, near to the borders of Laconia. Such interference would probably have been invoked earlier; only that Sparta had been under pressing embarrassments — and farther, had assembled no general muster of the confederacy against Athens — ever since the disaster in Sphakteria. But now she had her hands free, together with a good pretext as well as motive for interference.

To maintain the autonomy of all the little states, and prevent any of them from being mediatized or grouped into aggregations under the ascendancy of the greater, had been the general policy of Sparta; especially since her own influence as general leader was increased by insuring to every lesser state a substantive vote at the meetings of the confederacy.¹ Moreover, the rivalry of Tegea would probably operate here as an auxiliary motive against Mantinea. Under such apprehensions, the Mantineians hastened to court the alliance and protection of Argos, with whom they enjoyed the additional sympathy of a common democracy. Such revolt from Sparta² (for so it was considered) excited great sensation throughout Peloponnesus, together with considerable disposition, amidst the discontent then prevalent, to follow the example.

ὑπήκουον, ἐν τῷ πρὸς Ἀθηναίους πολέμῳ οὕτως, καὶ ἐνομίζον οὐ περιψεύσθαι σφᾶς τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους ἄρχειν, ἐπειδὴ καὶ σχολὴν ἔχον.

As to the way in which the agreement of the members of the confederacy modified the relations between subordinate and imperial states, see farther on, pages 25 and 26, in the case of Elis and Lepreum.

¹ Thucyd. i, 125.

² Thucyd. v, 29. Ἀποστάτων δὲ τῶν Μαντινέων, καὶ ἡ ἄλλη Πελοπόννησος ἐκ θρόνῳ καθίστατο ὡς καὶ σφίσι ποιητὶν τοῦτο, νομίζοντες πλέον τέ τι εἰδέτας μεταστῆναι αὐτοὺς, καὶ τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους ἅμα δὲ ὀργῇ ἔχοντας, etc.

In particular, it contributed much to enhance the importance of the congress at Corinth; whither the Lacedæmonians thought it necessary to send special envoys to counteract the intrigues going on against them. Their envoy addressed to the Corinthians strenuous remonstrance, and even reproach, for the leading part which they had taken in stirring up dissension among the old confederates, and organizing a new confederacy under the presidency of Argos. "They (the Corinthians) were thus aggravating the original guilt and perjury which they had committed by setting at nought the formal vote of a majority of the confederacy, and refusing to accept the peace, — for it was the sworn and fundamental maxim of the confederacy, that the decision of the majority should be binding on all, except in such cases as involved some offence to gods or heroes." Encouraged by the presence of many sympathizing deputies, Bœotian, Megarian, Chalkidian from Thrace,¹ etc., the Corinthians replied with firmness. But they did not think it good policy to proclaim their real ground for rejecting the peace, namely, that it had not procured for themselves the restoration of Sollium and Anaktorium: since, first, this was a question in which their allies present had no interest; next, it did not furnish any valid excuse for their resistance to the vote of the majority. Accordingly, they took their stand upon a pretence at once generous and religious; upon that reserve for religious scruples, which the Lacedæmonian envoy had himself admitted, and which of course was to be construed by each member with reference to his own pious feeling. "It was a religious impediment (the Corinthians contended) which prevented us from acceding to the peace with Athens, notwithstanding the vote of the majority; for we had previously exchanged oaths, ourselves apart from the confederacy, with the Chalkidians of Thrace at the time when they revolted from Athens: and we should have infringed those separate oaths, had we accepted a treaty of peace in which these Chalkidians were abandoned. As for alliance with Argos, we consider ourselves free to adopt any

¹ Thucyd. v, 30. Κορίνθιοι δὲ παρόντων σφίσι τῶν ξυμμάχων, ὅσοι οὐδ' αὐτοὶ ἐδέξαντο τὰς σπονδὰς (παρεκάλεσαν δὲ αὐτοὺς αὐτοὶ πρότερον) ἀντέλεγον τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις, ἃ μὲν ἡδικοῦντο, οὐ δὲ λούοντες ἀντικατεῖχε.

resolution which we may deem suitable, after consultation with our friends here present." With this unsatisfactory answer the Lacedæmonian envoys were compelled to return home. Yet some Argeian envoys, who were also present in the assembly for the purpose of urging the Corinthians to realize forthwith the hopes of alliance which they had held out to Argos, were still unable on their side to obtain a decided affirmative, being requested to come again at the next conference.¹

Though the Corinthians had themselves originated the idea of the new Argeian confederacy and compromised Argos in an open proclamation, yet they now hesitated about the execution of their own scheme. They were restrained in part doubtless by the bitterness of Lacedæmonian reproof; for the open consummation of this revolt, apart from its grave political consequences, shocked a train of very old feelings; but still more by the discovery that their friends, who agreed with them in rejecting the peace, decidedly refused all open revolt from Sparta and all alliance with Argos. In this category were the Bœotians and Megarians. Both of these states — left to their own impression and judgment by the Lacedæmonians, who did not address to them any distinct appeal as they had done to the Corinthians — spontaneously turned away from Argos, not less from aversion towards the Argeian democracy than from sympathy with the oligarchy at Sparta:² they were linked together by

¹ Thucyd. v, 30.

² Thucyd. v, 31. Βοιωτοὶ δὲ καὶ Μεγαρεῖς τὸ αὐτὸ λέγοντες ἡσυχάζον, περιορώμενοι ὑπὸ τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων, καὶ νομίζοντες σφίσι τῆς Ἀργείων δημοκρατίαν αὐτοῖς ὀλιγαρχουμένους ἥσσαν ξύμφορον εἶναι τῆς Λακεδαιμονίων πολιτείας.

These words, περιορώμενοι ὑπὸ τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων, are not clear, and have occasioned much embarrassment to the commentators, as well as some propositions for altering the text. It would undoubtedly be an improvement in the sense, if we were permitted (with Dobree) to strike out the words ὑπὸ τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων as a gloss, and thus to construe περιορώμενοι as a middle verb, "waiting to see the event," or literally, "keeping a look-out about them." But taking the text as it now stands, the sense which I have given to it seems the best which can be elicited.

Most of the critics translate περιορώμενοι "slighted or despised by the Lacedæmonians." But in the first place, this is not true as a matter of fact: in the next place, if it were true, we ought to have an adversative

communion of interest, not merely as being both neighbors and intense enemies of Attica, but as each having a body of democratical exiles who might perhaps find encouragement at Argos. Discouraged by the resistance of these two important allies, the Corinthians hung back from visiting Argos, until they were pushed forward by a new accidental impulse, the application of the Eleians; who, eagerly embracing the new project, sent envoys first to conclude alliance with the Corinthians, and next to go on and enroll Elis as an ally of Argos. This incident se

conjunction instead of καὶ before νομίζοντες, since the tendency of the two motives indicated would then be in opposite directions. "The Bœotians, though despised by the Lacedæmonians, still thought a junction with the Argeian democracy dangerous." And this is the sense which Haack actually proposes, though it does great violence to the word καὶ.

Dr. Thirlwall and Dr. Arnold translate περιορώμενοι "feeling themselves slighted;" and the latter says, "The Bœotians and Megarians took neither side; not the Lacedæmonian, for they felt that the Lacedæmonians had slighted them; not the Argive, for they thought that the Argive democracy would suit them less than the constitution of Sparta." But this again puts an inadmissible meaning on ἡσυχάζον, which means "stood as they were." The Bœotians were not called upon to choose between two sides or two positive schemes of action: they were invited to ally themselves with Argos, and this they decline doing: they prefer to remain as they are, allies of Lacedæmon, but refusing to become parties to the peace. Moreover, in the sense proposed by Dr. Arnold, we should surely find an adversative conjunction in place of καὶ.

I submit that the word περιορᾶν does not necessarily mean "to slight or despise," but sometimes "to leave alone, to take no notice of, to abstain from interfering." Thus, Thucyd. i, 24. Ἐπιδάμνιοι — πέμπουσιν ἐς τὴν Κερκύραν πρέσβεις — δέοντες μὴ σφᾶς περιορᾶν φθειρομένους, etc. Again, i, 69, καὶ νῦν τοῦδε Ἀθηναίου οὐχ ἕκας ἄλλ' ἐγγὺς ὄντας περιορᾶτε, etc. The same is the sense of περιδεῖν and περιόψεσθαι, ii, 20. In all these passages there is no idea of contempt implied in the word: the "leaving alone" or "abstaining from interference," proceeds from feelings quite different from contempt.

So in the passage here before us, περιορώμενοι seems the passive participle in this sense. Thucydides, having just described an energetic remonstrance sent by the Spartans to prevent Corinth from joining Argos, means to intimate (by the words here in discussion) that no similar interference was resorted to by them to prevent the Bœotians and Megarians from joining her. "The Bœotians and Megarians remained as they were, left to themselves by the Lacedæmonians, and thinking the Argeian democracy less suitable to them than the oligarchy of Sparta."

confirmed the Corinthians in their previous scheme, that they speedily went to Argos, along with the Chalkidians of Thrace, to join the new confederacy.

The conduct of Elis, like that of Mantinea, in thus revolting from Sparta, had been dictated by private grounds of quarrel, arising out of relations with their dependent ally Lepreum. The Lepreates had become dependent on Elis some time before the beginning of the Peloponnesian war, in consideration of aid lent by the Eleians to extricate them from a dangerous war against some Arcadian enemies. To purchase such aid, they had engaged to cede to the Eleians half their territory; but had been left in residence and occupation of it, under the stipulation of paying one talent yearly as tribute to the Olympian Zeus; in other words, to the Eleians as his stewards. When the Peloponnesian war began,¹ and the Lacedæmonians began to call for the unpaid service of the Peloponnesian cities generally, small as well as great, against Athens, the Lepreates were, by the standing agreement of the confederacy, exempted for the time from continuing to pay their tribute to Elis. Such exemption ceased with the war; at the close of which Elis became entitled, under the same agreement, to resume the suspended tribute. She accordingly required that the payment should then be recommenced: but the Lepreates refused, and when she proceeded to apply force, threw themselves on the protection of Sparta, by whose decision the Eleians themselves at first agreed to abide, having the general agreement of the confederacy decidedly in their favor. But it presently appeared that Sparta was more disposed to carry out her general system of favoring the autonomy of the lesser states, than to enforce the positive agreement of the confederacy. Accordingly the Eleians, accusing her of unjust bias, renounced her authority as arbitrator, and sent a military force to occupy Lepreum. Nevertheless, the Spartans persisted in their adjudication, pronounced Lepreum to be autonomous, and sent a body of their own hoplites to defend it against

¹ Thucyd. v, 31. Καὶ μέχρι τοῦ Ἀττικῆς πολέμου ἀπέφερον· ἔπειτα, πανσμένῳ διὰ πρόφασιν τοῦ πολέμου, οἱ Ἠλεῖοι ἐπηνύγκαζον, οἱ δ' ἐράποντες τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους.

For the agreement here alluded to, see a few lines forward.

the Eleians. The latter loudly protested against this proceeding, and pronounced the Lacedæmonians as having robbed them of one of their dependencies, contrary to that agreement which had been adopted by the general confederacy when the war began,—to the effect that each imperial city should receive back at the end of the war all the dependencies which it possessed at the beginning, on condition of waving its title to tribute and military service from them so long as the war lasted. After fruitless remonstrances with Sparta, the Eleians eagerly embraced the opportunity now offered of revolting from her, and of joining the new league with Corinth and Argos.¹

That new league, including Argos, Corinth, Elis, and Mantinea, had now acquired such strength and confidence, that the Argeians and Corinthians proceeded on a joint embassy to Tegea to obtain the junction of that city, seemingly the most

¹ Thucyd. v, 31. τὴν ξυνθήκην προφέροντες ἐν ᾗ εἶρητο, ἃ ἔχοντες ἐς τὸν Ἀττικὸν πόλεμον καθίσταντο τινες, ταῦτα ἔχοντας καὶ ἐξελθεῖν, ὥς οὐκ ἴσων ἔχοντες ἀφίστανται, etc.

Of the agreement here alluded to among the members of the Peloponnesian confederacy, we hear only in this one passage. It was extremely important to such of the confederates as were imperial cities; that is, which had subordinates or subject-allies.

Poppo and Bloomfield wonder that the Corinthians did not appeal to this agreement in order to procure the restitution of Sollium and Anaktorium. But they misconceive the scope of the agreement, which did not relate to captures made during the war by the common enemy. It would be useless for the confederacy to enter into a formal agreement that none of the members should lose anything through capture made by the enemy. This would be a question of superiority of force, for no agreement could bind the enemy. But the confederacy might very well make a covenant among themselves, as to the relations between their own imperial *immediate* members, and the *mediate* or subordinate dependencies of each. Each imperial state consented to forego the tribute or services of its dependency, so long as the latter was called upon to lend its aid in the general effort of the confederacy against the common enemy. But the confederacy at the same time gave its guarantee, that the imperial state should reënter upon these suspended rights, so soon as the war should be at an end. This guarantee was clearly violated by Sparta in the case of Elis and Lepreum. On the contrary, in the case of Mantinea, mentioned a few pages back, p. 19, the Mantineians had violated the maxim of the confederacy, and Sparta was justified in interfering at the request of their subjects to maintain the autonomy of the latter.

powerful in Peloponnesus next to Sparta and Argos. What grounds they had for expecting success we are not told. The mere fact of Mantinea having joined Argos, seemed likely to deter Tegea, as the rival Arcadian power, from doing the same: and so it proved, for the Tegeans decidedly refused the proposal, not without strenuous protestations that they would stand by Sparta in everything. The Corinthians were greatly disheartened by this repulse, which they had by no means expected, having been so far misled by general expressions of discontent against Sparta as to believe that they could transfer nearly the whole body of confederates to Argos. But they now began to despair of all farther extension of Argeian headship, and even to regard their own position as insecure on the side of Athens; with whom they were not at peace, while by joining Argos they had forfeited their claim upon Sparta and all her confederacy, including Bœotia and Megara. In this embarrassment they betook themselves to the Bœotians, whom they again entreated to join them in the Argeian alliance: a request already once refused, and not likely to be now granted, but intended to usher in a different request preferred at the same time. The Bœotians were entreated to accompany the Corinthians to Athens, and obtain for them from the Athenians an armistice terminable at ten days' notice, such as that which they had contracted for themselves. In case of refusal, they were farther entreated to throw up their own agreement, and to conclude no other without the concurrence of the Corinthians. So far the Bœotians complied, as to go to Athens with the Corinthians, and back their application for an armistice, which the Athenians declined to grant, saying that the Corinthians were already included in the general peace, if they were allies of Sparta. On receiving this answer the Corinthians entreated the Bœotians, putting it as a matter of obligation, to renounce their own armistice, and make common cause as to all future compact. But this request was steadily refused. The Bœotians maintained their ten days' armistice; and the Corinthians were obliged to acquiesce in their existing condition of peace *de facto*, though not guaranteed by any pledge of Athens.¹

Thucyd. v. 32. Κορινθίους δὲ ἀνακωχῇ ἀσπονδούς ἦν πρὸς Ἀθηναίους

Meanwhile the Lacedæmonians were not unmindful of the affront which they had sustained by the revolt of Mantinea and Elis. At the request of a party among the Parrhasii, the Arcadian subjects of Mantinea, they marched under king Pleistoanax into that territory, and compelled the Mantineians to evacuate the fort which they had erected within it; which the latter were unable to defend, though they received a body of Argeian troops to guard their city, and were thus enabled to march their whole force to the threatened spot. Besides liberating the Arcadian subjects of Mantinea, the Lacedæmonians also planted an additional body of Helots and Neodamodes at Lepreum, as a defence and means of observation on the frontiers of Elis.¹ These were the Brasidean soldiers, whom Klearidas had now brought back from Thrace. The Helots among them had been manumitted as a reward, and allowed to reside where they chose. But as they had imbibed lessons of bravery under their distinguished commander, their presence would undoubtedly be dangerous among the serfs of Laconia: hence the disposition of the Lacedæmonians to plant them out. We may recollect that not very long before, they had caused two thousand of the most soldierly Helots to be secretly assassinated, without any ground of suspicion against these victims personally, but simply from fear of the whole body and of course greater fear of the bravest.²

Upon which Dr. Arnold remarks: "By ἀσπονδος is meant a mere agreement in words, not ratified by the solemnities of religion. And the Greeks, as we have seen, considered the breach of their word very different from the breach of their oath."

Not so much is here meant even as that which Dr. Arnold supposes. There was no agreement at all, either in words or by oath. There was a simple absence of hostilities, *de facto*, not arising out of any recognized pledge. Such is the meaning of ἀνακωχῇ, i. 66; iii. 25, 26.

The answer here made by the Athenians to the application of Corinth is not easy to understand. They might, with much better reason, have declined to conclude the ten days' armistice with the Bœotians, because these latter still remained allies of Sparta, though refusing to accede to the general peace; whereas the Corinthians, having joined Argos, had less right to be considered allies of Sparta. Nevertheless, we shall still find them attending the meetings at Sparta, and acting as allies of the latter.

¹ Thucyd. v. 33, 34. The Neodamodes were Helots previously enfranchised, or the sons of such.

² Thucyd. iv. 80.

It was not only against danger from the returning Brasidean Helots that the Lacedæmonians had to guard, but also against danger — real or supposed — from their own Spartan captives, liberated by Athens at the conclusion of the recent alliance. Though the surrender of Sphacteria had been untarnished by any dishonor, nevertheless these men could hardly fail to be looked upon as degraded, in the eyes of Spartan pride; or at least they might fancy that they were so looked upon, and thus become discontented. Some of them were already in the exercise of various functions, when the ephors contracted suspicions of their designs, and condemned them all to temporary disqualification for any official post, placing the whole of their property under trust-management, and interdicting them, like minors, from every act either of purchase or sale.¹ This species of disfranchisement lasted for a considerable time; but the sufferers were at length relieved from it, the danger being supposed to be over. The nature of the interdict confirms, what we know directly from Thucydides, that many of these captives were among the first and wealthiest families in the state, and the ephors may have apprehended that they would employ their wealth in acquiring partisans and organizing revolt among the Helots. We have no facts to enable us to appreciate the situation; but the ungenerous spirit of the regulation, as applied to brave warriors recently come home from a long imprisonment — justly pointed out by modern historians — would not weigh much with the ephors under any symptoms of public danger.

Of the proceedings of the Athenians during this summer we hear nothing, except that the town of Skiônê at length surrendered to them after a long-continued blockade, and that they put to death the male population of military age, selling the women and children into slavery. The odium of having proposed this cruel resolution two years and a half before, belongs to Kleon; that of executing it, nearly a year after his death, to the leaders who succeeded him, and to his countrymen generally. The reader will, however, now be sufficiently accustomed to the Greek laws of war not to be surprised at such treatment against

¹ Thucyd. v, 34. Ἀτίμους ἐποίησαν, ἀτιμίαν δὲ τοιαύτην, ὥστε οὔτε ἄρχαι οὔτε πριαμένους τι, ἢ πωλοῦντας, κυρίους εἶναι.

subjects revolted and reconquered. Skiônê and its territory was made over to the Platean refugees. The native population of Delos, also, who had been removed from that sacred spot during the preceding year, under the impression that they were too impure for the discharge of the sacerdotal functions, were now restored to their island. The subsequent defeat of Amphipolis had created a belief at Athens that this removal had offended the gods; under which impression, confirmed by the Delphian oracle, the Athenians now showed their repentance by restoring the Delian exiles.¹ They farther lost the towns of Thyssus on the peninsula of Athos, and Mekyberna on the Sithonian gulf, which were captured by the Chalkidians of Thrace.²

Meanwhile the political relations throughout the powerful Grecian states remained all provisional and undetermined. The alliance still subsisted between Sparta and Athens, yet with continual complaints on the part of the latter that the prior treaty remained unfulfilled. The members of the Spartan confederacy were discontented; some had seceded, and others seemed likely to do the same; while Argos, ambitious to supplant Sparta, was trying to put herself at the head of a new confederacy, though as yet with very partial success. Hitherto, however, the authorities of Sparta — king Pleistoanax as well as the ephors of the year — had been sincerely desirous to maintain the Athenian alliance, so far as it could be done without sacrifice, and without the real employment of force against recusants, of which they had merely talked in order to amuse the Athenians. Moreover, the prodigious advantage which they had gained by recovering the prisoners, doubtless making them very popular at home, would attach them the more firmly to their own measure. But at the close of the summer — seemingly about the end of September or beginning of October, B.C. 421 — the year of these ephors expired, and new ephors were nominated for the ensuing year. Under the existing state of things this was an important revolution: for out of the five new ephors, two — Kleobûlus and Xenarês — were decidedly hostile to peace with Athens, and

¹ Thucyd. v, 32.

² Thucyd. v, 35-39. I agree with Dr. Thirlwall and Dr. Arnold in preferring the conjecture of Porpo, Χαλκιδῆς, in this place.

the remaining three apparently indifferent.¹ And we may here remark, that this fluctuation and instability of public policy, which is often denounced as if it were the peculiar attribute of a democracy, occurs quite as much under the constitutional monarchy of Sparta, the least popular government in Greece, both in principle and detail.

The new ephors convened a special congress at Sparta for the settlement of the pending differences, at which among the rest Athenian, Bœotian, and Corinthian envoys were all present. But, after prolonged debates, no approach was made to agreement; so that the congress was on the point of breaking up, when Kleobûlus and Xenarês, together with many of their partisans,² originated, in concert with the Bœotian and Corinthian deputies, a series of private underhand manœuvres for the dissolution of the Athenian alliance. This was to be effected by bringing about a separate alliance between Argos and Sparta, which the Spartans sincerely desired, and would grasp at in preference, so these ephors affirmed, even if it cost them the breach of their new tie with Athens. The Bœotians were urged, first to become allies of Argos themselves, and then to bring Argos into alliance with Sparta. But it was farther essential that they should give up Panaktum to Sparta, so that it might be tendered to the Athenians in exchange for Pylos; for Sparta could not easily go to war with them while they remained masters of the latter.³

Such were the plans which Kleobûlus and Xenarês laid with the Corinthian and Bœotian deputies, and which the latter went home prepared to execute. Chance seemed to favor the purpose at once: for on their road home, they were accosted by two Argeians, senators in their own city, who expressed an earnest anxiety to bring about alliance between the Bœotians and Argos. The Bœotian deputies, warmly encouraging this idea, urged the Argeians to send envoys to Thebes as solicitors of the alliance; and communicated to the bœotarchs, on their arrival at home, both the plans laid by the Spartan ephors and the wishes of these

¹ Thucyd. v, 36.

² Thucyd. v, 37. ἐπεσταλμένοι ἀπὸ τε τοῦ Κλεοβούλου καὶ Ξενάρους καὶ ὅσοι ὦντες ἦσαν αὐτοῖς, etc.

³ Thucyd. v, 36.

Argeians. The bœotarchs also entered heartily into the entire scheme; receiving the Argeian envoys with marked favor, and promising, as soon as they should have obtained the requisite sanction, to send envoys of their own and ask for alliance with Argos.

That sanction was to be obtained from "the Four Senates of the Bœotians;" bodies, of the constitution of which nothing is known. But they were usually found so passive and acquiescent that the bœotarchs, reckoning upon their assent as a matter of course, even without any full exposition of reasons, laid all their plans accordingly.¹ They proposed to these four Senates a resolution in general terms, empowering themselves in the name of the Bœotian federation to exchange oaths of alliance with any Grecian city which might be willing to contract on terms mutually beneficial: their particular object being, as they stated, to form alliance with the Corinthians, Megarians, and Chalkidians of Thrace, for mutual defence, and for war as well as peace with others only by common consent. To this specific object they anticipated no resistance on the part of the Senates, inasmuch as their connection with Corinth had always been intimate, while the position of the four parties named was the same, all being recusants of the recent peace. But the resolution was advisedly couched in the most comprehensive terms, in order that it might authorize them to proceed farther afterwards, and conclude alliance on the part of the Bœotians and Megarians with Argos; that ulterior purpose being however for the present kept back, because alliance with Argos was a novelty which might surprise and alarm the Senates. The manœuvre, skilfully contrived for entrapping these bodies into an approval of measures which they never contemplated, illustrates the manner in which an oligarchical executive could elude the checks devised to control its proceedings. But the bœotarchs, to their astonishment, found themselves defeated at the outset: for the Senates would not even hear of alliance with Corinth, so much did they fear to offend Sparta by any special connection with a city which had

¹ Thucyd. v, 38. οἰόμενοι τὴν βουλὴν, κὰν μὴ εἰπωσιν, οὐκ ἄλλα ψηφιεῖσθαι ἢ ἂν οἱ συμβουλεύοντες πείθονται. . . ταῖς τέσσαρσι βουλαῖς τῶν Βοιωτῶν αἰπερ ἅπαν τὸ κύρος ἐχέουσι.

revolted from her. Nor did the *bœotarchs* think it safe to divulge their communications with *Kleobûlus* and *Xenarês*, or to acquaint the *Senates* that the whole plan originated with a powerful party in *Sparta* herself. Accordingly, under this formal refusal on the part of the *Senates*, no farther proceedings could be taken. The *Corinthian* and *Chalkidian* envoys left *Thebes*, while the promise of sending *Bœotian* envoys to *Argos* remained unexecuted.¹

But the anti-Athenian ephors at *Sparta*, though baffled in their schemes for arriving at the *Argeian* alliance through the agency of the *Bœotians*, did not the less persist in their views upon *Panaktum*. That place — a frontier fortress in the mountainous range between *Attica* and *Bœotia*, apparently on the *Bœotian* side of *Phylê*, and on or near the direct road from *Athens* to *Thebes* which led through *Phylê*² — had been an *Athensian* possession, until six months before the peace, when it had been treacherously betrayed to the *Bœotians*.³ A special provision of the treaty between *Athens* and *Sparta*, prescribed that it should be restored to *Athens*; and *Lacedæmonian* envoys were now sent on an express mission to *Bœotia*, to request from the *Bœotians* the delivery of *Panaktum* as well as of their *Athenian* captives, in order that by tendering these to *Athens* she might be induced to surrender *Pylos*. The *Bœotians* refused compliance with this request, except on condition that *Sparta* should enter into special alliance with them as she had done with the *Athenians*. Now the *Spartans* stood pledged by their covenant with the latter, either by its terms or by its recognized import, not to enter into any new alliance without their consent. But they were eagerly bent upon getting possession of *Panaktum*; while the prospect of breach with *Athens*, far from being a deterring motive, was exactly that which *Kleobûlus* and *Xenarês* desired. Under these feelings, the *Lacedæmonians* consented to and swore the special alliance with *Bœotia*. But the *Bœotians*, instead of handing over *Panaktum* for surrender, as they had promised, immediately razed the fortress to the ground; under pretence of some ancient

¹ *Thucyd.* v. 38.

² See *Colonel Leake, Travels in Northern Greece*, vol. ii, ch. xvii, p. 273.

³ *Thucyd.* v. 3.

paths which had been exchanged between their ancestors and the *Athenians*, to the effect that the district round it should always remain without resident inhabitants, as a neutral strip of borderland, and under common pasture.

These negotiations, after having been in progress throughout the winter, ended in the accomplishment of the alliance and the destruction of *Panaktum* at the beginning of spring or about the middle of March. And while the *Lacedæmonian* ephors thus seemed to be carrying their point on the side of *Bœotia*, they were agreeably surprised by an unexpected encouragement to their views from another quarter. An embassy arrived at *Sparta* from *Argos*, to solicit renewal of the peace just expiring. The *Argeians* found that they made no progress in the enlargement of their newly-formed confederacy, while their recent disappointment with the *Bœotians* made them despair of realizing their ambitious projects of *Peloponnesian* headship. But when they learned that the *Lacedæmonians* had concluded a separate alliance with the *Bœotians*, and that *Panaktum* had been razed, their disappointment was converted into positive alarm for the future. Naturally inferring that this new alliance would not have been concluded except in concert with *Athens*, they interpreted the whole proceeding as indicating that *Sparta* had prevailed upon the *Bœotians* to accept the peace with *Athens*, the destruction of *Panaktum* being conceived as a compromise to obviate disputes respecting possession. Under such a persuasion, — noway unreasonable in itself, when the two contracting governments, both oligarchical and both secret, furnished no collateral evidence to explain their real intent, — the *Argeians* saw themselves excluded from alliance not merely with *Bœotia*, *Sparta*, and *Tegea*, but also with *Athens*; which latter city they had hitherto regarded as a sure resort in case of hostility with *Sparta*. Without a moment's delay, they despatched *Eustrophus* and *Æson*, two *Argeians* much esteemed at *Sparta*, and perhaps *proxeni* of that city, to press for a renewal of their expiring truce with the *Spartans*, and to obtain the best terms they could.

To the *Lacedæmonian* ephors this application was eminently acceptable, the very event which they had been manœuvring underhand to bring about: and negotiations were opened, in which the *Argeian* envoys at first proposed that the disputed

possession of Thyrea should be referred to arbitration. But they found their demand met by a peremptory negative, the Lacedæmonians refusing to enter upon such a discussion, and insisting upon simple renewal of the peace now at an end. At last the Argeian envoys, eagerly bent upon keeping the question respecting Thyrea open, in some way or other, prevailed upon the Lacedæmonians to assent to the following singular agreement. Peace was concluded between Athens and Sparta for fifty years; but if at any moment within that interval, excluding either periods of epidemic or periods of war, it should suit the views of either party to provoke a combat by chosen champions of equal number for the purpose of determining the right to Thyrea, there was to be full liberty of doing so; the combat to take place within the territory of Thyrea itself, and the victors to be interdicted from pursuing the vanquished beyond the undisputed border of either territory. It will be recollected, that about one hundred and twenty years before this date, there had been a combat of this sort by three hundred champions on each side, in which, after desperate valor on both sides, the victory as well as the disputed right still remained undetermined. The proposition made by the Argeians was a revival of this old practice of judicial combat: nevertheless, such was the alteration which the Greek mind had undergone during the interval, that it now appeared a perfect absurdity, even in the eyes of the Lacedæmonians, the most old-fashioned people in Greece.¹ Yet since they hazarded nothing, practically, by so vague a concession, and were supremely anxious to make their relations smooth with Argos, in contemplation of a breach with Athens, they at last agreed to the condition, drew up the treaty, and placed it in the hands of the envoys to carry back to Argos. Formal acceptance and ratification, by the Argeian public assembly, was necessary to give it validity: should this be granted, the envoys were invited to return to Sparta at

¹ Thucyd. v. 41. Τοῖς δὲ Λακεδαιμονίοις τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ἔδοκει μωρία εἶναι ταῦτα· ἔπειτα (ἐπεθύμουν γὰρ τὸ Ἄργος παντὶ φίλιον ἔχειν) ξυνεχώρησαν ὅς οἱ ἤξιον, καὶ ξυνεγράψαντο.

By the forms of treaty which remain, we are led to infer that the treaty was not subscribed by any signatures, but drawn up by the secretary or authorized officer, and ultimately engraved on a column. The names of those who take the oath are recorded, but seemingly no official signature.

the festival of the Hyakinthia, and there go through the solemnity of the oaths.

Amidst such strange crossing of purposes and interests, the Spartan ephors seemed now to have carried all their points; friendship with Argos, breach with Athens, and yet the means — through the possession of Panaktum — of procuring from Athens the cession of Pylos. But they were not yet on firm ground. For when their deputies, Andromedês and two colleagues, arrived in Bœotia for the purpose of going on to Athens and prosecuting the negotiation about Panaktum, at the time when Eustrophus and Æson were carrying on their negotiation at Sparta, they discovered for the first time that the Bœotians, instead of performing their promise to hand over Panaktum, had razed it to the ground. This was a serious blow to their chance of success at Athens: nevertheless, Andromedês proceeded thither, taking with him all the Athenian captives in Bœotia. These he restored at Athens, at the same time announcing the demolition of Panaktum as a fact: Panaktum as well as the prisoners was thus restored, he pretended; for the Athenians would not now find a single enemy in the place: and he claimed the cession of Pylos in exchange.¹

But he soon found that the final term of Athenian compliance had been reached. It was probably on this occasion that the separate alliance concluded between Sparta and the Bœotians first became discovered at Athens; since not only were the proceedings of these oligarchical governments habitually secret, but there was a peculiar motive for keeping this alliance concealed until the discussion about Panaktum and Pylos had been brought to a close. Both this alliance, and the demolition of Panaktum, excited among the Athenians the strongest marks of disgust and anger; aggravated probably rather than softened by the quibble of Andromedês, that demolition of the fort, being tantamount to restitution, and precluding any farther tenancy by the enemy, was a substantial satisfaction of the treaty; and aggravated still farther by the recollection of all the other unperformed items in the treaty. A whole year had now elapsed, amidst frequent notes and protocols, to employ a modern phrase; yet not one of

¹ Thucyd. v. 42.

the conditions favorable to Athens had yet been executed, except the restitution of her captives, seemingly not many in number; while she on her side had made to Sparta the capital cession on which almost everything hinged. A long train of accumulated indignation, brought to a head by this mission of Andromedês, discharged itself in the harshest dismissal and rebuke of himself and his colleagues.¹

Even Nikias, Lachês, and the other leading men, to whose improvident facility and misjudgment the embarrassment of the moment was owing, were probably not much behind the general public in exclamation against Spartan perfidy, if it were only to divert attention from their own mistake. But there was one of them — Alkibiadês son of Kleinias — who took this opportunity of putting himself at the head of the vehement anti-Laconian sentiment which now agitated the ekklesia, and giving to it a substantive aim.

The present is the first occasion on which we hear of this remarkable man as taking a prominent part in public life. He was now about thirty-one or thirty-two years old, which in Greece was considered an early age for a man to exercise important command. But such was the splendor, wealth, and antiquity of his family, of Æakid lineage through the heroes Eurysakês and Ajax, and such the effect of that lineage upon the democratical public of Athens,² that he stepped speedily and easily into a conspicuous station. Belonging also through his mother Deino-machê to the gens of the Alkmæonidæ, he was related to Periklês, who became his guardian when he was left an orphan at about five years old, along with his younger brother Kleinias. It was at that time that their father Kleinias was slain at the battle of Koroneia, having already served with honor in a trireme of his

¹ Thucyd. v. 42.

² Thucyd. v. 43. Ἀλκιβιάδης . . . ἀνὴρ ἡλικίᾳ μὲν ὢν ἐτι τότε νεός, ὡς ἐν ἄλλῃ πόλει, ἀξιώματι δὲ προγόνων τιμώμενος.

The expression of Plutarch, however, ἐτι μενῶν, seems an exaggeration (Alkibiad. c. 10).

Kritias and Chariklês, in reply to the question of Sokratês, whom they had forbidden to converse with or teach young men, defined a *young man* to be one under thirty years of age, the senatorial age at Athens (Xenophon Memor. i. 2. 35).

own at the seafight of Artemisium against the Persians. A Spartan nurse named Amykla was provided for the young Alkibiadês, and a slave named Zopyrus chosen by his distinguished guardian to watch over him; but even his boyhood was utterly ungovernable, and Athens was full of his freaks and enormities, to the unavailing regret of Periklês and his brother Ariphron.¹ His violent passions, love of enjoyment, ambition of preëminence, and insolence towards others,² were manifested at an early age, and never deserted him throughout his life. His finished beauty of person both as boy, youth, and mature man, caused him to be much run after by women,³ and even by women of generally reserved habits. Moreover, even before the age when such temptations were usually presented, the beauty of his earlier youth, while going through the ordinary gymnastic training, procured for him assiduous caresses, compliments, and solicitations of every sort, from the leading Athenians who frequented the public palæstræ. These men not only endured his petulance, but were even flattered when he would condescend to bestow it upon them. Amidst such universal admiration and indulgence, amidst corrupting influences exercised from so many quarters and from so early an age, combined with great wealth and the highest position, it was not likely that either self-restraint or regard for the welfare of others would ever acquire development in the mind of Alkibiadês. The anecdotes which fill his biography reveal the utter absence of both these constituent elements of morality; and though, in regard to the particular stories, allowance must doubtless be made for scandal and exaggeration, yet the general type

¹ Plato, Protagoras, c. 10, p. 320; Plutarch, Alkibiad. c. 2, 3, 4; Isokratês, De Bigis, Orat. xvi, p. 353, sect. 33, 34; Cornel. Nepos, Alkibiad. c. 1.

² Πέπονθα δὲ πρὸς τοῦτον (Σωκράτη) μόνον ἀνθρώπων, ὃ οὐκ ἂν τις οἶοιτο ἐν ἐμοὶ ἐνεῖναι, τὸ αἰσχύνεσθαι ὀντινοῦν.

This is a part of the language which Plato puts into the mouth of Alkibiadês, in the Symposium, c. 32, p. 216; see also Plato Alkibiad. i, c. 1, 2, 3. Compare his other contemporary, Xenophon, Memor. i, 2, 16-25.

Φύσει δὲ πολλῶν ὄντων καὶ μεγάλων πάθων ἐν αὐτῷ τὸ φιλόνηκον ἰσχυρότατον ἦν καὶ τὸ φιλόπρωτον, ὡς δὴλόν ἐστι τοῖς παιδικοῖς ὑπομνήμασι (Plutarch, Alkib. c. 2).

³ I translate, with some diminution of the force of the words, the expression of a contemporary author, Xenophon, Memorab. i, 2. 24. Ἀλκιβιάδης, αὐτὸς διὰ τὴν καλλοῦ ἐπὶ πολλῶν καὶ σεμνῶν γυναικῶν θηρώμενος, etc.

of character stands plainly marked and sufficiently established in all.

A dissolute life, and an immoderate love of pleasure in all its forms, is what we might naturally expect from a young man so circumstanced; and it appears that with him these tastes were indulged with an offensive publicity which destroyed the comfort of his wife Hipparetê, daughter of Hipponikus who was slain at the battle of Delium. She had brought him a large dowry of ten talents: when she sought a divorce, as the law of Athens permitted, Alkibiadês violently interposed to prevent her from obtaining the benefit of the law, and brought her back by force to his house even from the presence of the magistrate. It is this violence of selfish passion, and reckless disregard of social obligation towards every one, which forms the peculiar characteristic of Alkibiadês. He strikes the schoolmaster whose house he happens to find unprovided with a copy of Homer; he strikes Taureas,¹ a rival chorêgus, in the public theatre, while the representation is going on; he strikes Hipponikus, who afterwards became his father-in-law, out of a wager of mere wantonness, afterwards appeasing him by an ample apology; he protects the Thasian poet Hêgêmôn, against whom an indictment had been formally lodged before the archon, by effacing it with his own hand from the published list in the public edifice, called Metrôon; defying both magistrate and accuser to press the cause on for trial.² Nor does it appear that any injured person ever dared to bring Alkibiadês to trial before the dikastery, though we read with amazement the tissue of lawlessness³ which marked his private life;

¹ Demosthen. cont. Meidiam, c. 49; Thucyd. vi. 16; Antipho apud Athenæum, xii, p. 525.

² Athenæus, ix, p. 407.

³ Thucyd. vi. 15. I translate the expression of Thucydides, which is of great force and significance — φοβηθέντες γὰρ αὐτοῦ οἱ πολλοὶ τὸ μέγεθος τῆς τε κατὰ τὸ ἐαυτοῦ σώμα παρὰ νομίας ἐς τὴν διαίταν, etc. The same word is repeated by the historian, vi, 28. τὴν ἄλλην αὐτοῦ ἐς τὰ ἐπιτηδεύματα οὐ δημοτικὴν παρὰ νομίαν.

The same phrase is also found in the short extract from the *λοιδορία* of Antipho (Athenæus, xii, p. 525).

The description of Alkibiadês, given in that Discourse called the *Ἐρωτικὸς Λόγος*, erroneously ascribed to Demosthenês (c. 12, p. 1414), is more

a combination of insolence and ostentation with occasional mean deceit when it suited his purpose. But amidst the perfect legal, judicial, and constitutional equality, which reigned among the citizens of Athens, there still remained great social inequalities between one man and another, handed down from the times preceding the democracy: inequalities which the democratical institutions limited in their practical mischiefs, but never either effaced or discredited, and which were recognized as modifying elements in the current, unconscious vein of sentiment and criticism, by those whom they injured as well as by those whom they favored. In the speech which Thucydides¹ ascribes to Alkibiadês before the

discriminating than we commonly find in rhetorical compositions. Τοῦτο δ', Ἀλκιβιάδην εὐρήσεις φῶσει μὲν πρὸς ἀρετὴν πολλῶ χειρὸν διακείμενον, καὶ τὰ μὲν ὑπερηφανῶς, τὰ δὲ ταπεινῶς, τὸ δ' ὑπεράκρως, ζῆν προσηγμένον ἀπὸ δὲ τῆς Σωκράτους ὁμιλίας πολλὰ μὲν ἐπενορθώθεντα τοῦ βίου, τὰ δὲ λοιπὰ τῷ μεγέθει τῶν ἄλλων ἔργων ἐπικρυφάμενον.

Of the three epithets, whereby the author describes the bad tendencies of Alkibiadês, full illustrations will be seen in his proceedings, hereafter to be described. The improving influence here ascribed to Sokratês is unfortunately far less borne out.

¹ Plutarch, Alkibiad. c. 4; Cornel. Nepos, Alkibiad. c. 2; Plato, Protagoras, c. 1.

I do not know how far the memorable narrative ascribed to Alkibiadês in the Symposium of Plato (c. 33, 34, pp. 216, 217) can be regarded as matter of actual fact and history, so far as Sokratês is concerned; but it is abundant proof in regard to the general relations of Alkibiadês with others: compare Xenophon, Memorab. i, 2, 29, 30; iv, 1-2.

Several of the dialogues of Plato present to us striking pictures of the palaestra, with the boys, the young men, the gymnastic teachers, engaged in their exercises or resting from them, and the philosophers and spectators who came there for amusement and conversation. See particularly the opening chapters of the Lysis and the Charmidês; also the Rêtales, where the scene is laid in the house of a γραμματιστής, or schoolmaster. In the Lysis, Sokratês professes to set his own conversation with these interesting youths as an antidote to the corrupting flatteries of most of those who sought to gain their good-will. Οὕτω χρὴ, ὡς ἱππόθαλες, τοῖς παιδικοῖς διαλέγεσθαι ταπεινοῦντα καὶ συστέλλοντα, ἀλλὰ μὴ, ὥσπερ σὺ, χαννοῦντα καὶ διαθροῦντα (Lysis, c. 7, p. 210).

See, in illustration of what is here said about Alkibiadês as a youth, Euripid. Supplic. 906 (about Parthenopæus), and the beautiful lines in the *Atys* of Catullus, 60-69.

There cannot be a doubt that the characters of all the Greek youth of any pretensions were considerably affected by this society and conversation.

Athenian public assembly, we find the insolence of wealth and high social position not only admitted as a fact, but vindicated as a just morality; and the history of his life, as well as many other facts in Athenian society, show that if not approved, it was at least tolerated in practice to a serious extent, in spite of the restraints of the democracy.

Amidst such unprincipled exorbitances of behavior, Alkibiadēs stood distinguished for personal bravery. He served as a hoplite in the army under Phormion at the siege of Potidæa in 432 B.C. Though then hardly twenty years of age, he was among the most forward soldiers in the battle, received a severe wound, and was in great danger; owing his life only to the exertions of Sokratēs, who served in the ranks along with him. Eight years afterwards, Alkibiadēs also served with credit in the cavalry at the battle of Delium, and had the opportunity of requiting his obligation to Sokratēs, by protecting him against the Bæotian pursuers. As a rich young man, also, choregy and trierarchy became incumbent upon him; expensive duties, which, as we might expect, he discharged not merely with sufficiency, but with ostentation. In fact, expenditure of this sort, though compulsory up to a certain point upon all rich men, was so fully repaid, to all those who had the least ambition, in the shape of popularity and influence, that most of them spontaneously went beyond the requisite minimum for the purpose of showing themselves off. The first appearance of Alkibiadēs in public life is said to have been as a donor, for some special purpose, in the ekklesia, when various citizens were handing in their contributions: and the loud applause which his subscription provoked was at that time so novel and exciting to him, that he suffered a tame quail which he carried in his bosom to escape. This incident excited mirth and sympathy among the citizens present: the bird was caught and restored to him by Antiochus, who from that time forward acquired his favor, and in after days became his pilot and confidential lieutenant.¹

To a young man like Alkibiadēs, thirsting for power and pre-

of their boyish years; though the subject is one upon which the full evidence cannot well be produced and discussed.

¹ Plutarch, Alkibiadēs, c. 10.

eminent, a certain measure of rhetorical facility and persuasive power was indispensable. With a view to this acquisition, he frequented the society of various sophistical and rhetorical teachers,¹ Prodikus, Protagoras, and others; but most of all that of Sokratēs. His intimacy with Sokratēs has become celebrated on many grounds, and is commemorated both by Plato and Xenophon, though unfortunately with less instruction than we could desire. We may readily believe Xenophon, when he tells us that Alkibiadēs — like the oligarchical Kritias, of whom we shall have much to say hereafter — was attracted to Sokratēs by his unrivalled skill of dialectical conversation, his suggestive influence over the minds of his hearers, in eliciting new thoughts and combinations, his mastery of apposite and homely illustrations, his power of seeing far beforehand the end of a long cross-examination, his ironical affectation of ignorance, whereby the humiliation of opponents was rendered only the more complete, when they were convicted of inconsistency and contradiction out of their own answers. The exhibitions of such ingenuity were in themselves highly interesting, and stimulating to the mental activity of listeners, while the faculty itself was one of peculiar value to those who proposed to take the lead in public debate; with which view both these ambitious young men tried to catch the knack from Sokratēs,² and to copy his formidable string of

¹ See the description in the Protagoras of Plato, c. 8, p. 317.

² See Xenophon, Memorab. i, 2, 12-24, 39-47.

Κριτίας μὲν καὶ Ἀλκιβιάδης, οὐκ ἀρέσκοντες αὐτοῖς Σωκράτους, ὁμιλήσάτην, ὅν χρόνον ὁμιλείτην αὐτῷ, ἀλλ' εὐθὺς ἐξ ἀρχῆς ὁρμηκότε προσεσθάναι τῆς πόλεως. Ἐτι γὰρ Σωκράτει ξυνόντες οὐκ ἄλλοις τισι μᾶλλον ἐπεχείρουν διαλέγεσθαι ἢ τοῖς μάλιστα πράττονσι τὰ πολιτικά... Ἐπεὶ τοίνυν τάχιστα τῶν πολιτευομένων ὑπέλαβον κρείττονες εἶναι, Σωκράτει μὲν οὐκ ἐτι προσήεσαν, οὐδὲ γὰρ αὐτοῖς ἄλλως ἤρεσκεν· εἴτε προσέλθοιεν, ὑπὲρ ὧν, ἡμάρτανον ἐλεγχόμενοι ἤχθοντο· τὰ δὲ τῆς πόλεως ἐπραττον, ὥνπερ ἐνεκεν καὶ Σωκράτει προσῆλθον. Compare Plato, Apolog. Sokrat. c. 10, p. 23; c. 22, p. 33.

Xenophon represents Alkibiadēs and Kritias as frequenting the society of Sokratēs, for the same reason and with the same objects as Plato affirms that young men generally went to the Sophists: see Plato, Sophist. c. 20, p. 232 D.

¹ Nam et Socrati (observes Quintilian, Inst. Or. ii, 16) objiciunt comici docere eum, quomodo pejorem causam meliorem reddat; et contra Tisiaia et Gorgiam similia dicit polliceri Plato."

interrogations. Both of them doubtless involuntarily respected the poor, self-sufficing, honest, temperate, and brave citizen, in whom this eminent talent resided; especially Alkibiadēs, who not only owed his life to the generous valor of Sokratēs at Potidæa, but had also learned in that service to admire the iron physical frame of the philosopher in his armor, enduring hunger, cold, and hardship.¹ But we are not to suppose that either of them came to Sokratēs with the purpose of hearing and obeying his precepts on matters of duty, or receiving from him a new plan of life. They came partly to gratify an intellectual appetite, partly to acquire a stock of words and ideas, with facility of argumentative handling, suitable for their after-purpose as public speakers. Subjects moral, political, and intellectual, served as the theme sometimes of discourse, sometimes of discussion, in the society of all these sophists, Prodikus and Protagoras not less than Sokratēs; for in the Athenian sense of the word, Sokratēs was a sophist as well as the others: and to the rich youths of Athens, like Alkibiadēs and Kritias, such society was highly useful.² It imparted a nobler aim to their ambition, including

The representation given by Plato of the great influence acquired by Sokratēs over Alkibiadēs, and of the deference and submission of the latter, is plainly not to be taken as historical, even if we had not the more simple and trustworthy picture of Xenophon. Isokratēs goes so far as to say that Sokratēs was never known by any one as teacher of Alkibiadēs: which is an exaggeration in the other direction. Isokratēs, *Buciris*, Or. xi, sect. 6, p. 222.

¹ Plato, *Symposium*, c. 35-36, p. 220, etc.

² See the representation, given in the *Protagoras* of Plato, of the temper in which the young and wealthy Hippokratēs goes to seek instruction from Protagoras, and of the objects which Protagoras proposes to himself in imparting the instruction. Plato, *Protagoras*, c. 2, p. 310 D.; c. 8, p. 316 C.; c. 9, p. 318, etc.: compare also Plato, *Meno*, p. 91, and *Gorgias*, c. 4, p. 449 E., asserting the connection, in the mind of Gorgias, between teaching to speak and teaching to think — *ἀρετὴ καὶ ῥητορικὴ*, etc.

It would not be reasonable to repeat, as true and just, all the polemical charges against those who are called Sophists, even as we find them in Plato, without scrutiny and consideration. But modern writers on Grecian affairs run down the Sophists even more than Plato did, and take no notice of the admissions in their favor which he, though their opponent, is perpetually making.

This is a very extensive subject, to which I hope to revert.

mental accomplishments as well as political success. it enlarged the range of their understandings, and opened to them as ample a vein of literature and criticism as the age afforded: it accustomed them to canvass human conduct, with the causes and obstructions of human well-being, both public and private: it even suggested to them indirectly lessons of duty and prudence, from which their social position tended to estrange them, and which they would hardly have submitted to hear except from the lips of one whom they intellectually admired. In learning to talk, they were forced to learn more or less to think, and familiarized with the difference between truth and error: nor would an eloquent lecturer fail to enlist their feelings in the great topics of morals and politics. Their thirst for mental stimulus and rhetorical accomplishments had thus, as far as it went, a moralizing effect, though this was rarely their purpose in the pursuit.¹

¹ I dissent entirely from the judgment of Dr. Thirlwall, who repeats what is the usual representation of Sokratēs and the Sophists, depicting Alkibiadēs as "ensnared by the Sophists," while Sokratēs is described as a good genius preserving him from their corruptions (*Hist. of Greece*, vol. iii, ch. xxiv, pp. 312, 313, 314). I think him also mistaken when he distinguishes so pointedly Sokratēs from the Sophists; when he describes the Sophists as "pretenders to wisdom;" as "a new school;" as "teaching that there was no real difference between truth and falsehood, right and wrong," etc.

All the plausibility that there is in this representation, arises from a confusion between the original sense and the modern sense of the word Sophist; the latter seemingly first bestowed upon the word by Plato and Aristotle. In the common ancient acceptation of the word at Athens, it meant not a school of persons professing common doctrines, but a class of men bearing the same name, because they derived their celebrity from analogous objects of study and common intellectual occupation. The Sophists were men of similar calling and pursuits, partly speculative, partly professional; but they differed widely from each other, both in method and doctrine. (See for example Isokratēs, *cont. Sophistas*, Orat. xiii; Plato, *Meno*, p. 87 B.) Whoever made himself eminent in speculative pursuits, and communicated his opinions by public lecture, discussion, or conversation, was called a Sophist, whatever might be the conclusions which he sought to expound or defend. The difference between taking money, and expounding gratuitously, on which Sokratēs himself was so fond of dwelling (*Xenoph. Memor.* i, 6, 12), has plainly no essential bearing on the case. When Æschinēs the orator reminds the dikasts, "Recollect that you Athenians put to death the Sophist Sokratēs, because he was shown to have been the

Alkibiadēs, full of impulse and ambition of every kind, enjoyed the conversation of all the eminent talkers and lecturers to

teacher of Kritias," (Æschin. cont. Timarch. c. 34, p. 74,) he uses the word in its natural and true Athenian sense. He had no point to make against Sokratēs, who had then been dead more than forty years; but he describes him by his profession or occupation, just as he would have said, *Hippokratēs the physician*, *Pheidias the sculptor*, etc. Dionysius of Halikarn. calls both Plato and Isokratēs sophists (Ars Rhetor. De Compos. Verborum. p. 208 R.). The Nubes of Aristophanēs, and the defences put forth by Plato and Xenophon, show that Sokratēs was not only called by the name Sophist, but regarded just in the same light as that in which Dr. Thirlwall presents to us what he calls "the new School of the Sophists;" as "a corruptor of youth, indifferent to truth or falsehood, right or wrong," etc. See a striking passage in the Politicus of Plato, c. 38, p. 299 B. Whoever thinks, as I think, that these accusations were falsely advanced against Sokratēs, will be careful how he advances them against the general profession to which Sokratēs belonged.

That there were unprincipled and immoral men among the class of Sophists—as there are and always have been among schoolmasters, professors, lawyers, etc., and all bodies of men—I do not doubt; in what proportion, we cannot determine. But the extreme hardship of passing a sweeping condemnation on the great body of intellectual teachers at Athens, and canonizing exclusively Sokratēs and his followers, will be felt, when we recollect that the well-known Apologue, called the *Choice of Hercules*, was the work of the Sophist Prodikos, and his favorite theme of lecture (Xenophon, Memor. ii, 1, 21–34). To this day, that Apologue remains without a superior, for the impressive simplicity with which it presents one of the most important points of view of moral obligation: and it has been embodied in a greater number of books of elementary morality than anything of Sokratēs, Plato, or Xenophon. To treat the author of that Apologue, and the class to which he belonged, as teaching "that there was no real difference between right and wrong, truth and falsehood," etc., is a criticism not in harmony with the just and liberal tone of Dr. Thirlwall's history.

I will add that Plato himself, in a very important passage of the Republic (vi, c. 6, 7, pp. 492–493), refutes the imputation against the Sophists of being specially the corruptors of youth. He represents them as inculcating upon their youthful pupils that morality which was received as true and just in their age and society; nothing better, nothing worse. The grand corruptor, he says, is society itself; the Sophists merely repeat the voice and judgment of society. Without inquiring at present how far Plato or Sokratēs were right in condemning the received morality of their countrymen, I most fully accept his assertion that the great body of the contemporary professional teachers taught what was considered good morality among

be found in Athens, that of Sokratēs most of all and most frequently. The philosopher became greatly attached to him, and doubtless lost no opportunity of inculcating on him salutary lessons, as far as could be done, without disgusting the pride of a haughty and spoiled youth who was looking forward to the celebrity of public life. But unhappily his lessons never produced any serious effect, and ultimately became even distasteful to the pupil. The whole life of Alkibiadēs attests how faintly the sentiment of obligation, public or private, ever got footing in his mind; how much the ends which he pursued were dictated by overbearing vanity and love of aggrandizement. In the later part of life, Sokratēs was marked out to public hatred by his enemies, as having been the teacher of Alkibiadēs and Kritias. And if we could be so unjust as to judge of the morality of the teacher by that of these two pupils, we should certainly rank him among the worst of the Athenian sophists.

At the age of thirty-one or thirty-two, the earliest at which it was permitted to look forward to an ascendent position in public life, Alkibiadēs came forward with a reputation stained by private enormities, and with a number of enemies created by his insolent demeanor. But this did not hinder him from stepping into that position to which his rank, connections, and club-partisans, afforded him introduction; nor was he slow in displaying his extraordinary energy, decision, and capacity of command. From the beginning to the end of his eventful political life, he showed a combination of boldness in design, resource in contrivance, and vigor in execution, not surpassed by any one of his contemporary Greeks: and what distinguished him from all was his extraordinary flexibility of character¹ and consummate

the Athenian public: there were doubtless some who taught a better morality, others who taught a worse. And this may be said with equal truth of the great body of professional teachers in every age and nation.

Xenophon enumerates various causes to which he ascribes the corruption of the character of Alkibiadēs; wealth, rank, personal beauty, flatterers, etc.; but he does not name the Sophists among them (Memorab. i, 2, 24, 25).

¹ Cornel. Nepos, Alkibiad. c. 1; Satyrus apud Athenæum. xii, p. 534; Plutarch, Alkibiad. c. 23.

Ὁ γὰρ τοιοῦτον δεῖ, τοιοῦτος εἶμ' ἐγώ, says Odysseus, in the Philoklētēs of Sophoklēs.

power of adapting himself to new habits, new necessities, and new persons, whenever circumstances required. Like Themistoklēs, whom he resembled as well in ability and vigor as in want of public principle and in recklessness about means, Alkibiadēs was essentially a man of action. Eloquence was in him a secondary quality, subordinate to action; and though he possessed enough of it for his purposes, his speeches were distinguished only for pertinence of matter, often imperfectly expressed, at least according to the high standard of Athens.¹ But his career affords a memorable example of splendid qualities, both for action and command, ruined and turned into instruments of mischief by the utter want of morality, public and private. A strong tide of individual hatred was thus roused against him, as well from middling citizens whom he had insulted, as from rich men whom his ruinous ostentation outshone. For his exorbitant voluntary expenditure in the public festivals, transcending the

¹ I follow the criticism which Plutarch cites from Theophrastus, seemingly discriminating and measured: much more trustworthy than the vague eulogy of Nepos, or even of Demosthenēs (of course not from his own knowledge), upon the eloquence of Alkibiadēs (Plutarch, Alkib. c. 10); Plutarch, Reipubl. Gerend. Præcept. c. 8, p. 804.

Antisthenēs, companion and pupil of Sokratēs, and originator of what is called the Cynic philosophy, contemporary and personally acquainted with Alkibiadēs, was full of admiration for his extreme personal beauty, and pronounced him to be strong, manly, and audacious, but unschooled, ἀπαίδευτον. His scandals about the lawless life of Alkibiadēs, however, exceed what we can reasonably admit, even from a contemporary (Antisthenēs ap. Athenæum, v, p. 220, xii, v. 534). Antisthenēs had composed a dialogue called Alkibiadēs (Diog. Laërt. vi, 15).

See the collection of the Fragmenta Antisthenis (by A. G. Winckelmann, Zurich, 1842, pp. 17-19).

The comic writers of the day — Eupolis, Aristophanēs, Pherekratēs, and others — seem to have been abundant in their jests and libels against the excesses of Alkibiadēs, real or supposed. There was a tale, untrue, but current in comic tradition, that Alkibiadēs, who was not a man to suffer himself to be insulted with impunity, had drowned Eupolis in the sea, in revenge, for his comedy of the Bapta. See Meineke, Fragm. Com. Græc. Eupolidis Βάπται and Κόλακες (vol. ii, pp. 447-494), and Aristophanēs Τριφάλης, p. 1166; also Meineke's first volume, Historia Critica Comice Græc. pp. 124-136; and the Dissertat. xix, in Buttmann's *Mythologia, on the Bapta and the Cotytia*.

largest measure of private fortune, satisfied discerning men that he would reimburse himself by plundering the public, and even, if opportunity offered, by overthrowing¹ the constitution to make himself master of the persons and properties of his fellow-citizens. He never inspired confidence or esteem in any one; and sooner or later, among a public like that of Athens, so much accumulated odium and suspicion was sure to bring a public man to ruin, in spite of the strongest admiration for his capacity. He was always the object of very conflicting sentiments: "The Athenians desired him, hated him, but still wished to have him," was said in the latter years of his life by a contemporary poet; while we find also another pithy precept delivered in regard to him: "You ought not to keep a lion's whelp in your city at all; but, if you choose to keep him, you must submit yourself to his behavior."² Athens had to feel the force of his energy, as an exile and enemy, but the great harm which he did to her was in his capacity of adviser; awakening in his countrymen the same thirst for showy, rapacious, uncertain, perilous aggrandizement which dictated his own personal actions.

Mentioning Alkibiadēs now for the first time, I have somewhat anticipated on future chapters, in order to present a general idea of his character, hereafter to be illustrated. But at the moment which we have now reached (March, 420 B.C.) the lion's whelp was yet young, and had neither acquired his entire strength nor disclosed his full-grown claws.

He began to put himself forward as a party leader, seemingly not long before the Peace of Nikias. The political traditions hereditary in his family, as in that of his relation Periklēs, were democratical: his grandfather Alkibiadēs had been vehement in his opposition to the Peisistratids, and had even afterwards publicly renounced an established connection of hospitality with the

¹ Thucyd. vi, 15. Compare Plutarch, Reip. Ger. Præc. c. 4, p. 800. The sketch which Plato draws in the first three chapters of the ninth Book of the Republic, of the citizen who erects himself into a despot and enslaves his fellow-citizens, exactly suits the character of Alkibiadēs. See also the same treatise, vi, 6-8, pp. 491-494, and the preface of Schleiermacher to his translation of the Platonic dialogue called Alkibiadēs the first.

² Aristophan. Ranæ, 1445-1453; Plutarch, Alkibiadēs, c. 16; Plutarch, Nikias, c. 9.

Lacedæmonian government, from strong antipathy to them on political grounds. But Alkibiadēs himself, in commencing political life, departed from this family tradition, and presented himself as a partisan of oligarchical and philo-Laonian sentiment, doubtless far more consonant to his natural temper than the democratical. He thus started in the same general party with Nikias and Thessalus son of Kimôn, who afterwards became his bitter opponents; and it was in part probably to put himself on a par with them, that he took the marked step of trying to revive the ancient family tie of hospitality with Sparta, which his grandfather had broken off.¹

To promote this object, he displayed peculiar solicitude for the good treatment of the Spartan captives, during their detention at Athens. Many of them being of high family at Sparta, he naturally calculated upon their gratitude, as well as upon the favorable sympathies of their countrymen, whenever they should be restored. He advocated both the peace and the alliance with Sparta, and the restoration of her captives; and indeed not only advocated these measures, but tendered his services, and was eager to be employed, as the agent of Sparta for carrying them through at Athens. From these selfish hopes in regard to Sparta, and especially from the expectation of acquiring, through the agency of the restored captives, the title of Proxenus of Sparta, Alkibiadēs thus became a partisan of the blind and gratuitous philo-Laonian concessions of Nikias. But the captives on their return were either unable, or unwilling, to carry the point which he wished; while the authorities at Sparta rejected all his advances, not without a contemptuous sneer at the idea of confiding important political interests to the care of a youth chiefly known for ostentation, profligacy, and insolence. That the Spartans should thus judge, is noway astonishing, considering their extreme reverence both for old age and for strict discipline. They naturally preferred Nikias and Lachēs, whose prudence would commend, if it did not originally suggest, their mistrust of the new claimant. Nor had Alkibiadēs yet shown the mighty move-

¹ Thucyd. v. 43, vi. 90; Isokratēs, De Bigis, Or. xvi, p. 352, sect. 27-30. Plutarch (Alkibiad. c. 14) carelessly represents Alkibiadēs as being actually proxenus of Sparta at Athens.

ment of which he was capable. But this contemptuous refusal of the Spartans stung him so to the quick, that, making an entire revolution in his political course,¹ he immediately threw himself into anti-Laonian politics with an energy and ability which he was not before known to possess.

The moment was favorable, since the recent death of Kleon, for a new political leader to espouse this side; and was rendered still more favorable by the conduct of the Lacedæmonians. Month after month passed, remonstrance after remonstrance was addressed, yet not one of the restitutions prescribed by the treaty in favor of Athens had yet been accomplished. Alkibiadēs had therefore ample pretext for altering his tone respecting the Spartans, and for denouncing them as deceivers who had broken their solemn oaths, abusing the generous confidence of Athens. Under his present antipathies, his attention naturally turned to Argos, in which city he possessed some powerful friends and family guests. The condition of that city, now free by the expiration of the peace with Sparta, opened a possibility of connection with Athens, and this policy was strongly recommended by Alkibiadēs, who insisted that Sparta was playing false with the Athenians, merely in order to keep their hands tied until she had attacked and put down Argos separately. This particular argument had less force when it was seen that Argos acquired new and powerful allies, Mantinea, Elis, and Corinth; but on the other hand, such acquisitions rendered Argos positively more valuable as an ally to the Athenians.

It was not so much, however, the inclination towards Argos, but the growing wrath against Sparta, which furthered the philo-Argæian plans of Alkibiadēs; and when the Lacedæmonian envoy Andromedēs arrived at Athens from Bœotia, tendering to the Athenians the mere ruins of Panaktum in exchange for Pylos; when it farther became known that the Spartans had

¹ Thucyd. v. 43. Οὐ μέντοι ἀλλὰ καὶ φρονήματι φιλονεικῶν ἡναντιοῦτο, διὰ Λακεδαιμόνιοι διὰ Νικίου καὶ Λάχης ἐπραξαν τὰς σπονδὰς, αὐτὸν διὰ τὴν νεότητά ὑπεριδόντες καὶ κατὰ τὴν παλαιὰν προξενίαν ποτὲ οὖσαν οὐ τιμῆσαντες, ἣν τοῦ πάππου ἀπειπόντος αὐτὸς ἐκ τῆς νήσου αὐτῶν αἰχμαλώτους θεραπέων διενόειτο ἀνανεώσασθαι. Παντὰ χοθὲν τε νομίζων ἰσχυροῦσθαι τό τε πρῶτον ἀντίπεν. εἰς.

already concluded a special alliance with the Boeotians without consulting Athens, the unmeasured expression of displeasure in the Athenian ekklesia showed Alkibiadēs that the time was now come for bringing on a substantive decision. While he lent his own voice to strengthen this discontent against Sparta, he at the same time despatched a private intimation to his correspondents at Argos, exhorting them, under assurances of success and promise of his own strenuous aid, to send without delay an embassy to Athens in conjunction with the Mantineians and Eleians, requesting to be admitted as Athenian allies. The Argeians received this intimation at the very moment when their citizens Eustrophus and Æson were negotiating at Sparta for the renewal of the peace, having been sent thither under great uneasiness lest Argos should be left without allies to contend single-handed against the Lacedæmonians. But no sooner was the unexpected chance held out to them of alliance with Athens, a former friend, a democracy like their own, an imperial state at sea, but not interfering with their own primacy in Peloponnesus, — than they became careless of Eustrophus and Æson, and despatched forthwith to Athens the embassy advised. It was a joint embassy, Argeian, Eleian, and Mantineian: the alliance between these three cities had already been rendered more intimate by a second treaty concluded since that treaty to which Corinth was a party; but Corinth had refused all concern in the second.²

But the Spartans had been already alarmed by the harsh repulse of their envoy Andromedēs, and probably warned by reports from Nikias and their other Athenian friends of the crisis impending respecting alliance between Athens and Argos. Accordingly they sent off without a moment's delay three citizens extremely popular at Athens,³ Philocharidas, Leon, and Endius; with full powers to settle all matters of difference. The envoys were instructed to deprecate all alliance of Athens with Argos, to explain that the alliance of Sparta with Boeotia had been concluded without any purpose or possibility of evil to Athens, and at the same time to renew the demand that Pylos should be re-

¹ Thucyd. v. 43.

² Thucyd. v. 43.

³ Thucyd. v. 44. Ἀρχόντες δὲ καὶ Λακεδαιμονίων πρέσβεις κατὰ τὸν χρόνον αὐτόν.

stored to them in exchange for the demolished Panaktum. Such was still the confidence of the Lacedæmonians in the strength of assent at Athens, that they did not yet despair of obtaining an affirmative, even to this very unequal proposition: and when the three envoys, under the introduction and advice of Nikias, had their first interview with the Athenian senate, preparatory to an audience before the public assembly, the impression which they made, on stating that they came with full powers of settlement, was highly favorable. It was indeed so favorable, that Alkibiadēs became alarmed lest, if they made the same statement in the public assembly, holding out the prospect of some trifling concessions, the philo-Laconian party might determine public feeling to accept a compromise, and thus preclude all idea of alliance with Argos.

To obviate such a defeat of his plans, he resorted to a singular manœuvre. One of the Lacedæmonian envoys, Endius, was his private guest, by an ancient and particular intimacy subsisting between their two families.¹ This probably assisted in procuring

¹ Thucyd. viii. 6. Ἐνδίου τῷ ἐφορεύοντι πατρικὸς ἐς τὰ μάλιστα φίλος — ὅθεν καὶ τοῖνομα Λακωνικὸν ἢ οἴκῳ αὐτῶν κατὰ τὴν ξενίαν ἔσχεν. Ἐνδίου γὰρ Ἀλκιβιάδου ἐκαλεῖτο.

I incline to suspect, from this passage, that the father of Endius was *not* named Alkibiadēs, but that Endius himself was nevertheless named Ἐνδίου Ἀλκιβιάδου, in consequence of the peculiar intimacy of connection with the Athenian family in which that name occurred. If the father of Endius was really named Alkibiadēs, Endius himself would naturally, pursuant to general custom, be styled Ἐνδίου Ἀλκιβιάδου: there would be nothing in this denomination to call for the particular remark of Thucydides. But according to the view of the Scholiast and most commentators, all that Thucydides wishes to explain here is, how the father of Endius came to receive the name of Alkibiadēs. Now if he had meant this, he surely would not have used the terms which we read: the circumstance to be explained would then have reference to the father of Endius, not to Endius himself, nor to the family generally. His words imply that the family, that is, each successive individual of the family, derived his Laconian designation (not from the name of his father, but) from his intimate connection of hospitality with the Athenian family of Alkibiadēs. Each successive individual attached to his own personal name the genitive case Ἀλκιβιάδου, instead of the genitive of his real father's name. Doubtless this was an anomaly in Grecian practice; but on the present occasion, we are to expect something anomalous: had it not been such, Thucydides would not have stepped aside to particularize it.

for him a secret interview with the envoys, and enabled him to address them with greater effect, on the day before the meeting of the public assembly, and without the knowledge of Nikias. He accosted them in the tone of a friend of Sparta, anxious that their proposition should succeed; but he intimated that they would find the public assembly turbulent and angry, very different from the tranquil demeanor of the senate: so that if they proclaimed themselves to have come with full powers of settlement, the people would burst out with fury, to act upon their fears and bully them into extravagant concessions. He therefore strongly urged them to declare that they had come, not with any full powers of settlement, but merely to explain, discuss, and report: the people would then find that they could gain nothing by intimidation, explanations would be heard, and disputed points be discussed with temper, and he (Alkibiadēs) would speak emphatically in their favor. He would advise, and felt confident that he could persuade, the Athenians to restore Pylos, a step which his opposition had hitherto been the chief means of preventing. He gave them his solemn pledge — confirmed by an oath, according to Plutarch — that he would adopt this conduct, if they would act upon his counsel.¹ The envoys were much struck with the apparent sagacity of these suggestions,² and still more delighted to find that the man from whom they anticipated the most formidable opposition was prepared to speak in their favor. His language obtained with them, probably, the more ready admission and confidence, inasmuch as he had volunteered his services to become the political agent of Sparta only a few months before; and he appeared now to be simply resuming that policy. They were sure of the support of

¹ Thucyd. v, 45. Μηχανάται δὲ πρὸς αὐτοὺς τοιοῦτόν τι ὁ Ἀλκιβιάδης τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους πείθει, πιστεῖν αὐτοῖς δοῦν, ἢν μὴ ὁμολογήσωσιν ἐν τῷ δήμῳ αὐτοκράτορες ἦκειν, Πύλον τε αὐτοῖς ἀποδώσειν (πείσειν γὰρ αὐτὸς Ἀθηναίους, ὥσπερ καὶ νῦν ἀντιλέγειν) καὶ τὰλλα ξυναλλάξειν. Πουλόμενος δὲ αὐτοὺς Νικίου τε ἀποστήσαι ταῦτα ἐπράττε, καὶ ὅπως ἐν τῷ δήμῳ διαβαλὼν αὐτοὺς ὥς οὐδὲν ἀληθές ἐν νῷ ἔχουσιν, οὐδὲ λέγουσιν οὐδέποτε ταῦτά, τοὺς Ἀργεῖους ξυμμάχους ποιῆσαι.

² Plutarch (Alkibiad. c. 14). Ταῦτα δ' εἰπὼν ἤρκους ἐδωκέν αὐτοῖς καὶ μετέστησεν ἀπὸ τοῦ Νικίου παντὶ πείθειν αὐτοὺς αἰτῶν, καὶ θαυμάζοντας αἶμα τὴν δεινότητα καὶ συνέσειν, ὥς οὐ τοῦ τυχόντος ἀνδρὸς ἦσαν. Again, Plutarch, Nikias, c. 10.

Nikias and his party, under all circumstances; if, by complying with the recommendation of Alkibiadēs, they could gain *his* strenuous advocacy and influence also, they fancied that their cause was sure of success. Accordingly, they agreed to act upon his suggestion, not only without consulting but without even warning Nikias, which was exactly what Alkibiadēs desired, and had probably required them to promise.

Next day, the public assembly met, and the envoys were introduced; upon which Alkibiadēs himself, in a tone of peculiar mildness, put the question to them, upon what footing they came? what powers they brought with them? They immediately declared that they had brought no full powers for treating and settlement, but only came to explain and discuss. Nothing could exceed the astonishment with which this declaration was heard. The senators present, to whom these envoys a day or two before had publicly declared the distinct contrary, — the assembled people, who, made aware of this previous affirmation, had come prepared to hear the ultimatum of Sparta from their lips, — lastly, most of all, Nikias himself, — their confidential agent and probably their host at Athens, — who had doubtless announced them as plenipotentiaries, and concerted with them the management of their cases before the assembly, — all were alike astounded, and none knew what to make of the words just heard. But the indignation of the people equalled their astonishment: there was a unanimous burst of wrath against the standing faithlessness and duplicity of Lacedæmonians; never saying the same thing two days together. To crown the whole, Alkibiadēs himself affected to share all the surprise of the multitude, and was even the loudest of them all in invectives against the envoys; denouncing Lacedæmonian perfidy and evil designs in language far more bitter than he had ever employed before. Nor was this all: he took advantage of

¹ Plutarch, Alkib. c. 14. Ἐρωτώμενοι δ' ὑπὸ τοῦ Ἀλκιβιάδου πάντες φιλανθρωπῶς, ἐφ' οἷς ἀφιγμένοι τυγχάνουσιν, οὐκ ἔφασαν ἦκειν αὐτοκράτορες.

² Thucyd. v, 45. Οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι οὐκετι ἡνείχοντο, ἀλλὰ τοῦ Ἀλκιβιάδου πολλὰ μᾶλλον ἢ πρότερον καταβοῶντος τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων, ἐσθικόν τε καὶ ἱταῖον ἦσαν εἶδος παραγαγεῖν τοὺς Ἀργεῖους, etc. Compare Plutarch, Alkib. c. 14 and Plutarch, Nikias, c. 10.

the vehement acclamation which welcomed these invectives to propose that the Argeian envoys should be called in and the alliance with Argos concluded forthwith. And this would certainly have been done, if a remarkable phenomenon — an earthquake — had not occurred to prevent it; causing the assembly to be adjourned to the next day, pursuant to a religious scruple then recognized as paramount.

This remarkable anecdote comes in all its main circumstances from Thucydides. It illustrates forcibly that unprincipled character which will be found to attach to Alkibiades through life, and presents indeed an unblushing combination of impudence and fraud, which we cannot better describe than by saying that it is exactly in the vein of Fielding's Jonathan Wild. In depicting Kleon and Hyperbolus, historians vie with each other in strong language to mark the impudence which is said to have been their peculiar characteristic. Now we have no particular facts before us to measure the amount of truth in this, though as a general charge it is sufficiently credible. But we may affirm, with full assurance, that none of the much-decried demagogues of Athens — not one of those sellers of leather, lamps, sheep, ropes, pollard, and other commodities, upon whom Aristophanes heaps so many excellent jokes — ever surpassed, if they ever equalled, the impudence of this descendant of Deukos and Zeus in his manner of overreaching and disgracing the Lacedæmonian envoys. These latter, it must be added, display a carelessness of public faith and consistency, a facility in publicly unsaying what they have just before publicly said, and a treachery towards their own confidential agent, which is truly surprising, and goes far to justify the general charge of habitual duplicity so often alleged against the Lacedæmonian character.¹

The disgraced envoys would doubtless quit Athens immediately: but this opportune earthquake gave Nikias a few hours to recover from his unexpected overthrow. In the assembly of the next day, he still contended that the friendship of Sparta was preferable to that of Argos, and insisted on the prudence of postponing all consummation of engagement with the latter until the real intentions of Sparta, now so contradictory and inex-

¹ Euripid. *Andromach.* 445-455; Herodot. ix. 54.

able, should be made clear. He contended that the position of Athens, in regard to the peace and alliance, was that of superior honor and advantage; the position of Sparta, one of comparative disgrace: Athens had thus a greater interest than Sparta in maintaining what had been concluded. But he at the same time admitted that a distinct and peremptory explanation must be exacted from Sparta as to her intentions, and he requested the people to send himself with some other colleagues to demand it. The Lacedæmonians should be apprised that Argeian envoys were already present in Athens with propositions, and that the Athenians might already have concluded this alliance, if they could have permitted themselves to do wrong to the existing alliance with Sparta. But the Lacedæmonians, if their intentions were honorable, must show it forthwith: 1. By restoring Panaktum, not demolished, but standing. 2. By restoring Amphipolis also. 3. By renouncing their special alliance with the Bœotians, unless the Bœotians on their side chose to become parties to the peace with Athens.¹

The Athenian assembly, acquiescing in the recommendation of Nikias, invested him with the commission which he required: a remarkable proof, after the overpowering defeat of the preceding day, how strong was the hold which he still retained upon them, and how sincere their desire to keep on the best terms with Sparta. This was a last chance granted to Nikias and his policy; a perfectly fair chance, since all that was asked of Sparta was just; but it forced him to bring matters to a decisive issue with her, and shut out all farther evasion. His mission to Sparta failed altogether: the influence of Kleobulus and Xenarês, the anti-Athenian ephors, was found predominant, so that not one of his demands was complied with. And even when he formally announced that unless Sparta renounced her special alliance with the Bœotians or compelled the Bœotians to accept the peace with Athens, the Athenians would immediately contract alliance with Argos, the menace produced no effect. He could only obtain, and that too as a personal favor to himself, that the oaths as they stood should be formally renewed; an empty concession, which covered but faintly the humiliation of his retreat to Athens.

¹ Thuc. d. v. 46.

The Athenian assembly listened to his report with strong indignation against the Lacedæmonians, and with marked displeasure even against himself, as the great author and voucher of this unperformed treaty; while Alkibiadēs was permitted to introduce the envoys — already at hand in the city — from Argos, Mantinea, and Elis, with whom a pact was at once concluded.¹

The words of this, which Thucydides gives us doubtless from the record on the public column, comprise two engagements; one for peace, another for alliance.

The Athenians, Argeians, Mantineians, and Eleians, have concluded a treaty of peace by sea and by land, without fraud or mischief, each for themselves and for the allies over whom each exercise empire.² [The express terms in which these states announce themselves as imperial states and their allies as dependencies, deserve notice. No such words appear in the treaty between Athens and Lacedæmon. I have already mentioned that the main ground of discontent on the part of Mantinea and Elis towards Sparta, was connected with their imperial power.]

Neither of them shall bear arms against the other for purposes of damage.

The Athenians, Argeians, Mantineians, and Eleians, shall be allies with each other for one hundred years. If any enemy shall invade Attica, the three contracting cities shall lend the most vigorous aid in their power at the invitation of Athens. Should the forces of the invading city damage Attica and then retire, the three will proclaim that city their enemy and attack it: neither of the four shall in that case suspend the war, without consent of the others.

Reciprocal obligations imposed upon Athens, in case Argos, Mantinea, or Elis, shall be attacked.

Neither of the four contracting powers shall grant passage to troops through their own territory, or the territory of allies over whom they may at the time be exercising command, either by land or sea, unless upon joint resolution.³

¹ Thucyd. v, 46; Plutarch, Nikias, c. 10.

² Thucyd. v, 47. *ὑπὲρ σφῶν αὐτῶν καὶ τῶν συμμάχων ὧν ἀρχοῦσιν ἐκάτεροι*

³ Thucyd. v, 48. *καὶ τῶν συμμάχων ὧν ἂν ἀρχῶσιν ἕκαστοι*. The

In case auxiliary troops shall be required and sent under this treaty, the city sending shall furnish their maintenance for the space of thirty days, from the day of their entrance upon the territory of the city requiring. Should their services be needed for a longer period, the city requiring shall furnish their maintenance, at the rate of three Æginæan oboli for each hoplite, light-armed or archer, and of one Æginæan drachma or six oboli for each horseman, per day. The city requiring shall possess the command, so long as the service required shall be in her territory. But if any expedition shall be undertaken by joint resolution, then the command shall be shared equally between all.

Such were the substantive conditions of the new alliance. Provision was then made for the oaths, — by whom? where? when? in what words? how often? they were to be taken. Athens was to swear on behalf of herself and her allies; but Argos, Elis, and Mantinea, with their respective allies, were to swear by separate cities. The oaths were to be renewed every four years; by Athens, within thirty days before each Olympic festival, at Argos, Elis, and Mantinea; by these three cities, at Athens, ten days before each festival of the greater Panathenæa. "The words of the treaty of peace and alliance, and the oaths sworn, shall be engraven on stone columns, and put up in the temples of each of the four cities; and also upon a brazen column, to be put up by joint cost at Olympia, for the festival now approaching."

"The four cities may, by joint consent, make any change they please in the provisions of this treaty, without violating their oaths."¹

The conclusion of this new treaty introduced a greater degree of complication into the grouping and association of the Grecian cities than had ever before been known. The ancient Spartan confederacy, and the Athenian empire still subsisted. A peace

tense and phrase here deserve notice, as contrasted with the phrase in the former part of the treaty — *τῶν συμμάχων ὧν ἀρχοῦσιν ἐκάτεροι*

The clause imposing actual obligation to hinder the passage of troops required to be left open for application to the actual time.

¹ Thucyd. v, 47.

had been concluded between them, ratified by the formal vote of the majority of the confederates, yet not accepted by several of the minority. Not merely peace, but also special alliance had been concluded between Athens and Sparta; and a special alliance between Sparta and Bœotia. Corinth, member of the Spartan confederacy, was also member of a defensive alliance with Argos, Mantinea, and Elis; which three states had concluded a more intimate alliance, first with each other (without Corinth), and now recently with Athens. Yet both Athens and Sparta still retained the alliance¹ concluded between themselves, without formal rupture on either side, though Athens still complained that the treaty had not been fulfilled. No relations whatever subsisted between Argos and Sparta. Between Athens and Bœotia there was an armistice terminable at ten days' notice. Lastly, Corinth could not be prevailed upon, in spite of repeated solicitation from the Argeians, to join the new alliance of Athens with Argos: so that no relations subsisted between Corinth and Athens; while the Corinthians began, though faintly, to resume their former tendencies towards Sparta.²

The alliance between Athens and Argos, of which particulars have just been given, was concluded not long before the Olympic festival of the 90th Olympiad, or 420 B.C.: the festival being about the beginning of July, the treaty might be in May.³ That festival was memorable, on more than one ground. It was the first which had been celebrated since the conclusion of the peace, the leading clause of which had been expressly introduced to guarantee to all Greeks free access to the great Pan-Hellenic temples, with liberty of sacrificing, consulting the oracle, and witnessing the matches. For the last eleven years, including two Olympic festivals, Athens herself, and apparently all the numerous allies of Athens, had been excluded from sending their solemn legation, or *theōry*, and from attending as spectators, at the Olympic games.⁴ Now that such exclusion was removed,

¹ Thucyd. v, 48.

² Thucyd. v, 49-50.

³ *Καταθέντων δὲ καὶ Ὀλυμπίᾳ στήλην χαλκὴν κοινὴν Ὀλυμπίοις τοῖς κοινῇ* (Thucyd. v, 47), words of the treaty.

⁴ Dorieus of Rhodes was victor in the Pankration, both in Olymp. 88 and 89, (428-424 B.C.) Rhodes was included among the tributary allies of Athens. But the athletes who came to contend were privileged and (as if

and that the Eleian heralds (who came to announce the approaching games and proclaim the truce connected with them) again trod the soil of Attica,—the Athenian visit was felt both by themselves and by others as a novelty. Some curiosity was entertained to see what figure the *theōry* of Athens would make as to show and splendor. Nor were there wanting spiteful rumors, that Athens had been so much impoverished by the war, as to be prevented from appearing with appropriate magnificence at the altar and in the presence of Olympic Zeus.

Alkibiadēs took pride in silencing these surmises, as well as in glorifying his own name and person, by a display more imposing than had ever been previously beheld. He had already distinguished himself in the local festivals and liturgies of Athens by an ostentation surpassing Athenian rivals: but he now felt himself standing forward as the champion and leader of Athens before Greece. He had discredited his political rival Nikias, given a new direction to the politics of Athens by the Argeian alliance, and was about to commence a series of intra-Peloponnesian operations against the Lacedæmonians. On all these grounds he determined that his first appearance on the plain of Olympia should impose upon all beholders. The Athenian *theōry*, of which he was a member, was set out with first-rate splendor, and with the amplest show of golden ewers, censers, etc., for the public sacrifice and procession.¹ But when the chariot-races came on, Alkibiadēs himself appeared as competitor at his own cost,—not merely with one well-equipped chariot and four, which the richest Greeks had hitherto counted as an extra-

were) sacred persons, who were never molested or hindered from coming to the festival, if they chose to come, under any state of war. Their inviolability was never disturbed even down to the harsh proceeding of Aratus (Plutarch, Aratus, c. 28).

But this does not prove that Rhodian visitors generally, or a Rhodian *theōry*, could have come to Olympia between 431-421 in safety.

From the presence of individuals, even as spectators, little can be inferred: because, even at this very Olympic festival of 420 B.C., Lichas the Spartan was present as a spectator, though all Lacedæmonians were formally excluded by proclamation of the Eleians (Thucyd. v, 50).

¹ Of the taste and elegance with which these exhibitions were usually got up in Athens, surpassing generally every other city in Greece, see a remarkable testimony in Xenophon, Memorabil. iii, 3, 12.

ordinary personal glory, but with the prodigious number of seven distinct chariots, each with a team of four horses. And so superior was their quality, that one of his chariots gained a first prize, and another a second prize, so that Alkibiadēs was twice crowned with sprigs of the sacred olive-tree, and twice proclaimed by the herald. Another of his seven chariots also came in fourth: but no crown or proclamation, it seems, was awarded to any after the second in order. We must recollect that he had competitors from all parts of Greece to contend against, not merely private men, but even despots and governments. Nor was this all. The tent which the Athenian theōrs provided for their countrymen, visitors to the games, was handsomely adorned; but a separate tent, which Alkibiadēs himself provided for a public banquet to celebrate his triumph, together with the banquet itself, was set forth on a scale still more stately and expensive. The rich allies of Athens — Ephesus, Chios, and Lesbos — are said to have lent him their aid in enhancing this display. It is highly probable that they would be glad to cultivate his favor, as he had now become one of the first men in Athens, and was in an ascendent course. But we must farther recollect that they, as well as Athens, had been excluded from the Olympic festival, so that their own feelings on first returning might well prompt them to take a genuine interest in this imposing reappearance of the Ionic race at the common sanctuary of Hellas.

Five years afterwards, on an important discussion which will be hereafter described, Alkibiadēs maintained publicly before the Athenian assembly that his unparalleled Olympic display had produced an effect upon the Grecian mind highly beneficial to Athens;¹

¹ Thucyd. vi, 16. Οἱ γὰρ Ἕλληνες καὶ ὑπὲρ δόναμιν μετὰ ἡμῶν τὴν πόλιν ἐνόμισαν τῷ ἑμῷ διακρηπεί τῆς Ὀλυμπιαζέ θεωρίας, πρότερόν τι λατρίαν τε αὐτὴν καταπεπολεμήσθαι· διότι ἄρματα μὲν ἔπα καθήκα, ὅσα οὐδεὶς πω ἰδιώτης πρότερον, ἐνίκησά τε, καὶ δεύτερος καὶ τέταρτος ἔγε νόμην, καὶ τάλλα ἀξίως τῆς νίκης παρσκευασμένην.

The full force of this grandiose display cannot be felt unless we bring to our minds the special position both of Athens and the Athenian allies towards Olympia, — and of Alkibiadēs himself towards Athens, Argos, and the rest of Greece, — in the first half of the year 420 B.C.

Alkibiadēs obtained from Euripidēs the honor of an epinikian ode, or song of triumph, to celebrate this event; of which a few lines are preserved

dissipating the suspicions entertained that she was ruined by the war, and establishing beyond dispute her vast wealth and power.

by Plutarch (Alkib. c. 11). It is curious that the poet alleges Alkibiadēs to have been first, second, and third, in the course; while Alkibiadēs himself, more modest and doubtless more exact, pretends only to first, second, and fourth. Euripidēs informs us that Alkibiadēs was crowned twice and proclaimed twice — δις στεφθέντ' ἐλαία κύρκει βοῶν παραδόναι. Reiske, Coray, and Schäfer, have thought it right to alter this word δις to τρίς, without any authority, which completely alters the asserted fact. Sintenis in his edition of Plutarch has properly restored the word δις.

How long the recollection of this famous Olympic festival remained in the Athenian public mind, is attested partly by the Oratio de Bigis of Isokratēs, composed in defence of the son of Alkibiadēs at least twenty-five years afterwards, perhaps more. Isokratēs repeats the loose assertion of Euripidēs, πρῶτος, δεύτερος, and τρίτος (Or. xvi, p. 353, sect. 40). The spurious Oration called that of Andokidēs against Alkibiadēs also preserves many of the current tales, some of which I have admitted into the text, because I think them probable in themselves, and because that oration itself may reasonably be believed to be a composition of the middle of the fourth century B.C. That oration puts all the proceedings of Alkibiadēs in a very invidious temper and with palpable exaggeration. The story of Alkibiadēs having robbed an Athenian named Diomédēs of a fine chariot, appears to be a sort of variation on the story about Tisias, which figures in the oration of Isokratēs; see Andokid. cont. Alkib. sect. 26: possibly Alkibiadēs may have left one of the teams not paid for. The aid lent to Alkibiadēs by the Chians, Ephesians, etc., as described in that oration, is likely to be substantially true, and may easily be explained. Compare Athenæ. i, p. 3.

Our information about the arrangements of the chariot-racing at Olympia is very imperfect. We do not distinctly know how the seven chariots of Alkibiadēs ran, — in how many races, — for all the seven could not, in my judgment, have run in one and the same race. There must have been many other chariots to run, belonging to other competitors: and it seems difficult to believe that ever a greater number than ten can have run in the same race, since the course involved going twelve times round the goal (Pindar, Ol. iii, 33; vi, 75). Ten competing chariots run in the race described by Sophoklēs (Electr. 708), and if we could venture to construe strictly the expression of the poet, — δέκατον ἐκπληρῶν δχον, — it would seem that ten was the extreme number permitted to run. Even so great a number as ten was replete with danger to the persons engaged, as may be seen by reading the description in Sophoklēs (compare Demosth. Ἐρωτ. Δογ. p. 1410), who refers indeed to a Pythian and not an Olympic solemnity: but the main circumstances must have been common to both; and we know that the twelve turns (δωδεκάγναμpton δωδεκάδρομον) were common to both (Pindar, Pyth. v, 31).

Alkibiadēs was not the only person who gained a chariot victory at this

He was doubtless right to a considerable extent; though not sufficient to repel the charge from himself, which it was his pur-

90th Olympiad. 420 B.C. Lichas the Lacedæmonian also gained one (Thucyd. v, 50), though the chariot was obliged to be entered in another name, since the Lacedæmonians were interdicted from attendance.

Dr. Thirlwall (Hist. of Greece, vol. iii, ch. xxiv, p. 316) says: "We are not aware that the Olympiad, in which these chariot-victories of Alkibiadēs were gained, can be distinctly fixed. But it was probably Olymp. 89, B.C. 424."

In my judgment, both Olymp. 88 (B.C. 428) and Olymp. 89 (B.C. 424) are excluded from the possible supposition, by the fact that the general war was raging at both periods. To suppose that in the midst of the summer of these two fighting years, there was an Olympic truce for a month, allowing Athens and her allies to send thither their solemn legations, their chariots for competition, and their numerous individual visitors, appears to me contrary to all probability. The Olympic month of B.C. 424, would occur just about the time when Brasidas was at the Isthmus levying troops for his intended expedition to Thrace, and when he rescued Megara from the Athenian attack. This would not be a very quiet time for the peaceable Athenian visitors, with the costly display of gold and silver plate and the ostentatious theory, to pass by, on its way to Olympia. During the time when the Spartans occupied Dekeleia, the solemn processions of communicants at the Eleusinian mysteries could never march along the Sacred Way from Athens to Eleusis. Xen. Hell. i, 4, 20.

Moreover, we see that the very first article both of the Truce for one year and of the Peace of Nikias, expressly stipulate for liberty to all to attend the common temples and festivals. The first of the two relates to Delphi expressly: the second is general, and embraces Olympia as well as Delphi. If the Athenians had visited Olympia in 428 or 424 B.C., without impediment, these stipulations in the treaties would have no purpose nor meaning. But the fact of their standing in the front of the treaty, proves that they were looked upon as of much interest and importance.

I have placed the Olympic festival wherein Alkibiadēs contended with his seven chariots, in 420 B.C., in the peace, but immediately after the war. No other festival appears to me at all suitable.

Dr. Thirlwall farther assumes, as a matter of course, that there was only one chariot-race at this Olympic festival, that all the seven chariots of Alkibiadēs ran in this one race, and that in the festival of 420 B.C., Lichas gained the prize: thus implying that Alkibiadēs could not have gained the prize at the same festival.

I am not aware that there is any evidence to prove either of these three propositions. To me they all appear improbable and unfounded.

We know from Pausanias (vi, 13, 2) that even in the case of the stadiō-bromi, or runners who contended in the stadium, all were not brought out

pose to do, both of overweening personal vanity, and of that reckless expenditure which he would be compelled to try and overtake by peculation or violence at the public cost. All the unfavorable impressions suggested to prudent Athenians by his previous life, were aggravated by this stupendous display; much more, of course, the jealousy and hatred of personal competitors. And this feeling was not the less real, though as a political man he was now in the full tide of public favor.

If the festival of the 90th Olympiad was peculiarly distinguished by the reappearance of Athenians and those connected with them, it was marked by a farther novelty yet more striking, the exclusion of the Lacedæmonians. This exclusion was the consequence of the new political interests of the Eleians, combined with their increased consciousness of force arising out of the recent alliance with Argos, Athens, and Mantinea. It has already been mentioned that since the peace with Athens, the Lacedæmonians, acting as arbitrators in the case of Lepreum, which the Eleians claimed as their dependency, had declared it to be autonomous, and had sent a body of troops to defend it. Probably the Eleians had recently renewed their attacks upon the district, since the junction with their new allies; for the Lacedæmonians had detached thither a fresh body of one thousand hoplites immediately prior to the Olympic festival. Out of the mission of this fresh detachment the sentence of exclusion arose. The Eleians were privileged administrators of the festival, regulating the details of the ceremony itself, and formally

in one race. They were distributed into sets, or batches, of what number we know not. Each set ran its own heat, and the victors in each then competed with each other in a fresh heat; so that the victor who gained the grand final prize was sure to have won two heats.

Now if this practice was adopted with the foot-runners, much more would it be likely to be adopted with the chariot-racers in case many chariots were brought to the same festival. The danger would be lessened, the sport would be increased, and the glory of the competitors enhanced. The Olympic festival lasted five days, a long time to provide amusement for so vast a crowd of spectators. Alkibiadēs and Lichas may therefore both have gained chariot-victories at the same festival: of course only one of them can have gained the grand final prize, and which of the two that was it is impossible to say.

proclaiming by heralds the commencement of the Olympic truce during which all violation of the Eleian territory by an armed force was a sin against the majesty of Zeus. On the present occasion they affirmed that the Lacedæmonians had sent the one thousand hoplites into Lepreum, and had captured a fort called Phyrkus, both Eleian possessions, after the proclamation of the truce. They accordingly imposed upon Sparta the fine prescribed by the "Olympian law," of two minæ for each man, two thousand minæ in all; a part to Zeus Olympius, a part to the Eleians themselves. During the interval between the proclamation of the truce and the commencement of the festival, the Lacedæmonians sent to remonstrate against this fine, which they alleged to have been unjustly imposed, inasmuch as the heralds had not yet proclaimed the truce at Sparta when the hoplites reached Lepreum. The Eleians replied that the truce had already at that time been proclaimed among themselves (for they always proclaimed it first at home, before their heralds crossed the borders), so that *they* were interdicted from all military operations; of which the Lacedæmonian hoplites had taken advantage to commit their last aggressions. To which the Lacedæmonians rejoined, that the behavior of the Eleians themselves contradicted their own allegation, for they had sent the Eleian heralds to Sparta to proclaim the truce after they knew of the sending of the hoplites, thus showing that they did not consider the truce to have been already violated. The Lacedæmonians added, that after the herald reached Sparta, they had taken no further military measures. How the truth stood in this disputed question, we have no means of deciding. But the Eleians rejected the explanation, though offering, if the Lacedæmonians would restore to them Lepreum, to forego such part of the fine as would accrue to themselves, and to pay out of their own treasury on behalf of the Lacedæmonians the portion which belonged to the god. This new proposition being alike refused, was again modified by the Eleians. They intimated that they would be satisfied if the Lacedæmonians, instead of paying the fine at once, would publicly on the altar at Olympia, in presence of the assembled Greeks, take an oath to pay it at a future date. But the Lacedæmonians would not listen to the proposition either of payment or of promise. Accordingly the Eleians, as judges under the

Olympic law, interdicted them from the temple of Olympic Zeus, from the privilege of sacrificing there, and from attendance and competition at the games; that is, from attendance in the form of the sacred legation called theôry, occupying a formal and recognized place at the solemnity.¹

As all the other Grecian states — with the single exception of Lepreum — were present by their theôries² as well as by individual spectators, so the Spartan theôry "shone by its absence" in a manner painfully and insultingly conspicuous. So extreme, indeed, was the affront put upon the Lacedæmonians, connected as they were with Olympia by a tie ancient, peculiar, and never yet broken; so pointed the evidence of that comparative degradation into which they had fallen, through the peace with Athens coming at the back of the Sphakterian disaster,³ that they were supposed likely to set the exclusion at defiance; and to escort their theôrs into the temple at Olympia for sacrifice, under the protection of an armed force. The Eleians even thought it necessary to put their younger hoplites under arms, and to summon to their aid one thousand hoplites from Mantinea as well as the same number from Argos, for the purpose of repelling this probable attack: while a detachment of Athenian cavalry were stationed at Argos during the festival, to lend assistance in case of need. The alarm prevalent among the spectators of the festival was most serious, and became considerably aggravated by an incident which occurred after the chariot racing. Lichas,⁴ a Lacedæmonian of great wealth and consequence, had a chariot running in the lists, which he was obliged to enter, not in his own name, but in the name of the Bœotian federation. The sentence of exclusion hindered him from taking any ostensible part, but it did not hinder him from being present as a spectator; and when he saw his chariot proclaimed victorious under the title of Bœotian, his impatience to make himself known became uncontrol-

¹ Thucyd. v. 49, 50.

² Thucyd. v. 50. Λακεδαιμόνιοι μὲν εἰργοντο τοῦ ἱεροῦ, θυσίας καὶ ἀγώνων καὶ οἱ αἰκοὶ ἴθιγον: οἱ δὲ ἄλλοι Ἕλληνες ἰθιγούρουν, πλὴν Λεπρεατῶν.

³ Thucyd. v. 28. Κατὰ γὰρ τὸν χρόνον τούτον ἡ τε Λακεδαιμων μάλιστα δὴ κακῶς ἔκρινε, καὶ ὑπερῶσθη διὰ τὰς συμφορὰς, οἱ τε Ἀργεῖοι ὀρίστα ἔσχον τοῖς πᾶσι, etc.

⁴ See a previous note, p. 56.

lable. He stepped into the midst of the lists, and placed a chaplet on the head of the charioteer, thus advertising himself as the master. This was a flagrant indecorum and known violation of the order of the festival: accordingly, the official attendants with their staffs interfered at once in performance of their duty, chastising and driving him back to his place with blows.¹ Hence arose an increased apprehension of armed Lacedæmonian interference. None such took place, however: the Lacedæmonians, for the first and last time in their history, offered their Olympic sacrifice at home, and the festival passed off without any interruption.² The boldness of the Eleians in putting this affront upon the most powerful state in Greece is so astonishing, that we can hardly be mistaken in supposing their proceeding to have been suggested by Alkibiadēs and encouraged by the armed aid from the allies. He was at this moment not less ostentatious in humiliating Sparta than in showing off Athens.

Of the depressed influence and estimation of Sparta, a farther proof was soon afforded by the fate of her colony, the Trachinian Herakleia, established near Thermopylæ, in the third year of the war. That colony — though at first comprising a numerous body of settlers, in consequence of the general trust in Lacedæmonian power, and though always under the government of a Lacedæmonian harmost — had never prospered. It had

¹ Thucyd. v. 50. Αἴτιος ὁ Ἀρκεσίου Λακεδαιμόνιος ἐν τῷ ἀγῶνι ὑπὸ τῶν βασιλέων πληγὰς ἔλαβεν, ὅτι νικῶντος τοῦ ταυτοῦ ζεύγους, καὶ ἀνακλιθεὶς ἐν τῷ ἀγῶνι δημοσίῳ κατὰ τὴν οἴκ ἐξουσίαν τῆς ἀγωνίας προελθὼν τοὺς ἀγῶνα ἀνέθηκε τὸν ἥμιστον, δουλομανὸς δηλώσαι ὅτι ταυτοῦ ἦν τὸ ἄρμα.

We see by comparison with this incident how much less rough and harsh was the manner of dealing at Athens, and in how much more serious a light blows to the person were considered. At the Athenian festival of the Dionysia, if a person committed disorder or obtruded himself into a place not properly belonging to him in the theatre, the archon or his officials were both empowered and required to repress the disorder by turning the person out, and fining him, if necessary. But they were upon no account to strike him. If they did, they were punishable themselves by the dikastery afterwards (Demosth. cont. Meidiam, c. 49).

² It will be seen, however, that the Lacedæmonians remembered and revenged themselves upon the Eleians for this insult twelve years afterwards during the plenitude of their power (Xenoph. Hellen. iii. 2, 21; Diodor. xiv. 17).

been persecuted from the beginning by the neighboring tribes, and administered with harshness as well as peculation by its governors. The establishment of the town had been regarded from the beginning by the neighbors, especially the Thessalians, as an invasion of their territory; and their hostilities, always vexatious, had, in the winter succeeding the Olympic festival just described, been carried to a greater point of violence than ever. They had defeated the Herakleots in a ruinous battle, and slain Xenarēs the Lacedæmonian governor. But though the place was so reduced as to be unable to maintain itself without foreign aid, Sparta was too much embarrassed by Peloponnesian enemies and waverers to be able to succor it; and the Bœotians, observing her inability, became apprehensive that the interference of Athens would be invoked. Accordingly they thought it prudent to occupy Herakleia with a body of Bœotian troops, dismissing the Lacedæmonian governor Hegesippidas for alleged misconduct. Nor could the Lacedæmonians prevent this proceeding, though it occasioned them to make indignant remonstrance.¹

CHAPTER LVI.

FROM THE FESTIVAL OF OLYMPIAD NINETY DOWN TO THE BATTLE OF MANTINEIA.

SHORTLY after the remarkable events of the Olympic festival described in my last chapter, the Argeians and their allies sent a fresh embassy to invite the Corinthians to join them. They thought it a promising opportunity, after the affront just put upon Sparta, to prevail upon the Corinthians to desert her: but Spartan envoys were present also, and though the discussions were much protracted, no new resolution was adopted. An

¹ Thucyd. v. 51, 52.

earthquake — possibly an earthquake not real, but simulated for convenience — abruptly terminated the congress. The Corinthians — though seemingly distrusting Argos, now that she was united with Athens, and leaning rather towards Sparta — were unwilling to pronounce themselves in favor of one so as to make an enemy of the other.¹

In spite of this first failure, the new alliance of Athens and Argos manifested its fruits vigorously in the ensuing spring. Under the inspirations of Alkibiadēs, Athens was about to attempt the new experiment of seeking to obtain intra-Peloponnesian followers and influence. At the beginning of the war, she had been maritime, defensive, and simply conservative, under the guidance of Periklēs. After the events of Sphakteria, she made use of that great advantage to aim at the recovery of Megara and Boeotia, which she had before been compelled to abandon by the thirty years' truce, at the recommendation of Kleon. In this attempt she employed the eighth year of the war, but with signal ill-success; while Brasidas during that period broke open the gates of her maritime empire, and robbed her of many important dependencies. The grand object of Athens then became, to recover these lost dependencies, especially Amphipolis: Nikias and his partisans sought to effect such recovery by making peace, while Kleon and his supporters insisted that it could never be achieved except by military efforts. The expedition under Kleon against Amphipolis had failed, the peace concluded by Nikias had failed also: Athens had surrendered her capital advantage, without regaining Amphipolis; and if she wished to regain it, there was no alternative except to repeat the attempt which had failed under Kleon. And this perhaps she might have done, as we shall find her projecting to do in the course of about four years forward, if it had not been, first, that the Athenian mind was now probably sick and disheartened about Amphipolis, in consequence of the prodigious disgrace so recently undergone there; next, that Alkibiadēs, the new chief adviser or prime minister of Athens — if we may be allowed to use an inaccurate expression, which yet suggests the reality of the case — was prompted by his personal impulses to turn the stream of Athe-

¹ Thucyd. v, 48-50.

man ardor into a different channel. Full of antipathy to Sparta, he regarded the interior of Peloponnesus as her most vulnerable point, especially in the present disjointed relations of its component cities. Moreover, his personal thirst for glory was better gratified amidst the centre of Grecian life than by undertaking an expedition into a distant and barbarous region: lastly, he probably recollected with discomfort the hardships and extreme cold, insupportable to all except the iron frame of Sokrates, which he had himself endured at the blockade of Potidæa twelve years before,¹ and which any armament destined to conquer Amphipolis would have to go through again. It was under these impressions that he now began to press his intra-Peloponnesian operations against Lacedæmon, with the view of organizing a counter-alliance under Argos sufficient to keep her in check, and at any rate to nullify her power of carrying invasion beyond the Isthmus. All this was to be done without ostensibly breaking the peace and alliance between Athens and Lacedæmon, which stood in conspicuous letters on pillars erected in both cities.

Coming to Argos at the head of a few Athenian hoplites and bowmen, and reinforced by Peloponnesian allies, Alkibiadēs exhibited the spectacle of an Athenian general traversing the interior of the peninsula, and imposing his own arrangements in various quarters, a spectacle at that moment new and striking.² He first turned his attention to the Achæan towns in the north-west, where he persuaded the inhabitants of Patræ to ally themselves with Athens, and even to undertake the labor of connecting their town with the sea by means of long walls, so as to place themselves within the protection of Athens from seaward. He farther projected the erection of a fort and the formation of a naval station at the extreme point of Cape Rhium, just at the narrow entrance of the Corinthian gulf; whereby the Athenians, who already possessed the opposite shore by means of Naupaktus, would have become masters of the commerce of the gulf.

¹ Plato, Symposium, c. 35, p. 220. *δεινὸν γὰρ αὐτοῖσι χειμῶνες, πᾶσι οἷον χειμῶντον, etc.*

² Thucyd. v, 52. Isokratēs (De Bigis, sect. 17, p. 349) speaks of this expedition of Alkibiadēs in his usual loose and exaggerated language: but he has a right to call attention to it as something very memorable at the time

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But the Corinthians and Sikyonians, to whom this would have been a serious mischief, despatched forces enough to prevent the consummation of the scheme, and probably also to hinder the erection of the walls at Patræ.¹ Yet the march of Alkibiades doubtless strengthened the anti-Laconian interest throughout the Achaean coast.

He then returned to take part with the Argeians in a war against Epidaurus. To acquire possession of this city would much facilitate the communication between Athens and Argos, since it was not only immediately opposite to the island of Ægina now occupied by the Athenians, but also opened to the latter an access by land, dispensing with the labor of circumnavigating Cape Skyllaum, the southeastern point of the Argeian and Epidaurian peninsula, whenever they sent forces to Argos. Moreover, the territory of Epidaurus bordered to the north on that of Corinth, so that the possession of it would be an additional guarantee for the neutrality of the Corinthians. Accordingly it was resolved to attack Epidaurus, for which a pretext was easily found. As presiding and administering state of the temple of Apollo Pythæus (situated within the walls of Argos), the Argeians enjoyed a sort of religious supremacy over Epidaurus and other neighboring cities, seemingly the remnant of that extensive supremacy, political as well as religious, which in early times had been theirs.² The Epidaurians owed to this temple certain sacrifices and other ceremonial obligations, one of which, arising out of some circumstance which we cannot understand, was now due and unperformed: at least so the Argeians alleged. Such default imposed upon them the duty of getting together a military force to attack the Epidaurians and enforce the obligation.

Their invading march, however, was for a time suspended by the news that king Agis with the full force of Lacedæmon and her allies had advanced as far as Leuktra, one of the border towns of Laconia on the northwest, towards Mount Lykaum and the Arcadian Parrhasii. What this movement meant was known only to Agis himself, who did not even explain the purpose to

¹ Thucyd. v. 52.

² Thucyd. v. 53, with Dr. Arnold's note.

his own soldiers or officers, or allies.¹ But the sacrifice constantly offered before passing the border was found so unfavorable, that he abandoned his march for the present and returned home. The month Karneius, a period of truce as well as religious festival among the Dorian states, being now at hand, he directed the allies to hold themselves prepared for an out-march as soon as that month had expired.

On being informed that Agis had dismissed his troops, the Argeians prepared to execute their invasion of Epidaurus. The day on which they set out was already the twenty-sixth of the month preceding the Karneian month, so that there remained only three days before the commencement of that latter month with its holy truce, binding upon the religious feelings of the Dorian states generally, to which Argos, Sparta, and Epidaurus all belonged. But the Argeians made use of that very peculiarity of the season, which was accounted likely to keep them at home, to facilitate their scheme, by playing a trick with the calendar, and proclaiming one of those arbitrary interferences with the reckoning of time which the Greeks occasionally employed to correct the ever-recurring confusion of their lunar system. Having begun their march on the twenty-sixth of the month before Karneius, the Argeians called each succeeding day still the twenty-sixth, thus disallowing the lapse of time, and pretending that the Karneian month had not yet commenced. This proceeding was further facilitated by the circumstance, that their allies of Athens, Elis, and Mantinea, not being Dorians, were under no obligation to observe the Karneian truce. Accordingly, the army marched from Argos into the territory of Epidaurus, and spent seemingly a fortnight or three weeks in laying it waste; all this time being really, according to the reckoning of the other Dorian states, part of the Karneian truce, which the Argeians, adopting their own arbitrary computation of time, professed not to be violating. The Epidaurians, unable to meet them single-handed in the field,

¹ Thucyd. v. 54. ἤδει δὲ οὐδείς ὅποι στρατεύουσιν οὐδὲ αἱ πόλεις ἐξ ὧν ἐπέμψθησαν.

This incident shows that Sparta employed the military force of her allies without any regard to their feelings, quite as decidedly as Athens; though there were some among them too powerful to be thus treated.

invoked the aid of their allies: who, however, had already been summoned by Sparta for the succeeding month, and did not choose, any more than the Spartans, to move during the Karneian month itself. Some allies, however, perhaps the Corinthians, came as far as the Epidaurian border, but did not feel themselves strong enough to lend aid by entering the territory alone.¹

¹ Thueyd. v. 54. Ἀργεῖοι δ' ἀναχωρησάντων αὐτῶν (the Lacedæmonians), τοῦ πρὸ τοῦ Καρνείου μηνὸς ἐξελθόντες τετράδι θύοντο, καὶ ἀγῶνες τῇν ἡμέραν ταύτην πάντα τὸν χρόνον, ἐσιδόντες ἐς τὴν Ἐπιδaurίαν καὶ ἐδύοντο. Ἐπιδaurιοὶ δὲ τοὺς ξυμμαχοὺς ἐπικαλοῦντο ὡς αὐτῶν μὴνα πρὸ ὑφ' αὐτοῦ, οἱ δὲ καὶ ἐς μεθόριαν τῆς Ἐπιδaurίας ἐλθόντες ἡσυχάζον.

In explaining this passage, I venture to depart from the views of all the commentators; with the less scruple, as it seems to me that even the best of them are here embarrassed and unsatisfactory.

The meaning which I give to the words is the most strict and literal possible: "The Argeians, having set out on the 26th of the month before Karneius, and *keeping that day during the whole time*, invaded the Epidaurian territory, and went on ravaging it." By "during the whole time" is meant, during the whole time that this expedition lasted. That is, in my judgment, they kept the twenty-sixth day of the antecedent month for a whole fortnight or so; they called each successive day by the same name; they stopped the computed march of time; the twenty-seventh was never admitted to have arrived. Dr. Thirlwall translates it (Hist. Gr. vol. iii. ch. xxiv. p. 331: "They began their march on a day which they had *always* been used to keep holy." But surely the words *πάντα τὸν χρόνον* must denote some definite interval of time, and can hardly be construed as equivalent to *αὐτῇ*. Moreover the words, as Dr. Thirlwall construes them, introduce a new fact which has no visible bearing on the main affirmation of the sentence.

The meaning which I give may perhaps be called in question on the ground that such tampering with the calendar is too absurd and childish to have been really committed. Yet it is not more absurd than the two votes of the Athenian assembly (in 290 B.C.), who being in the month of Munychion, first passed a vote that that month should be the month Anthestêrion; next, that it should be the month Boëdromion: in order that Demetrius Poliorkêtês might be initiated both in the lesser and greater mysteries of Dêmêtêr, both at once and at the same time. Demetrius arrived at Athens in the month Munychion, and went through both ceremonies with little or no delay; the religious scruple, and the dignity of the Two Goddesses being saved by altering the name of the month twice (Plutarch, Demetrius c. 26).

Meanwhile the Athenians had convoked another congress of deputies at Mantinea, for the purpose of discussing propositions

Besides, if we look to the conduct of the Argeians themselves at a subsequent period (B.C. 389, Xenophon, Hellen. iv. 7, 2, 5; v. 1, 29), we shall see them playing an analogous trick with the calendar in order to get the benefit of the sacred truce. When the Lacedæmonians invaded Argos, the Argeians despatched heralds with wreaths and the appropriate insignia, to warn them off on the ground of its being the period of the holy truce, — though it *really was not so*, — οὐχ ὅποτε καθ' ἡκοι ὁ χρόνος, ἀλλ' ὅποτε ἐμβάλλειν μέλλοιεν Λακεδαιμόνιοι, τότε ὑπέθεσαν τοὺς μῆνας — (ὁ δὲ Ἀργεῖοι ἐπεὶ ἔγνωσαν οὐ δυνησόμενοι κωλῆειν, ὥσπερ εἰώθεσαν, ἐστειλόμενοι δύο κήρυκας, ὑποφέντες τὰς σπονδας). On more than one occasion, this stratagem was successful: the Lacedæmonians did not dare to act in defiance of the summons of the heralds, who affirmed that it *was* the time of the truce, though in reality it was not so. At last, the Spartan king Agesipolis actually went north to Olympia and Delphi, to put the express question to those oracles, whether he was bound to accept the truce at any moment, right or wrong, when it might suit the convenience of the Argeians to bring it forward as a *plain plea* (ῥέπουρι). The oracles both told him that he was under no obligation to submit to such a pretence; accordingly, he sent back the heralds, refusing to attend to their summons, and invaded the Argeian territory.

Now here is a case exactly in point, with this difference; that the Argeians, when they are invaders of Epidaurus, falsify the calendar in order to get out the holy truce where it really ought to have come: whereas when they are the party invaded, they commit similar falsification in order to produce the truce where it does not legitimately belong. I conceive, therefore, that such an analogous incident completely justifies the interpretation which I have given of the passage now before us in Thucydides.

But even if I were unable to produce a case so exactly parallel, I should still defend the interpretation. Looking to the state of the ancient Grecian calendars, the proceeding imputed to the Argeians ought not to be looked on as too preposterous and absurd for adoption, with the same eyes as we should regard it now.

With the exception of Athens, we do not know completely the calendar of a single other Grecian city: but we know that the months of all were lunar months, and that the practice followed in regard to intercalation, for the prevention of inconvenient divergence between lunar and solar time, was different in each different city. Accordingly, the lunar month of one city did not, except by accident, either begin or end at the same time as the lunar month of another. M. Boeckh observes (ad Corp. Inscr. t. i. p. 734): "Variorum populorum menses, qui sibi secundum legitimos annorum cardines respondent, non quovis conveniunt anno, nisi cyclus intercalatio-

of peace: perhaps this may have been a point carried by Nikias at Athens, in spite of Alkibiadēs. What other deputies attended

num utriusque populi idem sit: sed ubi differunt cycli, altero populo prius intercalante mensem dum non intercalat alter, eorum qui non intercalant mensis certus cedit jam in eum mensem alterorum qui præcedit illum cui vulgo respondet certus iste mensis: quod tamen negligere solent chronologi." Compare also the valuable Dissertation of K. F. Hermann, Ueber die Griechische Monatskunde, Götting. 1844, pp. 21-27, where all that is known about the Grecian names and arrangement of months is well brought together.

The names of the Argeian months we hardly know at all (see K. F. Hermann, pp. 84-124): indeed, the only single name resting on positive proof is that of a month *Hermæus*. How far the months of Argos agreed with those of Epidaurus or Sparta we do not know, nor have we any right to presume that they did agree. Nor is it by any means clear that every city in Greece had what may properly be called a *system* of intercalation, so correct as to keep the calendar right without frequent arbitrary interferences. Even at Athens, it is not yet satisfactorily proved that the Metonic calendar was ever actually received into civil use. Cicero, in describing the practice of the Sicilian Greeks about reckoning of time, characterizes their interferences for the purpose of correcting the calendar as occasional rather than systematic. Verres took occasion from these interferences to make a still more violent change, by declaring the Ides of January to be the calends of March (Cicero, Verr. ii, 52, 129).

Now where a people are accustomed to get wrong in their calendar, and to see occasional interferences introduced by authority to set them right, the step which I here suppose the Argeians to have taken about the invasion of Epidaurus will not appear absurd and preposterous. The Argeians would pretend that the real time for celebrating the festival of Karneia had not yet arrived. On that point, they were not bound to follow the views of other Dorian states, since there does not seem to have been any recognized authority for proclaiming the commencement of the Karneian truce: as the Eleians proclaimed the Olympic and the Corinthians the Isthmian truce. In saying, therefore, that the twenty-sixth of the month preceding Karneius should be repeated, and that the twenty-seventh should not be recognized as arriving for a fortnight or three weeks, the Argeian government would only be employing an expedient the like of which had been before resorted to; though, in the case before us, it was employed for a fraudulent purpose.

The Spartan month *Hekatombeus* appears to have corresponded with the Attic month Hekatombaion; the Spartan month following it, *Karneius* with the Attic month Metageitnion (Hermann, p. 112), our months July and August; such correspondence being by no means exact or constant. Both Dr. Arnold and Gölter speak of Hekatombeus as if it were the Argeian

we are not told; but Euphamidas, coming as envoy from Corinth, animadverted even at the opening of the debates upon the inconsistency of assembling a peace congress while war was actually raging in the Epidaurian territory. So much were the Athenian deputies struck with this observation, that they departed, persuaded the Argeians to retire from Epidaurus, and then came back to resume negotiations. Still, however, the pretensions of both parties were found irreconcilable, and the congress broke up; upon which the Argeians again returned to renew their devastations in Epidaurus, while the Lacedæmonians, immediately on the expiration of the Karneian month, marched out again, as far as their border town of Karyæ, but were again arrested and forced to return by unfavorable border-sacrifices. Intimation of their out-march, however, was transmitted to Athens; upon which Alkibiadēs, at the head of one thousand Athenian hoplites, was sent to join the Argeians. But before he arrived, the Lacedæmonian army had been already disbanded; so that his services were no longer required, and the Argeians carried their ravages over one-third of the territory of Epidaurus before they at length evacuated it.¹

month preceding Karneius: but we only know it as a *Spartan* month. Its name does not appear among the months of the Dorian cities in Sicily, among whom nevertheless Karneius seems universal. See Franz, *Comm. ad Corp. Inscript. Græc.* No. 5475, 5491, 5640. Part xxxii, p. 640.

The tricks played with the calendar at Rome, by political authorities for party purposes, are well known to every one. And even in some states of Greece, the course of the calendar was so uncertain as to serve as a proverbial expression for inextricable confusion. See Hesychius — *Εν Κεφ τις παύρα*; *Ἐπεὶ τὸν οὐκ εἰγνώστων οὐδὲν γὰρ οἶδον ἐν Κερ τις ἡ ἡμέρα, ὅτι οὐκ ἔσται αἱ ἡμέραι, ἄλλ' ὡς ἕκαστοι θέλωσιν ἀγορεύειν.* See also Aristoph. *Nubes*, 605.

¹ Thucyd. v. 55. καὶ Ἀθηναίων αὐτοῖς χίλιοι ἐβοήθησαν ὅπλιστα καὶ Ἀλκιβιάδης στρατηγός. πλοῦταινοι τὰς Λακεδαιμονίων ἐξστρατεύσαντες καὶ ὡς οὐκ ἔτι αὐτῶν ἴδον, ἀπῆλθον. This is the reading which Portus, Bloomfield, Didot, and Gölter, either adopt or recommend, leaving out the participle which stands in the common text after πλοῦταινοι.

If we do not adopt this reading, we must construe *ἐξστρατεύσθαι*, as Dr. Arnold and Poppo construe it, in the sense of "had already completed their expedition and returned home." But no authority is produced for putting such a meaning upon the verb *ἐκστρατεύω*; and the view of Dr. Arnold, who conceives that this meaning exclusively belongs to the preterite

The Epidaurians were reinforced about the end of September by a detachment of three hundred Lacedæmonian hoplites under Agesippidas, sent by sea without the knowledge of the Athenians. Of this, the Argeians preferred loud complaints at Athens; and they had good reason to condemn the negligence of the Athenians as allies, for not having kept better naval watch at their neighboring station of Ægina, and for having allowed this enemy to enter the harbor of Epidaurus. But they took another ground of complaint, somewhat remarkable. In the alliance between Athens, Argos, Elis, and Mantinea, it had been stipulated that neither of the four should suffer the passage of troops through its territory, without the joint consent of all. Now the sea was accounted a part of the territory of Athens: so that the Athenians had violated this article of the treaty by permitting the Lacedæmonians to send troops by sea to Epidaurus. And the Argeians now required Athens, in compensation for this wrong, to carry back the Messenians and Helots from Kephallenia to Pylos, and allow them to ravage Laconia. The Athenians, under the persuasion of Alkibiadēs, complied with their requisition; inscribing, at the foot of the pillar on which their alliance with Sparta stood recorded, that the Lacedæmonians had not observed their oaths. Nevertheless, they still abstained from formally throwing up their treaty with Lacedæmon, or breaking it in any other way.¹ The relations between Athens and Sparta thus remained in name, peace and alliance, so far as concerns direct operations against each other's territory; in reality, hostile action as well as hostile manœuvring, against each other, as allies respectively of third parties.

The Argeians, after having prolonged their incursions on the Epidaurian territory throughout all the autumn, made in the winter an unavailing attempt to take the town itself by storm. Though there was no considerable action, but merely a succession of desultory attacks, in some of which the Epidaurians even

or pluperfect tense, is powerfully contradicted by the use of the word *στρατεύμενον* (ii, 7), the same verb and the same tense, yet in a meaning contrary to that which he assigns.

It appears to me the least objectionable proceeding of the two, to dispense with the particle *δε*.

¹ Thucyd. v. 51.

had the advantage, yet they still suffered serious hardship, and pressed their case forcibly on the sympathy of Sparta. Thus importuned, and mortified as well as alarmed by the increasing defection or coldness which they now experienced throughout Peloponnesus, the Lacedæmonians determined during the course of the ensuing summer to put forth their strength vigorously, and win back their lost ground.¹

Towards the month of June (B.C. 418) they marched with their full force, freemen as well as Helots, under king Agis, against Argos. The Tegeans and other Arcadian allies joined them on the march, while their other allies near the Isthmus,—Boeotians, Megarians, Corinthians, Sikyonians, Phliasians, etc., were directed to assemble at Phlius. The number of these latter allies were very considerable, for we hear of five thousand Boeotian hoplites, and two thousand Corinthian: the Boeotians had with them also five thousand light-armed, five hundred horsemen, and five hundred foot-soldiers, who ran alongside of the horsemen. The numbers of the rest, or of Spartans themselves, we do not know; nor probably did Thucydides himself know: for we find him remarking elsewhere the impenetrable concealment of the Lacedæmonians on all public affairs, in reference to the numbers at the subsequent battle of Mantinea. Such muster of the Lacedæmonian alliance was no secret to the Argeians, who marching first to Mantinea, and there taking up the force of that city as well as three thousand Eleian hoplites who came to join them, met the Lacedæmonians in their march at Methydrium in Arcadia. The two armies being posted on opposite hills, the Argeians had resolved to attack Agis the next day, so as to prevent him from joining his allies at Phlius. But he eluded this separate encounter by decamping in the night, reached Phlius, and operated his junction in safety. We do not hear that there was in the Lacedæmonian army any commander of *lochos*, who, copying the unreasonable punctilio of Amompharetus before the battle of Plataea, refused to obey the order of retreat before the enemy, to the imminent risk of the whole army. And the fact, that no similar incident occurred now, may be held to prove that

¹ Thucyd. v. 57.

the Lacedæmonians had acquired greater familiarity with the exigencies of actual warfare.

As soon as the Lacedæmonian retreat was known in the morning, the Argeians left their position also, and marched with their allies, first to Argos itself; next, to Nemea, on the ordinary road from Corinth and Phlius to Argos, by which they imagined that the invaders would approach. But Agis acted differently. Distributing his force into three divisions, he himself with the Lacedæmonians and Arcadians, taking a short, but very rugged and difficult road, crossed the ridge of the mountains and descended straight into the plain near Argos. The Corinthians, Pellensians, and Phliasians, were directed to follow another mountain road, which entered the same plain upon a different point; while the Boeotians, Corinthians, and Sikyonians, followed the longer, more even, and more ordinary route, by Nemea. This route, though apparently frequented and convenient, led for a considerable distance along a narrow ravine, called the Trétus, bounded on each side by mountains. The united army under Agis was much superior in number to the Argeians: but if all had marched in one line by the frequented route through the narrow Trétus, their superiority of number would have been of little use, whilst the Argeians would have had a position highly favorable to their defence. By dividing his force, and taking the mountain road with his own division, Agis got into the plain of Argos in the rear of the Argeian position at Nemea. He anticipated that when the Argeians saw him devastating their properties near the city, they would forthwith quit the advantageous ground near Nemea, to come and attack him in the plain: the Boeotian division would thus find the road by Nemea and the Trétus open, and would be able to march without resistance into the plain of Argos, where their numerous cavalry would act with effect against the Argeians engaged in attacking Agis. This triple march was executed. Agis with his division, and the Corinthians with theirs, got across the mountains into the Argeian plain during the night; while the Argeians, hearing at daybreak that he was near their

¹ Thucyd. v, 58. Οἱ δὲ Ἀργεῖοι γινόντες ἐξοηθὲν ἐν ἡμέρας ἡδὲ ἐν νύκτι Νεμεῶς, etc.

city, ravaging Saminthus and other places, left their position at Nemea to come down to the plain and attack him. In their march they had a partial skirmish with the Corinthian division, which had reached a high ground immediately above the Argeian plain, and which lay nearly in the road. But this affair was indecisive, and they soon found themselves in the plain near to Agis and the Lacedæmonians, who lay between them and their city.

On both sides, the armies were marshalled, and order taken for battle. But the situation of the Argeians was in reality little less than desperate: for while they had Agis and his division in their front, the Corinthian detachment was near enough to take them in flank, and the Boeotians marching along the undefended road through the Trétus would attack them in the rear. The Boeotian cavalry too would act with full effect upon them in the plain, since neither Argos, Elis, nor Mantinea, seemed to have possessed any horsemen; a description of force which ought to have been sent from Athens, though from some cause which does not appear, the Athenian contingent had not yet arrived. Nevertheless, in spite of this very critical position, both the Argeians and their allies were elate with confidence and impatient for battle; thinking only of the division of Agis immediately in their front, which appeared to be inclosed between them and their city, and taking no heed to the other formidable enemies in their flank and rear. But the Argeian generals were better aware than their soldiers of the real danger; and just as the two armies were about to charge, Alkiphron, proxenus of the Lacedæmonians at Argos, accompanied Thrasyllus, one of the five generals of the Argeians, to a separate parley with Agis, without the least consultation or privy on the part of their own army. They exhorted Agis not to force on a battle, assuring him that the Argeians were ready both to give and receive equitable satisfaction, in all matters of complaint which the Lacedæmonians might urge against them, and to conclude a just peace for the future. Agis, at once acquiescing in the proposal, granted them a truce of four months to accomplish what they had promised. He on his part also took this step without consulting either his army or his allies, simply addressing a few words of confidential talk to

one of the official Spartans near him. Immediately, he gave the order for retreat, and the army, instead of being led to battle, was conducted out of the Argeian territory, through the Nemean road whereby the Boeotians had just been entering. But it required all the habitual discipline of Lacedaemonian soldiers to make them obey this order of the Spartan king, alike unexpected and unwelcome.¹ For the army were fully sensible both of the prodigious advantages of their position, and of the overwhelming strength of the invading force, so that all the three divisions were loud in their denunciations of Agis, and penetrated with shame at the thoughts of so disgraceful a retreat. And when they all saw themselves in one united body at Nemea, previous to breaking up and going home, — so as to have before their eyes their own full numbers and the complete equipment of one of the finest Hellenic armies which had ever been assembled, — the Argeian body of allies, before whom they were now retiring, appeared contemptible in the comparison, and they separated with yet warmer and more universal indignation against the king who had betrayed their cause.

On returning home, Agis incurred not less blame from the Spartan authorities than from his own army, for having thrown away so admirable an opportunity of subduing Argos. This was assuredly no more than he deserved: but we read with no small astonishment that the Argeians and their allies on returning were even more exasperated against Thrasyllus,² whom they accused of having traitorously thrown away a certain victory. They had indeed good ground, in the received practice, to censure him for having concluded a truce without taking the sense of the people. It was their custom on returning from a march to hold a public court-martial before entering the city, at a place called the Charadrus, or winter torrent near the walls, for the purpose of adjudicating on offences and faults committed in the army. Such was their wrath on this occasion against Thrasyllus, that they would scarcely be prevailed upon even to put him upon his trial, but began to stone him. He was forced to seek personal

¹ Thucyd. v. 60. Οἱ δὲ Λακεδαιμόνιοι καὶ οἱ ξιμμαχοὶ εἶποντο μὲν ὡς ἔγειτο διὰ τὸν νόμον, ἐν αἷσι δὲ εἶχον κατ' ἀλλήλους πολλὰ τὸν Ἄγιον, etc.

² Thucyd. v. 60. Ἀργεῖοι δὲ καὶ αὐτοὶ εἶσι ἐν πολλῇ πλείονι αἰτίᾳ αὐτοῦ τοῦ σπείσαντων ἀνεῦ τοῦ πεισθῆναι, etc.

safety at the altar; upon which the soldiers tried him, and he was condemned to have his property confiscated.¹

Very shortly afterwards the expected Athenian contingent arrived, which probably ought to have come earlier: one thousand hoplites, with three hundred horsemen, under Lachês and Nikostratus. Alkibiadês came as ambassador, probably serving as a soldier also among the horsemen. The Argeians, notwithstanding their displeasure against Thrasyllus, nevertheless felt themselves pledged to observe the truce which he had concluded, and their magistrates accordingly desired the newly-arrived Athenians to depart. Nor was Alkibiadês even permitted to approach and address the public assembly, until the Mantineian and Eleian allies insisted that thus much at least should not be refused. An assembly was therefore convened, in which these allies took part, along with the Argeians. Alkibiadês contended strenuously that the recent truce with the Lacedaemonians was null and void; since it had been contracted without the privity of all the allies, distinctly at variance with the terms of the alliance. He therefore called upon them to resume military operations forthwith, in conjunction with the reinforcement now seasonably arrived. His speech so persuaded the assembly, that the Mantineians and Eleians consented at once to join him in an expedition against the Arcadian town of Orchomenus; the Argeians, also, though at first reluctant, very speedily followed them thither. Orchomenus was a place important to acquire, not merely because its territory joined that of Mantinea on the northward, but because the Lacedaemonians had deposited therein the hostages which they had taken from Arcadian townships and villages as guarantee for fidelity. Its walls were however in bad condition, and its inhabitants, after a short resistance, capitulated. They agreed to become allies of Mantinea, to furnish hostages for faithful adhesion to such alliance, and to deliver up the hostages deposited with them by Sparta.²

Encouraged by first success, the allies debated what they should next undertake; the Eleians contending strenuously for a march against Lepreum, while the Mantineians were anxious to attack their enemy and neighbor Tegea. The Argeians and Athenians

¹ Thucyd. v. 60.

² Thucyd. v. 62.

preferred the latter, incomparably the more important enterprise of the two: but such was the disgust of the Eleians at the rejection of their proposition, that they abandoned the army altogether, and went home. Notwithstanding their desertion, however, the remaining allies continued together at Mantinea, organizing their attack upon Tegea, in which city they had a strong favorable party, who had actually laid their plans, and were on the point of proclaiming the revolt of the city from Sparta.¹ When the philo-Laconian Tegeans just saved themselves by despatching the most urgent message to Sparta, and receiving the most rapid succor. The Lacedæmonians, filled with indignation at the news of the surrender of Orchomenus, vented anew all their displeasure against Agis, whom they now threatened with the severe punishment of demolishing his house and fining him in the sum of one hundred thousand drachmæ, or about twenty-seven and two-thirds Attic talents. He urgently entreated that an opportunity might be afforded to him of redeeming by some brave deed the ill name which he had incurred: if he failed in doing so, then they might inflict on him what penalty they chose. The penalty was accordingly withdrawn: but a restriction, new to the Spartan constitution, was now placed upon the authority of the king. It had been before a part of his prerogative to lead out the army single-handed and on his own authority; but a council of ten was now named, without whose concurrence he was interdicted from exercising such power.²

To the great good fortune of Agis, a pressing message now arrived announcing the imminent revolt of Tegea, the most important ally of Sparta, and close upon her border. Such was the alarm occasioned by this news that the whole military population instantly started off to relieve the place, Agis at their head, the most rapid movement ever known to have been made by Lacedæmonian soldiers.³ When they arrived at Orestheium in Arcadia, in their way, perhaps hearing that the danger was

¹ Thucyd. v. 64. ὅταν ἀπὸ ἀδίστηκον, etc.

² Thucyd. v. 63.

³ Thucyd. v. 64. ἵσταται δὲ βοήθεια τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων γίγνεται αὐτῶν πρὸς καὶ τῶν Ἑλλήνων πανόρμῃ ὁρμήναι καὶ οἷα οὐρα τασσόμεναι. The outmarch of the Spartans just before the battle of Platæa (described in Herodot. vii. 10) seems, however, to have been quite as rapid and instantaneous.

somewhat less pressing, they sent back to Sparta one-sixth part of the forces, for home defence, the oldest as well as the youngest men. The remainder marched forward to Tegea, where they were speedily joined by their Arcadian allies. They farther sent messages to the Corinthians and Bœotians, as well as to the Phocians and Lokrians, invoking the immediate presence of these contingents in the territory of Mantinea. The arrival of such reinforcements, however, even with all possible zeal on the part of the cities contributing, could not be looked for without some lapse of time; the rather, as it appears, that they could not get into the territory of Mantinea except by passing through that of Argos,¹ which could not be safely attempted until they had all formed a junction. Accordingly Agis, impatient to redeem his reputation, marched at once with the Lacedæmonians and the Arcadian allies present, into the territory of Mantinea, and took up a position near the Herakleion, or temple of Herakles,² from whence he began to ravage the neighboring lands. The Argeians and their allies presently came forth from Mantinea, planted themselves near him, but on very rugged and impracticable ground, and thus offered him battle. Nothing daunted by the difficulties of the position, he marshalled his army and led it up to attack them. His rashness on the present occasion might have produced as much mischief as his inconsiderate concession to Thrasyllus near Argos, had not an ancient Spartan called out to him that he was now merely proceeding "to heal mischief by mischief." So forcibly was Agis impressed either with this timely admonition, or by the closer view of the position which he had undertaken to assault, that he suddenly halted the army and gave orders for retreat, though actually within distance no greater than the cast of a javelin from the enemy.³

¹ Thucyd. v. 64. ἐπὶ τῇ ἐκείνῃ γὰρ δὴν ἦσαν.

² The Lacedæmonian kings appear to have felt a sense of protection in encamping near a temple of Heraklēs, their heroic progenitor (see Xenophon. Hellen. vii. 1, 31).

³ Thucyd. v. 65. See an exclamation by an old Spartan mentioned as productive of important consequences, at the moment when a battle was going to commence, in Xenophon. Hellen. vii. 4, 25.

His march was now intended to draw the Argeians away from the difficult ground which they occupied. On the frontier between Mantinea and Tegea — both situated on a lofty but inclosed plain, drained only by katabothra, or natural subterranean channels in the mountains — was situated a head of water, the regular efflux of which seems to have been kept up by joint operations of both cities for their mutual benefit. Thither Agis now conducted his army, for the purpose of turning the water towards the side of Mantinea, where it would occasion serious damage; calculating that the Mantineians and their allies would certainly descend from their position to hinder it. No stratagem however was necessary to induce the latter to adopt this resolution. For so soon as they saw the Lacedæmonians, after advancing to the foot of the hill, first suddenly halt, next retreat, and lastly disappear, their surprise was very great: and this surprise was soon converted into contemptuous confidence and impatience to pursue the flying enemy. The generals not sharing such confidence, hesitated at first to quit their secure position: upon which the troops became clamorous, and loudly denounced them for treason in letting the Lacedæmonians quietly escape a second time, as they had before done near Argos. These generals would probably not be the same with those who had incurred, a short time before, so much undeserved censure for their convention with Agis: but the murmurs on the present occasion, hardly less unreasonable, drove them, not without considerable shame and confusion, to give orders for advance. They abandoned the hill, marched down into the plain so as to approach the Lacedæmonians, and employed the next day in arranging themselves in good battle order, so as to be ready to fight at a moment's notice.

Meanwhile it appears that Agis had found himself disappointed in his operations upon the water. He had either not done so much damage, or not spread so much terror, as he had expected: and he accordingly desisted, putting himself again in march to resume his position at the Herakleion, and supposing that his enemies still retained their position on the hill. But in the course of this march he came suddenly upon the Argeian and allied army where he was not in the least prepared to see them: they were not only in the plain, but already drawn up in perfect

order of battle. The Mantineians occupied the right wing, the post of honor, because the ground was in their territory: next to them stood their dependent Arcadian allies: then the chosen Thousand-regiment of Argos, citizens of wealth and family, trained in arms at the cost of the state: alongside of them, the remaining Argeian hoplites, with their dependent allies of Kleonæ and Orneæ: last of all, on the left wing, stood the Athenians, their hoplites as well as their horsemen.

It was with the greatest surprise that Agis and his army beheld this unexpected apparition. To any other Greeks than Lacedæmonians, the sudden presentation of a formidable enemy would have occasioned a feeling of dismay from which they would have found it difficult to recover; and even the Lacedæmonians, on this occasion, underwent a momentary shock unparalleled in their previous experience.¹ But they now felt the full advantage of their rigorous training and habit of military obedience, as well as of that subordination of officers which was peculiar to themselves in Greece. In other Grecian armies orders were proclaimed to the troops in a loud voice by a herald, who received them personally from the general: each *taxis*, or company, indeed, had its own taxiarch, but the latter did not receive his orders separately from the general, and seems to have had no personal responsibility for the execution of them by his soldiers. Subordinate and responsible military authority was not recognized. Among the Lacedæmonians, on the contrary, there was a regular gradation of military and responsible authority, "commanders of commanders," each of whom had his special duty in insuring the execution of orders.² Every order emanated from the Spartan king when he was present, and was given to the polemarchs (each commanding a mora, the largest military divis-

¹ Thucyd. v. 66. *μαλιστα δὲ Λακεδαιμόνιοι, ἐς ὃ ἐμνηνέτο, ἐν τούτῳ τῷ καιρῷ ἐξέπληχσαν: οὐ γὰρ ἀρχαίως γὰρ μέλλεσθαι τὴν παρασκευὴν αὐτοῖς ἐγγίγντο, etc.*

² Thucyd. v. 66. *Σχεδόν γὰρ τι πάν, πλὴν ὀλίγων, τὸ στρατόπεδον τῶν Λακεδαιμόνων ἀρχόντι, ἔρχοντων εἶσι, καὶ τὸ ἐπιμελεῖς τοῦ ὁρωμένου πολλὰ προσέκει.*

Xenophon. De Republ. Laced. xi. 5. *Αἱ παραβολαὶ ὥσπερ ἐπὶ κήρυκος ἐπὶ τοῦ ἐνωσιτάρχου λαγῶ ἐγίνοντο: compare xi. 8, τῷ ἐνωσιτάρχῳ παρεγγράφη: καὶ ἐπὶ τῷ ἐνωσιτάρχῳ ἐπὶ τῷ ἐνωσιτάρχῳ, etc.*

ion), who intimated it to the lochagi, or colonels, of the respective lochi. These again gave command to each pentekontêr, or captain of a pentekosty; lastly, he to the enômotarch, who commanded the lowest subdivision, called an enômoty. The soldier thus received no immediate orders except from the enômotarch, who was in the first instance responsible for his enômoty; but the pentekontêr and the lochage were responsible also each for his larger division; the pentekosty including four enômoties, and the lochus four pentekosties, at least so the numbers stood on this occasion. All the various military manoeuvres were familiar to the Lacedæmonians from their unremitting drill, so that their armies enjoyed the advantage of readier obedience along with more systematic command. Accordingly, though thus taken by surprise, and called on now for the first time in their lives, to form in the presence of an enemy, they only manifested the greater promptitude and anxious haste in obeying the orders of Agis, transmitted through the regular series of officers. The battle array was attained with regularity as well as with speed.

The extreme left of the Lacedæmonian line belonged by ancient privilege to the Skiritæ; mountaineers of the border district of Laconia, skirting the Arcadian Parrhasii, seemingly east of the Eurotas, near its earliest and highest course. These men, originally Arcadians, now constituted a variety of Lacomian Perioeci, with peculiar duties as well as peculiar privileges. Numbered among the bravest and most active men in Peloponnesus, they generally formed the vanguard in an advancing march; and the Spartans stand accused of having exposed them to danger as well as toil with unbecoming recklessness.² Next to the Skiritæ, who were six hundred in number, stood the enfranchised Helots, recently returned from serving with Brasidas in Thrace, and the Neodamodes, both probably summoned home from Lepreum, where we were told before that they had been planted. After them, in the centre of the entire line, came the Lacedæmonian lochi, seven in number, with the Arcadian de-

¹ Thucyd. v. 66. εἶπε ἰπὸ στρατάρχης καθ' ἑκάστην ἐς λόχον τὸν ἑαυτοῦ. Ἄγαντες τοῖς βασιλέωσι ἑκάστη ἐξηγομένη κατὰ τοὺς νόμους, etc.

² Xenophon, Cyrop. iv. 2. 1: see Diodor. xv. c. 32; Xenophon, Rep. Laced. xiii. 6.

pendent allies, Heræan and Manalian, near them. Lastly, in the right wing, stood the Tegeans, with a small division of Lacedæmonians occupying the extreme right, as the post of honor. On each flank there were some Lacedæmonian horsemen.¹

Thucydides, with a frankness which enhances the value of his testimony wherever he gives it positively, informs us that he cannot pretend to set down the number of either army. It is evident that this silence is not for want of having inquired; but none of the answers which he received appeared to him trustworthy: the extreme secrecy of Lacedæmonian politics admitted of no certainty about *their* numbers, while the empty numerical boasts of other Greeks were not less misleading. In the absence of assured information about aggregate number, the historian gives us some general information accessible to every inquirer, and some facts visible to a spectator. From his language it is conjectured, with some probability, by Dr. Thirlwall and others, that he was himself present at the battle, though in what capacity we cannot determine, as he was an exile from his country. First, he states that the Lacedæmonian army *appeared* more numerous than that of the enemy. Next he tells us, that independent of the Skiritæ on the left, who were six hundred in number, the remaining Lacedæmonian front, to the extremity of their right wing, consisted of four hundred and forty-eight men, each enômoty having four men in front. In respect to depth, the different enômoties were not all equal; but for the most part, the files were eight deep. There were seven lochi in all (apart from the Skiritæ); each lochus comprised four pentekosties, each pentekosty contained four enômoties.² Multiplying four hundred and

¹ Thucyd. v. 67.

² Very little can be made out respecting the structure of the Lacedæmonian army. We know that the enômoty was the elementary division, the military unit: that the pentekosty was composed of a definite (not always the same) number of enômoties: that the lochus also was composed of a definite (not always the same) number of pentekosties. The mora appears to have been a still larger division, consisting of so many lochi (according to Xenophon, of four lochi): but Thucydides speaks as if he *knew* no division larger than the lochus.

Beyond this very slender information, there seems no other fact certainly

forty-four by eight, and adding the six hundred Skiritæ, this would make a total of four thousand one hundred and eighty-four hoplites, besides a few horsemen on each flank. Respecting light-armed, nothing is said. I have no confidence in such an estimate — but the total is smaller than we should have expected, considering that the Lacedæmonians had marched out from Sparta with their entire force on a pressing emergency, and that they had only sent home one-sixth of their total, their oldest and youngest soldiers.

It does not appear that the generals on the Argeian side made any attempt to charge while the Lacedæmonian battle-array was yet incomplete. It was necessary for them, according to Grecian practice, to wind up the courage of their troops by some words of exhortation and encouragement: and before these were finished, the Lacedæmonians may probably have attained their order. The Mantincian officers reminded their countrymen that the coming battle would decide whether Mantinea should continue to be a free and imperial city, with Arcadian dependencies of her own, as she now was, or should again be degraded into a dependency of Lacedæmon. The Argeian leaders dwelt upon

established about the Lacedæmonian military distribution. Nor ought we reasonably to expect to find that these words *enómoty*, *pentekosty*, *lochos*, etc. indicate any fixed number of men: our own names *regiment*, *company*, *troop*, *brigade*, *division*, etc., are all more or less indefinite as to positive number and proportion to each other.

That which was peculiar to the Lacedæmonian drill, was, the teaching a small number of men like an *enómoty* (twenty-five, thirty-two, thirty-six men, as we sometimes find it), to perform its evolutions under the command of its *enómotarch*. When this was once secured, it is probable that the combination of these elementary divisions was left to be determined in every case by circumstances.

Thucydides states two distinct facts. 1. Each *enómoty* had *four men in front*. 2. Each *enómoty varied in depth*, according as every *lochos* chose. Now Dobree asks, with much reason, how these two assertions are to be reconciled? Given the number of men in front, the depth of the *enómoty* is of course determined, without any reference to the discretion of any one. These two assertions appear distinctly contradictory, unless we suppose (what seems very difficult to believe) that the *lochos* might make one or two of the four files of the same *enómoty* deeper than the rest. Dobree proposes, as a means of removing this difficulty, to expunge some words from the text. One cannot have confidence, however, in the conjecture

the opportunity which Argos now had of recovering her lost ascendancy in Peloponnesus, and of revenging herself upon her worst enemy and neighbor. The Athenian troops were exhorted to show themselves worthy of the many brave allies with whom they were now associated, as well as to protect their own territory and empire by vanquishing their enemy in Peloponnesus.

It illustrates forcibly the peculiarity of Lacedæmonian character, that to them no similar words of encouragement were addressed either by Agis or any of the officers. "They knew (says the historian¹) that long practice beforehand in the business of war, was a better preservative than fine speeches on the spur of the moment." As among professional soldiers, bravery was assumed as a thing of course, without any special exhortation: but mutual suggestions were heard among them with a view to get their order of battle and position perfect, which at first it probably was not, from the sudden and hurried manner in which they had been constrained to form. Moreover, various war-songs, perhaps those of Tyrtæus, were chanted in the ranks. At length the word was given to attack: the numerous pipers in attendance — an hereditary caste at Sparta — began to play, while the slow, solemn, and equable march of the troops adjusted itself to the time given by these instruments without any break or wavering in the line. A striking contrast to this deliberate pace was presented by the enemy: who having no pipers or other musical instruments, rushed forward to the charge with a step vehement and even furious,² fresh from the exhortations just addressed to them.

It was the natural tendency of all Grecian armies, when coming into conflict, to march not exactly straight forward, but somewhat

¹ Thucyd. v, 69. Λακεδαιμόνιοι δὲ καθ' ἑκάστους τε καὶ μετὰ τῶν πολεμικῶν νόμων ἐν σφίσιν αὐτοῖς ὧν ἡπιστάντο τὴν παρακίλευσιν τῆς μυίας ἀγαθοῖς οὖσαν ἐποιεῖντο, εἰδοτες ἔργων ἐκ πολλοῦ μελετῆν πλῆως σῶζουσιν ἢ λόγων δι' ὀλίγον καλῶς ρηθέντων παραίνεσιν.

² Thucyd. v, 70. Ἀργεῖοι μὲν καὶ οἱ ξερμαχοί, ἐντονωσὶ καὶ ἐργῇ χωροῦντες. Λακεδαιμόνιοι δὲ, βραδεὶς καὶ ἐπο' ἀλλήτων πολλῶν νόμων ἐκαστῶν, ὡς τῶν οὐκ ἔστιν χάριν, ἀλλ' ἵνα ὁμαλῶς μετὰ ῥυθμοῦ δαινόντες προέλθοιεν καὶ ὡς διαστῶσθαι αὐτῶν ἡ τάξις, ὑπὲρ φίλῃ τὰ μεγάλα στρατόπεδα ἐν ταῖς τοῦ τοῦ πολεμικοῦ.

slant towards the right. The soldiers on the extreme right of both armies set the example of such inclination, in order to avoid exposing their own unshielded side; while for the same reason every man along the line took care to keep close to the shield of his right-hand neighbor. We see from hence that, with equal numbers, the right was not merely the post of honor, but also of comparative safety. So it proved on the present occasion, even the Lacedæmonian discipline being noway exempt from this cause of disturbance. Though the Lacedæmonian front, from their superior numbers, was more extended than that of the enemy, still their right files did not think themselves safe without slanting still farther to the right, and thus outflanked very greatly the Athenians on the opposite left wing; while on the opposite side the Mantineians who formed the right wing, from the same disposition to keep the left shoulder forward, outflanked, though not in so great a degree, the Skiritæ and Brasideians on the Lacedæmonian left. King Agis, whose post was with the lochi in the centre, saw plainly that when the armies closed, his left would be certainly taken in flank and perhaps even in the rear. Accordingly, he thought it necessary to alter his dispositions even at this critical moment, which he relied upon being able to accomplish through the exact discipline, practised evolutions, and slow march, of his soldiers.

The natural mode of meeting the impending danger would have been to bring round a division from the extreme right, where it could well be spared, to the extreme left against the advancing Mantineians. But the ancient privilege of the Skiritæ, who always fought by themselves on the extreme left, forbade such an order.¹ Accordingly, Agis gave signal to the Brasideians and Skiritæ to make a flank movement on the left, so as to get on equal front with the Mantineians; while in order to fill

¹ Thucyd. v. 67. Τότε δὲ κρημαίνοντες Σκίριται αὐτὴν ἀντιστάσαντες, ἀεὶ ταύτην τὴν τάξιν ποιεῖν Λακεδαιμόνιοι ἐπισφῶν αὐτῶν ἔχοντες, etc.

The strong and precise language, which Thucydides here uses, shows that this was a privilege pointedly noted and much esteemed among the Lacedæmonians, especially, ancient routine was more valued than elsewhere. And it is essential to take notice of the circumstance, in order to appreciate the generalship of Agis, which has been rather hardly criticized.

up the vacancy thus created in his line, he sent orders to the two polemarchs Aristoklēs and Hipponoidas, who had their lochi on the extreme right of the line, to move to the rear and take post on the right of the Brasideians, so as again to close up the line. But these two polemarchs, who had the safest and most victorious place in the line, chose to keep it, disobeying his express orders: so that Agis, when he saw that they did not move, was forced to send a second order countermanning the flank movement of the Skiritæ, and directing them to fall in upon the centre, back into their former place. But it had now become too late to execute this second command before the hostile armies closed: and the Skiritæ and Brasideians were thus assailed while in disorder and cut off from their own centre. The Mantineians, finding them in this condition, defeated and drove them back; while the chosen Thousand of Argos, breaking in by the vacant space between the Brasideians and the Lacedæmonian centre, took them on the right flank and completed their discomfiture. They were routed and pursued even to the Lacedæmonian baggage-wagons in the rear; some of the elder troops who guarded the wagons being slain, and the whole Lacedæmonian left wing altogether dispersed.

But the victorious Mantineians and their comrades, thinking only of what was immediately before them, wasted thus a precious time when their aid was urgently needed elsewhere. Matters passed very differently on the Lacedæmonian centre and right; where Agis, with his body-guard of three hundred chosen youths called Hippæi, and with the Spartan lochi, found himself in front conflict with the centre and left of the enemy;—with the Argæans, their elderly troops and the so-called Five Lochi, with the Kleonæans and Orneates, dependent allies of Argos, and with the Athenians. Over all these troops they were completely victorious, after a short resistance, indeed, on some points with no resistance at all. So formidable was the aspect and name of the Lacedæmonians, that the opposing troops gave way without crossing spears; and even with a panic so headlong, that they trod down each other in anxiety to escape.¹ While thus

¹ Thucyd. v. 72. (Οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι τοὺς Ἀργεῖους) Ἐπύρην, οὐδὲ ἐς ῥέως τοὺς πολλοὺς ἱπομείναντας, ἀλλ', ὡς ἐπύρην οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι, εἰθὺς

defeated in front, they were taken in flank by the Tegeans and Lacedæmonians on the right of Agis's army, and the Athenians

ἐκδόντας, καὶ ἐστὶν οἷς καὶ καταπατηθέντας, τοῦ μὴ φθῆναι τὴν ἐγκατάληψιν.

The last words of this sentence present a difficulty which has perplexed all the commentators, and which none of them have yet satisfactorily cleared up.

They all admit that the expressions, *τοῦ μὴ*, *τοῦ μὴ*, preceding the infinitive mood as here, signify *design* or *purpose*; *ἐνεκα* being understood. But none of them can construe the sentence satisfactorily with this meaning; accordingly they here ascribe to the words a different and exceptional meaning. See the notes of Poppo, Göller, and Dr. Arnold, in which notes the views of other critics are cited and discussed.

Some say that *τοῦ μὴ* in this place means the same as *ὥστε μὴ*; others affirm, that it is identical with *ὅτι τοῦ μὴ* or with *τῷ μὴ*. "Formula *τοῦ μὴ* (say Bauer and Göller), plerumque *consilium* significat interdum *effectum* (i. e. *ὥστε μὴ*); hic causam indicat (i. e. *ὅτι τοῦ μὴ*, or *τῷ μὴ*)." But I agree with Dr. Arnold in thinking that the last of these three alleged meanings is wholly unauthorized; while the second, which is adopted by Dr. Arnold himself, is sustained only by feeble and dubious evidence: for the passage of Thucydides (ii. 4. *τοῦ μὴ ἐκφυγεῖν*) may be as well construed as Poppo's note thereupon suggests, without any such supposed exceptional sense of the words.

Now it seems to me quite possible to construe the words *τοῦ μὴ* *φθῆναι* here in their regular and legitimate sense of *ἐνεκα τοῦ μὴ*, or *consilium*. But first an error must be cleared up which pervades the view of most of the commentators. They suppose that those Argeians, who are here affirmed to have been "trodden under foot," were so trodden down by the Lacedæmonians in their advance. But this is in every way improbable. The Lacedæmonians were particularly slow in their motions, regular in their ranks, and backward as to pursuit, qualities which are dwelt upon by Thucydides in regard to this very battle. They were not at all likely to overtake such terrified men as were only anxious to run away; moreover, if they did overtake them, they would spear them, not trample them under foot.

To be trampled under foot, though possible enough from the numerous Persian cavalry (Herodot. vii. 173, Xenoph. Hellen. iii. 4. 12), is not the treatment which defeated soldiers meet with from victorious hostile infantry in the field, especially Lacedæmonian infantry. But it is precisely the treatment which they meet with, if they be in one of the hinder ranks, from their own panic-stricken comrades in the front rank, who find the enemy closing upon them, and rush back madly to get away from him. Of course it was the Argeians in the front rank who were seized with the most violent panic, and who thus fell back upon their own comrades in the rear ranks, overthrowing and treading them down to secure their own escape. It seems

here incurred serious hazard of being all cut to pieces, had they not been effectively aided by their own cavalry close at hand.

quite plain that it was the Argeians in front — not the Lacedæmonians — who trod down their comrades in the rear (there were probably six or eight men in every file), in order to escape themselves before the Lacedæmonians should be upon them: compare Xen. Hellenic. iv. 4. 11; *Æconomic*. viii. 5.

There are therefore in the whole scene which Thucydides describes, three distinct subjects: 1. The Lacedæmonians 2. The Argeians soldiers, who were trodden down. 3. Other Argeian soldiers, who trod them down in order to get away themselves. Out of these three he only specifies the first two; but the third is present to his mind, and is implied in his narrative, just as much as if he had written *καταπατηθέντας ἐπ' ἀλλήλων*, or *ἐπ' ἀλλήλων*, as in Xenoph. Hellen. iv. 4. 11.

Now it is to this third subject, implied in the narrative, but not formally specified (i. e. those Argeians who trod down their comrades in order to get away themselves), or rather to the second and third conjointly and confusedly, that the *design* or *purpose* (*consilium*) in the words *τοῦ μὴ φθῆναι* refers.

Farther, the commentators all construe *τοῦ μὴ φθῆναι τὴν ἐγκατάληψιν*, as if the last word were an accusative case coming after *φθῆναι* and governed by it. But there is also another construction, equally good Greek, and much better for the sense. In my judgment, *τὴν ἐγκατάληψιν* is here the accusative case coming before *φθῆναι* and forming the subject of it. The words will thus read (*ἐνεκα*) *τοῦ τὴν ἐγκατάληψιν μὴ φθῆναι* (*ἐπελθούσαν αὐτοῖς*): "in order that the actual grasp of the Lacedæmonians might not be beforehand in coming upon them;" "might not come upon them too soon," i. e. "sooner than they could get away." And since the word *ἐγκατάληψις* is an abstract active substantive, so, in order to get at the real meaning here, we may substitute the concrete words with which it correlates, i. e. *τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους ἐγκαταλαμβάνοντας*, subject as well as attribute, for the active participle is here essentially involved.

The sentence would then read, supposing the ellipsis filled up and the meaning expressed in full and concrete words — *ἐστὶν οἷς καὶ καταπατηθέντας ἐπ' ἀλλήλων φεγόντων* (or *διαζομένων*), *ἐνεκα τοῦ τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους μὴ φθῆναι ἐγκαταλαμβάνοντας αὐτοὺς* (*τοὺς φεγόντας*): "As soon as the Lacedæmonians approached near, the Argeians gave way at once, without staying for hand-combat: and some were even trodden down by each other, or by their own comrades running away in order that the Lacedæmonians might not be beforehand in catching them sooner than they could escape."

Construing in this way the sentence as it now stands, we have *τοῦ μὴ φθῆναι* used in its regular and legitimate sense of *purpose*, or *consilium*. We have moreover a plain and natural state of facts, in full keeping with the general narrative. Nor is there any violence put upon the words. Nothing more is done than to expand a very elliptical sentence, and to fill up that entire sentence which was present to the writer's own mind. To do this

Moreover Agis, having decidedly beaten and driven them back was less anxious to pursue them than to return to the rescue of his own defeated left wing; so that even the Athenians, who were exposed both in flank and front, were enabled to effect their retreat in safety. The Mantineians and the Argeian Thousand, though victorious on their part of the line, yet seeing the remainder of their army in disorderly flight, had little disposition to renew the combat against Agis and the conquering Lacedæmonians. They sought only to effect their retreat, which however could not be done without severe loss, especially on the part of the Mantineians; and which Agis might have prevented altogether, had not the Lacedæmonian system, enforced on this occasion by the counsels of an ancient Spartan named Pharax, enjoyed abstinence from prolonged pursuit against a defeated enemy.

There fell in this battle seven hundred men of the Argeians, Kleonæans, and Orneates; two hundred Athenians, together with both the generals Lachæus and Nikostratus; and two hundred Mantineians. The loss of the Lacedæmonians, though never certainly known, from the habitual secrecy of their public proceedings, was estimated at about three hundred men. They stripped the enemy's dead, spreading out to view the arms thus acquired, and selecting some for a trophy; then picked up their own dead and carried them away for burial at Tegea, granting the customary burial-truce to the defeated enemy. Pleistoanax, the other Spartan king, had advanced as far as Tegea with a reinforcement composed of the elder and younger citizens; but on hearing of the victory, he returned back home.²

Such was the important battle of Mantinea, fought in the month of June 418 B.C. Its effect throughout Greece was prodigious. The numbers engaged on both sides were very considerable for a Grecian army of that day, though seemingly not so large as at the battle of Delium five years before; the number and grandeur of the states whose troops were engaged was, however, greater than at Delium. But what gave peculiar value to the battle was, that it wiped off at once the preëxisting stain upon

properly is the chief duty, as well as the chief difficulty, of an expositor of Thucydides.

¹ Thucyd. v. 53. Orosius, xii. 79.

² Thucyd. v. 79.

the honor of Sparta. The disaster in Sphacteria, disappointing all previous expectation, had drawn upon her the imputation of something like cowardice; and there were other proceedings which, with far better reason, caused her to be stigmatized as stupid and backward. But the victory of Mantinea silenced all such disparaging criticism, and replaced Sparta in her old position of military preëminence before the eyes of Greece. It worked so much the more powerfully because it was entirely the fruit of Lacedæmonian courage, with little aid from that peculiar skill and tactics, which was generally seen concomitant, but had in the present case been found comparatively wanting. The manœuvre of Agis, in itself not ill-conceived, for the purpose of extending his left wing, had failed through the disobedience of the two refractory polemarchs; but in such a case the shame of failure falls more or less upon all parties concerned; nor could either general or soldiers be considered to have displayed at Mantinea any of that professional aptitude which caused the Lacedæmonians to be styled "artists in warlike affairs." So much the more conspicuously did Lacedæmonian courage stand out to view. After the left wing had been broken, and when the Argeian Thousand had penetrated into the vacant space between the left and centre, so that they might have taken the centre in flank, and ought to have done so, had they been well advised, the troops in the centre, instead of being daunted as most Grecian soldiers would have been, had marched forward against the enemies in their front, and gained a complete victory. The consequences of the battle were thus immense in re-establishing the reputation of the Lacedæmonians, and in exalting them again to their ancient dignity of chiefs of Peloponnesus.

We are not surprised to hear that the two polemarchs, Aristoklès and Hipponoidas, whose disobedience had wellnigh caused the ruin of the army, were tried and condemned to banishment as cowards, on their return to Sparta.²

Looking at the battle from the point of view of the other side,

¹ Thucyd. v. 75. Καὶ τὴν ὑπὸ τῶν Ἑλλήνων τότε ἐπιφερομένην αἰτίαν ἐς τὴν μάλακιαν διὰ τὴν ἐν τῇ νήσῳ ξυμφορὰν, καὶ ἐς τὴν ἄλλην ἀβουλίαν τε καὶ βραδύτητα, ἐν τῷ ἔργῳ τούτῳ ἀπέλυσαντο· τὴν μὲν, ὡς ἐδόκουν, κακίζόμενοι γινώμη δέ, οἱ αὐτοὶ αἰεὶ οὐκ οἶοντες.

² Thucyd. v. 79.

we may remark, that the defeat was greatly occasioned by the selfish caprice of the Eleians in withdrawing their three thousand men immediately before the battle, because the other allies, instead of marching against Lepreum, preferred to attempt the far more important town of Tegea: an additional illustration of the remark of Periklēs at the beginning of the war, that numerous and equal allies could never be kept in harmonious cooperation.¹ Shortly after the defeat, the three thousand Eleians came back to the aid of Mantinea, — probably regretting their previous untoward departure, — together with a reinforcement of one thousand Athenians. Moreover, the Karneian month began, a season which the Lacedæmonians kept rigidly holy; even despatching messengers to countermand their extra-Peloponnesian allies, whom they had invoked prior to the late battle,² and remaining themselves within their own territory, so that the field was for the moment left clear for the operations of a defeated enemy. Accordingly, the Epidaurians, though they had made an inroad into the territory of Argos during the absence of the Argeian main force at the time of the late battle, and had gained a partial success, now found their own territory overrun by the united Eleians, Mantinians, and Athenians, who were bold enough even to commence a wall of circumvallation round the town of Epidaurus itself. The entire work was distributed between them to be accomplished; but the superior activity and perseverance of the Athenians was here displayed in a conspicuous manner. For while the portion of work committed to them — the fortification of the cape on which the Heraum or temple of Hērē was situated — was indefatigably prosecuted and speedily brought to completion, their allies, both Eleians and Mantinians, abandoned the tasks respectively allotted to them in impatience and disgust. The idea of circumvallation being for this reason relinquished, a joint garrison was left in the new fort at Cape Heraum, after which the allies evacuated the Epidaurian territory.³

So far, the Lacedæmonians appeared to have derived little positive benefit from their late victory: but the fruits of it were soon manifested in the very centre of their enemy's force, at Argos. A material change had taken place since the battle in

¹ Thucyd. i. 141.

² Thucyd. v. 75.

³ Thucyd. v. 75.

the political tendencies of that city. There had been within it always an opposition party, philo-Laonian and anti-democratical and the effect of the defeat of Mantinea had been to strengthen this party as much as it depressed their opponents. The democratical leaders, who, in conjunction with Athens and Alkibiades, had aspired to maintain an ascendancy in Peloponnesus hostile and equal, if not superior to Sparta, now found their calculations overthrown and exchanged for the discouraging necessities of self-defence against a victorious enemy. And while these leaders thus lost general influence by so complete a defeat of their foreign policy, the ordinary democratical soldiers of Argos brought back with them from the field of Mantinea, nothing but humiliation and terror of the Lacedæmonian arms. But the chosen Argeian Thousand-regiment returned with very different feelings. Victorious over the left wing of their enemies, they had not been seriously obstructed in their retreat even by the Lacedæmonian centre. They had thus reaped positive glory,¹ and doubtless felt contempt for their beaten fellow-citizens. Now it has been already mentioned that these Thousand were men of rich families, and the best military age, set apart by the Argeian democracy to receive permanent training at the public expense, just at a time when the ambitious views of Argos first began to dawn, after the Peace of Nikias. So long as Argos was likely to become or continue the imperial state of Peloponnesus, these Thousand wealthy men would probably find their dignity sufficiently consulted in upholding her as such, and would thus acquiesce in the democratical government. But when the defeat of Mantinea reduced Argos to her own limits, and threw her upon the defensive, there was nothing to counterbalance their natural oligarchical sentiments, so that they became decided opponents of the democratical government in its distress. The oligarchical

¹ Aristotle (Polit. v. 4, 9) expressly notices the credit gained by the oligarchical force of Argos in the battle of Mantinea, as one main cause of the subsequent revolution, notwithstanding that the Argeians generally were beaten: *Οἱ γυρόντες ἐδόξαν ἄντας ἐν Μαντινείᾳ*, etc.

An example of contempt entertained by victorious troops over defeated fellow-countrymen, is mentioned by Xenophon in the Athenian army under Alkibiadēs and Thrasyllus, in one of the later years of the Peloponnesian war: see Xenophon, *Hellen.* i. 2, 15-17.

party in Argos, thus encouraged and reinforced, entered into a conspiracy with the Lacedæmonians to bring the city into alliance with Sparta as well as to overthrow the democracy.¹

As the first step towards the execution of this scheme, the Lacedæmonians, about the end of September, marched out their full forces as far as Tegea, thus threatening invasion, and inspiring terror at Argos. From Tegea they sent forward as envoy Lichas, proxenus of the Argeians at Sparta, with two alternative propositions: one for peace, which he was instructed to tender and prevail upon the Argeians to accept, if he could; another, in case they refused, of a menacing character. It was the scheme of the oligarchical faction first to bring the city into alliance with Lacedæmon and dissolve the connection with Athens, before they attempted any innovation in the government. The arrival of Lichas was the signal for them to manifest themselves by strenuously pressing the acceptance of his pacific proposition. But they had to contend against a strong resistance; since Alkibiadēs, still in Argos, employed his utmost energy to defeat their views. Nothing but the presence of the Lacedæmonian army at Tegea, and the general despondency of the people, at length enabled them to carry their point, and to procure acceptance of the proposed treaty; which being already adopted by the *ekklesia* at Sparta, was sent ready prepared to Argos, and there sanctioned without alteration. The conditions were substantially as follows:—

"The Argeians shall restore the boys whom they have received as hostages from Orchomenus, and the men-hostages from the Mantinians. They shall restore to the Lacedæmonians the men now in Mantinea, whom the Lacedæmonians had placed as hostages for safe custody in Orchomenus, and whom the Argeians and Mantinians have carried away from that place. They shall evacuate Epidaurus, and raise the fort recently erected near it. The Athenians, unless they also forthwith evacuate Epidaurus, shall be proclaimed as enemies to Lacedæmon as well as to Argos, and to the allies of both. The Lacedæmonians shall restore all the hostages whom they now have in keeping, from whatever place they may have been taken. Respecting the

¹ Thucyd. v. 78; Diodor. xiv. 80.

sacrifice alleged to be due to Apollo by the Epidaurians, the Argeians will consent to tender to them an oath, which if they swear, they shall clear themselves.² Every city in Peloponnesus, small or great, shall be autonomous and at liberty to maintain its own ancient constitution. If any extra-Peloponnesian city shall come against Peloponnesus with mischievous projects, Lacedæmon and Argos will take joint counsel against it, in the manner most equitable for the interest of the Peloponnesians generally. The extra-Peloponnesian allies of Sparta shall be in the same position with reference to this treaty as the allies of Lacedæmon and Argos in Peloponnesus, and shall hold their own in the same manner. The Argeians shall show this treaty to their allies, who shall be admitted to subscribe to it, if they think fit. But if the allies desire anything different, the Argeians shall send them home about their business."²

¹ Thucyd. v. 77. The text of Thucydides is incurably corrupt, in regard to several words of this clause: though the general sense appears sufficiently certain, that the Epidaurians are to be allowed to clear themselves in respect to this demand by an oath. In regard to this purifying oath, it seems to have been essential that the oath should be *tendered* by one litigant party and *taken* by the other: perhaps therefore *σμεν* or *θέμεν* *ζήν* (Valekenær's conjecture) might be preferable to *εμεν* *ζήν*.

To Herodot. vi. 86, and Aristotel. Rhetoric. i. 16. 6, which Dr. Arnold and other commentators notice in illustration of this practice, we may add the instructive exposition of the analogous practice in the procedure of Roman law, as given by Von Savigny, in his *System des heutigen Römischen Rechts*, cts. 309–313, vol. vii. pp. 53–83. It was an oath tendered by one litigant party to the opposite, in hopes that the latter would refuse to take it; if taken, it had the effect of a judgment in favor of the swearer. But the Roman lawyers laid down many limits and formalities, with respect to this *iuramentum delatum*, which Von Savigny sets forth with his usual perspicuity.

² Thucyd. v. 77. Ἐπειδὴ δὲ αὐτὰρ ἐπεὶ ἐπιδάουσι ἐκβαλέσθαι, αἱ καὶ αὐτοῖς δοκῇ: αἱ δὲ τε καὶ ἄλλοι δοκῇ τὸν ἐπιδάουσι, σέσωσθ' ἀπὶ ἀλλήλων. See Dr. Arnold's note and Dr. Thirlwall, *Hist. Gr. ch. xxiv*, vol. iii, p. 342.

One cannot be certain about the meaning of these two last words, but I incline to believe that they express a peremptory and almost a hostile sentiment, such as I have given in the text. The allies here alluded to are Athens, Elis, and Mantinea: all hostile in feeling to Sparta. The Lacedæmonians could not well decline admitting these cities to share in this treaty as it stood; but would probably think it suitable to repel them even with rudeness, if they desired any change.

Such was the agreement sent ready prepared by the Lacedæmonians to Argos, and there literally accepted. It presented a reciprocity little more than nominal, imposing one obligation of no importance upon Sparta; though it answered the purpose of the latter by substantially dissolving the alliance of Argos with its three confederates.

But this treaty was meant by the oligarchical party in Argos only as preface to a series of ulterior measures. As soon as it was concluded, the menacing army of Sparta was withdrawn from Tegea, and was exchanged for free and peaceful intercommunication between the Lacedæmonians and Argæians. Probably Alkibiadēs at the same time retired, while the renewed visits and hospitalities of Lacedæmonians at Argos strengthened the interest of their party more than ever. They were soon powerful enough to persuade the Argæian assembly formally to renounce the alliance with Athens, Elis, and Mantinea, and to conclude a special alliance with Sparta, on the following terms:—

"There shall be peace and alliance for fifty years between the Lacedæmonians and the Argæians—upon equal terms—each giving amicable satisfaction, according to its established constitution, to all complaints preferred by the other. On the same condition, also, the other Peloponnesian cities shall partake in this peace and alliance, holding their own territory, laws, and separate constitution. All extra-Peloponnesian allies of Sparta shall be put upon the same footing as the Lacedæmonians themselves. The allies of Argos shall also be put upon the same footing as Argos herself, holding their own territory undisturbed. Should occasion arise for common military operations on any point, the Lacedæmonians and Argæians shall take counsel together, determining in the most equitable manner they can for the interest of their allies. If any one of the cities hereunto belonging, either in or out of Peloponnesus, shall have disputes either about boundaries or other topics, she shall be held bound to enter upon

I rather imagine, too, that this last clause (*ἵστασθαι*) has reference exclusively to the Argæians, and not to the Lacedæmonians also. The form of the treaty is, that of a resolution already taken at Sparta, and sent for approval to Argos.

amicable adjustment.¹ If any allied city shall quarrel with another allied city, the matter shall be referred to some third city satisfactory to both. Each city shall render justice to her own citizens according to her own ancient constitution."

It will be observed that in this treaty of alliance, the disputed question of headship is compromised or evaded. Lacedæmon and Argos are both put upon an equal footing, in respect to taking joint counsel for the general body of allies: they two alone are to decide, without consulting the other allies, though binding themselves to have regard to the interests of the latter. The policy of Lacedæmon also pervades the treaty, that of insuring autonomy to all the lesser states of Peloponnesus, and thus breaking up the empire of Elis, Mantinea, or any other larger state which might have dependencies.² And accordingly the Mantinæians, finding themselves abandoned by Argos, were constrained to make their submission to Sparta, enrolling themselves again as her allies, renouncing all command over their

¹ Thucyd. v, 79. *Ἀλλ' ὅτι τὰς πόλιν ἢ ἀμφιλογία, ἢ τὰν ἐντὸς ἢ τὰν ἐκτὸς ἡμετέρας, αἵτε πρὸς ἑαυτὰς αἵτε πρὸς ἄλλων τινος, διακρινόμεναι.*

The object of this clause I presume to be, to provide that the joint-forces of Lacedæmon and Argos should not be bound to interfere for every separate dispute of each single ally with a foreign state, not included in the alliance. Thus, there were at this time standing disputes between Boeotia and Athens, and between Megara and Athens: the Argæians probably would not choose to pledge themselves to interfere for the maintenance of the alleged rights of Boeotia and Megara in these disputes. They guard themselves against such necessity in this clause.

M. H. Meier, in his recent Dissertation (*Die Privat. Schiedsrichter und die öffentlichen Diäten Athens* (Halle, 1846), sect. 19, p. 41), has given an analysis and explanation of this treaty which seems to me on many points unsatisfactory.

² All the smaller states in Peloponnesus are pronounced by this treaty to be (if we employ the language employed with reference to the Delphians peculiarly in the Peace of Nikias) *αὐτονομῶν, αὐτοκτελῶν, αὐτοδικῶν*, Thucyd. v, 19. The last clause of this treaty guarantees *αὐτοδικίαν* to all, though in language somewhat different: *τοὺς δὲ ἑταῖς κατὰ πάτρια δικάζοντες*. The expression in this treaty *αὐτοκτελῶν* is substantially equivalent to *αὐτοκτελῶν* in the former.

It is remarkable that we never find in Thucydides the very convenient Herodotean word *δοσάδικοι* (Herodot. vi, 42), though there are occasions in these fourth and fifth books on which it would be useful to his meaning.

Arcadian subjects, and delivering up the hostages of these latter according to the stipulation in the treaty between Lacedaemon and Argos.¹ The Lacedaemonians do not seem to have meddled farther with Elis. Being already possessed of Lepreum, — through the Brasideian settlers planted there, — they perhaps did not wish again to provoke the Eleians, from fear of being excluded a second time from the Olympic festival.

Meanwhile the conclusion of the alliance with Lacedaemon — about November or December, 418 B.C. — had still farther depressed the popular leaders at Argos. The oligarchical faction, and the chosen regiment of the Thousand, all men of wealth and family, as well as bound together by their common military training, now saw their way clearly to the dissolution of the democracy by force, and to the accomplishment of a revolution. Instigated by such ambitious views, and flattered by the idea of admitted headship jointly with Sparta, they espoused the new policy of the city with extreme vehemence, and began immediately to multiply occasions of collision with Athens. Joint Lacedaemonian and Argeian envoys were despatched to Thrace and Macedonia. With the Chalkidians of Thrace, the revolted subjects of Athens, the old alliance was renewed and even new engagements concluded; while Perdikkas of Macedonia was urged to renounce his covenants with Athens, and join the new confederacy. In that quarter the influence of Argos was considerable; for the Macedonian princes prized very highly their ancient descent from Argos, which constituted them brethren of the Hellenic family. Accordingly, Perdikkas consented to the demand and concluded the new treaty; insisting, however, with his habitual duplicity, that the step should for the moment be kept secret from Athens.² In farther pursuance of the new tone of hostility to that city, joint envoys were also sent thither, to require that the Athenians should quit Peloponnesus, and especially that they should evacuate the fort recently erected near Epidaurus. It seems to have been held jointly by Argeians, Mantineians, Eleians, and Athenians; and as the latter were only a minority of the whole, the Athenians in the city judged

¹ Thucyd. v, 81; Diodor. xii, 81. ² Compare Thucyd. v, 80, and v, 83.

it prudent to send Demosthenes to bring them away. That general not only effected the retreat, but also contrived a stratagem, which gave to it the air almost of an advantage. On his first arrival in the fort, he proclaimed a gymnastic match outside of the gates for the amusement of the whole garrison, contriving to keep back the Athenians within until all the rest had marched out: then hastily shutting the gates, he remained master of the place.¹ Having no intention, however, of keeping it, he made it over presently to the Epidaurians themselves, with whom he renewed the truce to which they had been parties jointly with the Lacedaemonians five years before, two years before the Peace of Nicias.²

The mode of proceeding here resorted to by Athens, in respect to the surrender of the fort, seems to have been dictated by a desire to manifest her displeasure against the Argeians. This was exactly what the Argeian leaders and oligarchical party, on their side, most desired; the breach with Athens had become irreparable, and their plans were now matured for violently subverting their own democracy. They concerted with Sparta a joint military expedition, of one thousand hoplites from each city, — the first joint expedition under the new alliance, — against Sikyon, for the purpose of introducing more thorough-paced oligarchy into the already oligarchical Sikyonian government. It is possible that there may have been some democratical opposition gradually acquiring strength at Sikyon: but that city seems to have been, as far as we know, always oligarchical in policy, and passively faithful to Sparta. Probably, therefore, the joint enterprise against Sikyon was nothing more than a pretext to

¹ The instances appear to have been not rare, wherein Grecian towns changed masters, by the citizens thus going out of the gates all together, or most part of them, for some religious festival. See the case of Smyrna (Herodot. i, 150), and the precautionary suggestions of the military writer Aeneas, in his treatise called *Polyorketicus*, c. 17.

² Thucyd. v, 80. Καὶ ἑσπέρην Ἐπιδάυριον ἀνανεωσάμενοι τὰς σπονδὰς αὐτοῖς οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἀπέδσαν τὸ τεῖχος. We are here told that the Athenians RENEWED their truce with the Epidaurians: but I know no truce previously between them except the general truce for a year, which the Epidaurians swore to, in conjunction with Sparta (iv, 119), in the beginning of B.C. 423.

cover the introduction of one thousand Lacedæmonian hoplites into Argos, whither the joint detachment immediately returned, after the business at Sikyôn had been accomplished. Thus reinforced, the oligarchical leaders and the chosen Thousand at Argos put down by force the democratical constitution in that city, slew the democratical leaders, and established themselves in complete possession of the government.¹

This revolution, accomplished about February, B.C. 417, the result of the victory of Mantinea and the consummation of a train of policy laid by Sparta, raised her ascendancy in Peloponnesus to a higher and more undisputed point than it had ever before attained. The towns in Achaia were as yet not sufficiently oligarchical for her purpose, perhaps since the march of Alkibiadês thither, two years before; accordingly, she now remodelled their governments in conformity with her own views. The new rulers of Argos were subservient to her, not merely from oligarchical sympathy, but from need of her aid to keep down internal rising against themselves: so that there was neither enemy, nor even neutral, to counterwork her or to favor Athens, throughout the whole peninsula.

But the Spartan ascendancy at Argos was not destined to last. Though there were many cities in Greece, in which oligarchies long maintained themselves unshaken, through adherence to a traditional routine and by being usually in the hands of men accustomed to govern, yet an oligarchy erected by force upon the ruins of a democracy was rarely of long duration. The angry discontent of the people, put down by temporary intimidation usually revived, and threatened the security of the rulers enough to render them suspicious and probably cruel. Nor was such cruelty their only fault: they found their emancipation from democratical restraints too tempting to be able to control either their lust or their rapacity. With the population of Argos, comparatively coarse and brutal in all ranks, and more like Korkyra than like

¹ Thucyd. v. 81. Καὶ Λακεδαιμόνιοι καὶ Ἀργεῖοι, ἡ δὲ πόλις ἑκάστην, ἐνστρατεύσαντες, τὰ τ' ἐν Σικυῶνι ἐκ ὁλίγων καὶ πολλῶν κατέστησαν· αὐτοὶ οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι ἐλθόντες, καὶ μετ' ἐκείνην ἐναυαροῦσιν ἰδὼν καὶ τὴν ἐν Ἀργεῖ δῆμον κατέλυσαν, καὶ ὁλιγαρχία ἐπέθηκεν αὐτῇ Λακεδαιμονίᾳ κατέστη· compare Diodor. xii. 80.

Athens, such abuse was pretty sure to be speedy as well as flagrant. Especially the chosen regiment of the Thousand — men in the vigor of their age, and proud of their military prowess as well as of their wealthier station — construed the new oligarchical government which they had helped to erect as a period of individual license to themselves. The behavior and fate of their chief, Bryas, illustrates the general demeanor of the troop. After many other outrages against persons of poorer condition, he one day met in the streets a wedding procession, in which the person of the bride captivated his fancy. He caused her to be violently torn from her company, carried her to his house, and possessed himself of her by force. But in the middle of the night, this high-spirited woman revenged herself for the outrage by putting out the eyes of the ravisher while he was fast asleep:¹ a terrible revenge, which the pointed clasp-pins of the feminine attire sometimes enabled women² to take upon those who wronged them. Having contrived to make her escape, she found concealment among her friends, as well as protection among the people generally against the indignant efforts of the chosen Thousand to avenge their leader.

From incidents such as this, and from the multitude of petty insults which so flagitious an outrage implies as coexistent, we are not surprised to learn that the Demos of Argos soon recovered their lost courage, and resolved upon an effort to put down their oligarchical oppressors. They waited for the moment when the festival called the Gymnopædiæ was in course of being solemnized at Sparta, — a festival at which the choric performances of men and boys were so interwoven with Spartan religion as well as bodily training, that the Lacedæmonians would make no military movement until they were finished. At this critical moment, the Argeian Demos rose in insurrection, and after a sharp contest gained a victory over the oligarchy, some of whom were slain, while others only saved themselves by flight. Even at the first instant of danger, pressing messages had been sent to Sparta for aid. But the Lacedæmonians at first peremptorily

¹ Pausanias, ii. 20, 1.

² See Herodot. v. 87; Euripid. Hecub. 1152, and the note of Musgrave on line 1135 of that drama.

refused to move during the period of their festival: nor was it until messenger after messenger had arrived to set forth the pressing necessity of their friends, that they reluctantly put aside their festival to march towards Argos. They were too late: the precious moment had already passed by. They were met at Tegea by an intimation that their friends were overthrown, and Argos in possession of the victorious people. Nevertheless, various exiles who had escaped still promised them success, urgently entreating them to proceed, but the Lacedæmonians refused to comply, returned to Sparta, and resumed their intermitted festival.¹

Thus was the oligarchy of Argos overthrown, after a continuance of about four months,² from February to June, 417 B.C., and the chosen Thousand-regiment either dissolved or destroyed. The movement excited great sympathy in several Peloponnesian cities,³ who were becoming jealous of the exorbitant preponderance of Sparta. Nevertheless, the Argeian Demos, though victorious within the city, felt so much distrust of being able to maintain themselves, that they sent envoys to Sparta to plead their cause and to entreat favorable treatment: a proceeding which proves the insurrection to have been spontaneous, not fomented by Athens. But the envoys of the expelled oligarchs were there to confront them, and the Lacedæmonians, after a lengthened discussion, adjudging the Demos to have been guilty of wrong, proclaimed the resolution of sending forces to put them down. Still, the habitual tardiness of Lacedæmonian habits prevented any immediate or separate movement. Their allies were to be summoned, none being very zealous in the cause, and least of all at this moment, when the period of harvest was at hand; so that about three months intervened before any actual force was brought together.

¹ Thucyd. v. 82; Diodor. xii. 80.

² Diodorus (xii. 80) says that it lasted eight months: but this, if correct at all, must be taken as beginning from the alliance between Sparta and Argos, and not from the first establishment of the oligarchy. The narrative of Thucydides does not allow more than four months for the duration of the latter.

³ Thucyd. v. 82. *ἡ δὲ πόλις ἔπειτα καὶ τὰς ἐν Πελοποννησῶν πόλεις ἔλκετο.*

This important interval was turned to account by the Argeian Demos, who, being plainly warned that they were to look on Sparta only as an enemy, immediately renewed their alliance with Athens. Regarding her as their main refuge, they commenced the building of long walls to connect their city with the sea, in order that the road might always be open for supplies and reinforcement from Athens, in case they should be confined to their walls by a superior Spartan force. The whole Argeian population — men and women, free and slave — set about the work with the utmost ardor: while Alkibiades brought assistance from Athens,¹ especially skilled masons and carpenters, of whom they stood in much need. The step may probably have been suggested by himself, as it was the same which, two years before, he had urged upon the inhabitants of Patræ. But the construction of walls adequate for defence, along the line of four miles and a half between Argos and the sea,² required a long time. Moreover, the oligarchical party within the town, as well as the exiles without, — a party defeated but not annihilated, — strenuously urged the Lacedæmonians to put an end to the work, and even promised them a counter-revolutionary movement in the town as soon as they drew near to assist; the same intrigue which had been entered into by the oligarchical party at Athens forty years before, when the walls down to Peiræus were in course of erection.³ Accordingly about the end of September, 417 B.C., king Agis conducted an army of Lacedæmonians and allies against Argos, drove the population within the city, and destroyed so much of the long walls as had been already raised. But the oligarchical party within were not able to realize their engagements of rising in arms, so that he was obliged to retire after merely ravaging the territory and taking the town of Hysiaë, where he put to death all the freemen who fell into his hands. After his departure, the Argeians retaliated these ravages upon the neighboring territory of Phlius, where the exiles from Argos chiefly resided.⁴

¹ Thucyd. v. 82. *Καὶ οἱ μὲν Ἀργεῖοι πανόημι, καὶ αὐτοὶ καὶ γυναῖκες καὶ οἰκίσται, ἵππους etc.* Plutarch, Alkibiad. c. 15.

² Pausanias, ii. 36. 3.

³ Thucyd. i. 107.

⁴ Thucyd. v. 83. Diodorus inaccurately states that the Argeians had already built their long walls down to the sea — *πυθόμενοι τοὺς Ἀργεῖους*.

The close neighborhood of such exiles, together with the declared countenance of Sparta, and the continued schemes of the oligarchical party within the walls, kept the Argeian democracy in perpetual uneasiness and alarm throughout the winter, in spite of their recent victory and the suppression of the dangerous regiment of a Thousand. To relieve them in part from embarrassment, Alkibiadēs was despatched thither early in the spring with an Athenian armament and twenty triremes. His friends and guests appear to have been now in the ascendancy, as leaders of the democratical government; and in concert with them, he selected three hundred marked oligarchical persons, whom he carried away and deposited in various Athenian islands, as hostages for the quiescence of the party, B.C. 416. Another ravaging march was also undertaken by the Argeians into the territory of Phlius, wherein, however, they sustained nothing but loss. And again, about the end of September, the Lacedæmonians gave the word for a second expedition against Argos. But having marched as far as the borders, they found the sacrifices — always offered previous to leaving their own territory — so unfavorable, that they returned back and disbanded their forces. The Argeian oligarchical party, in spite of the hostages recently taken from them, had been on the watch for this Lacedæmonian force, and had projected a rising; or at least were suspected of doing so, to such a degree that some of them were seized and imprisoned by the government, while others made their escape.² Later in the same winter, however, the Lacedæmonians became more fortunate with their border sacrifices, entered the Argeian territory in conjunction with their allies (except the Corinthians, who refused to take part), and established the Argeian oligarchic-

ὡκοδόμηκεν αὖτε τὰ μακρὰ τεῖχη μέχρι τῆς θαλάσσης (81. 81). Thucydides uses the participle of the present tense — *τε οἰκοδομοῦν* — *μὲν αὖτε τείχη ἐλόντες καὶ κατασκευάζοντες*, etc.

² Thucyd. v, 116. Λακεδαιμόνιοι, μέλλουσαν πρὸς τὴν Ἀργεῖαν στρατεῖν. . . ἀνεχώρησαν. Καὶ Ἀργεῖοι δὴ τὴν ἐκείνων μέλλουσαν τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει τινῶς ἐποτρυνύσαντες, τοὺς μὲν ξυνέλκον, οἱ δ' αὐτοὺς καὶ δευτέρῃ

I presume μέλλουσαν here is not used in its ordinary meaning of *loitering* or *delay*, but is to be construed by the previous verb *μελλόντες*, and agreeably to the analogy of iv, 126 — “prospect of action immediately impending” compare Diodor. xii, 81.

cal exiles at Orneæ: from which town these latter were again speedily expelled, after the retirement of the Lacedæmonian army, by the Argeian democracy with the aid of an Athenian reinforcement.¹

To maintain the renewed democratical government of Argos, against enemies both internal and external, was an important policy to Athens, as affording the basis, which might afterwards be extended, of an anti-Laconian party in Peloponnesus. But at the present time the Argeian alliance was a drain and an exhaustion rather than a source of strength to Athens: very different from the splendid hopes which it had presented prior to the battle of Mantinea, hopes of supplanting Sparta in her ascendancy within the Isthmus. It is remarkable, that in spite of the complete alienation of feeling between Athens and Sparta, — and continued reciprocal hostilities, in an indirect manner, so long as each was acting as ally of some third party, — nevertheless, neither the one nor the other would formally renounce the sworn alliance, nor obliterate the record inscribed on its stone column. Both parties shrank from proclaiming the real truth, though each half-year brought them a step nearer to it in fact. Thus during the course of the present summer (416 B.C.) the Athenian and Messenian garrison at Pylos became more active than ever in their incursions on Laconia, and brought home large booty; upon which the Lacedæmonians, though still not renouncing the alliance, publicly proclaimed their willingness to grant what we may call letters of marque, to any one, for privateering against Athenian commerce. The Corinthians also, on private grounds of quarrel, commenced hostilities against the Athenians.³ Yet still Sparta and her allies remained in a state of formal peace with Athens: the Athenians resisted all the repeated solicitations of the Argeians to induce them to make a landing on any part of Laconia and commit devastation.³ Nor was the license of free

¹ Thucyd. vi, 7.

² Thucyd. v, 115.

³ Thucyd. vi, 105. The author of the loose and inaccurate *Oratio de Pace*, ascribed to Andokidēs, affirms that the war was resumed by Athens against Sparta on the persuasion of the Argeians (*Orat. de Pac.* c. 1, 6-3, 31, pp. 93-105). This assertion is indeed partially true: the alliance with Argos was one of the causes of the resumption of war, but only one among others, some of them more powerful. Thucydides tells us that the

intercourse for individuals as yet suspended. We cannot doubt that the Athenians were invited to the Olympic festival of 416 B.C. (the 91st Olympiad), and sent thither their solemn legation along with those of Sparta and other Dorian Greeks.

Now that they had again become allies of Argos, the Athenians probably found out, more fully than they had before known, the intrigue carried on by the former Argelian government with the Macedonian Perdikkas. The effects of these intrigues, however, had made themselves felt even earlier in the conduct of that prince, who, having as an ally of Athens engaged to co-operate with an Athenian expedition projected under Nikias for the spring or summer of 417 B.C. against the Chalkidians of Thrace and Amphipolis, now withdrew his concurrence, receded from the alliance of Athens, and frustrated the whole scheme of expedition. The Athenians accordingly placed the ports of Macedonia under naval blockade, proclaiming Perdikkas an enemy.

Nearly five years had elapsed since the defeat of Kleon, without any fresh attempt to recover Amphipolis: the project just alluded to appears to have been the first. The proceedings of the Athenians with regard to this important town afford ample proof of that want of wisdom on the part of their leading men Nikias and Alkibiades, and of erroneous tendencies on the part of the body of the citizens, which we shall gradually find conducting their empire to ruin. Among all their possessions out of Attica, there was none so valuable as Amphipolis: the centre of a great commercial and mining region, situated on a large river and lake which the Athenian navy could readily command, and claimed by them with reasonable justice. Since it was their original colony, planted by their wisest statesman, Perikles. It had been lost only through unpardonable negligence on the part of their generals; and when lost, we should have expected to see the chief energies of Athens directed to the recovery of it: the more so, as, if once recovered, it admitted of being made sure and retained as a future possession. Kleon is the only leading man who at once proclaims to his countrymen the important truth that it never can be recovered except by force. He strenuously

persuasions of Argos, to induce Athens to throw up her alliance with Sparta were repeated and unavailing.

¹ Thucyd. v, 83.

urges his countrymen to make the requisite military effort, and prevails upon them in part to do so, but the attempt disgracefully fails; partly through his own incompetence as commander, whether his undertaking of that duty was a matter of choice or of constraint, partly through the strong opposition and antipathy against him from so large a portion of his fellow-citizens, which rendered the military force not hearty in the enterprise. Next, Nikias, Lachês, and Alkibiadês, all concur in making peace and alliance with the Lacedæmonians, with express promise and purpose to procure the restoration of Amphipolis. But after a series of diplomatic proceedings, which display as much silly credulity in Nikias as selfish deceit in Alkibiadês, the result becomes evident, as Kleon had insisted, that peace will not restore to them Amphipolis, and that it can only be regained by force. The fatal defect of Nikias is now conspicuously seen: his inertness of character and incapacity of decided or energetic effort. When he discovered that he had been out-manceuvred by the Lacedæmonian diplomacy, and had fatally misadvised his countrymen into making important cessions on the faith of equivalents to come, we might have expected to find him spurred on by indignant repentance for this mistake, and putting forth his own strongest efforts, as well as those of his country, in order to recover those portions of her empire which the peace had promised, but did not restore. Instead of which he exhibits no effective movement, while Alkibiadês begins to display the defects of his political character, yet more dangerous than those of Nikias, the passion for showy, precarious, boundless, and even perilous novelties. It is only in the year 417 B.C., after the defeat of Mantinea had put an end to the political speculations of Alkibiadês in the interior of Peloponnesus, that Nikias projects an expedition against Amphipolis: and even then it is projected only contingent upon the aid of Perdikkas, a prince of notorious perfidy. It was not by any half-exertions of force that the place could be regained, as the defeat of Kleon had sufficiently proved. We obtain from these proceedings a fair measure of the foreign politics of Athens at this time, during what is called the Peace of Nikias, preparing us for that melancholy catastrophe which will be developed in the coming chapters, where she is brought

near to ruin by the defects of Nikias and Alkibiadēs combined for, by singular misfortune, she does not reap the benefit of the good qualities of either.

It was in one of the three years between 420–416 B.C., though we do not know in which, that the vote of ostracism took place, arising out of the contention between Nikias and Alkibiadēs.¹ The political antipathy between the two having reached a point of great violence, it was proposed that a vote of ostracism should be taken, and this proposition — probably made by the partisans of Nikias, since Alkibiadēs was the person most likely to be reputed dangerous — was adopted by the people. Hyperbolus the lamp-maker, son of Cheremēs, a speaker of considerable influence in the public assembly, strenuously supported it, hating Nikias not less than Alkibiadēs. Hyperbolus is named by Aristophanēs as having succeeded Kleon in the mastership of the rostrum in the Pnyx: if this were true, his supposed demagogic preeminence would commence about September 422 B.C., the period of the death of Kleon. Long before that time, however, he had been among the chief butts of the comic authors, who ascribe to him the same baseness, dishonesty, impudence, and malignity in accusation, as that which they fasten upon Kleon, though in language which seems to imply an inferior idea of his power. And it may be doubted whether Hyperbolus ever succeeded to the same influence as had been enjoyed by Kleon, when we observe that Thucydides does not name him in any of the important debates which took place at and after the Peace of Nikias. Thucydides only mentions him once, in 411 B.C., while

¹ Dr Thirlwall (*History of Greece*, vol. iii, ch. xxiv, p. 360) places this vote of ostracism in midwinter or early spring of 415 B.C., immediately before the Sicilian expedition.

His grounds for this opinion are derived from the Oration called Andokides against Alkibiadēs, the genuineness of which he seems to accept (see his Appendix ii, on that subject, vol. iii, p. 494, seq.).

The more frequently I read over this Oration, the more do I feel persuaded that it is a spurious composition of one or two generations after the time to which it professes to refer. My reasons for this opinion have been already stated in previous notes, nor do I think that Dr. Thirlwall's Appendix is successful in removing the objections against the genuineness of the speech. See my preceding vol. vi, ch. xlvii, p. 6 note.

² Aristophan. *Pac.* 680.

he was in banishment under sentence of ostracism, and resident at Samos. He terms him, "one Hyperbolus, a low busy-body, who had been ostracized, not from fear of dangerous excess of dignity and power, but through his wickedness and his being felt as a disgrace to the city."¹ This sentence of Thucydides is really the only evidence against Hyperbolus: for it is not less unjust in his case than in that of Kleon to cite the jests and libels of comedy as if they were so much authentic fact and trustworthy criticism. It was at Samos that Hyperbolus was slain by the oligarchical conspirators who were aiming to overthrow the democracy at Athens. We have no particular facts respecting him to enable us to test the general character given by Thucydides.

At the time when the resolution was adopted at Athens, to take a vote of ostracism suggested by the political dissension between Nikias and Alkibiadēs, about twenty-four years had elapsed since a similar vote had been resorted to; the last example having been that of Periklēs and Thucydides son of Melēsius, the latter of whom was ostracized about 442 B.C. The democratical constitution had become sufficiently confirmed to lessen materially the necessity for ostracism as a safeguard against individual usurpers; moreover, there was now full confidence in the numerous dikasteries as competent to deal with the greatest of such criminals, thus abating the necessity as conceived in men's minds, not less than the real necessity, for such precautionary intervention. Under such a state of things, altered reality as well as altered feeling, we are not surprised to find that the vote of ostracism now invoked, though we do not know the circumstances which immediately preceded it, ended in an abuse, or rather in a sort of parody, of the ancient preventive. At a moment of extreme heat of party dispute, the friends of Alkibiadēs probably accepted the challenge of Nikias and concurred in supporting a vote of ostracism; each hoping to get rid of the opponent. The vote was accordingly decreed, but before it actually took place,

¹ Thucyd. viii. 73. Ὑπερβόλον τι τι Ἀθηναίων, μοχθηρὸν ἄνθρωπον, ὠστρακισμένον οὐ διὰ δυνάμεως, ἀλλὰ διὰ πονηρίαν καὶ αἰσχυνὴν τῆς πόλεως. According to Androtion (*Fragm.* 48 ed. Didot.) — ὠστρακισμένον διὰ φανόσητα.

Compare about Hyperbolus, Plutarch, Nikias, c. 11; Plutarch, Alkibiadēs, c. 13; Ælian. V. II. xii. 43. Theopompus. *Fragm.* 102, 103, ed. Didot.

the partisans of both changed their views, and preferred to let the political discussion proceed without closing it by separating the combatants. But the ostracising vote, having been formally pronounced, could not now be prevented from taking place: it was always, however, perfectly general in its form, admitting of any citizen being selected for temporary banishment. Accordingly, the two opposing parties, each *hetaïrê*, including various clubs, or hetæries, and according to some accounts the friends of Phæax also, united to turn the vote against some one else: and they fixed upon a man whom all of them jointly disliked, Hyperbolus.¹ By thus concurring, they obtained a sufficient number of votes against him to pass the sentence, and he was sent into temporary banishment. But such a result was in no one's contemplation when the vote was decreed to take place, and Plutarch even represents the people as clapping their hands at it as a good joke. It was presently recognized by every one, seemingly even by the enemies of Hyperbolus, as a gross abuse of the ostracism. And the language of Thucydides himself distinctly implies this: for if we even grant that Hyperbolus fully deserved the censure which that historian bestows, no one could treat his presence as dangerous to the commonwealth, nor was the ostracism introduced to meet low dishonesty or wickedness. It was even before, passing out of the political morality of Athens; and this sentence consummated its extinction, so that we never hear of it as employed afterwards. It had been extremely valuable in earlier days, as a security to the growing democracy against individual usurpation of power, and against dangerous exaggeration of rivalry between individual leaders: but the democracy was now strong enough to dispense with such exceptional protection. Yet if Alkibiades had returned as victor from Syracuse, it is highly probable that the Athenians would have had no other means than the precautionary antidote of ostracism to save themselves from him as despot.

It was in the beginning of summer (416 B.C.) that the Athenians undertook the siege and conquest of the Dorian island of

¹ Plutarch, Alkibiad. c. 13; Plutarch, Nikias, c. 11. Theophrastus says that the violent opposition at first, and the coalition afterwards, was not between Nikias and Alkibiades, but between Phæax and Alkibiades. The coalition of votes and parties may well have included all three.

Mélos, one of the Cyclades, and the only one, except Thêra, which was not already included in their empire. Mélos and Thêra were both ancient colonies of Lacedæmon, with whom they had strong sympathies of lineage. They had never joined the confederacy of Delos, nor been in any way connected with Athens: but at the same time, neither had they ever taken part in the recent war against her, nor given her any ground of complaint,¹ until she landed and attacked them in the sixth year of the recent war. She now renewed her attempt, sending against the island a considerable force under Kleomédês and Tisias: thirty Athenian triremes, with six Chian and two Lesbian, twelve hundred Athenian hoplites, and fifteen hundred hoplites from the allies, with three hundred bowmen and twenty horse-bowmen. These officers, after disembarking their forces, and taking position, sent envoys into the city summoning the government to surrender, and to become a subject-ally of Athens.

It was a practice, frequent, if not universal, in Greece, even in governments not professedly democratical — to discuss propositions for peace or war before the assembly of the people. But on the present occasion the Melian leaders departed from this practice, and admitted the envoys only to a private conversation with their executive council. Of this conversation Thucydides professes to give a detailed and elaborate account, at surprising length, considering his general brevity. He sets down thirteen distinct observations, with as many replies, interchanged between the Athenian envoys and the Melians: no one of them separately long, and some very short; but the dialogue carried on is dramatic, and very impressive. There is, indeed, every reason for concluding that what we here read in Thucydides is in far larger proportion his own and in smaller proportion authentic report, than any of the other speeches which he professes to set down. For this was not a public harangue, in respect to which he might have had the opportunity of consulting the recollection of many different persons: it was a private conversation, wherein three or four Athenians, and perhaps ten or a dozen Melians, may have taken part. Now as all the Melian population were slain imme-

Thucyd. iii. 91.

diately after the capture of the town, there remained only the Athenian envoys through whose report Thucydides could possibly have heard what really passed. That he did hear either from or through them the general character of what passed, I make no doubt: but there is no ground for believing that he received from them anything like the consecutive stream of debate, which, together with part of the illustrative reasoning, we must refer to his dramatic genius and arrangement.

The Athenian begins by restricting the subject of discussion to the mutual interests of both parties in the peculiar circumstances in which they now stand, in spite of the disposition of the Melians to enlarge the range of topics, by introducing considerations of justice and appealing to the sentiment of impartial critics. He will not multiply words to demonstrate the just origin of the Athenian empire, erected on the expulsion of the Persians, or to set forth injury suffered, as pretext for the present expedition. Nor will he listen to any plea on the part of the Melians, that they, though colonists of Sparta, have never fought alongside of her or done Athens wrong. He presses upon them to aim at what is attainable under existing circumstances, since they know as well as he that justice in the reasoning of mankind is settled according to equal compulsion on both sides; the strong doing what their power allows, and the weak submitting to it.¹ To

¹ In reference to this argumentation of the Athenian envoy, I call attention to the attack and bombardment of Copenhagen by the English government in 1807, together with the language used by the English envoy to the Danish Prince Regent on the subject. We read as follows in M. Thiers's *Histoire du Consulat et de l'Empire*: —

“ L'agent choisi étoit digne de sa mission. C'étoit M. Jackson qui avoit été autrefois chargé d'affaires en France, avant l'arrivée de Lord Whitworth, à Paris, mais qu'on n'avoit pas pu y laisser, à cause du mauvais esprit qu'il manifestoit en toute occasion. Introduit auprès du régent, il alléguait de prétendues stipulations secrètes, en vertu desquelles le Danemark devoit, (disoit-on) de gré ou de force, faire partie d'une coalition contre l'Angleterre: il donna comme raison d'agir la nécessité où se trouvoit le cabinet Britannique de prendre des précautions pour que les forces navales du Danemark et le passage du Sund ne tombassent pas au pouvoir des Français: et en conséquence il demanda au nom de son gouvernement, qu'on livrât à l'armée Anglaise la forteresse de Kronenberg qui commande le Sund, le port de Copenhague, et enfin la flotte elle-même — promettant de garder le tout en dépôt, pour le compte du Danemark, qui seroit remis en

this the Melians reply, that — omitting all appeal to justice, and speaking only of what was expedient — they hold it to be even expedient for Athens not to break down the common moral sanction of mankind, but to permit that equity and justice shall still remain as a refuge for men in trouble, with some indulgence even towards those who may be unable to make out a case of full and strict right. Most of all was this the interest of Athens herself, inasmuch as her ruin, if it ever occurred, would be awful both as punishment to herself and as lesson to others. — “ We are not afraid of *that* (rejoined the Athenian) even if our empire should be overthrown. It is not imperial cities like Sparta who deal harshly with the conquered. Moreover, our present contest is not undertaken against Sparta; it is a contest to determine whether subjects shall by their own attack prevail over their rulers. This is a risk for us to judge of: in the mean time, let us remind you that we come here for the advantage of our own empire, and that we are now speaking with a view to your safety; wishing to get you under our empire without trouble to ourselves, and to preserve you for the mutual benefit of both of us.” — “ Cannot you leave us alone, and let us be your friends instead of enemies, but neither allies of you nor of Sparta?” said the Melians. — “ No (is the reply); your friendship does us more harm than your enmity: your friendship is a proof of our weakness, in the eyes of our subject-allies; your enmity will give a demonstration of our power.” — “ But do your subjects really take such

possession de ce qu'on alloit lui enlever, dès que le danger seroit passé. M. Jackson assura que le Danemark ne perdrait rien, que l'on se conduiroit chez lui en auxiliaires et en amis — que les troupes Britanniques payeroient tout ce qu'elles consommeroient — Et avec quoi, répondit le prince indigné, payeriez vous notre honneur perdu, si nous adhérons à cette infame proposition? — Le prince continuant, et opposant à cette perfide intention la conduite loyale du Danemark, qui n'avoit pris aucune précaution contre les Anglois, qui les avoit toutes prises contre les François, ce dont on abusoit pour le surprendre — M. Jackson répondit à cette juste indignation par une insolente familiarité, disant que la guerre étoit la guerre, qu'il falloit se résigner à ces nécessités, et céder au plus fort quand on étoit le plus faible. Le prince congédia l'agent Anglois avec des paroles fort dures, et lui déclara qu'il alloit se transporter à Copenhague, pour y remplir ses devoirs de prince et de citoyen Danois.” (Thiers, *Histoire du Consulat et de l'Empire* tome viii, livre xxviii, p. 199.)

a measure of equity, as to put us, who have no sort of connection with you, on the same footing with themselves, most of whom are your own colonists, while many of them have even revolted from you and been reconquered?" — "They do: for they think that both one and the other have fair ground for claiming independence, and that if you are left independent, this arises only from your power and from our fear to attack you. So that your submission will not only enlarge our empire, but strengthen our security throughout the whole; especially as you are islanders and feeble islanders too, while we are lords of the sea." — "But surely that very circumstance is in other ways a protection to you, as evincing your moderation: for if you attack us, you will at once alarm all neutrals, and convert them into enemies." — "We are in little fear of continental cities, who are out of our reach and not likely to take part against us, but only of islanders; either yet unincorporated in our empire, like you, or already in our empire and discontented with the constraint which it imposes. It is such islanders who by their ill-judged obstinacy are likely, with their eyes open, to bring both us and themselves into peril." — "We know well (said the Melians, after some other observations had been interchanged) how terrible it is to contend against your superior power, and your good fortune; nevertheless, we trust that in point of fortune we shall receive fair treatment from the gods, since we stand upon grounds of right against injustice; and as to our inferior power, we trust that the deficiency will be made up by our ally Sparta, whose kindred race will compel her from very shame to aid us." — "We too (replied the Athenians) think that we shall not be worse off than others in regard to the divine favor. For we neither advance any claim, nor do any act, overpassing that which men believe in regard to the gods, and wish in regard to themselves. What we believe about the gods is the same as that which we see to be the practice of men: the impulse of nature inclines them of necessity to rule over what is inferior in force to themselves. This is the principle on which we now proceed, — not having been the first either to lay it down or to follow it, but finding it established and likely to continue for ever, — and knowing well too that you or others in our position would do as much. As for your expectations from the Lacedæmonians, founded on the disgrace of their

remaining deaf to your call, we congratulate you indeed on your innocent simplicity, but we at the same time deprecate such foolishness. For the Lacedæmonians are indeed most studious of excellence in regard to themselves and their own national customs. But looking at their behavior towards others, we affirm roundly, and can prove by many examples of their history, that they are of all men the most conspicuous in construing what is pleasing as if it were honorable, and what is expedient as if it were just. Now that is not the state of mind which you require, to square with your desperate calculations of safety."

After various other observations interchanged in a similar tenor, the Athenian envoys, strenuously urging upon the Melians to reconsider the matter more cautiously among themselves, withdrew, and after a certain interval were recalled by the Melian council to hear the following words: "We hold to the same opinion, as at first, men of Athens: we shall not surrender the independence of a city which has already stood for seven hundred years; we shall yet make an effort to save ourselves, relying on that favorable fortune which the gods have hitherto vouchsafed to us, as well as upon aid from men, and especially from the Lacedæmonians. We request that we may be considered as your friends, but as hostile to neither party, and that you will leave the island after concluding such a truce as may be mutually acceptable." — "Well (said the Athenian envoys), you alone seem to consider future contingencies as clearer than the facts before your eyes, and to look at an uncertain distance, through your own wishes, as if it were present reality. You have staked your all upon the Lacedæmonians, upon fortune, and upon fond hopes; and, with your all, you will come to ruin."

The siege was forthwith commenced. A wall of circumvallation, distributed in portions among the different allies of Athens, was constructed round the town; which was left under full blockade, both by sea and land, while the rest of the armament retired home. The town remained blocked up for several months. During the course of that time, the besieged made two successful sallies, which afforded them some temporary relief, and forced the Athenians to send an additional detachment, under Philokratès. At length the provisions within were exhausted.

plots for betrayal commenced among the Melians themselves, so that they were constrained to surrender at discretion. The Athenians resolved to put to death all the men of military age and to sell the women and children as slaves. Who the proposer of this barbarous resolution was, Thucydides does not say; but Plutarch and others inform us that Alkibiades¹ was strenuous in supporting it. Five hundred Athenian settlers were subsequently sent thither, to form a new community: apparently not as *kleruchs*, or out-citizens of Athens, but as new Melians.²

Taking the proceedings of the Athenians towards Mélos from the beginning to the end, they form one of the grossest and most inexcusable pieces of cruelty combined with injustice which Grecian history presents to us. In appreciating the cruelty of such wholesale executions, we ought to recollect that the laws of war placed the prisoner altogether at the disposal of his conqueror, and that an Athenian garrison, if captured by the Corinthians in Naupaktus, Nisaea, or elsewhere, would assuredly have undergone the same fate, unless in so far as they might be kept for exchange. But the treatment of the Melians goes beyond all rigor of the laws of war; for they had never been at war with Athens, nor had they done anything to incur her enmity. Moreover, the acquisition of the island was of no material value to Athens; not sufficient to pay the expenses of the armament employed in its capture. And while the gain was thus in every sense slender, the shock to Grecian feeling by the whole proceeding seems to have occasioned serious mischief to Athens. Far from tending to strengthen her entire empire, by sweeping in this small insular population, who had hitherto been neutral and harmless, it raised nothing but odium against her, and was treasured up in after times as among the first of her misdeeds.

To gratify her pride of empire by a new conquest — easy to

¹ Plutarch, Alkibiades, c. 16. This is doubtless one of the statements which the composer of the Oration of Andokides against Alkibiades found current in respect to the conduct of the latter (sect. 123). Nor is there any reason for questioning the truth of it.

² Thucyd. v, 106. τὸ δὲ χωρίον αὐτοὶ ἔκλεσαν, ἀποικίους ἑστέον πεντακοσίους πέμψαντες. Lysander restored some Melians to the island after the battle of Ægospotami (Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 2, 9): some, therefore, must have escaped or must have been spared.

effect, though of small value — was doubtless her chief motive; probably also strengthened by pique against Sparta, between whom and herself a thoroughly hostile feeling subsisted, and by a desire to humiliate Sparta through the Melians. This passion for new acquisition, superseding the more reasonable hopes of recovering the lost portions of her empire, will be seen in the coming chapters breaking out with still more fatal predominance.

Both these two points, it will be observed, are prominently marked in the dialogue set forth by Thucydides. I have already stated that this dialogue can hardly represent what actually passed, except as to a few general points, which the historian has followed out into deductions and illustrations,¹ thus dramatizing the given situation in a powerful and characteristic manner. The language put into the mouth of the Athenian envoys is that of pirates and robbers, as Dionysius of Halikarnassus² long ago remarked; intimating his suspicion that Thucydides had so set out the case for the purpose of discrediting the country which had sent him into exile. Whatever may be thought of this suspicion, we may at least affirm that the arguments which he here ascribes to Athens are not in harmony even with the defects of the Athenian character. Athenian speakers are more open to the charge of equivocal wording, multiplication of false pretences, softening down the bad points of their case, putting an amiable name upon vicious acts, employing what is properly called *sophistry*, where their purpose needs it.³ Now the language of the envoy at Mélos, which has been sometimes cited as illustrating the immorality of the class or profession — falsely called a school — named Sophists at Athens, is above all things remarkable for a sort of audacious frankness; a disdain not merely of sophistry, in the modern sense of the word, but even

¹ Such is also the opinion of Dr. Thirlwall, Hist. Gr. vol. iii, ch. xxiv, p. 348.

² Dionys. Hal. Judic. de Thucyd. c. 37-42, pp. 906-920, Reisk: compare the remarks in his Epistol. ad Cn. Pompeium, de Præcipuis Historicis, p. 774, Reisk.

³ Plutarch, Alkibiad. 16. τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ἀεὶ τὰ πρῶτα τῶν ἡγουμένων τοῖς διαρτήμασι τιθεμένους, παιδὶς καὶ φιλονεικῶν. *to the same purpose* Plutarch, Solon, c. 15.

of such plausible excuse as might have been offered. It has been strangely argued, as if "*The good old plan, that they should take who have the power, and they should keep who can,*" had been first discovered and openly promulgated by Athenian sophists; whereas the true purpose and value of sophists, even in the modern and worst sense of the word — putting aside the perversion of applying that sense to the persons called sophists at Athens — is, to furnish plausible matter of deceptive justification, so that the strong man may be enabled to act upon this "good old plan" as much as he pleases, but without avowing it, and while professing fair dealing or just retaliation for some imaginary wrong. The wolf in Æsop's fable (of the Wolf and the Lamb) speaks like a sophist; the Athenian envoy at Melos speaks in a manner totally unlike a sophist, either in the Athenian sense or in the modern sense of the word; we may add, unlike an Athenian at all, as Dionysius has observed.

As a matter of fact and practice, it is true that stronger states, in Greece and in the contemporary world, did habitually tend, as they have tended throughout the course of history down to the present day, to enlarge their power at the expense of the weaker. Every territory in Greece, except Attica and Arcadia, had been seized by conquerors who dispossessed or enslaved the prior inhabitants. We find Brasidas reminding his soldiers of the good sword of their forefathers, which had established dominion over men far more numerous than themselves, as matter of pride and glory:¹ and when we come to the times of Philip and Alexander of Macedon, we shall see the lust of conquest reaching a pitch never witnessed among free Greeks. Of right thus founded on simple superiority of force, there were abundant examples to be quoted, as parallels to the Athenian conquest of Melos: but that which is unparalleled is the mode adopted by the Athenian envoy of justifying it, or rather of setting aside all justification, looking at the actual state of civilization in Greece. A barbarous invader casts his sword into the scale in lieu of argument: a civilized conqueror is bound by received international morality to furnish some justification, — a good plea, if he can, — a false

¹ Compare also what Brasidas says in his speech to the Akanthians, v, 86: *ισχυρός δικαιώσαι ἢ ἡ τύχη ἐδώκεν*, etc.

plea, or sham plea, if he has no better. But the Athenian envoy neither copies the contemptuous silence of the barbarian nor the smooth lying of the civilized invader. Though coming from the most cultivated city in Greece, where the vices prevalent were those of refinement and not of barbarism, he disdains the conventional arts of civilized diplomacy more than would have been done by an envoy even of Argos or Korkyra. He even disdains to mention, what might have been said with perfect truth as a matter of fact, whatever may be thought of its sufficiency as a justification, that the Melians had enjoyed for the last fifty years the security of the Ægean waters at the cost of Athens and her allies, without any payment of their own.

So at least he is made to do in the Thucydidean dramatic fragment, — *Μήλων Ἀλωσις* (The Capture of Melos), — if we may parody the title of the lost tragedy of Phrynichus "*The Capture of Miletus*." And I think a comprehensive view of the history of Thucydides will suggest to us the explanation of this drama, with its powerful and tragical effect. The capture of Melos comes immediately before the great Athenian expedition against Syracuse, which was resolved upon three or four months afterwards, and despatched during the course of the following summer. That expedition was the gigantic effort of Athens, which ended in the most ruinous catastrophe known to ancient history. From such a blow it was impossible for Athens to recover. Though thus crippled, indeed, she struggled against its effects with surprising energy; but her fortune went on, in the main, declining. — yet with occasional moments of apparent restoration, — until her complete prostration and subjugation by Lysander. Now Thucydides, just before he gets upon the plane of this descending progress, makes a halt, to illustrate the sentiment of Athenian power in its most exaggerated, insolent, and cruel manifestation, by this dramatic fragment of the envoys at Melos. It will be recollected that Herodotus, when about to describe the forward march of Xerxes into Greece, destined to terminate in such fatal humiliation, impresses his readers with an elaborate idea of the monarch's insolence and superhuman pride, by various conversations between him and the courtiers about him, as well as by other anecdotes, combined with the overwhelming specifications of the muster at Doriskus. Such moral

contrasts and juxtapositions, especially that of ruinous reverse following upon overweening good fortune, were highly interesting to the Greek mind. And Thucydides — having before him an act of great injustice and cruelty on the part of Athens, committed exactly at this point of time — has availed himself of the form of dialogue, for once in his history, to bring out the sentiments of a disdainful and confident conqueror in dramatic antithesis. They are, however, his own sentiments, conceived as suitable to the situation; not those of the Athenian envoy, — still less, those of the Athenian public, — least of all, those of that much-calumniated class of men, the Athenian sophists.

CHAPTER LVII.

SICILIAN AFFAIRS AFTER THE EXTINCTION OF THE GELONIAN DYNASTY.

IN the preceding chapters, I have brought down the general history of the Peloponnesian war to the time immediately preceding the memorable Athenian expedition against Syracuse, which changed the whole face of the war. At this period, and for some time to come, the history of the Peloponnesian Greeks becomes intimately blended with that of the Sicilian Greeks. But hitherto the connection between the two has been merely occasional, and of little reciprocal effect: so that I have thought it for the convenience of the reader to keep the two streams entirely separate, omitting the proceedings of Athens in Sicily during the first ten years of the war. I now proceed to fill up this blank: to recount as much as can be made out of Sicilian events during the interval between 461–416 B.C., and to assign the successive steps whereby the Athenians entangled themselves in ambitious projects against Syracuse, until they at length came to stake the larger portion of their force upon that fatal hazard.

The extinction of the Gelonian dynasty at Syracuse,¹ followed by the expulsion or retirement of all the other despots throughout the island, left the various Grecian cities to reorganize themselves in free and self-constituted governments. Unfortunately, our memorials respecting this revolution are miserably scanty; but there is enough to indicate that it was something much more than a change from single-headed to popular government. It included, farther, transfers on the largest scale both of inhabitants and of property. The preceding despots had sent many old citizens into exile, transplanted others from one part of Sicily to another, and provided settlements for numerous emigrants and mercenaries devoted to their interest. Of these proceedings much was reversed, when the dynasties were overthrown, so that the personal and proprietary revolution was more complicated and perplexing than the political. After a period of severe commotion, an accommodation was concluded, whereby the adherents of the expelled dynasty were planted partly in the territory of Messène, partly in the reestablished city of Kamarina in the eastern portion of the southern coast, bordering on Syracuse.²

¹ See above, vol. v, ch. xliii, pp. 204–239, for the history of these events I now take up the thread from that chapter.

² Mr. Mitford, in the spirit which is usual with him, while enlarging upon the suffering occasioned by this extensive revolution both of inhabitants and of property throughout Sicily, takes no notice of the cause in which it originated, namely, the number of foreign mercenaries whom the Gelonian dynasty had brought in and enrolled as new citizens (Gelon alone having brought in ten thousand, Diodor. xi. 72), and the number of exiles whom they had banished and dispossessed.

I will here notice only one of his misrepresentations respecting the events of this period, because it is definite as well as important (vol. iv, p. 9, chap. xviii, sect. i).

“But thus (he says) in every little state, lands were left to become public property, or to be assigned to new individual owners. *Everywhere, then, that favorite measure of democracy, the equal division of the lands of the state, was resorted upon*: a measure impossible to be perfectly executed; impossible to be maintained as executed; and of very doubtful advantage, if it could be perfectly executed and perfectly maintained.”

Again, sect. iii. p. 23, he speaks of “that incomplete and iniquitous partition of lands,” etc.

Now, upon this we may remark: —

1. The *equal division of the lands* of the state, here affirmed by Mr. Mitford

But though peace was thus reestablished, these large mutations of inhabitants first begun by the despots, — and the incoherent mixture of races, religious institutions, dialects, etc., which was brought about unavoidably during the process, — left throughout Sicily a feeling of local instability, very different from the long traditional tenures in Peloponnesus and Attica, and numbered by foreign enemies among the elements of its weakness.¹ The wonder indeed rather is, that such real and powerful causes of disorder were soon so efficaciously controlled by the popular governments, that the half century now approaching was decidedly the most prosperous and undisturbed period in the history of the island.

The southern coast of Sicily was occupied, beginning from the westward by Selinus, Agrigentum, Gela, and Kamarina. Then came Syracuse, possessing the southeastern cape, and the southern portion of the eastern coast: next, on the eastern coast, Leontini, Katana, and Naxos: Messênê, on the strait adjoining Italy. The centre of the island, and even much of the northern coast, was occupied by the non-Hellenic Sikels and Sikans: on this coast, Himera was the only Grecian city. Between Himera and Cape Lilybaum, the western corner of the island was occupied

is a pure fancy of his own. He has no authority for it whatever. Diodorus says (xi, 76) *κατεκλήρονησαν τὴν χώραν*, etc.; and again (xi, 86) he speaks of *τὴν ἀνάστασιν τῆς χώρας*: the *redistribution* of the territory; but respecting *equality of division*, not one word does he say. Nor can any principle of division in this case be less probable than equality; for one of the great motives of the redivision was to provide for those exiles who had been dispossessed by the Gelonian dynasty: and these men would receive lots, greater or less, on the ground of compensation for loss, greater or less as it might have been. Besides, immediately after the redivision, we find rich and poor mentioned, just as before (xi, 86).

2 Next, Mr. Mitford calls "the equal division of all the lands of the state" the *favorite measure of democracy*. This is an assertion not less incorrect. Not a single democracy in Greece, so far as my knowledge extends, can be produced, in which such equal partition is ever known to have been carried into effect. In the Athenian democracy, especially, not only there existed constantly great inequality of landed property, but the oath annually taken by the popular heliastic judges had a special clause, protesting emphatically against *redistribution of the land or extinction of debts*.

¹ Thucyd. vi, 17

by the non-Hellenic cities of Egesta and Eryx, and by the Carthaginian seaports, of which Panormus (Palermo) was the principal.

Of these various Grecian cities, all independent, Syracuse was the first in power, Agrigentum the second. The causes above noticed, disturbing the first commencement of popular governments in all of them, were most powerfully operative at Syracuse. We do not know the particulars of the democratical constitution which was there established, but its stability was threatened by more than one ambitious pretender, eager to seize the sceptre of Gelo and Hiero. The most prominent among these pretenders was Tyndarion, who employed a considerable fortune in distributing largesses and procuring partisans among the poor. His political designs were at length so openly manifested, that he was brought to trial, condemned, and put to death; yet not without an abortive insurrection of his partisans to rescue him. After several leading citizens had tried, and failed in a similar manner, the people thought it expedient to pass a law similar to the Athenian ostracism, authorizing the infliction of temporary preventive banishment.¹ Under this law several powerful citizens were actually and speedily banished; and such was the abuse of the new engine, by the political parties in the city, that men of conspicuous position are said to have become afraid of meddling with public affairs. Thus put in practice, the institution is said to have given rise to new political contentions not less violent than those which it checked, insomuch that the Syracusans found themselves obliged to repeal the law not long after its introduction. We should have been glad to learn some particulars concerning this political experiment, beyond the meagre abstract given by Diodorus, and especially to know the precautionary securities by which the application of the ostracizing sentence was restrained at Syracuse. Perhaps no care was taken to copy the checks and formalities provided by Kleisthenês at Athens. Yet under all circumstances, the institution, though tutelary, if reserved for its proper emergencies, was eminently

¹ Diodor. xi, 86, 87. The institution at Syracuse was called the *petalism*; because, in taking the votes, the name of the citizen intended to be banished was written upon a leaf of olive, instead of a shell or potsherd.

open to abuse, so that we have no reason to wonder that abuse occurred, especially at a period of great violence and discord. The wonder rather is, that it was so little abused at Athens.

Although the ostracism, or petalism, at Syracuse was speedily discontinued, it may probably have left a salutary impression behind, as far as we can judge from the fact that new pretenders to despotism are not hereafter mentioned. The republic increases in wealth, and manifests an energetic action in foreign affairs. The Syracusan admiral Phayllus was despatched with a powerful fleet to repress the piracies of the Tyrrhenian maritime towns, and after ravaging the island of Elba, returned home, under the suspicion of having been bought off by bribes from the enemy; on which accusation he was tried and banished, a second fleet of sixty triremes under Apellès being sent to the same regions. The new admiral not only plundered many parts of the Tyrrhenian coast, but also carried his ravages into the island of Corsica, at that time a Tyrrhenian possession, and reduced the island of Elba completely. His return was signalized by a large number of captives and a rich booty.¹

Meanwhile the great antecedent revolutions, among the Grecian cities in Sicily had raised a new spirit among the Sikels of the interior, and inspired the Sikel prince Duketius, a man of spirit and ability, with large ideas of aggrandizement. Many exiled Greeks having probably sought service with him, it was either by their suggestion, or from having himself caught the spirit of Hellenic improvement, that he commenced the plan of bringing the petty Sikel communities into something like city life and collective cooperation. Having acquired glory by the capture of the Grecian town of Morgantina, he induced all the Sikel communities, with the exception of Hybla, to enter into a sort of federative compact. Next, in order to obtain a central point for the new organization, he transferred his own little town from the hill-top, called Menæ, down to a convenient spot of the neighboring plain, near to the sacred precinct of the gods called Paliki.² As the veneration paid to these gods, determined in

¹ Diodor. xi, 87, 88.

² Diodor. xi, 78, 88, 90. The proceeding of Duketius is illustrated by the description of Dardanus in the Iliad. xx, 216. —

part by the striking volcanic manifestations in the neighborhood, rendered this plain a suitable point of attraction for Sikels generally. Duketius was enabled to establish a considerable new city of Palikê, with walls of large circumference, and an ample range of adjacent land which he distributed among a numerous Sikel population, probably with some Greeks intermingled.

The powerful position which Duketius had thus acquired is attested by the aggressive character of his measures, intended gradually to recover a portion at least of that ground which the Greeks had appropriated at the expense of the indigenous population. The Sikel town of Ennesia had been seized by the Hieronian Greeks expelled from Ætna, and had received from them the name of Ætna.¹ Duketius now found means to reconquer it, after ensnaring by stratagem the leading magistrate. He was next bold enough to invade the territory of the Agrigentines, and to besiege one of their country garrisons called Motyum. We are impressed with a high idea of his power, when we learn that the Agrigentines, while marching to relieve the place, thought it necessary to invoke aid from the Syracusans, who sent to them a force under Bolkon. Over this united force Duketius gained a victory, in consequence of the treason or cowardice of Bolkon, as the Syracusans believed, insomuch that they condemned him to death. In the succeeding year, however, the good fortune of the Sikel prince changed. The united army of these two powerful cities raised the blockade of Motyum, completely defeated him in the field, and dispersed all his forces. Finding himself deserted by his comrades and even on the point of being betrayed, he took the desperate resolution of casting himself upon the mercy of the Syracusans. He rode off by night to the gates of Syracuse, entered the city unknown, and sat down as a suppliant on the altar in the agora, surrendering himself together with all his territory. A spectacle thus unexpected brought together a crowd of Syracuse citizens, exciting

Κτίσσε δὲ Δαρδανίην, ἐπεὶ οὐπω Ἴλιος ἱρὴ
 Ἐν πεδίῳ πεπόλιστο, πόλις μερόπων ἀνθρώπων,
 Ἄλλ' ἔθ' ὑπὸ ρείας φκον πολυπιδάκον Ἴος.

Compare Plato, de Legg. iii, pp. 681, 682.

¹ Diodor. xi, 76.

in them the strongest emotions: and when the magistrates convened the assembly for the purpose of deciding his fate, the voice of mercy was found paramount, in spite of the contrary recommendations of some of the political leaders. The most respected among the elder citizens — earnestly recommending mild treatment towards a foe thus fallen and suppliant, coupled with scrupulous regard not to bring upon the city the avenging hand of Nemesis — found their appeal to the generous sentiment of the people welcomed by one unanimous cry of "Save the suppliant."¹ Duketius, withdrawn from the altar, was sent off to Corinth, under his engagement to live there quietly for the future; the Syracusans providing for his comfortable maintenance.

Amidst the cruelty habitual in ancient warfare, this remarkable incident excites mingled surprise and admiration. Doubtless the lenient impulse of the people mainly arose from their seeing Duketius actually before them in suppliant posture at their altar, instead of being called upon to determine his fate in his absence, — just as the Athenian people were in like manner moved by the actual sight of the captive Doriæus, and induced to spare his life, on an occasion which will be hereafter recounted.² If in some instances the assembled people, obeying the usual vehemence of multitudinous sentiment, carried severities to excess, — so, in other cases, as well as in this, the appeal to their humane impulses will be found to have triumphed over prudential regard for future security. Such was the fruit which the Syracusans reaped for sparing Duketius, who, after residing a year or two at Corinth, violated his parole. Pretending to have received an order from the oracle, he assembled a number of colonists, whom he conducted into Sicily to found a city at Kalê Aktê on the northern coast belonging to the Sikels. We cannot doubt that when the Syracusans found in what manner their lenity was requited, the speakers who had recommended severe treatment would take great credit on the score of superior foresight.³

¹ Diodor. xi, 91, 92. Ὁ δὲ δῆμος ὡς περ τιμὴν μὲν φωνῇ σωζέειν ἅπαντες ἐβόων τὸν ἐκέλευ.

² Xenophon. Hellen. i. 1, 19. Pausanias. vi. 7, 2.

³ Mr. Mitford recounts as follows the return of Duketius to Sicily: "The

But the return of this energetic enemy was not the only mischief which the Syracusans suffered. Their resolution to spare Duketius had been adopted without the concurrence of the Agrigentines, who had helped to conquer him; and the latter, when they saw him again in the island, and again formidable, were so indignant that they declared war against Syracuse. A standing jealousy prevailed between these two great cities, the first and second powers in Sicily. War actually broke out between them, wherein other Greek cities took part. After lasting some time, with various acts of hostility, and especially a serious defeat of the Agrigentines at the river Himera, these latter solicited and obtained peace.¹ The discord between the two cities, however, had left leisure to Duketius to found the city of Kalê Aktê, and to make some progress in reëstablishing his ascendancy over the Sikels, in which operation he was overtaken by death. He probably left no successor to carry on his plans, so that the Syracusans, pressing their attacks vigorously, reduced many of the Sikel townships in the island, regaining his former conquest, Morgantinê, and subduing even the strong position and town called Trinakia,² after a brave and desperate resistance on the part of the inhabitants.

him instrumental to their own views for advancing the power of their commonwealth. They permitted, or rather encouraged him to establish a colony of mixed people, Greeks and Sikels, at Kalê Aktê, on the northern coast of the island." (ch. xviii, sect. i, vol. iv, p. 13.)

The statement that "the Syracusans brought back Duketius, or encouraged him to come back, or to found the colony of Kalê Aktê," is a complete departure from Diodorus on the part of Mr. Mitford; who transforms a breach of parole on the part of the Sikel prince into an ambitious manœuvre on the part of Syracusan democracy. The words of Diodorus, the only authority in the case, are as follows (xii. 8): Οἱ τὸν δὲ (Duketius) ὀλίγον χρόνον μένας ἐν τῇ Κορίνθῳ, τῆς ὁμοῦ ἀρχῆς ἔλυσσε, καὶ προσποιουσάμενος χρησμον ἐπὶ τῶν θεῶν ἑαυτῷ δεδοσθαι, κτίσαι τὴν Καλὴν Ἀκτὴν ἐν Σικελίᾳ, κατεπλεύσεν εἰς τὴν νῆσον μετὰ πολλῶν οἰκητόρων· συνεπελάβοντο δὲ καὶ τῶν Σικελῶν τινες, ἐν οἷς ἦν καὶ Ἀρχωνίδης, ὁ τῶν Ἑρβιταίων δυναστεύων. Οὗτος μὲν οὖν περὶ τὸν οἰκισμὸν τῆς Καλῆς Ἀκτῆς ἐγένετο· Ἀκραγανταῖοι δὲ, ἅμα μὲν φθονοῦντες τοῖς Συρακουσίοις, ἅμα δ' ἐγκαλοῦντες αὐτοὺς ὅτι Δουκέτιον ὄντα κοινὸν πόλεμον διέσωσαν ἄνευ τῆς Ἀκραγαντίνων γνώμης, πόλεμον ἐξηγάσαν τοῖς Συρακουσίοις.

¹ Diodor. xii, 8.

² Diodor. xii, 29. For the reconquest of Morgantinê, see Thucyd. iv. 61.

By this large accession both of subjects and of tribute, combined with her recent victory over Agrigentum, Syracuse was elevated to the height of power, and began to indulge schemes for extending her ascendancy throughout the island: with which view her horsemen were doubled in number, and one hundred new triremes were constructed.¹ Whether any, or what, steps were taken to realize her designs our historian does not tell us. But the position of Sicily remains the same at the beginning of the Peloponnesian war: Syracuse, the first city as to power, indulging in ambitious dreams, if not in ambitious aggressions; Agrigentum, a jealous second, and almost a rival; the remaining Grecian states maintaining their independence, yet not without mistrust and apprehension.

Though the particular phenomena of this period, however, have not come to our knowledge, we see enough to prove that it was one of great prosperity for Sicily. The wealth, commerce, and public monuments of Agrigentum, especially appear to have even surpassed those of the Syracusans. Her trade with Carthage and the African coast was both extensive and profitable; for at this time neither the vine nor the olive were much cultivated in Libya, and the Carthaginians derived their wine and oil from the southern territory of Sicily,² particularly that of Agrigentum. The temples of the city, among which that of Olympic Zeus stood foremost, were on the grandest scale of magnificence, surpassing everything of the kind in Sicily. The population of the city, free as well as slave, was very great: the number of rich men keeping chariots and competing for the prize at the Olympic games was renowned, not less than the accumulation of

Respecting this town of Trinakia, known only from the passage of Diodorus here, Paulmier (as cited in Wesseling's note), as well as Marnett (*Geographie der Griechen und Römer*, b. x. ch. xv, p. 446), intimate some skepticism: which I share so far as to believe that Diodorus has greatly overrated its magnitude and importance.

Nor can it be true, as Diodorus affirms, that Trinakia was the only Sikeli township remaining unsubdued by the Syracusans, and that, after conquering that place, they had subdued them all. We know that there were no inconsiderable number of independent Sikels, at the time of the Athenian invasion of Sicily (*Thucyd.* vi. 88; vii. 2).

¹ Diodor. xii, 30.

² Diodor. xiii, 81.

works of art, statues and pictures,¹ with manifold insignia of ornament and luxury. All this is particularly brought to our notice because of the frightful catastrophe which desolated Agrigentum in 406 B.C. from the hands of the Carthaginians. It was in the interval which we are now describing that this prosperity was accumulated; doubtless not in Agrigentum alone, but more or less throughout all the Grecian cities of the island.

Nor was it only in material prosperity that they were distinguished. At this time, the intellectual movement in some of the Italian and Sicilian towns was very considerable. The inconsiderable town of Elea in the gulf of Poseidonia nourished two of the greatest speculative philosophers in Greece, Parmenidès and Zeno. Empedoklès of Agrigentum was hardly less eminent in the same department, yet combining with it a political and practical efficiency. The popular character of the Sicilian governments stimulated the cultivation of rhetorical studies, wherein not only Empedoklès and Pòlus at Agrigentum, but Tisias and Korax at Syracuse, and still more, Gorgias at Leontini, acquired great reputation.² The constitution established at Agrigentum after the dispossession of the Theronian dynasty was at first not thoroughly democratical, the principal authority residing in a large Senate of One Thousand members. We are told even that an ambitious club of citizens were aiming at the reestablishment of a despotism, when Empedoklès, availing himself of wealth and high position, took the lead in a popular opposition; so as not only to defeat this intrigue, but also to put down the Senate of One Thousand, and render the government completely democratical. His influence over the people was enhanced by the vein of mysticism, and pretence to miraculous or divine endowments, which accompanied his philosophical speculations, in a manner

¹ Diodor. xiii. 82, 83, 90.

² See Aristotle as cited by Cicero, *Brut.* c. 12; Plato, *Phædr.* p. 267, c. 13, 114; Dionys. Halic. *Judicium de Isocrate*, p. 534 R. and *Epist.* ii, ad Ammaum, p. 792; also Quintilian, iii. 1. 125. According to Cicero (*de Inventione*, ii. 2), the treatises of these ancient rhetoricians, "usque a principe illo et inventore Tisiâ," had been superseded by Aristotle, who had collected them carefully, "nominatim," and had improved upon their expositions. Dionysius laments that they had been so superseded (*Epist. ad Ammaum*, p. 722).

similar to Pythagoras.¹ The same combination of rhetoric with physical speculation appears also in Gorgias of Leontini, whose celebrity as a teacher throughout Greece was both greater and earlier than that of any one else. It was a similar demand for popular speaking in the assembly and the judicatures which gave encouragement to the rhetorical teachers Tisias and Korax at Syracuse.

In this state of material prosperity, popular politics, and intellectual activity, the Sicilian towns were found at the breaking out of the great struggle between Athens and the Peloponnesian confederacy in 431 B.C. In that struggle the Italian and Sicilian Greeks had no direct concern, nor anything to fear from the ambition of Athens; who, though she had founded Thurii in 443 B.C., appears to have never aimed at any political ascendancy even over that town, much less anywhere else on the coast. But the Sicilian Greeks, though forming a system apart in their own island, from which it suited the dominant policy of Syracuse to exclude all foreign interference,² were yet connected, by sympathy, and on one side even by alliances, with the two main streams of Hellenic politics. Among the allies of Sparta were numbered all or most of the Dorian cities of Sicily, — Syracuse, Kamarina, Gela, Agrigentum, Selinus, perhaps Himera and Messênê, — together with Lokri and Tarentum in Italy: among the allies of Athens, perhaps the Chalkidic or Ionic Rhegium in Italy.³ Whether the Ionic cities in Sicily — Naxos, Katana, and Leontini — were at this time united with Athens by any special treaty, is very doubtful. But if we examine the state of politics prior

¹ Diogen. Laërt. viii, 64-71; Seyfert, Akragas und sein Gebiet, sect. ii, p. 70; Ritter, Geschichte der Alten Philosophie, vol. i, ch. vi, p. 533, *seqq.*

² Thucyd. iv, 61-64. This is the tenor of the speech delivered by Herakleides at the congress of Gela in the eighth year of the Peloponnesian war. His language is remarkable: he calls all non-Sicilian Greeks ἀλλογενεῖς.

³ The inscription in Boeckh's Corpus Inscriptt. (No. 74, part i, p. 112) relating to the alliance between Athens and Rhegium, conveys little certain information. Boeckh refers it to a covenant concluded in the archonship of Apsandês at Athens (Olymp. 86, 4, B.C. 433-432, the year before the Peloponnesian war), renewing an alliance which was even then of old date. But it appears to me that the supposition of a renewal is only his own conjecture; and even the name of the archon, *Apsandês*, which he has restored by a plausible

to the breaking out of the war, it will be found that the connection of the Sicilian cities on both sides with Central Greece was rather one of sympathy and tendency than of pronounced obligation and action. The Dorian Sicilians, though doubtless sharing the antipathy of the Peloponnesian Dorians to Athens, had never been called upon for any coöperation with Sparta; nor had the Ionic Sicilians yet learned to look to Athens for protection against their powerful neighbor Syracuse.

It was the memorable quarrel between Corinth and Korkyra, and the intervention of Athens in that quarrel (B.C. 433-432), which brought the Sicilian parties one step nearer to coöperation in the Peloponnesian quarrel, in two different ways; first, by exciting the most violent anti-Athenian war spirit in Corinth, with whom the Sicilian Dorians held their chief commerce and sympathy, — next, by providing a basis for the action of Athenian maritime force in Italy and Sicily, which would have been impracticable without an established footing in Korkyra. But Plutarch — whom most historians have followed — is mistaken, and is contradicted by Thucydides, when he ascribes to the Athenians at this time ambitious projects in Sicily of the nature of those which they came to conceive seven or eight years afterwards. At the outbreak, and for some years before the outbreak, of the war, the policy of Athens was purely conservative, and that of her enemies aggressive, as I have shown in a former chapter. At that moment, Sparta and Corinth anticipated large assistance from the Sicilian Dorians, in ships of war, in money, and in provisions; while the value of Korkyra as an ally of Athens consisted in affording facilities for obstructing such reinforcements, far more than from any anticipated conquests.¹

If we could believe the story in Justin iv, 3, Rhegium must have ceased to be Ionic before the Peloponnesian war. He states that in a sedition at Rhegium, one of the parties called in auxiliaries from Himera. These Himeraean exiles having first destroyed the enemies against whom they were invoked, next massacred the friends who had invoked them. "ausi facinus nulli tyranno comparandum." They married the Rhegine women, and seized the city for themselves.

I do not know what to make of this story, which neither appears noticed in Thucydides, nor seems to consist with what he does tell us.

¹ Thucyd. i, 32.

In the spring of 431 B.C., the Spartans, then organizing their first invasion of Attica, and full of hope that Athens would be crushed in one or two campaigns, contemplated the building of a vast fleet of five hundred ships of war among the confederacy. A considerable portion of this charge was imposed upon the Italian and Sicilian Dorians, and a contribution in money besides; with instructions to refrain from any immediate declaration against Athens until their fleet should be ready.¹ Of such expected succor, indeed, little was ever realized in any way; in ships, nothing at all. But the expectations and orders of Sparta, show

¹ Thucyd. ii, 7. Καὶ Λακεδαιμονιοὶς μὲν, πρὸς ταῖς αὐτοῦ ὑπαρχούσαις, ἐξ Ἰταλίας καὶ Σικελίας τοῖς τακείνων ἐλόμενοις, ναὺς ἐπετάχθησαν ποιεῖσθαι κατὰ μέγεθος τῶν πολέων, ὥς ἐξ τῶν πάντα ἀριθμὸν πεντακοσίων νεῶν ἰσμεῖν, etc.

Respecting the construction of this perplexing passage, read the notes of Dr. Arnold, Poppo, and Gölner: compare Poppo, ad Thucyd. vol. i, ch. xv, p. 181.

I agree with Dr. Arnold and Gölner in rejecting the construction of αὐτῶν with ἐξ Ἰταλίας καὶ Σικελίας, in the sense of "those ships which were in Peloponnesus from Italy and Sicily." This would be untrue in point of fact, as they observe: there were no Sicilian ships of war in Peloponnesus.

Nevertheless I think, differing from them, that αὐτῶν is not a pronoun referring to ἐξ Ἰταλίας καὶ Σικελίας, but is used in contrast with those words, and really means, "in or about Peloponnesus." It was contemplated that new ships should be built in Sicily and Italy, of sufficient number to make the total fleet of the Lacedæmonian confederacy, including the triremes already in Peloponnesus, equal to five hundred sail. But it was never contemplated that the triremes in Italy and Sicily *alone* should amount to five hundred sail, as Dr. Arnold, in my judgment, erroneously imagines. Five hundred sail for the entire confederacy would be a prodigious total: five hundred sail for Sicily and Italy alone, would be incredible.

To construe the sentence as it stands now, putting aside the conjecture of νῆες instead of ναὺς, or ἐπετάχθη instead of ἐπετάχθησαν, which would make it run smoothly, we must admit the supposition of a break or double construction, such as sometimes occurs in Thucydides. The sentence begins with one form of construction and concludes with another. We must suppose, with Gölner, that αἱ πόλεις is understood as the nominative case to ἐπετάχθησαν. The dative cases (Λακεδαιμονιοῖς — ἐλόμενοις) are to be considered, & apprehend, as governed by νῆες ἐπετάχθησαν: that is, these dative cases belong to the first form of construction, which Thucydides has not carried out. The sentence is begun as if νῆες ἐπετάχθησαν were intended to follow.



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that here as elsewhere she was then on the offensive, and Athens only on the defensive. Probably the Corinthians had encouraged the expectation of ample reinforcements from Syracuse and the neighboring towns, a hope which must have contributed largely to the confidence with which they began the struggle. What were the causes which prevented it from being realized, we are not distinctly told; and we find Hermokratès the Syracusan reproaching his countrymen fifteen years afterwards, immediately before the great Athenian expedition against Syracuse, with their antecedent apathy.¹ But it is easy to see, that as the Sicilian Greeks had no direct interest in the contest, — neither wrongs to avenge, nor dangers to apprehend, from Athens, — nor any habit of obeying requisitions from Sparta, so they might naturally content themselves with expressions of sympathy and promises of aid in case of need, without taxing themselves to the enormous extent which it pleased Sparta to impose, for purposes both aggressive and purely Peloponnesian. Perhaps the leading men in Syracuse, from attachment to Corinth, may have sought to act upon the order. But no similar motive would be found operative either at Agrigentum or at Gela or Selinus.

Though the order was not executed, however, there can be little doubt that it was publicly announced and threatened, thus becoming known to the Ionic cities in Sicily as well as to Athens; and that it weighed materially in determining the latter afterwards to assist those cities, when they sent to invoke her aid. Instead of despatching their forces to Peloponnesus, where they had nothing to gain, the Sicilian Dorians preferred attacking the Ionic cities in their own island, whose territory they might have reasonable hopes of conquering and appropriating, — Naxos, Katana, and Leontini. These cities doubtless sympathized with Athens in her struggle against Sparta; yet, far from being strong enough to assist her or to threaten their Dorian neighbors, they were unable to defend themselves without Athenian aid. They were assisted by the Dorian city of Kamarina, which was afraid of her powerful border city Syracuse, and by Rhegium in Italy; while Lokri in Italy, the bitter enemy of Rhegium, sided with Syracuse against them. In the fifth summer of the war, finding

¹ Thucyd. vi, 34: compare iii, 86.

themselves blockaded by sea and confined to their walls, they sent to Athens, both to entreat succor, as allies¹ and Ionians, and to represent that, if Syracuse succeeded in crushing them, she and the other Dorians in Sicily would forthwith send over the positive aid which the Peloponnesians had so long been invoking. The eminent rhetor Georgias of Leontini, whose peculiar style of speaking is said to have been new to the Athenian assembly, and to have produced a powerful effect, was at the head of this embassy. It is certain that this rhetor procured for himself numerous pupils and large gains, not merely in Athens but in many other towns of Central Greece,² though it is exaggerated to ascribe to his pleading the success of the present application.

Now the Athenians had a real interest as well in protecting these Ionic Sicilians from being conquered by the Dorians in the island, as in obstructing the transport of Sicilian corn to Peloponnesus: and they sent twenty triremes under Lachês and Charœakês, with instructions, while accomplishing these objects, to ascertain the possibility of going beyond the defensive, and making conquests. Taking station at Rhegium, Lachês did something towards rescuing the Ionic cities in part from their maritime blockade, and even undertook an abortive expedition against the Lipari isles, which were in alliance with Syracuse.³ Throughout the ensuing year, he pressed the war in the neighborhood of Rhegium and Messênê, his colleague Charœadês being slain. Attacking Myla in the Messenian territory, he was fortunate enough to gain so decisive an advantage over the troops of Messênê, that that city itself capitulated to him, gave hostages, and enrolled itself as ally of Athens and the Ionic cities.⁴ He also

¹ Thucyd. vi. 86.

² Thucyd. iii. 86. Diodor. xii. 53; Plato, Hipp. Maj. p. 282, B. It is remarkable that Thucydides, though he is said, with much probability, to have been among the pupils of Georgias, makes no mention of that rhetor personally as among the envoys. Diodorus probably copied from Ephorus the pupil of Isokratês. Among the writers of the Isokratês school, the persons of distinguished rhetors, and their supposed political efficiency, counted for much more than in the estimation of Thucydides. Pausanias (vi. 17, 3) speaks of Tisias also as having been among the envoys in this celebrated legation.

³ Thucyd. iii. 88, Diodor. xii. 54.

⁴ Thucyd. iii. 90; vi. 6.

contracted an alliance with the non-Hellenic city of Egesta, in the northwest portion of Sicily, and he invaded the territory of Lokri, capturing one of the country forts on the river Halex:¹ after which, in a second debarkation, he defeated a Lokrian detachment under Proxenus. But he was unsuccessful in an expedition into the interior of Sicily against Inêssus. This was a native Sikel township, held in coercion by a Syracusan garrison in the acropolis; which the Athenians vainly attempted to storm, being repulsed with loss.² Lachês concluded his operations in the autumn by an ineffectual incursion on the territory of Himera and on the Lipari isles. On returning to Rhegium at the beginning of the ensuing year (B.C. 425), he found Pythodôrus already arrived from Athens to supersede him.³

That officer had come as the forerunner of a more considerable expedition, intended to arrive in the spring, under Eurymedon and Sophoklês, who were to command in conjunction with himself. The Ionic cities in Sicily, finding the squadron under Lachês insufficient to render them a match for their enemies at sea, had been emboldened to send a second embassy to Athens, with request for farther reinforcements, at the same time making increased efforts to enlarge their own naval force. It happened that at this moment the Athenians had no special employment elsewhere for their fleet, which they desired to keep in constant practice. They accordingly resolved to send to Sicily forty additional triremes, in full hopes of bringing the contest to a speedy close.⁴

Early in the ensuing spring, Eurymedon and Sophoklês started from Athens for Sicily in command of this squadron, with instructions to afford relief at Korkyra in their way, and with Demosthenês on board to act on the coast of Peloponnesus. It was this fleet which, in conjunction with the land-forces under the command of Kleon, making a descent almost by accident on the Laconian coast at Pylos, achieved for Athens the most signal success of the whole war, the capture of the Lacedæmonian hoplites in Sphacteria.⁵ But the fleet was so long occupied, first in

¹ Thucyd. iii. 92.

² Thucyd. iii. 115.

³ Thucyd. iii. 108.

⁴ Thucyd. iii. 114.

the blockade of that island, next in operations at Korkyra, that it did not reach Sicily until about the month of September.¹

Such delay, eminently advantageous for Athens generally, was fatal to her hopes of success in Sicily during the whole summer. For Pythodôrus, acting only with the fleet previously commanded by Lachês at Rhegium, was not merely defeated in a descent upon Lokri, but experienced a more irreparable loss by the revolt of Messênê, which had surrendered to Lachês a few months before; and which, together with Rhegium, had given to the Athenians the command of the strait. Apprized of the coming Athenian fleet, the Syracusans were anxious to deprive them of this important base of operations against the island; and a fleet of twenty sail — half Syracusan, half Lokrian — was enabled by the concurrence of a party in Messênê to seize the town. It would appear that the Athenian fleet was then at Rhegium, but that town was at the same time threatened by the entrance of the entire land-force of Lokri, together with a body of Rhegine exiles. These latter were even not without hopes of obtaining admission by means of a favorable party in the town. Though such hopes were disappointed, yet the diversion prevented all succor from Rhegium to Messênê. The latter town now served as a harbor for the fleet hostile to Athens,² which was speedily reinforced to more than thirty sail, and began maritime operations forthwith in hopes of crushing the Athenians and capturing Rhegium, before Eurymedon should arrive. But the Athenians, though they had only sixteen triremes together with eight others from Rhegium, gained a decided victory, in an action brought on accidentally for the possession of a merchantman sailing through the strait. They put the enemy's ships to flight, and drove them to seek refuge: some under protection of the Syracusan land-force at Cape Pelôrus near Messênê, others under the Lokrian force near Rhegium, each as they best could, with the loss of one trireme.³ This de-

¹ Thucyd. iv, 48.

² Thucyd. iii, 115; iv, 1.

³ Thucyd. iv, 24. καὶ νικηθέντες ὑπὸ τῶν Ἀθηναίων δια τυχόν ἀπειπ-
σαν, ὡς ἕκαστοι ἐτυχον, ἐς τὰ οἰκεία στρατόπεδα, τό τε ἐν τῇ Μεσσηνίᾳ καὶ ἐν
τῇ Ῥηγίῳ, μίαν ναὺν ἀπολέσαντες, etc.

I concur in Dr. Arnold's explanation of this passage, yet conceiving that the words ὡς ἕκαστοι ἐτυχον designate the flight as disorderly, inasmuch that all the Lokrian ships did not get back to the Lokrian station, nor all

feat so broke up the scheme of Lokrian operations against the latter place, that their land-force retired from the Rhegine territory, while the whole defeated squadron was reunited on the opposite coast under Cape Pelôrus. Here the ships were moored close on shore under the protection of the land-force, when the Athenians and Rhegines came up to attack them; but without success, and even with the loss of one trireme, which the men on shore contrived to seize and detain by a grappling-iron; her crew escaping by swimming to the vessels of their comrades. Having repulsed the enemy, the Syracusans got aboard, and rowed close along-shore, partly aided by tow-ropes, to the harbor of Messênê, in which transit they were again attacked, but the Athenians were a second time beaten off with the loss of another ship. Their superior seamanship was of no avail in this along-shore fighting.¹

The Athenian fleet was now suddenly withdrawn in order to prevent an intended movement in Kamarina, where a philo-Syracusan party under Archias threatened revolt: and the Messenian forces, thus left free, invaded the territory of their neighbor, the Chalkidic city of Naxos, sending their fleet round to the mouth of the Akesinês near that city. They were ravaging the lands, and were preparing to storm the town, when a considerable body of the indigenous Sikels were seen descending the neighboring hills to succor the Naxians: upon which the latter, elate with the sight, and mistaking the new comers for their Grecian brethren from Leontini, rushed out of the gates and made a vigorous sally at a moment when their enemies were unprepared. The Messenians were completely defeated, with the loss of no less than one thousand men, and with a still greater loss sustained in

the Syracusan ships to the Syracusan station: but each separate ship fled to either one or the other, as it best could.

¹ Thucyd. iv, 25. ἀποσιμωσάντων ἐκείνων καὶ προεμβαλόντων

I do not distinctly understand the nautical movement which is expressed by ἀποσιμωσάντων, in spite of the notes of the commentators. And I cannot but doubt the correctness of Dr. Arnold's explanation, when he says "The Syracusans, on a sudden, threw off their towing-ropes, made their way to the open sea by a lateral movement, and thus became the assailants," etc. The open sea was what the Athenians required, in order to obtain the benefit of their superior seamanship.

their retreat home from the pursuit of the Sikels. Their fleet went back also to Messênê, from whence such of the ships as were not Messenian returned home. So much was the city weakened by its recent defeat, that a Lokrian garrison was sent for its protection under Demomelês, while the Leontines and Naxians, together with the Athenian squadron on returning from Kamarina, attacked it by land and sea in this moment of distress. A well-timed sally of the Messenians and Lokrians, however, dispersed the Leontine land-force; but the Athenian force, landing from their ships, attacked the assailants while in the disorder of pursuit, and drove them back within the walls. The scheme against Messênê, however, had now become impracticable, so that the Athenians crossed the strait to Rhegium.¹

Thus indecisive was the result of operations in Sicily, during the first half of the seventh year of the Peloponnesian war: nor does it appear that the Athenians undertook anything considerable during the autumnal half, though the full fleet under Eurymedon had then joined Pythodôrus.² Yet while the presence of so large an Athenian fleet at Rhegium would produce considerable effect upon the Syracusan mind, the triumphant promise of Athenian affairs, and the astonishing humiliation of Sparta during the months immediately following the capture of Sphakteria, probably struck much deeper. In the spring of the eighth year of the war, Athens was not only in possession of the Spartan prisoners, but also of Pylos and Kythêra, so that a rising among the Helots appeared noway improbable. She was in the full swing of hope, while her discouraged enemies were all thrown on the defensive. Hence the Sicilian Dorians, intimidated by a state of affairs so different from that in which they had begun the war three years before, were now eager to bring about a pacification in their island.³ The Dorian city of Kamarina, which had hitherto acted along with the Ionic or Chalkidic cities, was the first to make a separate accommodation with its neighboring city of Gela; at which latter place deputies were invited to attend from

¹ Thucyd. iv, 25.

² Thucyd. i, 48.

³ Compare a similar remark made by the Syracusan Hermokratês, nine years afterwards, when the great Athenian expedition against Syracuse was on its way, respecting the increased disposition to union among the Sicilian cities, produced by common fear of Athens (Thucyd. vi, 33)

all the cities in the island, with a view to the conclusion of peace.¹

This congress met in the spring of 424 B.C., when Syracuse, the most powerful city in Sicily, took the lead in urging the common interest which all had in the conclusion of peace. The Syracusan Hermokratês, chief adviser of this policy in his native city, now appeared to vindicate and enforce it in the congress. He was a well-born, brave, and able man, clear-sighted in regard to the foreign interests of his country; but at the same time of pronounced oligarchical sentiments, mistrusted by the people, seemingly with good reason, in regard to their internal constitution. The speech which Thucydides places in his mouth, on the present occasion, sets forth emphatically the necessity of keeping Sicily at all cost free from foreign intervention, and of settling at home all differences which might arise between the various Sicilian cities. Hermokratês impressed upon his hearers that the aggressive schemes of Athens, now the greatest power in Greece, were directed against all Sicily, and threatened all cities alike, Ionians not less than Dorians. If they enfeebled one another by internal quarrels, and then invited the Athenians as arbitrators, the result would be ruin and slavery to all. The Athenians were but too ready to encroach everywhere, even without invitation: they had now come, with a zeal outrunning all obligation, under pretence of aiding the Chalkidic cities who had never aided them, but in the real hope of achieving conquest for themselves. The Chalkidic cities must not rely upon their Ionic kindred for security against evil designs on the part of Athens: as Sicilians, they had a paramount interest in upholding the independence of the island. If possible, they ought to maintain undisturbed peace; but if that were impossible, it was essential at least to confine the war to Sicily, apart from any foreign intruders. Complaints should be exchanged, and injuries redressed, by all, in a spirit of mutual forbearance; of which Syracuse — the first city in the island, and best able to sustain the brunt of war — was prepared to set the example, without that foolish over-valuation of favorable chances so ruinous even to first-rate powers, and with full sense of the uncertainty of the

future. Let them all feel that they were neighbors, inhabitants of the same island, and called by the common name of Sikeliots; and let them all with one accord repel the intrusion of aliens in their affairs, whether as open assailants or as treacherous mediators.¹

This harangue from Hermokratês, and the earnest dispositions of Syracuse for peace, found general sympathy among the Sicilian cities, Ionic as well as Doric. All of them doubtless suffered by the war, and the Ionic cities, who had solicited the intervention of the Athenians as protectors against Syracuse, conceived from the evident uneasiness of the latter a fair assurance of her pacific demeanor for the future. Accordingly, the peace was accepted by all the belligerent parties, each retaining what they possessed, except that the Syracusans agreed to cede Morgantinê to Kamarina, on receipt of a fixed sum of money.²

¹ See the speech of Hermokratês, Thucyd. iv, 59-64. One expression in this speech indicates that it was composed by Thucydides many years after its proper date, subsequently to the great expedition of the Athenians against Syracuse in 415 B.C.; though I doubt not that Thucydides collected the memoranda for it at the time.

Hermokratês says: "The Athenians are now near us with a few ships, lying in wait for our blunders," — οἱ δὲ ναῦν ἰσχυροὶ μάλιστα τῶν Ἑλλήνων τὰς τε ἀπορίας ἡμεῶν τηροῦσιν, ὀλίγαις ναυσὶ παρόντες, etc (iv, 60).

Now the fleet under the command of Eurymedon and his colleagues at Rhegium included all or most of the ships which had acted at Sphacteria and Korkyra, together with those which had been previously at the strait of Messina under Pythodorus. It could not have been less than fifty sail, and may possibly have been sixty sail. It is hardly conceivable that any Greek, speaking in the early spring of 424 B.C., should have alluded to this as a small fleet: assuredly, Hermokratês would not thus allude to it, since it was for the interest of his argument to exaggerate rather than extenuate, the formidable manifestations of Athens.

But Thucydides, composing the speech after the great Athenian expedition of 415 B.C., so much more numerous and commanding in every respect, might not unnaturally represent the fleet of Eurymedon as "a few ships," when he tacitly compared the two. This is the only way that I know, of explaining such an expression.

The Scholiast observes that some of the copies in his time omitted the words ὀλίγαις ναυσὶ: probably they noticed the contradiction which I have remarked; and the passage may certainly be construed without those words.

² Thucyd. iv, 65. We learn from Polybius (Fragm. xii, 22, 23, one of the *Excerpta* recently published by Maii, from the Cod. Vatic.) that Timæus

The Ionic cities stipulated that Athens should be included in the pacification; a condition agreed to by all, except the Epizephyrian Lokrians.¹ They then acquainted Eurymedon and his colleagues with the terms; inviting them to accede to the pacification in the name of Athens, and then to withdraw their fleet from Sicily. Nor had these generals any choice but to close with the proposition. Athens thus was placed on terms of peace with all the Sicilian cities, with liberty of access reciprocally to any single ship of war, but no armed force to cross the sea between Sicily and Peloponnesus. Eurymedon then sailed with his fleet home.²

On reaching Athens, however, he and his colleagues were received by the people with much displeasure. He himself was fined, and his colleagues Sophoklês and Pythodôrus banished, on the charge of having been bribed to quit Sicily, at a time when the fleet — so the Athenians believed — was strong enough to have made important conquests. Why the three colleagues were differently treated we are not informed.³ This sentence was harsh and unmerited; for it does not seem that Eurymedon had it in his power to prevent the Ionic cities from concluding peace, while it is certain that without them he could have achieved nothing serious. All that seems unexplained in his conduct, as recounted by Thucydides, is, that his arrival at Rhegium with the entire fleet in September, 425 B.C., does not seem to have been attended with any increased vigor or success, in the prosecution of the war. But the Athenians — besides an undue depreciation of the Sicilian cities, which we shall find fatally misleading them hereafter — were at this moment at the maximum of extravagant hopes, counting upon new triumphs everywhere, impatient of disappointment, and careless of proportion between the means intrusted to, and the objects expected from, their commanders. Such unmeasured confidence was painfully corrected in the course of a few months, by the battle of Delium

had in his twenty-first book described the congress of Gela at considerable length, and had composed an elaborate speech for Hermokratês: which speech Polybius condemns, as a piece of empty declamation.

¹ Thucyd. v, 5.

² Thucyd. vi, 13-22.

³ Thucyd. iv, 65.

and the losses in Thrace. But at the present moment, it was probably not less astonishing than grievous to the three generals, who had all left Athens prior to the success in Sphacteria.

The Ionic cities in Sicily were soon made to feel that they had been premature in sending away the Athenians. Dispute between Leontini and Syracuse, the same cause which had occasioned the invocation of Athens three years before, broke out afresh soon after the pacification of Gela. The democratical government of Leontini came to the resolution of strengthening their city by the enrolment of many new citizens; and a redivision of the territorial property of the state was projected in order to provide lots of land for these new-comers. But the aristocracy of the town upon whom the necessity would thus be imposed of parting with a portion of their lands, forestalled the project, seemingly before it was even formally decided, by entering into a treasonable correspondence with Syracuse, bringing in a Syracusan army, and expelling the Demos.¹ While these exiles found shelter as

¹ Thucyd. v. 4. Λεοντῖνοι γὰρ, ἀπελθόντων Ἀθηναίων ἐκ Σικελίας μετὰ τὴν ξυμβασιν, πολίτας τε ἐπεγράψαντο πολλοὺς, καὶ ὁ δῆμος τὴν γῆν ἐπεινοεῖ ἀναδυσασθαι. Οἱ δὲ δυνατοὶ εἰσάγοντες Συρακοσίους τε ἐπαγούται καὶ ἐκδιδοῦναι τὴν γῆν. Καὶ οἱ μὲν ἐπλανήθησαν ὡς ἕκαστοι, etc.

Upon this Dr. Arnold observes: "The principle on which this ἀναδυσμα γῆς was redemanded, was this; that every citizen was entitled to his portion, κλῆρος, of the land of the state, and that the admission of new citizens rendered a redivision of the property of the state a matter at once of necessity and of justice. It is not probable that in any case the actual κλῆροι (properties) of the old citizens were required to be shared with the new members of the state; but only, as at Rome, the ager publicus, or land still remaining to the state itself, and not apportioned out to individuals. This land, however, being beneficially enjoyed by numbers of the old citizens, either as common pasture, or as being farmed by different individuals on very advantageous terms, a division of it among the newly-admitted citizens, although not, strictly speaking, a spoliation of private property, was yet a serious shock to a great mass of existing interests, and was therefore always regarded as a revolutionary measure."

I transcribe this note of Dr. Arnold rather from its intrinsic worth than from any belief that analogy of agrarian relations existed between Rome and Leontini. The ager publicus at Rome was the product of successive conquests from foreign enemies of the city: there may, indeed, have been originally a similar ager publicus in the peculiar domain of Rome itself, anterior to all conquests; but this must at any rate have been very small

they could in other cities, the rich Leontines deserted and dismantled their own city, transferred their residence to Syracuse,

and had probably been all absorbed and assigned in private property before the agrarian disputes began.

We cannot suppose that the Leontines had any ager publicus acquired by conquest, nor are we entitled to presume that they had any at all, capable of being divided. Most probably the lots for the new citizens were to be provided out of private property. But unfortunately we are not told how, nor on what principles and conditions. Of what class of men were the new emigrants? Were they individuals altogether poor, having nothing but their hands to work with; or did they bring with them any amount of funds, to begin their settlement on the fertile and tempting plain of Leontini? (compare Thucyd. i. 27, and Plato de Legib. v. p. 744, A.) If the latter, we have no reason to imagine that they would be allowed to acquire their new lots gratuitously. Existing proprietors would be forced to sell at a fixed price, but not to yield their properties without compensation. I have already noticed, that to a small self-working proprietor, who had no slaves, it was almost essential that his land should be near the city; and provided this were insured, it might be a good bargain for a new resident having some money, but no land elsewhere, to come in and buy.

We have no means of answering these questions: but the few words of Thucydides do not present this measure as revolutionary, or as intended against the rich, or for the benefit of the poor. It was proposed, on public grounds, to strengthen the city by the acquisition of new citizens. This might be wise policy, in the close neighborhood of a doubtful and superior city, like Syracuse; though we cannot judge of the policy of the measure without knowing more. But most assuredly Mr. Mitford's representation can be noway justified from Thucydides: "Time and circumstances had greatly altered the state of property in all the Sicilian commonwealths, since that incomplete and iniquitous partition of lands, which had been made, on the general establishment of democratical government, after the expulsion of the family of Gelon. In other cities, the poor rested under their lot; but in Leontini, they were warring in project for a fresh and equal partition; and to strengthen themselves against the party of the wealthy, they carried, in the general assembly, a decree for associating a number of new citizens." (Mitford, H. G. ch. xviii, sect. ii, vol. iv, p. 23.)

I have already remarked, in a previous note, that Mr. Mitford has misrepresented the redivision of lands which took place after the expulsion of the Gelonian dynasty. That redivision had not been upon the principle of equal lots: it is not therefore correct to assert, as Mr. Mitford does, that the present movement at Leontini arose from the innovation made by time and circumstances in that equal division: as little is it correct to say, that the poor at Leontini now desired "a fresh and equal partition." Thucydides says not one word about equal partition. He puts forward the enrolment

and were enrolled as Syracusan citizens. To them the operation was exceedingly profitable, since they became masters of the properties of the exiled Demos in addition to their own. Presently, however, some of them, dissatisfied with their residence in Syracuse, returned to the abandoned city, and fitted up a portion of it called Phokeis, together with a neighboring strong post called Brikinnies. Here, after being joined by a considerable number of the exiled Demos, they contrived to hold out for some time against the efforts of the Syracusans to expel them from their fortifications.

The new enrolment of citizens, projected by the Leontine democracy, seems to date during the year succeeding the pacification of Gela, and was probably intended to place the city in a more defensible position in case of renewed attacks from Syracuse, thus compensating for the departure of the Athenian auxiliaries. The Leontine Demos, in exile and suffering, doubtless bitterly repenting that they had concurred in dismissing these auxiliaries, sent envoys to Athens with complaints, and renewed prayers for help.¹

But Athens was then too much pressed to attend to their call; her defeat at Delium and her losses in Thrace had been followed by the truce for one year; and even during that truce, she had been called upon for strenuous efforts in Thrace to check the progress of Brasidas. After the expiration of that truce, she sent Phæax and two colleagues to Sicily (B.C. 422) with the modest force of two triremes. He was directed to try and organize an anti-Syracusan party in the island, for the purpose of reestablishing the Leontine Demos. In passing along the coast of Italy, he concluded amicable relations with some of the Grecian cities,

of new citizens as the substantive and primary resolution, actually taken by the Leontines; the redivision of the lands as a measure consequent and subsidiary to this, and as yet existing only in project (*ἐπινοία*). Mr. Mitford states the fresh and equal division to have been the real object of desire, and the enrolment of new citizens to have been proposed with a view to attain it. His representation is greatly at variance with that of Thucydides.

¹ Justin (iv, 4) surrounds the Sicilian envoys at Athens with all the insignia of misery and humiliation, while addressing the Athenian assembly: "Sordidâ veste, capillo barbaque promissis, et omni squaloris habitu ad misericordiam commovendam conquisito, concionem deformes adeunt."

especially with Lokri, which had hitherto stood aloof from Athens; and his first addresses in Sicily appeared to promise success. His representations of danger from Syracusan ambition were well received both at Kamarina and Agrigentum. For on the one hand, that universal terror of Athens, which had dictated the pacification of Gela, had now disappeared; while on the other hand, the proceeding of Syracuse in regard to Leontini was well calculated to excite alarm. We see by that proceeding that sympathy between democracies in different towns was not universal: the Syracusan democracy had joined with the Leontine aristocracy to expel the Demos, just as the despot Gelon had combined with the aristocracy of Megara and Eubœa, sixty years before, and had sold the Demos of those towns into slavery. The birthplace of the famous rhetor Gorgias was struck out of the list of inhabited cities; its temples were deserted; and its territory had become a part of Syracuse. All these were circumstances so powerfully affecting Grecian imagination, that the Kamarinaans, neighbors of Syracuse on the other side, might well fear lest the like unjust conquest, expulsion, and absorption, should soon overtake them. Agrigentum, though without any similar fear, was disposed from policy, and jealousy of Syracuse, to second the views of Phæax. But when the latter proceeded to Gela, in order to procure the adhesion of that city in addition to the other two, he found himself met by so resolute an opposition that his whole scheme was frustrated, nor did he think it advisable even to open his case at Selinus or Himera. In returning, he crossed the interior of the island through the territory of the Sikels to Katana, passing in his way by Brikinnies, where the Leontine Demos were still maintaining a precarious existence. Having encouraged them to hold out by assurances of aid, he proceeded on his homeward voyage. In the strait of Messina, he struck upon some vessels conveying a body of expelled Lokrians from Messênê to Lokri. The Lokrians had got possession of Messênê after the pacification of Gela, by means of an internal edition; but after holding it some time, they were now driven out by a second revolution. Phæax, being under agreement with Lokri, passed by these vessels without any act of hostility.¹

¹ Thucyd. v. 4. 5

The Leontine exiles at Brikinnia, however, received no benefit from his assurances, and appear soon afterwards to have been completely expelled. Nevertheless, Athens was noway disposed, for a considerable time, to operations in Sicily. A few months after the visit of Phæax to that island, came the Peace of Nikias; the consequences of that peace occupied her whole attention in Peloponnesus, while the ambition of Alkibiades carried her on for three years in intra-Peloponnesian projects and cooperation with Argos against Sparta. It was only in the year 417 B.C., when these projects had proved abortive, that she had leisure to turn her attention elsewhere. During that year, Nikias had contemplated an expedition against Amphipolis in conjunction with Perdikkas, whose desertion frustrated the scheme. The year 416 B.C. was that in which Mélos was besieged and taken.

Meanwhile the Syracusans had cleared and appropriated all the territory of Leontini, which city now existed only in the talk and hopes of its exiles. Of these latter a portion seem to have continued at Athens, pressing their entreaties for aid, which began to obtain some attention about the year 417 B.C., when another incident happened to strengthen their chance of success. A quarrel broke out between the neighboring cities of Selinus (Hellenic) and Egesta (non-Hellenic) in the western corner of Sicily; partly about a piece of land on the river which divided the two territories, partly about some alleged wrong in cases of internuptial connection. The Selinuntines, not satisfied with their own strength, obtained assistance from the Syracusans their allies, and thus reduced Egesta to considerable straits by land as well as by sea.¹ Now the Egestæans had allied themselves with Lachês ten years before, during the first expedition sent by the Athenians to Sicily; upon the strength of which alliance they sent to Athens, to solicit her intervention for their defence, after having in vain applied both to Agrigentum and to Carthage. It may seem singular that Carthage did not at this time readily

¹ Thucyd. vi, 6; Diodor. xii, 82. The statement of Diodorus—that the Egestæans applied not merely to Agrigentum but also to Syracuse—is highly improbable. The war which he mentions as having taken place some years before between Egesta and Lilybæum (xi, 86) in 454 B.C., may probably have been a war between Egesta and Selinus.

embrace the pretext for interference, considering that, ten years afterwards, she interfered with such destructive effect against Selinus. At this time, however, the fear of Athens and her formidable navy appears to have been felt even at Carthage,¹ thus protecting the Sicilian Greeks against the most dangerous of their neighbors.

The Egestæan envoys reached Athens in the spring of 416 B.C., at a time when the Athenians had no immediate project to occupy their thoughts, except the enterprise against Mélos, which could not be either long or doubtful. Though urgent in setting forth the necessities of their position, they at the same time did not appear, like the Leontines, as mere helpless suppliants, addressing themselves to Athenian compassion. They rested their appeal chiefly on grounds of policy. The Syracusans, having already extinguished one ally of Athens (Leontini), were now hard pressing upon a second (Egesta), and would thus successively subdue them all: as soon as this was completed, there would be nothing left in Sicily except an omnipotent Dorian combination, allied to Peloponnesus both by race and descent, and sure to lend effective aid in putting down Athens herself. It was therefore essential for Athens to forestall this coming danger by interfering forthwith to uphold her remaining allies against the encroachments of Syracuse. If she would send a naval expedition adequate to the rescue of Egesta, the Egestæans themselves engaged to provide ample funds for the prosecution of the war.²

Such representations from the envoys, and fears of Syracusan aggrandizement as a source of strength to Peloponnesus, worked along with the prayers of the Leontines in rekindling the appetite of Athens for extending her power in Sicily. The impression made upon the Athenian public, favorable from the first, was wound up to a still higher pitch by renewed discussion. The envoys were repeatedly heard in the public assembly,³ together

¹ Thucyd. vi, 34.

² Thucyd. vi, 6; Diodor. xii, 83.

³ Thucyd. vi, 6. ὡν ἀκούοντες οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἐν ταῖς ἐκκλησίαις τῶν τε Ἐγεσταιῶν πολλὰκις λεγόντων καὶ τῶν ξυναγορευόντων αὐτοῖς ἐψηφίσαντο, &c.

Mr. Mitford takes no notice of all these previous debates, when he imputes to the Athenians hurry and passion in the ultimate decision (ch. xviii, sect. 2, vol. iv, p. 30.)

with those citizens who supported their propositions. At the head of these was Alkibiadēs, who aspired to the command of the intended expedition, tempting alike to his love of glory, of adventure, and of personal gain. But it is plain from these renewed discussions that at first the disposition of the people was by no means decided, much less unanimous, and that a considerable party sustained Nikias in a prudential opposition. Even at last, the resolution adopted was not one of positive consent, but a mean term such as perhaps Nikias himself could not resist. Special envoys were despatched to Egesta, partly to ascertain the means of the town to fulfil its assurance of defraying the costs of war, partly to make investigations on the spot and report upon the general state of affairs.

Perhaps the commissioners despatched were men themselves friendly to the enterprise; nor is it impossible that some of them may have been individually bribed by the Egesteans; at least such a supposition is not forbidden by the average state of Athenian public morality. But the most honest or even suspicious men could hardly be prepared for the deep-laid stratagems put in practice to delude them, on their arrival at Egesta. They were conducted to the rich temple of Aphrodītē on Mount Eryx, where the plate and donatives were exhibited before them; abundant in number, and striking to the eye, yet composed mostly of silver-gilt vessels, which, though falsely passed off as solid gold, were in reality of little pecuniary value. Moreover, the Egestean citizens were profuse in their hospitalities and entertainments both to the commissioners and to the crews of the triremes.¹ They collected together all the gold and silver vessels, dishes, and goblets, of Egesta, which they farther enlarged by borrowing additional ornaments of the same kind from the neighboring cities, Hellenic as well as Carthaginian. At each successive

¹ Thucyd. vi, 46. ἰδίᾳ ξενίσεις ποιοῦμενοι τῶν τριημιτῶν, τὰ τε ἐξ αὐτῆς ἑγέστης ἐκπώματα καὶ χρυσὰ καὶ ἀργυρὰ συλλέξαντες, καὶ τὰ ἐκ τῶν ἑγέστη πόλεων καὶ φοινικιστῶν καὶ Ἑλληνιστῶν αἰτησάμενοι, λαμβάνοντες ἐς τὰς ἐστιάσεις ὡς οἰκεία ἕκαστοι. Καὶ παντὶ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ τοῖς αὐτοῖς χρωμένῳ, καὶ πανταχοῦ πολλὰν φαινομένην, μεγάλην τὴν ἐκπληξιν τοῖς ἐκ τῶν τριημιτῶν Ἀθηναίοις παρίχον, etc.

Such loans of gold and silver plate betoken a remarkable degree of intimacy among the different cities

entertainment, every Egestean host exhibited all this large stock of plate as his own property, the same stock being transferred from house to house for the occasion. A false appearance was thus created of the large number of wealthy men in Egesta; and the Athenian seamen, while their hearts were won by the carresses, saw with amazement this prodigious display of gold and silver, and were thoroughly duped by the fraud.¹ To complete the illusion, by resting it on a basis of reality and prompt payment, sixty talents of uncoined silver were at once produced as ready for the operations of war. With this sum in hand, the Athenian commissioners, after finishing their examination, and the Egestean envoys also, returned to Athens, which they reached in the spring of 415 B.C.,² about three months after the capture of Mēlos.

The Athenian assembly being presently convened to hear their report, the deluded commissioners drew a magnificent picture of the wealth, public and private, which they had actually seen and touched at Egesta, and presented the sixty talents — one month's pay for a fleet of sixty triremes — as a small instalment out of the vast stock remaining behind. While they thus officially certified the capacity of the Egesteans to perform their promise of defraying the cost of the war, the seamen of their trireme, addressing the assembly in their character of citizens, — beyond all suspicion of being bribed, — overflowing with sympathy for the town in which they had just been so cordially welcomed, and full of wonder at the display of wealth which they had witnessed, would probably contribute still more effectually to kindle the sympathies of their countrymen. Accordingly, when the Eges-

¹ Thucyd. vi, 46; Diodor. xii, 83.

² To this winter or spring, perhaps, we may refer the representation of the lost comedy *Τριφυλῆς* of Aristophanēs. Iberians were alluded to in it, to be introduced by Aristarchus; seemingly, Iberian mercenaries, who were among the auxiliaries talked of at this time by Alkibiadēs and the other prominent advisers of the expedition, as a means of conquest in Sicily (Thucyd. vi, 90). The word *Τριφυλῆς* was a nickname (not difficult to understand) applied to Alkibiadēs, who was just now at the height of his importance, and therefore likely enough to be chosen as the butt of a comedy. See the few fragments remaining of the *Τριφυλῆς*, in Meineke, *Fragm. Comic. Gr.* vol. ii, pp. 1162-1167.

æcan envoys again renewed their petitions and representations, confidently appealing to the scrutiny which they had undergone, — when the distress of the suppliant Leontines was again depicted, — the Athenian assembly no longer delayed coming to a final decision. They determined to send forthwith sixty triremes to Sicily, under three generals with full powers, — Nikias, Alkibiadês, and Lamachus; for the purpose, first, of relieving Egesta; next, as soon as that primary object should have been accomplished, of reëstablishing the city of Leontini; lastly, of furthering the views of Athens in Sicily, by any other means which they might find practicable.¹ Such resolution being passed, a fresh assembly was appointed for the fifth day following, to settle the details.

We cannot doubt that this assembly, in which the reports from Egesta were first delivered, was one of unqualified triumph to Alkibiadês and those who had from the first advocated the expedition, as well as of embarrassment and humiliation to Nikias, who had opposed it. He was probably more astonished than any one else at the statements of the commissioners and seamen, because he did not believe in the point which they went to establish. Yet he could not venture to contradict eye-witnesses speaking in evident good faith, and as the assembly went heartily along with them, he labored under great difficulty in repeating his objections to a scheme now so much strengthened in public favor. Accordingly, his speech was probably hesitating and ineffective; the more so, as his opponents, far from wishing to make good any personal triumph against himself, were forward in proposing his name first on the list of generals, in spite of his own declared repugnance.² But when the assembly broke up, he be-

¹ Thucyd. vi. 8; Diodor. xii. 83.

² Thucyd. vi. 8. 'Ο δὲ Νικίας, ἀκούσιος μὲν ᾤοντο ἄρχιν, etc. The reading ἀκούσιος appears better sustained by MSS., and intrinsically more suitable, than ἀκούσας, which latter word probably arose from the correction of some reader who was surprised that Nikias made in the second assembly a speech which properly belonged to the first, and who explained this by supposing that Nikias had not been present at the first assembly. That he was not present, however, is highly improbable. The matter, nevertheless, does require some explanation; and I have endeavored to supply one in the text.

came tearfully impressed with the perilous resolution which it had adopted, and at the same time conscious that he had not done justice to his own case against it. He therefore resolved to avail himself of the next assembly, four days afterwards, for the purpose of reopening the debate, and again denouncing the intended expedition. Properly speaking, the Athenians might have declined to hear him on this subject; indeed, the question which he raised could not be put without illegality: the principle of the measure had been already determined, and it remained only to arrange the details, for which special purpose the coming assembly had been appointed. But he was heard, and with perfect patience; and his harangue, a valuable sample, both of the man and of the time, is set forth at length by Thucydides. I give here the chief points of it, not confining myself to the exact expressions.

"Though we are met to-day, Athenians, to settle the particulars of the expedition already pronounced against Sicily, yet I think we ought to take farther counsel whether it be well to send that expedition at all; nor ought we thus hastily to plunge, at the instance of aliens, into a dangerous war noway belonging to us. To myself personally, indeed, your resolution has offered an honorable appointment, and for my own bodily danger I care as little as any man: yet no considerations of personal dignity have ever before prevented me, nor shall now prevent me, from giving you my honest opinion, however it may clash with your habitual judgments. I tell you, then, that in your desire to go to Sicily, you leave many enemies here behind you, and that you will bring upon yourselves new enemies from thence to help them. Perhaps you fancy that your truce with Sparta is an adequate protection. In name, indeed (though only in name, thanks to the intrigues of parties both here and there), that truce may stand, so long as your power remains unimpaired; but on your first serious reverses, the enemy will eagerly take the opportunity of assailing you. Some of your most powerful enemies have never even accepted the truce; and if you divide your force as you now propose, they will probably set upon you at once along with the Sicilians, whom they would have been too happy to procure as cooperating allies at the beginning of the war. Recollect that your Chalkidian subjects in Thrace are still in revolt,

and have never yet been conquered: other continental subjects, too, are not much to be trusted; and you are going to redress injuries offered to Egesta, before you have yet thought of redressing your own. Now your conquests in Thrace, if you make any, can be maintained; but Sicily is so distant, and the people so powerful, that you will never be able to maintain permanent ascendancy; and it is absurd to undertake an expedition wherein conquest cannot be permanent, while failure will be destructive. The Egestæans alarm you by the prospect of Syracusan aggrandizement. But to me it seems that the Sicilian Greeks, even if they become subjects of Syracuse, will be less dangerous to you than they are at present: for as matters stand now, they might possibly send aid to Peloponnesus, from desire on the part of each to gain the favor of Lacedæmon, but imperial Syracuse would have no motive to endanger her own empire for the purpose of putting down yours. You are now full of confidence, because you have come out of the war better than you at first feared. But do not trust the Spartans: they, the most sensitive of all men to the reputation of superiority, are lying in wait to play you a trick in order to repair their own dishonor: their oligarchical machinations against you demand all your vigilance, and leave you no leisure to think of these foreigners at Egesta. Having just recovered ourselves somewhat from the pressure of disease and war, we ought to reserve this newly-acquired strength for our own purposes, instead of wasting it upon the treacherous assurances of desperate exiles from Sicily."

Nikias then continued, doubtless turning towards Alkibiadēs: "If any man, delighted to be named to the command, though still too young for it, exhorts you to this expedition in his own selfish interests, looking to admiration for his ostentation in chariot-racing, and to profit from his command, as a means of making good his extravagances, do not let such a man gain celebrity for himself at the hazard of the entire city. Be persuaded that such persons are alike unprincipled in regard to the public property and wasteful as to their own, and that this matter is too serious for the rash counsels of youth. I tremble when I see before me this band sitting, by previous concert, close to their leader in the assembly; and I in my turn exhort the elderly men, who are near them, not to be shamed out of their opposition by

the fear of being called cowards. Let them leave to these men the ruinous appetite for what is not within reach, in the conviction that few plans ever succeed from passionate desire; many, from deliberate foresight. Let them vote against the expedition; maintaining undisturbed our present relations with the Sicilian cities, and desiring the Egestæans to close the war against Selinus, as they have begun it, without the aid of Athens.' Nor be

Thucyd. vi, 9-14. Καὶ σὺ, ὦ πρύτανι, ταῦτα, εἰπερ ἦγελ σοι προσήκειν κήδεσθαι τε τῆς πόλεως, καὶ βούλει γενέσθαι πολίτης ἀγαθοῦ, ἐπιψήφισε, καὶ γνώμας προτίθει αὐτοῖς Ἀθηναίοις, νομίσας, εἰ ὁρῶδεῖς τὸ ἀναψηφίσαι, τὸ μὲν λύειν τοὺς νόμους μὴ μετὰ τοσῶνδ' ἂν μαρτύρων αἰτίαν σχεῖν, τῆς δὲ πόλεως κακῶς βουλευσαμένης λατρός ἂν γενέσθαι, etc.

I cannot concur in the remarks of Dr. Arnold, either on this passage or upon the parallel case of the renewed debate in the Athenian assembly, on the subject of the punishment to be inflicted on the Mitylenæans (see above, vol. vi, ch. I, p. 338, and Thucyd. iii, 36). It appears to me that Nikias was here asking the prytanis to do an illegal act, which might well expose him to accusation and punishment. Probably he *would* have been accused on this ground, if the decision of the second assembly had been different from what it actually turned out; if they had reversed the decision of the former assembly, but only by a small majority.

The distinction taken by Dr. Arnold between what was *illegal* and what was merely *irregular*, was little marked at Athens: both were called *illegal*, τοὺς νόμους λύειν. The rules which the Athenian assembly, a sovereign assembly, laid down for its own debates and decisions, were just as much *laws* as those which it passed for the guidance of private citizens. The English House of Commons is not a sovereign assembly, but only a portion of the sovereign power: accordingly, the rules which it lays down for its debates are not *laws*, but orders of the House: a breach of these orders, therefore, in debating any particular subject, would not be illegal, but merely irregular or informal. The same was the case with the French Chamber of Deputies, prior to the revolution of February, 1848: the rules which it laid down for its own proceedings were not laws, but simply *le règlement de la Chambre*. It is remarkable that the present National Assembly now sitting (March, 1849) has retained this expression, and adopted a *règlement* for its own business; though it is in point of fact a sovereign assembly, and the rules which it sanctions are, properly speaking, *laws*.

Both in this case, and in the Mitylenæan debate, I think the Athenian prytanis committed an illegality. In the first case, every one is glad of the illegality, because it proved the salvation of so many Mitylenæan lives. In the second case, the illegality was productive of practical bad consequences, inasmuch as it seems to have brought about the immense extension of the scale upon which the expedition was projected. But there will occur in a few years a third incident, the condemnation of the six generals after the

thou afraid, prytanis (Mr. President), to submit this momentous question again to the decision of the assembly, seeing that breach of the law, in the presence of so many witnesses, cannot expose thee to impeachment, while thou wilt afford opportunity for the correction of a perilous misjudgment."

Such were the principal points in the speech of Nikias on this memorable occasion. It was heard with attention, and probably made some impression, since it completely reopened the entire debate, in spite of the formal illegality. Immediately after he sat down, while his words were yet fresh in the ears of the audience, Alkibiadês rose to reply. The speech just made, bringing the expedition again into question, endangered his dearest hopes both of fame and of pecuniary acquisition; for his dreams went farther than those of any man in Athens; not merely to the conquest of all Sicily, but also to that of Carthage and the Carthaginian empire. Opposed to Nikias, both in personal character and in political tendencies, he had pushed his rivalry to such a degree of bitterness that at one moment a vote of ostracism had been on the point of deciding between them. That vote had indeed been turned aside by joint consent, and discharged upon Hyperbolus; yet the hostile feeling still continued on both sides, and Nikias had just manifested it by a parliamentary attack of the most galling character; all the more galling because it was strictly accurate and well deserved. Provoked as well as alarmed, Alkibiadês started up forthwith, his impatience breaking loose from the formalities of an exordium.

"Athenians, I both have better title than others to the post of commander,—for the taunts of Nikias force me to begin here,—and I count myself fully worthy of it. Those very matters with which he reproaches me are sources not merely of glory to my ancestors and myself, but of positive advantage to my country. For the Greeks, on witnessing my splendid theory at Olympia, were induced to rate the power of Athens even above the reality, having before regarded it as broken down by the war; when I sent into the lists seven chariots, being more than any private individual had ever sent before, winning the first prize, coming

battle of Arginusæ, in which the prodigious importance of a strict observance of forms will appear painfully and conspicuously manifest.

in also second and fourth, and performing all the accessories in a manner suitable to an Olympic victory. Custom attaches honor to such exploits, but the power of the performers is at the same time brought home to the feelings of spectators. My exhibitions at Athens, too, choregic and others, are naturally viewed with jealousy by my rivals here; but in the eyes of strangers they are evidences of power. Such so-called folly is by no means useless, when a man at his own cost serves the city as well as himself. Nor is it unjust, when a man has an exalted opinion of himself, that he should not conduct himself towards others as if he were their equal; for the man in misfortune finds no one to bear a share of it. Just as, when we are in distress, we find no one to speak to us, in like manner let a man lay his account to bear the insolence of the prosperous, or else let him give equal dealing to the low, and then claim to receive it from the high. I know well that such exalted personages, and all who have in any way attained eminence, have been during their lifetime unpopular, chiefly in society with their equals, and to a certain extent with others also; while after their decease, they have left such a reputation as to make people claim kindred with them falsely, and to induce their country to boast of them, not as though they were aliens or wrongdoers, but as her own citizens and as men who did her honor. It is this glory which I desire, and in pursuit of which I incur such reproaches for my private conduct. Yet look at my public conduct, and see whether it will not bear comparison with that of any other citizen. I brought together the most powerful states in Peloponnesus without any serious cost or hazard to you, and made the Lacedæmonians peril their all at Mantinea on the fortune of one day: a peril so great, that, though victorious, they have not even yet regained their steady belief in their own strength."

"Thus did my youth, and my so-called monstrous folly, find suitable words to address the Peloponnesian powers, and earnestness to give them confidence and obtain their coöperation. Be not now, therefore, afraid of this youth of mine: but so long as I possess it in full vigor, and so long as Nikias retains his reputation for good fortune, turn us each to account in our own way."¹

¹ Thucyd. vi, 16, 17

Having thus vindicated himself personally, Alkibiadês went on to deprecate any change of the public resolution already taken. The Sicilian cities, he said, were not so formidable as was represented. Their population was numerous, indeed, but fluctuating turbulent, often on the move, and without local attachment. No man there considered himself as a permanent resident, nor cared to defend the city in which he dwelt; nor were there arms or organization for such a purpose. The native Sikels, detesting Syracuse, would willingly lend their aid to her assailants. As to the Peloponnesians, powerful as they were, they were not more desperate enemies now than they had been in former days: they might invade Attica by land whether the Athenians sailed to Sicily or not; but they could do no mischief by sea, for Athens would still have in reserve a navy sufficient to restrain them. What valid ground was there, therefore, to evade performing obligations which Athens had sworn to her Sicilian allies? To be sure, they could bring no help to Attica in return; but Athens did not want them on her own side of the water; she wanted them in Sicily, to prevent her Sicilian enemies from coming over to attack her. She had originally acquired her empire by a readiness to interfere wherever she was invited; nor would she have made any progress, if she had been backward or prudish in scrutinizing such invitations. She could not now set limits to the extent of her imperial sway; she was under a necessity not merely to retain her present subjects, but to lay snares for new subjects, on pain of falling into dependence herself if she ceased to be imperial. Let her then persist in the resolution adopted, and strike terror into the Peloponnesians by undertaking this great expedition. She would probably conquer all Sicily; at least she would humble Syracuse: in case even of failure, she could always bring back her troops, from her unquestionable superiority at sea. The stationary and inactive policy recommended by Nikias

¹ Thucyd. vi, 17. Καὶ νῦν οὐτε ἀνέλπιστοὶ πῶ μᾶλλον Πελοποννήσιοι ἐς ἡμᾶς ἐγένοντο, εἴτε καὶ πᾶν ἔρρωται, etc.

The construction of ἀνέλπιστοι here is not certain: yet I cannot think that the meaning which Dr. Arnold and others assign to it is the most suitable. It rather seems to mean the same as in vii, 4, and vii, 47: "enemies beyond our hopes of being able to deal with."

was not less at variance with the temper, than with the position, of Athens, and would be ruinous to her if pursued. Her military organization would decline, and her energies would be wasted in internal rub and conflict, instead of that steady activity and acquisition which had become engrafted upon her laws and habits, which could not be now renounced, even if bad in itself, without speedy destruction.¹

Such was substantially the reply of Alkibiadês to Nikias. The debate was now completely reopened, so that several speakers addressed the assembly on both sides; more, however, decidedly in favor of the expedition than against it. The alarmed Eggestians and Leontines renewed their supplications, appealing to the plighted faith of the city: probably also those Athenians who had visited Eggesta, again stood forward to protest against what they would call the ungenerous doubts and insinuations of Nikias. By all these appeals, after considerable debate, the assembly was so powerfully moved, that their determination to send the fleet became more intense than ever; and Nikias, perceiving that farther direct opposition was useless, altered his tactics. He now attempted a manœuvre, designed indirectly to disgust his countrymen with the plan, by enlarging upon its dangers and difficulties, and insisting upon a prodigious force as indispensable to surmount them. Nor was he without hopes that they might be sufficiently disheartened by such prospective hardships, to throw up the scheme altogether. At any rate, if they persisted, he himself as commander would thus be enabled to execute it with completeness and confidence.

Accepting the expedition, therefore, as the pronounced fiat of the people, he reminded them that the cities which they were about to attack, especially Syracuse and Selinus, were powerful, populous, free: well prepared in every way with hoplites, horsemen, light-armed troops, ships of war, plenty of horses to mount their cavalry, and abundant corn at home. At best, Athens could hope for no other allies in Sicily except Naxos and Katana, from their kindred with the Leontines. It was no mere fleet, therefore, which could cope with enemies like these on their own soil. The fleet indeed must be prodigiously great, for the purpose

¹ Thucyd. vi, 16-19.

not merely of maritime combat, but of keeping open communication at sea, and insuring the importation of subsistence. But there must besides be a large force of hoplites, bowmen, and slingers, a large stock of provisions in transports, and, above all, an abundant amount of money: for the funds promised by the Egestæans would be found mere empty delusion. The army must be not simply a match for the enemy's regular hoplites and powerful cavalry, but also independent of foreign aid from the first day of their landing.¹ If not, in case of the least reverse, they would find everywhere nothing but active enemies, without a single friend. "I know (he concluded) that there are many dangers against which we must take precaution, and many more in which we must trust to good fortune, serious as it is for mere men to do so. But I choose to leave as little as possible in the power of fortune, and to have in hand all means of reasonable security at the time when I leave Athens. Looking merely to the interests of the commonwealth, this is the most assured course; while to us who are to form the armament, it is indispensable for preservation. If any man thinks differently, I resign to him the command."²

The effect of this second speech of Nikias on the assembly, coming as it did after a long and contentious debate, was much greater than that which had been produced by his first. But it was an effect totally opposite to that which he himself had anticipated and intended. Far from being discouraged or alienated from the expedition by those impediments which he had studiously magnified, the people only attached themselves to it with yet greater obstinacy. The difficulties which stood in the way of Sicilian conquest served but to endear it to them the more, calling forth increased ardor and eagerness for personal exertion in the cause. The people not only accepted, without hesitation or deduction, the estimate which Nikias had laid before them of

¹ Thucyd vi. 22.

² Thucyd vi. 23. ὅτι ἐγὼ φοβούμενος, καὶ εἰδὼς πολλὰ μὲν ἡμᾶς δεῖν δουλεύσασθαι, ἵτι δὲ πλεῖον ἐπιτυχίαι (χαλεπὸν δὲ ἀνθρώπους δύτασ), ὅτι ἐλαχίστα τῇ τύχῃ παραδοῖς ἑαυτὸν δουλοῦμαι ἐκπλεῖν, παρασκευὴ δὲ ἀπὸ τῶν εἰκωτῶν ἀσφαλὲς ἐκπλεῖν. Ταῦτα γὰρ τῇ τε συμπασίᾳ πόλει βέλτεστατα γίνονται καὶ ἡμῖν τοῖς στρατευομένοις σωτήρια· εἰ δὲ τῷ ἄλλῳ δοκεῖ, παύσῃ αὐτῷ τὴν ἰσχύν.

risk and cost, but warmly extolled his frankness not less than his sagacity, as the only means of making success certain. They were ready to grant without reserve everything which he asked, with an enthusiasm and unanimity such as was rarely seen to reign in an Athenian assembly. In fact, the second speech of Nikias had brought the two dissentient veins of the assembly into a confluence and harmony, all the more welcome because unexpected. While his partisans seconded it as the best way of neutralizing the popular madness, his opponents — Alkibiadês, the Egestæans, and the Leontines — caught at it with acclamation, as realizing more than they had hoped for, and more than they could ever have ventured to propose. If Alkibiadês had demanded an armament on so vast a scale, the people would have turned a deaf ear. But such was their respect for Nikias — on the united grounds of prudence, good fortune, piety, and favor with the gods — that his opposition to their favorite scheme had really made them uneasy; and when he made the same demand, they were delighted to purchase his concurrence by adopting all such conditions as he imposed.¹

It was thus that Nikias, quite contrary to his own purpose, not only imparted to the enterprise a gigantic magnitude which its projectors had never contemplated, but threw into it the whole soul of Athens, and roused a burst of ardor beyond all former example. Every man present, old as well as young, rich and poor, of all classes and professions, was eager to put down his name for personal service. Some were tempted by the love of gain, others by the curiosity of seeing so distant a region, others again by the pride and supposed safety of enlisting in so irresistible an armament. So overpowering was the popular voice in calling for the execution of the scheme, that the small minority who retained their objections were afraid to hold up their hands, for fear of incurring the suspicion of want of patriotism. When the excitement had somewhat subsided, an orator named Demonstratus, coming forward as spokesman of this sentiment, urged Nikias to declare at once, without farther evasion, what force he required from the people. Disappointed as Nikias was, yet being left without any alternative, he sadly responded to the appeal; saying, that he would take farther counsel with

¹ Plutarch. Comnare Nikias and Crassus, c. 3.

his colleagues, but that speaking on his first impression, he thought the triremes required must be not less than one hundred, nor the hoplites less than five thousand, Athenians and allies together. There must farther be a proportional equipment of other forces and accompaniments, especially Kretan bowmen and slingers. Enormous as this requisition was, the vote of the people not only sanctioned it without delay, but even went beyond it. They conferred upon the generals full power to fix both the numbers of the armament and every other matter relating to the expedition, just as they might think best for the interest of Athens.

Pursuant to this momentous resolution, the enrolment and preparation of the forces was immediately begun. Messages were sent to summon sufficient triremes from the nautical allies, as well as to invite hoplites from Argos and Mantinea, and to hire bowmen and slingers elsewhere. For three months, the generals were busily engaged in this proceeding, while the city was in a state of alertness and bustle, fatally interrupted, however, by an incident which I shall recount in the next chapter.

Considering the prodigious consequences which turned on the expedition of Athens against Sicily, it is worth while to bestow a few reflections on the preliminary proceedings of the Athenian people. Those who are accustomed to impute all the misfortunes of Athens to the hurry, passion, and ignorance of democracy, will not find the charge borne out by the facts which we have been just considering. The supplications of Egestæans and Leontines, forwarded to Athens about the spring or summer of 416 B.C., undergo careful and repeated discussion in the public assembly. They at first meet with considerable opposition, but the repeated debates gradually kindle both the sympathies and the ambition of the people. Still, however, no decisive step is taken without more ample and correct information from the spot, and special commissioners are sent to Egesta for the purpose. These men bring back a decisive report, triumphantly certifying all that the Egestæans had promised: nor can we at all wonder that the people never suspected the deep-laid fraud whereby their commissioners had been duped.

Upon the result of that mission to Egesta, the two parties for and against the projected expedition had evidently joined issue and when the commissioners returned, bearing testimony so de-

cisive in favor of the former, the party thus strengthened thought itself warranted in calling for a decision immediately, after all the previous debates. Nevertheless, the measure still had to surmount the renewed and hearty opposition of Nikias, before it became finally ratified. It was this long and frequent debate, with opposition often repeated but always outreasoned, which working gradually deeper and deeper conviction in the minds of the people, brought them all into hearty unanimity to support it, and made them cling to it with that tenacity which the coming chapters will demonstrate. In so far as the expedition was an error, it certainly was not error arising either from hurry, or want of discussion, or want of inquiry. Never in Grecian history was any measure more carefully weighed beforehand, or more deliberately and unanimously resolved.

The position of Nikias in reference to the measure is remarkable. As a dissuasive and warning counsellor, he took a right view of it; but in that capacity he could not carry the people along with him. Yet such was their steady esteem for him personally, and their reluctance to proceed in the enterprise without him, that they eagerly embraced any conditions which he thought proper to impose. And the conditions which he named had the effect of exaggerating the enterprise into such gigantic magnitude as no one in Athens had ever contemplated; thus casting into it so prodigious a proportion of the blood of Athens, that its discomfiture would be equivalent to the ruin of the commonwealth. This was the first mischief occasioned by Nikias, when, after being forced to relinquish his direct opposition, he resorted to the indirect manœuvre of demanding more than he thought the people would be willing to grant. It will be found only the first among a sad series of other mistakes, fatal to his country as well as to himself.

Giving to Nikias, however, for the present, full credit for the wisdom of his dissuasive counsel and his skepticism about the reports from Egesta, we cannot but notice the opposite quality in Alkibiades. His speech is not merely full of overweening insolence, as a manifestation of individual character, but of rash and ruinous instigations in regard to the foreign policy of his country. The arguments whereby he enforces the expedition against Syracuse are indeed more mischievous in the tendency than the ex-

pedition itself, for the failure of which Alkibiades is not to be held responsible. It might have succeeded in its special object, had it been properly conducted; but even if it had succeeded the remark of Nikias is not the less just, that Athens was aiming at an unmeasured breadth of empire, which it would be altogether impossible for her to preserve. When we recollect the true political wisdom with which Periklēs had advised his countrymen to maintain strenuously their existing empire, but by no means to grasp at any new acquisitions while they had powerful enemies in Peloponnesus, we shall appreciate by contrast the feverish system of never-ending aggression inculcated by Alkibiadēs, and the destructive principles which he lays down, that Athens must forever be engaged in new conquests, on pain of forfeiting her existing empire and tearing herself to pieces by internal discord. Even granting the necessity for Athens to employ her military and naval force, as Nikias had truly observed, Amphipolis and the revolted subjects in Thrace were still unsubdued; and the first employment of Athenian force ought to be directed against them, instead of being wasted in distant hazards and treacherous novelties, creating for Athens a position in which she could never permanently maintain herself. The parallel which Alkibiadēs draws, between the enterprising spirit whereby the Athenian empire had been first acquired, and the undefined speculations which he was himself recommending, is altogether fallacious. The Athenian empire took its rise from Athenian enterprise, working in concert with a serious alarm and necessity on the part of all the Grecian cities in or round the Ægean sea. Athens rendered an essential service by keeping off the Persians, and preserving that sea in a better condition than it had ever been in before: her empire had begun by being a voluntary confederacy, and had only passed by degrees into constraint; while the local situation of all her subjects was sufficiently near to be within the reach of her controlling navy. Her new career of aggression in Sicily, was in all these respects different. Nor is it less surprising to find Alkibiadēs asserting that the multiplication of subjects in that distant island, employing a large portion of the Athenian naval force to watch them, would impart new stability to the preëxisting Athenian empire; to read the terms in which he makes light of enemies both in Peloponnesus and in

Sicily, the Sicilian war being a new enterprise hardly less in magnitude and hazard than the Peloponnesian,¹ and to notice the credit which he claims to himself for his operations in Peloponnesus and the battle of Mantinea,² although it had ended in complete failure; restoring the ascendancy of Sparta to the maximum at which it had stood before the events of Sphakteria. There is in fact no speech in Thucydidēs so replete with rash, misguiding, and fallacious counsels, as this harangue of Alkibiadēs.

As a man of action, Alkibiadēs was always brave, vigorous and full of resource; as a politician and adviser, he was especially mischievous to his country, because he addressed himself exactly to their weak point, and exaggerated their sanguine and enterprising temper into a temerity which overlooked all permanent calculation. The Athenians had now contracted the belief that they, as lords of the sea, were entitled to dominion and receipt of tribute from all islands; a belief which they had not only acted upon, but openly professed, in their attack upon Mēlos during the preceding autumn. As Sicily was an island, it seemed to fall naturally under this category of subjects; nor ought we to wonder, amidst the inaccurate geographical data current in that day, that they were ignorant how much larger Sicily was³ than the largest island in the Ægean. Yet they seem to have been aware that it was a prodigious conquest to struggle for; as we may judge from the fact, that the object was one kept back rather than openly avowed, and that they acceded to all the immense preparations demanded by Nikias.⁴ Moreover, we shall see presently, that even the armament which was despatched had conceived nothing beyond vague and hesitating ideas of something great to be achieved in Sicily. But if the Athenian public

¹ Thucyd. vi. 1. οὐ πολλῶν τινι ὑποδεέστερον πόλεμον, etc.: compare vii, 28.

² Compare Plutarch, Præcept. Reipubl. Gerend. p. 804.

³ Thucyd. v. 99, vi. 1-6.

⁴ Thucyd. vi. 6. ἱσχυόμενοι μὲν τῇ ἀληθεστάτῃ προφάσει, τῆς πάσης (Σικελίας), ἀρξέειν, βοηθεῖν δὲ ἅμα εὐπρεπῶς βουλόμενοι τοῖς ἐαυτῶν συγγένεσι καὶ τοῖς προσγεγενημένοις συμμάχοις.

Even in the speech of Alkibiadēs, the conquest of Sicily is only once alluded to, and that indirectly; rather as a favorable possibility, than as a result to be counted upon.

were rash and ignorant, in contemplating the conquest of Sicily, much more extravagant were the views of Alkibiadês, who looked even beyond Sicily to the conquest of Carthage and her empire. Nor was it merely ambition which he desired to gratify; he was not less eager for the immense private gains which would be consequent upon success, in order to supply those deficiencies which his profligate expenditure had occasioned.¹

When we recollect how loudly the charges have been preferred against Kleon, of presumption, of rash policy, and of selfish motive, in reference to Sphakteria, to the prosecution of the war generally, and to Amphipolis; and when we compare these proceedings with the conduct of Alkibiadês as here described, we shall see how much more forcibly such charges attach to the latter than the former. It will be seen before this volume is finished, that the vices of Alkibiadês, and the defects of Nikias, were the cause of far greater ruin to Athens than either Kleon or Hyperbolus, even if we regard the two latter with the eyes of their worst enemies.

¹ Thucyd. vi, 15. Καὶ μάλιστα στρατηγήσαι τε ἐπιθυμῶν καὶ ἐλπίζων Σικελίαν τε δι' αὐτοῦ καὶ Καρχηδόνα λήψεσθαι, καὶ τὰ ἴδια ἅμα εὐτυχίῃσας χρήμασι τε καὶ δόξῃ ὠφελησεῖν. Ὡς γὰρ ἐν ἀξιώματι ὑπὲρ τῶν ἀσπῶν, ταῖς ἐπιθυμίαις μείζουσιν ἢ κατὰ τὴν ὑπάρχουσαν οὐσίαν ἐχρήτο ἐς τε τὰς ἱπποτροφίας καὶ τὰς ἄλλας δαπάνας, etc.

Compare vi, 90. Plutarch (Alkib. c. 19; Nikias, c. 12). Plutarch sometimes speaks as if, not Alkibiadês alone (or at least in conjunction with a few partisans), but the Athenians generally, set out with an expectation of conquering Carthage as well as Sicily. In the speech which Alkibiadês made at Sparta after his banishment (Thucyd. vi, 90), he does indeed state this as the general purpose of the expedition. But it seems plain that he is here describing, to his countrymen generally, plans which were only fermenting in his own brain, as we may discern from a careful perusal of the first twenty chapters of the sixth book of Thucydidês.

In the inaccurate Oratio de Pace ascribed to Andokidês (sect. 30), it is alleged that the Syracusans sent an embassy to Athens, a little before this expedition, entreating to be admitted as allies of the Athenians, and affirming that Syracuse would be a more valuable ally to Athens than Egesta or *Καρχηδών*. This statement is wholly untrue.

CHAPTER LVIII.

FROM THE RESOLUTION OF THE ATHENIANS TO ATTACK SYRACUSE, DOWN TO THE FIRST WINTER AFTER THEIR ARRIVAL IN SICILY.

FOR the two or three months immediately succeeding the final resolution taken by the Athenians to invade Sicily, described in the last chapter, the whole city was elate and bustling with preparation. I have already mentioned that this resolution, though long opposed by Nikias with a considerable minority, had at last been adopted — chiefly through the unforeseen working of that which he intended as a counter-manœuvre — with a degree of enthusiasm and unanimity, and upon an enlarged scale, which surpassed all the anticipations of its promoters. The prophets, circulators of oracles, and other accredited religious advisers, announced generally the favorable dispositions of the gods, and promised a triumphant result.¹ All classes in the city, rich and poor, — cultivators, traders, and seamen, old and young, all embraced the project with ardor; as requiring a great effort, yet promising unparalleled results, both of public aggrandizement and individual gain. Each man was anxious to put down his own name for personal service; so that the three generals, Nikias, Alkibiadês, and Lamachus, when they proceeded to make their selection of hoplites, instead of being forced to employ constraint and incur ill-will, as happened when an expedition was unpopular, had only to choose the fittest among a throng of eager volunteers. Every man provided himself with his best arms and with bodily accoutrements, useful as well as ostentatious, for a long voyage and for the exigencies of a varied land-and-sea-service. Among the trierarchs, or rich citizens, who undertook each in his turn the duty of commanding a ship of war, the competition was yet stronger. Each of them accounted it an honor to be named, and vied with his comrades to exhibit his ship in the most finished state of equipment. The state, indeed,

¹ Thucyd. viii, 1.

furnished both the trireme with its essential tackle and oars, and the regular pay for the crew; but the trierarch, even in ordinary cases, usually incurred various expenses besides, to make the equipment complete and to keep the crew together. Such additional outlay, neither exacted nor defined by law, but only by custom and general opinion, was different in every individual case, according to temper and circumstances. But on the present occasion, zeal and forwardness were universal: each trierarch tried to procure for his own ship the best crew, by offers of additional reward to all, but especially to the *thranitæ* or rowers on the highest of the three tiers:¹ and it seems that the seamen were not appointed specially to one ship, but were at liberty to accept these offers, and to serve in any ship they preferred. Each trierarch spent more than had ever been known before in pay, outfit, provision, and even external decoration of his vessel. Besides the best crews which Athens herself could furnish, picked seamen were also required from subject-allies, and were bid for in the same way by the trierarchs.²

Such efforts were much facilitated by the fact, that five years had now elapsed since the Peace of Nikias, without any considerable warlike operations. While the treasury had become replenished with fresh accumulations,³ and the triremes increased

¹ Thucyd. vi. 31. ἐπιφορίας τε πρὸς τῷ ἐκ δημοσίου μισθῷ δίδοντων τοὺς θρανίταις τῶν ναυίων καὶ ταῖς ὑπηρεσίαις, καὶ τὰλλα σημειῶσι καὶ κατασκευαῖς πολυτέλεισι χρησαμένων, etc.

Dobree and Dr. Arnold explain ὑπηρεσίαις to mean the petty officers, such as κυβερνήτης, κελυστής, etc. Göller and Poppo construe it to mean "the servants of the sailors." Neither of the two seems to me satisfactory. I think the word means "to the crews generally;" the word ὑπηρεσία being a perfectly general word comprising all who received pay in the ship. All the examples produced in the notes of the commentators testify this meaning, which also occurs in the text itself two lines before. To construe ταῖς ὑπηρεσίαις as meaning "the crews generally, or the remaining crews, along with the *thranitæ*," is doubtless more or less awkward. But it departs less from ordinary construction than either of the two senses which the commentators propose.

² Thucyd. vii. 13. οἱ ξένοι, οἳ μὲν ἐναγκαστοὶ ἔσονται, etc.

³ Thucyd. vi. 26. I do not trust the statement given in Æschinés De Fals. Legat. c. 54, p. 302, and in Andokidês De Pace, sect. 8, that seven thousand talents were laid by as an accumulated treasure in the acropolis during the Peace of Nikias, and that four hundred triremes, or three hun-

dred triremes, were newly built. The numerous historical inaccuracies in those orations, concerning the facts prior to 400 B.C., are such as to deprive them of all authority, except where they are confirmed by other testimony; even if we admitted the oration ascribed to Andokidês as genuine, which in all probability it is not.

But there exists an interesting Inscription which proves that the sum of three thousand talents at least must have been laid by, during the interval between the conclusion of the Peace of Nikias and the Sicilian Expedition, in the acropolis; and that over and above this accumulated fund, the state was in condition to discharge, out of the current receipts, various sums which it had borrowed during the previous war from the treasury of various temples, and seems to have had besides a surplus for docks and fortifications. The Inscription above named records the vote passed for discharging these debts, and for securing the sums so paid in the opisthodomus, or back-chamber, of the Parthenon, for account of those gods to whom they respectively belonged. See Boeckh's Corp. Inscr. part ii, Inscr. Att. No. 76, p. 117; also the Staats-haushaltung der Athener of the same author, vol ii, p. 198. This Inscription belongs unquestionably to one of the years between 421-415 B.C., to which year we cannot say.

¹ Thucyd. vi. 31; Diodor. xiii. 2. 3.

and Meton the astronomer, as forming exceptions to this universal tone of sanguine anticipation: the familiar genius which constantly waited upon the philosopher is supposed to have forewarned him of the result. Nor is it impossible that he may have been averse to the expedition, though the fact is less fully certified than we could wish. Amidst a general predominance of the various favorable religious signs and prophecies, there were also some unfavorable. Usually, on all public matters of risk or gravity, there were prophets who gave assurances in opposite ways: those which turned out right were treasured up: the rest were at once forgotten, or never long remembered.¹

After between two and three months of active preparations, the expedition was almost ready to start, when an event happened which fatally poisoned the prevalent cheerfulness of the city. This was the mutilation of the Hermæ, one of the most extraordinary events in all Grecian history.

These Hermæ, or half-statues of the god Hermês, were blocks of marble about the height of the human figure. The upper part was cut into a head, face, neck, and bust; the lower part was left as a quadrangular pillar, broad at the base, without arms, body, or legs, but with the significant mark of the male sex in front. They were distributed in great numbers throughout Athens, and always in the most conspicuous situations; standing beside the outer doors of private houses as well as of temples, near the most frequented porticos, at the intersection of cross ways, in the public agora. They were thus present to the eye of every Athenian in all his acts of intercommunion, either for business or pleasure, with his fellow-citizens. The religious feelings of the Greeks considered the god to be planted or domiciliated where his statue stood,² so that the companionship,

¹ Plutarch (Nikias, c. 12, 13, Alkibiad. c. 17). Immediately after the catastrophe at Syracuse, the Athenians were very angry with those prophets who had promised them success (Thucyd. viii, 1).

² Cicero, Legg. ii, 11. "Melius Græci atque nostri; qui, ut augerent pietatem in Deos, easdem illos urbes, quas nos, *incolere* voluerunt."

How much the Grecian mind was penetrated with the idea of the god as an actual inhabitant of the town, may be seen illustrated in the Oration of Lysias, cont. Andokid. sects. 15-46: compare Herodotus, v, 67; a striking

sympathy, and guardianship of Hermês became associated with most of the manifestations of conjunct life at Athens, — political, social, commercial, or gymnastic. Moreover, the quadrangular fashion of these statues, employed occasionally for other gods besides Hermês, was a most ancient relic handed down from the primitive rudeness of Pelasgian workmanship and was popular in Arcadia as well as peculiarly frequent in Athens.¹

About the end of May, 415 B.C., in the course of one and the same night, all these Hermæ, one of the most peculiar marks of the city, were mutilated by unknown hands. Their characteristic features were knocked off or levelled, so that nothing was left except a mass of stone with no resemblance to humanity or deity. All were thus dealt with in the same way, save and except very few: nay, Andokidês affirms, and I incline to believe him, that there was but *one* which escaped unharmed.²

It is of course impossible for any one to sympathize fully with the feelings of a religion not his own: indeed, the sentiment with

story, as illustrated in this History, vol. iii, ch. ix, p. 34; also Xenophon, Hellen. vi, 4-7; Livy, xxxviii, 43.

In an Inscription in Boeckh's Corp. Insc. (part ii, No. 190, p. 320) a list of the names of Prytaneis, appears, at the head of which list figures the name of Athênê Polias.

¹ Pausanias, i, 24, 3; iv, 33, 4; viii, 31, 4; viii, 48, 4; viii, 41, 4; Plutarch, An Seni sit Gerenda Respubl. ad finem; Aristophan. Plut. 1153, and Schol.: compare O. Müller, Archæologie der Kunst, sect. 67; K. F. Hermann, Gottesdienstl. Alterth. der Griechen, sect. 15; Gerhard, De Religione Hermarum. Berlin. 1845.

² Thucyd. vi, 27. ὅσοι Ἑρμαὶ ἦσαν λίθινοι ἐν τῇ πόλει τῇ Ἀθηναίων. . . . αἱ δὲ νυκτὶ οἱ πλείστοι περιεκόπησαν τὰ πρόσωπα.

Andokidês (De Myst. sect. 63) expressly states that only a single one was spared — καὶ διὰ ταῦτα ὁ Ἑρμῆς ὃν ὄρατε πάντες, ὁ παρὰ τὴν πατρῶαν οἰκίαν τὴν ἡμετέραν, οὐ περιεκόπη, μόνος τῶν Ἑρμῶν τῶν Ἀθηνησιν.

Cornelius Nepos (Alkibiad. c. 3) and Plutarch (Alkib. c. 13) copy Andokidês: in his life of Nikias (c. 18) the latter uses the expression of Thucydides — οἱ πλείστοι. This expression is noway at variance with Andokidês, though it stops short of his affirmation. There is great mixture of truth and falsehood in the Oration of Andokidês; but I think that he is to be trusted as to this point.

Diodorus (xiii, 2) says that *all* the Hermæ were mutilated, not recognizing a single exception. Cornelius Nepos, by a singular inaccuracy, talks about the Hermæ as having been all *thrown down* (dejicerentur).

which, in the case of persons of different creeds, each regards the strong emotions growing out of causes peculiar to the other, is usually one of surprise that such trifles and absurdities can occasion any serious distress or excitement.¹ But if we take that reasonable pains, which is incumbent on those who study the history of Greece, to realize in our minds the religious and political associations of the Athenians,² noted in ancient times for their superior piety, as well as for their accuracy and magnificence about the visible monuments embodying that feeling,—we shall in part comprehend the intensity of mingled dismay, terror, and wrath, which beset the public mind on the morning after this nocturnal sacrilege, alike unforeseen and unparalleled. Amidst all the ruin and impoverishment which had been inflicted by the Persian invasion of Attica, there was nothing which was so profoundly felt or so long remembered as the deliberate burning of the statues and temples of the gods.³ If we could imagine

¹ It is truly astonishing to read the account given of this mutilation of the Hermæ, and its consequences, by Wachsmuth, *Hellen. Alterthümer*, vol. ii, sect. 65, pp. 191–196. While he denounces the Athenian people for their conduct during the subsequent inquiry, in the most unmeasured language, you would suppose that the incident which plunged them into this mental distraction, at a moment of overflowing hope and confidence, was a mere trifle: so briefly does he pass it over, without taking the smallest pains to show in what way it profoundly wounded the religious feeling of Athens.

Büttner (*Geschichte der politischen Hetærien zu Athen*, p. 65), though very brief, takes a fairer view than Wachsmuth.

² Pausanias, i, 17, 1; i, 24, 3; Harpokration v, *Ἑρμαί*. See Sluiter, *Lectiones Andocidæ*, cap. 2.

Especially the *ἀγνιστὶς θεραπείαι* (Eurip. *Ion*, 187) were noted at Athens: ceremonial attentions towards the divine persons who protected the public streets, a function performed by Apollo Agnæus, as well as by Hermes.

³ Herodot. viii, 144; Æschylus, *Pers.* 810. Æschyl. *Agam.* 339. The wrath for any indignity offered to the statue of a god or goddess, and impatience to punish it capitally, is manifested as far back as the ancient epic poem of Arktinus: see the argument of the *Ἰλίου Πέρσεως* in Proclus, and Welcker, *Griechische Tragödien, Sopkoclès*, sect. 21, vol. i, p. 162. Herodotus cannot explain the indignities offered by Kambyzes to the Egyptian statues and holy customs upon any other supposition than that of stark madness, *ἰμάνη μεγάλως*; Herod. iii, 37–38.

Timæus the Sicilian historian (writing about 320–290 B.C.) represented

the excitement of a Spanish or Italian town, on finding that all the images of the Virgin had been defaced during the same night, we should have a parallel, though a very inadequate parallel, to what was now felt at Athens, where religious associations and persons were far more intimately allied with all civil acts and with all the proceedings of every-day life; where, too, the god and his efficiency were more forcibly localized, as well as identified with the presence and keeping of the statue. To the Athenians, when they went forth on the following morning, each man seeing the divine guardian at his doorway dishonored and defaced, and each man gradually coming to know that the devastation was general, it would seem that the town had become as it were godless; that the streets, the market-place, the porticos, were robbed of their divine protectors; and what was worse still, that these protectors, having been grossly insulted, carried away with them alienated sentiments, wrathful and vindictive instead of tutelary and sympathizing. It was on the protection of the gods, that all their political constitution as well as the blessings of civil life depended; insomuch that the curses of the gods were habitually invoked as sanction and punishment for grave offences, political as well as others: an extension and generalization of the feeling still attached to the judicial oath. This was, in the minds of the people of Athens, a sincere and literal conviction, not simply a form of speech to be pronounced in prayers and public harangues, without being ever construed as a reality in calculating consequences and determining practical measures.

the subsequent defeat of the Athenians as a divine punishment for the desecration of the Hermæ, inflicted chiefly by the Syracusan Hermokratês, son of Hermon and descendant of the god Hermes (Timæi *Fragm.* 103–104. ed. Didot; Longinus, *de Sublim.* iv, 3).

The etymological thread of connection, between the Hermæ and Hermokratês, is strange enough: but what is of importance to remark, is the deep-seated belief that such an act must bring after it divine punishment, and that the Athenians as a people were collectively responsible, unless they could appease the divine displeasure. If this was the view taken by the historian Timæus a century and more after the transaction, much more keenly was it present to the minds of the Athenians of that day.

¹ Thucyd. viii, 97; Plato, *Legg.* ix, pp. 871 b, 881 d. *ἡ τοῦ νόμου ἄρα*, etc. Demosthen. *Fals. Legat.* p. 363, c. 24, p. 404, c. 60; Plutarch, *Solon*, c. 24.

Accordingly, they drew from the mutilation of the Hermæ the inference, not less natural than terrifying, that heavy public misfortune was impending over the city, and that the political constitution to which they were attached was in imminent danger of being subverted.¹

Such was the mysterious incident which broke in upon the eager and bustling movement of Athens, a few days before the Sicilian expedition was in condition for starting. In reference to that expedition it was taken to heart as a most depressing omen.² It would doubtless have been so determined, had it been a mere undesigned accident happening to any venerated religious object, just as we are told that similar misgivings were occasioned by the occurrence, about this same time, of the melancholy festival of the Adonia, wherein the women loudly bewailed the untimely death of Adonis.³ The mutilation of the Hermæ, however, was something much more ominous than the worst accident. It proclaimed itself as the deliberate act of organized conspirators, not inconsiderable in number, whose names and final purpose were

¹ Dr. Thirlwall observes, in reference to the feeling at Athens after the mutilation of the Hermæ:—

"We indeed see so little connection between acts of daring impiety and designs against the state, that we can hardly understand how they could have been associated together as they were in the minds of the Athenians. But perhaps the difficulty may not without reason have appeared much less to the contemporaries of Alcibiadēs, who were rather disposed by their views of religion to regard them as inseparable." (Hist. Gr. ch. xxv, vol. iii, p. 394.)

This remark, like so many others in Dr. Thirlwall's history, indicates a tone of liberality forming a striking contrast with Wachsmuth; and rare indeed among the learned men who have undertaken to depict the democracy of Athens. It might, however, have been stated far more strongly; for an Athenian citizen would have had quite as much difficulty in comprehending our *disjunction* of the two ideas, as we have in comprehending his *association* of the two.

² Thucyd. vi, 27. Καὶ τὸ πρᾶγμα μείζονος ἐλάμβανον· τοῦ τε γὰρ ἐκπλοῦ οἰωνὸς ἐδόκει εἶναι, καὶ ἐπὶ συνωμοσίᾳ ἅμα νεωτέρων πραγμάτων καὶ δήμοι καταλύσεως γεγενῆσθαι.

Cornelius Nepos, Alcibiad. c. 3. "Hoc quum appareret non sine magni multorum consensione esse factam," etc.

³ Plutarch, Alcibiad. c. 18; Pherekratēs, Fr. Inc. 84, ed. Meintke; Fragment. Comic. Græc. vol. ii, p. 358, also p. 1164; Aristoph. Frag. Inc. 120.

indeed unknown, but who had begun by committing sacrilege of a character flagrant and unheard of. For intentional mutilation of a public and sacred statue, where the material afforded no temptation to plunder, is a case to which we know no parallel: much more mutilation by wholesale, spread by one band and in one night throughout an entire city. Though neither the parties concerned, nor their purposes, were ever more than partially made out, the concert and conspiracy itself is unquestionable.

It seems probable, as far as we can form an opinion, that the conspirators had two objects, perhaps some of them one and some the other: to ruin Alcibiadēs, to frustrate or delay the expedition. How they pursued the former purpose, will be presently seen: towards the latter, nothing was ostensibly done, but the position of Teukrus, and other metics implicated, renders it more likely that they were influenced by sympathies with Corinth and Megara,¹ prompting them to intercept an expedition which was supposed to promise great triumphs to Athens, rather than corrupted by the violent antipathies of intestine politics. Indeed, the two objects were intimately connected with each other; for the prosecution of the enterprise, while full of prospective conquest to Athens, was yet more pregnant with future power and wealth to Alcibiadēs himself. Such chances would disappear if the expedition could be prevented; nor was it at all impossible that the Athenians, under the intense impression of religious terror consequent on the mutilation of the Hermæ, might throw up the scheme altogether. Especially Nikias, exquisitely sensitive in his own

¹ Plutarch, Alkib. c. 18; Pseudo-Plutarch, Vit. X, Orator. p. 834, who professes to quote from Kratippus, an author nearly contemporary. The Pseudo-Plutarch, however, asserts, what cannot be true, that the Corinthians employed Leontine and Egestæan agents to destroy the Hermæ. The Leontines and Egestæans were exactly the parties who had greatest interest in getting the Sicilian expedition to start: they are the last persons whom the Corinthians would have chosen as instruments. The fact is, that no foreigners could well have done the deed: it required great familiarity with all the buildings, highways, and byways of Athens.

The Athenian Philochorus (writing about the date 310-280 B.C.) ascribed the mutilation of the Hermæ to the Corinthians; if we may believe the scholiast on Aristophanēs; who, however, is not very careful, since he tells us that Thucydides ascribed that act to Alcibiadēs and his friends: which is not true (Philochor. Frag. 110, ed. Didot, Schol. Aristoph. Lysistr. 1094).

religious conscience, and never hearty in his wish for going, a fact perfectly known to the enemy,¹ would hasten to consult his prophets, and might reasonably be expected to renew his opposition on the fresh ground offered to him, or at least to claim delay until the offended gods should have been appeased. We may judge how much such a proceeding was in the line of his character, and of the Athenian character, when we find him, two years afterwards, with the full concurrence of his soldiers, actually sacrificing the last opportunity of safe retreat for the half-ruined Athenian army in Sicily, and refusing even to allow the proposition to be debated, in consequence of an eclipse of the moon; and when we reflect that Spartans and other Greeks frequently renounced public designs if an earthquake happened before the execution.²

But though the chance of setting aside the expedition altogether might reasonably enter into the plans of the conspirators, as a likely consequence of the intense shock inflicted on the religious mind of Athens, and especially of Nikias, this calculation was not realized. Probably matters had already proceeded too far even for Nikias to recede. Notice had been sent round to all the allies; forces were already on their way to the rendezvous at Korkyra; the Argeian and Mantineian allies were arriving at Peiraus to embark. So much the more eagerly did the conspirators proceed in the other part of their plan, to work that exaggerated religious terror, which they had themselves artificially brought about, for the ruin of Alkibiadēs.

Few men in Athens either had or deserved to have a greater number of enemies, political as well as private, than Alkibiades; many of them being among the highest citizens, whom he offended by his insolence, and whose liturgies and other customary exhibitions he outshone by his reckless expenditure. His importance had been already so much increased, and threatened to be so much more increased, by the Sicilian enterprise, that they no longer observed any measures in compassing his ruin. That which the mutilators of the Hermæ seem to have deliberately planned, his other enemies were ready to turn to profit.

¹ Thucyd. vi, 34.

² See Thucyd. v, 45 = 50; viii, 5. Xenophon, Hellen. iv, 7, 4.

Amidst the mournful dismay spread by the discovery of so unparalleled a sacrilege, it appeared to the Athenian people, — as it would have appeared to the ephors at Sparta, or to the rulers in every oligarchical city of Greece, — that it was their paramount and imperative duty to detect and punish the authors. So long as these latter were walking about unknown and unpunished, the temples were defiled by their presence, and the whole city was accounted under the displeasure of the gods, who would inflict upon it heavy public misfortunes.¹ Under this displeasure every citizen felt himself comprehended, so that the sense of public security as well as of private comfort were alike unappeased, until the offenders should be discovered and atonement made by punishing or expelling them. Large rewards were accordingly proclaimed to any person who could give information, and even impunity to any accomplice whose confession might lay open the plot. Nor did the matter stop here. Once under this painful shock of religious and political terror, the Athenians became eager talkers and listeners on the subject of other recent acts of impiety. Every one was impatient to tell all that he knew, and more than he knew, about such incidents; while to exercise any strict criticism upon the truth of such reports, would argue weakness of faith and want of religious zeal, rendering the critic himself a suspected man, “*metuunt dubitasse videri*.” To

¹ See the remarkable passage in the contemporary pleading of Antiphon on a trial for homicide (Orat. ii, Tetralog. l. 1, 10).

² Ἀσπιφορον θ' ἱμῖν ἐστὶ τοῦδε μισθὸν καὶ ἀναγνον ὄντα εἰς τὰ τεμένη των θεῶν εἰσόντα μαινεῖν τὴν ἀγνείαν αὐτῶν ἐπὶ τε τὰς ἀβρὰς τραπέζας ἰόντα συγκαταπιμπλάναι τοὺς ἀναιτίους ἐκ γὰρ τούτων αἱ τε ἀφοροὶ γίνονται δυστυχεῖς θ' αἱ πράξεις καθίστανται. Οἰκείαν οὖν χρὴ τὴν τιμωρίαν ἡγησαμένους, αὐτῶ τούτῳ τὰ τούτου ἀσιδήματα ἀναθύντας, ἰδίαν μὲν τὴν συμφορὰν καθάπερ δὲ τὴν πόλιν καταστήσαι.

Compare Antiphon, De Cæde Herodis, sect. 83 and Sophoklēs, Œdip. Tyrann. 26, 96, 170, as to the miseries which befell a country, so long as the person guilty of homicide remained to pollute the soil, and until he was slain or expelled. See also Xenophon, Hiero, iv, 4, and Plato, Legg. x, p. 885-910, at the beginning and the end of the tenth book. Plato ranks (ἱερὴς) outrage against sacred objects as the highest and most guilty species of ἱερὴς, deserving the severest punishment. He considers that the person committing such impiety, unless he be punished or banished, brings evil and the anger of the gods upon the whole population.

take out and rigorously visit all such offenders, and thus to display an earnest zeal for the honor of the gods, was accounted one auxiliary means of obtaining absolution from them for the recent outrage. Hence an additional public vote was passed, promising rewards and inviting information from all witnesses, — citizens, metics, or even slaves, — respecting any previous acts of impiety which might have come within their cognizance,¹ but at the same time providing that informers who gave false depositions should be punished capitally.²

The Senate of Five Hundred were invested with full powers of action; while Diognētus, Peisander, Chariklēs, and others, were named commissioners for receiving and prosecuting inquiries, and public assemblies were held nearly every day to receive reports.³ The first informations received, however, did not relate to the grave and recent mutilation of the Hermæ, but to analogous incidents of older date; to certain defacements of other statues, accomplished in drunken frolic; and above all, to ludicrous ceremonies celebrated in various houses,⁴ by parties of revellers

¹ Thucyd. vi, 27.

² Andokidēs de Mysteriis, sect. 20.

³ Andokidēs de Mysteriis, sects. 14, 15, 36; Plutarch, Alkibiad. c. 18.

⁴ Those who are disposed to imagine that the violent feelings and proceedings at Athens by the mutilation of the Hermæ were the consequence of her democratical government, may be reminded of an analogous event of modern times from which we are not yet separated by a century.

In the year 1766, at Abbeville in France, two young gentlemen of good family — the Chevalier d'Etallonde and Chevalier de la Barre — were tried, convicted, and condemned for having injured a wooden crucifix which stood on the bridge of that town: in aggravation of this offence they were charged with having sung indecent songs. The evidence to prove these points was exceedingly doubtful; nevertheless, both were condemned to have their tongues cut out by the roots, to have their right hands cut off at the church gate, then to be tied to a post in the market-place with an iron chain, and burnt by a slow fire. This sentence, after being submitted by way of appeal to the Parliament of Paris, and by them confirmed, was actually executed upon the Chevalier de la Barre — d'Etallonde having escaped — in July, 1766; with this mitigation, that he was allowed to be decapitated before he was burnt; but at the same time with this aggravation, that he was put to the torture, ordinary and extraordinary, to compel him to disclose his accomplices (Voltaire, Relation de la Mort du Chevalier de la Barre, Œuvres, vol. xlii, pp. 361–379, ed. Beuchot: also Voltaire, Le Cri du Sang Innocent, vol. xii, p. 133).

caricaturing and divulging the Eleusinian mysteries. It was under this latter head that the first impeachment was preferred against Alkibiadēs.

So fully were the preparations of the armament now complete, that the trireme of Lamachus — who was doubtless more diligent about the military details than either of his two colleagues — was already moored in the outer harbor, and the last public assembly was held for the departing officers,¹ who probably laid before their countrymen an imposing account of the force assembled, when Pythonikus rose to impeach Alkibiadēs. "Athenians," said he, "you are going to despatch this great force and incur all this hazard, at a moment when I am pre-

I extract from this treatise a passage showing how — as in this mutilation of the Hermæ at Athens — the occurrence of one act of sacrilege turns men's imagination, belief, and talk, to others, real or imaginary: —

"Tandis que Belleval ourdissoit secrètement cette trame, il arriva malheureusement que le crucifix de bois, posé sur le pont d'Abbeville, étoit endommagé, et l'on soupçonna que des soldats ivres avoient commis cette insolence impie.

"Malheureusement l'évêque d'Amiens, étant aussi évêque d'Abbeville, donna à cette aventure une célébrité et une importance qu'elle ne méritoit pas. Il fit lancer des monitoires: il vint faire une procession solennelle auprès du crucifix; et on ne parla en Abbeville que de sacrilèges pendant une année entière. On disoit qu'il se formoit une nouvelle secte qui brisoit les crucifix, qui jettoit par terre toutes les hosties, et les perçoit à coups de couteaux. On assuroit qu'ils avoient répandu beaucoup de sang. Il y eut des femmes qui crurent en avoir été témoins. On renouvela tous les contes calomnieux répandues contre les Juifs dans tant de villes de l'Europe. Vous connoissez, Monsieur, jusqu'à quel point la populace porte la crédulité et le fanatisme, toujours encouragé par les moines.

"La procédure une fois commencée, il y eut une foule de délations. Chacun disoit ce qu'il avoit vu ou cru voir — ce qu'il avoit entendu ou cru entendre."

It will be recollected that the sentence on the Chevalier de la Barre was passed, not by the people, nor by any popular judicature, but by a limited court of professional judges sitting at Abbeville, and afterwards confirmed by the Parlement de Paris, the first tribunal of professional judges in France.

¹ Andokidēs (De Myster. s. 11) marks this time minutely — Ἦν μὲν γὰρ ἐκκλησία τοῖς στρατηγοῖς τοῖς εἰς Σικελίαν, Νικίᾳ καὶ Λαμάρχῳ καὶ Ἀλκιβιάδῃ, καὶ τριῶν ἡ στοατῆγῃς ἡδὴ ἐξώρμει ἡ Λαμαχῶν· ἀναστὰς δὲ Πυθόνικος ἐν τῇ ἡμῶν εἶπεν, etc.

pared to show you that your general Alkibiadês is one of the profaners of the holy mysteries, in a private house. Pass a vote of impunity, and I will produce to you forthwith a slave of one here present, who, though himself not initiated in the mysteries, shall repeat to you what they are. Deal with me in any way you choose, if my statement prove untrue." While Alkibiadês strenuously denied the allegation, the prytanes — senators presiding over the assembly, according to the order determined by lot for that year among the ten tribes — at once made proclamation for all uninitiated citizens to depart from the assembly, and went to fetch the slave — Andromachus by name — whom Pythonikus had indicated. On being introduced, Andromachus deposed before the assembly that he had been with his master in the house of Polytion, when Alkibiadês, Nikiadês, and Melêtus, went through the sham celebration of the mysteries; many other persons being present, and especially three other slaves besides himself. We must presume that he verified this affirmation by describing what the mysteries were which he had seen, the test which Pythonikus had offered.¹

Such was the first direct attack made upon Alkibiadês by his enemies. Pythonikus, the demagogue Androklês, and other speakers, having put in evidence this irreverent proceeding, — probably in substance true, — enlarged upon it with the strongest invective, imputed to him many other acts of the like character, and even denounced him as cognizant of the recent mutilation of the Hermæ. All had been done, they said, with a view to accomplish his purpose of subverting the democracy, when bereft of its divine protectors; a purpose manifested by the constant tenor of his lawless, overbearing, antipopular demeanor. Infamous as this calumny was, so far as regarded the mutilation of the Hermæ, — for whatever else Alkibiadês may have done, of that act he was unquestionably innocent, being the very person who had most to lose by it, and whom it ultimately ruined, — they calculated upon the reigning excitement to get it accredited, and probably to procure his deposition from the command, preparatory to public trial. But in spite of all the disquietude arising from the recent sacrilege, their expectations were de-

¹ Andokid. de Myster. s. 13.

feated. The strenuous denial of Alkibiadês, aided by his very peculiar position as commander of the armament, as well as by the reflection that the recent outrage tended rather to spoil his favorite projects in Sicily, found general credence. The citizens enrolled to serve, manifested strong disposition to stand by him; the allies from Argos and Mantinea were known to have embraced the service chiefly at his instigation; the people generally had become familiar with him as the intended conqueror in Sicily, and were loth to be balked of this project. From all these circumstances, his enemies, finding little disposition to welcome the accusations which they preferred, were compelled to postpone them until a more suitable time.¹

But Alkibiadês saw full well the danger of having such charges hanging over his head, and the peculiar advantage which he derived from his accidental position at the moment. He implored the people to investigate the charges at once; proclaiming his anxiety to stand trial and even to suffer death, if found guilty, — accepting the command only in case he should be acquitted, — and insisting above all things on the mischief to the city, of sending him on such an expedition with the charge undecided, as well as on the hardship to himself, of being aspersed by calumny during his absence, without power of defence. Such appeals, just and reasonable in themselves, and urged with all the vehemence of a man who felt that the question was one of life or death to his future prospects, were very near prevailing. His enemies could only defeat them by the trick of putting up fresh speakers, less notorious for hostility to Alkibiadês. These men affected a tone of candor, deprecated the delay which would be occasioned in the departure of the expedition, if he were put upon his trial forthwith, and proposed deferring the trial until certain number of days after his return.² Such was the determi-

¹ Thucyd. vi. 29. Isokratês (Orat. xvi. De Bigis, sects. 7, 8) represents these proceedings before the departure for Sicily, in a very inaccurate manner.

² Thucyd. vi. 29. Οἱ δ' ἐχθροὶ, δεδιότες τὸ τε στράτευμα, μὴ ἐβνουν ἔχειν, ἢν ἡδὴ ἀγωνίζηται, δὲ τε δῆμος μὴ μαλακίζηται, θεραπεύων δτι δι' ἐκείνον οἱ Ἰσθμιοὶ ξυνεστράτευον καὶ τῶν Μαντινέων τινες, ἀπετρεπον καὶ ἀπέσπευδον ἄλλους ῥήτορας ἐνείεντες, οἱ ἐλεγον νῦν μὲν πλεῖν αὐτὸν καὶ μὴ καταστῆναι τὴν ἀγωγὴν, ἐλθόντα δὲ κρίνεσθαι ἐν ἡμέραις ὀκταίς βουλευόμενοι ἑα

nation ultimately adopted; the supporters of Alkibiadês probably not fully appreciating its consequences, and conceiving that the speedy departure of the expedition was advisable even for his interest, as well as agreeable to their own feelings. And thus his enemies, though baffled in their first attempt to bring on his immediate ruin, carried a postponement which insured to them leisure for thoroughly poisoning the public mind against him, and choosing their own time for his trial. They took care to keep back all farther accusation until he and the armament had departed.¹

αἰζῶνος διαβολῆς, ἣν ἐμελλον ῥῆον αὐτοῦ ἀπόντος ποιεῖν, μετὰπεμπτον κομισθέντα αὐτὸν ἀγωνίσασθαι.

Compare Plutarch, Alkib. c. 19.

The account which Andokidês gives of the first accusation against Alkibiadês by Pythonikus, in the assembly, prior to the departure of the fleet, presents the appearance of being substantially correct, and I have followed it in the text. It is in harmony with the more brief indications of Thucydidês. But when Andokidês goes on to say, that "in consequence of this information, Polystratus was seized and put to death, while the rest of the parties denounced fled, and were condemned to death in their absence," (sect. 13,) this cannot be true. Alkibiadês most certainly did not flee, and was not condemned at that time. If Alkibiadês was not then tried, neither could the other persons have been tried, who were denounced as his accomplices in the same offence. My belief is that this information, having been first presented by the enemies of Alkibiadês before the sailing of the fleet, was dropped entirely for that time, both against him and against his accomplices. It was afterwards resumed, when the information of Andokidês himself had satisfied the Athenians on the question of the Hermokopids: and the impeachment presented by Thessalus son of Kimon against Alkibiadês, was founded, in part at least, upon the information presented by Andromachus.

If Polystratus was put to death at all, it could only have been on this second bringing forward of the charge, at the time when Alkibiadês was sent for and refused to come home. But we may well doubt whether he was put to death at that time or on that ground, when we see how inaccurate the statement of Andokidês is as to the consequences of the information of Andromachus. He mentions Panætius as one of those who fled in consequence of that information, and were condemned in their absence: but Panætius appears afterwards, in the very same speech, as not having fled at that time (sects. 13, 52, 67). Harpokration states (v. Πολύστρατος), on the authority of an oration ascribed to Lysias, that Polystratus was put to death on the charge of having been concerned in the mutilation of the Herma. This is quite different from the statement of Andokidês, and would

The spectacle of its departure was indeed so imposing, and the moment so full of anxious interest, that it banished even the recollection of the recent sacrilege. The entire armament was not mustered at Athens; for it had been judged expedient to order most of the allied contingents to rendezvous at once at Korkyra. But the Athenian force alone was astounding to behold. There were one hundred triremes, sixty of which were in full trim for rapid nautical movement, while the remaining forty were employed as transports for the soldiers. There were fifteen hundred select citizen hoplites, chosen from the general muster-roll, and seven hundred Thêtes, or citizens too poor to be included in the muster-roll, who served as hoplites on shipboard, — epibatæ, or marines, — each with a panoply furnished by the state. To these must be added, five hundred Argeian and two hundred and fifty Mantineian hoplites, paid by Athens and transported on board Athenian ships.¹ The number of horsemen was so small, that all were conveyed in a single horse transport. But the condition, the equipment, the pomp both of wealth and force, visible in the armament, was still more impressive than the number. At daybreak on the day appointed, when all the ships were ready in Peiræus, for departure, the military force was marched down in a body from the city and embarked. They were accompanied by nearly the whole population, metics and foreigners as well as citizens, so that the appearance was that of a collective emigration, like the flight to Salamis sixty-five years before. While the crowd of foreigners, brought thither by curiosity, were amazed by the grandeur of the spectacle, the citizens accompanying were moved by deeper and more stirring anxieties. Their sons, brothers, relatives, and friends, were just starting on the longest and largest enterprise which Athens had ever undertaken; against an island extensive as well as powerful, known to none of them accurately, and into a sea of undefined possibilities; glory and profit on the one side, but hazards of unassignable magnitude on the other. At this final parting, ideas of doubt and danger became far more painfully present than they had been in any of the preliminary

lead us to suppose that Polystratus was one of those against whom Andokidês himself informed.

¹ Thucyd. vi, 43; vii, 57.

discussions; and in spite of all the reassuring effect of the unrivalled armament before them, the relatives now separating at the water's edge could not banish the dark presentiment that they were bidding each other farewell for the last time.

The moment immediately succeeding this farewell — when all the soldiers were already on board, and the keleustês was on the point of beginning his chant to put the rowers in motion — was peculiarly solemn and touching. Silence having been enjoined and obtained by sound of trumpet, both the crews in every ship and the spectators on shore followed the voice of the herald in praying to the gods for success, and in singing the paean. On every deck were seen bowls of wine prepared, out of which the officers and the epibatæ made libations, with goblets of silver and gold. At length the final signal was given, and the whole fleet quitted Peiræus in single file, displaying the exuberance of their yet untried force by a race of speed as far as Ægina.¹ Never in Grecian history was an invocation more unanimous, emphatic, and imposing, addressed to the gods; never was the refusing nod of Zeus more stern or peremptory. All these details, given by Thucydides, of the triumphant promise which now issued from Peiræus, derive a painful interest from their contrast with the sad issue which will hereafter be unfolded.

The fleet made straight for Korkyra, where the contingents of the maritime allies, with the ships for burden and provisions, were found assembled. The armament thus complete was passed in review, and found to comprise one hundred and thirty-four triremes with two Rhodian pentekonteres; five thousand one hundred hoplites; four hundred and eighty bowmen, eighty of them Kretan; seven hundred Rhodian slingers; and one hundred and twenty Megarian exiles serving as light troops. Of vessels of burden, in attendance with provisions, muniments of war, bakers, masons, and carpenters, etc., the number was not less than five hundred; besides which, there was a considerable number of private trading-ships, following it voluntarily for purposes of profit.² Three fast-sailing triremes were despatched in advance to ascertain which of the cities in Italy and Sicily would welcome the arrival of the armament; and especially to give notice at Egesta,

¹ Thucyd. vi, 32 Diodor. xiii, 3

² Thucyd. vi, 44

that the succor solicited was now on its way, requiring at the same time that the money promised by the Egestæans should be produced. Having then distributed by lot the armament into three divisions, one under each of the generals, Nikias, Alkibiadês, and Lamachus, they crossed the Ionic gulf from Korkyra to the Iapygian promontory.

In their progress southward along the coast of Italy to Rhegium, they met with a very cold reception from the various Grecian cities. None would receive them within their walls or even sell them provisions without. The utmost which they would grant was, the liberty of taking moorings and of watering; and even thus much was denied to them both at Tarentum and at the Epizephyrian Lokri. At Rhegium, immediately on the Sicilian strait, though the town-gate was still kept shut, they were so far more hospitably treated, that a market of provisions was furnished to them, and they were allowed to encamp in the sacred precinct of Artemis, not far from the walls. They here hauled their ships ashore and took repose until the return of the three scout-ships from Egesta; while the generals entered into negotiation with the magistrates and people of Rhegium, endeavoring to induce them to aid the armament in reëstablishing the dispossessed Leontines, who were of common Chalkidian origin with themselves. But the answer returned was discouraging. The Rhegines would promise nothing more than neutrality, and coöperation in any course of policy which it might suit the other Italian Greeks to adopt. Probably they, as well as the other Italian Greeks, were astonished and intimidated by the magnitude of the newly-arrived force, and desired to leave themselves open latitude of conduct for the future, not without mistrust of Athens and her affected forwardness for the restoration of the Leontines. To the Athenian generals, however, such a negative from Rhegium was an unwelcome disappointment; for that city had been the ally of Athens in the last war, and they had calculated on the operation of Chalkidic sympathies.¹

It was not until after the muster of the Athenians at Korkyra, about July 415 B.C., that the Syracusans became thoroughly convinced both of their approach, and of the extent of their designs.

¹ Thucyd. vi, 44-46.

against Sicily. Intimation had indeed reached Syracuse, from several quarters, of the resolution taken by the Athenians in the preceding March to assist Egesta and Leontini, and of the preparations going on in consequence. There was, however, a prevailing indisposition to credit such tidings. Nothing in the state of Sicily held out any encouragement to Athenian ambition: the Leontines could give no aid, the Egestæans very little, and that little at the opposite corner of the island; while the Syracusans considered themselves fully able to cope with any force which Athens was likely to send. Some derided the intelligence as mere idle rumor; others anticipated, at most, nothing more serious than the expedition sent from Athens ten years before.¹ No one could imagine the new eagerness and obstinacy with which she had just thrown herself into the scheme of Sicilian conquest, nor the formidable armament presently about to start. Nevertheless, the Syracusan generals thought it their duty to make preparations, and strengthen the military condition of the state.²

Hermokratês, however, whose information was more complete, judged these preparations insufficient, and took advantage of a public assembly — held seemingly about the time that the Athenians were starting from Peiræus — to impress such conviction on his countrymen, as well as to correct their incredulity. He pledged his own credit that the reports which had been circulated were not merely true, but even less than the full truth; that the Athenians were actually on their way, with an armament on the largest scale, and vast designs of conquering all Sicily. While he strenuously urged that the city should be put in immediate

¹ Thucyd. vi. 32-35. Mr. Mitford observes: "It is not specified by historians, but the account of Thucydides makes it evident, that there had been a revolution in the government of Syracuse, or at least a great change in its administration, since the oligarchical Leontines were admitted to the rights of Syracusan citizens (ch. xviii, sect. iii, vol. iv, p. 46). The democratical party now bore the sway," etc.

I cannot imagine upon what passage of Thucydides Mr. Mitford founds this conjecture, which appears to me pure fancy. He had spoken of the government as a democracy before, he continues to speak of it as a democracy now, in the same unaltered vituperative strain.

² Thucyd. vi. 41. *τα δὲ καὶ ἐπιμετλημένα ἦδη, etc.*

condition for repelling a most formidable invasion, he deprecated all alarm as to the result, and held out the firmest assurances of ultimate triumph. The very magnitude of the approaching force would intimidate the Sicilian cities and drive them into hearty defensive coöperation with Syracuse. Rarely indeed did any large or distant expedition ever succeed in its object, as might be seen from the failure of the Persians against Greece, by which failure Athens herself had so largely profited. Preparations, however, both effective and immediate, were indispensable; not merely at home, but by means of foreign missions, to the Sicilian and Italian Greeks, to the Sikels, and to the Carthaginians, who had for some time been suspicious of the unmeasured aggressive designs of Athens, and whose immense wealth would now be especially serviceable, and to Lacedæmon and Corinth, for the purpose of soliciting aid in Sicily, as well as renewed invasion of Attica. So confident did he (Hermokratês) feel of their powers of defence, if properly organized, that he would even advise the Syracusans with their Sicilian allies to put to sea at once, with all their naval force and two months' provisions, and to sail forthwith to the friendly harbor of Tarentum, from whence they would be able to meet the Athenian fleet and prevent it even from crossing the Ionic gulf from Korkyra. They would thus show that they were not only determined on defence, but even forward in coming to blows: the only way of taking down the presumption of the Athenians, who now speculated upon Syracusan lukewarmness, because they had rendered no aid to Sparta when she solicited it at the beginning of the war. The Syracusans would probably be able to

¹ Thucyd. vi. 34. *Ὁ δὲ μάλιστα ἐγὼ τε νομίζω ἐπικαίρον, ὑμεῖς δὲ διὰ τὰ ξυνηγέας ἡσυχον ἡκιστ' ἀν' ὁξέως πείθοισθε, ὅμως εἰρήσεται.*

That "habitual quiescence" which Hermokratês here predicates of his countrymen, forms a remarkable contrast with the restless activity, and intermeddling carried even to excess, which Periklês and Nikias deprecate in the Athenians (Thucyd. i. 144; vi. 7). Both of the governments, however, were democratical. This serves as a lesson of caution respecting general predications about all democracies; for it is certain that one democracy differed in many respects from another. It may be doubted, however, whether the attribute here ascribed by Hermokratês to his countrymen was really deserved, to the extent which his language implies.

deter or obstruct the advance of the expedition until winter approached: in which case Nikias, the ablest of the three generals, who was understood to have undertaken the scheme against his own consent, would probably avail himself of the pretext to return.¹

Though these opinions of Hermokratēs were espoused farther by various other citizens in the assembly, the greater number of speakers held an opposite language, and placed little faith in his warnings. We have already noticed Hermokratēs nine years before as envoy of Syracuse and chief adviser at the congress of Gela, — then, as now, watchful to bar the door against Athenian interference in Sicily, — then, as now, belonging to the oligarchical party, and of sentiments hostile to the existing democratical constitution; but brave as well as intelligent in foreign affairs. A warm and even angry debate arose upon his present speech.² Though there was nothing, in the words of Hermokratēs himself, disparaging either to the democracy or to the existing magistratēs, yet it would seem that his partisans who spoke after him must have taken up a more criminative tone, and must have exaggerated that which he characterized as the “habitual quiescence” of the Syracusans, into contemptible remissness and disorganization under those administrators and generals, characterized as worthless, whom the democracy preferred. Amidst the speakers, who, in replying to Hermokratēs and the others, indignantly repelled such insinuations and retorted upon their authors, a citizen named Athenagoras was the most distinguished. He was at this time the leading democratical politician, and the most popular orator, in Syracuse.³

¹ Thucyd. vi, 33–36.

² Thucyd. vi, 32–35. τῶν δὲ Συρακοσίων ὁ δῆμος ἐν πολλῇ πρὸς ἀλλήλους ἰριδί ἦσαν, etc.

³ Thucyd. vi, 35. παρελθὼν δ' αὐτοῖς Ἀθηναγόρας, ὃς δῆμον τε προστάτης ἦν καὶ ἐν τῷ παρόντι πιθανώτατος τοῖς πολλοῖς, ἔλεγε τοιούδε, etc.

The position ascribed here to Athenagoras seems to be the same as that which is assigned to Kleon at Athens — ἀνὴρ δημαγωγός κατ' ἐκείνους τὸν χρόνον ὢν καὶ τῷ πληθει πιθανώτατος etc. (iv, 21.)

Neither δῆμον προστάτης nor δημαγωγός denotes any express functions, or titular office (see the note of Dr. Arnold), at least in these places. It is possible that there may have been some Grecian town constitutions, in

“Every one” (said he), except only cowards and bad citizens, must wish that the Athenians *would* be fools enough to come here and put themselves into our power. The tales which you have just heard are nothing better than fabrications, got up to alarm you; and I wonder at the folly of these alarmists in fancying that their machinations are not seen through.² You will be too wise to take measure of the future from their reports: you will rather judge from what able men, such as the Athenians, are likely to do. Be assured that they will never leave behind them the Peloponnesians in menacing attitude, to come hither and court a fresh war not less formidable: indeed, I think they account themselves lucky that we, with our powerful cities, have never come across to attack them. And if they *should* come, as it is pretended, they will find Sicily a more formidable foe than Peloponnesus: nay, our own city alone will be a match for twice the force which they can bring across. The Athenians, knowing all this well enough, will mind their own business, in spite of all the fictions which men on this side of the water conjure up, and which they have already tried often before, sometimes even worse than on the present occasion, in order to terrify you, and get themselves nominated to the chief posts.³ One of these days, I fear they may even succeed, from our want of precautions before-

which there was an office bearing that title: but this is a point which cannot be affirmed. Nor would the words δῆμον προστάτης always imply an equal degree of power: the person so designated might have more power in one town than in another. Thus in Megara (iv, 67) it seems that the oligarchical party had recently been banished: the leaders of the popular party had become the most influential men in the city. See also iii, 70, Peithias at Korkyra.

¹ Thucyd. vi, 36–40. I give the substance of what is ascribed to Athenagoras by Thucydides, without binding myself to the words.

² Thucyd. vi, 36. τοὺς δ' ἀγγέλλοντας τὰ τοιαῦτα καὶ περιφόβους ὑμᾶς ποιῶντας τῆς μὲν πόλεως οὐ θαυμάζω, τῆς δὲ ἀξυνεσίας, εἰ μὴ οἴονται ἐνδύλοι εἶναι.

³ Thucyd. vi, 38. Ἀλλὰ ταῦτα, ὥσπερ ἐγὼ λέγω, οἱ τε Ἀθηναῖς γινώσκοντες, τὰ σφετερὰ αὐτῶν, εὐ οἶδ' ὅτι, σώζουσι, καὶ ἐνθενδὲ ἄνδρες οὔτε δύντα, οὔτε ἂν γενόμενα, λογοποιούσιν. Οὐς ἐγὼ οὐ νῦν πρῶτον, ἀλλ' αἰεὶ ἐπίσταμαι, ἥτοι λόγοις γε τοιοῖσδε, καὶ ἐπὶ τούτων κακουργοτέροις, ἢ ἔργοις, βουλομένους καταπλήξαντας τὸ ὑμέτερον πλῆθος αὐτοὺς τῆς πόλεως ἄρχειν. Καὶ δέδοικα μέντοι μήποτε πολλὰ πειρώντες καὶ κατορθώσωσιν, etc.

hand. Such intrigues leave but short moments of tranquillity to our city; they condemn it to an intestine discord worse than foreign war, and have sometimes betrayed it even to despots and usurpers. However, if you will listen to me, I will try and prevent anything of this sort at present; by simple persuasion to you, by chastisement to these conspirators, and by watchful denunciation of the oligarchical party generally. Let me ask, indeed, what is it that you younger nobles covet? To get into command at your early age? The law forbids you, because you are yet incompetent. Or, do you wish not to be under equal laws with the many? But how can you pretend that citizens of the same city should not have the same rights? Some one will tell me! that democracy is neither intelligent nor just, and that the

¹ Thucyd. vi, 39. φήσει τις δημοκρατίαν οὔτε ξυνετόν οὔτ' ἴσον εἶναι, τοῖς δ' ἔχοντας τὰ χρήματα καὶ ἀρχειν ἀρίστα βελτιστοῦς. Ἐγὼ δὲ φημι, πρῶτα μὲν, δῆμον ξύμπαν ὀνομάσθαι, ὀλιγαρχίαν δὲ μέρος. ἔπειτα, φύλακας μὲν ἀρίστοις εἶναι χρημάτων τοῦς πλουσίους, βουλευτὰς δ' ἂν βελτίστα τοῦς ξυνετοῦς, κρίναι δ' ἂν ἀκούσαντας ἀρίστα τοῦς πολλοὺς καὶ ταῦτα ὁμοίως καὶ κατὰ μέρη καὶ ξύμπαντα ἐν δημοκρατίᾳ ἰσομοιεῖν.

Dr. Arnold translates φύλακας χρημάτων, "having the care of the public purse," as if it were φύλακας τῶν δημοσίων χρημάτων. But it seems to me that the words carry a larger sense, and refer to the private property of these rich men, not to their functions as keepers of what was collected from taxation or tribute. Looking at a rich man from the point of view of the public, he is guardian of his own property until the necessities of the state require that he should spend more or less of it for the public defence or benefit. In the interim, he enjoys it as he pleases, but he will for his own interest take care that the property does not perish (compare vi, 9). This is the service which he renders, *quatenus, rich man*, to the state; he may also serve it in other ways, but that would be by means of his personal qualities; thus he may, for example, be intelligent as well as rich (*ξυνετός* as well as *πλούσιος*), and then he may serve the state as *counsellor*, the second of the two categories named by Athenagoras. What that orator is here negating is, the better title and superior fitness of the rich to exercise command, which was the claim put forward in their behalf. And he goes on to indicate what is their real position and service in a democracy; that they are to enjoy the revenue, and preserve the capita of their wealth, subject to demands for public purposes when necessary, but not to expect command, unless they are personally competent. Properly speaking, that which he here affirms is true of the small lots of property taken in the mass, as well as of the large, and is one of the grounds of defence of private property against communism. But the rich man's property is an appreciable item to the state

rich are the persons best fitted to command. But I affirm, first, that the people are the sum total, and the oligarchy merely a fraction; next, that rich men are the best trustees of the aggregate wealth existing in the community, — intelligent men, the best counsellors, — and the multitude, the best qualified for hearing and deciding after such advice. In a democracy, these functions, one and all, find their proper place. But oligarchy, though imposing on the multitude a full participation in all hazards, is not content even with an exorbitant share in the public advantages, but grasps and monopolizes the whole for itself.¹ This is just what you young and powerful men are aiming at, though you will never be able to keep it permanently in a city such as Syracuse. Be taught by me, or at least alter your views, and devote yourselves to the public advantage of our common city. Desist from practising, by reports such as these, upon the belief of men who know you too well to be duped. If even there be any truth in what you say, and if the Athenians do come, our city will repel them in a manner worthy of her reputation. She will not take you at your word, and choose *you* commanders, in order to put the yoke upon her own neck. She will look for herself, construe your communications for what they really mean, and, instead of suffering you to talk her out of her free government, will take effective precautions for maintaining it against you."

Immediately after this venement speech from Athenagoras, one of the strategē who presided in the assembly interposed; permitting no one else to speak, and abruptly closing the assembly, with these few words: "We generals deprecate this interchange of personal vituperation, and trust that the hearers present will not suffer themselves to be biased by it. Let us rather take care, in reference to the reports just communicated,

individually taken; moreover, he is perpetually raising unjust pretensions to political power, so that it becomes necessary to define how much he is really entitled to.

¹ Thucyd. vi, 39. Ὀλιγαρχία δὲ τῶν μὲν κινδύνων τοῖς πολλοῖς μεταδίδωσι, τῶν δ' ὠφελίμων οὐ πλεονεττεῖ μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ ξύμπαν ἀφελομένη ἔχει. ἂν ὅμως οἱ τε δυναμενοὶ καὶ οἱ νέοι προθυμοῦνται, ἀδύνατα ἐν μεγάλῃ πόλει κατασχέειν.

that we be one and all in a condition to repel the invader. And even should the necessity not arise, there is no harm in strengthening our public force with horses, arms, and the other muniments of war. We generals shall take upon ourselves the care and supervision of these matters, as well as of the missions to neighboring cities, for procuring information and for other objects. We have, indeed, already busied ourselves for the purpose, and we shall keep you informed of what we learn."

The language of Athenagoras, indicating much virulence of party feeling, lets us somewhat into the real working of politics among the Syracusan democracy. Athenagoras at Syracuse was like Kleon at Athens, the popular orator of the city. But he was by no means the most influential person, nor had he the principal direction of public affairs. Executive and magisterial functions belonged chiefly to Hermokratēs and his partisans, the opponents of Athenagoras. Hermokratēs has already appeared as taking the lead at the congress of Gela nine years before, and will be seen throughout the coming period almost constantly in the same position; while the political rank of Athenagoras is more analogous to that which we should call a leader of opposition, a function of course suspended under pressing danger, so that we hear of him no more. At Athens as at Syracuse, the men who got to real power and handled the force and treasures of the state, were chiefly of the rich families, often of oligarchical sentiments, acquiescing in the democracy as an uncomfortable necessity, and continually open to be solicited by friends or kinsmen to conspire against it. Their proceedings were doubtless always liable to the scrutiny, and their persons to the animadversion, of the public assembly: hence arose the influence of the demagogue, such as Athenagoras and Kleon, the bad side of whose character is so constantly kept before the readers of Grecian history. By whatever disparaging epithets such character may be surrounded, it is in reality the distinguishing feature of a free government under all its forms, whether constitutional monarchy or democracy. By the side of the real political actors, who hold principal office and wield personal powers, there are always abundant censors and critics, — some better, others worse, in respect of honesty, candor, wisdom, or rhetoric, — the most distinguished of whom acquires considerable importance, though

holding a function essentially inferior to that of the authorized magistrate or general.

We observe here, that Athenagoras, far from being inclined to push the city into war, is averse to it, even beyond reasonable limit; and denounces it as the interested policy of the oligarchical party. This may show how little it was any constant interest or policy on the part of the persons called demagogues, to involve their city in unnecessary wars: a charge which has been frequently advanced against them, because it so happens that Kleon, in the first half of the Peloponnesian war, discountenanced the propositions of peace between Athens and Sparta. We see by the harangue of Athenagoras that the oligarchical party were the usual promoters of war: a fact which we should naturally expect, seeing that the rich and great, in most communities, have accounted the pursuit of military glory more conformable to their dignity than any other career. At Syracuse, the ascendancy of Hermokratēs was much increased by the invasion of the Athenians, while Athenagoras does not again appear. The latter was egregiously mistaken in his anticipations respecting the conduct of Athens, though right in his judgment respecting her true political interest. But it is very unsafe to assume that nations will always pursue their true political interest, where present temptations of ambition or vanity intervene. Positive information was in this instance a surer guide than speculations *a priori* founded upon the probable policy of Athens. But that the imputations advanced by Athenagoras against the oligarchical youth, of promoting military organization with a view to their own separate interest, were not visionary, may be seen by the analogous case of Argos, two or three years before. The democracy of Argos, contemplating a more warlike and aggressive policy, had been persuaded to organize and train the select regiment of one thousand hoplites, chosen from the oligarchical youth: within three years, this regiment subverted the democratical constitution.¹ Now the persons, respecting whose designs Athenagoras expresses so much apprehension, were exactly the class at Syracuse corresponding to the select thousand at Argos.

¹ See above, in this volume, chap. lvi.

The political views, proclaimed in this remarkable speech, are deserving of attention, though we cannot fully understand it without having before us those speeches to which it replies. Not only is democratical constitution forcibly contrasted with oligarchy, but the separate places which it assigns to wealth, intelligence, and multitude, are laid down with a distinctness not unworthy of Aristotle.

Even before the debate here adverted to, the Syracusan generals had evidently acted upon views more nearly approaching to those of Hermokratēs than to those of Athenagoras. Already alive to the danger, they were apprized by their scouts when the Athenian armament was passing from Korkyra to Rhegium, and pushed their preparations with the utmost activity, distributing garrisons and sending envoys among their Sikel dependencies, while the force within the city was mustered and placed under all the conditions of war.¹ The halt of the Athenians at Rhegium afforded increased leisure for such equipment. That halt was prolonged for more than one reason. In the first place, Nikias and his colleagues wished to negotiate with the Rhegines, as well as to haul ashore and clean their ships: next, they awaited the return of the three scout-ships from Egesta: lastly, they had as yet formed no plan of action in Sicily.

The ships from Egesta returned with disheartening news. Instead of the abundant wealth which had been held forth as existing in that town, and upon which the resolutions of the Athenians as to Sicilian operations had been mainly grounded, it turned out that no more than thirty talents in all could be produced. What was yet worse, the elaborate fraud, whereby the Egestæans had duped the commissioners on their first visit, was now exposed; and these commissioners, on returning to Rhegium from their second visit, were condemned to the mortification of proclaiming their own credulity, visited by severe taunts and reproaches from the army. Disappointed in the source from whence they had calculated on obtaining money, — for it appears that both Alkibiadēs and Lamachus had sincerely relied on the pecuniary resources of Egesta, though Nikias was always mistrustful, — the generals now discussed their plan of action.

¹ Thucyd. vi, 45.

Nikias — availing himself of the fraudulent conduct on the part of the Egestæan allies, now become palpable — wished to circumscribe his range of operations within the rigorous letter of the vote which the Athenian assembly had passed. He proposed to sail at once against Selinus; then, formally to require the Egestæans to provide the means of maintaining the armament, or, at least, of maintaining those sixty triremes which they themselves had solicited. Since this requisition would not be realized, he would only tarry long enough to obtain from the Selinuntines some tolerable terms of accommodation with Egesta, and then return home; exhibiting, as they sailed along, to all the maritime cities, this great display of Athenian naval force. And while he would be ready to profit by any opportunity which accident might present for serving the Leontines or establishing new alliances, he strongly deprecated any prolonged stay in the island for speculative enterprises, all at the cost of Athens.¹

Against this scheme Alkibiadēs protested, as narrow, timid, and disgraceful to the prodigious force with which they had been intrusted. He proposed to begin by opening negotiations with all the other Sicilian Greeks, — especially Messenē, convenient both as harbor for their fleet and as base of their military operations, — to prevail upon them to coöperate against Syracuse and Selinus. With the same view, he recommended establishing relations with the Sikels of the interior, in order to detach such of them as were subjects of Syracuse, as well as to insure supplies of provisions. As soon as it had been thus ascertained what extent of foreign aid might be looked for, he would open direct attack forthwith against Syracuse and Selinus; unless, indeed, the former should consent to reestablish Leontini, and the latter to come to terms with Egesta.²

Lamachus, delivering his opinion last, dissented from both his colleagues. He advised, that they should proceed at once, without any delay, to attack Syracuse, and fight their battle under its walls. The Syracusans, he urged, were now in terror and only half-prepared for defence. Many of their citizens, and much

¹ Thucyd. vi, 47; Plutarch, Nikias, c. 14.

² Thucyd. vi, 48. Οὕτως ἤδη Συρακουσאים καὶ Σελινούντι ἐπιχειρεῖν, ἢ ἢ οἱ μὲν Ἐγέσταιους ξυμβαινῶσιν, οἱ δὲ Λεοντίνους ἔωσι κατοικεῖν.

property, would be found still lingering throughout the neighboring lands, not yet removed within the walls, and might thus be seized for the subsistence of their army;¹ while the deserted town and harbor of Megara, very near to Syracuse both by land and by sea, might be occupied by the fleet as a naval station. The imposing and intimidating effect of the armament, not less than its real efficiency, was now at the maximum, immediately after its arrival. If advantage were taken of this first impression to strike an instant blow at their principal enemy, the Syracusans would be found destitute of the courage, not less than of the means, to resist: but the longer such attack was delayed, the more this first impression of dismay would be effaced, giving place to a reactionary sentiment of indifference and even contempt, when the much-dreaded armament was seen to accomplish little or nothing. As for the other Sicilian cities, nothing would contribute so much to determine their immediate adhesion, as successful operations against Syracuse.²

But Lamachus found no favor with either of the other two, and being thus compelled to choose between the plans of Alkibiadês and Nikias, gave his support to that of the former, which was the mean term of the three. There can be no doubt — as far as it is becoming to pronounce respecting that which never reached execution — that the plan of Lamachus was far the best and most judicious: at first sight, indeed, the most daring, but intrinsically the safest, easiest, and speediest, that could be suggested. For undoubtedly the siege and capture of Syracuse, was the one enterprise indispensable towards the promotion of Athenian views in Sicily. The sooner that was commenced, the more easily it would be accomplished: and its difficulties were in many ways aggravated, in no way abated, by those preliminary precautions upon which Alkibiadês insisted. Anything like delay tended fearfully to impair the efficiency, real as well as reputed, of an ancient aggressive armament, and to animate as well as to strengthen those who stood on the defensive, a point on which we shall find painful evidence presently. The advice of Lamachus, alike soldier-like and far-sighted, would probably

¹ Compare iv, 104, describing the surprise of Amphipolis by Brasidas.

² Thucyd. vi, 49.

have been approved and executed either by Brasidas or by Demosthenês; while the dilatory policy still advocated by Alkibiadês, even after the suggestion of Lamachus had been started, tends to show that if he was superior in military energy to one of his colleagues, he was not less inferior to the other. Indeed, when we find him talking of besieging Syracuse, *unless* the Syracusans would consent to the reestablishment of Leontini, it seems probable that he had not yet made up his mind peremptorily to besiege the city at all; a fact completely at variance with those unbounded hopes of conquest which he is reported as having conceived even at Athens. It is possible that he may have thought it impolitic to contradict too abruptly the tendencies of Nikias, who, anxious as he was chiefly to find some pretext for carrying back his troops unharmed, might account the proposition of Lamachus too desperate even to be discussed. Unfortunately, the latter, though the ablest soldier of the three, was a poor man, of no political position, and little influence among the hoplites. Had he possessed, along with his own straightforward military energy, the wealth and family ascendancy of either of his colleagues, the achievements as well as the fate of this splendid armament would have been entirely altered, and the Athenians would have entered Syracuse not as prisoners but as conquerors.

Alkibiadês, as soon as his plan had become adopted by means of the approval of Lamachus, sailed across the strait in his own trireme from Rhegium to Messênê. Though admitted personally into the city, and allowed to address the public assembly, he could not induce them to conclude any alliance, or to admit the armament to anything beyond a market of provisions without the walls. He accordingly returned back to Rhegium, from whence he and one of his colleagues immediately departed with sixty triremes for Naxos. The Naxians cordially received the armament, which then steered southward along the coast of Sicily to Katana. In the latter place the leading men and the general sentiment were at this time favorable to Syracuse, so that the Athenians, finding admittance refused, were compelled to sail farther southward and take their night-station at the mouth of the river Terias. On the ensuing day they made sail with their ships in single column immediately in front of Syracuse itself,

while an advanced squadron of ten triremes were even despatched into the Great Harbor, south of the town, for the purpose of surveying on this side the city with its docks and fortifications, and for the farther purpose of proclaiming from shipboard by the voice of the herald: "The Leontines now in Syracuse are hereby invited to come forth without apprehension and join their friends and benefactors, the Athenians." After this empty display, they returned back to Katana.¹

We may remark that this proceeding was completely at variance with the judicious recommendation of Lamachus. It tended to familiarize the Syracusans with the sight of the armament piece-meal, without any instant action, and thus to abate in their minds the terror-striking impression of its first arrival.

At Katana, Alkibiadēs personally was admitted into the town, and allowed to open his case before the public assembly, as he had been at Messenē. Accident alone enabled him to carry his point, for the general opinion was averse to his propositions. While most of the citizens were in the assembly listening to his discourse, some Athenian soldiers without, observing a postern-gate carelessly guarded, broke it open and showed themselves in the market-place. The town was thus in the power of the Athenians, so that the leading men who were friends of Syracuse thought themselves lucky to escape in safety, while the general assembly came to a resolution accepting the alliance proposed by Alkibiadēs.² The whole Athenian armament was now conducted from Rhegium to Katana, which was established as head-quarters. Intimation was farther received from a party at Kamarina, that the city might be induced to join them, if the armament showed itself: accordingly, the whole armament proceeded thither, and took moorings off the shore, while a herald was sent up to the city. But the Kamarinians declined to admit the army, and declared that they would abide by the existing treaty; which bound them to receive at any time one single ship, but no more, unless they themselves should ask for it. The Athenians were

¹ Thucyd. vi, 50.

² Polyænus (i, 40, 4) treats this acquisition of Katana as the result, not of accident, but of a preconcerted plot. I follow the account as given by Thucydides.

therefore obliged to return to Katana. Passing by Syracuse both going and returning, they ascertained the falsehood of a report that the Syracusans were putting a naval force afloat; moreover, they landed near the city and ravaged some of the neighboring lands. The Syracusan cavalry and light troops soon appeared, and a skirmish with trifling loss ensued, before the invaders retired to their ships,¹ the first blood shed in this important struggle, and again at variance with the advice of Lamachus.

Serious news awaited them on their return to Katana. They found the public ceremonial trireme, called the Salaminian, just arrived from Athens, the bearer of a formal resolution of the assembly, requiring Alkibiadēs to come home and stand his trial for various alleged matters of irreligion combined with treasonable purposes. A few other citizens specified by name were commanded to come along with him under the same charge; but the trierarch of the Salaminian was especially directed to serve him only with the summons, without any guard or coercion, so that he might return home in his own trireme.²

This summons, pregnant with momentous results both to Athens and to her enemies, arose out of the mutilation of the Hermæ, described a few pages back, and the inquiries instituted into the authorship of that deed, since the departure of the armament. The extensive and anxious sympathies connected with so large a body of departing citizens, combined with the solemnity of the scene itself, had for the moment suspended the alarm caused by that sacrilege; but it speedily revived, and the people could not rest without finding out by whom the deed had been done. Considerable rewards, one thousand and even ten thousand drachms, were proclaimed to informers; of whom others soon appeared, in addition to the slave Andromachus, before mentioned. A metic named Teukrus had fled from Athens, immediately after the event, to Megara, from whence he sent intimation to the senate at Athens that he had himself been a party concerned in the recent sacrilege concerning the mysteries, as well as cognizant of the mutilation of the Hermæ, and that, if impunity were guaranteed to him, he would come back and give full

¹ Thucyd. vi, 52.

² Thucyd. vi, 53-61

information. A vote of the senate was immediately passed to invite him. He denounced by name eleven persons as having been concerned, jointly with himself, in the mock-celebration of the Eleusinian mysteries, and eighteen different persons, himself not being one, as the violators of the Hermæ. A woman named Agaristê, daughter of Alkmæonidês, — these names bespeak her great rank and family in the city, — deposed farther that Alkibiadês, Axiochus, and Adeimantus, had gone through a parody of the mysteries in a similar manner, in the house of Charmidês. And lastly Lydus, slave of a citizen named Phereklês, stated that the like scene had been enacted in the house of his master in the deme Thêmakus, giving the names of the parties present, one of whom — though asleep, and unconscious of what was passing — he stated to be Leogoras, the father of Andokidês.¹ Of the parties named in these different depositions, the greater number seem to have fled from the city at once; but all who remained were put into prison to stand future trial.² Those inform-

¹ Andokidês de Mysteriis, sects. 14, 15, 35. In reference to the deposition of Agaristê, Andokidês again includes Alkibiadês among those who fled into banishment in consequence of it. Unless we are to suppose another Alkibiadês, not the general in Sicily, this statement cannot be true. There was another Alkibiadês, of the deme Phegus: but Andokidês in mentioning him afterwards (sect. 65), specifies his deme. He was cousin of Alkibiadês, and was in exile at the same time with him (Xenoph. Hellen. i, 2, 13).

² Andokidês (sects. 13-34) affirms that some of the persons, accused by Teukrus as mutilators of the Hermæ, were put to death upon his deposition. But I contest his accuracy on this point. For Thucydidês recognizes no one as having been put to death except those against whom Andokidês himself informed (see *ii*, 27, 53, 61). He dwells particularly upon the number of persons, and persons of excellent character, imprisoned on suspicion; but he mentions none as having been put to death except those against whom Andokidês gave testimony. He describes it as a great harshness, and as an extraordinary proof of the reigning excitement, that the Athenians should have detained so many persons upon suspicion, on the evidence of informers not entitled to credence. But he would not have specified this detention as extraordinary harshness, if the Athenians had gone so far as to put individuals to death upon the same evidence. Besides, to put these men to death would have defeated their own object, the full and entire disclosure of the plot and the conspirators. The ignorance in which they were of their internal enemies, was among the most agonizing

ers received the promised rewards, after some debate as to the parties entitled to receive the reward; for Pythonikus, the citizen who had produced the slave Andromachus, pretended to the first claim, while Androkles, one of the senators, contended that the senate collectively ought to receive¹ the money; a strange pretension, which we do not know how he justified. At last, however, at the time of the Panathenaic festival, Andromachus the slave received the first reward of ten thousand drachms; Teukrus the metic, the second reward of one thousand drachma.

A large number of citizens, many of them of the first consideration in the city, were thus either lying in prison or had fled into exile. But the alarm, the agony, and the suspicion, in the public mind, went on increasing rather than diminishing. The information hitherto received had been all partial, and, with the exception of Agaristê, all the informants had been either slaves or metics, not citizens; while Teukrus, the only one among them who had stated anything respecting the mutilation of the Hermæ, did not profess to be a party concerned, or to know all those who were.² The people had heard only a succession of disclosures, all attesting a frequency of irreligious acts, calculated to insult and banish the local gods who protected their country and constitution; all indicating that there were many powerful citizens bent on prosecuting such designs, interpreted as treasonable, yet none communicating any full or satisfactory idea of the Hermæ

of all their sentiments; and to put any prisoner to death until they arrived, or believed themselves to have arrived, at the knowledge of the whole, would tend so far to bar their own chance of obtaining evidence: *ὁ δὲ δῆμος ὁ τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἄσμενος λαβὼν, ὡς ᾤετο, τὸ σαφές, καὶ δεινὸν ποιούμενοι πρότερον εἰ τοὺς ἐπιβουλευόντας σφὼν τῷ πλήθει μὴ εἰσονται*, etc.

Wachsmuth says (p. 194): "The bloodthirsty dispositions of the people had been excited by the previous murders. the greater the number of victims to be slaughtered, the better were the people pleased," etc. This is an inaccuracy quite in harmony with the general spirit of his narrative. It is contradicted, implicitly, by the very words of Thucydidês which he transcribes in his note 108.

¹ Andokid. de Mysteriis, sects. 27-28. καὶ Ἀνδροκλῆς ὑπὲρ τῆς βουλῆς.

² Andokid. de Myst. sect. 36. It seems that Diognêtus, who had been commissioner of inquiry at the time when Pythonikus presented the first information of the slave Andromachus, was himself among the parties denounced by Teukrus (And. de Mys. sects. 14, 15).

kopid plot, of the real conspirators, or of their farther purposes. The enemy was among themselves, yet they knew not where to lay hands upon him. Amidst the gloomy terrors, political blended with religious, which distracted their minds, all the ancient stories of the last and worst oppressions of the Peisistratid despots, ninety-five years before, became again revived, and some new despots, who seemed on the point of occupying the acropolis, the only way of procuring this melancholy paroxysm, for which purpose the people were willing to welcome questionable witnesses, and to imprison on suspicion citizens of the best character, until the truth could be ascertained.¹

The public distraction was aggravated by Peisander and Chariklēs, who acted as commissioners of investigation, furious and unprincipled politicians,² at that time professing exaggerated attachment to the democratical constitution, though we shall find both of them hereafter among the most unscrupulous agents in its subversion. These men loudly proclaimed that the facts disclosed indicated the band of Hermokopid conspirators to be numerous, with an ulterior design of speedily putting down the democracy; and they insisted on pressing their investigations until full discovery should be attained. And the sentiment of the people, collectively taken, responded to this stimulus; though individually, every man was so afraid of becoming himself the next victim arrested, that when the herald convoked the senate for the purpose of receiving informations, the crowd in the market-place straightway dispersed.

It was amidst such eager thirst for discovery, that a new informer appeared, Diokleidēs, who professed to communicate some material facts connected with the mutilation of the Hermæ, affirming that the authors of it were three hundred in number. He recounted that, on the night on which that incident occurred, he

¹ Thucyd. vi, 53-60. οὐ δοκιμάζοντες τοὺς μηνυτάς, ἀλλὰ πάντας ὑπόπτας ἀποδεχόμενοι, διὰ πονηρῶν ἀνθρώπων πίστιν πᾶν χρηστὸς τῶν πολιτῶν ἐνλαβάνοντες κατέδουν, χρησιμώτερον ἡγούμενοι εἶναι βασανίσαι τὸ πρᾶγμα καὶ εὐρεῖν, ἢ διὰ μηνυτοῦ πονηριαν τινὰ καὶ χρηστὸν δοκούντα εἶναι αἰτιαθέντα ἀνέλεγκτον διαφυγεῖν.

..... δεινὸν ποιοῦμενοι, εἰ τιδὲς ἐπιβουλευόντας σφῶν τῷ πλῆθει μὴ εἰσονται.

² Andokid. de Myst. sect. 36

started from Athens to go to the mines of Laureion; wherein he had a slave working on hire, on whose account he was to receive pay. It was full moon, and the night was so bright that he began his journey mistaking it for daybreak.¹ On reaching the propylæum of the temple of Dionysus, he saw a body of men about three hundred in number descending from the Odeon towards the public theatre. Being alarmed at this unexpected sight, he concealed himself behind a pillar, from whence he had leisure to contemplate this body of men, who stood for some time conversing together, in groups of fifteen or twenty each, and then dispersed: the moon was so bright that he could discern the faces of most of them. As soon as they had dispersed, he pursued his walk to Laureion, from whence he returned next day, and learned to his surprise that during the night the Hermæ had been mutilated; also, that commissioners of inquiry had been named, and the reward of ten thousand drachms proclaimed for information. Impressed at once with the belief that the nocturnal crowd whom he had seen were authors of the deed, he happened soon after-

¹ Plutarch (Alkib. c. 20) and Diodorus (xiii. 2) assert that this testimony was glaringly false, since on the night in question it was *new moon*. I presume, at least, that the remark of Diodorus refers to the deposition of Diokleidēs, though he never mentions the name of the latter, and even describes the deposition referred to with many material variations as compared with Andokidēs. Plutarch's observation certainly refers to Diokleidēs, whose deposition, he says, affirming that he had seen and distinguished the persons in question by the light of the moon, on a night when it was *new moon*, shocked all sensible men, but produced no effect upon the blind fury of the people. Wachsmuth (Hellenisch. Alterth. vol. ii, ch. viii, p. 194) copies this remark from Plutarch.

I disbelieve altogether the assertion that it was *new moon* on that night. Andokidēs gives in great detail the deposition of Diokleidēs, with a strong wish to show that it was false and perfidiously got up. But he nowhere mentions the fact that it was *new moon* on the night in question; though if we read his report and his comments upon the deposition of Diokleidēs, we shall see that he never could have omitted such a means of discrediting the whole tale, if the fact had been so (Andokid. de Myst. sects. 37-43). Besides, it requires very good positive evidence to make us believe, that a suborned informer, giving his deposition not long after one of the most memorable nights that ever passed at Athens, would be so clumsy as to make particular reference to the circumstance that it was *full moon* (εἶναι δὲ πανσέληνον), if it had really been *new moon*.

wards to see one of them, Euphêmus, sitting in the workshop of a brazier, and took him aside to the neighboring temple of Hephæstus, where he mentioned in confidence that he had seen the party at work and could denounce them, but that he preferred being paid for silence, instead of giving information and incurring private enmities. Euphêmus thanked him for the warning, desiring him to come next day to the house of Leogoras and his son Andokidês, where he would see them as well as the other parties concerned. Andokidês and the rest offered to him, under solemn covenant, the sum of two talents, or twelve thousand drachms thus overbidding the reward of ten thousand drachms proclaimed by the senate to any truth-telling informer, with admission to a partnership in the benefits of their conspiracy, supposing that it should succeed. Upon his reply that he would consider the proposition, they desired him to meet them at the house of Kallias son of Têleklês, brother-in-law of Andokidês: which meeting accordingly took place, and a solemn bargain was concluded in the acropolis. Andokidês and his friends engaged to pay the two talents to Diokleidês at the beginning of the ensuing month, as the price of his silence. But since this engagement was never performed, Diokleidês came with his information to the senate.¹

Such — according to the report of Andokidês — was the story of this informer, which he concluded by designating forty-two individuals, out of the three hundred whom he had seen. The first names whom he specified were those of Mantitheus and Aphepsion, two senators actually sitting among his audience. Next came the remaining forty, among whom were Andokidês and many of his nearest relatives, his father Leogoras, his first or second cousins and brother-in-law, Charmidês, Taureas, Nisæus, Kalias son of Alkmæon, Phrynichus, Eukratês (brother of Nikias the commander in Sicily), and Kritias. But as there were a still greater number of names — assuming the total of three hundred to be correct — which Diokleidês was unable to specify, the commissioner Peisander proposed that Mantitheus and Aphepsion should be at once seized and tortured, in order to force them to disclose their accomplices; the psephism passed in the archonship of Skamandrius, whereby it was unlawful to apply

¹ Andokid. de Myster. sects. 37-42.

the torture to any free Athenian, being first abrogated. Illegal, not less than cruel, as this proposition was, the senate at first received it with favor. But Mantitheus and Aphepsion, casting themselves as suppliants upon the altar in the senate-house, pleaded so strenuously for their rights as citizens, to be allowed to put in bail and stand trial before the dikastery, that this was at last granted.¹ No sooner had they provided their sureties, than

¹ Considering the extreme alarm which then pervaded the Athenian mind, and their conviction that there were traitors among themselves whom yet they could not identify, it is to be noted as remarkable that they resisted the proposition of their commissioners for applying torture. We must recollect that the Athenians admitted the principle of the torture, as a good mode of eliciting truth as well as of testing depositions, — for they applied it often to the testimony of slaves, — sometimes apparently to that of metics. Their attachment to the established law, which forbade the application of it to citizens, must have been very great, to enable them to resist the great special and immediate temptation to apply it in this case to Mantitheus and Aphepsion, if only by way of exception.

The application of torture to witnesses and suspected persons, handed down from the Roman law, was in like manner recognized, and pervaded nearly all the criminal jurisprudence of Europe until the last century. I hope that the reader, after having gone through the painful narrative of the proceedings of the Athenians after the mutilation of the Hermæ, will take the trouble to peruse by way of comparison the *Storia della Colonna Infame*, by the eminent Alexander Manzoni, author of "I Promessi Sposi." This little volume, including a republication of Verri's "Osservazioni sulla Tortura," is full both of interest and instruction. It lays open the judicial enormities committed at Milan in 1630, while the terrible pestilence was raging there, by the examining judges and the senate, in order to get evidence against certain suspected persons called *Untori*; that is, men who were firmly believed by the whole population, with very few exceptions, to be causing and propagating the pestilence by means of certain ointment which they applied to the doors and walls of houses. Manzoni recounts with simple, eloquent, and impressive detail, the incredible barbarity with which the official lawyers at Milan, under the authority of the senate, extorted, by force of torture, evidence against several persons, of having committed this imaginary and impossible crime. The persons thus convicted were executed under horrible torments: the house of one of them, a barber named Mora, was pulled down, and a pillar with an inscription erected upon the site, to commemorate the deed. This pillar, the *Colonna Infame*, remained standing in Milan until the close of the 18th century. The reader will understand, from Manzoni's narrative, the degree to which public excitement and alarm can operate to poison and barbarize the course of

they broke their covenant, mounted their horses, and deserted to the enemy, without any regard to their sureties, who were exposed by law to the same trial and the same penalties as would have overtaken the offenders themselves. This sudden flight, together with the news that a Bœotian force was assembled on the borders of Attica, exasperated still farther the frantic terror of the public mind. The senate at once took quiet measures for seizing and imprisoning all the remaining forty whose names had been denounced; while by concert with the strategi, all the citizens were put under arms; those who dwelt in the city, mustering in the market-place; those in and near the long walls, in the Theseium; those in Peiræus, in the square called the Market-place of Hippodamus. Even the horsemen of the city were convoked by sound of trumpet in the sacred precinct of the Anakeion. The senate itself remained all night in the acropolis, except the prytanes, or fifty senators of the presiding tribe, who passed the night in the public building called the Tholus. Every man in Athens felt the terrible sense of an internal conspiracy on the point of breaking out, perhaps along with an invasion of the foreigner, prevented only by the timely disclosure of Diokleidês, who was hailed as the saviour of the city, and carried in procession to dinner at the prytaneium.¹

Miserable as the condition of the city was generally, yet more miserable was that of the prisoners confined; and worse, in every way, was still to be looked for, since the Athenians would know neither peace nor patience until they could reach, by some means or other, the names of the undisclosed conspirators. The female relatives and children of Andokidês, and his companions, were by permission along with them in the prison,² aggravating by their tears and wailings the affliction of the scene, when Charmidês, one of the parties confined, addressed himself to Andokidês, as his cousin and friend, imploring him to make a voluntary dis-

justice in a Christian city, without a taint of democracy, and with professional lawyers and judges to guide the whole procedure secretly, as compared with a pagan city, ultra-democratical, where judicial procedure as well as decision was all oral, public, and multitudinous

¹ Andokid. de Myst. sects. 41-46.

² Andokid. de Myst. sect. 48: compare Lysias, Orat. xiii, cont. Agorast. sect. 42.

closure of all that he knew, in order to preserve the lives of so many innocent persons, his immediate kinsmen, as well as to rescue the city out of a feverish alarm not to be endured. "You know (he said) all that passed about the mutilation of the Hermæ, and your silence will now bring destruction not only upon yourself, but also upon your father and upon all of us; while if you inform, whether you have been an actor in the scene or not, you will obtain impunity for yourself and us, and at the same time soothe the terrors of the city." Such instances on the part of Charmidês,¹ aided by the supplications of the other prisoners present, overcame the reluctance of Andokidês to become informer, and he next day made his disclosures to the senate. "Euphilêtus (he said) was the chief author of the mutilation of the Hermæ. He proposed the deed at a convivial party where I was present, but I denounced it in the strongest manner and refused all compliance. Presently, I broke my collar-bone, and injured my head, by a fall from a young horse, so badly as to be confined to my bed; when Euphilêtus took the opportunity of my absence to assure the rest of the company falsely that I had consented, and that I had agreed to cut the Hermes near my paternal house, which the tribe Ægeis have dedicated. Accordingly, they executed the project, while I was incapable of moving, without my knowledge: they presumed that I would undertake the mutilation of this particular Hermes, and you see that this is the only one in all Athens which has escaped injury. When the conspirators ascertained that I had not been a party, Euphilêtus and Melêtus threatened me with a terrible revenge unless I observed silence, to which I replied that it was not I, but their own crime, which had brought them into danger."

Having recounted this tale, in substance, to the senate, Andokidês tendered his slaves, both male and female, to be tortured, in order that they might confirm his story that he was in his bed and unable to leave it, on the night when the Hermæ were mutilated. It appears that the torture was actually applied (according to the custom so cruelly frequent at Athens in the case of

¹ Plutarch (Alkibiades c. 21) states that the person who thus addressed himself to, and persuaded Andokidês, was named Timæus. From whom we got the latter name, we do not know.

slaves), and that the senators thus became satisfied of the truth of what Andokidēs affirmed. He delivered in twenty-two names of citizens as having been the mutilators of the Hermæ: eighteen of these names, including Euphilētus and Melētus, had already been specified in the information of Teukrus; the remaining four, were Panætius, Diakritus, Lysistratus, and Chæredēmus; all of whom fled, the instant their names were mentioned, without waiting the chance of being seized. As soon as the senate heard the story of Andokidēs, they proceeded to question Diokleidēs over again; who confessed that he had given a false deposition, and begged for mercy, mentioning Alkibiadēs the Phegusian — a relative of the commander in Sicily — and Amiantus, as having suborned him to the crime. Both of them fled immediately on this revelation; but Diokleidēs was detained, sent before the dikastery for trial, and put to death.¹

The foregoing is the story which Andokidēs, in the oration *De Mysteriis*, delivered between fifteen and twenty years afterwards, represented himself to have communicated to the senate at this perilous crisis. But it probably is not the story which he really did tell, certainly not that which his enemies represented him as having told: least of all does it communicate the whole truth, or afford any satisfaction to such anxiety and alarm as are described to have been prevalent at the time. Nor does it accord with the brief information of Thucydides, who tells us that Andokidēs impeached himself, along with others, as participant in the mutilation.² Among the accomplices against whom he informed, his enemies affirmed that his own nearest relatives were included, though this latter statement is denied by himself. We may be sure, therefore, that the tale which Andokidēs really told was

¹ The narrative, which I have here given in substance, is to be found in Andokid. *de Myst.* sects. 48–66.

² Thucyd. vi, 60. Καὶ ὁ μὲν αὐτὸς τε καὶ ἑαυτοῦ καὶ κατ' ἄλλων μὲνύει τὸ τῶν Ἑρμῶν, etc.

To the same effect, see the hostile oration of Lysias contra Andocidem, *Or.* vi, sects. 36, 37, 51: also Andokidēs himself. *De Mysteriis*, sect. 71; *De Reditu*, sect. 7.

If we may believe the Pseudo-Plutarch (*Vit.* x, *Orator.* p. 834), Andokidēs had on a previous occasion been guilty of drunken irregularity and damaging a statue.

something very different from what now stands in his oration. But what it really was we cannot make out; nor should we gain much even if it could be made out, since even at the time, neither Thucydides nor other intelligent critics could determine how far it was true. The mutilation of the Hermæ remained to them always an unexplained mystery; though they accounted Andokidēs the principal organizer.¹

That which is at once most important and most incontestable, is the effect produced by the revelations of Andokidēs, true or false, on the public mind at Athens. He was a young man of rank and wealth in the city, belonging to the sacred family of the Kerykes, — said to trace his pedigree to the hero Odysseus, — and invested on a previous occasion with an important naval command; whereas the preceding informers had been metics and slaves. Moreover, he was making confession of his own guilt. Hence the people received his communications with implicit confidence. They were delighted to have got to the bottom of the terrible mystery: and the public mind subsided from its furious terrors into comparative tranquillity. The citizens again began to think themselves in safety and to resume their habitual confidence in each other, while the hoplites everywhere on guard were allowed to return to their homes.² All the prisoners in cus-

¹ Thucyd. vi, 60. ἐνταῦθα ἀναπειθεται εἰς τῶν δεδεμένων, ὅσπερ ἰδὼκει αἰτιώτατος εἶναι, ὑπὸ τῶν ἐνδεσμών τινος, εἴτε ἄρα καὶ τὰ ὄντα μὲνύσαι, εἴτε καὶ οὐ· ἐπ' αὐτοῦτερον γὰρ εἰκάζεται· τὸ δὲ σαφές οὐδεὶς οὔτε τότε οὔτε ὕστερον ἔχει εἰπεῖν περὶ τῶν δρασάντων τὸ ἔργον.

If the statement of Andokidēs in the *Oratio de Mysteriis* is correct, the deposition previously given by Teukrus the metic must have been a true one; though this man is commonly denounced among the lying witnesses (see the words of the comic writer Phrynichus ap. Plutarch, *Alkib.* c. 20).

Thucydides refuses even to mention the name of Andokidēs, and expresses himself with more than usual reserve about this dark transaction, as if he were afraid of giving offence to great Athenian families. The bitter feuds which it left behind at Athens, for years afterwards, are shown in the two orations of Lysias and of Andokidēs. If the story of Didymus be true, that Thucydides after his return from exile to Athens died by a violent death (see *Biogr.* Thucyd. p. xvii, ed. Arnold), it would seem probable that all his reserve did not protect him against private enmities arising out of his historical assertions.

² Thucyd. vi, 60. Ὁ δὲ δῆμος ὁ τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἀσμενος λαβὼν, ὡς ᾤετο, τὸ σαφές, etc. compare Andokid. *de Mysteriis*, sects. 67, 68.

tody on suspicion, except those against whom Andokidēs informed, were forthwith released: those who had fled out of apprehension, were allowed to return; while those whom he named as guilty, were tried, convicted, and put to death. Such of them as had already fled, were condemned to death in their absence, and a reward offered for their heads.¹ And though discerning men were not satisfied with the evidence upon which these sentences were pronounced, yet the general public fully believed themselves to have punished the real offenders, and were thus inexpressibly relieved from the depressing sense of unexpiated insult to the gods, as well as of danger to their political constitution from the withdrawal of divine protection.² Andokidēs himself was pardoned, and was for the time an object, apparently, even of public gratitude, so that his father Leogoras who had been among the parties imprisoned, ventured to indict a senator named Speusippus for illegal proceedings towards him, and obtained an almost unanimous verdict from the dikastery.³ But the character of a statue-breaker and an informer could never be otherwise than odious at Athens. Andokidēs was either banished by the indirect effect of a general disqualifying decree; or at least found that he had made so many enemies, and incurred so much obloquy, by his conduct in this affair, as to make it necessary for him to quit the city. He remained in banishment for many years, and seems never to have got clear of the hatred which his conduct in this nefarious proceeding so well merited.⁴

¹ Andokid. de Myster. sect. 66; Thucyd. vi, 60; Philochorus, Fragment. 111, ed. Didot.

² Thucyd. vi, 60. *ἡ μὲντοι ἄλλη πόλις περιφανῶς ὠφέλητο*: compare Andokid. de Reditu. sect. 8.

³ See Andokid. de Mysteriis. sect. 17. There are several circumstances not easily intelligible respecting this *γραφὴ παρανομῶν*, which Andokidēs alleges that his father Leogoras brought against the senator Speusippus, before a dikastery of six thousand persons (a number very difficult to believe), out of whom he says that Speusippus only obtained two hundred votes; but if this trial ever took place at all, we cannot believe that it could have taken place until after the public mind was tranquillized by the disclosures of Andokidēs, especially as Leogoras was actually in prison along with Andokidēs immediately before those disclosures were given in.

⁴ See for evidence of these general positions respecting the circumstances

But the comfort arising out of these disclosures respecting the Herma, though genuine and inestimable at the moment, was soon again disturbed. There still remained the various alleged profanations of the Eleusinian mysteries, which had not yet been investigated or brought to atonement; and these were the more sure to be pressed home, and worked with a factitious exaggeration of pious zeal, since the enemies of Alkibiadēs were bent upon turning them to his ruin. Among all the ceremonies of Attic religion, there was none more profoundly or universally revered than the mysteries of Eleusis, originally enjoined by the goddess Dēmêtēr herself, in her visit to that place, to Eumolpus and the other Eleusinian patriarch, and transmitted as a precious hereditary privilege in their families.¹ Celebrated annually in the month of August or September, under the special care of the basileus, or second archon, these mysteries were attended by vast crowds from Athens as well as from other parts of Greece, presenting to the eye a solemn and imposing spectacle, and striking the imagination still more powerfully by the special initiation which they conferred, under pledge of secrecy, upon pious and predisposed communicants. Even the divulgence in words to the uninitiated, of that which was exhibited to the eye and ear of the assembly in the interior of the Eleusinian temple, was accounted highly criminal: much more the actual mimicry of these ceremonies for the amusement of a convivial party. Moreover, the individuals who held the great sacred offices at Eleusis,—the hierophant, the daduch (torch-bearer), and the keryx, or herald,—which were transmitted by inheritance in the Eumolpidae and other great families of antiquity and importance, were personally insulted by such proceedings, and vindicated their own dignity at the same time that they invoked punishment on the offenders in the name of Dēmêtēr and Persephonê. The most appalling legends were current among the Athenian public, and repeated on proper occasions even by the hierophant

of Andokidēs, the three Orations: Andokidēs de Mysteriis, Andokidēs de Reditu Suo, and Lysias contra Andokidem.

¹ Homer, Hymn. Cerer. 475. Compare the Epigram cited in Lobbeck, Eleusinia, p. 47.

himself, respecting the divine judgments which always overtook such impious men.¹

When we recollect how highly the Eleusinian mysteries were venerated by Greeks not born in Athens and even by foreigners, we shall not wonder at the violent indignation excited in the Athenian mind by persons who profaned or divulged them; especially at a moment when their religious sensibilities had been so keenly wounded, and so tardily and recently healed, in reference to the Hermæ.² It was about this same time³ that a prosecution was instituted against the Melian philosopher Diagoras for irreligious doctrines. Having left Athens before trial, he was found guilty in his absence, and a reward was offered for his life.

Probably the privileged sacred families, connected with the mysteries, were foremost in calling for expiation from the state

¹ Lysias cont. Andokid. init. et fin.; Andokid. de Myster. sect. 29. Compare the fragment of a lost Oration by Lysias against Kinêsias (Fragm. xxxi, p. 490, Bekker; Athenæus, xii, p. 551), where Kinêsias and his friends are accused of numerous impieties, one of which consisted in celebrating festivals on unlucky and forbidden days, "in derision of our gods and our laws." — ὡς καταγελῶντες τῶν θεῶν καὶ τῶν νόμων τῶν ἡμετέρων. The lamentable consequences which the displeasure of the gods had brought upon them are then set forth: the companions of Kinêsias had all miserably perished, while Kinêsias himself was living in wretched health and in a condition worse than death: τὸ δ' οὕτως ἔχοντα τοσοῦτον χρόνον διατελεῖν, καὶ καθ' ἐκάστην ἡμέραν ἀποθνήσκοντα μὴ δύνασθαι τελευτῆσαι τὸν βίον, τοῖς μόνους προσήκει τοῖς τὰ τοιαῦτα ὑπερ οὗτος ἐξημαρτηκόσι.

The comic poets Strattis and Plato also marked out Kinêsias among their favorite subjects of derision and libel, and seem particularly to have represented his lean person and constant ill health as a punishment of the gods for his impiety. See Meineke, *Fragm. Comic. Græc.* (Strattis), vol. ii, p. 768 (Plato), p. 679.

² Lysias cont. Andokid. sects. 50, 51; Cornel. Nepos, Alcib. c. 4. The expressions of Pindar (Fragm. 96) and of Sophoklēs (Fragm. 58, Brunck. — *Edip. Kolon.* 1058) respecting the value of the Eleusinian mysteries, are very striking: also Cicero, *Legg.* ii, 14.

Horace will not allow himself to be under the same roof, or in the same boat, with any one who has been guilty of divulging these mysteries (*Od.* iii, 2, 26), much more then of deriding them.

The reader will find the fullest information about these ceremonies in the *Eleusinia*, forming the first treatise in the work of Lobeck called *Aglaophamus*; and in the Dissertation called *Eleusinia*, in K. O. Müller's *Kleine Schriften*, vol. ii, p. 242, *seqq.*

³ Diodor. xiii, 6.

to the majesty of the two offended goddesses, and for punishment on the delinquents.¹ And the enemies of Alkibiadēs, personal as well as political, found the opportunity favorable for reviving that charge against him which they had artfully suffered to drop before his departure to Sicily. The matter of fact alleged against him — the mock-celebration of these holy ceremonies — was not only in itself probable, but proved by reasonably good testimony against him and some of his intimate companions. Moreover, the overbearing insolence of demeanor habitual with Alkibiadēs, so glaringly at variance with the equal restraints of democracy, enabled his enemies to impute to him not only irreligious acts, but anti-constitutional purposes; an association of ideas which was at this moment the more easily accredited, since his divulcation and parody of the mysteries did not stand alone, but was interpreted in conjunction with the recent mutilation of the Hermæ — as a manifestation of the same anti-patriotic and irreligious feeling, if not part and parcel of the same treasonable scheme. And the alarm on this subject was now renewed by the appearance of a Lacedæmonian army at the isthmus, professing to contemplate some enterprise in conjunction with the Bœotians, a purpose not easy to understand, and presenting every appearance of being a cloak for hostile designs against Athens. So fully was this believed among the Athenians, that they took arms, and remained under arms one whole night in the sacred precinct of the Theseium. No enemy indeed appeared, either without or within; but the conspiracy had only been prevented from breaking out, so they imagined, by the recent inquiries and detection. Moreover, the party in Argos connected with Alkibiadēs were just at this time suspected of a plot for the subversion of their own democracy, which still farther aggravated the presumptions against him, while it induced the Athenians to give up to the Argeian democratical government the oligarchical hostages which had been taken from that town a few months before,² in order that it might put these hostages to death, whenever it thought fit.

¹ We shall find these sacred families hereafter to be the most obstinate in opposing the return of Alkibiadēs from banishment (*Thucyd.* viii, 53).

² *Thucyd.* vi, 53-61.

Such incidents materially aided the enemies of Alkibiadēs in their unremitting efforts to procure his recall and condemnation. Among them were men very different in station and temper: Thessalus son of Kimon, a man of the highest lineage and of hereditary oligarchical politics, as well as Androklēs, a leading demagogue or popular orator. It was the former who preferred against him in the senate the memorable impeachment, which, fortunately for our information, is recorded verbatim.

"Thessalus son of Kimon, of the deme Lakiadæ, hath impeached Alkibiadēs son of Kleinias, of the deme Skambônidæ, as guilty of crime in regard to the two goddesses Dēmêtēr and Persephonê, in mimicking the mysteries, and exhibiting them to his companions in his own house, wearing the costume of the hierophant: applying to himself the name of hierophant; to Polytion, that of daduch; to Theodōrus that of herald, and addressing his remaining companions as mysts and epopts; all contrary to the sacred customs and canons, of old established by the Eumolpidæ, the Kerykes, and the Eleusinian priests."

Similar impeachments being at the same time presented against other citizens now serving in Sicily along with Alkibiadēs, the accusers moved that he and the rest might be sent for to come home and take their trial. We may observe that the indictment against him is quite distinct and special, making no allusion to any supposed treasonable or anti-constitutional projects: probably, however, these suspicions were pressed by his enemies in their preliminary speeches, for the purpose of inducing the Athenians to remove him from the command of the army forthwith, and send for him home. For such a step it was indispensable that a strong case should be made out: but the public was at length thoroughly brought round, and the Salaminian trireme

¹ Plutarch, Alkib. c. 22. Θέσσαλος Κίμωνος Λακιάδης, Ἀλκιβιάδην Κλεινίου Σκαμβωνιδὴν εἰσηγγεῖλεν ἁδικεῖν περὶ τῶ θεῶ, τὴν Δημήτρα καὶ τὴν Κόρη, ἐπομμύμενον τῶ μυστήρια, καὶ δεικνύοντα τοῖς αὐτοῦ ἑταίροις ἐν τῇ οἰκίᾳ ἑαυτοῦ, ἔχοντα στολὴν, ὁλοπερ ἱεροφάντης ἔχων δεικνύει τὰ ἱερὰ, καὶ ἐνομάζοντα αὐτὸν μὲν ἱεροφάντην, Πολυτίωνα δὲ δαδούχον, κήρυκα δὲ Θεόδωρον Φηγεία· τοὺς δ' ἄλλους ἑταίρους, μύστας προσαγορεύοντα καὶ ἐπόπτας, παρὰ τὰ νόμιμα καὶ τὰ καθιεστηκότα ὑπὸ τῶ Εὐμολπιδῶν καὶ κηρύκων καὶ τῶν ἱερῶν ὧν ἐξ Ἑλευσίνος.

was despatched to Sicily to fetch him. Great care however was taken, in sending this summons, to avoid all appearance of pre-judgment, or harshness, or menace. The trierarch was forbidden to seize his person, and had instructions to invite him simply to accompany the Salaminian home in his own trireme: so as to avoid the hazard of offending the Argeian and Mantineian allies serving in Sicily, or the army itself.¹

It was on the return of the Athenian army from their unsuccessful attempt at Kamarina, to their previous quarters at Katana, that they found the Salaminian trireme newly arrived from Athens with this grave requisition against the general. We may be sure that Alkibiadēs received private intimation from his friends at Athens, by the same trireme, communicating to him the temper of the people, so that his resolution was speedily taken. Professing to obey, he departed in his own trireme on the voyage homeward, along with the other persons accused, the Salaminian trireme being in company; but as soon as they arrived at Thurii, in coasting along Italy, he and his companions quitted the vessel and disappeared. After a fruitless search on the part of the Salaminian trierarch, the two triremes were obliged to return to Athens without him. Both Alkibiadēs and the rest of the accused — one of whom² was his own cousin and namesake — were tried, condemned to death on non-appearance, and their property confiscated; while the Eumolpidæ and the other Eleusinian sacred families pronounced him to be accursed by the gods, for his desecration of the mysteries,³ and recorded the condemnation on a plate of lead.

Probably his disappearance and exile were acceptable to his enemies at Athens: at any rate, they thus made sure of getting rid of him; while had he come back, his condemnation to death,

¹ Thucyd. vi, 61.

² Xenoph. Hellen. i, 2, 13.

³ Thucyd. vi, 61; Plutarch, Alkib. c. 22-33; Lysias, Orat. vi, cont. Andokid. sect. 42.

Plutarch says that it would have been easy for Alkibiadēs to raise a mutiny in the army at Katana, had he chosen to resist the order for coming home. But this is highly improbable. Considering what his conduct became immediately afterwards, we shall see good reason to believe that he would have taken this step, had it been practicable.

though probable, could not be considered as certain. In considering the conduct of the Athenians towards Alkibiadès, we have to remark, that the people were guilty of no act of injustice. He had committed — at least there was fair reason for believing that he had committed — an act criminal in the estimation of every Greek; the divulgence and profanation of the mysteries. This act — alleged against him in the indictment very distinctly, divested of all supposed ulterior purpose, treasonable or otherwise — was legally punishable at Athens, and was universally accounted guilty in public estimation, as an offence at once against the religious sentiment of the people and against the public safety, by offending the two goddesses, Dêmêter and Persephonê, and driving them to withdraw their favor and protection. The same demand for legal punishment would have been supposed to exist in a Christian Catholic country, down to a very recent period of history, if instead of the Eleusinian mysteries we suppose the sacrament of the mass to have been the ceremony ridiculed; though such a proceeding would involve no breach of obligation to secrecy. Nor ought we to judge what would have been the measure of penalty formerly awarded to a person convicted of such an offence, by consulting the tendency of penal legislation during the last sixty years. Even down to the last century it would have been visited with something sharper than the draught of hemlock, which is the worst that could possibly have befallen Alkibiadès at Athens, as we may see by the condemnation and execution of the Chevalier de la Barre at Abbeville, in 1766. The uniform tendency of Christian legislation,¹ down to a recent period, leaves no room for reproaching

¹ To appreciate fairly the violent emotion raised at Athens by the mutilation of the Hermæ and by the profanation of the mysteries, it is necessary to consider the way in which analogous acts of sacrilege have been viewed in Christian and Catholic penal legislation, even down to the time of the first French Revolution.

I transcribe the following extract from a work of authority on French criminal jurisprudence — *Jousse, Traité de la Justice Criminelle*, Paris, 1771, part iv, tit. 27, vol. iii, p. 672: —

“Du Crime de Leze-Majesté Divine. — Les Crimes de Leze Majesté Divine, sont ceux qui attaquent Dieu immédiatement, et qu'on doit regarder par cette raison comme les plus atroces et les plus exécrationnels — La Majesté

the Athenians with excessive cruelty in their penal visitation of offences against the religious sentiment. On the contrary, the Athenians are distinguished for comparative mildness and tolerance, as we shall find various opportunities for remarking.

Now in reviewing the conduct of the Athenians towards Alkibiadès, we must consider, that this violation of the mysteries, of which he was indicted in good legal form, was an action for which he really deserved punishment, if any one deserved it. Even

de Dieu peut être offensée de plusieurs manières. — 1. En niant l'existence de Dieu. 2. Par le crime de ceux qui attentent directement contre la Divinité comme quand on profane ou qu'on foule aux pieds les saintes Hosties; ou qu'on frappe les Images de Dieu dans le dessein de l'insulter. C'est ce qu'on appelle *Crime de Leze-Majesté Divine au premier Chef*.”

Again in the same work, part iv, tit. 46, n. 5, 8, 10, 11, vol. iv, pp. 97-99: —

“La profanation des Sacramens et des Mystères de la Religion est un sacrilège des plus exécrationnels. Tel est le crime de ceux qui emploient les choses sacrées à des usages communs et mauvais, en dérision des Mystères; ceux qui profanent la sainte Eucharistie, ou qui en abusent en quelque manière que ce soit; ceux qui en mépris de la Religion, profanent les Fonts-Baptismaux; qui jettent par terre les saintes Hosties, ou qui les emploient à des usages vils et profanes: ceux qui, en dérision de nos sacrés Mystères, les contrefont dans leurs débauches; ceux qui frappent, mutilent, abattent, les Images consacrées à Dieu, ou à la Sainte Vierge, ou aux Saints, en mépris de la Religion; et enfin, tous ceux qui commettent de semblables impiétés. Tous ces crimes sont des crimes de Leze-Majesté divine au premier chef, parce, qu'ils s'attaquent immédiatement à Dieu, et ne se font à aucun dessein que de l'offenser.”

“... La peine du Sacrilège, par l'Ancien Testament, étoit celle du feu, et d'être lapidé. — Par les Loix Romaines, les coupables étoient condamnés au fer, au feu, et aux bêtes farouches, suivant les circonstances. — En France, la peine du sacrilège est arbitraire, et dépend de la qualité et des circonstances du crime, du lieu, du temps, et de la qualité de l'accusé. — Dans le sacrilège au premier chef, qui attaque la Divinité, la Sainte Vierge, et les Saints, v. g. à l'égard de ceux qui foulent aux pieds les saintes Hosties, ou qui les jettent à terre, ou en abusent, et qui les emploient à des usages vils et profanes, la peine est le feu, l'amende honorable, et le poing coupé. Il en est de même de ceux qui profanent les Fonts-Baptismaux: ceux qui, en dérision de nos Mystères, s'en moquent et les contrefont dans leurs débauches: ils doivent être punis de peine capitale, parceque ces crimes attaquent immédiatement la Divinité.”

M. Jousse proceeds to cite several examples of persons condemned to death for acts of sacrilege, of the nature above described.

his enemies did not fabricate this charge, or impute it to him falsely; though they were guilty of insidious and unprincipled manœuvres to exasperate the public mind against him. Their machinations begin with the mutilation of the Hermæ; an act of new and unparalleled wickedness, to which historians of Greece seldom do justice. It was not, like the violations of the mysteries, a piece of indecent pastime committed within four walls, and never intended to become known. It was an outrage essentially public, planned and executed by conspirators for the deliberate purpose of lacerating the religious mind of Athens, and turning the prevalent terror and distraction to political profit. Thus much is certain; though we cannot be sure who the conspirators were, nor what was their exact or special purpose. That the destruction of Alkibiadēs was one of the direct purposes of the conspirators, is highly probable. But his enemies, even if they were not among the original authors, at least took upon themselves half the guilt of the proceeding, by making it the basis of treacherous machinations against his person. How their scheme, which was originally contrived to destroy him before the expedition departed, at first failed, was then artfully dropped, and at length effectually revived, after a long train of calumny against the absent general, has been already recounted. It is among the darkest chapters of Athenian political history, indicating, on the part of the people, strong religious excitability, without any injustice towards Alkibiadēs; but indicating, on the part of his enemies, as well as of the Hermokopids generally, a depth of wicked contrivance rarely paralleled in political warfare. It is to these men, not to the people, that Alkibiadēs owes his expulsion, aided indeed by the effect of his own previous character. In regard to the Hermæ, the Athenians condemned to death — after and by consequence of the deposition of Andokidēs — a small number of men who may perhaps have been innocent victims, but whom they sincerely believed to be guilty; and whose death not only tranquillized comparatively the public mind, but served as the only means of rescue to a far larger number of prisoners confined on suspicion. In regard to Alkibiadēs, they came to no collective resolution, except that of recalling him to take his trial, a resolution implying no wrong in those who voted

for it, whatever may be the guilt of those who proposed and prepared it by perfidious means.¹

¹ The proceedings in England in 1678 and 1679, in consequence of the pretended Popish Plot, have been alluded to by various authors, and recently by Dr. Thirlwall, as affording an analogy to that which occurred at Athens after the mutilation of the Hermæ. But there are many material differences, and all, so far as I can perceive, to the advantage of Athens.

1. The "hellish and damnable plot of the Popish Recusants," (to adopt the words of the Houses of Lords and Commons, — see Dr. Lingard's History of England, vol. xiii, ch. v, p. 88, — words, the like of which were doubtless employed at Athens in reference to the Hermokopids,) was baseless, mendacious, and incredible, from the beginning. It started from no real fact: the whole of it was a tissue of falsehoods and fabrications proceeding from Oates, Bedloe, and a few other informers of the worst character.

At Athens, there was unquestionably a plot; the Hermokopids were real conspirators, not few in number. No one could doubt that they conspired for other objects besides the mutilation of the Hermæ. At the same time, no one knew what these objects were, nor who the conspirators themselves were.

If before the mutilation of the Hermæ, a man like Oates had pretended to reveal to the Athenian people a fabricated plot implicating Alkibiadēs and others, he would have found no credence. It was not until after and by reason of that terror-striking incident, that the Athenians began to give credence to informers. And we are to recollect that they did not put any one to death on the evidence of these informers. They contented themselves with imprisoning on suspicion, until they got the confession and deposition of Andokidēs. Those implicated in that deposition were condemned to death. Now Andokidēs, as a witness, deserves but very qualified confidence; yet it is impossible to degrade him to the same level even as Teukrus or Diokleidēs, much less to that of Oates and Bedloe. We cannot wonder that the people trusted him, and, under the peculiar circumstances of the case, it was the least evil that they should trust him. The witnesses upon whose testimony the prisoners under the Popish Plot were condemned, were even inferior to Teukrus and Diokleidēs in presumptive credibility.

The Athenian people have been censured for their folly in believing the democratical constitution in danger, because the Hermæ had been mutilated. I have endeavored to show, that, looking to their religious ideas, the thread of connection between these two ideas is perfectly explicable. And why are we to quarrel with the Athenians because they took arms, and put themselves on their guard, when a Lacedæmonian or a Bœotian armed force was actually on their frontier?

As for the condemnation of Alkibiadēs and others for profaning and divulging the Eleusinian mysteries, these are not for a moment to be put upon a level with the condemnations in the Popish Plot. These were true

In order to appreciate the desperate hatred with which the exile Alkibiadēs afterwards revenged himself on his countrymen, it has been necessary to explain to what extent he had just ground of complaint against them. On being informed that they had condemned him to death in his absence, he is said to have exclaimed: "I shall show them that I am alive." He fully redeemed his word.¹

The recall and consequent banishment of Alkibiadēs was mischievous to Athens in several ways. It transferred to the

charges, at least there is strong presumptive reason for believing that they were true. Persons were convicted and punished for having done acts which they really had done, and which they knew to be legal crimes. Whether it be right to constitute such acts legal crimes, or not, is another question. The enormity of the Popish Plot consisted in punishing persons for acts which they had not done, and upon depositions of the most lying and worthless witnesses.

The state of mind into which the Athenians were driven after the cutting of the Hermæ, was indeed very analogous to that of the English people during the circulation of the Popish Plot. The suffering, terror, and distraction, I apprehend to have been even greater at Athens: but the cause of it was graver and more real, and the active injustice which it produced was far less than in England.

"I shall not detain the reader (says Dr. Lingard, Hist. Engl. xiii, p. 105) with a narrative of the partial trials and judicial murders of the unfortunate men, whose names had been inserted by Oates in his pretended discoveries. So violent was the excitement, so general the delusion created by the perjuries of the informer, that the voice of reason and the claims of justice were equally disregarded. Both judge and jury seemed to have no other object than to inflict vengeance on the supposed traitors. To speak in support of their witnesses, or to hint the improbability of the informations, required a strength of mind, a recklessness of consequences, which falls to the lot of few individuals: even the king himself, convinced as he was of the imposture, and contemptuously as he spoke of it in private, dared not exercise his prerogative of mercy to save the lives of the innocent."

It is to be noted that the House of Lords, both acting as a legislative body, and in their judicial character when the Catholic Lord Stafford was tried before them (ch. vi, pp. 231-241), displayed a degree of prejudice and injustice quite equal to that of the judges and juries in the law-courts.

Both the English judicature on this occasion, and the Milanese judicature on the occasion adverted to in a previous note, were more corrupted and driven to greater injustice by the reigning prejudice, than the purely popular dikastery of Athens in this affair of the Hermæ, and of the other profanations.

¹ Plutarch, Alkib. c. 22.

enemy's camp an angry exile, to make known her weak points, and to rouse the sluggishness of Sparta. It offended a portion of the Sicilian armament, most of all probably the Argeians and Mantineians, and slackened their zeal in the cause.¹ And what was worst of all, it left the armament altogether under the paralyzing command of Nikias. For Lamachus, though still equal in nominal authority, and now invested with the command of one-half instead of one-third of the army, appears to have had no real influence except in the field.

Nikias now proceeded to execute that scheme which he had first suggested, to sail round from Katana to Selinus and Egesta, with the view of investigating the quarrel between the two as well as the financial means of the latter. Passing through the strait and along the north coast of the island, he first touched at Himera, where admittance was refused to him; he next captured a Sikanian maritime town named Hykkara, together with many prisoners; among them the celebrated courtesan Laïs, then a very young girl.² Having handed over this place to the Egestæans, Nikias went in person to inspect their city and condition; but could obtain no more money than the thirty talents which had been before announced on the second visit of the commissioners. He then restored the prisoners from Hykkara to their Sikanian countrymen, receiving a ransom of one hundred and twenty talents,³ and conducted the Athenian land-force across the centre of the island, through the territory of the friendly Sikels to Katana; making an attack in his way upon the hostile Sikel

¹ Thucyd. ii, 65. τὰ τε ἐν τῷ στρατοπέδῳ ἀμβλύτερα ἐποίουν, etc.

² The statements respecting the age and life of Laïs appear involved in inextricable confusion. See the note of Gölner ad Philisti, Fragment. v.

³ Diodor. viii, 6; Thucyd. vi, 62. Καὶ τὸν δόρυπα ἀπὸ δόσαν, καὶ ἐγένοντο ἐξ αὐτῶν εἴκοσι καὶ ἑκατὸν τάλαντα. The word ἀπὸ δόσαν seems to mean that the prisoners were handed over to their fellow-countrymen, the natural persons to negotiate for their release, upon private contract of a definite sum. Had Thucydides said ἀπέδοντο, it would have meant that they were put up to auction for what they would fetch. This distinction is at least possible, and, in my judgment, more admissible than that proposed in the note of Dr. Arnold.

If, however, we refer to Thucyd. vi, 88, with Duker's note, we shall see that μεταπέμειν is sometimes, though rarely, used in the sense of μεταπέμψαι. The case may perhaps be the same with ἀπέδσαν for ἀπέδοντο.

town of Hybla, in which he was repulsed. At Katana he was rejoined by his naval force.

It was now seemingly about the middle of October, and three months had elapsed since the arrival of the Athenian armament at Rhegium; during which period they had achieved nothing except the acquisition of Naxos and Katana as allies — unless we are to reckon the insignificant capture of Hykkara. But Naxos and Katana, as Chalkidic cities, had been counted upon beforehand even by Nikias; together with Rhegium, which had been found reluctant, to his great disappointment. What is still worse, in reference to the character of the general, not only nothing serious had been achieved, but nothing serious had been attempted. The precious moment pointed out by Lamachus for action, when the terrific menace of the recent untried armament was at its maximum, and preparation as well as confidence was wanting at Syracuse, had been irreparably wasted. Every day the preparations of the Syracusans improved and their fears diminished; the invader, whom they had looked upon as so formidable, turned out both hesitating and timorous,¹ and when he had disappeared out of their sight to Hykkara and Egesta, still more when he assailed in vain the insignificant Sikel post of Hybla, their minds underwent a reaction from dismay to extreme confidence. The mass of Syracusan citizens, now reinforced by allies from Selinus and other cities, called upon their generals to lead to the attack of the Athenian position at Katana, since the Athenians did not dare to approach Syracuse; while Syracusan horsemen even went so far as to insult the Athenians in their camp, riding up to ask if they were come to settle as peaceable citizens in the island, instead of restoring the Leontines. Such unexpected humiliation, acting probably on the feelings of the soldiers, at length shamed Nikias out of his inaction, and compelled him to strike a blow for the maintenance of his own reputation. He devised a stratagem for approaching Syracuse in such a manner as to elude the opposition of the Syracusan cavalry, informing himself as to the ground near the city, through some exiles serving along with him.²

He despatched to Syracuse a Katanæan citizen, in his heart

¹ Thucyd. vi, 63 · vii, 42.

² Thucyd. vi, 63; Diodor. xiii 6.

attached to Athens, yet apparently neutral and on good terms with the other side, as bearer of a pretended message and proposition from the friends of Syracuse at Katana. Many of the Athenian soldiers, so the message ran, were in the habit of passing the night within the walls, apart from their camp and arms. It would be easy for the Syracusans by a vigorous attack at daybreak, to surprise them thus unprepared and dispersed; while the philo-Syracusan party at Katana promised to aid, by closing the gates, assailing the Athenians within, and setting fire to the ships. A numerous body of Katanæans, they added, were eager to coöperate in the plan now proposed.

This communication, reaching the Syracusan generals at a moment when they were themselves elate and disposed to an aggressive movement, found such incautious credence, that they sent back the messenger to Katana with cordial assent and agreement for a precise day. Accordingly, a day or two before, the entire Syracusan force was marched out towards Katana, and encamped for the night on the river Symæthus, in the Leontine territory, within about eight miles of Katana. But Nikias, with whom the whole proceeding originated, choosing this same day to put on shipboard his army, together with his Sikel allies present, sailed by night southward along the coast, rounding the island of Ortydia, into the Great Harbor of Syracuse. Arrived thither by break of day, he disembarked his troops unopposed south of the mouth of the Anâpus, in the interior of the Great Harbor, near the hamlet which stretched towards the temple of Zeus Olympius. Having broken down the neighboring bridge, where the Helôrine road crossed the Anâpus, he took up a position protected by various embarrassing obstacles, — houses, walls, trees, and standing water, besides the steep ground of the Olympieion itself on his left wing; so that he could choose his own time for fighting, and was out of the attack of the Syracusan horse. For the protection of his ships on the shore, he provided a palisade work by cutting down the neighboring trees; and even took precautions for his rear by throwing up a hasty fence of wood and stones touching the shore at the inner bay called Darkon. He had full leisure for such defensive works, since the enemy within the walls made no attempt to disturb him, while the Syracusan horse only discovered his manœuvre on arriving

before the lines at Katana; and though they lost no time in returning, the march back was a long one.¹ Such was the confidence of the Syracusans, however, that even after so long a march, they offered battle forthwith; but as Nikias did not quit his position, they retreated, to take up their night-station on the other side of the Helôrine road, probably a road bordered on each side by walls.

On the next morning, Nikias marched out of his position and formed his troops in order of battle, in two divisions, each eight deep. His front division was intended to attack; his rear division — in hollow square, with the baggage in the middle — was held in reserve near the camp, to lend aid where aid might be wanted; cavalry there was none. The Syracusan hoplites, seemingly far more numerous than his, presented the levy in mass of the city, without any selection; they were ranged in the deeper order of sixteen, alongside of their Selinuntine allies. On the right wing were posted their horsemen, the best part of their force, not less than twelve hundred in number; together with two hundred horsemen from Gela, twenty from Kamarina, about fifty bowmen, and a company of darters. The hoplites, though full of courage, had little training; and their array, never precisely kept, was on this occasion farther disturbed by the immediate vicinity of the city. Some had gone in to see their families; others, hurrying out to join, found the battle already begun, and took rank wherever they could.²

Thucydides, in describing this battle, gives us, according to his practice, a statement of the motives and feelings which animated the combatants on both sides, and which furnished a theme for the brief harangue of Nikias. This appears surprising to one accustomed to modern warfare, where the soldier is under the influence simply of professional honor and disgrace, without any thought of the cause for which he is fighting. In ancient times, such a motive was only one among many others, which, according to the circumstances of the case, contributed to elevate or depress the soldier's mind at the eve of action. Nikias adverted to the recognized military preeminence of chosen Argeians, Mantine-

¹ Thucyd. vi. 65, 66; Diodor. xiii, 6, Plutarch, Nikias, c. 13.

² Thucyd. vi, 67-69.

ians, and Athenians, as compared to the Syracusan levy in mass, who were full of belief in their own superiority, — this is a striking confession of the deplorable change which had been wrought by his own delay, — but who would come short in actual conflict, from want of discipline.¹ Moreover, he reminded them that they were far away from home, and that defeat would render them victims, one and all, of the Syracusan cavalry. He little thought, nor did his prophets forewarn him, that such a calamity, serious as it would have been, was even desirable for Athens, since it would have saved her from the far more overwhelming disasters which will be found to sadden the coming chapters of this history.

While the customary sacrifices were being performed, the slingers and bowmen on both sides became engaged in skirmishing. But presently the trumpets sounded, and Nikias ordered his first division of hoplites to charge at once rapidly, before the Syracusans expected it. Judging from his previous backwardness, they never imagined that he would be the first to give orders for charging; nor was it until they saw the Athenian line actually advancing towards them that they lifted their own arms from the ground and came forward to give the meeting. The shock was bravely encountered on both sides, and for some time the battle continued hand to hand with undecided result. There happened to supervene a violent storm of rain, with thunder and lightning, which alarmed the Syracusans, who construed it as an unfavorable augury, while to the more practised Athenian hoplites, it seemed a mere phenomenon of the season,² so that they still farther astonished the Syracusans by the unabated confidence

¹ Thucyd. vi, 68, 69. ἄλλως δὲ καὶ πρὸς ἀνδρας πανδημεῖ τε ὑμνομένοις, καὶ οὐκ ἀπολέκτους ὥσπερ ἡμᾶς· καὶ προσέτι Σικελιώτας, οἱ ὑπερφρονοῦσι μὲν ἡμᾶς, ὑπομένονσι δὲ οὐ· διὰ τὸ τὴν ἐπιστήμην τῆς τόλμης ἥσσω ἔχειν.

This passage illustrates very clearly the meaning of the adverb πανδημεῖ (compare πανδαμεῖ, πανομιλεῖ, Æschylus, Sept. Theb. 275.

² Thucyd. vi, 70. Τοῖς δ' ἐμπειροτέροις, τὰ μὲν γινόμενα, καὶ ὥρα ἔτους περαινεσθαι δοκεῖν, τοὺς δὲ ἀνθεστώτας, πολὺ μείζω ἐκπλήξιν μὴ νικωμένους παρεχεῖν.

The Athenians, unfortunately for themselves, were not equally unmoved by eclipses of the moon. The force of this remark will be seen in the next chapter but one.

with which they continued the fight. At length the Syracusan army was broken, dispersed, and fled; first, before the Argeians on the right, next, before the Athenians in the centre. The victors pursued as far as was safe and practicable, without disordering their ranks: for the Syracusan cavalry, which had not yet been engaged, checked all who pressed forward, and enabled their own infantry to retire in safety behind the Helôrine road.¹

So little were the Syracusans dispirited with this defeat, that they did not retire within their city until they had sent an adequate detachment to guard the neighboring temple and sacred precinct of the Olympian Zeus, wherein there was much deposited wealth, which they feared that the Athenians might seize. Nikias, however, without approaching the sacred ground, contented himself with occupying the field of battle, burnt his own dead, and stripped the arms from the dead of the enemy. The Syracusans and their allies lost two hundred and fifty men, the Athenians fifty.²

On the morrow, having granted to the Syracusans their dead bodies for burial, and collected the ashes of his own dead, Nikias reëmbarked his troops, put to sea, and sailed back to his former station at Katana. He conceived it impossible, without cavalry and a farther stock of money, to maintain his position near Syracuse or to prosecute immediate operations of siege or blockade. And as the winter was now approaching, he determined to take up winter quarters at Katana; though considering the mild winter at Syracuse, and the danger of marsh fever near the Great Harbor in summer, the change of season might well be regarded as a questionable gain. But he proposed to employ the interval

¹ Thucyd. vi, 70.

² Thucyd. vi, 71. Plutarch (Nikias, c. 16) states that Nikias refused from religious scruples to invade the sacred precinct, though his soldiers were eager to seize its contents.

Diodorus (xiii, 6) affirms erroneously that the Athenians became masters of the Olympieion. Pausanias too says the same thing (x, 28, 3), adding that Nikias abstained from disturbing either the treasures or the offerings, and left them still under the care of the Syracusan priests.

Plutarch farther states that Nikias stayed some days in his position before he returned to Katana. But the language of Thucydides indicates that the Athenians returned on the day after the battle.

in sending to Athens for cavalry and money, as well as in procuring the like reinforcements from his Sicilian allies, whose numbers he calculated now on increasing by the accession of new cities after his recent victory, and to get together magazines of every kind for beginning the siege of Syracuse in the spring. Despatching a trireme to Athens with these requisitions, he sailed with his forces to Messênê, within which there was a favorable party who gave hopes of opening the gates to him. Such a correspondence had already been commenced before the departure of Alkibiadês: but it was the first act of revenge which the departing general took on his country, to betray the proceedings to the philo-Syracusan party in Messênê. Accordingly, these latter, watching their opportunity, rose in arms before the arrival of Nikias, put to death their chief antagonists, and held the town by force against the Athenians; who after a fruitless delay of thirteen days, with scanty supplies and under stormy weather, were forced to return to Naxos, where they established a palisaded camp and station, and went into winter quarters.¹

The recent stratagem of Nikias, followed by the movement into the harbor of Syracuse, and the battle, had been ably planned and executed. It served to show the courage and discipline of the army, as well as to keep up the spirits of the soldiers themselves, and to obviate those feelings of disappointment which the previous inefficiency of the armament tended to arouse. But as to other results, the victory was barren; we may even say, positively mischievous, since it imparted a momentary stimulus which served as an excuse to Nikias for the three months of total inaction which followed, and since it neither weakened nor humiliated the Syracusans, but gave them a salutary lesson which they turned to account while Nikias was in his winter quarters. His apathy during these first eight months after the arrival of the expedition at Rhegium (from July 415 B.C. to March 414 B.C.), was the most deplorable of all calamities to his army, his country, and himself. Abundant proofs of this will be seen in the coming events: at present, we have only to turn back to his own predictions and recommendations. All the difficulties and dangers to

¹ Thucyd. vi, 71-74.

be surmounted in Sicily had been foreseen by himself and impressed upon the Athenians: in the first instance, as grounds against undertaking the expedition; but the Athenians, though unfortunately not allowing them to avail in that capacity, fully admitted their reality, and authorized him to demand whatever force was necessary to overcome them.¹ He had thus been allowed to bring with him a force calculated upon his own ideas, together with supplies and implements for besieging; yet when arrived, he seems only anxious to avoid exposing that force in any serious enterprise, and to find an excuse for conducting it back to Athens. That Syracuse was the grand enemy, and that the capital point of the enterprise was the siege of that city, was a truth familiar to himself as well as every man at Athens:² upon the formidable cavalry of the Syracusans, Nicias had himself insisted, in the preliminary debates. Yet, after four months of mere trifling, and pretence of action so as to evade dealing with the real difficulty, the existence of this cavalry is made an excuse for a farther postponement of four months until reinforcements can be obtained from Athens. To all the intrinsic dangers of the case, predicted by Nicias himself with proper discernment, was thus superadded the aggravated danger of his own factitious delay; frittering away the first impression of his armament, giving the Syracusans leisure to enlarge their fortifications, and allowing the Peloponnesians time to interfere against Attica as well as to succor Sicily. It was the unhappy weakness of this commander to shrink from decisive resolutions of every kind, and at any rate to postpone them until the necessity became imminent: the consequence of which was, — to use an expression of the Corinthian envoy before the Peloponnesian war in censuring the dilatory policy of Sparta, — that never acting, yet always seeming about to act, he found his enemy in double force instead of single, at the moment of actual conflict.³

Great, indeed, must have been the disappointment of the Athe-

¹ Thucyd. vi, 21-26.

² Thucyd. vi, 20.

³ Thucyd. vi, 69. ἡσυχάζετε γὰρ μόνοι Ἕλληνων, ὡς Λακεδαιμόνιοι, οὐ γὰρ δυνάμει τινὰ ἀλλὰ τῇ μελλήσει ἀμυνόμενοι, καὶ μόνοι οὐκ ἀρχομένην τὴν ἀβέστησιν τῶν ἐχθρῶν, ἀλλὰ διπλασιουμένην, καταλίοντες.

nians, when, after having sent forth in the month of June, an expedition of unparalleled efficiency, they receive in the month of November a despatch to acquaint them that the general has accomplished little except one indecisive victory; and that he has not even attempted anything serious, nor can do so unless they send him farther cavalry and money. Yet the only answer which they made was, to grant and provide for this demand without any public expression of discontent or disappointment against him.¹ And this is the more to be noted, since the re-

¹ Δισχρὸν δὲ βιασθέντας ἀπελθεῖν, ἢ ὕστερον ἐπιμεταπέμπεσθαι, τὸ πρῶτον ἀσκέπτως βουλευσαμένους: "It is disgraceful to be driven out of Sicily by superior force, or to send back here afterwards for fresh reinforcements, through our own fault in making bad calculations at first." (Thucyd. vi, 21.)

This was a part of the last speech by Nicias himself at Athens, prior to the expedition. The Athenian people in reply had passed a vote that he and his colleagues should fix their own amount of force, and should have everything which they asked for. Moreover, such was the feeling in the city, that every one individually was anxious to put down his name to serve (vi, 26-31). Thucydides can hardly find words sufficient to depict the completeness, the grandeur, the wealth public and private, of the armament.

As this goes to establish what I have advanced in the text, — that the actions of Nicias in Sicily stand most of all condemned by his own previous speeches at Athens, — so it seems to have been forgotten by Dr. Arnold, when he wrote his note on the remarkable passage, ii, 65, of Thucydides, — ἰς ὧν ἄλλα τε πολλὰ, ὡς ἐν μεγάλῃ πόλει, καὶ ἀρχὴν ἐχούσῃ, ἡμαρτήθη, καὶ ὡς Σικελίαν πλοῦς· ὅς οὐ τοσοῦτον γνώμης ἀμάρτημα ἦν πρὸς οὐς ἐπείσαν, ὅσον οἱ ἐκπέμψαντες, οὐ τὰ πρόσφορα τοῖς οἰχομένοις ἐπιγιγνώσκοντες, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὰς ἰδίας διαβολὰς περὶ τῆς τοῦ δήμου πρостаσίας, τα τε ἐν τῷ στρατοπέδῳ ἀμβλύτερα ἐποίουν, καὶ τὰ περὶ τὴν πόλιν πρῶτον ἐν ἀλλήλοις ἐταρήχθησαν. Upon which Dr. Arnold remarks: —

"Thucydides here expresses the same opinion which he repeats in two other places (vi, 31; vii, 42), namely, that the Athenian power was fully adequate to the conquest of Syracuse, had not the expedition been mismanaged by the general, and insufficiently supplied by the government at home. The words οὐ τὰ πρόσφορα τοῖς οἰχομένοις ἐπιγιγνώσκοντες signify "not voting afterwards the needful supplies to their absent armament:" for Nicias was prevented from improving his first victory over the Syracusans by the want of cavalry and money; and the whole winter was lost before he could get supplied from Athens. And subsequently the armament was allowed to be reduced

moval of Alkibiadês afforded an inviting and even valuable opportunity for proposing to send out a fresh colleague in his room.

to great distress and weakness, before the second expedition was sent to reinforce it." Göller and Poppo concur in this explanation.

Let us in the first place discuss the explanation here given of the words τὰ πρόσφορα ἐπιγιγνώσκοντες. It appears to me that these words do not signify "voting the needful supplies."

The word ἐπιγιγνώσκειν cannot be used in the same sense with ἐπιπέμπειν — παρασχεῖν (vii, 2-15), ἐκπορίζειν. As it would not be admissible to say ἐπιγιγνώσκειν ὅπλα, νῆας, ἵππους, χρήματα, etc., so neither can it be right to say ἐπιγιγνώσκειν τὰ πρόσφορα, if this latter word were used only as a comprehensive word for these particulars, meaning "supplies." The words really mean: "taking farther resolutions (after the expedition was gone) unsuitable or mischievous to the absent armament." Πρόσφορα is used here quite generally, agreeing with βουλευματα, or some such word; indeed, we find the phrase τὰ πρόσφορα used in the most general sense, for "what is suitable;" "what is advantageous or convenient." γυμνασῶ τὰ πρόσφορα — πρᾶσσεται τὰ πρόσφορα — τὰ πρόσφορα ἡδέατ' — τὰ πρόσφορα δρωγς ἄν — τὸ ταῖσδε πρόσφορον Euripid. Hippol. 112; Alkestis, 148; Iphig. Aul. 160, B; Helen. 1299; Troades, 304.

Thucydides appears to have in view the violent party contests which broke out in reference to the Hermæ and the other irreligious acts at Athens, after the departure of the armament, especially to the mischief of recalling Alkibiadês, which grew out of those contests. He does not allude to the withholding of supplies from the armament; nor was it the purpose of any of the parties at Athens to withhold them. The party acrimony was directed against Alkibiadês exclusively, not against the expedition.

Next, as to the main allegation in Dr Arnold's note, that one of the causes of the failure of the Athenian expedition in Sicily, was, that it was "insufficiently supplied by Athens." Of the two passages to which he refers in Thucydides (vi, 31; vii, 42), the first distinctly contradicts this allegation, by setting forth the prodigious amount of force sent, the second says nothing about it, and indirectly discountenances it, by dwelling upon the glaring blunders of Nikias.

After the Athenians had allowed Nikias in the spring to name and collect the force which he thought requisite, how could they expect to receive a demand for farther reinforcements in the autumn, the army having really done nothing? Nevertheless, the supplies were sent, as soon as they could be, and as soon as Nikias expected them. If the whole winter was lost, that was not the fault of the Athenians.

Still harder is it in Dr Arnold, to say, "that the armament was allowed to be reduced to great distress and weakness before the second expedition was sent to reinforce it." The second expedition was sent the moment that Nikias made known his distress and asked for it, his intimation of distress coming quite suddenly, almost immediately after most successful appearances.



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If there were no complaints raised against Nikias at Athens, so neither are we informed of any such, even among his own soldiers in Sicily, though *their* disappointment must have been yet greater than that of their countrymen at home, considering the expectations with which they had come out. We may remember that the delay of a few days at Eion, under perfectly justifiable circumstances, and while awaiting the arrival of reinforcements actually sent for, raised the loudest murmurs against Kleon in his expedition against Amphipolis, from the hoplites in his own army.¹ The contrast is instructive, and will appear yet more instructive as we advance forward.

Meanwhile the Syracusans were profiting by the lesson of their recent defeat. In the next public assembly which ensued, Hermokratês addressed them in the mingled tone of encouragement and admonition. He praised their bravery, while he deprecated their want of tactics and discipline. Considering the great superiority of the enemy in this last respect, he regarded the recent battle as giving good promise for the future; and he appealed with satisfaction to the precautions taken by Nikias in fortifying his camp, as well as to his speedy retreat after the battle. He pressed them to diminish the excessive number of fifteen generals, whom they had hitherto been accustomed to nominate to the command; to reduce the number to three, conferring upon them at the same

It appears to me that nothing can be more incorrect or inconsistent with the whole tenor of the narrative of Thucydides, than to charge the Athenians with having starved their expedition. What they are really chargeable with, is, the having devoted to it a disproportionate fraction of their entire strength, perfectly enormous and ruinous. And so Thucydides plainly conceives it, when he is describing both the armament of Nikias and that of Demosthenês.

Thucydides is very reserved in saying anything against Nikias, whom he treats throughout with the greatest indulgence and tenderness. But he lets drop quite sufficient to prove that he conceived the mismanagement of the general as *the cause* of the failure of the armament, not as "one of two causes," as Dr. Arnold here presents it. Of course, I recognize fully the consummate skill, and the aggressive vigor so unusual in a Spartan, of Gylippus, together with the effective influence which this exercised upon the result. But Gylippus would never have set foot in Syracuse, had he not been let in, first through the apathy, next through the contemptuous want of precaution, shown by Nikias (vii, 42).

Thucyd. v, 7. See volume vi of this History, chap. liv, p. 464.

time fuller powers than had been before enjoyed, and swearing a solemn oath to leave them unfettered in the exercise of such powers; lastly, to enjoin upon these generals the most strenuous efforts, during the coming winter, for training and arming the whole population. Accordingly Hermokratês himself, with Herakleidês and Sikanus, were named to the command. Ambassadors were sent both to Sparta and to Corinth, for the purpose of entreating assistance in Sicily, as well as of prevailing on the Peloponnesians to recommence a direct attack against Attica;¹ so as at least to prevent the Athenians from sending farther reinforcements to Nikias, and perhaps even to bring about the recall of his army.

But by far the most important measure which marked the nomination of the new generals, was, the enlargement of the line of fortifications at Syracuse. They constructed a new wall, inclosing an additional space and covering both their inner and their outer city to the westward, reaching from the outer sea to the Great Harbor, across the whole space fronting the rising slope of the hill of Epipolæ, and stretching far enough westward to inclose the sacred precinct of Apollo Temenites. This was intended as a precaution, in order that if Nikias, resuming operations in the spring, should beat them in the field and confine them to their walls, he might, nevertheless, be prevented from carrying a wall of circumvallation from sea to sea without covering a great additional extent of ground.² Besides this, the Syracusans fitted up and garrisoned the deserted town of Megara, on the coast to the north of Syracuse; they established a regular fortification and garrison in the Olympieion or temple of Zeus Olympius, which they had already garrisoned after the recent battle with Nikias; and they planted stakes in the sea to obstruct the convenient landing-places. All these precautions were useful to them; and we may even say that the new outlying fortification, inclosing the Temenites, proved their salvation in the coming siege, by so lengthening the circumvallation necessary for the Athenians to

¹ Thucyd. vi, 72, 73.

² Thucyd. vi, 75. Ἐπειχόν δὲ οἱ Συρακοῖται ἐν τῷ χειμῶνι πρὸς τὴν πόλιν τὸν Τεμένιτῃν ἐνδοῦ παλαιῶν τειχῶν παρὰ παντὸς πρὸς Ἐπιπόλᾳς ὄρον, ὅπως αἱ δι' Ἰλασσόνορος ἐθαποτειχίστοιο ὥσιν, ἦν ἄρα σφαλλόνται, etc.

I reserve the general explanation of the topography of Syracuse for the next chapter, when the siege begins.

construct, that Gylippus had time to arrive before it was finished. But there was one farther precaution which the Syracusans omitted at this moment, when it was open to them without any hindrance, to occupy and fortify the Euryalus, or the summit of the hill of Epipolæ. Had they done this now, probably the Athenians could never have made progress with their lines of circumvallation: but they did not think of it until too late, as we shall presently see.

Nevertheless it is important to remark, in reference to the general scheme of Athenian operations in Sicily, that if Nikias had adopted the plan originally recommended by Lamachus, or if he had begun his permanent besieging operations against Syracuse in the summer or autumn of 415 B.C., instead of postponing them, as he actually did, to the spring of 414 B.C., he would have found none of these additional defences to contend against, and the line of circumvallation necessary for his purpose would have been shorter and easier. Besides these permanent and irreparable disadvantages, his winter's inaction at Naxos drew upon him the farther insult, that the Syracusans marched to his former quarters at Katana and burned the tents which they found standing, ravaging at the same time the neighboring fields.¹

Kamarina maintained an equivocal policy which made both parties hope to gain it; and in the course of this winter the Athenian envoy Euphêmus with others was sent thither to propose a renewal of that alliance, between the city and Athens, which had been concluded ten years before. Hermokratês the Syracusan went to counteract his object; and both of them, according to Grecian custom, were admitted to address the public assembly.

Hermokratês began by denouncing the views, designs, and past history of Athens. He did not, he said, fear her power, provided the Sicilian cities were united and true to each other: even against Syracuse alone, the hasty retreat of the Athenians after the recent battle had shown how little they confided in their own strength. What he did fear, was, the delusive promises and insinuations of Athens, tending to disunite the island, and to paralyze all joint resistance. Every one knew that her purpose in this expedition was to subjugate all Sicily,—that Leontini and

¹ Thucyd. vi, 75.

Egesta served merely as convenient pretences to put forward, — and that she could have no sincere sympathy for Chalkidians in Sicily, when she herself held in slavery the Chalkidians in Eubœa. It was, in truth, nothing else but an extension of the same scheme of rapacious ambition, whereby she had reduced her Ionian allies and kinsmen to their present wretched slavery, now threatened against Sicily. The Sicilians could not too speedily show her that they were no Ionians, made to be transferred from one master to another, but autonomous Dorians from the centre of autonomy, Peloponnesus. It would be madness to forfeit this honorable position through jealousy or lukewarmness among themselves. Let not the Kamarinæans imagine that Athens was striking her blow at Syracuse alone: they were themselves next neighbors of Syracuse, and would be the first victims if she were conquered. They might wish, from apprehension or envy, to see the superior power of Syracuse humbled, but this could not happen without endangering their own existence. They ought to do for her what they would have asked her to do if the Athenians had invaded Kamarina, instead of lending merely nominal aid, as they had hitherto done. Their former alliance with Athens was for purposes of mutual defence, not binding them to aid her in schemes of pure aggression. To hold aloof, give fair words to both parties, and leave Syracuse to fight the battle of Sicily single-handed, was as unjust as it was dishonorable. If she came off victor in the struggle, she would take care that the Kamarinæans should be no gainers by such a policy. The state of affairs was so plain, that he (Hermokratês) could not pretend to enlighten them: but he solemnly appealed to their sentiments of common blood and lineage. The Dorians of Syracuse were assailed by their eternal enemies the Ionians, and ought not to be now betrayed by their own brother Dorians of Kamarina.¹

Euphemus, in reply, explained the proceedings of Athens in reference to her empire, and vindicated her against the charges of Hermokratês. Though addressing a Dorian assembly, he did not fear to take his start from the position laid down by Hermokratês, that Ionians were the natural enemies of Dorians. Under this feeling Athens, as an Ionian city, had looked about to

¹ Thucyd, vi, 77-80

strengthen herself against the supremacy of her powerful Dorian neighbors in Peloponnesus. Finding herself after the repulse of the Persian king at the head of those Ionians and other Greeks who had just revolted from him, she had made use of her position as well as of her superior navy to shake off the illegitimate ascendancy of Sparta. Her empire was justified by regard for her own safety against Sparta, as well as by the immense superiority of her maritime efforts in the rescue of Greece from the Persians. Even in reference to her allies, she had good ground for reducing them to subjection, because they had made themselves the instruments and auxiliaries of the Persian king in his attempt to conquer her. Prudential views for assured safety to herself had thus led her to the acquisition of her present empire, and the same views now brought her to Sicily. He was prepared to show that the interests of Kamarina were in full accordance with those of Athens. The main purpose of Athens in Sicily was to prevent her Sicilian enemies from sending aid to her Peloponnesian enemies, to accomplish which, powerful Sicilian allies were indispensable to her. To enfeeble or subjugate her Sicilian allies would be folly: if she did this, they would not serve her purpose of keeping the Syracusans employed in their own island. Hence her desire to reestablish the expatriated Leontines, powerful and free, though she retained the Chalkidians in Eubœa as subjects. Near home, she wanted nothing but subjects, disarmed and tribute-paying, while in Sicily, she required independent and efficient allies; so that the double conduct, which Hermokratês reproached as inconsistent, proceeded from one and the same root of public prudence. Pursuant to that motive, Athens dealt differently with her different allies, according to the circumstances of each. Thus, she respected the autonomy of Chios and Methymna, and maintained equal relations with other islanders near Peloponnesus; and such were the relations which she now wished to establish in Sicily.

No: it was Syracuse, not Athens, whom the Kamarinæans and other Sicilians had really ground to fear. Syracuse was aiming at the acquisition of imperial sway over the island; and that which she had already done towards the Leontines showed what she was prepared to do when the time came, against Kamarina and others. It was under this apprehension that the Kamarina-

naeans had formerly invited Athens into Sicily: it would be alike unjust and impolitic were they now to repudiate her aid, for she could accomplish nothing without them; if they did so on the present occasion, they would repent it hereafter when exposed to the hostility of a constant encroaching neighbor, and when Athenian auxiliaries could not again be had. He repelled the imputations which Hermokratês had cast upon Athens, but the Kamarinaeans were not sitting as judges or censors upon her merits. It was for them to consider whether that meddling disposition, with which Athens was reproached, was not highly beneficial as the terror of oppressors, and the shield of weaker states, throughout Greece. He now tendered it to the Kamarinaeans as their only security against Syracuse; calling upon them, instead of living in perpetual fear of her aggression, to seize the present opportunity of attacking her on an equal footing, jointly with Athens.¹

In these two remarkable speeches, we find Hermokratês renewing substantially the same line of counsel as he had taken up ten years before at the congress of Gela, to settle all Sicilian differences at home, and above all things to keep out the intervention of Athens; who if she once got footing in Sicily, would never rest until she reduced all the cities successively. This was the natural point of view for a Syracusan politician; but by no means equally natural, nor equally conclusive, for an inhabitant of one of the secondary Sicilian cities, especially of the conterminous Kamarina. And the oration of Euphêmus is an able pleading to demonstrate that the Kamarinaeans had far more to fear from Syracuse than from Athens. His arguments to this point are at least highly plausible, if not convincing; but he seems to lay himself open to attack from the opposite quarter. If Athens cannot hope to gain any subjects in Sicily, what motive has she for interfering? This Euphêmus meets by contending that if she does not interfere, the Syracusans and their allies will come across and render assistance to the enemies of Athens in Peloponnesus. It is manifest, however, that under the actual circumstances of the time, Athens could have no real fears of this nature, and that her real motives for meddling in Sicily were

¹ Thucyd. vi, 83-87.

those of hope and encroachment, not of self-defence. But it shows how little likely such hopes were to be realized, and therefore how ill-advised the whole plan of interference in Sicily was, — that the Athenian envoy could say to the Kamarinaeans, in the same strain as Nikias had spoken at Athens when combating the wisdom of the expedition: "Such is the distance of Sicily from Athens, and such the difficulty of guarding cities of great force and ample territory combined, that if we wished to hold you Sicilians as subjects, we should be unable to do it: we can only retain you as free and powerful allies."¹ What Nikias said at Athens to dissuade his countrymen from the enterprise, under sincere conviction, Euphêmus repeated at Kamarina for the purpose of conciliating that city; probably, without believing it himself, yet the anticipation was not on that account the less true and reasonable.

The Kamarinaeans felt the force of both speeches, from Hermokratês and Euphêmus. Their inclinations carried them towards the Athenians, yet not without a certain misgiving in case Athens should prove completely successful. Towards the Syracusans, on the contrary, they entertained nothing but unqualified apprehension, and jealousy of very ancient date; and even now their great fear was, of probable suffering, if the Syracusans succeeded against Athens without their coöperation. In this dilemma, they thought it safest to give an evasive answer, of friendly sentiment towards both parties, but refusal of aid to either; hoping thus to avoid an inexpiable breach, whichever way the ultimate success might turn.²

For a city comparatively weak and situated like Kamarina, such was perhaps the least hazardous policy. In December, 415 B.C., no human being could venture to predict how the struggle between Nikias and the Syracusans in the coming year would turn out; nor were the Kamarinaeans prompted by any hearty feeling to take the extreme chances with either party. Matters had borne

¹ Thucyd. vi, 86. ἡμεῖς μὲν γε οὔτε ἐμμεῖναι δυνατοὶ μὴ μεθ' ὑμῶν· εἰ τε καὶ γενόμενοι κακοὶ κατεργασάμεθα, ἀδύνατοι κατασχεῖν, διὰ μήκος τε πλοῦ καὶ ἀπορία φυλακῆς πόλεων μεγάλων καὶ παρασκευῇ ἡπειρωτῶν, etc.

This is exactly the language of Nikias in his speech to the Athenians, vi, 11.

² Thucyd. vi, 88.

a different aspect, indeed, in the preceding month of July 415 B.C., when the Athenians first arrived. Had the vigorous policy urged by Lamachus been then followed up, the Athenians would always have appeared likely to succeed, if, indeed, they had not already become conquerors of Syracuse; so that waverers like the Kamarinæans would have remained attached to them from policy. The best way to obtain allies, Lamachus had contended, was, to be prompt and decisive in action, and to strike at the capital point at once, while the intimidating effect of their arrival was fresh. Of the value of his advice, an emphatic illustration is afforded by the conduct of Kamarina.¹

Throughout the rest of the winter, Nikias did little or nothing. He merely despatched envoys for the purpose of conciliating the Sikels in the interior, where the autonomous Sikels, who dwelt in the central regions of the island, for the most part declared in his favor, — especially the powerful Sikel prince Archônidês, — sending provisions and even money to the camp at Naxos. Against some refractory tribes, Nikias sent detachments for purposes of compulsion; while the Syracusans on their part did the like to counteract him. Such Sikel tribes as had become dependents of Syracuse, stood aloof from the struggle. As the spring approached, Nikias transferred his position from Naxos to Katana, reëstablishing that camp which the Syracusans had destroyed.²

He farther sent a trireme to Carthage, to invite coöperation from that city; and a second to the Tyrrhenian maritime cities on the southern coast of Italy, some of whom had proffered to him their services, as ancient enemies of Syracuse, and now realized their promises. From Carthage nothing was obtained; why, we do not know; for we shall find the Carthaginians, six years hence, invading Sicily with prodigious forces; and if they entertained any such intentions, it would seem that the presence of Nikias in Sicily must have presented the most convenient moment for executing them. To the Sikels, Egestæans, and all the other allies of Athens, Nikias sent orders for bricks, iron bars, clamps, and everything suitable for the wall of circumvallation, which was to be commenced with the first burst of spring.

¹ Compare the remarks of Alkibiadês, Thucyd. vi, 91.

² Thucyd. vi, 88.

While such preparations were going on in Sicily, debates of portentous promise took place at Sparta. Immediately after the battle near the Olympieion, and the retreat of Nikias into winter quarters, the Syracusans had despatched envoys to Peloponnesus to solicit reinforcements. Here, again, we are compelled to notice the lamentable consequences arising out of the inaction of Nikias. Had he commenced the siege of Syracuse on his first arrival, it may be doubted whether any such envoys would have been sent to Peloponnesus at all; at any rate, they would not have arrived in time to produce decisive effects.¹ After exerting what influence they could upon the Italian Greeks in their voyage, the Syracusan envoys reached Corinth, where they found the warmest reception and obtained promises of speedy succor. The Corinthians furnished envoys of their own to accompany them to Sparta, and to back their request for Lacedæmonian aid.

They found at the congress at Sparta another advocate upon whom they could not reasonably have counted, Alkibiadês. That exile had crossed over from Thurii to the Eleian port of Kyllênê in Peloponnesus in a merchant-vessel,² and now appeared at

¹ Thucyd. vi, 88; vii, 42.

² Plutarch (Alkib. c. 23) says that he went to reside at Argos; but this seems difficult to reconcile with the assertion of Thucydides (vi, 61) that his friends at Argos had incurred grave suspicions of treason.

Cornelius Nepos (Alkib. c. 4) says, with greater probability of truth, that Alkibiadês went from Thurii, first to Elis, next to Thebes.

Isokratês (De Bigis, Orat. xvi, s. 10) says that the Athenians banished him out of all Greece, inscribed his name on a column, and sent envoys to demand his person from the Argeians; so that Alkibiadês was compelled to take refuge with the Lacedæmonians. This whole statement of Isokratês is exceedingly loose and untrustworthy, carrying back the commencement of the conspiracy of the Four Hundred to a time anterior to the banishment of Alkibiadês. But among all the vague sentences, this allegation that the Athenians banished him out of all Greece stands prominent. They could only banish him from the territory of Athens and her allies. Whether he went to Argos, as I have already said, seems to me very doubtful: perhaps Plutarch copied the statement from this passage of Isokratês.

But under all circumstances, we are not to believe that Alkibiadês turned against his country, or went to Sparta, upon compulsion. The first act of his hostility to Athens, the disappointing her of the acquisition of Messênê, was committed before he left Sicily. Moreover, Thucydides represents him as unwilling indeed to go to Sparta, but only unwilling because he was afraid

Sparta on special invitation and safe-conduct from the Lacedæmonians; of whom he was at first vehemently afraid, in consequence of having raised against them that Peloponnesian combination which had given them so much trouble before the battle of Mantinea. He now appeared, too, burning with hostility against his country, and eager to inflict upon her all the mischief in his power. Having been the chief evil genius to plunge her, mainly for selfish ends of his own, into this ill-starred venture, he was now about to do his best to turn it into her irreparable ruin. His fiery stimulus, and unmeasured exaggerations, supplied what was wanting in Corinthian and Syracusan eloquence, and inflamed the tardy good-will of the Spartan ephors into comparative decision and activity.¹ His harangue in the Spartan congress is given to us by Thucydides, who may possibly have heard it, as he was then himself in exile. Like the earlier speech which he puts into the mouth of Alkibiades at Athens, it is characteristic in a high degree; and interesting in another point of view as the latest composed speech of any length which we find in his history. I give here the substance, without professing to translate the words.

"First, I must address you, Lacedæmonians, respecting the prejudices current against me personally, before I can hope to find a fair hearing on public matters. You know it was I, who renewed my public connection with Sparta, after my ancestors before me had quarrelled with you and renounced it. Moreover, I assiduously cultivated your favor on all points, especially by attentions to your prisoners at Athens: but while I was showing all this zeal towards you, you took the opportunity of the peace which you made with Athens to employ my enemies as your agents, thus strengthening their hands, and dishonoring me. It was this conduct of yours which drove me to unite with the Argæians and Mantineians; nor ought you to be angry with me for mischief which you thus drew upon yourselves. Probably some of you hate me too, without any good reason, as a forward partisan of democracy. My family were always opposed to the Pei-

of the Spartans, in fact, waiting for a safe-conduct and invitation from them. Thucydides mentions nothing about his going to Argos (vi, 88).

¹ Thucyd. vi, 88.

nistratid despots; and as all opposition to a reigning dynasty takes the name of The People, so from that time forward we continued to act as leaders of the people.¹ Moreover, our established constitution was a democracy, so that I had no choice but to obey, though I did my best to maintain a moderate line of political conduct in the midst of the reigning license. It was not my family, but others, who in former times as well as now, led the people into the worst courses, those same men who sent me into exile. I always acted as leader, not of a party, but of the entire city; thinking it right to uphold that constitution in which Athens had enjoyed her grandeur and freedom, and which I found already existing.² For as to democracy, all we Athenians of common sense well knew its real character. Personally, I have better reason than any one else to rail against it, if one *could* say anything new about such confessed folly; but I did not think it safe to change the government, while you were standing by as enemies.

"So much as to myself personally: I shall now talk to you about the business of the meeting, and tell you something more than you yet know. Our purpose in sailing from Athens, was, first to conquer the Sicilian Greeks; next, the Italian Greeks; afterwards, to make an attempt on the Carthaginian empire and on Carthage herself. If all or most of this succeeded, we were then to attack Peloponnesus. We intended to bring to this enterprise the entire power of the Sicilian and Italian Greeks, besides large numbers of Iberian and other warlike barbaric mer-

¹ Thucyd. vi, 89. Τοῖς γὰρ τυράννοις ἀεὶ ποτὲ διάφοροι ἔσμεν, παν δὲ τὸ ἐναντιούμενον τῷ δυναστεύοντι δῆμος ἀνίσταται καὶ ἀπ' ἐκείνου συμπαρέμεινεν ἢ προστασία ἡμῖν τοῦ πληθους.

It is to be recollected that the Lacedæmonians had been always opposed to τυράννοι, or despots, and had been particularly opposed to the Peisistratid τυράννοι, whom they in fact put down. In tracing his democratical tendencies, therefore, to this source, Alkibiades took the best means of excusing them before a Lacedæmonian audience.

² Thucyd. vi, 89. ἡμεῖς δὲ τοῦ ξύμπαντος προΐστημεν, δικαιούντες, ἐν ᾧ σχήματι μέγιστη ἡ πόλις ἔτυχε καὶ ἐλευθερωτάτη οὖσα, καὶ ὅπερ ἐδέξατο τις, τοῦτο ξυνδισώζειν ἐπεὶ δημοκρατίαν γε καὶ ἐγινώσκομεν οἱ φρονούντες τι, καὶ αὐτὸς οὐδένδ' ἂν χεῖρον, ὅσῳ καὶ λοιδορήσαιμι ἄλλὰ περὶ ὁμολογουμένης ἀνοίας οὐδέν ἂν καινὸν ληγοίτο καὶ τὸ μεθιστάναί αὐτὴν οὐκ ἔδοκει ἡμῖν ἀσφαλές εἶναι, ἡμῶν πολέμῳ προσκαθήμενων.

cenaries, together with many new triremes built from the abundant forests of Italy, and large supplies both of treasure and provision. We could thus blockade Peloponnesus all round with our fleet, and at the same time assail it with our land-force; and we calculated, by taking some towns by storm and occupying others as permanent fortified positions, that we should easily conquer the whole peninsula, and then become undisputed masters of Greece. You thus hear the whole scheme of our expedition from the man who knows it best; and you may depend on it that the remaining generals will execute all this, if they can. Nothing but your intervention can hinder them. If, indeed, the Sicilian Greeks were all united, they might hold out; but the Syracusans standing alone cannot, beaten as they already have been in a general action, and blocked up as they are by sea. If Syracuse falls into the hands of the Athenians, all Sicily and all Italy will share the same fate; and the danger which I have described will be soon upon you.

"It is not therefore simply for the safety of Sicily, — it is for the safety of Peloponnesus, — that I now urge you to send across, forthwith, a fleet with an army of hoplites as rowers; and what I consider still more important than an army, a Spartan general to take the supreme command. Moreover, you must also carry on declared and vigorous war against Athens here, that the Syracusans may be encouraged to hold out, and that Athens may be in no condition to send additional reinforcements thither. You must farther fortify and permanently garrison Dekeleia in Attica: that is the contingency which the Athenians have always been most afraid of, and which therefore you may know to be your best policy. You will thus get into your own hands the live and dead stock of Attica, interrupt the working of the silver mines at Laureion, deprive the Athenians of their profits from judicial fines as well as of their landed revenue, and dispose the subject-allies to withhold their tribute.

"None of you ought to think the worse of me because I make this vigorous onset upon my country in conjunction with her

* The establishment and permanent occupation of a fortified post in Attica, had been contemplated by the Corinthians even before the beginning of the war (Thucyd. i, 122).

enemies, I who once passed for a patriot.¹ Nor ought you to mistrust my assurances, as coming from the reckless passion of an exile. The worst enemies of Athens are not those who make open war like you, but those who drive her best friends into hostility. I loved my country,² while I was secure as a citizen; I love her no more, now that I am wronged. In fact, I do not conceive myself to be assailing a country still mine; I am rather trying to win back a country now lost to me. The real patriot is not he, who, having unjustly lost his country, acquiesces in patience, but he whose ardor makes him try every means to regain her.

"Employ me without fear, Lacedæmonians, in any service of danger or suffering; the more harm I did you formerly as an enemy, the more good I can now do you as a friend. But above all, do not shrink back from instant operations both in Sicily and in Attica, upon which so much depends. You will thus put down the power of Athens, present as well as future; you will dwell yourselves in safety; and you will become the leaders of undivided Hellas, by free consent and without force."³

Enormous consequences turned upon this speech, no less masterly in reference to the purpose and the audience, than infamous as an indication of the character of the speaker. If its contents became known at Athens, as they probably did, the enemies of Alkibiadēs would be supplied with a justification of their most violent political attacks. That imputation which they had taken so much pains to fasten upon him, citing in proof of it alike his profligate expenditure, overbearing insolence, and derision of the religious ceremonies of the state,⁴ — that he detested the democracy in his heart, submitted to it only from necessity, and was watching for the first safe opportunity of subverting it, — appears here in his own language as matter of avowal and

¹ Thucyd. vi, 92. Καὶ χειρῶν οὐδενὶ ἀξιώσκειν ἑμῶν εἶναι, εἰ τῇ ἑμῶν αὐτῶν μετὰ τῶν πολεμικῶν, φιλόπολις ποτε δοκῶν εἶναι, νῦν ἐγκρατῶς ἐπέρχομαι.

² Thucyd. vi, 92. Τό τε φιλόπολι οὐκ ἐν ᾧ ἀδικούμαι ἔχω, ἀλλ' ἐν ᾧ ἀσφαλῶς ἐπολιτεύθην. Οὐδ' ἐπὶ πατρίδα οὐσαν ἐτι ἡγοῦμαι νῦν εἶναι, πλεονεχὲς δὲ μάλλον τὴν οὐκ οὐσαν ἀνακτᾶσθαι. Καὶ φιλόπολις οὗτος ὁρθῶς, οὐχ ὅς ἐν τὴν ἑαυτοῦ ἀδίκως ἀπολέσας μὴ ἐπὶ, ἀλλ' ὅς ἐν ἐκ παντὸς τρόπῳ διὰ τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν πειραθῇ αὐτὴν ἀναλαβεῖν.

³ Thucyd. vi, 89-92.

⁴ Thucyd. vi, 24.

boast. The sentence of condemnation against him would now be unanimously approved, even by those who at the time had deprecated it; and the people would be more firmly persuaded than before of the reality of the association between irreligious manifestations and treasonable designs. Doubtless the inferences so drawn from the speech would be unsound, because it represented, not the actual past sentiments of Alkibiadēs, but those to which he now found it convenient to lay claim. As far as so very selfish a politician could be said to have any preference, democracy was, in some respects, more convenient to him than oligarchy. Though offensive to his taste, it held out larger prospects to his love of show, his adventurous ambition, and his rapacity for foreign plunder; while under an oligarchy, the jealous restraints and repulses imposed on him by a few equals, would be perhaps more galling to his temper than those arising from the whole people.¹ He takes credit in his speech for moderation, as opposed to the standing license of democracy. But this is a pretence absurd even to extravagance, and which Athenians of all parties would have listened to with astonishment. Such license as that of Alkibiadēs had never been seen at Athens; and it was the adventurous instincts of the democracy towards foreign conquest, combined with their imperfect apprehension of the limits and conditions under which alone their empire could be permanently maintained, which he stimulated up to the highest point, and then made use of for his own power and profit. As against himself, he had reason for accusing his political enemies of unworthy manœuvres, and even of gross political wickedness, if they were authors or accomplices — as seems probable of some — in the mutilation of the Hermæ. But most certainly, their public advice to the commonwealth was far less mischievous than his. And if we are to strike the balance of personal political merit between Alkibiadēs and his enemies, we must take into the comparison his fraud upon the simplicity of the Lacedæmonian envoys, recounted in the last chapter but one of this History.

If, then, that portion of the speech of Alkibiadēs, wherein he

¹ See a remarkable passage of Thucyd. viii, 89, *ἅσιν τὰ ἀποβαίνοντα, ὡς νῦν ἀπὸ τῶν ὁμοίων, ἐλασσούμενος τις φέρει*, and the note in explanation of it, in a later chapter of this History, chap. lxii.

touches upon Athenian politics and his own past conduct, is not to be taken as historical evidence, just as little can we trust the following portion in which he professes to describe the real purposes of Athens in her Sicilian expedition. That any such vast designs as those which he announces were ever really contemplated even by himself and his immediate friends, is very improbable; that they were contemplated by the Athenian public, by the armament, or by Nikias, is utterly incredible. The tardiness and timid movements of the armament — during the first eight months after arriving at Rhegium — recommended by Nikias, partially admitted even by Alkibiadēs, opposed only by the unavailing wisdom of Lamachus, and not strongly censured when known at Athens, conspire to prove that their minds were not at first fully made up even to the siege of Syracuse; that they counted on alliances and money in Sicily which they did not find; and that those who sailed from Athens with large hopes of brilliant and easy conquest were soon taught to see the reality with different eyes. If Alkibiadēs had himself conceived at Athens the designs which he professed to reveal in his speech at Sparta, there can be no doubt that he would have espoused the scheme of Lamachus, or rather would have originated it himself. We find him, indeed, in his speech delivered at Athens before the determination to sail, holding out hopes that by means of conquests in Sicily, Athens might become mistress of all Greece. But this is there put as an alternative and as a favorable possibility, is noticed only in one place, without expansion or amplification, and shows that the speaker did not reckon upon finding any such expectations prevalent among his hearers. Alkibiadēs could not have ventured to promise, in his discourse at Athens the results which he afterwards talked of at Sparta as having been actually contemplated, — Sicily, Italy, Carthage, Iberian mercenaries, etc., all ending in a blockading fleet large enough to gird round Peloponnesus.¹ Had he put forth such promises, the charge of juvenile folly which Nikias urged against him would probably have been believed by every one. His speech at Sparta, though it has passed with some as a fragment of true Grecian

¹ Thucyd. vi, 12-17.

History, is in truth little better than a gigantic romance dressed up to alarm his audience.¹

Intended for this purpose, it was eminently suitable and effective. The Lacedæmonians had already been partly moved by the representations from Corinth and Syracuse, and were even prepared to send envoys to the latter place with encouragement to hold out against Athens. But the Peace of Nikias and the alliance succeeding it, still subsisted between Athens and Sparta. It had indeed been partially and indirectly violated in many ways, but both the contracting parties still considered it as subsisting, nor would either of them yet consent to break their oaths openly and avowedly. For this reason — as well as from the distance of Sicily, great even in the estimation of the more nautical Athenians — the ephors could not yet make up their minds to despatch thither any positive aid. It was exactly in this point of hesitation between the will and the deed that the energetic and vindictive exile from Athens found them. His flaming picture of the danger impending, — brought home to their own doors, and appearing to proceed from the best informed of all witnesses, — overcame their reluctance at once; while he at the same time pointed out the precise steps whereby their interference would be rendered of most avail. The transfer of Alkibiadēs to Sparta thus reverses the superiority of force between the two contending chiefs of Greece: "*Momentumque fuit mutatus Curio rerum.*"² He had not yet shown his power of doing his country good, as we shall find him hereafter engaged, during the later years of the war: his first achievements were but too successful in doing her harm.

The Lacedæmonians forthwith resolved to send an auxiliary force to Syracuse. But as this could not be done before the spring, they nominated Gylippus commander, directing him to proceed thither without delay, and to take counsel with the Corinthians for operations as speedily as the case admitted.³ We do not know that Gylippus had as yet given any positive evidence of that consummate skill and activity which we shall presently be called upon to describe. He was probably chosen on account

¹ Plutarch, Alkib. c. 17.

² Lucan, Pharsal. iv, 819.

³ Thucyd. vi, 93; Plutarch, Alkib. c. 23; Diodor. xiii, 7.

of his superior acquaintance with the circumstances of the Italian and Sicilian Greeks; since his father Kleandridas, after having been banished from Sparta fourteen years before the Peloponnesian war for taking Athenian bribes, had been domiciliated as a citizen at Thurii.¹ Gylippus desired the Corinthians to send immediately two triremes for him to Asinê, in the Messenian gulf, and to prepare as many others as their docks could furnish.

CHAPTER LIX.

FROM THE COMMENCEMENT OF THE SIEGE OF SYRACUSE BY NIKIAS, DOWN TO THE SECOND ATHENIAN EXPEDITION UNDER DEMOSTHENES, AND THE RESUMPTION OF THE GENERAL WAR.

THE Athenian troops at Katana, probably tired of inaction, were put in motion in the early spring, even before the arrival of the reinforcements from Athens, and sailed to the deserted walls of Megara, not far from Syracuse, which the Syracusans had recently garrisoned. Having in vain attacked the Syracusan garrison, and laid waste the neighboring fields, they reëmbarked, landed again for similar purposes at the mouth of the river Terias, and then, after an insignificant skirmish, returned to Katana. An expedition into the interior of the island procured for them the alliance of the Sikel town of Kentoripa; and the cavalry being now arrived from Athens, they prepared for operations against Syracuse. Nikias had received from Athens two hundred and fifty horsemen fully equipped, for whom horses were to be procured in Sicily,² thirty horse-bowmen, and three

¹ Thucyd. vi, 104.

Horses were so largely bred in Sicily, that they even found their way into Attica and Central Greece. Sophoklēs, Œd. Kolon. 312:—

γυναιχ' ὄρω
Στείχονσαν ἡμῖν, ἄσπον, Αἰτναίας ἐπὶ
Πώλου βεβῶσαν.

If the Scholiast is to be trusted, the Sicilian horses were of unusually great size.

hundred talents in money. He was not long in furnishing them with horses from Egesta and Katana, from which cities he also received some farther cavalry, so that he was presently able to muster six hundred and fifty cavalry in all.¹

Even before this cavalry could be mounted, Nikias made his first approach to Syracuse. For the Syracusan generals on their side, apprized of the arrival of the reinforcement from Athens, and aware that besieging operations were on the point of being commenced, now thought it necessary to take the precaution of occupying and guarding the roads of access to the high ground of Epipolæ which overhung their outer city.

Syracuse consisted at this time of two parts, an inner and outer city. The former was comprised in the island of Ortygia, the original settlement founded by Archias, and within which the modern city is at this moment included: the latter or outer city, afterwards known by the name of Achradina, occupied the high ground of the peninsula north of Ortygia, but does not seem to have joined the inner city, or to have been comprised in the same fortification. This outer city was defended, on the north and east, by the sea, with rocks presenting great difficulties of landing, and by a sea-wall; so that on these sides it was out of the reach of attack. Its wall on the land-side, beginning from the sea somewhat eastward of the entrance of the cleft now called Santa Bonagia, or Panagia, ran in a direction westward of south as far as the termination of the high ground of Achradina, and then turned eastward along the stone quarries now known as those of the Capucins and Novanteris, where the ground is in part so steep, that probably little fortification was needed. This fortified high land of Achradina thus constituted the outer city; while the lower ground, situated between it and the inner city, or Ortygia, seems at this time not to have been included in the fortifications of either, but was employed (and probably had been employed even from the first settlement in the island), partly for religious processions, games, and other multitudinous ceremonies; partly for the burial of the dead, which, according to invariable Grecian custom, was performed without the walls of the city. Extensive catacombs yet remain to mark the length of time during which this ancient Nekropolis served its purpose.

¹ Thucyd. vi, 95-98.

To the northwest of the outer city wall, in the direction of the port called Trogilus, stood an unfortified suburb which afterwards became enlarged into the distinct walled town of Tychê. West of the southern part of the same outer city wall, nearly south-west of the outer city itself, stood another suburb, afterwards known and fortified as Neapolis, but deriving its name, in the year 415 B.C., from having within it the statue and consecrated ground of Apollo Temenitês,¹ which stood a little way up on the ascent of the hill of Epipolæ, and stretching from thence down southward in the direction of the Great Harbor. Between these two suburbs lay a broad open space, the ground rising in gradual acclivity from Achradina to the westward, and diminishing in breadth as it rose higher, until at length it ended in a small conical mound, called in modern times the Belvedere. This acclivity formed the eastern ascent of the long ridge of high ground called Epipolæ. It was a triangle upon an inclined plane, of which Achradina was the base: to the north as well as to the south, it was suddenly broken off by lines of limestone cliff (forming the sides of the triangle), about fifteen or twenty feet high, and quite precipitous, except in some few openings made for convenient ascent. From the western point or apex of the triangle, the descent was easy and gradual — excepting two or three special mounds, or cliffs — towards the city, the interior of which was visible from this outer slope.

According to the warfare of that time, Nikias, could only take Syracuse by building a wall of circumvallation so as to cut off its supplies by land, and at the same time blockading it by sea. Now looking at the inner and outer city as above described, at the moment when he first reached Sicily, we see that — after defeating the Syracusans and driving them within their walls, which would be of course the first part of the process — he might have carried his blockading wall in a direction nearly southerly from the innermost point of the cleft of Santa Bonagia, between the city wall and the Temenitês so as to reach the

¹ At the neighboring city of Gela, also, a little without the walls, there stood a large brazen statue of Apollo; of so much sanctity, beauty, or notoriety, that the Carthaginians in their invasion of the island, seven years after the siege of Syracuse by Nikias, carried it away with them and transported it to Tyre (Diodor. xiii, 108).

Great Harbor at a spot not far westward of the junction of Ortygia with the main land. Or he might have landed in the Great Harbor, and executed the same wall, beginning from the opposite end. Or he might have preferred to construct two blockading walls, one for each city separately: a short wall would have sufficed in front of the isthmus joining Ortygia, while a separate wall might have been carried to shut up the outer city, across the unfortified space constituting the Nekropolis, so as to end not in the Great Harbor, but in the coast of the Nekropolis opposite to Ortygia. Such were the possibilities of the case at the time when Nikias first reached Rhegium. But during the many months of inaction which he had allowed, the Syracusans had barred out both these possibilities, and had greatly augmented the difficulties of his intended enterprise. They had constructed a new wall, covering both their inner and their outer city, — stretching across the whole front which faced the slope of Epipolæ, from the Great Harbor to the opposite sea near Santa Bonagia, — and expanding westward so as to include within it the statue and consecrated ground of Apollo Temenitès, with the cliff near adjoining to it known by the name of the Temenite Cliff. This was done for the express purpose of lengthening the line indispensable for the besiegers to make their wall a good blockade.¹ After it was finished, Nikias could not begin his blockade from the side of the Great Harbor, since he would have been obstructed by the precipitous southern cliff of Epipolæ. He was under the necessity of beginning his wall from a portion of the higher ground of Epipolæ, and of carrying it both along a greater space and higher up on the slope, until he touched the Great Harbor at a point farther removed from Ortygia.

Syracuse having thus become assailable only from the side of Epipolæ, the necessity so created for carrying on operations much higher up on the slope, gave to the summit of that eminence a greater importance than it had before possessed. Nikias, doubtless furnished with good local information by the exiles, seems to

¹ Thucyd. vi, 75. Ἐτερίζον δὲ καὶ οἱ Συρακοῖοι ἐν τῷ χειμῶνι, τοῦτε πρὸς τῇ πόλει, τὸν Τεμενίτην ἐντός ποιησάμενοι, τείχεος παρὰ πᾶν τὸ πρὸς τὰς Ἐπιπολᾶς ὁρῶν, ὅπως αὐτὸν εἰς ἑλασσόνος ἐβαποτεῖν γένοιτο, ὥσιν, ὅν ἄρα ἀφάλλωνται, etc.

have made this discovery earlier than the Syracusan generals, who — having been occupied in augmenting their defences on another point, where they were yet more vulnerable — did not make it until immediately before the opening of the spring campaign. It was at that critical moment that they proclaimed a full muster, for break of day, in the low mead on the left bank of the Anapus. After an inspection of arms, and probably final distribution of forces for the approaching struggle, a chosen regiment of six hundred hoplites was placed under the orders of an Andrian exile named Diomilus, in order to act as garrison of Epipolæ, as well as to be in constant readiness wherever they might be wanted.¹ These men were intended to occupy the strong ground on the summit of the hill, and thus obstruct all the various approaches to it, seemingly not many in number, and all narrow.

But before they had yet left their muster, to march to the summit, intelligence reached them that the Athenians were already in possession of it. Nikias and Lamachus, putting their troops on board at Katana, had sailed during the preceding night to a landing-place not far from a place called Leon, or the Lion, which was only six or seven furlongs from Epipolæ, and seems to have lain between Megara and the peninsula of Thapsus. They here landed their hoplites, and placed their fleet in safety under cover of a palisade across the narrow isthmus of Thapsus, before day and before the Syracusans had any intimation of their arrival. Their hoplites immediately moved forward with rapid step to ascend Epipolæ, mounting seemingly from the northeast, by the side towards Megara and farthest removed from Syracuse; so that they first reached the summit called Euryalus, near the apex of the triangle above described. From hence they commanded the slope of Epipolæ beneath them, and the town of Syracuse to the eastward. They were presently attacked by the Syracusans, who broke up their muster in the mead as soon as they heard the news. But as the road by which they had to march, approaching Euryalus from the southwest, was circuitous, and hardly less than three English miles in length, they had the mortification of seeing that the Athenians were already masters of the position; and when they hastened up to retake it, the rapid pace had so

¹ Thucyd. vi, 96.

disordered their ranks, that the Athenians attacked them at great advantage, besides having the higher ground. The Syracusans were driven back to their city with loss, Diomilus with half his regiment being slain; while the Athenians remained masters of the high ground of Euryalus, as well as of the upper portion of the slope of Epipolæ.¹

This was a most important advantage; indeed, seemingly essential to the successful prosecution of the siege. It was gained by a plan both well laid and well executed, grounded upon the omission of the Syracusans to occupy a post of which they did not at first perceive the importance, and which in fact only acquired its preeminent importance from the new enlargement made by the Syracusans in their fortifications. To that extent, therefore, it depended upon a favorable accident which could not have been reasonably expected to occur. The capture of Syracuse was certain, upon the supposition that the attack and siege of the city had been commenced on the first arrival of the Athenians in the island, without giving time for any improvement in its defensibility. But the moment such delay was allowed, success ceased to be certain, depending more or less upon this favorable turn of accident. The Syracusans actually did a great deal to create additional difficulty to the besiegers, and might have done more, especially in regard to the occupation of the high ground above Epipolæ. Had they taken this precaution, the effective prosecution of the siege would have been rendered extremely difficult, if not completely frustrated.

On the next morning, Nikias and Lamachus marched their army down the slope of Epipolæ near to the Syracusan walls, and offered battle, which the enemy did not accept. They then withdrew the Athenian troops; after which their first operation was to construct a fort on the high ground called Labdulum, near the western end of the upper northern cliffs bordering Epipolæ, on the brink of the cliff, and looking northward towards Megara. This was intended as a place of security wherein both treasures and stores might be deposited, so as to leave the army unincumbered in its motions. The Athenian cavalry being now completed by the new arrivals from Egesta, Nikias descended from Labda-

¹ Thucyd. vi, 97.

lum to a new position called Sykê, lower down on Epipolæ, seemingly about midway between the northern and southern cliffs. He here constructed, with as much rapidity as possible, a walled inclosure, called the Circle, intended as a centre from whence the projected wall of circumvallation was to start northward towards the sea at Trogilus, southward towards the Great Harbor. This Circle appears to have covered a considerable space, and was farther protected by an outwork in front covering an area of one thousand square feet.¹ Astounded at the rapidity with which the Athenians executed this construction,² the Syracusans marched their forces out, and prepared to give battle in order to interrupt it. But when the Athenians, relinquishing the work, drew up on their side in battle order, the Syracusan generals were so struck with their manifest superiority in soldierlike array, as compared with the disorderly trim of their own ranks, that they withdrew their soldiers back into the city without venturing to engage; merely leaving a body of horse to harass the operations of the besiegers, and constrain them to keep in masses. The newly-acquired Athenian cavalry, however, were here brought for the first time into effective combat. With the aid of one tribe of their own hoplites, they charged the Syracusan horse, drove them off with some loss, and erected their trophy. This is the only occasion on which we read of the Athenian cavalry being brought into conflict; though Nikias had made the absence of cavalry the great reason for his prolonged inaction.

Interruption being thus checked, Nikias continued his blockading operations; first completing the Circle,³ then beginning

¹ Thucyd. vi, 97. ἐχούρου πρὸς τὴν Συκὴν οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι, ἵνα περ καθεζόμενοι ἐταίρισαν τὸν κύκλον διὰ ταχέως.

² The Athenians seem to have surpassed all other Greeks in the diligence and skill with which they executed fortifications: see some examples, Thucyd. v, 75-82; Xenoph. Hellen. iv, 4, 18.

³ Dr. Arnold, in his note on Thucyd. vi, 98, says that the Circle is spoken of, in one passage of Thucydides, as if it had never been completed. I construe this one passage differently from him (vii, 2, 4) — τῷ ἄλλῳ τοῦ κύκλου πρὸς τὸν Τρώγιλον ἐπὶ τὴν ἐτέραν θαλάσσαν: where I think τῷ ἄλλῳ τοῦ κύκλου is equivalent to ἐτέρῳ τοῦ κύκλου, as plainly appears from the accompanying mention of Trogilus and the northern sea. I am persuaded that the Circle was finished, and Dr. Arnold himself indicates two passages in which it is distinctly spoken of as having been completed

his wall of circumvallation in a northerly direction from the Circle towards Trogilus: for which purpose a portion of his forces were employed in bringing stones and wood, and depositing them in proper places along the intended line. So strongly did Hermokratês feel the inferiority of the Syracusan hoplites in the field, that he discouraged any fresh general action, and proposed to construct a counter-wall, or cross-wall, traversing the space along which the Athenian circumvallation must necessarily be continued so as to impede its farther progress. A tenable counter-wall, if they could get time to carry it sufficiently far to a defensible terminus, would completely defeat the intent of the besiegers: but even if Nikias should interrupt the work by his attacks, the Syracusans calculated on being able to provide a sufficient force to repel them, during the short time necessary for hastily constructing the palisade, or front outwork. Such palisade would serve them as a temporary defence, while they finished the more elaborate cross-wall behind it, and would, even at the worst, compel Nikias to suspend all his proceedings and employ his whole force to dislodge them.¹

¹ Thucyd. vi. 99. Ὑποτειγίσειν δὲ ἄμεινον ἐδόκει εἶναι (τοῖς Συρακουσίοις) ἢ ἐκείνοι (the Athenians) ἐμελλον ἄξιον τὸ τεῖχος· καὶ εἰ φθάσειαν ἀποκλήσεις γίνεσθαι, καὶ ἡμᾶ καὶ ἐν τούτῳ εἰ ἐπιδοηδοίεν, μέρος ἀντιπείπειν αὐτοὶ τῆς στρατῆς, καὶ φθάνειν ἂν τοῖς στασιῶσι προκαταλαμβάνοντες τὰς ἐφόδους· ἐκείνους δὲ ἂν πανομένους τοῦ ἔργου πάντας ἀπὸς σφῶς τρέπεσθαι.

The Scholiast here explains τὰς ἐφόδους to mean τὰ βασίμια, adding ὅλγα δὲ τὰ ἐπιδοῖναι δοκίμενα, διὰ τὸ τελευτῶδες εἶναι τὸ χωρίον. Though he is here followed by the best commentators, I cannot think that his explanation is correct. He evidently supposes that this first counter-wall of the Syracusans was built — as we shall see presently that the second counter-work was — across the marsh, or low ground between the southern cliff of Epipolæ and the Great Harbor. "The ground being generally marshy (τελευτῶδες) there were only a few places where it could be crossed." But I conceive this supposition to be erroneous. The first counter-wall of the Syracusans was carried, as it seems to me, up the slope of Epipolæ, between the Athenian circle and the southern cliff: it commenced at the Syracusan newly-erected advanced wall, inclosing the Temenitês. This was all hard, firm ground, such as the Athenians could march across at any point: there might perhaps be some roughness here and there, but they would be mere exceptions to the general character of the ground.

It appears to me that τὰς ἐφόδους means simply, "the attacks of the

Accordingly, they took their start from the postern-gate near the grove of Apollo Temenitês; a gate in the new wall, erected four or five months before, to enlarge the fortified space of the city. From this point, which was lower down on the slope of Epipolæ than the Athenian circle, they carried their palisade and counter-wall up the slope, in a direction calculated to intersect the intended line of hostile circumvallation southward of the Circle. The nautical population from Ortygia could be employed in this enterprise, since the city was still completely undisturbed by sea, and mistress of the great harbor, the Athenian fleet not having yet moved from Thapsus. Besides this active crowd of workmen, the sacred olive-trees in the Temenite grove were cut down to serve as materials; and by such efforts the work was presently finished to a sufficient distance for traversing and intercepting the blockading wall intended to come southward from the Circle. It seems to have terminated at the brink of the precipitous southern cliff of Epipolæ, which prevented the Athenians from turning it and attacking it in flank; while it was defended in front by a stockade and topped with wooden towers for discharge of missiles. One tribe of hoplites was left to defend it, while the crowd of Syracusans who had either been employed on the work or on guard, returned back to the city.

During all this process, Nikias had not thought it prudent to interrupt them.¹ Employed as he seems to have been on the Circle, and on the wall branching out from his Circle northward, he was unwilling to march across the slope of Epipolæ to attack them with half his forces, leaving his own rear exposed to attack from the numerous Syracusans in the city, and his own Circle

Athenians," without intending to denote any special assailable points: προκαταλαμβάνειν τὰς ἐφόδους, means "to get beforehand with the attacks," (see Thucyd. i. 57, v. 30.) This is in fact the more usual meaning of ἐφόδος (compare vii. 5; vii. 43; i. 6; v. 35; vi. 63), "attack, approach, visit," etc. There are doubtless other passages in which it means, "the way or road through which the attack was made:" in one of these, however (vii. 51), all the best editors now read ἐσόδου instead of ἐφόδου.

It will be seen that arguments have been founded upon the inadmissible sense which the Scholiast here gives to the word ἐφόδοι: see Dr. Arnold. *Memoir on the Map of Syracuse*, Appendix to his ed. of Thucyd. vol. iii. p. 271. ¹ Thucyd. vi. 100.

only partially guarded. Moreover, by such delay, he was enabled to prosecute his own part of the circumvallation without hindrance, and to watch for an opportunity of assaulting the new counter-wall with advantage. Such an opportunity soon occurred, just at the time when he had accomplished the farther important object of destroying the aqueducts, which supplied the city, partially at least, with water for drinking. The Syracusans appear to have been filled with confidence, both by the completion of their counter-wall, which seemed an effective bar to the besiegers, and by his inaction. The tribe left on guard presently began to relax in their vigilance: instead of occupying the wall, tents were erected behind it to shelter them from the midday sun; while some even permitted themselves to take repose during that hour within the city walls. Such negligence did not escape the Athenian generals, who silently prepared an assault for midday. Three hundred chosen hoplites, with some light troops clothed in panoplies for the occasion, were instructed to sally out suddenly and run across straight to attack the stockade and counter-wall; while the main Athenian force marched in two divisions under Nikias and Lamachus; half towards the city walls, to prevent any succor from coming out of the gates, half towards the Temenite postern-gate from whence the stockade and cross-wall commenced. The rapid forward movement of the chosen three hundred was crowned with full success. They captured both the stockade and the counter-wall, feebly defended by its guards; who, taken by surprise, abandoned their post and fled along behind their wall to enter the city by the Temenite postern-gate. Before all of them could get in, however, both the pursuing three hundred, and the Athenian division which marched straight to that point, had partially come up with them: so that some of these assailants even forced their way along with them through the gate into the interior of the Temenite city wall. Here, however, the Syracusan strength within was too much for them: these foremost Athenians and Argeians were thrust out again with loss. But the general movement of the Athenians had been completely triumphant. They pulled down the counter-wall, plucked up the palisade, and carried the materials away for the use of their own circumvallation.

As the recent Syracusan counter-work had been carried to the

brink of the southern cliff, which rendered it unassailable in flank, Nikias was warned of the necessity of becoming master of this cliff, so as to deprive them of this resource in future. Accordingly, without staying to finish his blockading wall, regularly and continuously from the Circle southward, across the slope of Epipolæ, he left the Circle under a guard, and marched across at once to take possession of the southern cliff, at the point where the blockading wall was intended to reach it. This point of the southern cliff he immediately fortified as a defensive position, whereby he accomplished two objects. First, he prevented the Syracusans from again employing the cliff as a flank defence for a second counter-wall.¹ Next, he acquired the means of providing a safe and easy road of communication between the high ground of Epipolæ and the low marshy ground beneath, which divided Epipolæ from the Great Harbor, and across which the Athenian wall of circumvallation must necessarily be presently

¹ Thucyd. vi, 101. Τῇ δ' ὕστεραια ἀπὸ τοῦ κύκλου ἐτείχιζον οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι τὸν κρημὸν τὸν ὑπὲρ τοῦ ἔλους, ὅς τῶν Ἐπιπολῶν ταύτῃ πρὸς τὸν μέγαν λιμένα ἔρα, καὶ ἥπερ αὐτοῖς βραχύτατον ἐγένετο καταβάσι διὰ τοῦ ὁμόλου καὶ τοῦ ἔλους ἐς τὸν λιμένα τὸ περιτειχισμα.

I give in the text what I believe to be the meaning of this sentence, though the words ἀπὸ τοῦ κύκλου are not clear, and have been differently construed. Göller, in his first edition, had construed them as if it stood ἀρξάμενοι ἀπὸ τοῦ κύκλου: as if the fortification now begun on the cliff was continuous and in actual junction with the Circle. In his second edition, he seems to relinquish this opinion, and to translate them in a manner similar to Dr. Arnold, who considers them as equivalent to ἀπὸ τοῦ κύκλου ὁρμώμενοι, but not at all implying that the fresh work performed was continuous with the Circle, which he believes not to have been the fact. If thus construed, the words would imply, "starting from the Circle as a base of operations." Agreeing with Dr. Arnold in his conception of the event signified, I incline, in construing the words, to proceed upon the analogy of two or three passages in Thucyd. i, 7; i, 46; i, 99; vi, 64 — Αἱ δὲ παλαιαὶ πόλεις διὰ τὴν ληστεῖαν ἐπιπολὶ ἀντισχοῦσαν ἀπὸ θαλάσσης μᾶλλον ὥκισθησαν. . . . Ἔστι δὲ λιμὴν, καὶ πόλις ὑπὲρ αὐτοῦ κεῖται ἀπὸ θαλάσσης ἐν τῇ Ἐλαιωτίδι τῆς Θεσπρωτίδος, Ἐφύρη. In these passages ἀπὸ is used in the same sense as we find ἀποθεν, iv, 125, signifying "apart from, at some distance from:" but not implying any accompanying idea of motion, or proceeding from, either literal or metaphorical.

"The Athenians began to fortify, at some distance from their Circle, the cliff above the marsh," etc.

carried. As his troops would have to carry on simultaneous operations, partly on the high ground above, partly on the low ground beneath, he could not allow them to be separated from each other by a precipitous cliff which would prevent ready mutual assistance. The intermediate space between the Circle and the fortified point of the cliff, was for the time left with an unfinished wall, with the intention of coming back to it, as was in fact afterwards done, and this portion of wall was in the end completed. The Circle though isolated, was strong enough for the time to maintain itself against attack, and was adequately garrisoned.

By this new movement, the Syracusans were debarred from carrying a second counter-wall on the same side of Epipolæ, since the enemy were masters of the terminating cliff on the southern side of the slope. They now turned their operations to the lower ground or marsh between the southern cliff of the Epipolæ and the Great Harbor; being as yet free on that side, since the Athenian fleet was still at Thapsus. Across that marsh — and seemingly as far as the river Anapus, to serve as a flank barrier — they resolved to carry a palisade work with a ditch, so as to intersect the line which the Athenians must next pursue in completing the southernmost portion of their circumvallation. They so pressed the prosecution of this new cross palisade, beginning from the lower portion of their own city walls, and stretching in a southwesterly direction across the low ground as far as the river Anapus, that, by the time the new Athenian fortification on the cliff was completed, the new Syracusan obstacle was completed also, and a stockade with a ditch seemed to shut out the besiegers from reaching the Great Harbor.

Lamachus overcame the difficulty before him with ability and bravery. Descending unexpectedly, one morning before day-break, from his fort on the cliff of Epipolæ into the low ground beneath, — and providing his troops with planks and broad gates to bridge over the marsh where it was scarcely passable, — he contrived to reach and surprise the palisade with the first dawn of morning. Orders were at the same time given for the Athenian fleet to sail round from Thapsus into the Great Harbor, so as to divert the attention of the enemy, and get on the rear of the new palisade work. But before the fleet could arrive, the

palisade and ditch had been carried, and its defenders driven off. A large Syracusan force came out from the city to sustain them, and retake it, so that a general action now ensued, in the low ground between the cliff of Epipolæ, the harbor, and the river Anapus. The superior discipline of the Athenians proved successful: the Syracusans were defeated and driven back on all sides, so that their right wing fled into the city, and their left (including the larger portion of their best force, the horsemen), along the banks of the river Anapus, to reach the bridge. Flushed with victory, the Athenians hoped to cut them off from this retreat, and a chosen body of three hundred hoplites ran fast in hopes of getting to the bridge first. In this hasty movement they fell into disorder, so that the Syracusan cavalry turned upon them, put them to flight, and threw them back upon the Athenian right wing, to which the fugitives communicated their own panic and disorder. The fate of the battle appeared to be turning against the Athenians, when Lamachus, who was on the left wing, hastened to their aid with the Argeian hoplites and as many bowmen as he could collect. His ardor carried him incautiously forward, so that he crossed a ditch with very few followers, before the remaining troops could follow him. He was here attacked and slain,¹ in single combat with a horseman named Kallikratēs: but the Syracusans were driven back when his soldiers came up, and had only just time to snatch and carry off his dead body, with which they crossed the bridge and retreated behind the Anapus. The rapid movement of this gallant officer was thus crowned with complete success, restoring the victory to his own right wing: a victory dearly purchased by the forfeit of his own life.²

Meanwhile the visible disorder and temporary flight of the Athenian right wing, and the withdrawal of Lamachus from the left to reinforce it, imparted fresh courage to the Syracusan right, which had fled into the town. They again came forth to renew the contest; while their generals attempted a diversion by sending out a detachment from the northwestern gates of the city to attack the Athenian circle on the mid-slope of Epipolæ. As this

¹ Thucyd. vi. 102, Plutarch. Nikias, c. 18. Diodorus erroneously places the battle, in which Lamachus was slain *after* the arrival of Gythippus (xiii. 8).

² Thucyd. vi. 102.

Circle lay completely apart and at considerable distance from the battle, they hoped to find the garrison unprepared for attack, and thus to carry it by surprise. Their manœuvre, bold and well-timed, was on the point of succeeding. They carried with little difficulty the covering outwork in front, and the Circle itself, probably stripped of part of its garrison to reinforce the combatants in the lower ground, was only saved by the presence of mind and resource of Nikias, who was lying ill within it. He directed the attendants immediately to set fire to a quantity of wood which lay, together with the battering engines of the army, in front of the circle-wall, so that the flames prevented all farther advance on the part of the assailants, and forced them to retreat. The same flames also served as a signal to the Athenians engaged in the battle beneath, who immediately sent reinforcements to the relief of their general; while at the same time the Athenian fleet, just arrived from Thapsus, was seen sailing into the Great Harbor. This last event, threatening the Syracusans on a new side, drew off their whole attention to the defence of their city, so that both their combatants from the field and their detachment from the Circle were brought back within the walls.¹

Had the recent attempt on the Circle succeeded, carrying with it the death or capture of Nikias, and combined with the death of Lamachus in the field on that same day, it would have greatly brightened the prospects of the Syracusans, and might even have arrested the farther progress of the siege, from the want of an authorized commander. But in spite of such imminent hazard, the actual result of the day left the Athenians completely victorious, and the Syracusans more discouraged than ever. What materially contributed to their discouragement, was, the recent entrance of the Athenian fleet into the Great Harbor, wherein it was henceforward permanently established, in coöperation with the army in a station near the left bank of the Anapus.

Both the army and the fleet now began to occupy themselves seriously with the construction of the southernmost part of the wall of circumvallation; beginning immediately below the Athenian fortified point of descent from the southern cliff of Epipolæ,

¹ Thucyd. vi, 102.

and stretching across the lower marshy ground to the Great Harbor. The distance between these two extreme points was about eight stadia or nearly an English mile: the wall was double, with gates, and probably towers, at suitable intervals, inclosing a space of considerable breadth, doubtless roofed over in part, since it served afterwards, with the help of the adjoining citadel on the cliff, as shelter and defence for the whole Athenian army. The Syracusans could not interrupt this process, nor could they undertake a new counter-wall up the mid-slope of Epipolæ, without coming out to fight a general battle, which they did not feel competent to do. Of course the Circle had now been put into condition to defy a second surprise.

But not only were they thus compelled to look on without hindering the blockading wall towards the Harbor. It was now, for the first time, that they began to taste the real restraints and privations of a siege.¹ Down to this moment, their communication with the Anapus and the country beyond, as well as with all sides of the Great Harbor, had been open and unimpeded; whereas now, the arrival of the Athenian fleet, and the change of position of the Athenian army, had cut them off from both,² so that little or no fresh supplies of provision could reach them except at the hazard of capture from the hostile ships. On the side of Thapsus, where the northern cliff of Epipolæ affords only two or three practicable passages of ascent, they had before been blocked up by the Athenian army and fleet; and a portion of the fleet seems even now to have been left at Thapsus: so that nothing now remained open, except a portion, especially the northern portion, of the slope of Epipolæ. Of this outlet the besieged, especially their numerous cavalry, doubtless availed themselves, for the purpose of excursions and of bringing in supplies. But it was both longer and more circuitous for such purposes than the plain near the Great Harbor and the Helôrîne road: moreover, it had

¹ Thucyd. vi, 103. οἱ δὲ εἰδὼς ἀνθρώπων ἀπορούντων καὶ μᾶλλον ἢ πρὶν πολιορκουμένων, etc.

² Diodorus, however, is wrong in stating (xiii, 7) that the Athenians occupied the temple of Zeus Olympius and the polichnê, or hamlet, surrounding it, on the right bank of the Anapus. These posts remained always occupied by the Syracusans, throughout the whole war (Thucyd. vii, 4, 37).

to pass by the high and narrow pass of Euryálus, and might thus be rendered unavailable to the besieged, whenever Nikias thought fit to occupy and fortify that position. Unfortunately for himself and his army, he omitted this easy but capital precaution, even at the moment when he must have known Gylippus to be approaching.

In regard to the works actually undertaken, the order followed by Nikias and Lamachus can be satisfactorily explained. Having established their fortified post on the centre of the slope of Epipolæ, they were in condition to combat opposition and attack any counter-wall on whichever side the enemy might erect it. Commencing in the first place the execution of the northern portion of the blockading line, they soon desist from this and turn their attention to the southern portion, because it was here that the Syracusans carried their two first counter-works. In attacking the second counter-work of the Syracusans, across the marsh to the Anapus, they chose a suitable moment for bringing the main fleet round from Thapsus into the Great Harbor, with a view to its coöperation. After clearing the lower ground, they probably deemed it advisable, in order to establish a safe and easy communication with their fleet, that the double wall across the marsh, from Epipolæ to the Harbor, should stand next for execution; for which there was this farther reason, that they thereby blocked up the most convenient exit and channel of supply for Syracuse. There are thus plausible reasons assignable why the northern portion of the line of blockade, from the Athenian camp on Epipolæ to the sea at Trogilus, was left to the last, and was found open, at least the greater part of it, by Gylippus.

While the Syracusans thus began to despair of their situation, the prospects of the Athenians were better than ever, promising certain and not very distant triumph. The reports circulating through the neighboring cities all represented them as in the full tide of success, so that many Sikel tribes, hitherto wavering, came in to tender their alliance, while three armed pentekonters also arrived from the Tyrrhenian coast. Moreover, abundant supplies were furnished from the Italian Greeks generally. Nikias, now sole commander since the death of Lamachus, had even the glory of receiving and discussing proposals from Syracuse for capitulation, a necessity which was openly and abundantly canvassed

within the city itself. The ill-success of Hermokratês and his colleagues had caused them to be recently displaced from their functions as generals, to which Herakleidês, Euklês, and Tellias, were appointed. But this change did not give them confidence to hazard a fresh battle, while the temper of the city, during such period of forced inaction, was melancholy in the extreme. Though several propositions for surrender, perhaps unofficial, yet seemingly sincere, were made to Nikias, nothing definitive could be agreed upon as to the terms.¹ Had the Syracusan government been oligarchical, the present distress would have exhibited a large body of malcontents upon whom he could have worked with advantage; but the democratical character of the government maintained union at home in this trying emergency.²

We must take particular note of these propositions in order to understand the conduct of Nikias during the present critical interval. He had been from the beginning in secret correspondence with a party in Syracuse;³ who, though neither numerous nor powerful in themselves, were now doubtless both more active and more influential than ever they had been before. From them he received constant and not unreasonable assurances that the city was on the point of surrendering, and could not possibly hold out. And as the tone of opinion without, as well as within, conspired to raise such an impression in his mind, so he suffered himself to be betrayed into a fatal languor and security as to the farther prosecution of the besieging operations. The injurious consequences of the death of Lamachus now became evident. From the time of the departure from Katana down to the battle in which that gallant officer perished, — a period seemingly of about three months, from about March to June 414 B.C., — the operations of the siege had been conducted with great vigor as well as unremitting perseverance, and the building-work, especially, had been so rapidly executed as to fill the Syracusans with amazement. But so soon as Nikias is left sole commander, this vigorous march disappears and is exchanged for slackness and apathy. The wall across the low ground near the harbor

¹ Thucyd. vi, 103. πάλαι ἐλέγτο πρὸς τε ἐκείνους καὶ πλείω ἐτι κατὰ τὴν πόλιν.

² Thucyd. vii, 56.

³ Thucyd. vii, 49-86.

might have been expected to proceed more rapidly, because the Athenian position generally was much stronger, the chance of opposition from the Syracusans was much lessened, and the fleet had been brought into the Great Harbor to cooperate. Yet in fact it seems to have proceeded more slowly; Nikias builds it at first as a double wall, though it would have been practicable to complete the whole line of blockade with a single wall before the arrival of Gylippus, and afterwards, if necessary, to have doubled it either wholly or partially, instead of employing so much time in completing this one portion that Gylippus arrived before it was finished, scarcely less than two months after the death of Lamachus. Both the besiegers and their commander now seem to consider success as certain, without any chance of effective interruption from within, still less from without; so that they may take their time over the work, without caring whether the ultimate consummation comes a month sooner or later.

Though such was the present temper of the Athenian troops, Nikias could doubtless have spurred them on and accelerated the operations, had he himself been convinced of the necessity of doing so. Hitherto, we have seen him always overrating the gloomy contingencies of the future, and disposed to calculate as if the worst was to happen which possibly could happen. But a great part of what passes for caution in his character, was in fact backwardness and inertia of temperament, aggravated by the melancholy addition of a painful internal complaint. If he wasted in indolence the first six months after his arrival in Sicily, and turned to inadequate account the present two months of triumphant position before Syracuse, both these mistakes arose from the same cause; from reluctance to act except under the pressure and stimulus of some obvious necessity. Accordingly, he was always behindhand with events; but when necessity became terrible, so as to subdue the energies of other men, then did he come forward and display unwonted vigor, as we shall see in the following chapter. But now, relieved from all urgency of apparent danger, and misled by the delusive hopes held out through his correspondence in the town, combined with the atmosphere of success which exhilarated his own armament, Nikias fancied the surrender of Syracuse inevitable, and became, for one brief moment preceding his calamitous end, not merely

anguine, but even careless and presumptuous in the extreme. Nothing short of this presumption could have let in his destroying enemy, Gylippus.¹

That officer — named by the Lacedæmonians commander in Sicily, at the winter-meeting which Alkibiadēs had addressed at Sparta — had employed himself in getting together forces for the purpose of the expedition. But the Lacedæmonians, though so far stimulated by the representations of the Athenian exile as to promise aid, were not forward to perform the promise. Even the Corinthians, decidedly the most hearty of all in behalf of Syracuse, were yet so tardy, that in the month of June, Gylippus was still at Leukas, with his armament not quite ready to sail. To embark in a squadron for Sicily, against the numerous and excellent Athenian fleet now acting there, was a service not tempting to any one, and demanding both personal daring and devotion. Moreover, every vessel from Sicily, between March and June 414 B.C., brought intelligence of progressive success on the part of Nikias and Lamachus, thus rendering the prospects of Corinthian auxiliaries still more discouraging.

At length, in the month of June, arrived the news of that defeat of the Syracusans wherein Lamachus was slain, and of its important consequences in forwarding the operations of the besiegers. Great as those consequences were, they were still farther exaggerated by report. It was confidently affirmed, by messenger after messenger, that the wall of circumvallation had been completed, and that Syracuse was now invested on all sides.² Both Gylippus and the Corinthians were so far misled as to believe this to be the fact, and despaired, in consequence, of being able to render any effective aid against the Athenians in Sicily. But as there still remained hopes of being able to preserve the Greek cities in Italy, Gylippus thought it important to pass over thither at once with his own little squadron of four sail, two Lacedæ-

¹ Plutarch, Nikias, c. 18.

² Thucyd. vi, 104. *ὡς αὐτοῖς αἱ ἀγγελίαι ἐφοίτων δεῖναι καὶ πᾶσαι ἐπὶ τὸ πύρρον ἐφύσασθαι, ὡς ἡδὴ παντελῶς ἀποτετελιχισμέναι αἱ Συράκουσαι εἰσι, τῆς αὖν Σικελίας οὐκέτι ἐλπίδα οὐδεμίαν εἶχεν ὁ Γύλιππος, τὴν δὲ Ἰταλίαν βουλόμενος περιποιῆσαι, etc.* Compare Plutarch, Nikias, c. 18.

It will be seen from Thucydides, that Gylippus heard this news while he was yet at Leukas.

monians and two Corinthians, and the Corinthian captain Pythên; leaving the Corinthian main squadron to follow as soon as it was ready. Intending then to act only in Italy, Gylippus did not fear falling in with the Athenian fleet. He first sailed to Tarentum, friendly and warm in his cause. From hence he undertook a visit to Thurii, where his father Kleandridas, exiled from Sparta, had formerly resided as citizen. After trying to profit by this opening for the purpose of gaining the Thurians, and finding nothing but refusal, he passed on farther southward, until he came opposite to the Terinæan gulf near the southeastern cape of Italy. Here a violent gust of wind off the land overtook him, exposed his vessels to the greatest dangers, and drove him out to sea, until at length, standing in a northerly direction, he was fortunate enough to find shelter again at Tarentum.¹ But

¹ Thucyd. vi, 104. Ἄρας (Γυλιππος) παρεπλεῖ τὴν Ἰταλίαν καὶ ἀρπασθεὶς ὑπ' ἀνέμου κατὰ τὸν Τεριναιὸν κόλπον, ὃς ἐκπνέει τανυτὴ μέγας, κατὰ βορέαν ἐστηκῶς ἀποφέρεται ἐς τὸ πηλαγόν, καὶ πάλιν χειμασθεὶς ἐς τὰ μάλιστα Τάραντι προσμίσγει.

Though all the commentators here construe the words κατὰ βορέαν ἐστηκῶς as if they agreed with ὃς or ἀνέμος, I cannot but think that these words really agree with Γυλιππος. Gylippus is overtaken by this violent off-shore wind while he is sailing southward along the eastern shore of what is now called Calabria Ultra: "setting his ship towards the north or standing to the north (to use the English nautical phrase), he is carried out to sea, from whence, after great difficulties, he again gets into Tarentum." If Gylippus was carried out to sea when in this position, and trying to get to Tarentum, he would naturally lay his course northward. What is meant by the words κατὰ βορέαν ἐστηκῶς, as applied to the wind, I confess I do not understand; nor do the critics throw much light upon it. Whenever a point of the compass is mentioned in conjunction with any wind, it always seems to mean the point from whence the wind blows. Now, that κατὰ βορέαν ἐστηκῶς, means "a wind which blows steadily from the north," as the commentators affirm, I cannot believe without better authority than they produce. Moreover, Gylippus could never have laid his course for Tarentum, if there had been a strong wind in this direction; while such a wind would have forwarded him to Lokri, the very place whither he wanted to go. The mention of the Terinæan gulf is certainly embarrassing. If the words are right (which perhaps may be doubted), the explanation of Dr. Arnold in his note seems the best which can be offered. Perhaps, indeed, — for though improbable, this is not wholly impossible, — Thucydides may himself have committed a geographical inadvertence, in supposing the Terinæan gulf to be on the east side of Calabria.

such was the damage which his ships had sustained, that he was forced to remain here while they were hauled ashore and refitted.¹

So untoward a delay threatened to intercept altogether his farther progress. For the Thurians had sent intimation of his visit as well as of the number of his vessels, to Nikias at Syracuse; treating with contempt the idea of four triremes coming to attack the powerful Athenian fleet. In the present sanguine phase of his character, Nikias sympathized with the flattering tenor of the message, and overlooked the gravity of the fact announced. He despised Gylippus as a mere privateer, nor would he even take the precaution of sending four ships from his numerous fleet to watch and intercept the new-comer. Accordingly Gylippus, after having refitted his ships at Tarentum, advanced southward along the coast without opposition to the Epizephyrian Lokri. Here he first learned, to his great satisfaction, that Syracuse was not yet so completely blockaded but that an army might still reach and relieve it from the interior, entering it by the Euryâlus and the heights of Epipolæ. Having deliberated whether he should take the chance of running his ships into the harbor of Syracuse, despite the watch of the Athenian fleet, or whether he should sail through the strait of Messina to Himera at the north of Sicily, and from thence levy an army to cross the island and relieve Syracuse by land, he resolved on the latter course, and passed forthwith through the strait, which he found altogether unguarded. After touching both at Rhegium and Messênê, he arrived safely at Himera. Even at Rhegium, there was no Athenian naval force; though Nikias had, indeed, sent thither four Athenian triremes, after he had been apprized that Gylippus had reached Lokri, rather from excess of precaution, than because he thought it necessary. But this Athenian squadron reached Rhegium too late: Gylippus had already passed the strait; and fortune, smiting his enemy with blindness, landed him unopposed on the fatal soil of Sicily.

The blindness of Nikias would indeed appear unaccountable, were it not that we shall have worse yet to recount. To appreciate his misjudgment fully, and to be sensible that we are not

¹ Thucyd. vi, 104.

making him responsible for results which could not have been foreseen, we have only to turn back to what had been said six months before by the exile Alkibiadēs at Sparta: "Send forthwith an army to Sicily (he exhorted the Lacedæmonians); but *send at the same time, what will be yet more valuable than an army, a Spartan to take the supreme command.*" It was in fulfilment of this recommendation, the wisdom of which will abundantly appear, that Gylippus had been appointed. And had he even reached Syracuse alone in a fishing-boat, the effect of his presence, carrying the great name of Sparta, and full assurance of Spartan intervention to come, not to mention his great personal ability, would have sufficed to give new life to the besieged. Yet Nikias — having, through a lucky accident, timely notice of his approach, when a squadron of four ships would have prevented his reaching the island — disdains even this most easy precaution, and neglects him as a freebooter of no significance. Such neglect too is the more surprising, since the well-known philo-Laconian tendencies of Nikias would have led us to expect, that he would overvalue rather than undervalue the imposing ascendancy of the Spartan name.

Gylippus, on arriving at Himera, as commander named by Sparta, and announcing himself as forerunner of Peloponnesian reinforcements, met with a hearty welcome. The Himereans agreed to aid him with a body of hoplites, and to furnish panoplies for the seamen in his vessels. On sending to Selinus, Gela, and some of the Sikel tribes in the interior, he received equally favorable assurances; so that he was enabled in no very long time to get together a respectable force. The interest of Athens among the Sikels had been recently weakened by the death of one of her most active partisans, the Sikel prince Archonidēs, a circumstance which both enabled Gylippus to obtain more of their aid, and facilitated his march across the island. He was enabled to undertake this inland march from Himera to Syracuse at the head of seven hundred hoplites from his own vessels, seamen and epibatæ taken together; one thousand hoplites and light troops, with one hundred horse, from Himera, some horse and light troops from Selinus and Gela, and one thousand Sikels.¹ With

¹ Thucyd. vii, 1.

these forces, some of whom joined him on the march, he reached Euryâlus and the heights of Epipolæ above Syracuse, assaulting and capturing the Sikel fort of Ietæ in his way, but without experiencing any other opposition.

His arrival was all but too late, and might have been actually too late, had not the Corinthian admiral Goggylus got to Syracuse a little before him. The Corinthian fleet of twelve triremes, under Erasinidēs — having started from Leukas later than Gylippus, but as soon as it was ready — was now on its way to Syracuse. But Goggylus had been detained at Leukas by some accident, so that he did not depart until after all the rest. Yet he reached Syracuse the soonest; probably striking a straighter course across the sea, and favored by weather. He got safely into the harbor of Syracuse, escaping the Athenian guardships, whose watch doubtless partook of the general negligence of the besieging operations.¹

The arrival of Goggylus at that moment was an accident of unspeakable moment, and was in fact nothing less than the salvation of the city. Among all the causes of despair in the Syracusan mind, there was none more powerful than the circumstance, that they had not as yet heard of any relief approaching, or of any active intervention in their favor, from Peloponnesus. Their discouragement increasing from day to day, and the interchange of propositions with Nikias becoming more frequent, matters had at last so ripened that a public assembly was just about to be held to sanction a definitive capitulation.² It was at this critical juncture that Goggylus arrived, apparently a little before Gylippus reached Himera. He was the first to announce that both the Corinthian fleet and a Spartan commander were now actually on their voyage, and might be expected immediately, intelligence which filled the Syracusans with enthusiasm and with renewed courage. They instantly threw aside all idea of capitulation, and resolved to hold out to the last.

It was not long before they received intimation that Gylippus had reached Himera, which Goggylus at his arrival could not know, and was raising an army to march across for their relief.

¹ Thucyd. vii, 2-7.

² Thucyd. vi, 1-3 vii, 2 Plutarch, Nikias, c. 19.

After the interval necessary for his preparations and for his march, probably not less than between a fortnight and three weeks, they learned that he was approaching Syracuse by the way of Euryalus and Epipolæ. He was presently seen coming, having ascended Epipolæ by Euryalus; the same way by which the Athenians had come from Katana in the spring, when they commenced the siege. As he descended the slope of Epipolæ, the whole Syracusan force went out in a body to hail his arrival and accompany him into the city.¹

Few incidents throughout the whole siege of Syracuse appear so unaccountable as the fact, that the proceedings and march of Gylippus, from his landing at Himera to the moment of his entering the town, were accomplished without the smallest resistance on the part of Nikias. After this instant, the besiegers pass from incontestable superiority in the field, and apparent certainty of prospective capture of the city, to a state of inferiority, not only excluding all hope of capture, but even sinking, step by step, into absolute ruin. Yet Nikias had remained with his eyes shut and his hands tied, not making the least effort to obstruct so fatal a consummation. After having despised Gylippus, in his voyage along the coast of Italy, as a freebooter with four ships, he now despises him not less at the head of an army marching from Himera. If he was taken unawares, as he really appears to have been,² the fault was altogether his own, and the ignorance such as we must almost call voluntary. For the approach of Gylippus must have been well known to him beforehand. He must have learned from the four ships which he sent to Rhegium, that Gylippus had already touched thither in passing through the strait, on his way to Himera. He must therefore have been well aware, that the purpose was to attempt the relief of Syracuse by an army from the interior; and his correspondence among the Sikel tribes must have placed him in cognizance of the equipment going on at Himera. Moreover, when we recollect that Gylippus reached that place without either troops or arms; that he had to obtain forces not merely from Himera, but also from

¹ Thucyd. vii, 2.

² Thucyd. vii, 3. Οἱ δὲ Ἀθηναῖοι, ἀφ' οὐκ ἴδωσιν τοῦ τε Γυλίππου καὶ τῶν Συρακοσίων στρατοῦν ἐπιόντων, etc.

Selinus and Gela, as well as to sound the Sikel towns, not all of them friendly; lastly, that he had to march all across the island, partly through hostile territory, it is impossible to allow less interval than a fortnight or three weeks between his landing at Himera and his arrival at Epipolæ. Farther, Nikias must have learned, through his intelligence in the interior of Syracuse, the important revolution which had taken place in Syracusan opinion through the arrival of Goggylus, even before the landing of Gylippus in Sicily was known. He was apprized, from that moment, that he had to take measures, not only against renewed obstinate hostility within the town, but against a fresh invading enemy without. Lastly, that enemy had first to march all across Sicily, during which march he might have been embarrassed and perhaps defeated,¹ and could then approach Syracuse only by one road, over the high ground of Euryalus in the Athenian rear, through passes few in number, easy to defend, by which Nikias had himself first approached, and through which he had only got by a well-laid plan of surprise. Yet Nikias leaves these passes unoccupied and undefended; he takes not a single new precaution; the relieving army enters Syracuse as it were over a broad and free plain.

If we are amazed at the insolent carelessness with which Nikias disdained the commonest precautions for repelling the foreknown approach, by sea, of an enemy formidable even single-handed, what are we to say of that unaccountable blindness which led him to neglect the same enemy when coming at the head of a relieving army, and to omit the most obvious means of defence in a crisis upon which his future fate turned? Homer would have designated such neglect as a temporary delirium inflicted by the fearful inspiration of Atê. the historian has no such explanatory name to give, and can only note it as a sad and suitable prelude to the calamities too nearly at hand.

At the moment when the fortunate Spartan auxiliary was thus

¹ Compare an incident in the ensuing year, Thucyd. vii, 32. The Athenians, at a moment when they had become much weaker than they were now, had influence enough among the Sikel tribes to raise opposition to the march of a corps coming from the interior to the help of Syracuse. This auxiliary corps was defeated and nearly destroyed in its march.

allowed to march quietly into Syracuse, the Athenian double wall of circumvallation, between the southern cliff of Epipolæ and the Great Harbor, eight stadia long, was all but completed; a few yards only of the end close to the harbor were wanting. But Gylippus cared not to interrupt its completion. He aimed at higher objects, and he knew, what Nikias, unhappily, never felt and never lived to learn, the immense advantage of turning to active account that first impression and full tide of confidence which his arrival had just infused into the Syracusans. Hardly had he accomplished his junction with them, when he marshalled the united force in order of battle, and marched up to the lines of the Athenians. Amazed as they were, and struck dumb by his unexpected arrival, they too formed in battle order, and awaited his approach. His first proceeding marked how much the odds of the game were changed. He sent a herald to tender to them a five days' armistice, on condition that they should collect their effects and withdraw from the island. Nikias disdained to return any reply to this insulting proposal; but his conduct showed how much *he* felt, as well as Gylippus, that the tide was now turned. For when the Spartan commander, perceiving now for the first time the disorderly trim of his Syracusan hoplites, thought fit to retreat into more open ground farther removed from the walls, probably in order that he might have a better field for his cavalry, Nikias declined to follow him, and remained in position close to his own fortifications.¹ This was tantamount to a confession of inferiority in the field. It was a virtual abandonment of the capture of Syracuse, a tacit admission that the Athenians could hope for nothing better in the end than the humiliating offer which the herald had just made to them. So it seems to have been felt by both parties; for from this time forward, the Syracusans become and continue aggressors, the Athenians remaining always on the defensive, except for one brief instant after the arrival of Demosthenês.

After drawing off his troops and keeping them encamped for that night on the Temenite cliff, seemingly within the added fortified inclosure of Syracuse, Gylippus brought them out again the next morning, and marshalled them in front of the Athenian

¹ Thucyd. vii. 3.

lines, as if about to attack. But while the attention of the Athenians was thus engaged, he sent a detachment to surprise the fort of Labdalum, which was not within view of their lines. The enterprise was completely successful. The fort was taken, and the garrison put to the sword; while the Syracusans gained another unexpected advantage during the day, by the capture of one of the Athenian triremes which was watching their harbor. Gylippus pursued his successes actively, by immediately beginning the construction of a fresh counter-wall, from the outer city wall in a northwesterly direction aslant up the slope of Epipolæ; so as to traverse the intended line of the Athenian circumvallation on the north side of their Circle, and render blockade impossible. He availed himself, for this purpose, of stones laid by the Athenians for their own circumvallation, at the same time alarming them by threatening attack upon their lower wall, between the southern cliff of Epipolæ and the Great Harbor, which was now just finished, so as to leave their troops disposable for action on the higher ground. Against one part of the wall, which seemed weaker than the rest, he attempted a nocturnal surprise, but finding the Athenians in vigilant guard without, he was forced to retire. This part of the wall was now heightened, and the Athenians took charge of it themselves, distributing their allies along the remainder.¹

These attacks, however, appear to have been chiefly intended as diversions, in order to hinder the enemy from obstructing the completion of the counter-wall. Now was the time for Nikias to adopt vigorous aggressive measures both against this wall and against the Syracusans in the field, unless he chose to relinquish all hope of ever being able to beleaguer Syracuse. And, indeed, he seems actually to have relinquished such hope, even thus early after he had seemed certain master of the city. For he now undertook a measure altogether new; highly important in itself, but indicating an altered scheme of policy. He resolved to fortify Cape Plemmyrium, — the rocky promontory which forms one extremity of the narrow entrance of the Great Harbor, immediately south of the point of Ortygia, — and to make it a secure main station for the fleet and stores. The fleet had been hitherto

¹ Thucyd. vii. 4.

stationed in close neighborhood of the land-force, in a fortified position at the extremity of the double blockading wall between the southern cliff of Epipolæ and the Great Harbor. From such a station in the interior of the harbor, it was difficult for the Athenian triremes to perform the duties incumbent on them, of watching the two ports of Syracuse — one on each side of the isthmus which joins Ortygia to the mainland — so as to prevent any exit of ships from within, or ingress of ships from without, and of insuring the unobstructed admission by sea of supplies for their own army. For both these purposes, the station of Plemmyrium was far more convenient; and Nikias now saw that henceforward his operations would be for the most part maritime. Without confessing it openly, he thus practically acknowledged that the superiority of land-force had passed to the side of his opponents, and that a successful prosecution of the blockade had become impossible.¹

Three forts, one of considerable size and two subsidiary, were erected on the sea-board of Cape Plemmyrium, which became the station for triremes as well as for ships of burden. Though the situation was found convenient for all naval operations, it entailed also serious disadvantages; being destitute of any spring of water, such as the memorable fountain of Arethusa on the opposite island of Ortygia. So that for supplies of water, and of wood also, the crews of the ships had to range a considerable distance, exposed to surprise from the numerous Syracusan cavalry placed in garrison at the temple of Zeus Olympius. Day after day, losses were sustained in this manner, besides the increased facilities given for desertion, which soon fatally diminished the efficiency of each ship's crew. As the Athenian hopes of success now declined, both the slaves and the numerous foreigners who served in their navy became disposed to steal away. And though the ships of war, down to this time, had been scarcely at all engaged in actual warfare, yet they had been for many months continually at sea and on the watch, without any opportunity of hauling ashore to refit. Hence the naval force, now about to be called into action as the chief hope of the Athenians, was found lamentably degenerated from that ostentatious perfection

¹ Thucyd. vii, 4.

in which it had set sail fifteen months before, from the harbor of Peiræus.

The erection of the new forts at Plemmyrium, while by withdrawing the Athenian forces it left Gylippus unopposed in the prosecution of his counter-wall, at the same time emboldened him by the manifest decline of hope which it implied. Day after day he brought out his Syracusans in battle-array, planting them near the Athenian lines; but the Athenians showed no disposition to attack. At length he took advantage of what he thought a favorable opportunity to make the attack himself; but the ground was so hemmed in by various walls — the Athenian fortified lines on one side, the Syracusan front or Temenitic fortification on another, and the counter-wall now in course of construction on a third — that his cavalry and darters had no space to act. Accordingly, the Syracusan hoplites, having to fight without these auxiliaries, were beaten and driven back with loss, the Corinthian Goggylus being among the slain.¹ On the next day, Gylippus had the prudence to take the blame of this defeat upon himself. It was all owing to his mistake, he publicly confessed, in having made choice of a confined space wherein neither cavalry nor darters could avail. He would presently give them another opportunity, in a fairer field, and he exhorted them to show their inbred superiority, as Dorians and Peloponnesians, by chasing these Ionians with their rabble of islanders out of Sicily. Accordingly, after no long time, he again brought them up in order of battle; taking care, however, to keep in the open space, beyond the extremity of the walls and fortifications.

On this occasion, Nikias did not decline the combat, but marched out into the open space to meet him. He probably felt encouraged by the result of the recent action; but there was a farther and more pressing motive. The counter-wall of intersection, which the Syracusans were constructing, was on the point of cutting the Athenian line of circumvallation, so that it was essential for Nikias to attack without delay, unless he formally abnegated all farther hope of successful siege. Nor could the army endure, in spite of ~~ruined~~ ^{ruined} fortune, irrevocably to shut themselves out from such hope, without one struggle more. Both armies were

¹ Thucyd. vii, 5; Plutarch, Nikias, c. 19.

therefore ranged in battle order on the open space beyond the walls, higher up the slope of Epipolæ; Gylippus placing his cavalry and darters to the right of his line, on the highest and most open ground. In the midst of the action between the hoplites on both sides, these troops on the right charged the left flank of the Athenians with such vigor, that they completely broke it. The whole Athenian army underwent a thorough defeat, and only found shelter within its fortified lines. And in the course of the very next night, the Syracusan counter-wall was pushed so far as to traverse and get beyond the projected line of Athenian blockade, reaching presently as far as the edge of the northern cliff: so that Syracuse was now safe, unless the enemy should not only recover their superiority in the field, but also become strong enough to storm and carry the new-built wall.¹

Farther defence was also obtained by the safe arrival of the Corinthian, Ambrakiotic, and Leukadian fleet of twelve triremes, under Erasinidês, which Nikias had vainly endeavored to intercept. He had sent twenty sail to the southern coast of Italy; but the new-comers had had the good luck to avoid them.

Erasinidês and his division lent their hands to the execution of a work which completed the scheme of defence for the city. Gylippus took the precaution of constructing a fort or redoubt on the high ground of Epipolæ, so as to command the approach to Syracuse from the high ground of Euryalus; a step which Hermokratês had not thought of until too late, and which Nikias had never thought of at all, during his period of triumph and mastery. He erected a new fort on a suitable point of the high ground, backed by three fortified positions or encampments at proper distances in the rear of it, intended for bodies of troops to support the advanced post in case it was attacked. A continuous wall was then carried from this advanced post down the slope of Epipolæ, so as to reach and join the counter-wall recently constructed; whereby this counter-wall, already traversing and cutting the Athenian line of circumvallation, became in fact prolonged up the whole slope of Epipolæ, and barred all direct access from the Athenians in their existing lines up to the summit of that eminence, as well as up to the northern cliff. The Syracusans had now one continuous and uninterrupted line of defence; a long

¹ Thucyd. vii. 5.

single wall, resting at one extremity on the new-built fort upon the high ground of Epipolæ, at the other extremity, upon the city wall. This wall was only single; but it was defended, along its whole length, by the permanent detachments occupying the three several fortified positions or encampments just mentioned. One of these positions was occupied by native Syracusans; a second, by Sicilian Greeks; a third, by other allies. Such was the improved and systematic scheme of defence which the genius of Gylippus first projected, and which he brought to execution at the present moment: a scheme, the full value of which will be appreciated when we come to describe the proceedings of the second Athenian armament under Demosthenês.

Not content with having placed the Syracusans out of the reach of danger, Gylippus took advantage of their renewed confidence to infuse into them projects of retaliation against the enemy who had brought them so near to ruin. They began to equip their ships in the harbor, and to put their seamen under training, in hopes of qualifying themselves to contend with the Athenians even on their own element; while Gylippus himself quitted the city to visit the various cities of the island, and to get together farther reinforcements, naval as well as military. And as it was foreseen that Nikias on his part would probably demand aid from Athens, envoys, Syracusan as well as Corinthian, were despatched to Peloponnesus, to urge the necessity of forwarding additional troops, even in merchant vessels, if no triremes could be spared to convey them.² Should no reinforcements reach the Athenian

¹ Thucyd. vii. 7. Μετὰ δὲ τοῦτο, αἱ τε τῶν Κορινθίων νῆες καὶ Ἀμπεκτιῶν καὶ Λευκαδίων ἐσεπλευσαν αἱ ὑπόλοιποι δώδεκα (ἦρχε δὲ αὐτῶν Ἐρασινιδῆς Κορινθίος), καὶ ξυνετείχισαν τὸ λοιπὸν τοῖς Συρακουσίοις μέχρι τοῦ ἑγκαρσίου τείχους.

These words of Thucydides are very obscure, and have been explained by different commentators in different ways. The explanation which I here give does not, so far as I know, coincide with any of them, yet I venture to think that it is the most plausible, and the only one satisfactory. Compare the Memoir of Dr. Arnold on his Map of Syracuse (Arn. Thucyd. vol. iii, p. 273), and the notes of Poppe and Göller. Dr. Arnold is indeed so little satisfied with any explanation which had suggested itself to him that he thinks some words must have dropped out.

² Thucyd. vii. 7.

camp, the Syracusans well knew that its efficiency must diminish by every month's delay, while their own strength, in spite of heavy cost and effort, was growing with their increased prospects of success.

If this double conviction was present to sustain the ardor of the Syracusans, it was not less painfully felt amidst the Athenian camp, now blocked up like a besieged city, and enjoying no free movement except through their ships and their command of the sea. Nikias saw that if Gylippus should return with any considerable additional force, even the attack upon him by land would become too powerful to resist, besides the increasing disorganization of his fleet. He became fully convinced that to remain as they were was absolute ruin. As all possibility of prosecuting the siege of Syracuse successfully was now at an end, a sound judgment would have dictated that his position in the harbor had become useless as well as dangerous, and that the sooner it was evacuated the better. Probably Demosthenês would have acted thus, under similar circumstances; but such foresight and resolution were not in the character of Nikias, who was afraid, moreover, of the blame which it would bring down upon him at home, if not from his own army. Not venturing to quit his position without orders from Athens, he determined to send home thither an undisguised account of his critical position, and to solicit either reinforcements or instructions to return.

It was now, indeed, the end of September (B.C. 414), so that he could not even hope for an answer before midwinter, nor for reinforcements, if such were to be sent, until the ensuing spring was far advanced. Nevertheless, he determined to encounter this risk, and to trust to vigilant precautions for safety during the interval, precautions which, as the result will show, were within a hair's breadth of proving insufficient. But as it was of the last importance to him to make his countrymen at home fully sensible of the grave danger of his position, he resolved to transmit a written despatch; not trusting to the oral statement of a messenger, who might be wanting either in courage, in presence of mind, or in competent expression, to impress the full and sad truth upon a reluctant audience.¹ Accordingly he sent home a despatch, which

¹ Thucyd. vii, 8.

seems to have reached Athens about the end of November, and was read formally in the public assembly by the secretary of the city. Preserved by Thucydides verbatim, it stands as one of the most interesting remnants of antiquity, and well deserves a literal translation.

"Our previous proceedings have been already made known to you, Athenians, in many other despatches;¹ but the present crisis is such as to require your deliberation more than ever, when you shall have heard the situation in which we stand. After we had overcome in many engagements the Syracusans, against whom we were sent, and had built the fortified lines which we now occupy, there came upon us the Lacedæmonian Gylippus, with an army partly Peloponnesian, partly Sicilian. Him too we defeated, in the first action; but in a second, we were overwhelmed by a crowd of cavalry and darters, and forced to retire within our lines. And thus the superior number of our enemies has compelled us to suspend our circumvallation, and remain inactive; indeed, we cannot employ in the field even the full force which we possess, since a portion of our hoplites are necessarily required for the protection of our walls. Meanwhile the enemy have carried out a single intersecting counter-wall beyond our line of circumvallation, so that we can no longer continue the latter to completion, unless we have force enough to

¹ Thucyd. vii, 9 *ἐν ἄλλαις πολλαῖς ἐπιστολαῖς*. The word *despatches*, which I use to translate *ἐπιστολαῖς*, is not inapplicable to oral, as well as to written messages, and thus retains the ambiguity involved in the original, for *ἐπιστολαῖς*, though usually implying, does not necessarily imply, *written* communications.

The words of Thucydides (vii, 8) *may* certainly be construed to imply that Nikias had never on any previous occasion sent a written communication to Athens; and so Dr. Thirlwall understands them, though not without hesitation (Hist. Gr. ch. xxvi, vol. iii, p. 418). At the same time, I think them reconcilable with the supposition that Nikias may previously have sent written despatches, though much shorter than the present, leaving details and particulars to be supplied by the officer who carried them.

Mr. Mitford states the direct reverse of that which Dr. Thirlwall understands: "Nicias had used the precaution of frequently sending despatches in writing, with an exact account of every transaction." (Ch. xviii, sect. 1, vol. iv, p. 100.)

Certainly, the statement of Thucydides does not imply this

attack and storm their counter-wall. And things have come to such a pass, that we, who profess to besiege others, are ourselves rather the party besieged, by land at least, since the cavalry leave us scarce any liberty of motion. Farther, the enemy have sent envoys to Peloponnesus to obtain reinforcements, while Gylippus in person is going round the Sicilian cities, trying to stir up to action such of them as are now neutral, and to get, from the rest, additional naval and military supplies. For it is their determination, as I understand, not merely to assail our lines on shore with their land-force, but also to attack us by sea with their ships.

"Be not shocked when I tell you, that they intend to become aggressors even at sea. They know well, that our fleet was at first in high condition, with dry ships¹ and excellent crews; but now the ships have rotted, from remaining too long at sea, and the crews are ruined. Nor have we the means of hauling our ships ashore to refit, since the enemy's fleet, equal or superior in numbers, always appears on the point of attacking us. We see them in constant practice, and they can choose their own moment for attack. Moreover, they can keep their ships high and dry more than we can; for they are not engaged in maintaining watch upon others; while to us, who are obliged to retain all our fleet on guard, nothing less than prodigious superiority of number could insure the like facility. And were we to relax ever so little in our vigilance, we should no longer be sure of our supplies, which we bring in even now with difficulty close under their walls.

"Our crews, too, have been and are still wasting away from various causes. Among the seamen who are our own citizens, many, in going to a distance for wood, for water, or for pillage, are cut off by the Syracusan cavalry. Such of them as are slaves, desert, now that our superiority is gone, and that we have come to equal chances with our enemy; while the foreigners whom we pressed into our service, make off straight to some of the neighboring cities; and those who came, tempted by high

¹ It seems, that in Greek ship-building, moist and unsensoned wood was preferred, from the facility of bending it into the proper shape (Theophrastus, Hist. Plant. v, 7, 4).

pay, under the idea of enriching themselves by traffic rather than of fighting, now that they find the enemy in full competence to cope with us by sea as well as by land, either go over to him as professed deserters, or get away as they can amidst the wide area of Sicily.¹ Nay, there are even some, who, while trafficking

¹ Thucyd. vii, 13. Καὶ οἱ ξένοι οἱ μὲν ἀναγκαστοὶ ἐσβάντες, εὐθὺς κατὰ τὰς πόλεις ἀποχωρεῖν, οἱ δὲ ὑπὸ μεγάλῳ μισθοῦ τὸ πρῶτον ἐπαρθέντες, καὶ οἰόμενοι χρηματίζειν μᾶλλον ἢ μαχεῖσθαι, ἐπειδὴ παρὰ γνώμην ναύτικόν τε δὴ καὶ ἄλλα ἀπὸ τῶν πολεμίων ἀνθεστώτα ὁρῶσιν, οἱ μὲν ἐπ' αὐτονομίας προφάσει ἀπέρχονται, οἱ δὲ ὡς ἑκαστοὶ δύνανται πολλὰ δ' ἢ Σικελία.

All the commentators bestow long notes in explanation of this phrase ἐπ' αὐτονομίας προφάσει ἀπέρχονται: but I cannot think that any of them are successful. There are even some who despair of success so much, as to wish to change αὐτονομίας by conjecture; see the citations in Poppo's long note.

But surely the literal sense of the words is here both defensible and instructive: "Some of them depart under pretence (or profession) of being deserters to the enemy." All the commentators reject this meaning, because they say, it is absurd to talk of a man's announcing beforehand that he intends to desert to the enemy, and giving that as an excuse for quitting the camp. Such is not, in my judgment, the meaning of the word προφάσει here. It does not denote what a man said *before* he quitted the Athenian camp, he would of course say nothing of his intention to any one, but the color which he would put upon his conduct *after* he got within the Syracusan lines. He would present himself to them as a deserter to their cause; he would profess anxiety to take part in the defence; he would pretend to be tired of the oppressive Athenian dominion; for it is to be recollected, that all or most of these deserters were men belonging to the subject-allies of Athens. Those who passed over to the Syracusan lines would naturally recommend themselves by making profession of such dispositions, even though they did not really feel any such: for their real reason was, that the Athenian service had now become irksome, unprofitable, and dangerous; and the easiest manner of getting away from it was, to pass over as a deserter to Syracuse.

Nikias distinguishes these men from others, "who got away, as they could find opportunity, to some part or other of Sicily." These latter also would of course keep their intention of departing secret, until they got safe away into some Sicilian town; but when once there, they would make no profession of any feeling which they did not entertain. If they said anything, they would tell the plain truth, that they were making their escape from a position which now gave them more trouble than profit.

It appears to me that the words ἐπ' αὐτονομίας προφάσει will bear this sense perfectly well, and that it is the real meaning of Nikias.

here on their own account, bribe the trierarchs to accept Hykkarian slaves as substitutes, and thus destroy the strict discipline of our marine. And you know as well as I, that no crew ever continues long in perfect condition, and that the first class of seamen, who set the ship in motion, and maintain the uniformity of the oar-stroke, is but a small fraction of the whole number.

"Among all these embarrassments, the worst of all is, that I as general can neither prevent the mischief, from the difficulty of your tempers to govern, nor can I provide supplementary recruits elsewhere, as the enemy can easily do from many places open to him. We have nothing but the original stock which we brought out with us, both to make good losses and to do present duty; for Naxos and Katana, our only present allies, are of insignificant strength. And if our enemy gain but one farther point,—if the Italian cities, from whence we now draw our supplies, should turn against us, under the impression of our present bad condition, with no reinforcement arriving from you,—we shall be starved out, and he will bring the war to triumphant close, even without a battle.

"Pleasanter news than these I could easily have found to send you; but assuredly nothing so useful, seeing that the full knowledge of the state of affairs here is essential to your deliberations. Moreover, I thought it even the safer policy to tell you the truth without disguise, understanding as I do your real dispositions, that you never listen willingly to any but the most favorable assurances, yet are angry in the end if they turn to unfavorable results. Be thoroughly satisfied, that in regard to the force against which you originally sent us, both your generals and your soldiers have done themselves no discredit. But now that all Sicily is united against us, and that farther reinforcements are expected from Peloponnesus, you must take your resolution with full knowledge that we here have not even strength to contend

Before the Peloponnesian war was begun, the Corinthian envoy at Sparta affirmed that the Athenians cannot depend upon their seamen standing true to them, since their navy was manned with hired foreign seamen rather than with natives. *μη δὲ γὰρ ἡ Ἀθηναίων δύναμις μᾶλλον ἢ οἰκεία* (Thucyd. i. 17 c.). The statement of Nikias proves that this remark was to a great extent well founded.

against our present difficulties. You must either send for us home, or you must send us a second army, land-force as well as naval, not inferior to that which is now here, together with a considerable supply of money. You must farther send a successor to supersede me, as I am incapable of work from a disease in the kidneys. I think myself entitled to ask this indulgence at your hands, for while my health lasted I did you much good service in various military commands. But whatever you intend, do it at the first opening of spring, without any delay: for the new succors which the enemy is getting together in Sicily, will soon be here, and those which are to come from Peloponnesus, though they will be longer in arriving, yet, if you do not keep watch, will either elude or forestall you as they have already once done."¹

Such was the memorable despatch of Nikias, which was read to the public assembly of Athens about the end of November, or beginning of December, 414 B.C., brought by officers who strengthened its effect by their own oral communications, and answered all such inquiries as were put to them.² We have much reason to regret that Thucydides does not give us any idea of the debate which so gloomy a revelation called forth. He tells us merely the result: the Athenians resolved to comply with the second portion of the alternative put by Nikias; not to send for the present armament home, but to reinforce it by a second powerful armament, both of land and naval force, in prosecution of the same objects. But they declined his other personal request, and insisted on continuing him in command; passing a vote, however, to name Menander and Euthydemus, officers already in the army before Syracuse, joint commanders along with him, in order to assist him in his laborious duties. They sent Eurymedon speedily, about the winter solstice, in command of ten triremes to Syracuse, carrying one hundred and twenty talents of silver, together with assurances of coming aid to the suffering army. And they resolved to equip a new and formidable force, under Demosthenes and Eurymedon, to go thither as reinforcement in the earliest months of the spring. Demosthenes

¹ Thucyd. vii, 11-15.

² Thucyd. vii, 10.

was directed to employ himself actively in getting this larger force ready.¹

This letter of Nikias — so authentic, so full of matter, and so characteristic of the manners of the time — suggests several serious reflections, in reference both to himself and to the Athenian people. As to himself, there is nothing so remarkable as the sentence of condemnation which it pronounces on his own past proceedings in Sicily. When we find him lamenting the wear and tear of the armament, and treating the fact as notorious that even the best naval force could only maintain itself in good condition for a short time, what graver condemnation could be passed upon those eight months which he wasted in trifling measures, after his arrival in Sicily, before commencing the siege of Syracuse? When he announces that the arrival of Gylippus with his auxiliary force before Syracuse, made the difference to the Athenian army between triumph and something bordering on ruin, the inquiry naturally suggests itself, whether he had done his best to anticipate, and what precautions he had himself taken to prevent, the coming of the Spartan general. To which the answer must be, that, so far from anticipating the arrival of new enemies as a possible danger, he had almost invited them from abroad by his delay, and that he had taken no precautions at all against them, though forewarned and having sufficient means at his disposal. The desertion and demoralization of his naval force, doubtless but too real, was, as he himself points out, mainly the consequence of this turn of fortune, and was also the first commencement of that unmanageable temper of the Athenian soldiery, numbered among his difficulties. For it would be in-

¹ Thucyd. vii, 16. There is here a doubt as to the reading, between one hundred and twenty talents, or twenty talents.

I agree with Dr Arnold and other commentators in thinking that the money taken out by Eurymedon was far more probably the larger sum of the two, than the smaller. The former reading seems to deserve the preference. Besides, Diodorus states that Eurymedon took out with him one hundred and forty talents: his authority, indeed, does not count for much, but it counts for something, in coincidence with a certain force of intrinsic probability (Diodor. xiii, 8).

On an occasion such as this, to send a very small sum, such as twenty talents, would produce a discouraging effect upon the armament.

justice to this unfortunate army not to recognize that they first acquiesced patiently in prolonged inaction, because their general directed it, and next did their duty most gallantly in the operations of the siege, down to the death of Lamachus.

It even with our imperfect knowledge of the case, the ruin complained of by Nikias be distinctly traceable to his own remissness and oversight, much more must this conviction have been felt by intelligent Athenians, both in the camp and in the city, as we shall see by the conduct of Demosthenês¹ hereafter to be related. Let us conceive the series of despatches, to which Nikias himself alludes, as having been transmitted home, from their commencement. We must recollect that the expedition was originally sent from Athens with hopes of the most glowing character, and with a consciousness of extraordinary efforts about to be rewarded with commensurate triumphs. For some months, the despatches of the general disclose nothing but movements either abortive or inglorious; adorned, indeed, by one barren victory, but accompanied by an intimation that he must wait till the spring, and that reinforcements must be sent to him, before he can undertake the really serious enterprise. Though the disappointment occasioned by this news at Athens must have been mortifying, nevertheless his requisition was complied with; and the despatches of Nikias, during the spring and summer of 414 B.C., become cheering. The siege of Syracuse is described as proceeding successfully, and at length, about July or August, as being on the point of coming to a triumphant close, in spite of a Spartan adventurer, named Gylippus, making his way across the Ionian sea with a force too contemptible to be noticed. Suddenly, without any intermediate step to smoothe the transition, comes a despatch announcing that this adventurer has marched into Syracuse at the head of a powerful army, and that the Athenians are thrown upon the defensive, without power of proceeding with the siege. This is followed, after a short time, by the gloomy and almost desperate communication above translated.

When we thus look at the despatch, not merely as it stands singly, but as falling in series with its antecedents, the natural

¹ Thucyd. vii 42.

effect which we should suppose it likely to produce upon the Athenians, would be a vehement burst of wrath and displeasure against Nikias. Upon the most candid and impartial scrutiny, he deserved nothing less. And when we consider, farther, the character generally ascribed by historians of Greece to the Athenian people, that they are represented as fickle, ungrateful, and irritable, by standing habit; as abandoning upon the most trifling grounds those whom they had once esteemed, forgetting all prior services, visiting upon innocent generals the unavoidable misfortunes of war, and impelled by nothing better than demagogic excitements, we naturally expect that the blame really deserved by Nikias would be exaggerated beyond all due measure, and break forth in a storm of violence and fury. Yet what is the actual resolution taken in consequence of his despatch, after the full and free debate of the Athenian assembly? Not a word of blame or displeasure is proclaimed. Doubtless there must have been individual speakers who criticized him as he deserved. To suppose the contrary, would be to think meanly indeed of the Athenian assembly. But the general vote was one not simply imputing no blame, but even pronouncing continued and unabated confidence. The people positively refuse to relieve him from the command, though he himself solicits it in a manner sincere and even touching. So great is the value which they set upon his services, and the esteem which they entertain for his character, that they will not avail themselves of the easy opportunity which he himself provides to get rid of him.

It is not by way of compliment to the Athenians that I make these remarks on their present proceeding. Quite the contrary. The misplaced confidence of the Athenians in Nikias, on more than one previous occasion, but especially on this, betrays an incapacity of appreciating facts immediately before their eyes, and a blindness to decisive and multiplied evidences of incompetency, which is one of the least creditable manifestations of their political history. But we do learn from it a clear lesson, that the habitual defects of the Athenian character were very different from what historians commonly impute to them. Instead of being fickle, we find them tenacious in the extreme of confidence once bestowed, and of schemes once embarked upon. Instead of ingratitude for services actually rendered, we find credit given for ser-

vices which an officer ought to have rendered, but has not: instead of angry captiousness, we discover an indulgence not merely generous, but even culpable, in the midst of disappointment and humiliation: instead of a public assembly, wherein, as it is commonly depicted, the criminative orators were omnipotent, and could bring to condemnation any unsuccessful general, however meritorious; we see that even grave and well-founded accusations make no impression upon the people in opposition to preestablished personal esteem; and personal esteem for a man who not only was no demagogue, but in every respect the opposite of a demagogue: an oligarch by taste, sentiment, and position; who yielded to the democracy nothing more than sincere obedience, coupled with gentleness and munificence in his private bearing. If Kleon had committed but a small part of those capital blunders which discredit the military career of Nikias, he would have been irretrievably ruined. So much weaker was his hold upon his countrymen, by means of demagogic excellences, as compared with those causes which attracted confidence to Nikias; his great family and position, his wealth dexterously expended, his known incorruptibility against bribes, and even comparative absence of personal ambition, his personal courage combined with reputation for caution, his decorous private life and ultra-religious habits. All this assemblage of negative merits, and decencies of daily life, in a citizen whose station might have enabled him to act with the insolence of Alkibiadès, placed Nikias on a far firmer basis of public esteem than the mere power of accusatory speech in the public assembly or the dikastery could have done. It entitled him to have the most indulgent construction put upon all his short-comings, and spread a fatal varnish over his glaring incompetence for all grave and responsible command.

The incident now before us is one of the most instructive in all history, as an illustration of the usual sentiment, and strongest causes of error, prevalent among the Athenian democracy, and as a refutation of that exaggerated mischief which it is common to impute to the person called a demagogue. Happy would it have been for Athens had she now had Kleon present, or any other demagogue of equal power, at that public assembly which took the melancholy resolution of sending fresh forces to Sicily and continuing Nikias in the command! The case was one in

which the accusatory eloquence of the demagogue was especially called for, to expose the real past mismanagement of Nikias, to break down that undeserved confidence in his ability and caution which had grown into a sentiment of faith or routine, to prove how much mischief he had already done, and how much more he would do if continued.¹ Unluckily for Athens, she had now no demagogue who could convince the assembly beforehand of this truth, and prevent them from taking the most unwise and destructive resolution ever passed in the Pnyx.

What makes the resolution so peculiarly discreditable, is, that it was adopted in defiance of clear and present evidence. To persist in the siege of Syracuse, under present circumstances, was sad misjudgment; to persist in it with Nikias as commander, was hardly less than insanity. The first expedition, though even *that* was rash and ill-conceived, nevertheless presented tempting hopes which explain, if they do not excuse, the too light estimate of impossibility of lasting possession. Moreover, there was at that time a confusion, — between the narrow objects connected with Leontini and Egesta, and the larger acquisitions to be realized through the siege of Syracuse, — which prevented any clear and unanimous estimate of the undertaking in the Athenian mind. But now, the circumstances of Sicily were fully known: the mendacious promises of Egesta had been exposed; the hopes of allies for Athens in the island were seen to be futile; while Syracuse, armed with a Spartan general and Peloponnesian aid, had not only become inexpugnable, but had assumed the aggressive: lastly, the chance of a renewal of Peloponnesian hostility against Attica had been now raised into certainty. While perseverance in the siege of Syracuse, therefore, under circumstances so unpromising and under such necessity for increased exertions at home, was a melancholy imprudence in itself, perseverance in employing Nikias converted that imprudence into ruin, which even the addition of an energetic colleague in the person of

¹ Plutarch (Nikias, c. 20) tells us that the Athenians had been disposed to send a second armament to Sicily, even before the despatch of Nikias reached them; but that they had been prevented by certain men who were envious (οἰδωροί) of the glory and good fortune of Nikias.

No judgment can be more inconsistent with the facts of the case than this, facts recounted in general terms even by Plutarch himself.

Demosthenês was not sufficient to avert. Those who study the conduct of the Athenian people on this occasion, will not be disposed to repeat against them the charge of fickleness which forms one of the standing reproaches against democracy. Their mistake here arose from the very opposite quality; from what may be called obtuseness, or inability to get clear of two sentiments which had become deeply engraven on their minds; ideas of Sicilian conquest, and confidence in Nikias.

A little more of this alleged fickleness — or easy escape from past associations and impressibility to actual circumstances — would have been at the present juncture a tutelary quality to Athens. She would then have appreciated more justly the increased hazards thickening around her both in Sicily and at home. War with Sparta, though not yet actually proclaimed, had become impending and inevitable. Even in the preceding winter, the Lacedæmonians had listened favorably to the recommendation of Alkibiadês¹ that they should establish a fortified post at Dekeleia in Attica. They had not yet indeed brought themselves to execution of this resolve; for the peace between them and Athens, though indirectly broken in many ways, still subsisted in name, and they hesitated to break it openly, partly because they knew that the breach of peace had been on their side at the beginning of the Peloponnesian war; attributing to this fault their capital misfortune at Sphakteria.² Athens on her side had also scrupulously avoided direct violation of the Lacedæmonian territory, in spite of much solicitation from her allies at Argos. But her reserve on this point gave way during the present summer, probably at the time when her prospect of taking Syracuse appeared certain. The Lacedæmonians having invaded and plundered the Argeian territory, thirty Athenian triremes were sent to aid in its defence, under Pythodôrus with two colleagues. This armament disembarked on the eastern coast of Laconia near Prasîæ and committed devastations: which direct act of hostility — coming in addition to the marauding excursions of the garrison of Pylos, and to the refusal of pacific redress at Athens — satisfied the Lacedæmonians that the peace had

¹ Thucyd. vi, 93.

² Thucyd. vii, 18.

been now first and undeniably broken by their enemy, so that they might with a safe conscience recommence the war.¹

Such was the state of feeling between the two great powers of Central Greece in November 414 B.C., when the envoys arrived from Syracuse; envoys from Nikias on the one part, from Gylippus and the Syracusans on the other; each urgently calling for farther support. The Corinthians and Syracusans vehemently pressed their claims at Sparta; nor was Alkibiadēs again wanting, to renew his instances for the occupation of Dekeleia. It was in the face of this impending liability to renewed Peloponnesian invasion that the Athenians took their resolution, above commented on, to send a second army to Syracuse and prosecute the siege with vigor. If there were any hesitation yet remaining on the part of the Lacedæmonians, it disappeared so soon as they were made aware of the imprudent resolution of Athens; which not only created an imperative necessity for sustaining Syracuse, but also rendered Athens so much more vulnerable at home, by removing the better part of her force. Accordingly, very soon after the vote passed at Athens, an equally decisive resolution for direct hostilities was adopted at Sparta. It was determined that a Peloponnesian allied force should be immediately prepared, to be sent at the first opening of spring to Syracuse, and that at the same time Attica should be invaded, and the post of Dekeleia fortified. Orders to this effect were immediately transmitted to the whole body of Peloponnesian allies; especially requisitions for implements, materials, and workmen, towards the construction of the projected fort at Dekeleia.²

¹ Thucyd. vi, 105; vii, 18.

² Thucyd. vii, 16.

CHAPTER LX.

FROM THE RESUMPTION OF DIRECT HOSTILITIES BETWEEN ATHENS AND SPARTA, DOWN TO THE DESTRUCTION OF THE ATHENIAN ARMAMENT IN SICILY.

THE Syracusan war now no longer stands apart, as an event by itself, but becomes absorbed in the general war rekindling throughout Greece. Never was any winter so actively and extensively employed in military preparations, as the winter of 414-413 B.C., the months immediately preceding that which Thucydides terms the nineteenth spring of the Peloponnesian war, but which other historians call the beginning of the Dekeleian war.¹ While Eurymedon went with his ten triremes to Syracuse, even in midwinter, Demosthenēs exerted himself all the winter to get together the second armament for early spring. Twenty other Athenian triremes were farther sent round Peloponnesus to the station of Naupaktus, to prevent any Corinthian reinforcements from sailing out of the Corinthian gulf. Against these latter, the Corinthians on their side prepared twenty-five fresh triremes, to serve as a convoy to the transports carrying their hoplites.² In Corinth, Sikyôn, and Bœotia, as well as at Lacedæmon, levies of hoplites were going on for the armament to Syracuse, at the same time that everything was getting ready for the occupation of Dekeleia. Lastly, Gylippus was engaged with not less activity in stirring up all Sicily to take a more decisive part in the coming year's struggle.

From Cape Tanarus in Laconia, at the earliest moment of spring, embarked a force of six hundred Lacedæmonian hoplites — Helots and Neodamodes — under the Spartan Ekkritus, and three hundred Bœotian hoplites under the Thebans Xenon and Nikon, with the Thespian Hegesandrus. They were directed to cross the sea southward to Kyrênê in Libya, and from thence to make their way along the African coast to Sicily. At the same time a body of seven hundred hoplites under Akzarchus, partly

¹ Diodor. xiii, 8.

² Thucyd. vii, 17.

Corinthians, partly hired Arcadians, partly Sikyonians, under constraint from their powerful neighbors,¹ departed from the northwest of Peloponnesus and the mouth of the Corinthian gulf for Sicily, the Corinthian triremes watching them until they were past the Athenian squadron at Naupaktus.

These were proceedings of importance: but the most important of all was the reinvasion of Attica at the same time by the great force of the Peloponnesian alliance, under the Spartan king Agis son of Archidamus. Twelve years had elapsed since Attica last felt the hand of the destroyer, a little before the siege of Sphakteria. The plain in the neighborhood of Athens was now first laid waste, after which the invaders proceeded to their special purpose of erecting a fortified post for occupation at Dekeleia. The work, apportioned among the allies present, who had come prepared with the means of executing it, was completed during the present summer, and a garrison was established there composed of contingents relieving each other at intervals, under the command of king Agis himself. Dekeleia was situated on an outlying eminence belonging to the range called Parnês, about fourteen miles to the north of Athens, near the termination of the plain of Athens, and commanding an extensive view of that plain as well as of the plain of Eleusis. The hill on which it stood, if not the fort itself, was visible even from the walls of Athens. It was admirably situated both as a central point for excursions over Attica, and for communication with Boeotia; while the road from Athens to Orôpus, the main communication with Eubœa, passed through the gorge immediately under it.²

We read with amazement, and the contemporary world saw with yet greater amazement, that while this important work was actually going on, and while the whole Peloponnesian confederacy was renewing its pressure with redoubled force upon Athens, at that very moment,³ the Athenians sent out, not only a fleet of thirty triremes under Chariklês to annoy the coasts of Peloponnesus, but also the great armament which they had resolved

¹ Thucyd. vii, 19-58. Σικυνῶνιοι ἀναγκαστοὶ στρατεύοντες.

² Thucyd. vii, 19-28, with Dr. Arnold's note.

³ Thucyd. vii, 20. ἅμα τῆς Δεκελείας τῷ τειχισμῷ, etc. Compare Isokratês Orat. viii, De Pace, s. 102, p. 236, Bekk.

upon under Demosthenês, to push offensive operations against Syracuse. The force under the latter general consisted of sixty Athenian and five Chian triremes; of twelve hundred Athenian hoplites of the best class, chosen from the citizen muster-roll; with a considerable number of hoplites besides, from the subject-allies and elsewhere. There had been also engaged on hire fifteen hundred peltasts from Thrace, of the tribe called Dii; but these men did not arrive in time, so that Demosthenês set sail without them.¹ Chariklês having gone forward to take aboard a body of allies from Argos, the two fleets joined at Ægina, inflicted some devastations on the coasts of Laconia, and established a strong post on the island of Kythêra to encourage desertion among the Helots. From hence Chariklês returned with the Argeians, while Demosthenês conducted his armament round Peloponnesus to Korkyra.² On the Eleian coast, he destroyed a transport carrying hoplites to Syracuse, though the men escaped ashore: from thence he proceeded to Zakynthus and Kephallenia, from whence he engaged some additional hoplites, and to Anaktorium, in order to procure darters and slingers from Akarnania. It was here that he was met by Eurymedon with his ten triremes, who had gone forward to Syracuse in the winter with the pecuniary remittance urgently required, and was now returning to act as colleague of Demosthenês in the command.³ The news

¹ Thucyd. vii, 20-27.

² Thucyd. vii, 26.

³ Thucyd. vii, 31. Ὅτι δ' αὐτῷ (Demosthenês) περι ταῦτα (Anaktorium) Εὐρυμέδων ἀπαυτῶ, ὅς τότε τοῦ χειμῶνος τὰ χρήματα ἄγων τῇ στρατιᾷ ἀπέπεμψε, καὶ ἀγγέλλει, etc.

The meaning of this passage appears quite unambiguous, that Eurymedon had been sent to Sicily in the winter, to carry the sum of one hundred and twenty talents to Nikias, and was now on his return (see Thucyd. vii, 11). Nor is it without some astonishment that I read in Mr. Mitford: "At Anaktorium, Demosthenês found Eurymedon *collecting provisions* for Sicily," etc. Mr. Mitford then says in a note (quoting the Scholiast, Ἦτοι τὰ πρὸς τρῶσιν χρῆματα, καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ ἀντιτινόντα αὐτοῖς, Schol.): "This is not the only occasion on which Thucydides uses the term *χρήματα* for *necessaries* in general. Smith has translated accordingly: but the Latin has *pecunia*, which does not express the sense intended here," (ch. xviii, sect. vi, vol. iv p. 118.)

There cannot be the least doubt that the Latin is here right. The definite article makes the point quite certain, even if it were true (which I doubt) that Thucydides sometimes uses the word *χρήματα* to mean "necessaries in

brought by Eurymedon from Sicily was in every way discouraging. Yet the two admirals were under the necessity of sparing ten triremes from their fleet to reinforce Konon at Naupaktus, who was not strong enough alone to contend against the Corinthian fleet which watched him from the opposite coast. To make good this diminution, Eurymedon went forward to Korkyra, with the view of obtaining from the Korkyræans fifteen fresh triremes and a contingent of hoplites, while Demosthenês was getting together the Akarnanian darters and slingers.¹

Eurymedon not only brought back word of the distressed condition of the Athenians in the harbor of Syracuse, but had also learned, during his way back, their heavy additional loss by the capture of the fort at Plemmyrium. Gylippus returned to Syracuse early in the spring, nearly about the time when Agis invaded Attica and when Demosthenês quitted Peiræus. He returned with fresh reinforcements from the interior, and with redoubled ardor for decisive operations against Nicias before aid could arrive from Athens. It was his first care, in conjunction with Hermokratês, to inspire the Syracusans with courage for fighting the Athenians on shipboard. Such was the acknowledged superiority of the latter at sea, that this was a task of some difficulty, calling for all the eloquence and ascendancy of the two leaders: "The Athenians (said Hermokratês to his countrymen) have not been always eminent at sea as they now are: they were once landmen like you, and more than you, they were only forced on shipboard by the Persian invasion. The only way to deal with bold men like them, is to show a front bolder still. *They* have often by their audacity daunted enemies of greater real force than themselves, and they must now be taught that others can play the same game with them. Go right at them before they expect it; and you will gain more by thus surprising and intimidating them, than you will suffer by their superior science." Such lessons, addressed to men already in the tide of success, were presently efficacious, and a naval attack was resolved.²

general." I doubt still more whether he ever uses ἀγλα in the sense of "collecting."

¹ Thucyd. vii, 31.

² Thucyd. vii, 21. Among the topics of encouragement dwelt upon by Hermokratês, it is remarkable that he makes no mention of that which th-

The town of Syracuse had two ports, one on each side of the island of Ortygia. The lesser port — as it was called afterwards, the Portus Lakkus — lay northward of Ortygia, between that island and the low ground or Nekropolis near the outer city: the other lay on the opposite side of the isthmus of Ortygia within the Great Harbor. Both of them, it appears, were protected against attack from without, by piles and stakes planted in the bottom in front of them. But the lesser port was the more secure of the two, and the principal docks of the Syracusans were situated within it; the Syracusan fleet, eighty triremes strong, being distributed between them. The entire Athenian fleet was stationed under the fort of Plemmyrium, immediately opposite to the southern point of Ortygia.

Gylippus laid his plan with great ability, so as to take the Athenians completely by surprise. Having trained and prepared the naval force as thoroughly as he could, he marched out his land-force secretly by night, over Epipolæ and round by the right bank of the Anapus, to the neighborhood of the fort of Plemmyrium. With the first dawn of morning, the Syracusan fleet sailed out, at one and the same signal, from both the ports; forty-five triremes out of the lesser port, thirty-five out of the other. Both squadrons tried to round the southern point of Ortygia, so as to unite and to attack the enemy at Plemmyrium in concert. The Athenians, though unprepared and confused, hastened to man sixty ships; with twenty-five of which, they met the thirty-five Syracusans sailing forth from the Great Harbor, while with the other thirty-five they encountered the forty-five from the lesser port, immediately outside of the mouth of the Great Harbor. In the former of these two actions the Syracusans were at first victors; in the second also, the Syracusans from the outside forced their way into the mouth of the Great Harbor, and joined their comrades. But being little accustomed to naval warfare, they presently fell into complete confusion, partly in consequence of their unexpected success: so that the Athenians, recovering from the first shock, attacked them anew and completely defeated them; sinking or disabling eleven ships, of three of which the

sequel proved to be the most important of all, the confined space of the harbor which rendered Athenian ships and tactics unavailing.

crews were made prisoners, the rest being mostly slain.¹ Three Athenian triremes were destroyed also.

But this victory, itself not easily won, was more than counter-balanced by the irreparable loss of Plemmyrium. During the first excitement at the Athenian naval station, when the ships were in course of being manned to meet the unexpected onset from both ports at once, the garrison of Plemmyrium went to the water's edge to watch and encourage their countrymen, leaving their own walls thinly guarded, and little suspecting the presence of their enemy on the land side. This was just what Gylippus had anticipated. He attacked the forts at daybreak, taking the garrison completely by surprise, and captured them after a feeble resistance; first the greatest and most important fort, next the two smaller. The garrison sought safety as they could, on board the transports and vessels of burden at the station, and rowed across the Great Harbor to the land-camp of Nikias on the other side. Those who fled from the greater fort, which was the first taken, ran some risk from the Syracusan triremes, which were at that moment victorious at sea. But by the time that the two lesser forts were taken, the Athenian fleet had regained its superiority, so that there was no danger of similar pursuit in the crossing of the Great Harbor.

This well-concerted surprise was no less productive to the captors than fatal as a blow to the Athenians. Not only were many men slain, and many made prisoners, in the assault, but there were vast stores of every kind, and even a large stock of money found within the fort; partly belonging to the military chest, partly the property of the trierarchs and of private merchants, who had deposited it there as in the place of greatest security. The sails of not less than forty triremes were also found there, and three triremes which had been dragged up ashore. Gylippus caused one of the three forts to be pulled down, and carefully garrisoned the other two.²

Great as the positive loss was here to the Athenians at a time when their situation could ill bear it, the collateral damage and peril growing out of the capture of Plemmyrium was yet more serious, besides the alarm and discouragement which it spread

¹Thucy. vii, 23; Diod. xiii, 9; Plut. Nikias, c. 20. ²Thucy. vii, 23, 24.

among the army. The Syracusans were now masters of the mouth of the harbor on both sides, so that not a single storeship could enter without a convoy and a battle. What was of not less detriment, the Athenian fleet was now forced to take station under the fortified lines of its own land-force, and was thus cramped up on a small space in the innermost portion of the Great Harbor, between the city-wall and the river Anapus; the Syracusans being masters everywhere else, with full communication between their posts all round, hemming in the Athenian position both by sea and by land.

To the Syracusans, on the contrary, the result of the recent battle proved every way encouraging; not merely from the valuable acquisition of Plemmyrium, but even from the sea-fight itself, which had indeed turned out to be a defeat, but which promised at first to be a victory, had they not thrown away the chance by their own disorder. It removed all superstitious fear of Athenian nautical superiority; while their position was so much improved by having acquired the command of the mouth of the harbor, that they began even to assume the aggressive at sea. They detached a squadron of twelve triremes to the coast of Italy, for the purpose of intercepting some merchant vessels coming with a supply of money to the Athenians. So little fear was there of an enemy at sea, that these vessels seem to have been coming without convoy, and were for the most part destroyed by the Syracusans, together with a stock of ship-timber which the Athenians had collected near Kaulonia. In touching at Lokri, on their return, they took aboard a company of Thespian hoplites who had made their way thither in a transport. They were also fortunate enough to escape the squadron of twenty triremes which Nikias detached to lie in wait for them near Megara, with the loss of one ship, however, including her crew.¹

One of this Syracusan squadron had gone forward from Italy with envoys to Peloponnesus, to communicate the favorable news of the capture of Plemmyrium, and to accelerate as much as possible, the operations against Attica, in order that no reinforcements might be sent from thence. At the same time, other envoys went from Syracuse — not merely Syracusans, but also

¹Thucyd. vii, 25.

Corinthians and Lacedæmonians — to visit the cities in the interior of Sicily. They made known everywhere the prodigious improvement in Syracusan affairs arising from the gain of Plemmyrium, as well as the insignificant character of the recent naval defeat. They strenuously pleaded for farther aid to Syracuse without delay, since there were now the best hopes of being able to crush the Athenians in the harbor completely, before the reinforcements about to be despatched could reach them.¹

While these envoys were absent on their mission, the Great Harbor was the scene of much desultory conflict, though not of any comprehensive single battle. Since the loss of Plemmyrium, the Athenian naval station was in the northwest interior corner of that harbor, adjoining the fortified lines occupied by their land-army. It was inclosed and protected by a row of posts or stakes stuck in the bottom and standing out of the water.² The Syracusans on their side had also planted a stockade in front of the interior port of Ortygia, to defend their ships, their ship-houses, and their docks within. As the two stations were not far apart, each party watched for opportunities of occasional attack or annoyance by missile weapons to the other; and daily skirmishes of this sort took place, in which on the whole the Athenians seem to have had the advantage. They even formed the plan of breaking through the outworks of the Syracusan dockyard, and burning the ships within. They brought up a ship of the largest size, with wooden towers and side defences, against the line of posts fronting the dockyard, and tried to force the entrance, either by means of divers, who sawed them through at the bottom, or by boat-crews, who fastened ropes round them and thus unfixed or plucked them out. All this was done under cover of the great vessel with its towers manned by light-armed, who exchanged showers of missiles with the Syracusan bowmen on the top of the ship-houses, and prevented the latter from coming near enough to interrupt the operation. The Athenians contrived thus to remove many of the posts planted, even the most dangerous among them, those which did not reach to the surface of the water, and which therefore a ship approaching could not see. But they gained little by it, since the Syracusans

¹ Thucyd. vii, 25.

² Thucyd. vii, 38.

were able to plant others in their room. On the whole, no serious damage was done, either to the dockyard or to the ships within. And the state of affairs in the Great Harbor stood substantially unaltered, during all the time that the envoys were absent on their Sicilian tour, probably three weeks or a month.

These envoys had found themselves almost everywhere well received. The prospects of Syracuse were now so triumphant, and those of Nikias with his present force so utterly hopeless, that the waverers thought it time to declare themselves; and all the Greek cities in Sicily, except Agrigentum, which still remained neutral (and of course except Naxos and Katana), resolved on aiding the winning cause. From Kamarina came five hundred hoplites, four hundred darters, and three hundred bowmen; from Gela, five triremes, four hundred darters, and two hundred horsemen. Besides these, an additional force from the other cities was collected, to march to Syracuse in a body across the interior of the island, under the conduct of the envoys themselves. But this part of the scheme was frustrated by Nikias, who was rendered more vigilant by the present desperate condition of his affairs, than he had been in reference to the cross march of Gylippus. At his instance, the Sikel tribes Kentoripes and Halikyai, allies of Athens, were prevailed upon to attack the approaching enemy. They planned a skilful ambuscade, set upon them unawares, and dispersed them with the loss of eight hundred men. All the envoys were also slain, except the Corinthian, who conducted the remaining force, about fifteen hundred in number, to Syracuse.³

This reverse — which seems to have happened about the time when Demosthenes with his armament were at Korkyra, on the way to Syracuse — so greatly dismayed and mortified the Syracusans, that Gylippus thought it advisable to postpone awhile the attack which he intended to have made immediately on the reinforcement arriving.³ The delay of these few days proved nothing less than the salvation of the Athenian army.

It was not until Demosthenes was approaching Rhegium within two or three days' sail of Syracuse, that the attack was determined on without farther delay. Preparation in every way had been

¹ Thucyd. vii, 25.

² Thucyd. vii, 32, 3.

³ Thucyd. vii, 2.

made for it long before, especially for the most effective employment of the naval force. The captains and ship-masters of Syracuse and Corinth had now become fully aware of the superiority of Athenian nautical manœuvre, and of the causes upon which that superiority depended. The Athenian trireme was of a build comparatively light, fit for rapid motion through the water, and for easy change of direction: its prow was narrow, armed with a sharp projecting beak at the end, but hollow and thin, not calculated to force its way through very strong resistance. It was never intended to meet, in direct impact and collision, the prow of an enemy: such a proceeding passed among the able seamen of Athens for gross awkwardness. In advancing against an enemy's vessel, they evaded the direct shock, steered so as to pass by it, then, by the excellence and exactness of their rowing, turned swiftly round, altered their direction and came back before the enemy could alter his: or perhaps rowed rapidly round him, or backed their ship stern foremost, until the opportunity was found for driving the beak of their ship against some weak part of his, against the midships, the quarter, the stern, or the oar-blades without. In such manœuvres the Athenians were unrivalled: but none such could be performed unless there were ample sea-room, which rendered their present naval station the most disadvantageous that could be imagined. They were cooped up in the inmost part of a harbor of small dimensions, close on the station of their enemies, and with all the shore, except their own lines, in possession of those enemies: so that they could not pull round from want of space, nor could they back water, because they durst not come near shore. In this contracted area, the only mode of fighting possible was by straightforward collision, prow against prow; a process which not only shut out all their superior manœuvring, but was unsuited to the build of their triremes. On the other hand, the Syracusans, under the advice of the able Corinthian steersman Aristo, altered the construction of their triremes to meet the special exigency of the case, disregarding all idea of what had been generally looked upon as good nautical manœuvring.¹ Instead of the long, thin, hollow, and

¹ Thucyd. vii, 36. τῇ δὲ προτέρῳ ἀμαθίᾳ τῶν κυβερνητῶν δοκῶσιν εἶναι

sharp, advancing beak, striking the enemy considerably above the water-level, and therefore doing less damage, they shortened the prow, but made it excessively heavy and solid, and lowered the elevation of the projecting beak: so that it became not so much calculated to pierce, as to break in and crush by main force all the opposing part of the enemy's ship, not far above the water. What were called the epôtids, "ear-caps," or nozzles, projecting forwards to the right and left of the beak, were made peculiarly thick, and sustained by under-beams let in to the hull of the ship. In the Attic build, the beak stood forward very prominent, and the epôtids on each side of it were kept back, serving the same purpose as what are called catheads, in modern ships, to which the anchors are suspended: but in the Corinthian build, the beak projected less, and the epôtids more, so that they served to strike the enemy: instead of having one single beak, the Corinthian ship might be said to have three nozzles.¹ The Syracusans relied on the narrowness of the space, for shutting out the Athenian evolutions, and bringing the contest to nothing more than a straightforward collision; in which the weaker vessel would be broken and stove in at the prow, and thus rendered unmanœuvrable.

Having completed these arrangements, their land-force was

το ἀντισπῶρον ἐν γαροῖσι, μάλιστα ἂν αὐτοὶ χρῆσασθαι πλείστον γὰρ ἐν αὐτῷ σχῆματι, etc.

Diodor. xiii. 10.

¹ Compare Thucyd. vii. 34-36; Diodor. xiii. 10; Eurip. Iph. Taur. 1335. See also the notes of Arnold, Poppo, and Didot, on the passages of Thucydides.

It appears as if the ἀντηριδες or sustainer-beams were something new now provided for the first time, in order to strengthen the epôtid and render it fit to drive in collision against the enemy. The words which Thucydides employs to describe the position of these ἀντηριδες, are to me very obscure, nor do I think that any of the commentators clear them up satisfactorily.

It is Diodorus who specifies that the Corinthians lowered the level of their prows, so as to strike nearer to the water, which Thucydides does not mention.

A captive ship, when towed in as a prize, was disarmed by being deprived of her beak (Athenæus, xii, p. 535). Lysander reserved the beaks of the Athenian triremes captured at Ægosyotani to grace his triumphal return (Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 3, 8).

marched out under Gylippus to threaten one side of the Athenian lines, while the cavalry and the garrison of the Olympieion marched up to the other side. The Athenians were putting themselves in position to defend their walls from what seemed to be a land attack, when they saw the Syracusan fleet, eighty triremes strong, sailing out from its dock prepared for action: upon which they too, though at first confused by this unexpected appearance, put their crews on shipboard, and went out of their palisaded station, seventy-five triremes in number, to meet the enemy. The whole day passed off, however, in desultory and indecisive skirmish, with trifling advantage to the Syracusans, who disabled one or two Athenian ships, yet merely tried to invite the Athenians to attack, without choosing themselves to force on a close and general action.¹

It was competent to the Athenians to avoid altogether a naval action, at least until the necessity arose for escorting fresh supplies into the harbor, by keeping within their station; and as Demosthenes was now at hand, prudence counselled this reserve. Nikias himself, too, is said to have deprecated immediate fighting, but to have been outvoted by his two newly-appointed colleagues Menander and Euthydemus, who were anxious to show what they could do without Demosthenes, and took their stand upon Athenian maritime honor, which peremptorily forbade them to shrink from the battle when offered.²

Though on the next day the Syracusans made no movement, yet Nikias foreseeing that they would speedily recommence, and noway encouraged by the equal manifestations of the preceding day, caused every trierarch to repair what damage his ship had sustained, and even took the precaution of farther securing his naval station by mooring merchant-vessels just alongside of the openings in the palisade, about two hundred feet apart. The prows of these vessels were provided with dolphins, or beams lifted up on high and armed at the end with massive heads of

¹ Thucyd. vii, 37, 38.

² Plutarch Nikias, c. 20. Diodorus (xiii, 10) represents the battle as having been brought on against the wish and intention of the Athenians generally not alluding to any difference of opinion among the commanders.

iron, which could be so let fall as to crush any ship entering: any Athenian trireme which might be hard-pressed, would thus be enabled to get through this opening where no enemy could follow, and choose her own time for sailing out again. Before night these arrangements were completed, and at the earliest dawn of next day, the Syracusans reappeared, with the same demonstrations both of land force and naval force as before. The Athenian fleet having gone forth to meet them, several hours were spent in the like indecisive and partial skirmishes, until at length the Syracusan fleet sailed back to the city again without bringing on any general or close combat. The Athenians, construing this retirement of the enemy as evidence of backwardness and unwillingness to fight,³ and supposing the day's duty at an end, retired on their side within their own station, disembarked, and separated to get their dinners at leisure, having tasted no food that day.

But ere they had been long ashore, they were astonished to see the Syracusan fleet sailing back to renew the attack, in full battle order. This was a manœuvre suggested by the Corinthian Aristo, the ablest steersman in the fleet; at whose instance, the Syracusan admirals had sent back an urgent request to the city authorities, that an abundant stock of provisions might for that day be brought down to the sea-shore, and sale be rendered compulsory; so that no time should be lost, when the fleet returned thither, in taking a hasty meal without dispersion of the crews. Accordingly the fleet, after a short but sufficient interval allowed for refreshment thus close at hand, was brought back unexpectedly to the enemy's station. Confounded at the sight, the Athenian crews forced themselves again on board, most of them yet without refreshment, and in the midst of murmurs and disorder.³ On sailing out of their station, the indecisive skirmishing again com-

¹ Thucyd. vii, 41. *αἱ κεφαλαὶ δελφίνοφοροι* compare Pollux, i, 85, and Fragment vi, of the comedy of the poet Pherekrates, entitled *Ἀγροί* Meineke, *Fragm. Comic Græc.* vol. ii, p. 258, and the Scholiast. ad Aristoph. *Equit.* 759.

² Thucyd. vii, 40. *Οἱ δ' Ἀθηναῖοι, νομισαντες αὐτοῦ, ὡς ἡσυχήμενον σθένος πρὸς τῇ πόλει ἀνακρουσασθαι*, etc.

³ Thucyd. vii, 40.

menced, and continued for some time, until at length the Athenian captains became so impatient of prolonged and exhausting fatigue, that they resolved to begin of themselves, and make the action close as well as general. Accordingly, the word of command was given, and they rowed forward to make the attack, which was cheerfully received by the Syracusans. By receiving the attack instead of making it, the latter were better enabled to insure a straightforward collision of prow against prow, excluding all circuit, backing, or evolutions, on the part of the enemy: at any rate, their steersmen contrived to realize this plan, and to crush, stove in, or damage, the forepart of many of the Athenian triremes, simply by superior weight of material and solidity on their own side. The Syracusan darters on the deck, moreover, as soon as the combat became close, were both numerous and destructive; while their little boats rowed immediately under the sides of the Athenian triremes, broke the blades of their oars, and shot darts in through the oar-holes, against the rowers within. At length the Athenians, after sustaining the combat bravely for some time, found themselves at such disadvantage, that they were compelled to give way and to seek shelter within their own station. The armed merchant-vessels which Nikias had planted before the openings in the palisade were now found of great use in checking the pursuing Syracusans; two of whose triremes, in the excitement of victory, pushed forward too near to them and were disabled by the heavy implements on board, one of them being captured with all her crew. The general victory of the Syracusans, however, was complete: seven Athenian triremes were sunk or disabled, many others were seriously damaged, and numbers of seamen either slain or made prisoners.¹

Overjoyed with the result of this battle, which seems to have been no less skilfully planned than bravely executed, the Syracusans now felt confident of their superiority by sea as well as on land, and contemplated nothing less than the complete destruction of their enemies in the harbor. The generals were already concerting measures for renewed attack both by land and by sea, and a week or two more would probably have seen the ruin of this once triumphant besieging armament, now full of nothing but

¹ Thucyd. vii. 41.

discouragement. The mere stoppage of supplies, in fact, as the Syracusans were masters of the mouth of the harbor, would be sure to starve it out in no long time, if they maintained their superiority at sea. All their calculations were suspended, however, and the hopes of the Athenians for the time revived, by the entry of Demosthenes and Eurymedon with the second armament into the Great Harbor; which seems to have taken place on the very day, or on the second day, after the recent battle.¹ So important were the consequences which turned upon that postponement of the Syracusan attack, occasioned by the recent defeat of their reinforcing army from the interior. So little did either party think, at that moment, that it would have been a mitigation of calamity to Athens, if Demosthenes had not arrived in time; if the ruin of the first armament had been actually consummated before the coming of the second!

Demosthenes, after obtaining the required reinforcements at Korkyra, had crossed the Ionian sea to the islands called Chœrades on the coast of Iapygia; where he took aboard a band of one hundred and fifty Messapian darters, through the friendly aid of the native prince Artas, with whom an ancient alliance was renewed. Passing on farther to Metapontum, already in alliance with Athens, he was there reinforced with two triremes and three hundred darters, with which addition he sailed on to Thurii. Here he found himself cordially welcomed; for the philo-Athenian party was in full ascendancy, having recently got the better in a vehement dissension, and passed a sentence of banishment against their opponents.² They not only took a formal resolution to acknowledge the same friends and the same enemies as the Athenians, but equipped a regiment of seven hundred hoplites and three hundred darters to accompany Demosthenes, who remained there long enough to pass his troops in review and verify the completeness of each division. After having held this review on the banks of the river Sybaris, he marched his troops by land through the Thurian territory to the banks of the river Hylias which divided it from Kroton. He was here met by Krotoniate envoys, who forbade the access to their territory: upon which he marched down the river to the sea-shore, got on shipboard, and

Thucyd. vii. 42.

² Thucyd. vii. 33-37.

pursued his voyage southward along the coast of Italy, touching at the various towns, all except the hostile Lokri.¹

His entry into the harbor of Syracuse,² accomplished in the most ostentatious trim, with decoration and musical accompaniments, was no less imposing from the magnitude of his force than critical in respect to opportunity. Taking Athenians, allies, and mercenary forces, together, he conducted seventy-three triremes, five thousand hoplites, and a large number of light troops of every description, — archers, slingers, darters, etc., with other requisites for effective operation. At the sight of such an armament, not inferior to the first which had arrived under Nikias, the Syracusans lost for a moment the confidence of their recent triumph, and were struck with dismay as well as wonder.³ That Athens could be rash enough to spare such an armament, at a moment when the full burst of Peloponnesian hostility was reopening upon her, and when Dekeleia was in course of being fortified, was a fact out of all reasonable probability, and not to be credited unless actually seen. And probably the Syracusans, though they knew that Demosthenês was on his way, had no idea beforehand of the magnitude of his armament.

On the other hand, the hearts of the discomfited and beleaguered Athenians again revived as they welcomed their new comrades. They saw themselves again masters by land as well as by sea; and they displayed their renewed superiority by marching out of their lines forthwith and ravaging the lands near the Anapus; the Syracusans not venturing to engage in a general action, and merely watching the movement with some cavalry from the Olympieion.

But Demosthenês was not imposed upon by this delusive show of power, so soon as he had made himself master of the full state of affairs, and had compared his own means with those of the enemy. He found the army of Nikias not merely worn down with long-continued toil, and disheartened by previous defeat, but also weakened in a terrible degree by the marsh fever general towards the close of summer, in the low ground where they were encamped.⁴

¹ Thucyd. vii, 35.

² Thucyd. vii, 42.

³ Plutarch. Nikias, c. 21.

⁴ Thucyd. vii, 47-50.

He saw that the Syracusans were strong in multiplied allies, extended fortifications, a leader of great ability, and general belief that theirs was the winning cause. Moreover, he felt deeply the position of Athens at home, and her need of all her citizens against enemies within sight of her own walls. But above all, he came penetrated with the deplorable effects which had resulted from the mistake of Nikias, in wasting irreparably so much precious time, and frittering away the first terror-striking impression of his splendid armament. All these considerations determined Demosthenês to act, without a moment's delay and while the impression produced by his arrival was yet unimpaired, and to aim one great and decisive blow, such as might, if successful, make the conquest of Syracuse again probable. If this should fail, he resolved to abandon the whole enterprise, and return home with his armament forthwith.¹

By means of the Athenian lines, he had possession of the southernmost portion of the slope of Epipolæ. But all along that slope from east to west, immediately in front or to the north of his position, stretched the counter-wall built by the Syracusans; beginning at the city wall on the lowest ground, and reaching up first in a northwesterly, next in a westerly direction, until it joined the fort on the upper ground near the cliff, where the road from Euryalus down to Syracuse passed. The Syracusans, as defenders, were on the north side of this counter-wall; he and the Athenians on the south side. It was a complete bar to his progress, nor could he stir a step without making himself master of it: towards which end there were only two possible means, — either to storm it in front, or to turn it from its western extremity by marching round up to the Euryalus. He began by trying the first method, but the wall was abundantly manned and vigorously defended; his battering machines were all burnt or disqualified, and every attempt which he made was completely repulsed.² There then remained only the second method, to turn the wall, ascending by circuitous roads to the heights of Euryalus behind it, and then attacking the fort in which it terminated.

But the march necessary for this purpose, first, up the valley of the Anapus, visible from the Syracusan posts above; next,

¹ Thucyd. vii, 42.

² Thucyd. vii, 43.

ascending to the Euryalus by a narrow and winding path, was so difficult, that even Demosthenês, naturally sanguine, despaired of being able to force his way up in the daylight, against an enemy seeing the attack. He was therefore constrained to attempt a night-surprise, for which, Nikias and his other colleagues consenting, he accordingly made preparations on the largest and most effective scale. He took the command himself, along with Menander and Eurymedon (Nikias being left to command within the lines),¹ conducting hoplites and light troops, together with masons and carpenters, and all other matters necessary for establishing a fortified post; lastly, giving orders that every man should carry with him provisions for five days.

Fortune so far favored him, that not only all these preliminary arrangements, but even his march itself, was accomplished without any suspicion of the enemy. At the beginning of a moonlight night, he quitted the lines, moved along the low ground on the left bank of the Anapus and parallel to that river for a considerable distance, then following various roads to the right, arrived at the Euryalus, or highest pitch of Epipolæ, where he found himself in the same track by which the Athenians in coming from Katana a year and a half before — and Gylippus in coming from the interior of the island about ten months before — had passed, in order to get to the slope of Epipolæ above Syracuse. He reached, without being discovered, the extreme Syracusan fort on the high ground, assailed it completely by surprise, and captured it after a feeble resistance. Some of the garrison within it were slain; but the greater part escaped, and ran to give the alarm to the three fortified camps of Syracusans and allies, which were placed one below another behind the long continuous wall,² on the declivity of Epipolæ, as well as to a

¹ Thucyd. vii. 43. Diodorus tells us that Demosthenês took with him ten thousand hoplites, and ten thousand light troops, numbers which are not at all to be trusted (xiii. 11).

Plutarch (Nikias, c. 21) says that Nikias was extremely averse to the attack on Epipolæ: Thucydides notices nothing of the kind, and the assertion seems improbable.

² Thucyd. vii. 42, 43. Καὶ (Demosthenês) ὁρῶν τὸ παρατείχισμα τῶν Συρακοσίων, ἐκώλυσε περιτείχισαι σφᾶς τοὺς Ἀθηναίους, ἀπλοῦν τε ὄν, καὶ εἰ ἐπικρατήσῃ τις τῶν τε Ἐπιπολίων τῆς ἀναβασεως, καὶ αὐτῆς τοῦ ἐν αὐταῖς

chosen regiment of six hundred Syracusan hoplites under Hermokratês,¹ who formed a night-watch, or bivouac. This regiment hastened up to the rescue, but Demosthenês and the Athenian vanguard charging impetuously forward, drove them back in disorder upon the fortified positions in their rear. Ever Gylippus and the Syracusan troops advancing upwards out of these positions, were at first carried back by the same retreating movement.

So far the enterprise of Demosthenês had been successful beyond all reasonable hope. He was master not only of the outer fort of the Syracusan position, but also of the extremity of

στρατοπέδου, ῥαδίως ἂν αὐτὸ ληφθῇ (οὐδὲ γὰρ ὑπομῖναι ἂν σφᾶς οὐδένα) ἡττήγετο ἐπιθεῖσθαι τῇ πείρᾳ.

vii. 43. καὶ ἡμέρας μὲν ἀδύνατα ἐδόκει εἶναι λαθεῖν προσελθόντας καὶ ἀναβάντας, etc.

Dr. Arnold and Gölter both interpret this description of Thucydides (see their notes on this chapter, and Dr. Arnold's Appendix, p. 275) as if Nikias, immediately that the Syracusan counter-wall had crossed his blockading line, had evacuated his circle and works on the slope of Epipolæ, and had retired down exclusively into the lower ground below. Dr. Thirlwall too is of the same opinion (Hist. Gr. vol. iii, ch. xxvi, pp. 432-434).

This appears to me unauthorized and incorrect. What conceivable motive can be assigned to induce Nikias to yield up to the enemy so important an advantage? If he had once relinquished the slope of Epipolæ, to occupy exclusively the marsh beneath the southern cliff, Gylippus and the Syracusans would have taken good care that he should never again have mounted that cliff; nor could he ever have got near to the *παρατείχισμα*. The moment when the Athenians did at last abandon their fortifications on the slope of Epipolæ (τὰ ἄνω τεῖχη) is specially marked by Thucydides afterwards, vii. 60: it was at the last moment of desperation, when the service of all was needed for the final maritime battle in the Great Harbor. Dr. Arnold (p. 275) misinterprets this passage, in my judgment, evading the direct sense of it.

The words of Thucydides, vii. 42 — *εἰ ἐπικρατήσῃ τις τῶν τε Ἐπιπολίων τῆς ἀναβασεως καὶ αὐτῆς τοῦ ἐν αὐταῖς στρατοπέδου* — are more correctly conceived by M. Firmin Didot, in the note to his translation, than by Arnold and Gölter. The *στρατοπέδου* here indicated does *not* mean the Athenian circle, and their partially completed line of circumvallation on the slope of Epipolæ. It means the ground higher up than this, which they had partially occupied at first while building the fort of Labdum, and of which they had been substantially masters until the arrival of Gylippus, who had now converted it into a camp or *στρατοπέδου* of the Syracusans.

¹ Diodor. xiii. 11.

their counter-wall which rested upon that fort; the counter-wall was no longer defensible, now that he had got on the north or Syracusan side of it, so that the men on the parapet, where it joined the fort, made no resistance, and fled. Some of the Athenians even began to tear down the parapets, and demolish this part of the counter-wall, an operation of extreme importance, since it would have opened to Demosthenès a communication with the southern side of the counter-wall, leading directly towards the Athenian lines on Epipolæ. At any rate, his plan of turning the counter-wall was already carried, if he could only have maintained himself in his actual position, even without advancing farther, and if he could have demolished two or three hundred yards of the upper extremity of the wall now in his power. Whether it would have been possible for him to maintain himself without farther advance, until day broke, and thus avoid the unknown perils of a night-battle, we cannot say. But both he and his men, too much flushed with success to think of halting, hastened forward to complete their victory, and to prevent the disordered Syracusans from again recovering a firm array. Unfortunately, however, their ardor of pursuit — as it constantly happened with Grecian hoplites — disturbed the regularity of their own ranks, so that they were not in condition to stand the shock of the Bœotian hoplites, just emerged from their position, and marching up in steady and excellent order to the scene of action. The Bœotians charged them, and after a short resistance, broke them completely, forcing them to take flight. The fugitives of the van were thus driven back upon their own comrades advancing from behind, still under the impression of success, ignorant of what had passed in front, and themselves urged on by the fresh troops closing up in their rear.

In this manner the whole army presently became one scene of clamor and confusion wherein there was neither command nor obedience, nor could any one discern what was passing. The light of the moon rendered objects and figures generally visible, without being sufficient to discriminate friend from foe. The beaten Athenians, thrown back upon their comrades, were in many cases mistaken for enemies, and slain. The Syracusans and Bœotians, shouting aloud and pursuing their advantage, became intermingled with the foremost Athenians, and both

armies thus grouped into knots which only distinguished each other by mutual demand of the watchword. This test also soon failed, since each party got acquainted with the watchword of the other, especially that of the Athenians, among whom the confusion was the greatest, became well known to the Syracusans, who kept together in larger parties. Above all, the effect of the pæan or war-shout on both sides was remarkable. The Dorians in the Athenian army — from Argos, Korkyra, and other places — raised a pæan not distinguishable from that of the Syracusans; accordingly, their shout struck terror into the Athenians themselves, who fancied that they had enemies in their own rear and centre. Such disorder and panic presently ended in a general flight. The Athenians hurried back by the same roads which they had ascended; but these roads were found too narrow for terrified fugitives, and many of them threw away their arms in order to scramble or jump down the cliffs, in which most of them perished. Even of those who safely effected their descent into the plain below, many — especially the new-comers belonging to the armament of Demosthenès — lost their way through ignorance, and were cut off the next day by the Syracusan horse. With terrible loss of numbers, and broken spirit, the Athenians at length found shelter within their own lines. Their loss of arms was even greater than that of men, from the throwing away of shields by those soldiers who leaped the cliff.¹

The overjoyed Syracusans erected two trophies, one upon the road to Epipolæ, the other upon the exact and critical spot where the Bœotians had first withstood and first repelled the enemy. By this unexpected and overwhelming victory, their feelings were restored to the same pitch of confidence which had animated them before the arrival of Demosthenès. Again now masters of the field, they again indulged the hope of storming the Athenian lines and destroying the armament; to which end, however, it was thought necessary to obtain additional reinforcements, and Gylippus went in person with this commission to the various cities of Sicily, while Sikanus with fifteen triremes was despatched to Agrigentum, then understood to be wavering, and in a political crisis.²

¹ Thucyd. vii, 44, 45.

² Thucyd. vii, 46. Plutarch (Nikias, c. 21) states that the number of

During this absence of Gylippus, the Athenian generals were left to mourn the recent reverse, and to discuss the exigencies of their untoward position. The whole armament was now full of discouragement and weariness; impatient to escape from a scene where fever daily thinned their numbers, and where they seemed destined to nothing but dishonor. Such painful evidences of increasing disorganization only made Demosthenés more strenuous in enforcing the resolution which he had taken before the attack on Epipolæ. He had done his best to strike one decisive blow; the chances of war had turned out against him, and inflicted a humiliating defeat; he now therefore insisted on relinquishing the whole enterprise and returning home forthwith. The season was yet favorable for the voyage (it seems to have been the beginning of August), while the triremes recently brought, as yet unused, rendered them masters at sea for the present. It was idle, he added, to waste more time and money in staying to carry on war against Syracuse, which they could not now hope to subdue, especially when Athens had so much need of them all at home, against the garrison of Dekeleia.¹

This proposition, though espoused and seconded by Eurymedon, was peremptorily opposed by Nikias; who contended, first, that their present distress and the unpromising chances for the future, though he admitted the full reality of both, ought not nevertheless to be publicly proclaimed. A formal resolution to retire, passed in the presence of so many persons, would inevitably become known to the enemy, and therefore could never be executed with silence and secrecy,² as such a resolution ought to

slain was two thousand. Diodorus gives it at two thousand five hundred (xiii, 11). Thucydides does not state it at all.

These two authors probably both copied from some common authority, not Thucydides; perhaps Philistus.

¹ Thucyd. vi, 47.

² Thucyd. vii, 48. 'Ο δὲ Νικίας ἐνόμιζε μὲν καὶ αὐτὸς πονηρὰ σφόν τὰ πράγματα εἶναι, τῷ δὲ λόγῳ οὐκ ἐβούλετο αὐτὰ ἀσθενῆ ἀποσεικνῆναι, οὐδ' ἐμφανῶς σφᾶς ψηφισμένους μετὰ πολλῶν τὴν ἀναχώρησιν τοῖς πολέμοις καταγγέλτους γιγνεσθαι· λαθεῖν γὰρ ἂν, ὅποτε βούλονται, τυνιο ποιοῦντες πολλῶ ἤττον.

It seems probable that some of the taxiarchs and trierarchs were present at this deliberation, as we find in another case afterwards, c. 60. Possibly, Demosthenés might even desire that they should be present, as witnesses

be. But furthermore, he (Nikias) took a decided objection to the resolution itself. He would never consent to carry back the armament, without specific authority from home to do so. Sure he was, that the Athenian people would never tolerate such a proceeding. When submitted to the public assembly at home, the conduct of the generals would be judged, not by persons who had been at Syracuse and cognizant of the actual facts, but by hearers who would learn all that they knew from the artful speeches of criminating orators. Even the citizens actually serving, though now loud in cries of suffering, and impatient to get home, would alter their tone when they were safe in the public assembly; and would turn round to denounce their generals as having been bribed to bring away the army. Speaking his own personal feelings, he knew too well the tempers of his countrymen to expose himself to the danger of thus perishing under a charge alike unmerited and disgraceful. Sooner would he incur any extremity of risk from the enemy.¹ It must be recollected too, he added, that if *their* affairs were now bad, those of Syracuse were as bad, and even worse. For more than a year, the war had been imposing upon the Syracusans a ruinous cost, in subsistence for foreign allies as well as in keeping up outlying posts; so that they had already spent two thousand talents, besides heavy debts contracted and not paid. They could not continue in this course longer; yet the suspension of their payments would at once alienate their allies, and leave them helpless. The cost of the war — to which Demosthenés had alluded as a reason for returning home — could be much better borne by Athens; while a little farther pressure would utterly break down the Syr-

respecting the feeling of the army; and also as supporters, if the matter came afterwards to be debated in the public assembly at Athens. It is to this fact that the words ἐμφανῶς μετὰ πολλῶν seem to allude.

¹ Thucyd. vii, 48. Οἰκοῦν βούλεσθαι αὐτὸς γε, ἐπιστάμενος τὰς Ἀθηναίων φρεσιν, ἐπὶ αἰσχρῇ γε αἰτίᾳ καὶ ἀδίκῳ ὑπ' Ἀθηναίων ἀπολέσθαι, μᾶλλον ἢ ὑπὸ τῶν πολεμίων, εἰ δέ, κινδυνεύσας τοῦτο παθεῖν, ἰδίᾳ.

The situation of the last word *ιδίᾳ* in this sentence is perplexing, because it can hardly be construed except either with ἀπολέσθαι or with αὐτὸς γε: for Nikias could not run any risk of perishing *separately* by the hands of the enemy, unless we are to ascribe to him an absurd rhodomontade quite foreign to his character. Compare Plutarch Nikias, c. 22.

acusans. He (Nikias) therefore advised to remain where they were and continue the siege;¹ the more so, as their fleet had now become unquestionably the superior.

Both Demosthenês and Eurymedon protested in the strongest language against the proposition of Nikias. Especially they treated the plan of remaining in the Great Harbor as fraught with ruin, and insisted, at the very least, on quitting this position without a moment's delay. Even admitting, for argument, the scruples of Nikias against abandoning the Syracusan war without formal authority from home, they still urged an immediate transfer of their camp from the Great Harbor to Thapsus or Catana. At either of these stations they could prosecute operations against Syracuse, with all the advantage of a wider range of country for supplies, a healthier spot, and above all, of an open sea, which was absolutely indispensable to the naval tactics of Athenians; escaping from that narrow basin which condemned them to inferiority even on their own proper element. At all events to remove, and remove forthwith, out of the Great Harbor, such was the pressing requisition of Demosthenês and Eurymedon.²

But even to the modified motion of transferring the actual position to Thapsus or Katana, Nikias refused to consent. He insisted on remaining as they were; and it appears that Menander and Euthydemus³—colleagues named by the assembly at home, before the departure of the second armament—must have voted under the influence of his authority; whereby the majority became on his side. Nothing less than being in a minority, probably, would have induced Demosthenês and Eurymedon to submit, on a point of such transcendent importance.

It was thus that the Athenian armament remained without quitting the harbor, yet apparently quite inactive, during a period which cannot have been less than between three weeks and a month, until Gylippus returned to Syracuse with fresh reinforcements. Throughout the army, hope of success appears

¹ Thucyd. vii, 48. *τριβειν οὖν ἔφη χρῆναι προσκαθήμενους*, etc.

² Thucyd. vii, 49. *Ὁ δὲ Δημοσθένης περὶ μὲν τοῦ προσκαθῆσθαι οὐδ' ὁπωσοῦν ἐνεδίχετο—τὸ δὲ ξύμπαν εἰπεῖν, οὐδενὶ τρόπῳ οἱ ἔφη ἀρέσκειν ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ἔτι μῖναι, ἀλλ' ὅτι τάχιστα ἤδη καὶ μὴ μέλλειν ἐξανίστασθαι. Καὶ ὁ Εὐρυμέδων αὐτῷ τοῦτο ξυνηγόρευεν.*

³ Thucyd. vii, 69; Diodor. xiii, 12.

to have vanished, while anxiety for return had become general. The opinions of Demosthenês and Eurymedon were doubtless well known, and orders for retreat were expected, but never came. Nikias obstinately refused to give them, during the whole of this fatal interval; which plunged the army into the abyss of ruin, instead of mere failure in their aggressive enterprise.

So unaccountable did such obstinacy appear, that many persons gave Nikias credit for knowing more than he chose to reveal. Even Thucydides thinks that he was misled by that party in Syracuse with whom he had always kept up a secret correspondence, seemingly apart from his colleagues, and who still urged him, by special messages, not to go away; assuring him that Syracuse could not possibly go on longer. Without fully trusting these intimations, he could not bring himself to act against them; and he therefore hung back from day to day, and refused to pronounce the decisive word.¹

Nothing throughout the whole career of Nikias is so inexplicable as his guilty fatuity—for we can call it by no lighter name, seeing that it involved all the brave men around him in one common ruin with himself—at the present critical juncture. How can we suppose him to have really believed that the Syracusans, now in the flood-tide of success, and when Gylippus was gone forth to procure additional forces, would break down and be unable to carry on the war? Childish as such credulity seems, we are nevertheless compelled to admit it as real, to such an

¹ Thucyd. vii, 48. *Ἄ ἐπιστάμενος, τῷ μὲν ἔργῳ ἔτι ἐπ' ἀμφοτέροισιν ἔχων καὶ διασκοπῶν ἀνείχετο, τῷ δ' ἐμφανεῖ τότε ὅτι οὐκ ἔφη ἀπάξειν τὴν στρατιάν.*

The insignificance of the party in Syracuse which corresponded with Nikias may be reasonably inferred from Thucyd. vii, 55. It consisted in part of those Leontines who had been incorporated into the Syracusan citizenship (Diodor. xiii, 18).

Polænnus (i, 43, 1) has a tale respecting a revolt of the slaves or villeins (*οἰκέται*) at Syracuse during the Athenian siege, under a leader named Sokratês, a revolt suppressed by the stratagem of Hermokratês. That various attempts of this sort took place at Syracuse during these two trying years, is by no means improbable. In fact, it is difficult to understand how the numerous predial slaves were kept in order during the great pressure and danger prior to the coming of Gylippus.

extent as to counterbalance all the pressing motives for departure, motives enforced by discerning colleagues as well as by the complaints of the army, and brought home to his own observation by the experience of the late naval defeat. At any rate, it served as an excuse for that fatal weakness of his character which made him incapable of taking resolutions founded on prospective calculations, and chained him to his actual position until he was driven to act by imminent necessity.

But we discern on the present occasion another motive, which counts for much in dictating his hesitation. The other generals think with satisfaction of going back to their country and rescuing the force which yet remained, even under circumstances of disappointment and failure. Not so Nikias: he knows too well the reception which he had deserved, and which might possibly be in store for him. Avowedly, indeed, he anticipates reproach from the Athenians against the generals, but only unmerited reproach, on the special ground of bringing away the army without orders from home; adding some harsh criticisms upon the injustice of the popular judgment and the perfidy of his own soldiers. But in the first place, we may remark, that Demosthenes and Eurymedon, though as much responsible as he was for this decision, had no such fear of popular injustice; or, if they had, saw clearly that the obligation of braving it was here imperative. And in the next place, no man ever had so little reason to complain of the popular judgment as Nikias. The mistakes of the people in regard to him had always been those of indulgence, over-estimation, and over-constancy. But Nikias foresaw too well that he would have more to answer for at Athens than the simple fact of sanctioning retreat under existing circumstances. He could not but remember the pride and sanguine hopes under which he had originally conducted the expedition out of Peiræus, contrasted with the miserable sequel and ignominious close, even if the account had been now closed, without worse. He could not but be conscious, more or less, how much of all this was owing to his own misjudgment; and under such impressions, the idea of meeting the free criticism and scrutiny of his fellow-citizens — even putting aside the chance of judicial trial — must have been insupportably humiliating. To Nikias, — a perfectly brave man, and suffering withal under ex-

measurable disease. — life at Athens had neither charm nor honor left. Hence, as much as from any other reason, he was induced to withhold the order for departure; clinging to the hope that some unforeseen boon of fortune might yet turn up, and yielding to the idlest delusions from correspondents in the interior of Syracuse.¹

Nearly a month after the night-battle on Epipolæ,² Gylippus and Sikanus both returned to Syracuse. The latter had been unsuccessful at Agrigentum, where the philo-Syracusan party had been sent into banishment before his arrival; but Gylippus brought with him a considerable force of Sicilian Greeks, together with those Peloponnesian hoplites who had started from Cape Tænarus in the early spring, and who had made their way from Kyrênê first along the coast of Africa, and then across to Selinus. Such increase of strength immediately determined the Syracusans to resume the aggressive both by land and by sea. In the Athenians, as they saw the new allies marching in over Epipolæ, it produced a deeper despondency, combined with bitter regret that they had not adopted the proposition of departing immediately after the battle of Epipolæ, when Demosthenes first proposed it. The late interval of lingering hopeless inaction with continued sickness, had farther weakened their strength, and Demosthenes now again pressed the resolution for immediate departure. Whatever fancies Nikias may have indulged about Syracusan embarrassments, were dissipated by the arrival of Gylippus; nor did he venture to persist in his former peremptory opposition, though even now he seems to have assented against his own conviction.³ He however insisted, with good reason, that no formal or public vote should be taken on the occasion, but that the order

¹ Thucyd. vii, 49. 'Αντιλέγοντος δὲ τοῦ Νικίου, δκνος τις καὶ μέλλουσι ἐνεγέμετο, καὶ ἅμα ὑπόνοια μὴ τι καὶ πλέον εἰδῶς ὁ Νίκιας ἰσχυρίζεται.

The language of Justin respecting this proceeding is just and discriminating: "Nicias, seu pudore male actæ rei, seu metu destitutæ spei civium, seu impellente fato, manere contendit." (Justin, iv, 5.)

² This interval may be inferred (see Dodwell, Ann. Thucyd. vii, 50) from the state of the moon at the time of the battle of Epipolæ, compared with the subsequent eclipse.

³ Thucyd. vii, 50. ὡς αὐτοῖς οὐδὲ ὁ Νίκιας ἐτι ὁμοίως ἠναντιοῦτο, etc. Diodor. xiii, 12. 'Ο Νίκιας ἠναγκάσθη συγχωρῆσαι, etc.

should be circulated through the camp, as privately as possible, to be ready for departure at a given signal. Intimation was sent to Katana that the armament was on the point of coming away, with orders to forward no farther supplies.¹

This plan was proceeding successfully: the ships were made ready, much of the property of the army had already been conveyed aboard without awakening the suspicion of the enemy, the signal would have been hoisted on the ensuing morning, and within a few hours this fated armament would have found itself clear of the harbor, with comparatively small loss,² when the gods themselves — I speak in the language and feelings of the Athenian camp — interfered to forbid its departure. On the very night before, the 27th August, 413 B.C., which was full moon, the moon was eclipsed. Such a portent, impressive to the Athenians at all times, was doubly so under their present despondency, and many of them construed it as a divine prohibition against departure until a certain time should have elapsed, with expiatory ceremonies to take off the effect. They made known their wish for postponement to Nikias and his colleagues; but their interference was superfluous, for Nikias himself was more deeply affected than any one else. He consulted the prophets, who declared that the army ought not to decamp until thrice nine days, a full circle of the moon, should have passed over.³ And Nikias took upon himself to announce, that until after the inter-

¹ Thucyd. vii, 60.

² Diodor. xiii, 12. *Οἱ στρατῶνται τὰ σκευὴ μεταβαλεῖν*, etc. Plutarch, Nikias, c. 23.

³ The moon was totally eclipsed on this night, August 27, 413 B.C., from twenty-seven minutes past nine to thirty-four minutes past ten P.M. (Wurm De Ponderib. Græcor. sect. xciv, p. 184), speaking with reference to an observer in Sicily.

Thucydides states that Nikias adopted the injunction of the prophets, to tarry *thrice nine days* (vii, 50). Diodorus says *three days*. Plutarch intimates that Nikias went beyond the injunction of the prophets, who only insisted on *three days*, while he resolved on remaining for an entire lunar period (Plutarch, Nikias, c. 23).

I follow the statement of Thucydides: there is no reason to believe that Nikias would lengthen the time beyond what the prophets prescribed.

The erroneous statement respecting this memorable event, in so respectable an author as Polybius, is not a little surprising (Polyb. ix, 19).

val indicated by them, he would not permit even any discussion or proposition on the subject.

The decision of the prophets, which Nikias thus made his own, was a sentence of death to the Athenian army, yet it went along with the general feeling, and was obeyed without hesitation. Even Demosthenês, though if he had commanded alone, he might have tried to overrule it, found himself compelled to yield. Yet according to Philochorus, himself a professional diviner, skilful in construing the religious meaning of events; it was a decision decidedly wrong; that is, wrong according to the canonical principles of divination. To men planning escape, or any other operation requiring silence and secrecy, an eclipse of the moon, as hiding light and producing darkness, was, he affirmed, an encouraging sign, and ought to have made the Athenians even more willing and forward in quitting the harbor. We are told, too, that Nikias had recently lost by death Stilbidês, the ablest prophet in his service, and that he was thus forced to have recourse to prophets of inferior ability.¹ His piety left no means untried of appeasing the gods, by prayer, sacrifice, and expiatory ceremonies, continued until the necessity of actual conflict arrived.²

The impediment thus finally and irreparably intercepting the Athenian departure, was the direct, though unintended, consequence of the delay previously caused by Nikias. We cannot doubt, however, that, when the eclipse first happened, he regarded it as a sign confirmatory of the opinion which he had himself before delivered, and that he congratulated himself upon having so long resisted the proposition for going away. Let us add, that all those Athenians who were predisposed to look upon eclipses as signs from heaven of calamity about to come, would find themselves strengthened in that belief by the unparalleled woes even now impending over this unhappy army.

¹ Plutarch, Nikias, c. 22; Diodor. xiii, 12; Thucyd. vii, 50. Stilbidês was eminent in his profession of a prophet: see Aristophan. Pac. 1029, with the citations from Eupolis and Philochorus in the Scholia.

Compare the description of the effect produced by the eclipse of the sun at Thebes, immediately prior to the last expedition of Pelopidas into Thessaly (Plutarch, Pelopidas, c. 31).

² Plutarch, Nikias, c. 24.

What interpretation the Syracusans, confident and victorious, put on the eclipse, we are not told. But they knew well how to interpret the fact, which speedily came to their knowledge, that the Athenians had fully resolved to make a furtive escape, and had only been prevented by the eclipse. Such a resolution, amounting to an unequivocal confession of helplessness, emboldened the Syracusans yet farther, to crush them as they were in the harbor, and never to permit them to occupy even any other post in Sicily. Accordingly, Gylippus caused his triremes to be manned and practised for several days: he then drew out his land-force, and made a demonstration of no great significance against the Athenian lines. On the morrow, he brought out all his forces, both land and naval; with the former of which he beset the Athenian lines, while the fleet, seventy-six triremes in number, was directed to sail up to the Athenian naval station. The Athenian fleet, eighty-six triremes strong, sailed out to meet it, and a close, general, and desperate action took place. The fortune of Athens had fled. The Syracusans first beat the centre division of the Athenians; next, the right division under Eurymedon, who in attempting an evolution to outflank the enemy's left, forgot those narrow limits of the harbor which were at every turn the ruin of the Athenian mariner, neared the land too much, and was pinned up against it, in the recess of Daskon, by the vigorous attack of the Syracusans. He was here slain, and his division destroyed: successively, the entire Athenian fleet was beaten and driven ashore.

Few of the defeated ships could get into their own station. Most of them were forced ashore or grounded on points without those limits; upon which Gylippus marched down his land-force to the water's edge, in order to prevent the retreat of the crews as well as to assist the Syracusan seamen in hauling off the ships as prizes. His march, however, was so hurried and disorderly, that the Tyrrhenian troops, on guard at the flank of the Athenian station, sallied out against them as they approached, beat the foremost of them, and drove them away from the shore into the marsh called Lysimeleia. More Syracusan troops came to their aid; but the Athenians also, anxious above all things for the protection of their ships, came forth in greater numbers; and a general battle ensued in which the latter were victorious. Though they

did not inflict much loss upon the enemy, yet they saved most of their own triremes which had been driven ashore, together with the crews, and carried them into the naval station. Except for this success on land, the entire Athenian fleet would have been destroyed: as it was, the defeat was still complete, and eighteen triremes were lost, all their crews being slain. This was probably the division of Eurymedon, which having been driven ashore in the recess of Daskon, was too far off from the Athenian station to receive any land assistance. As the Athenians were hauling in their disabled triremes, the Syracusans made a last effort to destroy them by means of a fireship, for which the wind happened to be favorable. But the Athenians found means to prevent her approach, and to extinguish the flames.¹

Here was a complete victory gained over Athens on her own element, gained with inferior numbers, gained even over the fresh and yet formidable fleet recently brought by Demosthenes. It told but too plainly on which side the superiority now lay, how well the Syracusans had organized their naval strength for the specialties of their own harbor, how ruinous had been the folly of Nikias in retaining his excellent seamen imprisoned within that petty and unwholesome lake, where land and water alike did the work of their enemies. It not only disheartened the Athenians, but belied all their past experience, and utterly confounded them. Sickness of the whole enterprise, and repentance for having undertaken it, now became uppermost in their minds: yet it is remarkable that we hear of no complaints against Nikias separately.² But repentance came too late. The Syracusans, fully alive to the importance of their victory, sailed round the harbor in triumph as again their own,³ and already looked on the enemy within it as their prisoners. They determined to close up and guard the mouth of it, from Plemmyrium to Ortygia, so as to leave no farther liberty of exit.

Nor were they insensible how vastly the scope of the contest

¹ Thucyd. vii, 52, 53; Diodor. xiii, 13.

² Thucyd. vii, 55. Οἱ μὲν Ἀθηναῖοι ἐν ποντὶ δὴ ἀθυρίας ἦσαν, καὶ ὁ πάλαιος αὐτοῖς μέγας ἦν, πολλὰ δὲ μείζων ἐτι τῆς στρατείας ὁ μετὰ μελός.

³ Thucyd. vii, 56. Οἱ δὲ Συρακόσιοι τὸν τε λιμένα εὐθὺς παρέπλεον ἀδεῶς etc. This elate and visible manifestation of feeling ought not to pass unnoticed, as an evidence of Grecian character.

was now widened, and the value of the stake before them enhanced. It was not merely to rescue their own city from siege, nor even to repel and destroy the besieging army, that they were now contending. It was to extinguish the entire power of Athens, and liberate the half of Greece from dependence; for Athens could never be expected to survive so terrific a loss as that of the entire double armament before Syracuse.¹ The Syracusans exulted in the thought that this great achievement would be theirs, that their city was the field, and their navy the chief instrument of victory: a lasting source of glory to them, not merely in the eyes of contemporaries, but even in those of posterity. Their pride swelled when they reflected on the Pan-Hellenic importance which the siege of Syracuse had now acquired, and when they counted up the number and variety of Greek warriors who were now fighting, on one side or the other, between Euryalus and Plemmyrium. With the exception of the great struggle between Athens and the Peloponnesian confederacy, never before had combatants so many and so miscellaneous been engaged under the same banners. Greeks, continental and insular, Ionic, Doric, and Æolic, autonomous and dependent, volunteers and mercenaries, from Miletus and Chios in the east to Selinus in the west, were all here to be found; and not merely Greeks, but also the barbaric Sikels, Egestæans, Tyrrhenians, and Iapygians. If the Lacedæmonians, Corinthians, and Boeotians were fighting on the side of Syracuse, the Argæans and Mantinæans, not to mention the great insular cities, stood in arms against her. The jumble of kinship among the combatants on both sides, as well as the cross action of different local antipathies, is put in lively antithesis by Thucydides.² But amidst so vast an assembled number, of which they were the chiefs, the paymasters, and the centre of combination, the Syracusans might well feel a sense of personal aggrandizement, and a consciousness of the great blow which they were about to strike, sufficient to exalt them for the time above the level even of their great Dorian chiefs in Peloponnesus.

It was their first operation, occupying three days, to close up the mouth of the Great Harbor, which was nearly one mile

¹ Thucyd. vii, 56.

² Thucyd. vii, 57, 58.

broad, with vessels of every description, triremes, traders, boats, etc., anchored in an oblique direction, and chained together.¹ They at the same time prepared their naval force with redoubled zeal for the desperate struggle which they knew to be coming. They then awaited the efforts of the Athenians, who watched their proceedings with sadness and anxiety.

Nikias and his colleagues called together the principal officers to deliberate what was to be done. As they had few provisions remaining, and had counter-ordered their farther supplies, some instant and desperate effort was indispensable; and the only point in debate was, whether they should burn their fleet and retire by land, or make a fresh maritime exertion to break out of the harbor. Such had been the impression left by the recent sea-fight, that many in the camp leaned to the former scheme.² But the generals resolved upon first trying the latter, and exhausted all their combinations to give to it the greatest possible effect. They now evacuated the upper portion of their lines, both on the higher ground of Epipolæ, and even on the lower ground, such portion as was nearest to the southern cliff; confining themselves to a limited fortified space close to the shore, just adequate for their sick, their wounded, and their stores; in order to spare the necessity for a large garrison to defend them, and thus leave nearly their whole force disposable for sea-service. They then made ready every trireme in the station, which could be rendered ever so imperfectly seaworthy, constraining every fit man to serve aboard them, without distinction of age, rank, or country. The triremes were manned with double crews of soldiers, hoplites as well as bowmen and darters, the latter mostly Akarnanians; while the hoplites, stationed at the prow with orders to board the enemy as quickly as possible, were furnished with grappling-irons to detain the enemy's ship immediately after the moment of collision, in order that it might not be withdrawn and the collision repeated, with all its injurious effects arising from the strength and massiveness of the Syracusan epôtids. The best consultation was held with the steersmen as to arrangement and manœuvres of every trireme, nor was any precaution omitted which the scanty means at hand allowed. In the well-known

¹ Thucyd. vii, 59, Diodor. xiii, 14.

² Plutarch, Nikias, c. 24.

impossibility of obtaining new provisions, every man was anxious to hurry on the struggle.¹ But Nikias, as he mustered them on the shore immediately before going aboard, saw but too plainly that it was the mere stress of desperation which impelled them; that the elasticity, the disciplined confidence, the maritime pride, habitual to the Athenians on shipboard, was extinct, or dimly and faintly burning.

He did his best to revive them, by exhortations unusually emphatic and impressive. "Recollect (he said) that you too, not less than the Syracusans, are now fighting for your own safety and for your country; for it is only by victory in the coming struggle that any of you can ever hope to see his country again. Yield not to despair like raw recruits after a first defeat; you, Athenians and allies, familiar with the unexpected revolutions of war, will hope now for the fair turn of fortune, and fight with a spirit worthy of the great force which you see here around you. We generals have now made effective provision against our two great disadvantages, the narrow circuit of the harbor, and the thickness of the enemy's prows.² Sad as the necessity is, we have thrown aside all our Athenian skill and tactics, and have prepared to fight under the conditions forced upon us by the enemy, a land-battle on shipboard.³ It will be for you to conquer in this last desperate struggle, where there is no friendly shore to receive you if you give way. You, hoplites on the deck, as soon as you have the enemy's trireme in contact, keep him fast, and relax not until you have swept away his hoplites and mastered his deck. You, seamen and rowers, must yet keep up your courage, in spite of this sad failure in our means, and subversion of our tactics. You are better defended on deck above, and you have more triremes to help you, than in the recent defeat. Such of you, as are not Athenian citizens, I entreat to recollect the valuable privileges which you have hitherto enjoyed from serving in the navy of Athens. Though

¹ Thucyd. vii. 60.

² Thucyd. vii. 62. Ἄ δε ἀρωγὰ ἐνεδόμεν ἐπὶ τῇ τοῦ λυμένος στενότητι πρὸς τὸν μέλλοντα ὄχλον τῶν νεῶν ἐσεσθαι, etc.

³ Thucyd. vii. 62. Ἐς τοῦτο γὰρ δὴ ἡναγκάσμεθα, ὥστε περὶ μαχεῖν ἀπὸ τῶν νεῶν, καὶ τὸ μῆτε αὐτοὺς ἀνακρούεσθαι, μῆτε ἐκείνους εἶναι, ὡφέλιμο φαινεται.

not really citizens, you have been reputed and treated as such; you have acquired our dialect, you have copied our habits, and have thus enjoyed the admiration, the imposing station, and the security, arising from our great empire.¹ Partaking as you do freely in the benefits of that empire, do not now betray it to these Sicilians and Corinthians whom you have so often beaten. For such of you as are Athenians, I again remind you that Athens has neither fresh triremes, nor fresh hoplites, to replace those now here. Unless you are now victorious, her enemies near home will find her defenceless; and our countrymen there will become slaves to Sparta, as you will to Syracuse. Recollect, every man of you, that you now going aboard here are the *all* of Athens, — her hoplites, her ships, her entire remaining city, and her splendid name.² Bear up then and conquer, every man with his best mettle, in this one last struggle, for Athens as well as yourselves, and on an occasion which will never return."

If, in translating the despatch written home ten months before by Nikias to the people of Athens, we were compelled to remark, that the greater part of it was the bitterest condemnation of his

¹ Thucyd. vii. 63. Τῶν δ' ἡμετέρων παλαιῶν, καὶ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ τῷδε καὶ δέσσειν, μὴ ἐκτελέσθαι τοῖς ταῖς ξυμφοραῖς ἔχουσιν. . . . ἐκείνην τε τὴν ἡδομὴν ἐνθαλασσίαι, ὥς αἰεὶ ἐστὶ διασωσασθαι, οἱ τὸ ὡς Ἀθηναῖοι νομίζομεν καὶ μὴ ἄντιοι τῶν, τῆς τε φωνῆς τῇ ἐπιστημῇ καὶ τῶν τροπῶν τῇ μίαισιν, ἐπαρμόσαντες κατὰ τὴν Ἑλλάδα, καὶ τῆς ἀρχῆς τῆς ἡμετέρας οὐκ ἔλασσαν κατὰ τὸ ὡφελέστατον. ἐν τε τῷ φερόμεναι τοῖς ὑπὸ χεῖρας καὶ τῷ αὐτῷ ἀδικεῖσθαι πολὺ πλείον. μετὰ γὰρ ὥστε κοινῶν μόνον Ἑλλήνωνος ἡμῖν ἡ ἀρχὴ ὅντις, δίκαιον αὐτῶν τὴν μὴ καταπρόσδοτε, etc.

Dr. Arnold (together with Götter and Poppo), following the Scholast. explain these words as having particular reference to the metics in the Athenian naval service. But I cannot think this correct. All persons in that service — who were freemen, but yet not citizens of Athens — are here designated; partly metics, doubtless, but partly also citizens of the islands and dependent allies, — the *καὶ τῶν νησιῶν καὶ τῶν ἐσθίων* alluded to by the Corinthians and by Periklēs at the beginning of the Peloponnesian war (Thucyd. i. 121-123) as the *καὶ τῶν νησιῶν καὶ τῶν ἐσθίων* of Athens. Without doubt there were numerous foreign seamen in the warlike navy of Athens, who derived great consideration as well as profit from the service, and often passed themselves off for Athenian citizens when they really were not so.

Thucyd. vii. 64. Οὐ γὰρ ἐν ταῖς ναυσὶν οὐκ ἐσόμενοι, καὶ περὶ τοῖς Ἀθηναῖοις ἐστὶ καὶ τῶν, καὶ ἡ ἐποποιεῖται τοῖς, καὶ τὸ μέγα ὄνομα τῶν Ἀθηναίων.

own previous policy as commander, so we are here carried back, when we find him striving to palliate the ruinous effects of that confined space of water which paralyzed the Athenian seamen, to his own obstinate improvidence in forbidding the egress of the fleet when insisted on by Demosthenes. His hearers probably were too much absorbed with the terrible present, to revert to irremediable mistakes of the past. Immediately on the conclusion of his touching address, the order was given to go aboard, and the seamen took their places. But when the triremes were fully manned, and the trierarchs, after superintending the embarkation, were themselves about to enter and push off, the agony of Nikias was too great to be repressed. Feeling more keenly than any man the intensity of this last death-struggle, and the serious, but inevitable, shortcomings of the armament in its present condition, he still thought that he had not said enough for the occasion. He now renewed his appeal personally to the trierarchs, all of them citizens of rank and wealth at Athens. They were all familiarly known to him, and he addressed himself to every man separately by his own name, his father's name, and his tribe, adjuring him by the deepest and most solemn motives which could touch the human feelings. Some he reminded of their own previous glories, others of the achievements of illustrious ancestors, imploring them not to dishonor or betray these precious titles: to all alike he recalled the charm of their beloved country, with its full political freedom and its unconstrained license of individual agency to every man: to all alike he appealed in the names of their wives, their children, and their paternal gods. He cared not for being suspected of trenching upon the common places of rhetoric: he caught at every topic which could touch the inmost affections, awaken the inbred patriotism, and rekindle the abated courage of the officers, whom he was sending forth to this desperate venture. He at length constrained himself to leave off, still fancying in his anxiety that he ought to say more, and proceeded to marshal the land-force for the defence of the lines, as well as along the shore, where they might render as much service and as much encouragement as possible to the combatants on shipboard.¹

¹ See the striking chapter of Thucyd. vii, 69. Even the tame style of Diodorus (xiii, 15) becomes animated in describing this scene.



ARISTOTELES

Greece, vol. seven.

Very different was the spirit prevalent, and very opposite the burning words uttered, on the seaboard of the Syracusan station, as the leaders were mustering their men immediately before embarkation. They had been apprized of the grappling-irons now about to be employed by the Athenians, and had guarded against them in part by stretching hides along their bows, so that the "iron hand" might slip off without acquiring any hold. The preparatory movements even within the Athenian station being perfectly visible, Gylippus sent the fleet out with the usual prefatory harangue. He complimented them on the great achievements which they had already performed in breaking down the naval power of Athens, so long held irresistible.¹ He reminded them that the sally of their enemies was only a last effort of despair, seeking nothing but escape, undertaken without confidence in themselves, and under the necessity of throwing aside all their own tactics in order to copy feebly those of the Syracusans.² He called upon them to recollect the destructive purposes which the invaders had brought with them against Syracuse, to inflict with resentful hand the finishing stroke upon this half-ruined armament, and to taste the delight of satiating a legitimate revenge.³

The Syracusan fleet — seventy-six triremes strong, as in the last battle — was the first to put off from shore; Pythen with the Corinthians in the centre, Sikanus and Agatharchus on the wings. A certain proportion of them were placed near the mouth of the harbor, in order to guard the barrier; while the rest were distributed around the harbor in order to attack the Athenians from different sides as soon as they should approach. Moreover, the surface of the harbor swarmed with the light craft of the Syracusans, in many of which embarked youthful volun-

¹ Thucyd. vii, 65.

² Thucyd. vii, 66, 67.

³ Thucyd. vii, 68. πρὸς οὖν ἀταξίαν τε τοιαύτην . . . ὀργῇ προσμίζωμεν, αἱ νομισώμεν ἅμα μὲν νομιμώτατον εἶναι πρὸς τοὺς ἐναντίους, οἳ ἂν ὡς ἐπὶ ἱμῶν τοῦ προσπεσόντος δικαιώσωσιν ἀποπλῆσαι τῆς γνώμης τὸ θυμούμενον, ἅμα δὲ ἐχθροὺς ἀμύνεσθαι ἐγγενησόμενον ἡμῖν, καὶ (τὸ λεγόμενον πον) ἡδιστον εἶναι.

This plain and undisguised invocation of the angry and revengeful passions should be noticed, as a mark of character and manners.

teers, sons of the best families in the city;¹ boats of no mean service during the battle, saving or destroying the seamen cast overboard from disabled ships, as well as annoying the fighting Athenian triremes. The day was one sacred to Hēraklēs at Syracuse; and the prophets announced that the god would insure victory to the Syracusans, provided they stood on the defensive, and did not begin the attack.² Moreover, the entire shore round the harbor, except the Athenian station and its immediate neighborhood, was crowded with Syracusan soldiers and spectators; while the walls of Ortygia, immediately overhanging the water, were lined with the feeble population of the city, the old men, women, and children. From the Athenian station presently came forth one hundred and ten triremes, under Demosthenēs, Menander, and Euthydēmus, with the customary paean, its tone probably partaking of the general sadness of the camp. They steered across direct to the mouth of the harbor, beholding on all sides the armed enemies ranged along the shore, as well as the unarmed multitudes who were imprecating the vengeance of the gods upon their heads; while for them there was no sympathy, except among the fellow-sufferers within their own lines. Inside of this narrow basin, rather more than five English miles in circuit, one hundred and ninety-four ships of war, each manned with more than two hundred men, were about to join battle, in the presence of countless masses around, all with palpitating hearts, and near enough both to see and hear; the most picturesque battle — if we could abstract our minds from its terrible interest

¹ Diodorus, xiii. 14. Plutarch has a similar statement in reference to the previous battle: but I think he must have confused one battle with the other, for his account can hardly be made to harmonize with Thucydides (Plutarch, Nikias, c. 24).

It is to be recollected that both Plutarch and Diodorus had probably read the description of the battles in the Great Harbor of Syracuse, contained in Philistus; a better witness, if we had his account before us, even than Thucydides; since he was probably at this time in Syracuse and was perhaps actually engaged.

² Plutarch, Nikias, c. 24, 25. Timæus reckoned the aid of Hēraklēs as having been one of the great causes of Syracusan victory over the Athenians. He gave several reasons why the god was provoked against the Athenians: see Timæus, Fragm. 104, ed. Didot.

— probably in history, without smoke or other impediments to vision, and in the clear atmosphere of Sicily, a serious and magnified realization of those naumachiae which the Roman emperors used to exhibit with gladiators on the Italian lakes, for the recreation of the people.

The Athenian fleet made directly for that portion of the barrier where a narrow opening — perhaps closed by a movable chain — had been left for merchant-vessels. Their first impetuous attack broke through the Syracusan squadron defending it, and they were already attempting to sever its connecting bonds, when the enemy from all sides crowded in upon them and forced them to desist. Presently the battle became general, and the combatants were distributed in various parts of the harbor. On both sides a fierce and desperate courage was displayed, even greater than had been shown on any of the former occasions. At the first onset, the skill and tactics of the steersmen shone conspicuous, well seconded by zeal on the part of the rowers and by their ready obedience to the voice of the keleustēs. As the vessels neared, the bowmen, slingers, and throwers on the deck, hurled clouds of missiles against the enemy; next, was heard the loud crash of the two impinging metallic fronts, resounding all along the shore.¹ When the vessels were thus once in contact, they were rarely allowed to separate: a strenuous hand-fight then commenced by the hoplites in each, trying respectively to board and master their enemy's deck. It was not always, however, that each trireme had its own single and special enemy: sometimes one ship had

The destructive impact of these metallic masses at the head of the ships of war, as well as the periplos practised by a lighter ship to avoid direct collision against a heavier, is strikingly illustrated by a passage in Plutarch's Life of Lucullus, where a naval engagement between the Roman general, and Neoptolemus the admiral of Mithridates, is described. "Lucullus was on board a Rhodian quinquereme, commanded by Damagoras, a skilful Rhodian pilot; while Neoptolemus was approaching with a ship much heavier, and driving forward to a direct collision: upon which Damagoras evaded the blow, rowed rapidly round, and struck the enemy in the stern."

..... δεισας ὁ Δαμαγόρας τὸ βύρος τῆς βασιλικῆς, καὶ τὴν τραχύτητα τοῦ χαλκώματος, οὐκ ἐτόλμησε συμπεσεῖν ἀντίπρωρος, ἀλλ' ὁξέως ἐκ περιαγωγῆς ἀποστρέψας ἐκέλευσεν ἐπὶ πρύμναν ὤσασθαι· καὶ πιεσθείσης ἐν τούτῳ τις νεὺς ἐδέξατο τὴν πληγὴν ἀβλαβῆ γενόμενῃν, ὅτε δὴ τοῖς ναυαγιστέον ἐν τῇ τῆς νεὺς μέρεσι προσπεσοῦσαν. — Plutarch, Lucull. c. 3.

two or three enemies to contend with at once, sometimes she fell aboard of one unsought, and became entangled. After a certain time, the fight still obstinately continuing, all sort of battle order became lost; the skill of the steersman was of little avail, and the voice of the *keleustês* was drowned amidst the universal din and mingled cries from victors as well as vanquished. On both sides emulous exhortations were poured forth, together with reproach and sarcasm addressed to any ship which appeared flinching from the contest; though factitious stimulus of this sort was indeed but little needed.

Such was the heroic courage on both sides, that for a long time victory was altogether doubtful, and the whole harbor was a scene of partial encounters, wherein sometimes Syracusans, sometimes Athenians, prevailed. According as success thus fluctuated, so followed the cheers or wailings of the spectators ashore. At one and the same time, every variety of human emotion might be witnessed; according as attention was turned towards a victorious or a defeated ship. It was among the spectators in the Athenian station above all, whose entire life and liberty were staked in the combat, that this emotion might be seen exaggerated into agony, and overpassing the excitement even of the combatants themselves.¹ Those among them who looked towards a portion of the harbor where their friends seemed winning, were full of joy and thanksgiving to the gods: such of their neighbors who contemplated an Athenian ship in difficulty, gave vent to their feelings in shrieks and lamentation; while a third group, with their eyes fixed on some portion of the combat still disputed, were plunged in all the agitations of doubt, manifested even in the tremulous swing of their bodies, as hope or fear alternately predominated. During all the time that the combat remained undecided, the Athenians ashore were distracted by all these manifold varieties of intense sympathy. But at length the moment came, after a long-protracted struggle, when victory began to declare in favor of the Syracusans, who, perceiving that their enemies were slackening, redoubled their shouts as well as their efforts, and pushed them all back towards the land. All the Athenian triremes, abandoning farther resistance, were thrust ashore like shipwrecked

¹ Thucyd. vii, 71

vessels in or near their own station; a few being even captured before they could arrive there. The diverse manifestations of sympathy among the Athenians in the station itself were now exchanged for one unanimous shriek of agony and despair. The boldest of them rushed to rescue the ships and their crews from pursuit, others to man their walls in case of attack from land: many were even paralyzed at the sight, and absorbed with the thoughts of their own irretrievable ruin. Their souls were doubtless still farther subdued by the wild and enthusiastic joy which burst forth in maddening shouts from the hostile crowds around the harbor, in response to their own victorious comrades on ship-board.

Such was the close of this awful, heart-stirring, and decisive combat. The modern historian strives in vain to convey the impression of it which appears in the condensed and burning phrases of Thucydides. We find in his description of battles generally, and of this battle beyond all others, a depth and abundance of human emotion which has now passed out of military proceedings. The Greeks who fight, like the Greeks who look on, are not soldiers withdrawn from the community, and specialized as well as hardened by long professional training, but citizens with all the passions, instincts, sympathies, joys, and sorrows of domestic as well as political life. Moreover, the non-military population in ancient times had an interest of the most intense kind in the result of the struggle; which made the difference to them, if not of life and death, at least of the extremity of happiness and misery. Hence the strong light and shade, the Homeric exhibition of undisguised impulse, the tragic detail of personal motive and suffering, which pervades this and other military descriptions of Thucydides. When we read the few but most vehement words which he employs to depict the Athenian camp under this fearful trial, we must recollect that these were not only men whose all was at stake, but that they were moreover citizens full of impressibility, sensitive and demonstrative Greeks; and, indeed, the most sensitive and demonstrative of all Greeks. To repress all manifestations of strong emotion was not considered in ancient times essential to the dignity of the human character.

Amidst all the deep pathos, however, which the great historian

has imparted to the final battle at Syracuse, he has not explained the causes upon which its ultimate issue turned. Considering that the Athenians were superior to their enemies in number, as one hundred and ten to seventy-six triremes, that they fought with courage not less heroic, and that the action was on their own element, we might have anticipated for them, if not a victory, at least a drawn battle, with equal loss on both sides. But we may observe, 1. The number of one hundred and ten triremes was formed by including some hardly seaworthy.¹ 2. The crews were composed partly of men not used to sea-service; and the Akarnanian darters, especially, were for this reason unhandy with their missiles.² 3. Though the water had been hitherto the element favorable to Athens, yet her superiority in this respect was declining, and her enemies approaching nearer to her, even in the open sea. But the narrow dimensions of the harbor would have nullified her superiority at all times, and placed her even at great disadvantage, — without the means of twisting and turning her triremes so as to strike only at a vulnerable point of the enemy, — compared with the thick, heavy, straightforward butting of the Syracusans; like a nimble pugilist of light weight contending, in a very confined ring, against superior weight and muscle.³ For the mere land-fight on shipboard, Athenians had not only no advantage, but had on the contrary the odds against them. 4. The Syracusans enjoyed great advantage from having nearly the whole harbor lined round with their soldiers and friends; not simply from the force of encouraging sympathy, no

¹ Thucyd. vii, 60. τὰς ναῦς ἀπάσας ἵσαι ἔσαι καὶ δυναταὶ καὶ ἀπλοῦτεραι.

² Thucyd. vii, 60. πάντα τινα ἐσθλαζοῦσιν πληροῦσαι — ἀναγκασαντες ἐσβαίνειν ὅστις καὶ ὁπωσοῦν ἐδόκει ἡλικίας μετέχων ἐπιτηδείος εἶναι. Compare also the speech of Gylippus, c. 67.

³ The language of Theokritus, in describing the pugilistic contest between Pollux and the Bebrykian Amykus, is not inapplicable to the position of the Athenian ships and seamen when cramped up in this harbor (Idyll. xxii, 91): —

..... ἐκ δ' ἐτέρωθεν
Ἦρωες κρατερὸν Πολυδεῦκτα θαρσύνεσκον,
Δειδιότες μὴ πῶς μιν ἐπιβρίσας δαμάσειεν,
Χῶρ' ἐνὶ στείνῳ, Τετῶν ἐναλίκιος ἀνὴρ.

Compare Virgil's picture of Entellus and Dares, Æneid. v, 430.

mean auxiliary, but because any of their triremes, if compelled to fall back before an Athenian, found protection on the shore, and could return to the fight at leisure; while an Athenian in the same predicament had no escape. 5. The numerous light craft of the Syracusans doubtless rendered great service in this battle, as they had done in the preceding, though Thucydides does not again mention them. 6. Lastly, both in the Athenian and Syracusan characters, the pressure of necessity was less potent as a stimulus to action, than hopeful confidence and elation, with the idea of a flood-tide yet mounting. In the character of some other races, the Jews for instance, the comparative force of these motives appears to be the other way.

About sixty Athenian triremes, little more than half of the fleet which came forth, were saved as the wreck from this terrible conflict. The Syracusans on their part had suffered severely; only fifty triremes remaining out of seventy-six. The triumph with which, nevertheless, on returning to the city, they erected their trophy, and the exultation which reigned among the vast crowds encircling the harbor, was beyond all measure or precedent. Its clamorous manifestations were doubtless but too well heard in the neighboring camp of the Athenians, and increased, if anything could increase, the soul-subduing extremity of distress which paralyzed the vanquished. So utterly did the pressure of suffering, anticipated as well as actual, benumb their minds and extinguish their most sacred associations, that no man among them, not even the ultra-religious Nikias, thought of picking up the floating bodies or asking for a truce to bury the dead. This obligation, usually so serious and imperative upon the survivors after a battle, now passed unheeded amidst the sorrow, terror, and despair, of the living man for himself.

Such despair, however, was not shared by the generals, to their honor be it spoken. On the afternoon of this terrible defeat, Demosthenes proposed to Nikias that at daybreak the ensuing morning they should man all the remaining ships — even now more in number than the Syracusan — and make a fresh attempt to break out of the harbor. To this Nikias agreed, and both proceeded to try their influence in getting the resolution executed. But so irreparably was the spirit of the seamen broken, that nothing could prevail upon them to go again on shipboard: they

would hear of nothing but attempting to escape by land.¹ Preparations were therefore made for commencing their march in the darkness of that very night. The roads were still open, and, had they so marched, a portion of them, at least, might even yet have been saved.² But there occurred one more mistake, one farther postponement, which cut off the last hopes of this gallant and fated remnant.

The Syracusan Hermokratès, fully anticipating that the Athenians would decamp that very night, was eager to prevent their retreat, because of the mischief which they might do if established in any other part of Sicily. He pressed Gylippus and the military authorities to send out forthwith, and block up the principal roads, passes, and fords, by which the fugitives would get off. Though sensible of the wisdom of his advice, the generals thought it wholly inexecutable. Such was the universal and unbounded joy which now pervaded the city, in consequence of the recent victory, still rather magnified by the circumstance that the day was sacred to *Niraklès*. — so wild the jollity, the feasting, the intoxication, the congratulations, amidst men rewarding themselves after their recent effort and triumph, and amidst the necessary care for the wounded, — that an order to arm and march out would have been as little listened to as the order to go on shipboard was by the desponding Athenians. Perceiving that he could get nothing done until the next morning, Hermokratès resorted to a stratagem in order to delay the departure of the Athenians for that night. At the moment when darkness was beginning, he sent down some confidential friends on horseback to the Athenian wall. These men, riding up near enough to make themselves heard, and calling for the sentries, addressed them as messengers from the private correspondents of Nikias in Syracuse, who had sent to warn him, they affirmed, not to decamp during the night, inasmuch as the Syracusans had already beset and occupied the roads; but to begin his march quietly the next morning after adequate preparation.³

This fraud — the same as the Athenians had themselves practised two years before,⁴ in order to tempt the Syracusans to

¹ Thucyd. vii, 72.

² Thucyd. vii, 73; Diodor. xiii, 18.

³ Diodor. xiii, 18.

⁴ Thucyd. vi, 64.

march out against Katana — was perfectly successful: the sincerity of the information was believed, and the advice adopted. Had Demosthenès been in command alone, we may doubt whether he would have been so easily duped; for granting the accuracy of the fact asserted, it was not the less obvious that the difficulties, instead of being diminished, would be increased tenfold on the following day. We have seen, however, on more than one previous occasion, how fatally Nikias was misled by his treacherous advices from the philo-Athenians at Syracuse. An excuse for inaction was always congenial to his character; and the present recommendation, moreover, fell in but too happily with the temper of the army, now benumbed with depression and terror, like those unfortunate soldiers, in the Retreat of the Ten Thousand Greeks, who were yielding to the lethargy of extreme cold on the snows of Armenia, and whom Xenophon vainly tried to arouse.¹ Having remained over that night, the generals determined also to stay the next day, — in order that the army might carry away with them as much of their baggage as possible, — sending forward a messenger to the Sikels in the interior to request that they would meet the army, and bring with them a supply of provisions.² Gylippus and Hermokratès had thus ample time, on the following day, to send out forces and occupy all the positions convenient for obstructing the Athenian march. They at the same time towed into Syracuse as prizes all the Athenian triremes which had been driven ashore in the recent battle, and which now lay like worthless hulks, unguarded and unheeded,³ seemingly even those within the station itself.

It was on the next day but one after the maritime defeat that Nikias and Demosthenès put their army in motion to attempt retreat. The camp had long been a scene of sickness and death from the prevalence of marsh fever; but since the recent battle the number of wounded men, and the unburied bodies of the slain, had rendered it yet more pitiable. Forty thousand miserable men — so prodigious was the total, including all ranks and functions — now set forth to quit it, on a march of which few could hope to see the end; like the pouring forth of the population of a

¹ Xenophon. Anab. iv, 5, 15, 19; v, 8, 15.

² Thucyd. vii, 74.

³ Thucyd. vii, 77.

large city starved out by blockade. Many had little or no provisions to carry, so low had the stock become reduced; but of those who had, every man carried his own, even the horsemen and hoplites, now for the first time either already left without slaves, by desertion, or knowing that no slave could now be trusted. But neither such melancholy equality of suffering, nor the number of sufferers, counted for much in the way of alleviation. A downcast stupor and sense of abasement possessed every man; the more intolerable, when they recollected the exit of the armament from Peiræus two years before, with prayers, and solemn pæans, and all the splendid dreams of conquest, set against the humiliation of the closing scene now before them, without a single trireme left out of two prodigious fleets.

But it was not until the army had actually begun its march that the full measure of wretchedness was felt and manifested. It was then that the necessity first became proclaimed, which no one probably spoke out beforehand, of leaving behind not merely the unburied bodies, but also the sick and the wounded. The scenes of woe which marked this hour passed endurance or description. The departing soldier sorrowed and shuddered with the sentiment of an unperformed duty, as he turned from the unburied bodies of the slain; but far more terrible was the trial, when he had to tear himself from the living sufferers, who implored their comrades, with wailings of agony and distraction, not to abandon them. Appealing to all the claims of pious friendship, they clung round their knees, and even crawled along the line of march until their strength failed. The silent dejection of the previous day was now exchanged for universal tears and groans, and clamorous outbursts of sorrow, amidst which the army could not without the utmost difficulty be disengaged and put in motion.

After such heart-rending scenes, it might seem that their cup of bitterness was exhausted; but worse was yet in store, and the terrors of the future dictated a struggle against all the miseries of past and present. The generals did their best to keep up some sense of order as well as courage; and Nikias, particularly, in this closing hour of his career, displayed a degree of energy and heroism which he had never before seemed to possess. Though himself among the greatest personal sufferers of all,

from his incurable complaint, he was seen everywhere in the ranks marshalling the troops, heartening up their dejection, and addressing them with a voice louder, more strenuous, and more commanding than was his wont.

"Keep up your hope still, Athenians (he said), even as we are now: others have been saved out of circumstances worse than ours. Be not too much humiliated, either with your defeats or with your present unmerited hardships. I too, having no advantage over any of you in strength,—nay, you see the condition to which I have been brought by my disease,—and accustomed even to superior splendor and good fortune in private as well as public life, I too am plunged in the same peril with the humblest soldier among you. Nevertheless, my conduct has been constantly pious towards the gods as well as just and blameless towards men; in recompense for which, my hope for the future is yet sanguine, at the same time that our actual misfortunes do not appall me in proportion to their intrinsic magnitude.¹ Perhaps,

¹ Thucyd vii, 77. Καίτοι πολλὰ μὲν ἐς θεοὺς νομίμα δαδμήτημαι, πολλὰ δὲ ἐς ἀνθρώπους δίκαια καὶ ἀνεπιφθόνα. Ἄνθ' ὧν ἡ μὲν ἐλπίς ὁμῶς θρασεία τοῦ μέλλοντος, αἱ δὲ ξυμφοραὶ οὐ κατ' ἀξίαν δὴ φοβούσι. Ταχὺ δ' ἂν καὶ λωφίσειαν· ἱκανὰ γὰρ τοῖς τε πολεμοῖς εὐτυχῆται, καὶ ἐν τῷ θανάτῳ ἐπιφθόνοι ἐστρατεύσαμεν, ἀρκοῦντως ἤδη τετιμωρημένα.

I have translated the words οὐ κατ' ἀξίαν, and the sentence of which they form a part, differently from what has been hitherto sanctioned by the commentators, who construe κατ' ἀξίαν as meaning "according to our desert," understand the words αἱ ξυμφοραὶ οὐ κατ' ἀξίαν as bearing the same sense with the words ταῖς παρὰ τὴν ἀξίαν κακοπραγίαις some lines before; and likewise construe αὐ, not with φοβούσι, but with κατ' ἀξίαν, assigning to φοβούσι an affirmative sense. They translate, "Quare, quævis nostra fortuna, promissæ flucta valeatur (these words have no parallel in the original) rerum tamen futurarum spes est audax: sed clades, quas nullo nostro merito accepimus, nos jam terrent. At fortasse cessabunt," etc. M. Didot translates, "Aussi j'ai un ferme espoir dans l'avenir, malgré l'effroi que des malheurs non mérités nous causent." Dr. Arnold passes the sentence over without notice.

This manner of translating appears to me not less unsuitable in reference to the spirit and thread of the harangue, than awkward as regards the individual words. Looking to the spirit of the harangue, the object of encouraging the dejected soldiers would hardly be much answered by repeating—what in fact had been glanced at in a manner sufficient and becoming, before—that "the unmerited reverses terrified either Nikias or the soldiers." Then as to the words; the expressions ἀνθ' ὧν, ὁμῶς, μὲν, and δέ, seem to me to denote, not only that the two halves of the sentence apply

indeed, they may from this time forward abate; for our enemies have had their full swing of good fortune, and if, at the moment of our starting, we were under the jealous wrath of any of the

both of them to Nikias, but that the first half of the sentence is in harmony, not in opposition, with the second. Marthie (in my judgment, erroneously) refers (Gr. Gr. § 623) *ὁμως* to some words which have preceded; I think that *ὁμως* contributes to hold together the first and the second affirmation of the sentence. Now the Latin translation refers the first half of the sentence to Nikias, and the last half to the soldiers whom he addresses; while the translation of M. Didot, by means of the word *malgré*, for which there is nothing corresponding in the Greek, puts the second half in antithesis to the first.

I cannot but think that *οὐ* ought to be construed with *φοβοῦσι*, and that the words *κατ' ἀξίαν* do not bear the meaning assigned to them by the translators. *Ἀξίαν* not only means, "desert, merit, the title to that which a man has earned by his conduct," as in the previous phrase *παρὰ τὴν ἀξίαν*, but it also means, "price, value, title to be cared for, capacity of exciting more or less desire or aversion," in which last sense it is predicated as an attribute, not only of moral beings, but of other objects besides. Thus Aristotle says (Ethic. Nikom. iii. 11): *ὁ γὰρ αὐτὸς ἔχων, μᾶλλον ἀγαπᾷ τὰς τοιαύτας ἡδονὰς τῆς ἀξίας· ὁ δὲ ποιοῦν αὐτοῦτος, etc.* Again, *ibid.* iii. 5. *Ὁ μὲν οὖν ἂν δαί καὶ οὐ δικαί, ἱππομαν καὶ φοβοῦμαι, καὶ ὡς δει, καὶ δε, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἀφροσύνη, ἀνδρεία· κατ' ἀξίαν γὰρ, καὶ ὡς ἂν ὁ λόγος, πᾶσχει καὶ πράττει ὁ ἀνδρῆος.* Again, *ibid.* iv. 2. *Διὰ τοῦτό ἐστι τοῦ μεγαλουργοῦ, ἐν ᾧ ἂν ποῦν γένει, μεγαλουργοῦ ποιεῖν· το γὰρ τοιοῦτον οὐχ εὐπρόσλητον, καὶ ἔχον κατ' ἀξίαν τοῦ δαπανήματος.* Again, *ibid.* viii. 14. *Ἀχρεῖαι γὰρ διὰ τὰ οὐ φασὶ δεῖν ἴσον ἔχειν· λειτουργίαν τε γὰρ γίνεσθαι, καὶ οὐ φιλοῦν, εἰ μὴ κατ' ἀξίαν τῶν ἔργων ἔσται τὰ ἐκ τῆς φιλίας.* Compare also *ib.* viii. 13.

Xenophon, *Cyrop.* viii. 4. 32. *τὸ γὰρ πολλὰ δοκοῦντα ἔχειν μὴ κατ' ἀξίαν τῆς οὐσίας φαίνεται ἀφελόντα τοὺς φίλους, ἀνελευθερίαν ἐμοίγε δοκεῖ περιᾶσθαι.* Compare Xenophon, *Memorab.* ii. 5, 2. *ὥσπερ τῶν οἰκετῶν, οὕτω καὶ τῶν φίλων, εἴσιεν ἀξίαι;* also *ibid.* i. 6, 11, and Isokratēs, *cont. Loeb.* Or. xx. s. 8.

The words *κατ' ἀξίαν* in Thucydides appear to me to bear the same meaning as in these passages of Xenophon and Aristotle. "in proportion to their value," or to their real magnitude. If we so construe them, the words *ἀνθ' ὧν, ὁμως μὲν, and δὲ*, all fall into their proper order: the whole sentence after *ἀνθ' ὧν* applies to Nikias personally, is a corollary from what he had asserted before, and forms a suitable point in an harangue for encouraging his dispirited soldiers: "Look how I bear up, who have as much cause for mourning as any of you. I have behaved well both towards gods and towards men: in return for which, I am comparatively comfortable both as to the future and as to the present: as to the future, I have strong

gods, we have already undergone chastisement amply sufficient. Other people before us have invaded foreign lands, and after having done what was competent to human power, have suffered what was within the limit of human endurance. We too may reasonably hope henceforward to have the offended god dealing with us more mildly, for we are now objects fitter for his compassion than for his jealousy.¹ Look, moreover, at your own ranks, hoplites so numerous and so excellent: let that guard you against excessive despair, and recollect that, wherever you may sit down, you are yourselves at once a city; nor is there any other city in

hopes; at the same time that, as to the present, I am not overwhelmed by the present misfortunes in proportion to their prodigious intensity."

This is the precise thing for a man of resolution to say upon so terrible an occasion.

The particle *δὲ* has its appropriate meaning, *αἱ δὲ συμφοραὶ οὐ κατ' ἀξίαν δὲ φοβοῦσι*; "and the present distresses, though they do appall me, do not appall me assuredly in proportion to their actual magnitude." Lastly, the particle *καὶ* (in the succeeding phrase, *ταχὰ δ' ἂν καὶ λωφθῇσαν*) does not fit on to the preceding passage as usually construed: accordingly the Latin translator, as well as M. Didot, leave it out, and translate "At for tasse cessabunt." "Mais peut être vont ils cesser." It ought to be translated "And perhaps they may even abate," which implies that what had been asserted in the preceding sentence is here intended not to be contradicted, but to be carried forward and strengthened: see Kühner, *Griech. Gramm.* sects. 725-728. Such would not be the case as the sentence is usually construed.

¹ Thucyd. vii. 77. *Ἰκανὰ γὰρ τοῖς τε πολεμοῖς εὐτύχηται, καὶ εἰ τῷ θεῷ ἐπιδόντων ἐστρατεύσασιν, ἀποχρώντως ἡδὲ τιμωρήμεθα· ἦλθον γὰρ πον καὶ ἄλλοι τινες ἡδὲ ἐφ' ἑτέρους, καὶ ἀνδραπεία δρᾶσαντες ἀνεκτὰ ἔπαθον. Καὶ ἡμᾶς εἰκὸς νῦν τὰ τε ἀπὸ τοῦ θείου ἐλπίζειν ἡπιώτερα ἔχειν· οἴκτου γὰρ ἀπ' αὐτῶν ἀξιώτεροι ἡδὲ ἴσμεν ἢ φθάνον.*

This is a remarkable illustration of the doctrine, so frequently set forth in Herodotus, that the gods were jealous of any man or any nation who was preeminently powerful, fortunate, or prosperous. Nikias, recollecting the immense manifestation and promise with which his armament had started from Perræus, now believed that this had provoked the jealousy of some of the gods, and brought about the misfortunes in Sicily. He comforts his soldiers by saying that the enemy is now at the same dangerous pinnacle of exaltation, whilst they have exhausted the sad effects of the divine jealousy.

Compare the story of Amasis and Polykratēs in Herodotus (iii. 39), and the striking remarks put into the mouth of Paulus Æmilius by Plutarch (*Vit. Paul. Æmil.* c. 36).

Sicily that can either repulse your attack or expel you if you choose to stay. Be careful yourselves to keep your march firm and orderly, every man of you with this conviction, that whatever spot he may be forced to fight in, that spot is his country and his fortress, and must be kept by victorious effort. As our provisions are very scanty, we shall hasten on night and day alike; and so soon as you reach any friendly village of the Sikels, who still remain constant to us from hatred to Syracuse, then consider yourselves in security. We have sent forward to apprise them, and intreat them to meet us with supplies. Once more, soldiers, recollect that to act like brave men is now a matter of necessity to you, and that if you falter, there is no refuge for you anywhere. Whereas if you now get clear of your enemies, such of you as are not Athenians will again enjoy the sight of home, while such of you as are Athenians will live to renovate the great power of our city, fallen though it now be. *It is men that make a city; not walls, nor ships without men.*"¹

The efforts of both commanders were in full harmony with these strenuous words. The army was distributed into two divisions; the hoplites marching in a hollow oblong, with the baggage and unarmed in the interior. The front division was commanded by Nikias, the rear by Demosthenes. Directing their course towards the Sikel territory, in the interior of the island, they first marched along the left bank of the Anapus until they came to the ford of that river, which they found guarded by a Syracusan detachment. They forced the passage, however, without much resistance, and accomplished on that day a march of about five miles, under the delay arising from the harassing of the enemy's cavalry and light troops. Encamping for that night on an eminence, they recommenced their march with the earliest dawn, and halted, after about two miles and a half, in a deserted village on a plain. They were in hopes of finding some provisions in the houses, and were even under the necessity of carrying along with them some water from this spot; there being none to be found farther on. As their intended line of march had now become evident, the Syracusans profited by this halt to get

¹ Thucyd. vii, 77. ἄνδρες γὰρ πόλεις, καὶ οὐ τεῖχη, οὐδὲ νηὶς ἀνδρῶν εἶναι.

on before them, and to occupy in force a position on the road, called the Akraian cliff. Here the road, ascending a high hill, formed a sort of ravine bordered on each side by steep cliffs. The Syracusans erected a wall or barricade across the whole breadth of the road, and occupied the high ground on each side. But even to reach this pass was beyond the competence of the Athenians; so impracticable was it to get over the ground in the face of overwhelming attacks from the enemy's cavalry and light troops. They were compelled, after a short march, to retreat to their camp of the night before.¹

Every hour added to the distress of their position; for their food was all but exhausted, nor could any man straggle from the main body without encountering certain destruction from the cavalry. Accordingly, on the next morning, they tried one more desperate effort to get over the hilly ground into the interior. Starting very early, they arrived at the foot of the hill called the Akraian cliff, where they found the barricades placed across the road, with deep files of Syracusan hoplites behind them, and crowds of light troops lining the cliffs on each border. They made the most strenuous and obstinate efforts to force this impregnable position, but all their struggles were vain, while they suffered miserably from the missiles of the troops above. Amidst all the discouragement of this repulse, they were yet farther disheartened by storms of thunder and lightning, which occurred during the time, and which they construed as portents significant of their impending ruin.²

This fact strikingly illustrates both the change which the last two years had wrought in the contending parties, and the degree to which such religious interpretations of phenomena depended for their efficacy on predisposing temper, gloomy or cheerful. In the first battle between Nikias and the Syracusans, near the Great Harbor, some months before the siege was begun, a similar thunder-storm had taken place: on that occasion the Athenian soldiers had continued the battle unmoved, treating it as a natural event belonging to the season, and such indifference on their part

¹ Thucyd. vii, 78.

² Thucyd. vii, 79. ὅτι ὅτε οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι μᾶλλον ἐν ἡπείρῳ, καὶ ἐνόμιζον ἐπὶ τῷ σφοτερόφει λείπειν καὶ τὰ πάντα γίνεσθαι.

had still farther imposed upon the alarmed Syracusans.¹ Now both the self-confidence and the religious impression had changed sides.

Exhausted by their fruitless efforts, the Athenians fell back a short space to repose, when Gylippus tried to surround them by sending a detachment to block up the narrow road in their rear. This, however, they prevented, effecting their retreat into the open plain, where they passed the night, and on the ensuing day attempted once more the hopeless march over the Akraean cliff. But they were not allowed even to advance so far as the pass and the barricade. They were so assailed and harassed by the cavalry and darters, in flank and rear, that, in spite of heroic effort and endurance, they could not accomplish a progress of so much as one single mile. Extenuated by fatigue, half-starved, and with numbers of wounded men, they were compelled to spend a third miserable night in the same fatal plain.

As soon as the Syracusans had retired for the night to their camp, Nikias and Demosthenês took counsel. They saw plainly that the route which they had originally projected, over the Akraean cliff into the Sikel regions of the interior and from thence to Katana, had become impracticable, and that their unhappy troops would be still less in condition to force it on the morrow than they had been on the day preceding. Accordingly, they resolved to make off during the night, leaving numerous fires burning to mislead the enemy; but completely to alter the direction, and to turn down towards the southern coast on which lay Kamarina and Gela. Their guides informed them that if they could cross the river Kakyparis, which fell into the sea south of Syracuse, on the southeastern coast of Sicily, or a river still farther on, called the Erineus, — they might march up the right bank of either into the regions of the interior. Accordingly, they broke up in the night, amidst confusion and alarm; in spite of which, the front division of the army under Nikias got into full march, and made considerable advance. By daybreak this division reached the southeastern coast of the island not far south of Syracuse, and fell into the track of the Helôrîne road, which they pursued until they arrived at the Kakyparis. Even here,

¹ Thucyd. vi, 70.

however, they found a Syracusan detachment beforehand with them, raising a redoubt, and blocking up the ford; nor could Nikias pass it without forcing his way through them. He marched straightforward to the Erineus, which he crossed on the same day, and encamped his troops on some high ground on the other side.¹

Except at the ford of the Kakyparis, his march had been all day unobstructed by the enemy; and he thought it wiser to push his troops as fast as possible, in order to arrive at some place both of safety and subsistence, without concerning himself about the rear division under Demosthenês. That division, the larger half of the army, started both later and in great disorder. Unaccountable panics and darkness made them part company or miss their way, so that Demosthenês, with all his efforts to keep them together, made little progress, and fell much behind Nikias. He was overtaken by the Syracusans during the forenoon, seemingly before he reached the Kakyparis,² and at a moment when

¹ Thucyd. vii, 80-82.

² Dr. Arnold (Thucyd. vol. iii, p. 280, copied by Gôller, ad vii 81) thinks that the division of Demosthenês reached and passed the river Kakyparis; and was captured between the Kakyparis and the Erineus. But the words of Thucyd. vii, 80, 81, do not sustain this. The division of Nikias was in advance of Demosthenês from the beginning, and gained upon it principally during the early part of the march, before daybreak, because it was then that the disorder of the division of Demosthenês was the most inconvenient: see c. 81 — *ὡς τις πρὶν τότε εὐρετα μεγέθειεν*, etc. When Thucydides, therefore, says, that "at daybreak *they* arrived at the sea," (*αὐτὰς δὲ τῇ ᾠ ἡ ἀφικνοῦνται ἐς τὴν θάλατταν*, c. 80.) this cannot be true *both* of Nikias and of Demosthenês. If the former arrived there at daybreak, the latter cannot have come to the same point till some time after daybreak. Nikias must have been beforehand with Demosthenês when he reached the sea, and considerably *more* beforehand when he reached the Kakyparis: moreover, we are expressly told that Nikias did not wait for his colleague, that he thought it for the best to get on as fast as possible with his own division.

It appears to me that the words *ἀφικνοῦνται*, etc. (c. 80), are not to be understood both of Nikias and Demosthenês, but that they refer back to the word *αὐτοῖς*, two or three lines behind: "the *Athenians* (*taken generally*) reached the sea," no attention being at that moment paid to the difference between the front and the rear divisions. The *Athenians* might be said, not improperly, to reach the sea, at the time when the division of Nikias reached it.

the foremost division was nearly six miles ahead, between the Kakyparis and the Erineus.

When the Syracusans discovered at dawn that their enemy had made off in the night, their first impulse was to accuse Gylippus of treachery in having permitted the escape. Such ungrateful surmises, however, were soon dissipated, and the cavalry set forth in rapid pursuit, until they overtook the rear division, which they immediately began to attack and impede. The advance of Demosthenes had been tardy before, and his division disorganized: but he was now compelled to turn and defend himself against an indefatigable enemy, who presently got before him and thus stopped him altogether. Their numerous light troops and cavalry assailed him on all sides and without intermission; employing nothing but missiles, however, and taking care to avoid any close encounter. While this unfortunate division were exerting their best efforts both to defend themselves, and if possible to get forward, they found themselves inclosed in a walled olive-ground, through the middle of which the road passed; a farm bearing the name, and probably once the property, of Polyzelus, brother of the despot Gelon.¹ Entangled and huddled up in this inclosure, from whence exit at the farther end in the face of an enemy was found impossible, they were now overwhelmed with hostile missiles from the walls on all sides.² Though unable to get at the en-

¹ Plutarch, Nikias, c. 27.

² Thucyd. vii. 81. Καὶ τότε γνοὺς (sc. Demosthenēs) τοὺς Συρακοσίους διώκοντας οὐ πορεύεται μάλλον ἢ ἐς μάχην συνετασσετο, ἕως ἐνδιατριῶν κυκλοῦται τε ὑπ' αὐτῶν, καὶ ἐν πολλῷ θορυβῷ αὐτὸς τε καὶ οἱ μετ' αὐτοῦ Ἀθηναῖοι ἦσαν ἀνείληθεντες γὰρ ἐς τι χωρίου, ὃ κυκλῶ μεν τειχίον περιεῖν, ὁδὸς δὲ ἐνθεν τε καὶ ἐνθεν, ἑλάας δὲ οὐκ ὀλίγας εἶχεν, ἐβύλλοντο περιστάδων.

I translate ὁδὸς δὲ ἐνθεν τε καὶ ἐνθεν differently from Dr. Arnold, from Mitford, and from others. These words are commonly understood to mean that this walled plantation was bordered by two roads, one on each side. Certainly the words *might* have that signification; but I think they also may have the signification (compare ii, 76) which I have given in the text, and which seems more plausible. It certainly is very improbable that the Athenians should have gone out of the road, in order to shelter themselves in the plantation; since they were fully aware that there was no safety for them except in getting away. If we suppose that the plantation lay exactly in the road, the word ἀνείληθεντες becomes perfectly explicable, on which

emy, and deprived even of the resources of an active despair, they endured incessant harassing for the greater part of the day, without refreshment or repose, and with the number of their wounded continually increasing; until at length the remaining spirit of the unhappy sufferers was thoroughly broken. Perceiving their condition, Gylippus sent to them a herald with a proclamation; inviting all the islanders among them to come forth from the rest, and promising them freedom if they did so. The inhabitants of some cities, yet not many, — a fact much to their honor, — availed themselves of this offer and surrendered. Presently, however, a larger negotiation was opened, which ended by the entire division capitulating upon terms, and giving up their arms. Gylippus and the Syracusans engaged that the lives of all should be spared; that is, that none should be put to death either by violence, or by intolerable bonds, or by starvation. Having all been disarmed, they were forthwith conveyed away as prisoners to Syracuse, six thousand in number. It is a remarkable proof of the easy and opulent circumstances of many among these gallant sufferers, when we are told that the money which they had about them, even at this last moment of pressure, was sufficient to fill the concavities of four shields.¹ Disdaining either to surrender or to make any stipulation for himself personally, Demosthenes was on the point of killing himself with his own sword the moment that the capitulation was concluded; but his intention was prevented, and he was carried off a disarmed prisoner by the Syracusans.²

I do not think that Dr. Arnold's comment is satisfactory. The pressure of the troops from the rear into the hither opening, while those in the front could not get out by the farther opening, would naturally cause this crowd and *huddling* inside. A road which passed right through the walled ground, entering at one side and coming out at the other, might well be called ὁδὸς ἐνθεν τε καὶ ἐνθεν. Compare Dr. Arnold's Remarks on the Map of Syracuse, vol. iii, p. 281; as well as his note on vii, 81.

I imagine the olive-trees to be here named, not for either of the two reasons mentioned by Dr. Arnold, but because they hindered the Athenians from seeing beforehand distinctly the nature of the inclosure into which they were hastening, and therefore prevented any precautions from being taken, such as that of forbidding too many troops from entering at once, etc.

¹ Plutarch, Nikias, c. 27; Thucyd. vii. 82.

² This statement depends upon the very good authority of the contemporary Syracusan, Philistus: see Pausanias, i, 29, 9; Philisti Fragm. 46. ed. Didot.

On the next day, Gylippus and the victorious Syracusans overtook Nikias on the right bank of the Erineus, apprized him of the capitulation of Demosthenês, and summoned him to capitulate also. He demanded leave to send a horseman for the purpose of verifying the statement; and on the return of the horseman, he made a proposition to Gylippus, that his army should be permitted to return home, on condition of Athens reimbursing to Syracuse the whole expense of the war, and furnishing hostages until payment should be made; one citizen against each talent of silver. These conditions were rejected; but Nikias could not yet bring himself to submit to the same terms for his division as Demosthenês. Accordingly, the Syracusans recommenced their attacks, which the Athenians, in spite of hunger and fatigue, sustained as they best could until night. It was the intention of Nikias again to take advantage of the night for the purpose of getting away. But on this occasion the Syracusans were on the watch, and as soon as they heard movement in the camp, they raised the pæan, or war-shout; thus showing that they were on the lookout, and inducing the Athenians again to lay down the arms which they had taken up for departure. A detachment of three hundred Athenians, nevertheless, still persisting in marching off, apart from the rest, forced their way through the posts of the Syracusans. These men got safely away, and nothing but the want of guides prevented them from escaping altogether.¹

During all this painful retreat, the personal resolution displayed by Nikias was exemplary; his sick and feeble frame was made to bear up, and even to hearten up stronger men, against the extremity of hardship, exhausting the last fragment of hope or even possibility. It was now the sixth day of the retreat, — six days² of constant privation, suffering, and endurance of attack, — yet Nikias early in the morning attempted a fresh march, in order to get to the river Asinarus, which falls into the same sea, south of the Erineus, but is a more considerable stream, flowing deeply imbedded between lofty banks. This was a last effort of despair, with little hope of final escape, even if they did reach it. Yet the march was accomplished, in spite of renewed and incessant

¹ Thucyd. vii, 83.

² Plutarch (Nikias, c. 27) says eight days, inaccurately.

attacks all the way, from the Syracusan cavalry; who even got to the river before the Athenians, occupying the ford, and lining the high banks near it. Here the resolution of the unhappy fugitives at length gave way; when they reached the river, their strength, their patience, their spirit, and their hopes for the future, were all extinct. Tormented with raging thirst, and compelled by the attacks of the cavalry to march in one compact mass, they rushed into the ford all at once, treading down and tumbling over each other in the universal avidity for drink. Many thus perished from being pushed down upon the points of the spears, or lost their footing among the scattered articles of baggage, and were thus borne down under water.¹ Meanwhile, the Syracusans from above poured upon the huddled mass showers of missiles, while the Peloponnesian hoplites even descended into the river, came to close quarters with them, and slew considerable numbers. So violent, nevertheless, was the thirst of the Athenians, that all other suffering was endured in order to taste relief by drinking. And even when dead and wounded were heaped in the river, — when the water was tainted and turbid with blood, as well as thick with the mud trodden up, — still, the new-comers pushed their way in and swallowed it with voracity.²

Wretched, helpless, and demoralized as the army now was, Nikias could think no further of resistance. He accordingly surrendered himself to Gylippus, to be dealt with at the discretion of that general and of the Lacedæmonians,³ earnestly imploring that the slaughter of the defenceless soldiers might be arrested. Accordingly, Gylippus gave orders that no more should be killed, but that the rest should be secured as captives. Many were slain before this order was understood; but of those who remained, almost all were made captive, very few escaping. Nay, even the detachment of three hundred, who had broken out in the night, having seemingly not known whither to go, were captured,

¹ Thucyd. vii, 85. See Dr. Arnold's note.

² Thucyd. vii, 84.ἐβαλλον ἀνωθεν τοὺς Ἀθηναίους, πίνοντάς τε τοὺς πολλοὺς ἀσμένους, καὶ ἐν κοίλῳ ὄντι τῷ ποτάμῳ ἐν σφίσιν αὐτοὺς παρασσομένους.

³ Thucyd. vii, 85, 86; Philistus. Fragm. 46, ed. Didot; Pausanias, i, 29.

and brought in by troops sent forth for the purpose.¹ The triumph of the Syracusans was in every way complete, they hung the trees on the banks of the Asinarus with Athenian par-
opies as trophy, and carried back their prisoners in joyous procession to the city.

The number of prisoners thus made, is not positively specified by Thucydides, as in the case of the division of Demosthenes, which had capitulated and laid down their arms in a mass within the walls of the olive-ground. Of the captives from the division of Nikias, the larger proportion were seized by private individuals, and fraudulently secreted for their own profit; the number obtained for the state being comparatively small, seemingly not more than one thousand.² The various Sicilian towns became soon full of these prisoners, sold as slaves for private account.

Not less than forty thousand persons in the aggregate had started from the Athenian camp to commence the retreat, six days before. Of these probably many, either wounded or otherwise incompetent even when the march began, soon found themselves unable to keep up, and were left behind to perish. Each of the six days was a day of hard fighting and annoyance from an indefatigable crowd of light troops, with little, and at last seemingly nothing, to eat. The number was thus successively thinned, by wounds, privations, and straggling, so that the six thousand taken with Demosthenes, and perhaps three thousand or four thousand captured with Nikias, formed the melancholy remnant. Of the stragglers during the march, however, we are glad to learn that many contrived to escape the Syracusan cavalry and get to Katana, where also those who afterwards ran away from their slavery under private masters, found a refuge.³ These fugitive

¹ Thucyd. vii, 85; Plutarch. Nikias, c. 27.

² Thucydides states, roughly, and without pretending to exact means of knowledge, that the total number of captives brought to Syracuse under public supervision, was not less than seven thousand — ἐλθόντων δὲ οὐ ξυμπάντες, ἀκριβεῖα μὲν χαλεπὸν ἐξιπεῖν, ὅμως δὲ οὐκ ἐλάσσους ἑπτακισχιλίων (vii, 87). As the number taken with Demosthenes was six thousand (vii, 82), this leaves one thousand as having been obtained from the division of Nikias.

³ Thucyd. vii, 85. πολλοὶ δὲ οὐκ ἐπὶ τῇ ἀποσκευῇ καὶ παραίτῃ, οἱ δὲ καὶ δουλεύσαντες καὶ διαδιδόντες ἐν τῇ πόλει. The word παραίτῃ means, during the retreat.

Athenians served as auxiliaries to repel the attacks of the Syracusans upon Katana.¹

It was in this manner, chiefly, that Athens came to receive again within her bosom a few of those ill-fated sons whom she had drafted forth in two such splendid divisions to Sicily. For of those who were carried as prisoners to Syracuse, fewer yet could ever have got home. They were placed for safe custody, along with the other prisoners, in the stone-quarries of Syracuse, — of which there were several, partly on the southern descent of the outer city towards the Nekropolis, or from the higher level to the lower level of Achradina, — partly in the suburb afterwards called Neapolis, under the southern cliff of Epipolæ. Into these quarries — deep hollows of confined space, with precipitous sides, and open at the top to the sky — the miserable prisoners were plunged, lying huddled one upon another, without the smallest protection or convenience. For subsistence, they received each day a ration of one pint of wheaten bread, — half the daily ration of a slave, — with no more than half a pint of water, so that they were not preserved from the pangs either of hunger or of thirst. Moreover, the heat of the midday sun, alternating with the chill of the autumn nights, was alike afflicting and destructive; while the wants of life having all to be performed where they were, without relief, the filth and stench presently became insupportable. Sick and wounded even at the moment of arrival, many of them speedily died; and happiest was he who died the first, leaving an unconscious corpse, which the Syracusans would not take the trouble to remove, to distress and infect the survivors. Under this condition and treatment they remained for seventy days; probably serving as a spectacle for the triumphant Syracusan population, with their wives and children, to come and look down upon, and to congratulate themselves on their own narrow escape from sufferings similar in kind at least, if not in degree. After that time the novelty of the spectacle had worn off, while the place must have become a den of abomination and a nuisance intolerable even to the citizens themselves. Accordingly, they now removed all the surviving prisoners, except the native Athenian.

¹ Lysias pro Polystrato. Orat. xx, sects. 26–28, c. 6, p. 686 B.

and the few Italian or Sicilian Greeks among them. All those so removed were sold for slaves;¹ while the dead bodies were probably at the same time taken away, and the prison rendered somewhat less loathsome. What became of the remaining prisoners, we are not told; it may be presumed that those who could survive so great an extremity of suffering might after a certain time be allowed to get back to Athens on ransom. Perhaps some of them may have obtained their release; as was the case, we are told, with several of those who had been sold to private masters, by the elegance of their accomplishments and the dignity of their demeanor. The dramas of Euripidēs were so peculiarly popular throughout all Sicily, that those Athenian prisoners who knew by heart considerable portions of them, won the affections of their masters. Some even of the stragglers from the army are affirmed to have procured for themselves, by the same attraction, shelter and hospitality during their flight. Euripidēs, we are informed, lived to receive the thanks of several among these unhappy sufferers, after their return to Athens.² I cannot refrain from mentioning this story, though I fear its trustworthiness as matter of fact is much inferior to its pathos and interest.

Upon the treatment of Nikias and Demosthenēs, not merely the Syracusans, but also the allies present, were consulted, and much difference of opinion was found. To keep them in confinement simply, without putting them to death, was apparently the opinion advocated by Hermokratēs.³ But Gylippus, then in

¹ Thucyd. vii. 87. Diodorus (xiii. 20-32) gives two long orations purporting to have been held in the Syracusan assembly, in discussing how the prisoners were to be dealt with. An old citizen, named Nikolaus, who has lost his two sons in the war, is made to advocate the side of humane treatment; while Gylippus is introduced as the orator recommending harshness and revenge.

From whom Diodorus borrowed this, I do not know; but his whole account of the matter appears to me untrustworthy.

One may judge of his accuracy when one finds him stating that the prisoners received each two *chanikes* of barley-meal, instead of two *kotylē*, the *chanix* being four times as much as the *kotylē* (Diodor. xiii. 19).

² Plutarch, Nikias, c. 29; Diodor. xiii. 33. The reader will see how the Carthaginians treated the Grecian prisoners whom they took in Sicily, in Diodor. xiii. 111.

³ Plutarch, Nikias, c. 28; Diodor. xiii. 19.

full ascendancy and an object of deep gratitude for his invaluable services, solicited as a reward to himself to be allowed to conduct them back as prisoners to Sparta. To achieve this would have earned for him signal honor in the eyes of his countrymen; for while Demosthenēs, from his success at Pylos, was their hated enemy, Nikias had always shown himself their friend as far as an Athenian could do so. It was to him that they owed the release of their prisoners taken at Sphakteria; and he had calculated upon this obligation when he surrendered himself prisoner to Gylippus, and not to the Syracusans.

In spite of all his influence, however, Gylippus could not carry this point. First, the Corinthians both strenuously opposed him themselves, and prevailed on the other allies to do the same. They were afraid that the wealth of Nikias would always procure for him the means of escaping from imprisonment, so as to do them farther injury, and they insisted on his being put to death. Next, those Syracusans, who had been in secret correspondence with Nikias during the siege, were yet more anxious to get him put out of the way, being apprehensive that, if tortured by their political opponents, he might disclose their names and intrigues. Such various influences prevailed, and Nikias as well as Demosthenēs was ordered to be put to death by a decree of the public assembly, much to the discontent of Gylippus. Hermokratēs vainly opposed the resolution, but perceiving that it was certain to be carried, he sent to them a private intimation before the discussion closed; and procured for them, through one of the sentinels, the means of dying by their own hands. Their bodies were publicly exposed before the city gates to the view of the Syracusan citizens;¹ while the day on which the final capture of Nikias and his army was accomplished, came to be celebrated as an annual festival, under the title of the *Asinaria*, on the twenty-sixth day of the Dorian month *Karneius*.²

¹ Thucyd. vii. 86; Plutarch, Nikias, c. 28. The statement which Plutarch here cites from Timæus respecting the intervention of Hermokratēs, is not in any substantial contradiction with Philistus and Thucydides. The word *κελευσθέντας* seems decidedly preferable to *καταλευσθέντας*, in the text of Plutarch.

² Plutarch, Nikias, c. 28. Though Plutarch says that the month *Karneius* is "that which the Athenians call *Metageitnion*," yet it is not *εἰσα* to

Such was the close of the expedition, or rather of the two expeditions, undertaken by Athens against Syracuse. Never in Grecian history had a force so large, so costly, so efficient, and so full of promise and confidence, been turned out; never in Grecian history had ruin so complete and sweeping, or victory so glorious and unexpected, been witnessed.¹ Its consequences were felt from one end of the Grecian world to the other, as will appear in the coming chapters.

The esteem and admiration felt at Athens towards Nikias had been throughout lofty and unshaken; after his death it was exchanged for disgrace. His name was omitted, while that of his colleague Demosthenês was engraved, on the funereal pillar erected to commemorate the fallen warriors. This difference Pausanias explains by saying that Nikias was conceived to have disgraced himself as a military man by his voluntary surrender, which Demosthenês had disdained.²

affirm that the day of the slaughter of the Asinarus was the 16th of the Attic month Metageitnion. We know that the civil months of different cities seldom or never exactly coincided. See the remarks of Franz on this point, in his comment on the valuable Inscriptions of Tauromenium, Corp. Inscr. Gr. No. 5640, part xxxii, sect 3, p. 640.

The surrender of Nikias must have taken place, I think, not less than twenty-four or twenty-five days after the eclipse, which occurred on the 27th of August, that is, about Sept. 21. Mr. Fynes Clinton (F. H. ad ann. 413 B.C.) seems to me to compress too much the interval between the eclipse and the retreat; considering that that interval included two great battles, with a certain delay before, between, and after.

The *μετὰ-ἄλλω* noticed by Thucyd. vii, 79, suits with Sept. 21: compare Plutarch. Nikias, c. 22.

¹ Thucyd. vii, 87.

² Pausan. i, 29, 9; Philist. Fragm. 46, ed. Didot.

Justin erroneously says that Demosthenês actually did kill himself, rather than submit to surrender, before the surrender of Nikias; who, he says, did not choose to follow the example:—

"Demosthenês, amisso exercitu a captivitate gladio et voluntariâ morte se vindicat: Nikias autem, ne Demosthenis quidem exemplo, ut sibi consuleret, admonitus, cladem suorum auxit dedecore captivitatis." (Justin, iv, 5.)

Philistus, whom Pausanias announces himself as following, is an excellent witness for the actual facts in Sicily; though not so good a witness for the impression at Athens respecting those facts.

It seems certain, even from Thucydides, that Nikias, in surrendering himself to Gylippus, thought that he had considerable chance of saving his life

The opinion of Thucydides deserves special notice, in the face of this judgment of his countrymen. While he says not a word about Demosthenês, beyond the fact of his execution, he adds in reference to Nikias a few words of marked sympathy and commendation. "Such, or nearly such, (he says,) were the reasons why Nikias was put to death; though he assuredly, among all Greeks of my time, least deserved to come to so extreme a pitch of ill-fortune, considering his exact performance of established duties to the divinity."¹

If we were judging Nikias merely as a private man, and setting his personal conduct in one scale against his personal suffer-

Plutarch too so interprets the proceeding, and condemns it as disgraceful, see his comparison of Nikias and Crassus, near the end. Demosthenês could not have thought the same for himself: the fact of his attempted suicide appears to me certain, on the authority of Philistus, though Thucydides does not notice it.

¹ Thucyd. vii, 86. *Καὶ ὁ μὲν τοιαύτη ἡ ὅτι ἐγγύτατα τούτων αἰτία ἐτεθνῆκεν, ἡκιστα δὲ ἄξιός ὢν τῶν γε ἐπ' ἐμοῦ Ἑλλήνων ἐς τοῦτο δυστυχίας ἀφικέσθαι, διὰ τὴν νενομισμένην ἐς τὸ θεῖον ἐπιτηδεύειν.*

So stood the text of Thucydides, until various recent editors changed the last words, on the authority of some MSS., to *διὰ τὴν πᾶσαν ἐς ἀρετὴν νενομισμένην ἐπιτηδεύειν*.

Though Dr. Arnold and some of the best critics prefer and adopt the latter reading, I confess it seems to me that the former is more suitable to the Greek vein of thought, as well as more conformable to truth about Nikias.

A man's good or bad fortune, depending on the favorable or unfavorable disposition of the gods towards him, was understood to be determined more directly by his piety and religious observances, rather than by his virtue: see passages in Isokratês de Permutation. Orat. xv, sect. 301; Lysias, cont. Nikomach. c. 5, p. 854, though undoubtedly the two ideas went to a certain extent together. Men might differ about the virtue of Nikias; but his piety was an incontestable fact; and his "good fortune" also, in times prior to the Sicilian expedition, was recognized by men like Alkibiadês, who most probably had no very lofty opinion of his virtue (Thucyd. vi, 17). The contrast between the remarkable piety of Nikias, and that extremity of ill-fortune which marked the close of his life, was very likely to shock Grecian ideas generally, and was a natural circumstance for the historian to note. Whereas if we read, in the passage, *πᾶσαν ἐς ἀρετὴν*, the panegyric upon Nikias becomes both less special and more disproportionate, beyond what even Thucydides (as far as we can infer from other expressions, see v, 16) would be inclined to bestow upon him more, in fact, than he says in commendation even of Periklês.

ing on the other, the remark of Thucydides would be natural and intelligible. But the general of a great expedition, upon whose conduct the lives of thousands of brave men as well as the most momentous interests of his country, depend, cannot be tried by any such standard. His private merit becomes a secondary point in the case, as compared with the discharge of his responsible public duties, by which he must stand or fall.

Tried by this more appropriate standard, what are we to say of Nikias? We are compelled to say, that if his personal suffering could possibly be regarded in the light of an atonement, or set in an equation against the mischief brought by himself both on his army and his country, it would not be greater than his deserts. I shall not here repeat the separate points in his conduct which justify this view, and which have been set forth as they have occurred, in the preceding pages. Admitting fully both the good intentions of Nikias, and his personal bravery, rising even into heroism during the last few days in Sicily, it is not the less incontestable, that, first, the failure of the enterprise, next, the destruction of the armament, is to be traced distinctly to his lamentable misjudgment. Sometimes petty trifling, sometimes apathy and inaction, sometimes presumptuous neglect, sometimes obstinate blindness even to urgent and obvious necessities, one or other of these his sad mental defects, will be found operative at every step, whereby this fated armament sinks down from exuberant efficiency into the last depth of aggregate ruin and individual misery. His improvidence and incapacity stand proclaimed, not merely in the narrative of the historian, but even in his own letter to the Athenians, and in his own speeches both before the expedition and during its closing misfortunes, when contrasted with the reality of his proceedings. The man whose flagrant incompetency brought such wholesale ruin upon two fine armaments intrusted to his command, upon the Athenian maritime empire, and ultimately upon Athens herself, must appear on the tablets of history under the severest condemnation, even though his personal virtues had been loftier than those of Nikias.

And yet our great historian, after devoting two immortal books to this expedition, after setting forth emphatically both the glory of its dawn and the wretchedness of its close, with a dramatic genius parallel to the *Œdipus Tyrannus* of Sophoklēs, when he

comes to recount the melancholy end of the two commanders, has no words to spare for Demosthenēs, — far the abler officer of the two, who perished by no fault of his own, — but reserves his flowers to strew on the grave of Nikias, the author of the whole calamity — “What a pity! Such a respectable and religious man!”

Thucydides is here the more instructive, because he exactly represents the sentiment of the general Athenian public towards Nikias during his lifetime. They could not bear to condemn, to mistrust, to dismiss, or to do without, so respectable and religious a citizen. The private qualities of Nikias were not only held to entitle him to the most indulgent construction of all his public short-comings, but also insured to him credit for political and military competence altogether disproportionate to his deserts. When we find Thucydides, after narrating so much improvidence and mismanagement on the grand scale, still keeping attention fixed on the private morality and decorum of Nikias, as if it constituted the main feature of his character, we can understand how the Athenian people originally came both to over-estimate this unfortunate leader, and continued over-estimating him with tenacious fidelity even after glaring proof of his incapacity. Never in the political history of Athens did the people make so fatal a mistake in placing their confidence.

In reviewing the causes of popular misjudgment, historians are apt to enlarge prominently, if not exclusively, on demagogues and demagogic influences. Mankind being usually considered in the light of governable material, or as instruments for exalting, arming, and decorating their rulers, whatever renders them more difficult to handle in this capacity, ranks first in the category of vices. Nor can it be denied that this was a real and serious cause: clever crimination speakers often passed themselves off for something above their real worth; though useful and indispensable as a protection against worse, they sometimes deluded the people into measures impolitic or unjust. But, even if we grant, to the cause of misjudgment here indicated, a greater practical efficiency than history will fairly sanction, still, it is only one among others more mischievous. Never did any man at Athens, by mere force of demagogic qualities, acquire a measure of esteem at once so exalted and so durable, combined with so much power of injuring his fellow-citizens, as this

anti-demagogic Nikias. The man who, over and above his shabby manoeuvre about the expedition against Sphacteria, and his improvident sacrifice of Athenian interests in the alliance with Sparta, ended by inflicting on his country that cruel wound which destroyed so many of her citizens as well as her maritime empire, was not a leather-seller of impudent and criminative eloquence, but a man of ancient family and hereditary wealth, munificent and affable, having credit not merely for the largesses which he bestowed, but also for all the insolences, which as a rich man he might have committed, but did not commit, — free from all pecuniary corruption, — a brave man, and above all, an ultra-religious man, believed therefore to stand high in the favor of the gods, and to be fortunate. Such was the esteem which the Athenians felt for this union of good qualities purely personal and negative with eminent station, that they presumed the higher aptitudes of command,¹ and presumed them, unhappily, after proof that they did not exist, — after proof that what they had supposed to be caution was only apathy and mental weakness. No demagogic arts or eloquence would ever have created in the people so deep-seated an illusion as the imposing respectability of Nikias. Now it was against the overweening ascendancy of such decorous and pious incompetence, when aided by wealth and family advantages, that the demagogic accusatory eloquence ought to have served as a natural bar and corrective. Performing the functions of a constitutional opposition, it afforded the only chance of that tutelary exposure whereby blunders and shortcomings might be arrested in time. How insufficient was the check which it provided, — even at Athens, where every one denounces it as having prevailed in devouring excess, — the history of Nikias is an ever-living testimony.

¹ A good many of the features depicted by Tacitus (Hist. i. 49) in Galba, suit the character of Nikias, much more than those of the rapacious and unprincipled Crassus, with whom Plutarch compares the latter: —

"Vetus in familiâ nobilitas, magnæ opes: ipsi medium ingenium, magis extra vitia, quam cum virtutibus. Sed claritas natalium, et metus temporum, obtentui fuit, ut quod segnitia fuit, sapientia vocaretur. Dum vigebat ætas, militari laude apud Germanias floruit: proconsul, Africam moderate jam senior, citeriorem Hispaniam, pari justitiâ continuit. Major privato viuis, dum privatus fuit, et omnium consensu capax imperii, nisi imperasset."

CHAPTER LXI.

FROM THE DESTRUCTION OF THE ATHENIAN ARMAMENT IN SICILY, DOWN TO THE OLIGARCHICAL CONSPIRACY OF THE FOUR HUNDRED AT ATHENS.

IN the preceding chapter we followed to its melancholy close the united armament of Nikias and Demosthenês, first in the harbor and lastly in the neighborhood of Syracuse, towards the end of September, 413 B.C.

The first impression which we derive from the perusal of that narrative is, sympathy for the parties directly concerned, chiefly for the number of gallant Athenians who thus miserably perished, partly also for the Syracusan victors, themselves a few months before on the verge of apparent ruin. But the distant and collateral effects of the catastrophe throughout Greece, were yet more momentous than those within the island in which it occurred.

I have already mentioned that even at the moment when Demosthenês with his powerful armament left Peiraus to go to Sicily, the hostilities of the Peloponnesian confederacy against Athens herself had been already recommenced. Not only was the Spartan king Agis ravaging Attica, but the far more important step of fortifying Dekeleia, for the abode of a permanent garrison, was in course of completion. That fortress, having been begun about the middle of March, was probably by the month of June in a situation to shelter its garrison, which consisted of contingents periodically furnished, and relieving each other alternately, from all the different states of the confederacy, under the permanent command of King Agis himself.

And now began that incessant marauding of domiciliated enemies — destined to last for nine years until the final capture of Athens — partially contemplated even at the beginning of the Peloponnesian war, and recently enforced, with full comprehension of its disastrous effects, by the virulent antipathy of the exile Alkibiadês.¹ The earlier invasions of Attica had been all

¹ Thucyd. i. 123-142; vi. 90.

temporary, continuing for five or six weeks at the farthest, and leaving the country in repose for the remainder of the year. But the Athenians now underwent from henceforward the fatal experience of a hostile garrison within fifteen miles of their city; an experience peculiarly painful this summer, as well from its novelty as from the extraordinary vigor which Agis displayed in his operations. His excursions were so widely extended, that no part of Attica was secure or could be rendered productive. Not only were all the sheep and cattle destroyed, but the slaves too, especially the most valuable slaves, or artisans, began to desert to Dekeleia in great numbers; more than twenty thousand of them soon disappeared in this way. So terrible a loss of income, both to proprietors of land and to employers in the city, was farther aggravated by the increased cost and difficulty of import from Eubœa. Provisions and cattle from that island had previously come over land from Oropus, but as that road was completely stopped by the garrison of Dekeleia, they were now of necessity sent round Cape Sunium by sea; a transit more circuitous and expensive, besides being open to attack from the enemy's privateers.¹ In the midst of such heavy privations, the demands on citizens and metics for military duty were multiplied beyond measure. The presence of the enemy at Dekeleia forced them to keep watch day and night throughout their long extent of wall, comprising both Athens and Peiraus: in the daytime the hoplites of the city relieved each other on guard, but at night, nearly all of them were either on the battlements or at the various military stations in the city. Instead of a city, in fact, Athens was reduced to the condition of something like a military post.² Moreover, the rich citizens of the state, who

¹ Thucyd. viii, 4. About the extensive ruin caused by the Lacedæmonians to the olive-grounds in Attica, see Lysias. Or. vii, De Oleâ Sacri, sects. 6, 7.

An inscription preserved in M. Boeckh's Corp. Inscr. (part ii. No. 93, p. 132), gives some hint how landlords and tenants met this inevitable damage from the hands of the invaders. The deme Exônœis lets a farm to a certain tenant for forty years, at a fixed rent of one hundred and forty drachmæ; but if an invading enemy shall drive him out or injure his farm, the deme is to receive one half of the year's produce, in place of the year's rent.

² Thucyd. vii, 28, 29.

served as horsemen, shared in the general hardship; being called on for daily duty in order to restrain at least, since they could not entirely prevent, the excursions of the garrison of Dekeleia. Their efficiency was, however, soon impaired by the laming of their horses on the hard and stony soil.¹

Besides the personal efforts of the citizens, such exigencies pressed heavily on the financial resources of the state. Already the immense expense incurred in fitting out the two large armaments for Sicily, had exhausted all the accumulations laid by in the treasury during the interval since the Peace of Nikias; so that the attacks from Dekeleia, not only imposing heavy additional cost, but at the same time cutting up the means of paying, brought the finances of Athens into positive embarrassment. With the view of increasing her revenues, she altered the principle on which her subject-allies had hitherto been assessed: instead of a fixed sum of annual tribute, she now required from them payment of a duty of five per cent. on all imports and exports by sea.² How this new principle of assessment worked, we have unfortunately no information. To collect the duty and take precautions against evasion, an Athenian custom-house officer must have been required in each allied city. Yet it is difficult to understand how Athens could have enforced a system at once novel, extensive, vexatious, and more burdensome to the payers, when we come to see how much her hold over those payers, as well as her naval force, became enfeebled, before the close even of the actual year.³

¹ Thucyd. vii, 27.

² Thucyd. vii, 28.

³ Upon this new assessment on the allies, determined by the Athenians, Mr. Mitford remarks as follows:—

"Thus light, in comparison of what we have laid upon ourselves, was the heaviest tax, as far as we learn from history, at that time known in the world. Yet it caused much discontent among the dependent commonwealths; the arbitrary power by which it was imposed being indeed reasonably execrated, though the burden itself was comparatively a nothing."

This admission is not easily reconciled with the frequent invectives in which Mr. Mitford indulges against the empire of Athens, as practising a system of extortion and oppression ruinous to the subject-allies.

I do not know, however, on what authority he affirms that this was "the heaviest tax then known in the world;" and that "it caused much discontent among the subject commonwealths." The latter assertion would

Her impoverished finances also compelled her to dismiss a body of Thracian mercenaries, whose aid would have been very useful against the enemy at Dekeleia. These Thracian peltasts, thirteen hundred in number, had been hired at a drachma per day each man, to go with Demosthenês to Syracuse, but had not reached Athens in time. As soon as they came thither, the Athenians placed them under the command of Diitrephês, to conduct them back to their native country, with instructions to do damage to the Bœotians, as opportunity might occur, in his way through the Euripus. Accordingly, Diitrephês, putting them on shipboard, sailed round Sunium and northward along the eastern coast of Attica. After a short disembarkation near Tanagra, he passed on to Chalkis in Eubœa in the narrowest part of the strait, from whence he crossed in the night to the Bœotian coast opposite, and marched up some distance from the sea to the neighborhood of the Bœotian town Mykalêssus. He arrived here unseen, lay in wait near a temple of Hermês about two miles distant, and fell upon the town unexpectedly at break of day. To the Mykalessians, dwelling in the centre of Bœotia, not far from Thebes, and at a considerable distance from the sea, such an assault was not less unexpected than formidable. Their fortifications were feeble, in some parts low, in other parts even tumbling down; nor had they even taken the precaution to close their gates at night: so that the barbarians under Diitrephês, entering the town without the smallest difficulty, began at once the work of pillage and destruction. The scene which followed was something alike novel and revolting to Grecian eyes. Not only were all the houses and even the temples plundered, but the Thracians farther manifested that raging thirst for blood which seemed inherent in their race. They slew every living thing that came in their way; men, women, children, horses, cattle, etc. They burst into a school, wherein many boys had just been assembled, and mas-

indeed be sufficiently probable, if it be true that the tax ever came into operation; but we are not entitled to affirm it.

Considering how very soon the terrible misfortunes of Athens came on, I cannot but think it a matter of uncertainty whether the new assessment ever became a reality throughout the Athenian empire. And the fact that Thucydides does not notice it as an additional cause of discontent among the allies, is one reason for such doubts.

cred them all. This scene of bloodshed, committed by barbarians who had not been seen in Greece since the days of Xerxes, was recounted with horror and sympathy throughout all Grecian communities, though Mykalêssus was in itself a town of second-rate or third-rate magnitude.¹

The succor brought from Thebes, by Mykalessian fugitives, arrived unhappily only in time to avenge, but not to save, the inhabitants. The Thracians were already retiring with the booty which they could carry away, when the bœotarch Skirphondas overtook them, both with cavalry and hoplites, after having put to death some greedy plunderers who tarried too long in the town. He compelled them to relinquish most of their booty, and pursued them to the sea-shore; not without a brave resistance from these peltasts, who had a peculiar way of fighting which disconcerted the Thebans. But when they arrived at the sea-shore, the Athenian ships did not think it safe to approach very close, so that not less than two hundred and fifty Thracians were slain before they could get aboard;² and the Athenian commander, Diitrephês was so severely wounded that he died shortly afterwards. The rest pursued their voyage homeward.

Meanwhile, the important station of Naupaktus and the mouth of the Corinthian gulf again became the theatre of naval encounter. It will be recollected that this was the scene of the memorable victories gained by the Athenian admiral Phormion in the second year of the Peloponnesian war,³ wherein the nautical superiority of Athens over her enemies, as to ships, crews, and admiral, had been so transcendently manifested. In that respect matters had now considerably changed. While the navy of Athens had fallen off since the days of Phormion, that of her enemy had improved: Ariston, and other skilful Corinthian steersmen,

¹ Thucyd. vii. 29, 30, 31. I conceive that *οὕση οὐ μεγάλη* is the right reading, and not *οὕση μεγάλη*, in reference to Mykalêssus. The words *ἐπὶ μεγέθει*, in c. 31, refer to the size of the city.

The reading is, however, disputed among critics. It is evident from the language of Thucydides that the catastrophe at Mykalêssus made a profound impression throughout Greece.

² Thucyd. vii. 30; Pausanias, i. 23, 3. Compare Meineke, ad *Arrianis* Fragment. *Ἡρώες*, vol. ii, p. 1069.

See above, vol. vi, ch. xlix, p. 196 of this History.

not attempting to copy Athenian tactics, had studied the best mode of coping with them, and had modified the build of their own triremes accordingly,¹ at Corinth as well as at Syracuse. Seventeen years before, Phormion with eighteen Athenian triremes would have thought himself a full match for twenty-five Corinthian; but the Athenian admiral of this year, Konon, also a perfectly brave man, now judged so differently, that he constrained Demosthenês and Eurymedon to reinforce his eighteen triremes with ten others,—out of the best of their fleet, at a time when they had certainly none to spare,—on the ground that the Corinthian fleet opposite, of twenty-five sail, was about to assume the offensive against him.²

Soon afterwards Diphilus came to supersede Konon, with some fresh ships from Athens, which made the total number of triremes thirty-three. The Corinthian fleet, reinforced so as to be nearly of the same number, took up a station on the coast of Achaia opposite Naupaktus, at a spot called Erineus, in the territory of Rhypes. They ranged themselves across the mouth of a little indentation of the coast, or bay, in the shape of a crescent, with two projecting promontories as horns: each of these promontories was occupied by a friendly land-force, thus supporting the line of triremes at both flanks. This was a position which did not permit the Athenians to sail through the line, or manœuvre round it and in the rear of it. Accordingly, when the fleet of Diphilus came across from Naupaktus, it remained for some time close in front of the Corinthians, neither party venturing to attack, for the straightforward collision was destructive to the Athenian ships with their sharp, but light and feeble beaks, while it was favorable to the solid bows and thick epôtids, or ear-projections, of the Corinthian trireme. After considerable delay, the Corinthians at length began the attack on their side, yet not advancing far enough out to sea to admit of the manœuvring and evolutions of the Athenians. The battle lasted some time, terminating with no decisive advantage to either party. Three Corinthian triremes were completely disabled, though the crews of all escaped by swimming to their friends ashore: on the Athenian side, not

¹ See the preceding chapter.

² Thucyd. vii, 31. Compare the language of Phormion, ii, 88, 89.

one trireme became absolutely water-logged, but seven were so much damaged, by straightforward collision with the stronger bows of the enemy, that they became almost useless after they got back to Naupaktus. The Athenians had so far the advantage, that they maintained their station, while the Corinthians did not venture to renew the fight: moreover, both the wind and the current set towards the northern shore, so that the floating fragments and dead bodies came into possession of the Athenians. Each party thought itself entitled to erect a trophy, but the real feeling of victory lay on the side of Corinth, and that of defeat on the side of Athens. The reputed maritime superiority of the latter was felt by both parties to have sustained a diminution; and such assuredly would have been the impression of Phormion, had he been alive to witness it.¹

This battle appears to have taken place, so far as we can make out, a short time before the arrival of Demosthenês at Syracuse, about the close of the month of May. We cannot doubt that the Athenians most anxiously expected news from that officer, with some account of victories obtained in Sicily, to console them for having sent him away at a moment when his services were so cruelly wanted at home. Perhaps they may even have indulged hopes of the near capture of Syracuse, as a means of restoring their crippled finances. Their disappointment would be all the more bitter when they came to receive, towards the end of June or beginning of July, despatches announcing the capital defeat of Demosthenês in his attempt upon Epipolæ, and the consequent extinction of all hope that Syracuse could ever be taken. After these despatches, we may perhaps doubt whether any others subsequently reached Athens. The generals would not write home during the month of indecision immediately succeeding, when Demosthenês was pressing for retreat, and Nikias resisting it. They might possibly, however, write immediately on taking their resolution to retreat, at the time when they sent to Katana to forbid farther supplies of provisions, but this was the last practicable opportunity; for closely afterwards followed their naval defeat, and the blocking up of the mouth of the Great Harbor. The mere absence of intelligence would satisfy the Athenians that their

¹ Thucyd. vii, 34.

affairs in Sicily were proceeding badly; but the closing series of calamities, down to the final catastrophe, would only come to their knowledge indirectly; partly through the triumphant despatches transmitted from Syracuse to Sparta, Corinth, and Thebes, partly through individual soldiers of their own armament who escaped.

According to the tale of Plutarch, the news was first made known at Athens through a stranger, who, arriving at Peiræus, went into a barber's shop and began to converse about it, as upon a theme which must of course be uppermost in every one's mind.

The astonished barber, hearing for the first time such fearful tidings, ran up to Athens to communicate it to the archons as well as to the public in the market-place. The public assembly being forthwith convoked, he was brought before it, and called upon to produce his authority, which he was unable to do, as the stranger had disappeared. He was consequently treated as a fabricator of uncertified rumors for the disturbance of the public tranquillity, and even put to the torture.¹ How much of this improbable tale may be true, we cannot determine; but we may easily believe that neutrals, passing from Corinth or Megara to Peiræus, were the earliest communicants of the misfortunes of Nikias and Demosthenes in Sicily during the months of July and August. Presently came individual soldiers of the armament, who had got away from the defeat and found a passage home; so that the bad news was but too fully confirmed. But the Athenians were long before they could bring themselves to believe, even upon the testimony of these fugitives, how entire had been the destruction of their two splendid armaments, without even a feeble remnant left to console them.²

As soon as the full extent of their loss was at length forced upon their convictions, the city presented a scene of the deepest affliction, dismay, and terror. Over and above the extent of private mourning, from the loss of friends and relatives, which overspread nearly the whole city, there prevailed utter despair as to the public safety. Not merely was the empire of Athens apparently lost, but Athens herself seemed utterly defenceless. Her treasury was empty, her docks nearly destitute of triremes, the flower of

¹ Plutarch, Nikias, c. 30. He gives the story without much confidence. Ἀθηναίους δὲ φασί, etc.

² Thucyd. viii. 1.

her hoplites as well as of her seamen had perished in Sicily without leaving their like behind, and her maritime reputation was irretrievably damaged; while her enemies, on the contrary, animated by feelings of exuberant confidence and triumph, were further strengthened by the accession of their new Sicilian allies. In these melancholy months — October, November, 413 B.C. — the Athenians expected nothing less than a vigorous attack, both by land and sea, from the Peloponnesian and Sicilian forces united, with the aid of their own revolted allies, an attack which they knew themselves to be in no condition to repel.¹

Amidst so gloomy a prospect, without one ray of hope to cheer them on any side, it was but poor satisfaction to vent their displeasure on the chief speakers who had recommended their recent disastrous expedition, or on those prophets and reporters of oracles who had promised them the divine blessing upon it.²

¹ Thucyd. viii. 1. Πάντα δὲ παντάχῃθεν αὐτοῖς ἐλπίει, etc.

² Thucyd. viii. 1. Ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἔγνωσαν, χαλεποὶ μὲν ἦσαν τοῖς συμποδῶν ἀποδείξαι τῶν βητόρων τὸν ἐκπλῶν, ὥσπερ οὐκ αὐτοὶ ψηφισάμενοι, etc.

From these latter words, it would seem that Thucydides considered the Athenians, after having adopted the expedition by their votes, to have debarred themselves from the right of complaining of those speakers who had stood forward prominently to advise the step. I do not at all concur in his opinion. The adviser of any important measure always makes himself morally responsible for its justice, usefulness, and practicability; and he very properly incurs disgrace, more or less according to the case, if it turns out to present results totally contrary to those which he had predicted. We know that the Athenian law often imposed upon the mover of a proposition not merely *moral*, but even *legal*, responsibility; a regulation of doubtful propriety under other circumstances, but which I believe to have been useful at Athens.

It must be admitted, however, to have been hard upon the advisers of this expedition, that — from the total destruction of the armament, neither generals nor soldiers returning — they were not enabled to show how much of the ruin had arisen from faults in the execution, not in the plan conceived. The speaker in the Oration of Lysias — *περὶ δημεύσεως τοῦ Νικίας ἀδελφοῦ* (Or. xviii, sect. 2) — attempts to transfer the blame from Nikias upon the advisers of the expedition, a manifest injustice.

Demosthenes (in the Oration De Coronâ, c. 73) gives an emphatic and noble statement of the responsibility which he cheerfully accepts for himself as a political speaker and adviser; responsibility for seeing the beginnings and understanding the premonitory signs of coming events, and giving

After this first burst both of grief and anger, however, they began gradually to look their actual situation in the face; and the more energetic speakers would doubtless administer the salutary lesson of reminding them how much had been achieved by their forefathers, sixty-seven years before, when the approach of Xerxes threatened them with dangers not less overwhelming. Under the peril of the moment, the energy of despair revived in their bosoms; they resolved to get together, as speedily as they could, both ships and money, — to keep watch over their allies, especially Eubœa, — and to defend themselves to the last. A Board of ten elderly men, under the title of Probûli, was named to review the expenditure, to suggest all practicable economies, and propose for the future such measures as occasion might seem to require. The propositions of these probûli were for the most part adopted, with a degree of unanimity and promptitude rarely seen in an Athenian assembly, springing out of that pressure and alarm of the moment which silenced all criticism.¹ Among other economies, the Athenians abridged the costly splendor of their choric and liturgic ceremonies at home, and brought back the recent garrison which they had established on the Laconian coast; they at the same time collected timber, commenced the construction of new ships, and fortified Cape Sunium, in order to protect their numerous transport ships in the passage from Eubœa to Peiræus.²

countrymen warning beforehand: *ἰδεῖν τὰ πράγματα ἀρχόμενα καὶ προαισθῆσθαι καὶ προειπεῖν τοῖς ἄλλοις*. This is the just view of the subject; and, applying the measure proposed by Demosthenēs, the Athenians had ample ground to be displeased with their orators.

¹ Thucyd. viii, 1. *πάντα δὲ πρὸς τὸ παραχρῆμα περιδεῖς, ὅπερ φιλεῖ ὁ ἄνθρωπος ποιεῖν, ἐτοῖμοι ἦσαν εὐτακτεῖν*; compare Xenoph. Mem. iii, 5, 5.

² Thucyd. viii, 1-4. About the functions of this Board of Probûli, much has been said for which there is no warrant in Thucydides: *τῶν τὴν πόλιν τι ἐξ εὐτέλειαν σωφρονίσαι, καὶ ἀρχὴν τινα πρεσβυτέρων ἀνδρῶν ἰλέσθαι, οἵτινες περὶ τῶν παρόντων ὡς ἂν καιρὸς ἢ προβουλεύουσιν*. Πάντα δὲ πρὸς τὸ παραχρῆμα περιδεῖς, ὅπερ φιλεῖ ὁ ἄνθρωπος ποιεῖν, ἐτοῖμοι ἦσαν εὐτακτεῖν.

Upon which Dr. Arnold remarks: "That is, no measure was to be submitted to the people, till it had first been approved by this council of elders." And such is the general view of the commentators.

No such meaning as this, however, is necessarily contained in the word

While Athens was thus struggling to make head against her misfortunes, all the rest of Greece was full of excitement and aggressive scheming against her. So vast an event as the destruction of this great armament had never happened since the expedition of Xerxes against Greece. It not only roused the most distant cities of the Grecian world, but also the Persian satraps and the court of Susa. It stimulated the enemies of Athens to redoubled activity; it emboldened her subject-allies to revolt; it pushed the neutral states, who all feared what she would have done if successful against Syracuse, now to declare war against her, and put the finishing stroke to her power as well as to her ambition. All of them, enemies, subjects, and neutrals, alike believed that the doom of Athens was sealed, and

Πρόβουλοι. It is, indeed, conceivable that persons so denominated might be invested with such a control; but we cannot infer it, or affirm it, simply from the name. Nor will the passages in Aristotle's Politics, wherein the word *Πρόβουλοι* occurs, authorize any inference with respect to this Board in the special case of Athens (Aristotel. Politic. iv, 11, 9; iv, 12, 8; vi, 5, 10-13).

The Board only seems to have lasted for a short time at Athens, being named for a temporary purpose, at a moment of peculiar pressure and discouragement. During such a state of feeling, there was little necessity for throwing additional obstacles in the way of new propositions to be made to the people. It was rather of importance to encourage the suggestion of new measures, from men of sense and experience. A Board destined merely for control and hindrance, would have been mischievous instead of useful under the reigning melancholy at Athens.

The Board was doubtless merged in the Oligarchy of Four Hundred, like all the other magistracies of the state, and was not reconstituted after their deposition.

I cannot think it admissible to draw inferences as to the functions of this Board of Probûli now constituted, from the proceedings of the Probûlus in Aristophanes' *Lysistrata*, as is done by Wachsmuth (*Hellenische Alterthumskunde*, i, 2, p. 198), and by Wattenbach (*De Quadringentorum Athenis Factione*, pp. 17-21, Berlin 1842).

Schömann (*Ant. Jur. Pub. Græcor.* v xii, p. 181) says of these *Πρόβουλοι*: "*Videtur autem eorum potestas fere annua fuisse*." I do not distinctly understand what he means by these words; whether he means that the Board continued permanent, but that the members were annually changed. If this be his meaning, I dissent from it. I think that the Board lasted until the time of the Four Hundred, which would be about a year and a half after its first institution.

that the coming spring would see her captured. Earlier than the ensuing spring, the Lacedæmonians did not feel disposed to act; but they sent round their instructions to the allies for operations both by land and sea to be then commenced; all these allies being prepared to do their best, in hopes that this effort would be the last required from them, and the most richly rewarded. A fleet of one hundred triremes was directed to be prepared against the spring; fifty of these being imposed in equal proportion on the Lacedæmonians themselves and the Bœotians; fifteen on Corinth; fifteen on the Phocians and Lokrians; ten on the Arcadians, with Pellênê and Sikyon; ten on Megara, Troezen, Epidaurus, and Hermionê. It seems to have been considered that these ships might be built and launched during the interval between September and March.¹ The same large hopes, which had worked upon men's minds at the beginning of the war, were now again rife in the bosoms of the Peloponnesians;² the rather as that powerful force from Sicily, which they had then been disappointed in obtaining, might now be anticipated with tolerable assurance as really forthcoming.³

From the smaller allies, contributions in money were exacted for the intended fleet by Agis, who moved about during this autumn with a portion of the garrison of Dekeleia. In the course of his circuit, he visited the town of Herakleia, near the Maliac gulf, and levied large contributions on the neighboring Ceteans, in reprisal for the plunder which they had taken from that town, as well as from the Phthiot Achæans and other subjects of the Thessalians, though the latter vainly entered their protest against his proceedings.⁴

It was during the march of Agis through Bœotia that the inhabitants of Eubœa — probably of Chalkis and Eretria — applied to him, entreating his aid to enable them to revolt from Athens; which he readily promised, sending for Alkamenês at the head of three hundred Neodamode hoplites from Sparta, to

¹ Thucyd. viii, 2, 3. Λακεδαιμόνιοι δὲ τὴν πρόσκαιρὴν ταῖς πόλεσιν ἑκατὸν ἑξῶν τῆς ναυπηγίας ἐποιούνοιο, etc.; compare also c. 4 — παρισκευάζοντες τὴν ναυπηγίαν, etc.

² Thucyd. viii, 5. ὧντων οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἢ ὥσπερ ἀρχομένων ἐν κατασκευῇ τοῦ πολέμου: compare ii, 7.

³ Thucyd. viii, 2: compare ii, 7; iii, 86.

⁴ Thucyd. viii, 3.

be despatched across to the island as harmost. Having a force permanently at his disposal, with full liberty of military action, the Spartan king at Dekeleia was more influential even than the authorities at home, so that the disaffected allies of Athens addressed themselves in preference to him. It was not long before envoys from Lesbos visited him for this purpose. So powerfully was their claim enforced by the Bœotians (their kinsmen of the Æolic race), who engaged to furnish ten triremes for their aid, provided Agis would send ten others, that he was induced to postpone his promise to the Eubœans, and to direct Alkamenês as harmost to Lesbos instead of Eubœa,² without at all consulting the authorities at Sparta.

The threatened revolt of Lesbos and Eubœa, especially the latter, was a vital blow to the empire of Athens. But this was not the worst. At the same time that these two islands were negotiating with Agis, envoys from Chios, the first and most powerful of all Athenian allies, had gone to Sparta for the same purpose. The government of Chios, — an oligarchy, but distinguished for its prudent management and caution in avoiding risks, — considering Athens to be now on the verge of ruin, even in the estimation of the Athenians themselves, thought itself safe, together with the opposite city of Erythræ, in taking measures for achieving independence.³

Besides these three great allies, whose example in revolting was sure to be followed by others, Athens was now on the point of being assailed by other enemies yet more unexpected, the two Persian satraps of the Asiatic seaboard, Tissaphernes and Pharnabazus. No sooner was the Athenian catastrophe in Sicily known at the court of Susa, than the Great King claimed from these two satraps the tribute due from the Asiatic Greeks on the coast; for which they had always stood enrolled in the tribute records, though it had never been actually levied since the complete establishment of the Athenian empire. The only way to realize this tribute, for which the satraps were thus made debtors, was to detach the towns from Athens, and break up her empire;⁴

¹ Thucyd. viii, 5.

² Thucyd. viii, 7-24.

³ Thucyd. viii, 5. Ὑπὸ συνθέως γὰρ νεώσσι ἐτύχχανε πεπραγμένοι (Tissaphernes) τοὺς ἐκ τῆς αὐτοῦ ἀρχῆς φόρους, οὓς δὲ Ἀθηναίους ἀπὸ τῶν

for which purpose Tissaphernes sent an envoy to Sparta, in conjunction with those of the Chians and Erythræans. He invited the Lacedæmonians to conclude an alliance with the Great King, for joint operations against the Athenian empire in Asia; promising to furnish pay and maintenance for any forces which they might send, at the rate of one drachma per day for each man of the ship's crews.¹ He farther hoped by means of this aid to reduce Amorgês the revolted son of the late satrap Pissuthnês, who was established in the strong maritime town of Iasus, with a Grecian mercenary force and a considerable treasure, and was in alliance with Athens. The Great King had sent down a peremptory mandate, that Amorgês should be either brought prisoner to Susa or slain.

At the same moment, though without any concert, there arrived at Sparta Kalligeitus and Timagoras, two Grecian exiles in the service of Pharnabazus, bringing propositions of a similar character from that satrap, whose government² comprehended the coast lands north of Æolis, from the Euxine and Propontis, to the northeast corner of the Egeatic gulf. Eager to have the assistance of a Lacedæmonian fleet in order to detach the Hellespontine Greeks from Athens, and realize the tribute required by the court of Susa, Pharnabazus was at the same time desirous of forestalling Tissaphernes as the medium of alliance between Sparta and the Great King. The two missions having thus arrived simultaneously at Sparta, a strong competition arose between them, one striving to attract the projected expedition to Chios, the other to the Hellespont;³ for which latter purpose, Kalligeitus

Ἑλληνίδων πόλεων οὐ δυνάμενος πρᾶσσεισθαι ἐπωφειλήσε. Τους τε οὖν φόρους μᾶλλον ἐνόμιζε κομίζεισθαι κακῶς τοὺς Ἀθηναίους, etc.

I have already discussed this important passage at some length, in its bearing upon the treaty concluded thirty-seven years before this time between Athens and Persia. See the note to volume v, chap. xlv, pp. 337-339, of this History.

¹ Thucyd. viii, 29. Καὶ μηνὸς μὲν τροφὴν, ὡς περ ὑπέστη ἐν τῇ Ἀσπιδαιμονί, ἐς δραχμὴν Ἀττικὴν ἐκάστη πάσαις ταῖς ναυσὶ διέδωκε, τοῦ δὲ λοιποῦ χρόνου ἐβούλετο ἡρώβολον δίδοναι, etc.

² The satrapy of Tissaphernes extended as far north as Antandros and Adramyttium (Thucyd. viii, 108).

³ Thucyd. viii, 6.

had brought twenty-five talents, which he tendered as a first payment in part.

From all quarters, new enemies were thus springing up against Athens in the hour of her distress, and the Lacedæmonians had only to choose which they would prefer; a choice in which they were much guided by the exile Alkibiadês. It so happened that his family friend Endius was at this moment one of the board of ephors; while his personal enemy king Agis, with whose wife Timæa he carried on an intrigue,¹ was absent in command at Dekeleia. Knowing well the great power and importance of Chios, Alkibiadês strenuously exhorted the Spartan authorities to devote their first attention to that island. A pericæus named Phrynus, being sent thither to examine whether the resources alleged by the envoys were really forthcoming, brought back a satisfactory report, that the Chian fleet was not less than sixty triremes strong: upon which the Lacedæmonians concluded an alliance with Chios and Erythræ, engaging to send a fleet of forty sail to their aid. Ten of these triremes, now ready in the Lacedæmonian ports — probably at Gythium — were directed immediately to sail to Chios, under the admiral Melanchridas. It seems to have been now midwinter; but Alkibiadês, and still more the Chian envoys, insisted on the necessity of prompt action, for fear that the Athenians should detect the intrigue. However, an earthquake just then intervening, was construed by the Spartans as an index of divine displeasure, so that they would not persist in sending either the same commander or the same ships. Chalkideus was named to supersede Melanchridas, while five new ships were directed to be equipped, so as to be ready to sail in the early spring along with the larger fleet from Corinth.²

As soon as spring arrived, three Spartan commissioners were sent to Corinth — in compliance with the pressing instances of the Chian envoys — to transport across the isthmus from the Corinthian to the Saronic gulf, the thirty-nine triremes now in the Corinthian port of Lechæum. It was at first proposed to send off all, at one and the same time, to Chios, even those which Agis had been equipping for the assistance of Lesbos; although Kalik-

¹ Thucyd. viii, 6-12, Plutarch, Alkibiad. c. 23, 24, Cornelius Nepos, Alkibiad. c. 3.

² Thucyd. viii, 6.

geitus declined any concern with Chios, and refused to contribute for this purpose any of the money which he had brought. A general synod of deputies from the allies was held at Corinth, wherein it was determined, with the concurrence of Agis, to despatch the fleet first to Chios, under Chalkideus; next, to Lesbos, under Alkamenês; lastly, to the Hellespont, under Klearchus. But it was judged expedient to divide the fleet, and bring across twenty-one triremes out of the thirty-nine, so as to distract the attention of Athens, and divide her means of resistance. So low was the estimate formed of these means, that the Lacedæmonians did not scruple to despatch their expedition openly from the Saronic gulf, where the Athenians would have full knowledge both of its numbers and of its movements.¹

Hardly had the twenty-one triremes, however, been brought across to Kenchreæ, when a fresh delay arose to obstruct their departure. The Isthmian festival, celebrated every alternate year, and kept especially holy by the Corinthians, was just approaching; nor would they consent to begin any military operations until it was concluded, though Agis tried to elude their scruples by offering to adopt the intended expedition as his own. It was during the delay which thus ensued that the Athenians were first led to conceive suspicions about Chios, whither they despatched Aristokratês, one of the generals of the year. The Chian authorities strenuously denied all projects of revolt, and being required by Aristokratês to furnish some evidence of their good faith, sent back along with him seven triremes to the aid of Athens. It was much against their own will that they were compelled thus to act; but they knew that the Chian people were in general averse to the idea of revolting from Athens, nor did they feel confidence enough to proclaim their secret designs without some manifestation of support from Peloponnesus, which had been so much delayed that they knew not when it would arrive. The Athenians, in their present state of weakness, perhaps thought it prudent to accept insufficient assurances, for fear of driving this powerful island to open revolt. But during the Isthmian festival, to which they were invited along with other Greeks, they discovered farther evidences of the plot which was going

¹ Thucyd. viii, 8

on, and resolved to keep strict watch on the motions of the fleet now assembled at Kenchreæ, suspecting that this squadron was intended to second the revolting party in Chios.¹

Shortly after the Isthmian festival, the squadron actually started from Kenchreæ to Chios, under Alkamenês; but an equal number of Athenian ships watched them as they sailed along the shore, and tried to tempt them farther out to sea, with a view to fight them. Alkamenês, however, desirous of avoiding a battle, thought it best to return back; upon which the Athenians also returned to Peiræus, mistrusting the fidelity of the seven Chian triremes which formed part of their fleet. Reappearing presently with a larger squadron of thirty-seven triremes, they pursued Alkamenês, who had again begun his voyage along the shore southward, and attacked him near the uninhabited harbor called Peiræum, on the frontiers of Corinth and Epidaurus. They here gained a victory, captured one of his ships, and damaged or disabled most of the remainder. Alkamenês himself was slain, and the ships were run ashore, where on the morrow the Pelo-

¹ Thucyd. viii, 10. 'Εν δὲ τούτῳ τὸ Ἰσθμια ἐγένετο· καὶ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι (ἐπηγγέλθησαν γὰρ) ἐθεώρουν ἐς αὐτὰ· καὶ καταδύλα μᾶλλον αὐτοῖς τὰ τῶν Χίων ἐφάνη.

The language of Thucydides in this passage deserves notice. The Athenians were now at enmity with Corinth: it was therefore remarkable, and contrary to what would be expected among Greeks, that they should be present with their theôry, or solemn sacrifice, at the Isthmian festival. Accordingly Thucydides, when he mentions that they went thither, thinks it right to add the explanation — ἐπηγγέλθησαν γὰρ — "for they had been invited;" "for the festival truce had been formally signified to them." That the heralds who proclaimed the truce should come and proclaim it to a state in hostility with Corinth, was something unusual, and merited special notice: otherwise, Thucydides would never have thought it worth while to mention the proclamation, it being the uniform practice.

We must recollect that this was the first Isthmian festival which had taken place since the resumption of the war between Athens and the Peloponnesian alliance. The habit of leaving out Athens from the Corinthian herald's proclamation had not yet been renewed. In regard to the Isthmian festival, there was probably greater reluctance to leave her out, because that festival was in its origin half Athenian, said to have been established, or revived after interruption, by Theseus, and the Athenian theôry enjoyed a *προεδρία*, or privileged place, at the games (Plutarch Theseus, c. 25; Argument ad Pindar Isthm. Schol.)

ponnesian land-force arrived in sufficient numbers to defend them. So inconvenient, however, was their station on this desert spot, that they at first determined to burn the vessels and depart. Nor was it without difficulty that they were induced, partly by the instances of king Agis, to guard the ships until an opportunity could be found for eluding the blockading Athenian fleet; a part of which still kept watch off the shore, while the rest were stationed at a neighboring islet.¹

The Spartan ephors had directed Alkamenês, at the moment of his departure from Kenchræa, to despatch a messenger to Sparta, in order that the five triremes under Chalkideus and Alkibiadês might leave Laconia at the same moment. And these latter appear to have been actually under way, when a second messenger brought the news of the defeat and death of Alkamenês at Peiræum. Besides the discouragement arising from such a check at the outset of their plans against Ionia, the ephors thought it impossible to begin operations with so small a squadron as five triremes, so that the departure of Chalkideus was for the present countermanded. This resolution, perfectly natural to adopt, was only reversed at the strenuous instance of the Athenian exile Alkibiadês, who urged them to permit Chalkideus and himself to start forthwith. Small as the squadron was, yet as it would reach Chios before the defeat at Peiræum became public, it might be passed off as the precursor of the main fleet; while he (Alkibiadês) pledged himself to procure the revolt of Chios and the other Ionic cities, through his personal connection with the leading men, who would repose confidence in his assurances of the helplessness of Athens, as well as of the thorough determination of Sparta to stand by them. To these arguments, Alkibiadês added an appeal to the personal vanity of Endius; whom he instigated to assume for himself the glory of liberating Ionia as well as of first commencing the Persian alliance, instead of leaving this enterprise to king Agis.¹

By these arguments—assisted doubtless by his personal influence, since his advice respecting Gylippus and respecting Dekeleia had turned out so successful—Alkibiadês obtained the consent of the Spartan ephors, and sailed along with Chalkideus in

¹ Thucyd. viii, 11.

² Thucyd. viii, 12.

the five triremes to Chios. Nothing less than his energy and ascendancy could have extorted from men both dull and backward, a determination apparently so rash, yet, in spite of such appearance, admirably conceived, and of the highest importance. Had the Chians waited for the fleet now blocked up at Peiræum, their revolt would at least have been long delayed, and perhaps might not have occurred at all: the accomplishment of that revolt by the little squadron of Alkibiadês was the proximate cause of all the Spartan successes in Ionia, and was ultimately the means even of disengaging the fleet at Peiræum, by distracting the attention of Athens. So well did this unprincipled exile, while playing the game of Sparta, know where to inflict the dangerous wounds upon his country!

There was, indeed, little danger in crossing the Ægean to Ionia, with ever so small a squadron; for Athens in her present destitute condition had no fleet there, and although Strombichidês was detached with eight triremes from the blockading fleet off Peiræum, to pursue Chalkideus and Alkibiadês as soon as their departure was known, he was far behind them, and soon returned without success. To keep their voyage secret, they detained the boats and vessels which they met, and did not liberate them, until they reached Korykus in Asia Minor, the mountainous land southward of Erythræ. They were here visited by their leading partisans from Chios, who urged them to sail thither at once before their arrival could be proclaimed. Accordingly, they reached the town of Chios—on the eastern coast of the island, immediately opposite to Erythræ on the continent—to the astonishment and dismay of every one, except the oligarchical plotters who had invited them. By the contrivance of these latter, the council was found just assembling, so that Alkibiadês was admitted without delay, and invited to state his case. Suppressing all mention of the defeat at Peiræum, he represented his squadron as the foremost of a large Lacedæmonian fleet actually at sea and approaching, and affirmed Athens to be now helpless by sea as well as by land, incapable of maintaining any farther hold upon her allies. Under these impressions, and while the population were yet under their first impulse of surprise and alarm, the oligarchical council took the resolution of revolting. The example was followed by Erythræ, and soon after-

wards by Klazomenæ, determined by three triremes from Chios. The Klazomenians had hitherto dwelt upon an islet close to the continent; on which latter, however, a portion of their town, called Polichnê, was situated, which they now resolved, in anticipation of attack from Athens, to fortify as their main residence. Both the Chians and Erythræans also actively employed themselves in fortifying their towns and preparing for war.¹

In reviewing this account of the revolt of Chios, we find occasion to repeat remarks already suggested by previous revolts of other allies of Athens, — Lesbos, Akanthus, Torônê, Mendê, Amphipolis, etc. Contrary to what is commonly intimated by historians, we may observe first, that Athens did not systematically interfere to impose her own democratical government upon her allies; next, that the empire of Athens, though upheld mainly by an established belief in her superior force, was nevertheless by no means odious, nor the proposition of revolting from her acceptable to the general population of her allies. She had at this moment no force in Ionia; and the oligarchical government of Chios, wishing to revolt, was only prevented from openly declaring its intention by the reluctance of its own population, a reluctance which it overcame partly by surprise arising from the sudden arrival of Alkibiadês and Chalkideus, partly by the fallacious assurance of a still greater Peloponnesian force approaching.² Nor would the Chian oligarchy themselves have determined to revolt, had they not been persuaded that such was now the safer course, inasmuch as Athens was now ruined, and

¹ Thucyd. viii, 14.

² Thucyd. viii, 9. Αἰτίων δ' ἐγένετο τῆς ἀποστολῆς τῶν νεῶν, οἱ μὲν πολλοὶ τῶν Χίων οὐκ εἰδότες τὰ πρᾶσσόμενα, οἱ δ' ὀλιγοὶ ξυνειδότες, τό τε πλῆθος οὐ βουλευόμενοι πῶς πολέμιον ἔχειν, πρὶν τι καὶ ἰσχυρὸν λάβωσι, καὶ τοὺς Πελοποννησίουσιν οὐκέτι προσδεχόμενοι ἦσαν, ὅτι διετρίβον.

Also viii, 14. Ὁ δὲ Ἀλκιβιάδης καὶ ὁ Χαλκιδεύς.....προϋγγενομένοι τῶν συμπρασσόντων Χίων τισὶ, καὶ κελευόντων καταπλεῖν μὴ προεῖπονται ἐκ τῆς πόλεως, ἀφικνούμενοι ἀφ' ἑαυτοῦ τοῖς Χίοις. Καὶ οἱ μὲν πολλοὶ ἐν θαύματι ἦσαν καὶ ἐκπλήξαι· τοῖς δὲ ὀλίγοις παρεσκεύαστο ὅστε βουλὴν τε τυχεῖν συλλεγομένην, καὶ γενομένων λόγων ἀπὸ τοῦ Ἀλκιβιάδου, ὡς ἄλλαι τε νῆες πολλαὶ προσπλεονοῦσι, καὶ τὰ περὶ τῆς πολιτείας τῶν ἐν Πειραιῶν νεῶν οὐ δῆλωσαντων, ἀφίστανται Χίοι, καὶ αὐτοὶ Ἐρυθραῖοι, Ἀθηναίων.

her power to protect, not less than her power to oppress, at an end.¹ The envoys of Tissaphernês had accompanied those of Chios to Sparta, so that the Chian government saw plainly that the misfortunes of Athens had only the effect of reviving the aggressions and pretensions of their former foreign master, against whom Athens had protected them for the last fifty years. We may well doubt, therefore, whether this prudent government looked upon the change as on the whole advantageous. But they had no motive to stand by Athens in her misfortunes, and good policy seemed now to advise a timely union with Sparta as the preponderant force. The sentiment entertained towards Athens by her allies, as I have before observed, was more negative than positive. It was favorable rather than otherwise, in the minds of the general population, to whom she caused little actual hardship or oppression; but averse, to a certain extent, in the minds of their leading men, since she wounded their dignity, and offended that love of town autonomy which was instinctive in the Grecian political mind.

The revolt of Chios, speedily proclaimed, filled every man at Athens with dismay. It was the most fearful symptom, as well as the heaviest aggravation, of their fallen condition; especially as there was every reason to apprehend that the example of this first and greatest among the allies would be soon followed by the rest. The Athenians had no fleet or force even to attempt its reconquest: but they now felt the full importance of that reserve of one thousand talents, which Perikles had set aside in the first year of the war against the special emergency of a hostile fleet approaching Peiræus. The penalty of death had been decreed against any one who should propose to devote this fund to any other purpose; and, in spite of severe financial pressure, it had remained untouched for twenty years. Now, however, though the special contingency foreseen had not yet arisen, matters were come to such an extremity, that the only chance of saving the remaining empire was by the appropriation of this money. An unanimous vote was accordingly passed to abrogate the penal enactment, or standing order, against proposing any other mode

¹ See the remarkable passage of Thucyd. viii, 24, about the calculations of the Chian government.

of appropriation; after which the resolution was taken to devote this money to present necessities.¹

By means of this new fund, they were enabled to find pay and equipment for all the triremes ready or nearly ready in their harbor, and thus to spare a portion from their blockading fleet off Peiræum; out of which Strombichidês with his squadron of eight triremes was despatched immediately to Ionia; followed, after a short interval, by Thrasyklês, with twelve others. At the same time, the seven Chian triremes which also formed part of this fleet, were cleared of their crews; among whom such as were slaves were liberated, while the freemen were put in custody. Besides fitting out an equal number of fresh ships to keep up the numbers of the blockading fleet, the Athenians worked with the utmost ardor to get ready thirty additional triremes. The extreme exigency of the situation, since Chios had revolted, was felt by every one: yet with all their efforts, the force which they were enabled to send was at first lamentably inadequate. Strombichidês, arriving at Samos, and finding Chios, Erythræ, and Klazomenæ already in revolt, reinforced his little squadron with one Samian trireme, and sailed to Teos,—on the continent, at the southern coast of that isthmus, of which Klazomenæ is on the northern,—in hopes of preserving that place. But he had not been long there when Chalkideus arrived from Chios with twenty-three triremes, all or mostly Chian; while the forces of Erythræ and Klazomenæ approached by land. Strombichidês was obliged to make a hasty flight back to Samos, vainly pursued by the Chian fleet. Upon this evidence of Athenian weakness, and the superiority of the enemy, the Teians admitted into their town the land-force without; by the help of which, they now demolished the wall formerly built by Athens to protect the city against attack from the interior. Some of the troops of Tissaphernes lending their aid in the demolition, the town was laid altogether open to the satrap; who, moreover, came himself shortly afterwards to complete the work.²

Having themselves revolted from Athens, the Chian government were prompted by considerations of their own safety to instigate revolt in all other Athenian dependencies; and Alkibiadês

¹ Thucyd. viii, 15.

² Thucyd. viii, 16.

now took advantage of their forwardness in the cause to make an attempt on Miletus. He was eager to acquire this important city, the first among all the continental allies of Athens, by his own resources and those of Chios, before the fleet could arrive from Peiræum; in order that the glory of the exploit might be insured to Endius, and not to Agis. Accordingly, he and Chalkideus left Chios with a fleet of twenty-five triremes, twenty of them Chian, together with the five which they themselves had brought from Laconia: these last five had been remanned with Chian crews, the Peloponnesian crews having been armed as hoplites and left as garrison in the island. Conducting his voyage as secretly as possible, he was fortunate enough to pass unobserved by the Athenian station at Samos, where Strombichidês had just been reinforced by Thrasyklês with the twelve fresh triremes from the blockading fleet at Peiræum. Arriving at Miletus, where he possessed established connections among the leading men, and had already laid his train, as at Chios, for revolt, Alkibiadês prevailed on them to break with Athens forthwith: so that when Strombichidês and Thrasyklês, who came in pursuit the moment they learned his movements, approached, they found the port shut against them, and were forced to take up a station on the neighboring island of Ladê. So anxious were the Chians for the success of Alkibiadês in this enterprise, that they advanced with ten fresh triremes along the Asiatic coast as far as Anava, opposite to Samos, in order to hear the result and to render aid if required. A message from Chalkideus apprized them that he was master of Miletus, and that Amorgês, the Persian ally of Athens at Iasus, was on his way at the head of an army; upon which they returned to Chios, but were unexpectedly seen in the way — off the temple of Zeus, between Lebedos and Kolophon — and pursued, by sixteen fresh ships just arrived from Athens, under the command of Diomedon. Of the ten Chian triremes, one found refuge at Ephesus, and five at Teos: the remaining four were obliged to run ashore and became prizes, though the crews all escaped. In spite of this check, however, the Chians came out again with fresh ships and some land-forces, as soon as the Athenian fleet had gone back to Samos, and procured the revolt both of Lebedos and Eræ from Athens.¹

¹ Thucyd. viii, 17-19.

It was at Milêtus, immediately after the revolt, that the first treaty was concluded between Tissaphernês, on behalf of himself and the Great King, and Chalkideus, for Sparta and her allies. Probably the aid of Tissaphernês was considered necessary to maintain the town, when the Athenian fleet was watching it so closely on the neighboring island: at least it is difficult to explain otherwise an agreement so eminently dishonorable as well as disadvantageous to the Greeks. —

"The Lacedæmonians and their allies have concluded alliance with the Great King and Tissaphernês, on the following conditions: The king shall possess whatever territories and cities he himself had, or his predecessors had before him. The king, and the Lacedæmonians with their allies, shall jointly hinder the Athenians from deriving either money or other advantages from all those cities which have hitherto furnished to them any such. They shall jointly carry on war against the Athenians, and shall not renounce the war against them, except by joint consent. Whoever shall revolt from the king, shall be treated as an enemy by the Lacedæmonians and their allies; whoever shall revolt from the Lacedæmonians, shall in like manner be treated as an enemy by the king."¹

As a first step to the execution of this treaty, Milêtus was handed over to Tissaphernês, who immediately caused a citadel to be erected and placed a garrison within it.² If fully carried out, indeed, the terms of the treaty would have made the Great King master not only of all the Asiatic Greeks and all the islanders in the Ægean, but also of all Thessaly and Boeotia, and the full ground which had once been covered by Xerxes.³ Besides this monstrous stipulation, the treaty farther bound the Lacedæmonians to aid the king in keeping enslaved any Greeks who might be under his dominion. Nor did it, on the other hand, secure to them any pecuniary aid from him for the payment of their armament, which was their great motive for courting his alliance. We shall find the Lacedæmonian authorities themselves hereafter refusing to ratify the treaty, on the ground of its exorbitant concessions. But it stands as a melancholy evidence of the new

¹ Thucyd. viii. 18.

² Thucyd. viii. 41.

³ Thucyd. viii. 84-109.

source of mischief now opening upon the Asiatic and insular Greeks, the moment that the empire of Athens was broken up, the revived pretensions of their ancient lord and master; whom nothing had hitherto kept in check, for the last fifty years, except Athens, first as representative and executive agent, next as successor and mistress, of the confederacy of Delos. We thus see against what evils Athens had hitherto protected them: we shall presently see, what is partially disclosed in this very treaty, the manner in which Sparta realized her promise of conferring autonomy on each separate Grecian state.

The great stress of the war had now been transferred to Ionia and the Asiatic side of the Ægean sea. The enemies of Athens had anticipated that her entire empire in that quarter would fall an easy prey: yet in spite of two such serious defections as Chios and Milêtus, she showed an unexpected energy in keeping hold of the remainder. Her great and capital station, from the present time to the end of the war, was Samos; and a revolution which now happened, insuring the fidelity of that island to her alliance, was a condition indispensable to her power of maintaining the struggle in Ionia.

We have heard nothing about Samos throughout the whole war, since its reconquest by the Athenians after the revolt of 440 B.C.: but we now find it under the government of an oligarchy called the Geômorî, the proprietors of land, as at Syracuse before the rule of Gelon. It cannot be doubted that these geômorî were disposed to follow the example of the Chian oligarchy, and revolt from Athens, while the people at Samos, as at Chios, were averse to such a change. Under this state of circumstances, the Chian oligarchy had themselves conspired with Sparta, to trick and constrain their Demos by surprise into revolt, through the aid of five Peloponnesian ships. The like would have happened at Samos, had the people remained quiet. But they profited by the recent warning, forestalled the designs of their oligarchy, and rose in insurrection, with the help of three Athenian triremes which then chanced to be in the port. The oligarchy were completely defeated, but not without a violent and bloody struggle; two hundred of them being slain, and four hundred banished. This revolution secured — and probably nothing less than a democratical revolution could have secured, under the existing

state of Hellenic affairs — the adherence of Samos to the Athenians; who immediately recognized the new democracy, and granted to it the privilege of an equal and autonomous ally. The Samian people confiscated and divided among themselves the property of such of the *geōmori* as were slain or banished; the remainder were deprived of all political privileges, and were even forbidden to intermarry with any of the families of the remaining citizens.⁹ We may fairly suspect that this latter prohibition is

¹ Thucyd. viii, 21. Ἐγένετο δὲ κατὰ τὸν χρόνον τούτον καὶ ἡ ἐν Σάμῳ ἐπανάστασις ἐπὶ τοῦ δήμου τοῖς δυνατοῖς, μετὰ Ἀθηναίων, οἱ ἔτυχον ἐν τρισὶ ναυσὶ παρόντες. Καὶ ὁ δῆμος ὁ Σαμίων ἐς διακοσίους μὲν τινὰς τοὺς πάντας τῶν δυνατῶν ἀπέκτεινε, τετρακοσίους δὲ φυγῇ ζῆντιώσαντες, καὶ αὐτοὶ τὴν γῆν αὐτῶν καὶ οἰκίαν νεμῶμενοι, Ἀθηναίων τε σφίσιν αὐτονομίαν μετὰ ταῦτα ὡς βεβαίοις ἤδη ψηφισαμένων, τὰ λοιπὰ δῶκον τὴν πόλιν, καὶ τοῖς γεωμόροις μετεδίδοσαν οὔτε ἄλλον οὐδενός, οὔτε ἐκδοῦναι οὐδ' ἀγαγεῖσθαι παρ' ἐκείνων οὐδ' ἐξ ἐκείνων οὐδενὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ δήμου ἔξην.

² Thucyd. viii, 21. The dispositions and plans of the "higher people" at Samos, to call in the Peloponnesians and revolt from Athens, are fully admitted even by Mr. Mitford, and implied by Dr. Thirlwall, who argues that the government of Samos cannot have been oligarchical, because, if it had been so, the island would already have revolted from Athens to the Peloponnesians.

Mr. Mitford says (ch. xix, sect. iii, vol. iv, p. 191): "Meanwhile the body of the higher people at Samos, more depressed than all others since their reduction on their former revolt, were proposing to seize the opportunity that seemed to offer through the prevalence of the Peloponnesian arms, of mending their condition. The lower people, having intelligence of their design, rose upon them, and, with the assistance of the crews of three Athenian ships then at Samos, overpowered them," etc. etc. etc.

"The massacre and robbery were rewarded by a decree of the Athenian people, granting to the perpetrators the independent administration of the affairs of their island; which, since the last rebellion, had been kept under the immediate control of the Athenian government."

To call this a massacre is perversion of language. It was an insurrection and intestine conflict, in which the "higher people" were vanquished, but of which they also were the beginners, by their conspiracy — which Mr. Mitford himself admits as a fact — to introduce a foreign enemy into the island. Does he imagine that the "lower people" were bound to sit still and see this done? And what means had they of preventing it, except by insurrection; which inevitably became bloody, because the "higher people" were a strong party, in possession of the powers of government, with great means of resistance. The loss on the part of the assailants is not made known to us, nor indeed the loss in so far as it fell on the followers of the

only the retaliation of a similar exclusion which the oligarchy, when in power, had enforced to maintain the purity of their own

geōmori. Thucydides specifies only the number of the *geōmori* themselves, who were persons of individual importance.

I do not clearly understand what idea Mr. Mitford forms to himself of the government of Samos at this time. He seems to conceive it as democratical, yet under great immediate control from Athens, and that it kept the "higher people" in a state of severe depression, from which they sought to relieve themselves by the aid of the Peloponnesian arms.

But if he means by the expression, "*under the immediate control of the Athenian government*," that there was any Athenian governor or garrison at Samos, the account here given by Thucydides distinctly refutes him. The conflict was between two intestine parties, "the higher people and the lower people." The only Athenians who took part in it were the crews of three triremes, and even they were there by accident (οἱ ἔτυχον παρόντες), not as a regular garrison. Samos was under an indigenous government; but it was a subject and tributary ally of Athens, like all the other allies, with the exception of Chios and Methymna (Thucyd. vi, 85). After this resolution, the Athenians raised it to the rank of an autonomous ally, which Mr. Mitford is pleased to call "rewarding massacre and robbery," in the language of a party orator rather than of an historian.

But was the government of Samos, immediately before this intestine contest, oligarchical or democratical? The language of Thucydides carries to my mind a full conviction that it was oligarchical, under an exclusive aristocracy, called The *Geōmori*. Dr. Thirlwall, however (whose candid and equitable narrative of this event forms a striking contrast to that of Mr. Mitford), is of a different opinion. He thinks it certain that a democratical government had been established at Samos by the Athenians, when it was reconquered by them (B.C. 440) after its revolt. That the government continued democratical during the first years of the Peloponnesian war, he conceives to be proved by the hostility of the Samian exiles at Anaea, whom he looks upon as oligarchical refugees. And though not agreeing in Mr. Mitford's view of the peculiarly depressed condition of the "higher people" at Samos at this later time, he nevertheless thinks that they were not actually in possession of the government. "Still (he says), as the island gradually recovered its prosperity, the privileged class seems also to have looked upward, perhaps contrived to regain a part of the substance of power under different forms, and probably betrayed a strong inclination to revive its ancient pretensions on the first opportunity. That it had not yet advanced beyond this point, may be regarded as certain; because otherwise Samos would have been among the foremost to revolt from Athens: and on the other hand, it is no less clear, that the state of parties there was such as to excite a high degree of mutual jealousy, and great alarm in the Athenians, to whom the loss of the island at this juncture would have

blood. What they had enacted as a privilege was now thrown back upon them as an insult.

been almost irreparable." (Hist. of Gr. ch. xxvii, vol. iii, p. 477 2d edit.) Manso (Sparta, book iv, vol. ii, p. 266) is of the same opinion.

Surely, the conclusion which Dr. Thirlwall here announces as certain, cannot be held to rest on adequate premises. Admitting that there was an oligarchy in power at Samos, it is perfectly possible to explain why this oligarchy had not yet carried into act its disposition to revolt from Athens. We see that none of the allies of Athens — not even Chios, the most powerful of all — revolted without the extraneous pressure and encouragement of a foreign fleet. Alkibiadēs, after securing Chios, considered Milētus to be next in order of importance, and had, moreover, peculiar connections with the leading men there (viii, 17); so that he went next to detach that place from Athens. Milētus, being on the continent, placed him in immediate communication with Tissaphernēs, for which reason he might naturally deem it of importance superior even to Samos in his plans. Moreover, not only no foreign fleet had yet reached Samos, but several Athenian ships had arrived there: for Strombichidēs, having come across the Aegean too late to save Chios, made Samos a sort of central station (viii, 16). These circumstances combined with the known reluctance of the Samian demos, or commonalty, are surely sufficient to explain why the Samian oligarchy had not yet consummated its designs to revolt. And hence the fact, that no revolt had yet taken place, cannot be held to warrant Dr. Thirlwall's inference, that the government was *not* oligarchical.

We have no information how or when the oligarchical government at Samos got up. That the Samian refugees at Anaea, so actively hostile to Samos and Athens during the first ten years of the Peloponnesian war, were oligarchical exiles acting against a democratical government at Samos (iv, 75), is not in itself improbable; yet it is not positively stated. The government of Samos might have been, even at that time, oligarchical: yet, if it acted in the Athenian interest, there would doubtless be a body of exiles watching for opportunities of injuring it, by aid of the enemies of Athens.

Moreover, it seems to me, that if we read and put together the passages of Thucydides, viii, 21, 63, 73, it is impossible without the greatest violence to put any other sense upon them, except as meaning that the government of Samos was now in the hands of the oligarchy, or *geōmori*, and that the Demos rose in insurrection against them, with ultimate triumph. The natural sense of the words *ἐπαναστασις*, *ἐπανασταται*, is that of *insurrection against an established government*: it does not mean, "a violent attack by one party upon another;" still less does it mean, "an attack made by a party in possession of the government;" which nevertheless it ought to mean, if Dr. Thirlwall be correct in supposing that the Samian government was now democratical. Thus we have, in the description of the Samian revolt from Athens — Thucyd. i, 115 (after Thucydides has stated that the Athe-

On the other hand, the Athenian blockading fleet was surprised and defeated, with the loss of four triremes, by the Peloponnesian

nians established a democratical government, he next says that the Samian exiles presently came over with a mercenary force) — καὶ πρῶτον μὲν τῷ δῆμῳ ἐπ' ἀνέστησαν, καὶ ἐκρατήσαν τῶν πλείστων, etc. Again, v, 23 — about the apprehended insurrection of the Helots against the Spartans — ἥν δὲ ἡ δουλεία ἐπ' ἀνίστηται: compare Xenoph. Hellen. v, 4, 19; Plato, Republ. iv, 18, p. 444; Herodot. iii, 39–120. So also *δυνατοὶ* is among the words which Thucydides uses for an oligarchical party, either in government or in what may be called *opposition* (i, 24; v, 4). But it is not conceivable to me that Thucydides would have employed the words *ἡ ἐπαναστασις ἐπὶ τοῦ δήμου τοῖς δυνατοῖς* — if the Demos had at that time been actually in the government.

Again, viii, 63, he says, that the Athenian oligarchical party under Peisander αἰτῶν τῶν Σαμίων προέβριμναντο τοὺς δυνατοὺς ὥστε πεῖρᾶσθαι μετὰ σόφῳ ὀλιγαρχεῖν, καὶ περὶ ἐπαναστάντας αὐτοὺς ἀλλήλοις ἵνα μὴ ὀλιγαρχῶνται. Here the motive of the previous *ἐπαναστασις* is clearly noted: it was in order that they might *not* be under an oligarchical government: for I agree with Krüger (in opposition to Dr. Thirlwall), that this is the clear meaning of the words, and that the use of the present tense prevents our construing it, "in order that their democratical government might not be subverted, and an oligarchy put upon them," which ought to be the sense, if Dr. Thirlwall's view were just.

Lastly, vii, 73, we have οἱ γὰρ τότε πῶν Σαμίων ἐπαναστάντες τοῖς δυνατοῖς καὶ ὄντες δῆμος, μεταδεδωμένοι αὐτοῖς — ἐγχευοντο τε ἐν πρᾶξι καὶ ἐν λόγῳ, καὶ ἐπέλεον τοῖς ἄλλοις ὥς δῆμῳ ὄντι ἐπὶ δέσποιναι. Surely these words — οἱ ἐπαναστάντες τοῖς δυνατοῖς καὶ ὄντες δῆμος — "those who having risen in arms against the wealthy and powerful, were now a demos, or a democracy," must imply, that the persons against whom the rising had taken place had been a governing oligarchy. Surely, also, the words *μεταδεδωμένοι αὐτοῖς*, can mean nothing else except to point out the strange antithesis between the conduct of these same men at two different epochs not far distant from each other. On the first occasion, they rose up against an established oligarchical government, and constituted a democratical government. On the second occasion, they rose up in conspiracy against this very democratical government, in order to subvert it, and constitute themselves an oligarchy in its place. If we suppose that on the first occasion, the established government was already democratical, and that the persons here mentioned were not conspirators against an established oligarchy, but merely persons making use of the powers of a democratical government to do violence to rich citizens, all this antithesis completely vanishes.

On the whole, I feel inclined to think that the government of Samos, at the time when Chios revolted from Athens, was oligarchical, like that of Chios itself.

fleet at Peiræum, which was thus enabled to get to Kenchreæ, and to refit in order that it might be sent to Ionia. The sixteen Peloponnesian ships which had fought at Syracuse had already come back to Lechæum, in spite of the obstructions thrown in their way by the Athenian squadron under Hippoklès at Naupaktus.¹ The Lacedæmonian admiral Astyochus was sent to Kenchreæ to take the command and proceed to Ionia as admiral-in-chief: but it was some time before he could depart for Chios, whither he arrived with only four triremes, followed by six more afterwards.²

Before he reached that island, however, the Chians, zealous in the new part which they had taken up, and interested for their own safety in multiplying defections from Athens, had themselves undertaken the prosecution of the plans concerted by Agis and the Lacedæmonians at Corinth. They originated an expedition of their own, with thirteen triremes under a Lacedæmonian pericækus named Deiniadas, to procure the revolt of Lesbos; with the view, if successful, of proceeding afterwards to do the same among the Hellespontine dependencies of Athens. A land force under the Spartan Eualas, partly Peloponnesian, partly Asiatic, marched along the coast of the mainland northward towards Kymê, to coöperate in both these objects. Lesbos was at this time divided into at least five separate city governments: Methymna at the north of the island, Mitylênê towards the south-east, Antissa, Eresus, and Pyrrha on the west. Whether these governments were oligarchical or democratical we do not know, but the Athenian kleruchs who had been sent to Mitylênê after

Nor do I see any difficulty in believing this to be the fact, though I cannot state when and how the oligarchy became established there. So long as the island performed its duty as a subject ally, Athens did not interfere with the form of its government. And she was least of all likely to interfere during the seven years of peace intervening between the years 421-414 B.C. There was nothing then to excite her apprehensions. The degree to which Athens intermeddled generally with the internal affairs of her subject-allies, seems to me to have been much exaggerated.

The Samian oligarchy, or *geômorî*, dispossessed of the government on this occasion, were restored by Lysander after his victorious close of the Peloponnesian war. — Xenoph. Hellen. iii. 3, 6. — where they are called of *ἀρχαίου πολιτείας*.

¹ Thucyd. viii, 13.

² Thucyd. viii, 20-23.

its revolt sixteen years before, must have long ago disappeared. The Chian fleet first went to Methymna and procured the revolt of that place, where four triremes were left in guard, while the remaining nine sailed forward to Mitylênê, and succeeded in obtaining that important town also.³

Their proceedings, however, were not unwatched by the Athenian fleet at Samos. Unable to recover possession of Teos, Diomedon had been obliged to content himself with procuring neutrality from that town, and admission for the vessels of Athens as well as of her enemies: he had, moreover, failed in an attack upon Eresus.⁴ But he had since been strengthened partly by the democratical revolution at Samos, partly by the arrival of Leon with ten additional triremes from Athens: so that these two commanders were now enabled to sail, with twenty-five triremes, to the relief of Lesbos. Reaching Mitylênê — the largest town in that island — very shortly after its revolt, they sailed straight into the harbor when no one expected them, seized the nine Chian ships with little resistance, and after a successful battle on shore, regained possession of the city. The Lacedæmonian admiral Astyochus — who had only been three days arrived at Chios from Kenchreæ with his four triremes — saw the Athenian fleet pass through the channel between Chios and the mainland, on its way to Lesbos; and immediately on the same evening followed it to that island, to lend what aid he could, with one Chian trireme added to his own four, and some hoplites aboard. He sailed first to Pyrrha, and on the next day to Eresus, on the west side of the island, where he first learned the recapture of Mitylênê by the Athenians. He was here also joined by three out of the four Chian triremes which had been left to defend that place, and which had been driven away, with the loss of one of their number, by a portion of the Athenian fleet pushing on thither from Mitylênê. Astyochus prevailed on Eresus to revolt from Athens, and having armed the population, sent them by land together with his own hoplites under Eteonikus to Methymna, in hopes of preserving that place, whither he also proceeded with his fleet along the coast. But in spite of all his endeavors,

¹ See the earlier part of this History, vol. vi, ch. i. pp. 257, 258.

² Thucyd. viii, 22.

³ Thucyd. viii, 20.

ma as well as Eresus and all Lesbos was recovered by the Athenians, while he himself was obliged to return with his forces to Chios. The land troops which had marched along the mainland, with a view to farther operations at the Hellespont, were carried back to Chios and to their respective homes.¹

The recovery of Lesbos, which the Athenians now placed in a better posture of defence, was of great importance in itself, and arrested for the moment all operations against them at the Hellespont. Their fleet from Lesbos was first employed in the recovery of Klazomenæ, which they again carried back to its original islet near the shore; the new town on the mainland, called Polichna, though in course of being built, being not yet sufficiently

¹ Thucyd. viii, 23. ἀπεκομίσθη δὲ πάλιν κατὰ πόλεις καὶ ὁ ἀπὸ τῶν νεῶν πεζὺς, ὃς ἐπὶ τὸν Ἑλλήσποντον ἐμελλήσαν ἵνα.

Dr. Arnold and Götter suppose that these soldiers had been carried over to Lesbos to coöperate in detaching the island from the Athenians. But this is not implied in the narrative. The land-force marched along by land to Klazomenæ and Kymê (ὁ πεζὺς ἄμα Πελοποννησίων τε τῶν παρόντων καὶ τῶν αὐτόθεν ξυμμάχων παρήει ἐπὶ Κλαζομένων τε καὶ Κύμης. Thucydides does not say that they ever crossed to Lesbos: they remained near Kymê, prepared to march forward, after that island should have been conquered, to the Hellespont.

Haacke is right, I think, in referring the words ὁ ἀπὸ τῶν νεῶν πεζὺς to what had been stated in c. 17; that Alkibiadēs and Chalkideus, on first arriving with the Peloponnesian five triremes at Chios, disembarked on that island their Peloponnesian seamen and armed them as hoplites for land-forces; taking aboard fresh crews of seamen from the island. The motive to make this exchange was, the great superiority of bravery, in heavy armor and stand-up fighting, of Peloponnesians as compared with Chians or Asiatic Greeks (see Xenoph. Hell. iii, 2, 17). These foot-soldiers taken from the Peloponnesian ships are the same as those spoken of in c. 22: ὁ πεζὺς ἄμα Πελοποννησίων τε τῶν παρόντων καὶ τῶν αὐτόθεν ξυμμάχων . . . ὁ ἀπὸ τῶν νεῶν πεζὺς.

Farther, these troops are again mentioned in c. 24, as οἱ μετὰ Χαλκιδέως ἐλθόντες Πελοποννησίοι, where Dr. Arnold again speaks of them in his note incorrectly. He says: "The Peloponnesians who came with Chalkideus must have been too few to offer any effectual resistance to one thousand heavy-armed Athenians, being only the *epibata* of five ships." The fact is that they were not merely the *epibata*, but the *entire crews*, of five ships; comprising probably from eight hundred to one thousand men (ἐκ μὲν τῶν ἐκ Πελοποννησίου νεῶν τοὺς ναῦτας δὲ πλείοντες ἐν Χίῳ καταλιπόντες, c. 17), since there were a remnant of five hundred left of them, after some months' operations and a serious defeat (viii, 32).

fortified to defend itself. The leading anti-Athenians in the town made their escape, and went farther up the country to Daphnūs. Animated by such additional success — as well as by a victory which the Athenians, who were blockading Milētus, gained over Chalkideus, wherein that officer was slain — Leon and Diomedon thought themselves in a condition to begin aggressive measures against Chios, now their most active enemy in Ionia. Their fleet of twenty-five sail was well equipped with *epibata*; who, though under ordinary circumstances they were *thetes* armed at the public cost, yet in the present stress of affairs were impressed from the superior hoplites in the city muster-roll.¹ They occupied the little islets called CEnussæ, near Chios on the northeast, as well as the forts of Sidussa and Pteleus in the territory of Erythræ; from which positions they began a series of harassing operations against Chios itself. Disembarking on the island at Kardamylê and Bolissus, they not only ravaged the neighborhood, but inflicted upon the Chian forces a bloody defeat. After two farther defeats, at Phanæ and at Leukonium, the Chians no longer dared to quit their fortifications; so that the invaders were left to ravage at pleasure the whole territory, being at the same time masters of the sea around, and blocking up the port.

The Athenians now retaliated upon Chios the hardships under which Attica itself was suffering; hardships the more painfully felt, inasmuch as this was the first time that an enemy had ever been seen in the island since the repulse of Xerxēs from Greece and the organization of the confederacy of Delos, more than sixty years before. The territory of Chios was highly cultivated,² its commerce extensive, and its wealth among the greatest in all Greece. In fact, under the Athenian empire, its prosperity had been so marked and so uninterrupted, that Thucydides expresses his astonishment at the undeviating prudence and circumspection of the government, in spite of circumstances well calculated to tempt them into extravagance. "Except Sparta (he says),³ Chios is the only state that I know,

¹ Thucyd. viii, 24, with Dr. Arnold's note.

² Aristotel. Politic. iv, 4, 1; Atheniens. vi, p. 265.

³ Thucyd. viii, 24. Καὶ μετὰ τοῦτο οἱ μὲν Χίῳ ἤδη ἀρετὴ ἐπέχεσαν, οἱ δὲ Ἰσθμιοὶ τὴν Ἰωνίαν, κατὰ κατασκευασμένην καὶ οὐκ ὄσαν ἀπὸ τῶν Ἀθηναίων. VOL. VII 17 250c.

which maintained its sober judgment throughout a career of prosperity, and became even more watchful in regard to security, in proportion as it advanced in power." He adds, that the step of revolting from Athens, though the Chian government now discovered it to have been an error, was at any rate a pardonable error; for it was undertaken under the impression, universal throughout Greece, and prevalent even in Athens herself after the disaster at Syracuse, that Athenian power, if not Athenian independence, was at an end, and undertaken in conjunction with allies seemingly more than sufficient to sustain it. This remarkable observation of Thucydides doubtless includes an indirect censure upon his own city, as abusing her prosperity for purposes of unmeasured aggrandizement: a censure not undeserved in reference to the enterprise against Sicily. But it counts at the same time as a valuable testimony to the condition of the allies of Athens under the Athenian empire, and goes far in reply to the charge of practical oppression against the imperial city.

The operations now carrying on in Chios indicated such an unexpected renovation in Athenian affairs, that a party in the island began to declare in favor of reunion with Athens. The Chian government were forced to summon Astyochus, with his four Peloponnesian ships from Erythræ, to strengthen their hands, and keep down opposition, by seizing hostages from the suspected parties, as well as by other precautions. While the Chians were thus endangered at home, the Athenian interest in Ionia was still farther fortified by the arrival of a fresh armament from Athens at Samos. Phrynichus, Onomaklês, and Skironidês conducted a fleet of forty-eight triremes, some of them employed for the transportation of hoplites; of which latter there were aboard one thousand Athenians, and fifteen hundred Argeians. Five hundred of these Argeians, having come to Athens without arms, were clothed with Athenian panoplies for service. The newly-arrived armament immediately sailed from Samos to Milêtus, where it effected a disembarkation, in conjunction with those

Μηδικῶν μέχρι τότε, διεπορεύθησαν. Χίοι γὰρ μόνοι μετὰ Λακεδαιμονίους, ὡς ἔγω ἡσθόμην, εὐδαιμονήσαντες ἅμα καὶ ἐσωφρόνησαν, καὶ ὅσα ἐπέδιδον ἢ πόλιν αὐτοῖς ἐπὶ τὸ μείζον, τόσῃ καὶ ἐκοσμοῦντο ἐχυρώτερον, etc.
viii, 45. Οἱ Χίοι... πλουσιώτατοι ὄντες τῶν Ἑλλήνων, etc.

Athenians who had been before watching the place from the island of Ladê. The Milêsians marched forth to give them battle; mustering eight hundred of their own hoplites, together with the Peloponnesian seamen of the five triremes brought across by Chalkideus, and a body of troops, chiefly cavalry, yet with a few mercenary hoplites, under the satrap Tissaphernês. Alkibiadês, also, was present and engaged. The Argeians were so full of contempt for the Ionians of Milêtus who stood opposite to them, that they rushed forward to the charge with great neglect of rank or order; a presumption which they expiated by an entire defeat, with the loss of three hundred men. But the Athenians on their wing were so completely victorious over the Peloponnesians and others opposed to them, that all the army of the latter, and even the Milesians themselves on returning from their pursuit of the Argeians, were forced to shelter themselves within the walls of the town. The issue of this combat excited much astonishment, inasmuch as, on each side, Ionian hoplites were victorious over Dorian.¹

For a moment, the Athenian army, masters of the field under the walls of Milêtus, indulged the hope of putting that city under blockade, by a wall across the isthmus which connected it with the continent. But these hopes soon vanished when they were apprized, on the very evening of the battle, that the main Peloponnesian and Sicilian fleet, fifty-five triremes in number, was actually in sight. Of these fifty-five, twenty-two were Sicilian,—twenty from Syracuse and two from Selinus,—sent at the pressing instance of Hermokratês, and under his command, for the purpose of striking the final blow at Athens; so at least it was anticipated, in the beginning of 412 B.C. The remaining thirty-three triremes being Peloponnesian, the whole fleet was placed under the temporary command of Theramenês, until he could join the admiral Astyochus. Theramenês, halting first at the island of Lerus,—off the coast, towards the southward of Milêtus,—was there first informed of the recent victory of the Athenians, so that he thought it prudent to take station for the night in the neighboring gulf of Iasus. Here he was found by Alkibiadês, who came on horseback, in all haste, from Milêtus to the Milesian

¹ Thucyd. viii. 25, 26.

town of Teichiussa on that gulf. Alkibiadês strenuously urged him to lend immediate aid to the Milêsiens, so as to prevent the construction of the intended wall of blockade; representing that if that city were captured, all the hopes of the Peloponnesians in Ionia would be extinguished. Accordingly, he prepared to sail thither the next morning: but, during the night, the Athenians thought it wise to abandon their position near Milêtus and return to Samos with their wounded and their baggage. Having heard of the arrival of Theramenês with his fleet, they preferred leaving their victory unimproved, to the hazard of a general battle. Two out of the three commanders, indeed, were at first inclined to take the latter course, insisting that the maritime honor of Athens would be tarnished by retiring before the enemy. But the third, Phrynichus, opposed with so much emphasis the proposition of fighting, that he at length induced his colleagues to retire. The fleet, he said, had not come prepared for fighting a naval battle, but full of hoplites for land-operations against Milêtus: the numbers of the newly-arrived Peloponnesians were not accurately known; and a defeat at sea, under existing circumstances, would be utter ruin to Athens. Thucydidês bestows much praise on Phrynichus for the wisdom of this advice, which was forthwith acted upon. The Athenian fleet sailed back to Samos; from which place the Argeian hoplites, sulky with their recent defeat, demanded to be conveyed home.¹

On the ensuing morning, the Peloponnesian fleet sailed from the gulf of Iasus to Milêtus, expecting to find and fight the Athenians, and leaving their masts, sails, and rigging — as was usual when going into action — at Teichiussa. Finding Milêtus already relieved of the enemy, they stayed there only one day, in order to reinforce themselves with the twenty-five triremes which Chalkidêus had originally brought thither, and which had been since blocked up by the Athenian fleet at Ladê, and then sailed back to Teichiussa to pick up the tackle there deposited. Being now not far from Iasus, the residence of Amorgês, Tissaphernês persuaded them to attack it by sea, in coöperation with his forces by land. No one at Iasus was aware of the arrival of the Peloponnesian fleet: the triremes approaching were supposed to be

¹ Thucyd. viii. 20, 21.

Athenians and friends, so that the place was entered and taken by surprise;¹ though strong in situation and fortifications, and defended by a powerful band of Grecian mercenaries. The capture of Iasus, in which the Syracusans distinguished themselves, was of signal advantage, from the abundant plunder which it distributed among the army; the place being rich from ancient date, and probably containing the accumulations of the satrap Pissuthnês, father of Amorgês. It was handed over to Tissaphernês, along with all the prisoners, for each head of whom he paid down a Daric stater, or twenty Attic drachmæ, and along with Amorgês himself, who had been taken alive, and whom the satrap was thus enabled to send up to Susa. The Grecian mercenaries captured in the place were enrolled in the service of the captors, and sent by land under Pedaritus to Erythræ, in order that they might cross over from thence to Chios.²

The arrival of the recent reinforcements to both the opposing fleets, and the capture of Iasus, took place about the autumnal equinox or the end of September; at which period, the Peloponnesian fleet being assembled at Milêtus, Tissaphernês paid to them the wages of the crews, at the rate of one Attic drachma per head per diem, as he had promised by his envoy at Sparta. But he at the same time gave notice for the future, — partly at the instigation of Alkibiadês, of which more hereafter, — that he could not continue so high a rate of pay, unless he should receive express instructions from Susa: and that, until such instructions came, he should give only half a drachma per day. Theramenês, being only commander for the interim, until the junction with Astyochus, was indifferent to the rate at which the men were paid, — a miserable jealousy, which marks the low character of many of

¹ Phrynichus the Athenian commander was afterwards displaced by the Athenians, — by the recommendation of Peisander, at the time when this displacement suited the purpose of the oligarchical conspirators, — on the charge of having abandoned and betrayed Amorgês on this occasion, and caused the capture of Iasus (Thucyd. viii. 54).

Phrynichus and his colleagues were certainly guilty of grave omission in not sending notice to Amorgês of the sudden retirement of the Athenian fleet from Milêtus, the ignorance of which circumstance was one reason why Amorgês mistook the Peloponnesian ships for Athenian.

² Thucyd. viii. 28.

these Spartan officers, — but the Syracusan Hermokiatês remonstrated so loudly against the reduction, that he obtained from Tissaphernês the promise of a slight increase above the half drachma, though he could not succeed in getting the entire drachma continued.¹ For the present, however, the seamen were in good spirits; not merely from having received the high rate of pay, but from the plentiful booty recently acquired at Iasus;² while Astyochus and the Chians were also greatly encouraged by the arrival of so large a fleet. Nevertheless, the Athenians on their side were also reinforced by thirty-five fresh triremes, which reached Samos under Strombichidês, Charminus, and Euktêmon. The Athenian fleet from Chios was now recalled to Samos, where the commanders mustered their whole naval force, with a view of redividing it for ulterior operations.

Considering that in the autumn of the preceding year, immediately after the Syracusan disaster, the navy of Athens had been no less scanty in number of ships than defective in equipment, we read with amazement, that she had now at Samos no less than one hundred and four triremes in full condition and disposable for service, besides some others specially destined for the transport of troops. Indeed, the total number which she had sent out, putting together the separate squadrons, had been one hundred and twenty-eight.³ So energetic an effort, and so unexpected a renovation of affairs from the hopeless prostration of last year, was such as no Grecian state except Athens could have accomplished; nor even Athens herself, had she not been aided by that reserve fund, consecrated twenty years before through the long-sighted calculation of Periklês.

The Athenians resolved to employ thirty triremes in making a landing, and establishing a fortified post, in Chios; and lots being

¹ Thucyd. viii, 29. What this new rate of pay was, or by what exact fraction it exceeded the half drachma, is a matter which the words of Thucydides do not enable us to make out. None of the commentators can explain the text without admitting some alteration or omission of words: nor do any of the explanations given appear to me convincing. On the whole, I incline to consider the conjecture and explanation given by Paulmier and Dobree as more plausible than that of Dr. Arnold and Gôller, or of Poppo and Hermann.

² Thucyd. viii, 36.

³ Thucyd. viii, 30: compare Dr. Arnold's note.

drawn among the generals, Strombichidês with two others were assigned to the command. The other seventy-four triremes, remaining masters of the sea, made descents near Milêtus, and in vain tried to provoke the Peloponnesian fleet out of that harbor. It was some time before Astyochus actually went thither to assume his new command, being engaged in operations near to Chios, which island had been left comparatively free by the recall of the Athenian fleet to the general muster at Samos. Going forth with twenty triremes, — ten Peloponnesian and ten Chian, — he made a fruitless attack upon Pteleus, the Athenian fortified post in the Erythræan territory; after which he sailed to Klazomenæ, recently retransferred from the continent to the neighboring islet. He here — in conjunction with Tamôs, the Persian general of the district — enjoined the Klazomenians again to break with Athens, to leave their islet, and to take up their residence inland at Daphnûs, where the philo-Peloponnesian party among them still remained established since the former revolt. This demand being rejected, he attacked Klazomenæ, but was repulsed, although the town was unfortified, and was presently driven off by a severe storm, from which he found shelter at Kymê and Phokæa. Some of his ships sheltered themselves during the same storm on certain islets near to and belonging to Klazomenæ; on which they remained eight days, destroying and plundering the property of the inhabitants, and then rejoined Astyochus. That admiral was now anxious to make an attempt on Lesbos, from which he received envoys promising revolt from Athens. But the Corinthians and others in his fleet were so averse to the enterprise, that he was forced to relinquish it and sail back to Chios; his fleet, before it arrived there, being again dispersed by the storms, frequent in the month of November.¹

Meanwhile Pedaritus, despatched by land from Milêtus, — at the head of the mercenary force made prisoners at Iasus, as well as of five hundred of the Peloponnesian seamen who had originally crossed the sea with Chalkideus, and since served as hoplites, — had reached Erythræ and from thence crossed the channel to Chios. To him and to the Chians, Astyochus now proposed to undertake the expedition to Lesbos; but he experi-

¹ Thucyd. viii, 31, 32.

enced from them the same reluctance as from the Corinthians, a strong proof that the tone of feeling in Lesbos had been found to be decidedly philo-Athenian on the former expedition. Pedaritus even peremptorily refused to let him have the Chian triremes for any such purpose, an act of direct insubordination in a Lacedæmonian officer towards the admiral-in-chief, which Astyochus resented so strongly, that he immediately left Chios for Milætus, carrying away with him all the Peloponnesian triremes, and telling the Chians, in terms of strong displeasure, that they might look in vain to him for aid, if they should come to need it. He halted with his fleet for the night under the headland of Korykus (in the Erythræan territory), on the north side; but while there, he received an intimation of a supposed plot to betray Erythræ by means of prisoners sent back from the Athenian station at Samos. Instead of pursuing his voyage to Milætus, he therefore returned on the next day to Erythræ to investigate this plot, which turned out to be a stratagem of the prisoners themselves in order to obtain their liberation.¹

The fact of his thus going back to Erythræ, instead of pursuing his voyage, proved, by accident, the salvation of his fleet. For it so happened that on that same night the Athenian fleet, under Strombichidēs — thirty triremes, accompanied by some triremes carrying hoplites — had its station on the southern side of the same headland. Neither knew of the position of the other, and Astyochus, had he gone forward the next day towards Milætus, would have fallen in with the superior numbers of his enemy. He farther escaped a terrible storm, which the Athenians encountered when they doubled the headland going northward. Deserving three Chian triremes, they gave chase, but the storm became so violent that even these Chians had great difficulty in making their own harbor, while the three foremost Athenian ships were wrecked on the neighboring shore, all the crews either perishing or becoming prisoners.² The rest of the Athenian fleet found shelter in the harbor of Phœnikus on the opposite mainland, under the lofty mountain called Minas, north of Erythræ.

As soon as weather permitted, they pursued their voyage to Lesbos, from which island they commenced their operations of

¹ Thucyd. viii, 32, 33.

² Thucyd. viii, 33, 34.

invading Chios and establishing in it a permanent fortified post. Having transported their land-force across from Lesbos, they occupied a strong maritime site called Delphinium, seemingly a projecting cape having a sheltered harbor on each side, not far from the city of Chios.¹ They bestowed great labor and time in fortifying this post, both on the land and the sea-side, during which process they were scarcely interrupted at all either by the Chians, or by Pedaritus and his garrison; whose inaction arose not merely from the discouragement of the previous defeats, but from the political dissension which now reigned in the city. A strong philo-Athenian party had pronounced itself; and though Tydeus its leader was seized by Pedaritus and put to death, still, his remaining partisans were so numerous, that the government was brought to an oligarchy narrower than ever, and to the extreme of jealous precaution, not knowing whom to trust. In spite of numerous messages sent to Milætus, intreating succor, and representing the urgent peril to which this greatest among all the Ionian allies of Sparta was exposed, Astyochus adhered to his parting menaces, and refused compliance. The indignant Pedaritus sent to prefer complaint against him at Sparta as a traitor. Meanwhile the fortress at Delphinium advanced so near towards completion, that Chios began to suffer from it as much as Athens suffered from Dekeleia, with the farther misfortune of being blocked up by sea. The slaves in this wealthy island — chiefly foreigners acquired by purchase, but more numerous than in any other Grecian state except Laconia — were emboldened by the manifest superiority and assured position of the invaders to desert in crowds; and the loss arising, not merely from their flight, but from the valuable information and aid which they gave to the enemy was immense.² The dis-

¹ Thucyd. viii, 34-38. *Δελφίνιον* — *λίμνην ἔχον*, etc.

That the Athenians should select Lesbos on this occasion as the base of their operations, and as the immediate scene of last preparations, against Chios, — was only repeating what they had once done before (c. 24), and what they again did afterwards (c. 100). I do not feel the difficulty which strikes Dobree and Dr. Thirlwall. Doubtless Delphinium was to the north of the city of Chios.

² Thucyd. viii, 38-40. About the slaves in Chios, see the extracts from *Thucyd. viii, 38-40* in *Athenian History*, p. 265.

treasure of the island increased every day, nor could anything relieve it except succor from without, which Astyochus still withheld.

That officer, on reaching Milêtus, found the Peloponnesian force on the Asiatic side of the Ægean just reinforced by a squadron of twelve triremes under Dorieus; chiefly from Thuri, which had undergone a political revolution since the Athenian disaster at Syracuse, and was now decidedly in the hands of the active philo-Laconian party; the chief persons friendly to Athens having been exiled.¹ Dorieus and his squadron, crossing the Ægean in its southern latitude, had arrived safely at Knidus, which had already been conquered by Tissaphernês from Athens, and had received a Persian garrison.² Orders were sent from Milêtus that half of this newly-arrived squadron should remain on guard at Knidus, while the other half should cruise near the Triopian cape to intercept the trading vessels from Egypt. But the Athenians, who had also learned the arrival of Dorieus, sent a powerful squadron from Samos, which captured all these six triremes off Cape Triopium, though the crews escaped ashore. They farther made an attempt to recover Knidus, which was very nearly successful, as the town was unfortified on the sea-side. On the morrow the attack was renewed, — but additional defences had been provided during the night, while the crews of the ships captured near Triopium had come in to help, — so that the Athenians were forced to return to Samos without any farther advantage than that of ravaging the Knidian territory. Astyochus took no step to intercept them, nor did he think himself strong enough to keep the sea against the seventy-four Athenian triremes at Samos, though his fleet at Milêtus was at this moment in high condition. The rich booty acquired at Iasus was uncon-

That from Nymphodôrus appears to be nothing but a romantic local legend, connected with the Chapel of the *Kind-hearted Hero* (*Ἡρώς εὐμέρους*) at Chios.

Even in antiquity, though the institution of slavery was universal and noway disapproved, yet the slave-trade, or the buying and selling of slaves, was accounted more or less odious.

¹ See the life of Lysias the Rhetor, in Dionysius of Halikarnassus, c. i, p. 453, Reisk., and in Plutarch, Vit. x, Orat. p. 835.

² Thucyd. viii, 35-109.

sumed; the Milêsians were zealous in the confederate cause; while the pay from Tissaphernês continued to be supplied with tolerable regularity, though at the reduced rate mentioned a little above.¹

Though the Peloponnesians had yet no ground of complaint — such as they soon came to have — against the satrap for irregularity of payment, still, the powerful fleet now at Milêtus inspired the commanders with a new tone of confidence, so that they became ashamed of the stipulations of that treaty to which Chalkideus and Alkibiadês, when first landing at Milêtus with their scanty armament, had submitted. Accordingly Astyochus, shortly after his arrival at Milêtus, and even before the departure of Theramenês, — whose functions had expired when he had handed over the fleet, — insisted on a fresh treaty with Tissaphernês, which was agreed on, to the following effect: —

“Convention and alliance is concluded, on the following conditions, between the Lacedæmonians, with their allies, and king Darius, his sons, and Tissaphernês. The Lacedæmonians and their allies shall not attack or injure any territory or any city which belongs to Darius, or has belonged to his father or ancestors; nor shall they raise any tribute from any of the said cities. Neither Darius nor any of his subjects shall attack or injure the Lacedæmonians or their allies. Should the Lacedæmonians or their allies have any occasion for the king, or should the king have any occasion for the Lacedæmonians or their allies, let each meet, as much as may be, the wishes expressed by the other. Both will carry on jointly the war against Athens and her allies: neither party shall bring the war to a close, without mutual consent. The king shall pay and keep any army which he may have sent for, and which may be employed in his territory. If any of the cities parties to this convention shall attack the king's territory, the rest engage to hinder them, and to defend the king with their best power. And if any one within the king's territory, or within the territory subject to him,² shall attack the

¹ Thucyd. viii, 35, 36. καὶ γὰρ μισθὸς ἐδίδοτο ἀρκούντως, etc.

² Thucyd. viii, 37. Καὶ ἢν τις τῶν ἐν τῇ βασιλείᾳ χώρα ἢ δόξης βασιλεὺς ἄρχῃ, ἐπὶ τὴν Λακεδαιμονίων ἢ τῶν συμμάχων, βασιλεὺς κωλύτω καὶ ἀμυνέτω κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν.

The distinction here drawn between *the king's territory*, and *the territory*

Lacedæmonians or their allies, the king shall hinder them, and lend his best defensive aid."

Looked at with the eyes of Pan-Hellenic patriotism, this second treaty of Astyochus and Theramenês was less disgraceful than the first treaty of Chalkideus. It did not formally proclaim that all those Grecian cities which had ever belonged to the king or to his ancestors, should still be considered as his subjects, nor did it pledge the Lacedæmonians to aid the king in hindering any of them from achieving their liberty. It still admitted, however, by implication, the same undiminished extent of the king's dominion, as it had stood when at its maximum under his predecessors; the same undefined rights of the king to meddle with Grecian affairs; the same unqualified abandonment of all the Greeks on the continent of Asia. The conclusion of this treaty was the last act performed by Theramenês, who was lost at sea shortly afterwards, on his voyage home, in a small boat, no one knew how.¹

Astyochus, now alone in command, was still importuned by the urgent solicitations of the distressed Chians for relief, and, in spite of his reluctance, was compelled by the murmurs of his own army to lend an ear to them, when a new incident happened which gave him at least a good pretext for directing his attention southward. A Peloponnesian squadron of twenty-seven triremes under the command of Antisthenês, having started from Cape Malea about the winter tropic or close of 412 B.C., had first crossed the sea to Melos, where it dispersed ten Athenian triremes and captured three of them; then afterwards, from apprehension that these fugitive Athenians would make known its approach at Samos, had made a long circuit round by Krete, and thus ultimately reached Kaunos at the southeastern extremity of Asia Minor. This was the squadron which Kalligeitus and

over which the king holds empire, deserves notice. By the former phrase is understood, I presume, the continent of Asia, which the court of Susa looked upon, together with all its inhabitants, as a freehold exceedingly sacred and peculiar (Herodot. i. 4): by the latter, as much as the satrap should find it convenient to lay hands upon, of that which had once belonged to Darius son of Hystaspes or to Xerxes, in the plenitude of their power.

¹ Thucyd. viii. 38. ἀποπλεων ἐν κέλῃτι ἀφανίζεται.

Timagoras had caused to be equipped, having come over for that purpose a year before as envoys from the satrap Pharnabazus. Antisthenês was instructed first to get to Milêtus and put himself in concert with the main Lacedæmonian fleet; next, to forward these triremes, or another squadron of equal force under Klearchus, to the Hellespont, for the purpose of coöperating with Pharnabazus against the Athenian dependencies in that region. Eleven Spartans, the chief of whom was Lichas, accompanied Antisthenês, to be attached to Astyochus as advisers, according to a practice not unusual with the Lacedæmonians. These men were not only directed to review the state of affairs at Milêtus, and exercise control coördinate with Astyochus, but even empowered, if they saw reason, to dismiss that admiral himself, upon whom the complaints of Pedaritus from Chios had cast suspicion; and to appoint Antisthenês in his place.¹

No sooner had Astyochus learned at Milêtus the arrival of Antisthenês at Kaunos, than he postponed all idea of lending aid to Chios, and sailed immediately to secure his junction with the twenty-seven new triremes as well as with the new Spartan counsellors. In his voyage southward he captured the city of Kôs, unfortified and half-ruined by a recent earthquake, and then passed on to Knidus; where the inhabitants strenuously urged him to go forward at once, even without disembarking his men, in order that he might surprise an Athenian squadron of twenty triremes under Charminus; which had been despatched from Samos, after the news received from Melos, in order to attack and repel the squadron under Antisthenês. Charminus, having his station at Symê, was cruising near Rhodes and the Lykian coast, to watch, though he had not been able to keep back, the Peloponnesian fleet just arrived at Kaunos. In this position he was found by the far more numerous fleet of Astyochus, the approach of which he did not at all expect. But the rainy and hazy weather had so dispersed it, that Charminus, seeing at first only a few ships apart from the rest, mistook them for the smaller squadron of new-comers. Attacking the triremes thus seen, he at first gained considerable advantage, dis-

¹ Thucyd. viii. 39. Καὶ εἰρητο αὐτοῖς, ἐς Μίλητον ἀφικομένους τῶν τῶν ἄλλων ἐννεπιμελεῖσθαι, ἧ μέλλει ἀριστα εἶναι, etc.

abling three and damaging several others. But presently the dispersed vessels of the main fleet came in sight and closed round him, so that he was forced to make the best speed in escaping, first to the island called Teutlussa, next to Halikarnassus. He did not effect his escape without the loss of six ships; while the victorious Peloponnesians, after erecting their trophy on the island of Symê, returned to Knidus, where the entire fleet, including the twenty-seven triremes newly arrived, was now united.¹ The Athenians in Samos — whose affairs were now in confusion, from causes which will be explained in the ensuing chapter — had kept no watch on the movements of the main Peloponnesian fleet at Milêtus, and seem to have been ignorant of its departure until they were apprized of the defeat of Charminus. They then sailed down to Symê, took up the sails and rigging belonging to that squadron, which had been there deposited, and then, after an attack upon Loryma, carried back their whole fleet, probably including the remnant of the squadron of Charminus, to Samos.²

Though the Peloponnesian fleet now assembled at Knidus consisted of ninety-four triremes, much superior in number to the Athenian, it did not try to provoke any general action. The time of Lichas and his brother commissioners was at first spent in negotiations with Tissaphernês, who had joined them at Knidus, and against whom they found a strong feeling of discontent prevalent in the fleet. That satrap — now acting greatly under the advice of Alkibiadês, of which also more in the coming chapter — had of late become slack in the Peloponnesian cause, and irregular in furnishing pay to their seamen, during the last weeks of their stay at Milêtus. He was at the same time full of promises, paralyzing all their operations by assurances that he was bringing up the vast fleet of Phenicia to their aid: but in reality his object was, under fair appearances, merely to prolong the contest and waste the strength of both parties. Arriving in the midst of this state of feeling, and discussing with Tissaphernês the future conduct of the war, Lichas not only expressed dis-

¹ Thucyd. viii, 42.

² Thucyd. viii, 43. This defeat of Charminus is made the subject of a jest by Aristophanês, Thesmophor. 810, with the note of Paulmier.

pleasure at his past conduct, but even protested against the two conventions concluded by Chalkideus and by Theramenês, as being, both the one and the other, a disgrace to the Hellenic name. By the express terms of the former, and by the implications of the latter, not merely all the islands of the Ægean, but even Thessaly and Bœotia, were acknowledged as subject to Persia; so that Sparta, if she sanctioned such conditions, would be merely imposing upon the Greeks a Persian sceptre, instead of general freedom, for which she professed to be struggling. Lichas, declaring that he would rather renounce all prospect of Persian pay, than submit to such conditions, proposed to negotiate for a fresh treaty upon other and better terms, a proposition which Tissaphernês rejected with so much indignation as to depart without settling anything.¹

His desertion did not discourage the Peloponnesian counsellors. Possessing a fleet larger than they had ever before had united in Asia, together with a numerous body of allies, they calculated on being able to get money to pay their men without Persian aid; and an invitation, which they just now received from various powerful men at Rhodes, tended to strengthen such confidence. The island of Rhodes, inhabited by a Dorian population considerable in number as well as distinguished for nautical skill, was at this time divided between three separate city governments, as it had been at the epoch of the Homeric Catalogue, — Lindus, Ialysus, and Kameirus; for the city called Rhodes, formed by a coalescence of all these three, dates only from two or three years after the period which we have now reached. Invited by several of the wealthy men of the island, the Peloponnesian fleet first attacked Kameirus, the population of which, intimidated by a force of ninety-four triremes, and altogether uninformed of their approach, abandoned their city, which had no defences, and fled to the mountains.² All the three Rhodian towns, destitute of

¹ Thucyd. viii, 43.

² Thucyd. viii, 44. Οἱ δ' ἐς τὴν Ῥόδον, ἐπικηρυκενομένων ἀπὸ τῶν δυνατάτων ἀνδρῶν, τὴν γνώμην εἶχον πλεῖν, etc.

...Καὶ προσβαλόντες Καμείρῳ τῆς Ῥοδίας πρώτῃ, ναυσὶ τέσσαρσι καὶ ἑννεήκοντα, ἐξεφόβησαν μὲν τοὺς πολλοὺς, οὐκ εἰδότες τὰ τρασσομένα, καὶ ἔφυγον, ἄλλως τε καὶ ἀτειχίστου οὐσῆς τῆς πόλεως, etc. We have to remark here, as on former occasions of revolts among the

fortifications, were partly persuaded, partly frightened, into the step of revolting from Athens and allying themselves with the Peloponnesians. The Athenian fleet, whose commanders were just now too busy with political intrigue to keep due military watch, arrived from Samos too late to save Rhodes, and presently returned to the former island, leaving detachments at Chalkê and Kôs to harass the Peloponnesians with desultory attacks.

The Peloponnesians now levied from the Rhodians a contribution of thirty-two talents, and adopted the island as the main station for their fleet, instead of Milêtus. We can explain this change of place by their recent unfriendly discussion with Tissaphernês, and their desire to be more out of his reach.¹ But what we cannot so easily explain, is, that they remained on the island without any movement or military action, and actually hauled their triremes ashore, for the space of no less than eighty days; that is, from about the middle of January to the end of March 411 B.C. While their powerful fleet of ninety-four triremes, superior to that of Athens at Samos, was thus lying idle, their allies in Chios were known to be suffering severe and increasing distress, and repeatedly pressing for aid:² moreover, the promise of sending to coöperate with Pharnabazus against the Athenian dependencies on the Hellespont, remained unperformed.³ We may impute such extreme military slackness mainly to the insidious policy of Tissaphernês, now playing a double game between Sparta and Athens. He still kept up intelligence with the Peloponnesians at Rhodes, paralyzed their energies by assurances that the Phœnician fleet was actually on its way to aid them, and insured the success of these intrigues by bribes distributed per-

dependent allies of Athens, that the general population of the allied city manifests no previous discontent, nor any spontaneous disposition to revolt. The powerful men of the island — those who, if the government was democratical, formed the oligarchical minority, but who formed the government itself, if oligarchical — conspire and bring in the Peloponnesian force, unknown to the body of the citizens, and thus leave to the latter no free choice. The real feeling towards Athens on the part of the body of the citizens is one of simple acquiescence, with little attachment on the one hand, yet no hatred, or sense of practical suffering, on the other.

¹ Thucyd. viii, 44 • compare c. 57.

² Thucyd. viii, 40-45.

³ Thucyd. viii, 39.

sonally among the generals and the trierarchs. Even Astyochus, the general-in-chief, took his share in this corrupt bargain, against which not one stood out except the Syracusan Hermokratês.¹ Such prolonged inaction of the armament, at the moment of its greatest force, was thus not simply the fruit of honest mistake, like the tardiness of Nikias in Sicily, but proceeded from the dishonesty and personal avidity of the Peloponnesian officers.

I have noticed, on more than one previous occasion, the many evidences which exist of the prevalence of personal corruption — even in its coarsest form, that of direct bribery — among the leading Greeks of all the cities, when acting individually. Of such evidences the incident here recorded is not the least remarkable. Nor ought this general fact ever to be forgotten by those who discuss the question between oligarchy and democracy, as it stood in the Grecian world. The confident pretensions put forth by the wealthy and oligarchical Greeks to superior virtue, public as well as private, — and the quiet repetition, by various writers modern and ancient, of the laudatory epithets implying such assumed virtue, — are so far from being borne out by history, that these individuals were perpetually ready as statesmen to betray their countrymen, or as generals even to betray the interests of their soldiers, for the purpose of acquiring money themselves. Of course, it is not meant that this was true of all of them; but it was true sufficiently often, to be reckoned upon as a contingency more than probable. If, speaking on the average, the leading men of a Grecian community were not above the commission of political misdeeds thus palpable, and of a nature not to be disguised even from themselves, far less would they be above the vices, always more or less mingled with self-delusion, of pride, power-seeking, party-antipathy or sympathy, love of ease, etc. And if the community were to have any chance of guarantee against such abuses, it could only be by full license of accusation against delinquents.

¹ Thucyd. viii, 45. Suggestions of Alkibiadês to Tissaphernês — Καὶ τοὺς τριηράρχους καὶ τοὺς στρατηγοὺς τῶν πόλεων ἐδίδασκεν ὥστε οὐκ εὖ χρημάτων αὐτὸν πείσαι, ὥστε συγχωρῆσαι ταῦτα ἑαυτῷ πλὴν τῶν Συρακοσίων· τούτων δὲ, Ἑρμοκράτης ἡναντιοῦτο μόνος ὑπὲρ τοῦ ξυμπατοῦς ξυμμαχικοῦ.

About the bribes to Astyochus himself, see also c. 50.

and certainty of trial before judges identified in interest with the people themselves. Such were the securities which the Grecian democracies, especially that of Athens, tried to provide; in a manner not always wise, still less always effectual, but assuredly justified, in the amplest manner, by the urgency and prevalence of the evil. Yet in the common representations given of Athenian affairs, this evil is overlooked or evaded; the precautions taken against it are denounced as so many evidences of democratical ill-temper and injustice; and the class of men, through whose initiatory action alone such precautions were enforced, are held up to scorn as demagogues and *sycophants*. Had these Peloponnesian generals and trierarchs, who under the influence of bribes wasted two important months in inaction, been Athenians, there might have been some chance of their being tried and punished; though even at Athens the chance of impunity to offenders, through powerful political clubs and other sinister artifices, was much greater than it ought to have been. So little is it consistent with the truth, however often affirmed, that judicial accusation was too easy, and judicial condemnation too frequent. When the judicial precautions provided at Athens are looked at, as they ought to be, side by side with the evil, they will be found imperfect, indeed, both in the scheme and in the working, but certainly neither uncalled for nor over-severe.

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VOLUME VIII



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PREFACE TO VOL. VIII

I HAD hoped to be able, in this Volume, to carry the history of Greece down as far as the battle of Knidus; but I find myself disappointed.

A greater space than I anticipated has been necessary, not merely to do justice to the closing events of the Peloponnesian war, especially the memorable scenes at Athens after the battle of Arginusæ, but also to explain my views both respecting the Sophists and respecting Sokratês.

It has been hitherto common to treat the sophists as corruptors of the Greek mind, and to set forth the fact of such corruption, increasing as we descend downwards from the great invasion of Xerxês, as historically certified. Dissenting as I do from former authors, and believing that Grecian history has been greatly misconceived, on both these points, I have been forced to discuss the evidences, and exhibit the reasons for my own way of thinking, at considerable length.

To Sokratês I have devoted one entire Chapter. No smaller space would have sufficed to lay before the reader any tolerable picture of that illustrious man, the rarest intellectual phenomenon of ancient times, and originator of the most powerful scientific impulse which the Greek mind ever underwent.

G. G.

London, February, 1850.

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PART II.

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CHAPTER LXII

TWENTY-FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.—OLIGARCHY OF FOUR HUNDRED AT ATHENS.

ABOUT a year elapsed between the catastrophe of the Athenians near Syracuse and the victory which they gained over the Milésians, on landing near Milétus (from September 413 B.C., to September 412 B.C.). After the first of those two events, the complete ruin of Athens had appeared both to her enemies and to herself, impending and irreparable. But so astonishing, so rapid, and so energetic had been her rally, that, at the time of the second, she was found again carrying on a tolerable struggle, though with impaired resources and on a purely defensive system, against enemies both bolder and more numerous than ever. Nor is there any reason to doubt that her foreign affairs might have gone on thus improving, had they not been endangered at this critical moment by the treason of a fraction of her own citizens, bringing her again to the brink of ruin, from which she was only rescued by the incompetence of her enemies.

That treason took its first rise from the exile Alkibiadês. I have already recounted how this man, alike unprincipled and energetic, had thrown himself with his characteristic ardor into the service of Sparta, and had indicated to her the best means

of aiding Syracuse, of inflicting positive injury upon Athens, and lastly, of provoking revolt among the Ionic allies of the latter. It was by his boldness and personal connections in Ionia that the revolt of Chios and Miletus had been determined.

In the course of a few months, however, he had greatly lost the confidence of the Spartans. The revolt of the Asiatic dependencies of Athens had not been accomplished so easily and rapidly as he had predicted; Chalkideus, the Spartan commander with whom he had acted was defeated and slain near Miletus; the ephor Endius, by whom he was chiefly protected, retained his office only for one year, and was succeeded by other ephors,¹ just about the end of September, or beginning of October, when the Athenians gained their second victory near Miletus, and were on the point of blocking up the town; while his personal enemy king Agis still remained to persecute him. Moreover, there was in the character of this remarkable man something so essentially selfish, vain, and treacherous, that no one could ever rely upon his faithful coöperation. And as soon as any reverse occurred, that very energy and ability, which seldom failed him, made those with whom he acted the more ready to explain the mischance, by supposing that he had betrayed them.

It was thus that, after the defeat of Miletus, king Agis was enabled to discredit Alkibiadês as a traitor to Sparta; upon which the new ephors sent out at once an order to the general Astyochus, to put him to death.² Alkibiadês had now an opportunity of tasting the difference between Spartan and Athenian procedure. Though his enemies at Athens were numerous and virulent, with all the advantage, so unspeakable in political warfare, of being able to raise the cry of irreligion against him, yet the utmost which they could obtain was that he should be summoned home to take his trial before the dikastery. At Sparta, without any positive ground of crimination, and without any idea of judicial trial, his enemies procure an order that he shall be put to death.

Alkibiadês, however, got intimation of the order in time to

¹ See Thucyd. v, 36.

² Thucyd. viii, 45. Καὶ ἀπ' αὐτῶν ἀφικομένης ἐπιστολῆς πρὸς Ἀστυόχον ἐκ Λακεδαιμόνος ὥστ' ἀποκτείνειν (ἦν γὰρ καὶ τῷ Ἀγίδι ἐχθρὸς καὶ ἄλλω ἐπιστολῶν ἐβαίνετο), etc.

retire to Tissaphernês. Probably he was forewarned by Astyochus himself, not ignorant that so monstrous a deed would greatly alienate the Chians and Milesians, nor foreseeing the full mischief which his desertion would bring upon Sparta. With that flexibility of character which enabled him at once to master and take up a new position, Alkibiadês soon found means to insinuate himself into the confidence of the satrap. He began now to play a game neither Spartan nor Athenian, but Persian and anti-Hellenic: a game of duplicity to which Tissaphernês himself was spontaneously disposed, but to which the intervention of a dexterous Grecian negotiator was indispensable. It was by no means the interest of the Great King, Alkibiadês urged, to lend such effective aid to either of the contending parties as would enable it to crush the other: he ought neither to bring up the Phœnician fleet to the aid of the Lacedæmonians, nor to furnish that abundant pay which would procure for them indefinite levies of new Grecian force. He ought so to feed and prolong the war, as to make each party an instrument of exhaustion and impoverishment against the other, and thus himself to rise on the ruins of both: first to break down the Athenian empire by means of the Peloponnesians, and afterwards to expel the Peloponnesians themselves; which might be effected with little trouble if they were weakened by a protracted previous struggle.¹

Thus far Alkibiadês gave advice, as a Persian counsellor, not unsuitable to the policy of the court of Susa. But he seldom gave advice without some view to his own profit, ambition, or antipathies. Cast off unceremoniously by the Lacedæmonians, he was now driven to seek restoration in his own country. To accomplish this object, it was necessary not only that he should preserve her from being altogether ruined, but that he should present himself to the Athenians as one who could, if restored, divert the aid of Tissaphernês from Lacedæmon to Athens. Accordingly, he farther suggested to the satrap, that while it was essential to his interest not to permit land power and maritime power to be united in the same hands, whether Lacedæmonian or Athenian, it would nevertheless be found easier to

¹ Thucyd. viii, 45, 46.

arrange matters with the empire and pretensions of Athens than with those of Lacedæmon. The former, he argued, neither sought nor professed any other object than the subjection of her own maritime dependencies, in return for which she would willingly leave all the Asiatic Greeks in the hands of the Great King; while the latter, forswearing all idea of empire, and professing ostentatiously to aim at the universal enfranchisement of every Grecian city, could not with the smallest consistency conspire to deprive the Asiatic Greeks of the same privilege. This view appeared to be countenanced by the objection which Theramenês and many of the Peloponnesian officers had taken to the first convention concluded by Chalkideus and Alkibiadês with Tissaphernês: objections afterwards renewed by Lichas even against the second modified convention of Theramenês, and accompanied with an indignant protest against the idea of surrendering to the Great King all the territory which had been ever possessed by his predecessors.¹

All these latter arguments, whereby Alkibiadês professed to create in the mind of the satrap a preference for Athens, were either futile or founded on false assumptions. For on the one hand, even Lichas never refused to concur in surrendering the Asiatic Greeks to Persia; while on the other hand, the empire of Athens, so long as she retained any empire, was pretty sure to be more formidable to Persia than any efforts undertaken by Sparta under the disinterested pretence of liberating generally the Grecian cities. Nor did Tissaphernês at all lend himself to any such positive impression; though he felt strongly the force of the negative recommendations of Alkibiadês, that he should do no more for the Peloponnesians than was sufficient to feed the war, without insuring to them either a speedy or a decisive success: or rather, this duplicity was so congenial to his Oriental mind, that there was no need of Alkibiadês to recommend it. The real use of the Athenian exile, was to assist the satrap in carrying it into execution; and to provide for him those plausible pretences and justifications, which he was to issue as a substitute for effective supplies of men and money. Established along with Tissaphernês at Magnesia, — the same place which had been

¹ Thucyd. viii, 46-52.

occupied about fifty years before by another Athenian exile, equally unprincipled, and yet abler, Themistoklês, — Alkibiadês served as interpreter of his views in all his conversations with the Greeks, and appeared to be thoroughly in his confidence: an appearance of which he took advantage to pass himself off falsely upon the Athenians at Samos, as having the power of turning Persian wealth to the aid of Athens.

The first payment made by Tissaphernês, immediately after the capture of Iasus and of the revolted Amorgês, to the Peloponnesians at Milêtus, was at the rate of one drachma per head. But notice was given that for the future it would be reduced one half, and for this reduction Alkibiadês undertook to furnish a reason. The Athenians, he urged, gave no more than half a drachma; not because they could not afford more, but because, from their long experience of nautical affairs, they had found that higher pay spoiled the discipline of the seamen by leading them into excesses and over-indulgence, as well as by inducing too ready leave of absence to be granted, in confidence that the high pay would induce them to return when called for.¹ As he probably never expected that such subterfuges, employed at a moment when Athens was so poor that she could not even pay the half drachma per head, would carry conviction to any one, so he induced Tissaphernês to strengthen their effect by individual bribes to the generals and trierarchs: a mode of argument which was found effectual in silencing the complaints of all, with the single exception of the Syracusan Hermokratês. In regard to other Grecian cities who sent to ask pecuniary aid, and especially Chios, Alkibiadês spoke out with less reserve. They had been hitherto compelled to contribute to Athens, he said, and now that they had shaken off this payment, they must not shrink from imposing upon themselves equal or even greater burdens in their own defence. Nor was it anything less, he added, than sheer impudence in the Chians, the richest people in Greece, if they required

Thucyd. viii, 45. Οἱ δὲ τὰς ναῦς ἀπολείπουσιν, ὑπολιπόντες ἐς ὁμήρειαν ἢν προσοφειλόμενον μισθόν.

This passage is both doubtful in the text and difficult in the translation. Among the many different explanations given by the commentators, I adopt that of Dr. Arnold as the least unsatisfactory, though without any confidence that it is right.

a foreign military force for their protection, to require at the same time that others should furnish the means of paying it.¹ At the same time, however, he intimated, — by way of keeping up hopes for the future, — that Tissaphernês was at present carrying on the war at his own cost; but if hereafter remittances should arrive from Susa, the full rate of pay would be resumed, with the addition of aid to the Grecian cities in any other way which could be reasonably asked. To this promise was added an assurance that the Phenician fleet was now under equipment, and would shortly be brought up to their aid, so as to give them a superiority which would render resistance hopeless: an assurance not merely deceitful but mischievous, since it was employed to dissuade them from all immediate action, and to paralyze their navy during its moments of fullest vigor and efficiency. Even the reduced rate of pay was furnished so irregularly, and the Peloponnesian force kept so starved, that the duplicity of the satrap became obvious to every one, and was only carried through by his bribery to the officers.²

While Alkibiadês, as the confidential agent and interpreter of Tissaphernês, was carrying on this anti-Peloponnesian policy through the autumn and winter of 412-411 B.C., — partly during the stay of the Peloponnesian fleet at Milêtus, partly after it had moved to Knidus and Rhodes, — he was at the same time opening correspondence with the Athenian officers at Samos. His breach with the Peloponnesians, as well as his ostensible position in the service of Tissaphernês, were facts well known among the Athenian armament; and his scheme was, to procure both restoration and renewed power in his native city, by representing himself as competent to bring over to her the aid and alliance of Persia, through his ascendancy over the mind of the satrap. His hos-

¹ Thucyd. viii, 45. Τὰς δὲ πόλεις δεομένας χρημάτων ἀπῆλθον, αὐτὸς ἀντίλαβων ὑπὲρ τοῦ Τισσαφέρνη, ὥς οἱ μὲν Χίοι ἀναίσχυντοι εἶεν, πλουσιώτατοι ὄντες τῶν Ἑλλήνων, ἐπικουρίᾳ δὲ ὅμως σωζόμενοι ἀξιοῦσι καὶ τοῖς σύμασι καὶ τοῖς χρήμασι ἄλλους ὑπὲρ τῆς ἐκείνων ἐλευθερίας κινδυνεύειν.

² Thucyd. viii, 46. Τὴν τε τροφὴν κακῶς ἐπόρεζε τοῖς Πελοποννησίοις καὶ ναυμαχεῖν οὐκ εἶα· ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰς φοινίσσας ναὺς φάσκων ἤξειν καὶ ἐκ περιόντος ἀγωνιεῖσθαι ἐφθαιρε τὰ πράγματα καὶ τὴν ἀκμὴν τοῦ ναυτικοῦ αὐτῶν ἀφείλετο, γενομένην καὶ πάνυ ἰσχυράν, τὰ τε ἄλλα, καταφανέστερον δὲ ὅτι λανθάνειν, οὐ προθύμως ξυνοπολέμει.

sility to the democracy, however, was so generally known, that he despaired of accomplishing his return, unless he could connect it with an oligarchical revolution; which, moreover, was not less gratifying to his sentiment of vengeance for the past, than to his ambition for the future. Accordingly, he sent over a private message to the officers and trierarchs at Samos, several of them doubtless his personal friends, desiring to be remembered to the "best men" in the armament,¹ such was one of the standing phrases by which oligarchical men knew and described each other; and intimating his anxious wish to come again as a citizen among them, bringing with him Tissaphernês as their ally. But he would do this only on condition of the formation of an oligarchical government; nor would he ever again set foot amidst the odious democracy to whom he owed his banishment.²

Such was the first originating germ of that temporary calamity, which so nearly brought Athens to absolute ruin, called the Oligarchy of Four Hundred: a suggestion from the same exile who had already so deeply wounded his country by sending Gylippus to Syracuse, and the Lacedæmonian garrison to Dekeleia. As yet, no man in Samos had thought of a revolution; but the moment that the idea was thus started, the trierarchs and wealthy men in the armament caught at it with avidity. To subvert the democracy for their own profit, and to be rewarded for doing so with the treasures of Persia as a means of carrying on the war against the Peloponnesians, was an extent of good fortune greater than they could possibly have hoped. Amidst the exhaustion of the public treasure at Athens, and the loss of tribute from her dependencies, it was now the private proprietors, and most of all, the wealthy proprietors, upon whom the cost of military operations fell: from which burden they here saw the prospect of relief, coupled with increased chance of victory. Elate with so tempting a promise, a deputation of them crossed over from Samos to the mainland to converse personally with Alkibiadês,

¹ Thucyd. viii, 47. Τὰ μὲν καὶ Ἀλκιβιάδου προσπέμψαντος λόγους ἐς τοὺς δυνάστατους αὐτῶν (Ἀθηναίων) ἄνδρας, ὥστε μνησθῆναι περὶ αὐτοῦ ἐς τοὺς βελτίστους τῶν ἀνθρώπων, ὅτι ἐπ' ὀλιγαρχίᾳ βούλεται, καὶ οὐ κοινῇ οὐδὲ δημοκρατίᾳ τῇ ἐναντιὸν ἐκβαλοῦσα, κατελθῶσι, etc.

² Thucyd. viii, 47.

who again renewed his assurances in person, that he would bring not only Tissaphernês, but the Great King himself, into active alliance and coöperation with Athens, provided they would put down the Athenian democracy, which he affirmed that the king could not possibly trust.¹ He doubtless did not omit to set forth the other side of the alternative; that, if the proposition were refused, Persian aid would be thrown heartily into the scale of the Peloponnesians, in which case, there was no longer any hope of safety for Athens.

On the return of the deputation with these fresh assurances, the oligarchical men in Samos came together, both in greater number and with redoubled ardor, to take their measures for subverting the democracy. They even ventured to speak of the project openly among the mass of the armament, who listened to it with nothing but aversion, but who were silenced at least, though not satisfied, by being told that the Persian treasury would be thrown open to them on condition, and only on condition, that they would relinquish their democracy. Such was at this time the indispensable need of foreign money for the purposes of the war, such was the certainty of ruin, if the Persian treasure went to the aid of the enemy, that the most democratical Athenian might well hesitate when the alternative was thus laid before him. The oligarchical conspirators, however, knew well that they had the feeling of the armament altogether against them, that the best which they could expect from it was a reluctant acquiescence, and that they must accomplish the revolution by their own hands and management. They formed themselves into a political confederacy, or *hetæria*, for the purpose of discussing the best measures towards their end. It was resolved to send a deputation to Athens, with Peisander² at the head, to

¹ Thucyd. viii. 48.

² It is asserted in an Oration of Lysias (Orat. xxv. *Δίμου Καταλύσεως Ἀπολογία*, c. 3, p. 766, Reisk.) that Phrynichus and Peisander embarked in this oligarchical conspiracy for the purpose of getting clear of previous crimes committed under the democracy. But there is nothing to countenance this assertion, and the narrative of Thucydides gives quite a different color to their behavior.

Peisander was now serving with the armament at Samos; moreover, his forwardness and energy — presently to be described — in taking the formid-

make known the new prospects, and to put the standing oligarchical clubs, or *hetæries*, into active coöperation for the purpose of violently breaking up the democracy, and farther to establish oligarchical governments in all the remaining dependencies of Athens. They imagined that these dependencies would be thus induced to remain faithful to her, perhaps even that some of those which had already revolted might come back to their allegiance, when once she should be relieved from her democracy, and placed under the rule of her "best and most virtuous citizens."

Hitherto, the bargain tendered for acceptance had been, subversion of the Athenian democracy and restoration of Alkibiadês, on one hand, against hearty coöperation, and a free supply of gold from Persia, on the other. But what security was there that such bargain would be realized, or that when the first part should have been brought to pass, the second would follow? There was absolutely no security except the word of Alkibiadês, — very little to be trusted, even when promising what was in his own power to perform, as we may recollect from his memorable dealing with the Lacedæmonian envoys at Athens, — and on the present occasion, vouching for something in itself extravagant and preposterous. For what reasonable motive could be imagined to make the Great King shape his foreign policy according to the interests of Alkibiadês, or to inspire him with such lively interest in the substitution of oligarchy for democracy at Athens? This was a question which the oligarchical conspirators at Samos not only never troubled themselves to raise, but which they had every motive to suppress. The suggestion of Alkibiadês coincided fully with their political interest and ambition. Their object was to put down the democracy, and get possession of the

able initiative of putting down the Athenian democracy, is to me quite sufficient evidence that the taunts of the comic writers against his cowardice are unfounded. Xenophon in the *Symposion* repeats this taunt (ii, 14) which also appears in Aristophanês, *Eupolis*, *Plato Comicus*, and others see the passages collected in Meineke, *Histor. Critic. Comicor. Græcorum*, vol. i, p. 178. etc.

Modern writers on Grecian history often repeat such bitter jests as if they were so much genuine and trustworthy evidence against the person labelled

government for themselves; and the promise of Persian gold, if they could get it accredited, was inestimable as a stepping-stone towards this goal, whether it afterwards turned out to be a delusion or not. The probability is, that having a strong interest in believing it themselves, and a still stronger interest in making others believe it, they talked each other into a sincere persuasion. Without adverting to this fact, we should be at a loss to understand how the word of such a man as Alkibiadēs, on such a matter, could be so implicitly accepted as to set in motion a whole train of novel and momentous events.

There was one man, and one man alone, so far as we know, who ventured openly to call it in question. This was Phrynichus, one of the generals of the fleet, who had recently given valuable counsel after the victory of Milētus; a clear-sighted and sagacious man, but personally hostile to Alkibiadēs, and thoroughly seeing through his character and projects. Though Phrynichus was afterwards one of the chief organizers of the oligarchical movement, when it became detached from, and hostile to Alkibiadēs, yet under the actual circumstances he discountenanced it altogether.¹ Alkibiadēs, he said, had no attachment to oligarchical government rather than to democratical; nor could he be relied on for standing by it after it should have been set up. His only purpose was, to make use of the oligarchical conspiracy now forming, for his own restoration; which, if brought to pass, could not fail to introduce political discord into the camp, the greatest misfortune that could at present happen. As to the Persian king, it was unreasonable to expect that he would put himself out of his way to aid the Athenians, his old enemies, in whom he had no confidence, while he had the Peloponnesians present as allies, with a good naval force and powerful cities in his own territory, from whom he had never experienced either insult or annoyance. Moreover, the dependencies of Athens — upon whom it was now proposed to confer simultaneously with Athens herself, the blessing of oligarchical government — would

¹ Phrynichus is affirmed, in an Oration of Lysias, to have been originally poor, keeping sheep in the country part of Attica; then, to have resided in the city, and practised what was called *sycophancy*, or false and vexatious accusation before the dikastery and the public assembly, (Lysias, Orat. xx pro Polystrato, c. 3, p. 674, Reisk.)

receive that boon with indifference. Those who had already revolted would not come back, those who yet remained faithful, would not be the more inclined to remain so longer. Their object would be to obtain autonomy, either under oligarchy or democracy, as the case might be. Assuredly, they would not expect better treatment from an oligarchical government at Athens, than from a democratical; for they knew that those self-styled "good and virtuous" men, who would form the oligarchy, were, as ministers of democracy, the chief advisers and instigators of the people to iniquitous deeds, most commonly for nothing but their own individual profit. From an Athenian oligarchy, the citizens of these dependencies had nothing to expect but violent executions without any judicial trial; but under the democracy, they could obtain shelter and the means of appeal, while their persecutors were liable to restraint and chastisement, from the people and the popular dikasteries. Such, Phrynichus affirmed on his own personal knowledge, was the genuine feeling among the dependencies of Athens.¹ Having thus shown the calculations of the conspirators — as to Alkibiadēs, as to Persia, and as to the allied dependencies — to be all illusory, Phrynichus concluded by entering his decided protest against adopting the propositions of Alkibiadēs.

But in this protest, borne out afterwards by the result, he stood nearly alone. The tide of opinion, among the oligarchical conspir-

¹ Thucyd. viii. 48. Τὰς τε ξυμμαχίας πόλεις, αἷς ἐπεσχίσθαι ὅτι τὸν ὀλιγαρχίαν, ὅτι δὲ καὶ αὐτοὶ οὐ δημοκρατήσονται, εὖ εἶδέναι ἔργον ὅτι οὐδὲν μᾶλλον σφίσι οἷον αἱ ἀφιστηκῆναι προσχωρήσονται. οὐδ' αἱ ἐπάρχονσαι βέλαιότεραι ἔσονται· οὐ γὰρ βουλήσονται αὐτοὺς μετ' ὀλιγαρχίας ἢ δημοκρατίας δουλείην μᾶλλον, ἢ μετ' ὀλιγαρχίας ἢ δημοκρατίας εὐνοίας εἶναι. τοῖς τε καλοῦς καὶ κακοῖς ὀνόμαζομένους οὐκ ἔλασσαν αὐτοὺς νομίζον σφίσι πρὸς τὸν δῆμον, πορίστας οὐκ αὐτὰς καὶ ἐσχηγῆτας τῶν κακῶν τῷ δήμῳ, ἐξ ὧν τὰ πλεῖστα αὐτοὺς ἐκείναι· καὶ τὸ μὲν ἐπ' ἐκείνοις εἶναι, καὶ ἀκριτοὶ ἂν καὶ βέλαιότεροι ἀποθνήσκουσιν, τὸν τε δῆμον σφῶν τε καταφυγὴν εἶναι καὶ ἐκείνων σωφρονιστὴν. καὶ τὰντα παρ' αὐτῶν τῶν ἐργῶν ἐπισταμένους· ὅς πόλεις σάως αὐτοὺς εἶδέναι, ὅτι οὕτω νομίζουσι.

In taking the comparison between oligarchy and democracy in Greece, there is hardly any evidence more important than this passage: a testimony to the comparative merit of democracy, pronounced by an oligarchical conspirator, and sanctioned by an historian himself unfriendly to the democracy.

ators, ran so furiously the other way, that it was resolved to despatch Peisander and others immediately to Athens to consummate the oligarchical revolution as well as the recall of Alkibiadês; and at the same time to propose to the people their new intended ally, Tissaphernês.

Phrynichus knew well what would be the consequence to himself — if this consummation were brought about, as he foresaw that it probably would be — from the vengeance of his enemy Alkibiadês against his recent opposition. Satisfied that the latter would destroy him, he took measures for destroying Alkibiadês beforehand, even by a treasonable communication to the Lacedæmonian admiral Astyochus at Milêtus, to whom he sent a secret account of the intrigues which the Athenian exile was carrying on at Samos to the prejudice of the Peloponnesians, prefaced with an awkward apology for this sacrifice of the interests of his country to the necessity of protecting himself against a personal enemy. But Phrynichus was imperfectly informed of the real character of the Spartan commander, or of his relations with Tissaphernês and Alkibiadês. Not merely was the latter now at Magnesia, under the protection of the satrap, and out of the power of the Lacedæmonians, but Astyochus, a traitor to his duty through the gold of Tissaphernês, went up thither to show the letter of Phrynichus to the very person whom it was intended to expose. Alkibiadês forthwith sent intelligence to the generals and officers at Samos, of the step taken by Phrynichus, and pressed them to put him to death.

The life of Phrynichus now hung by a thread, and was probably preserved only by that respect for judicial formalities so deeply rooted in the Athenian character. In the extremity of danger, he resorted to a still more subtle artifice to save himself. He despatched a second letter to Astyochus, complaining of the violation of confidence in regard to the former, but at the same time intimating that he was now willing to betray to the Lacedæmonians the camp and armament at Samos. He invited Astyochus to come and attack the place, which was as yet unfortified, explaining minutely in what manner the attack could be best conducted. And he concluded by saying that this, as well as every other means of defence, must be pardoned to one whose life was in danger from a personal enemy. Foreseeing that Astyochus

would betray this letter as he had betrayed the former, Phrynichus waited a proper time, and then revealed to the camp the intention of the enemy to make an attack, as if it had reached him by private information. He insisted on the necessity of immediate precautions, and himself, as general, superintended the work of fortification, which was soon completed. Presently arrived a letter from Alkibiadês, communicating to the army that Phrynichus had betrayed them, and that the Peloponnesians were on the point of making an attack. But this letter, arriving after the precautions taken by order of Phrynichus himself had been already completed, was construed as a mere trick on the part of Alkibiadês himself, through his acquaintance with the intentions of the Peloponnesians, to raise a charge of treasonable correspondence against his personal enemy. The impression thus made by his second letter effaced the taint which had been left upon Phrynichus by the first, insomuch that the latter stood exculpated on both charges.¹

But Phrynichus, though successful in extricating himself, failed thoroughly in his manœuvre against the influence and life of Alkibiadês; in whose favor the oligarchical movement not only went on, but was transferred from Samos to Athens. On arriving at the latter place, Peisander and his companions laid before the public assembly the projects which had been conceived by the oligarchs at Samos. The people were invited to restore Alkibiadês and renounce their democratical constitution; in return for which, they were assured of obtaining the Persian king as an ally, and of overcoming the Peloponnesians.² Violent was the storm which these propositions raised in the public as-

¹ Thucyd. viii, 50, 51.

² In the speech made by Theramênês (the Athenian) during the oligarchy of Thirty, seven years afterwards, it is affirmed that the Athenian people voted the adoption of the oligarchy of Four Hundred, from being told that the Lacedæmonians would never trust a democracy (Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 3, 45).

This is thoroughly incorrect, a specimen of the loose assertion of speakers in regard to facts even not very long past. At the moment when Theramênês said this, the question, what political constitution at Athens the Lacedæmonians would please to tolerate, was all-important to the Athenians. Theramênês transfers the feelings of the present to the incidents of the past.

sembly. Many speakers rose in animated defence of the democracy; few, if any, distinctly against it. The opponents of Alkibiadès indignantly denounced the mischief of restoring him, in violation of the laws, and in reversal of a judicial sentence, while the Eumolpidæ and Kerykes, the sacred families connected with the Eleusinian mysteries which Alkibiadès had violated, entered their solemn protest on religious grounds to the same effect. Against all these vehement opponents, whose impassioned invectives obtained the full sympathy of the assembly, Peisander had but one simple reply. He called them forward successively by name, and put to each the question: "What hope have you of salvation for the city, when the Peloponnesians have a naval force against us fully equal to ours, together with a greater number of allied cities, and when the king as well as Tissaphernès are supplying them with money, while we have no money left? What hope have you of salvation, unless we can persuade the king to come over to our side?" The answer was a melancholy negative, or perhaps not less melancholy silence. "Well, then, rejoined Peisander, that object cannot possibly be attained, unless we conduct our political affairs for the future in a more moderate way, and put the powers of government more in the hands of a few, and unless we recall Alkibiadès, the only man now living who is competent to do the business. Under present circumstances, we surely shall not lay greater stress upon our political constitution than upon the salvation of the city; the rather as what we now enact may be hereafter modified, if it be found not to answer."

Against the proposed oligarchical change, the repugnance of the assembly was alike angry and unanimous. But they were silenced by the imperious necessity of the case, as the armament at Samos had been before; and admitting the alternative laid down by Peisander, as I have observed already, the most democratical citizen might be embarrassed as to his vote. Whether any speaker, like Phrynichus at Samos, arraigned the fallacy of the alternative, and called upon Peisander for some guarantee, better than mere asseveration, of the benefits to come, we are not informed. But the general vote of the assembly, reluctant and only passed in the hope of future change, sanctioned his recom-

mendation.¹ He and ten other envoys, invested with full powers of negotiating with Alkibiadès and Tissaphernès, were despatched to Ionia immediately. Peisander at the same time obtained from the assembly a vote deposing Phrynichus from his command; under the accusation of having traitorously caused the loss of Iasus and the capture of Amorgès, after the battle of Milètus, but from the real certainty that he would prove an insuperable bar to all negotiations with Alkibiadès. Phrynichus, with his colleague Skironidès, being thus displaced, Leon and Diomedon were sent to Samos as commanders in their stead; an appointment of which, as will be presently seen, Peisander was far from anticipating the consequences.

Before his departure for Asia, he took a step yet more important. He was well aware that the recent vote — a result of fear inspired by the war, representing a sentiment utterly at variance with that of the assembly, and only procured as the price of Persian aid against a foreign enemy — would never pass into a reality by the spontaneous act of the people themselves. It was, indeed, indispensable as a first step; partly as an authority to himself, partly also as a confession of the temporary weakness of the democracy, and as a sanction and encouragement for the oligarchical forces to show themselves. But the second step yet remained to be performed; that of calling these forces into energetic action, organizing an amount of violence sufficient to extort from the people actual submission in addition to verbal acquiescence, and thus, as it were, tying down the patient while the process of emasculation was being consummated. Peisander visited all the various political clubs, conspiracies, or

¹ Thucyd. viii, 54. 'Ο δὲ δῆμος τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ἀκούων χαλεπῶς ἔφερε τὸ περὶ τῆς ὀλιγαρχίας· σαφῶς δὲ διδασκόμενος ὑπὸ τοῦ Πεισάνδρου μὴ εἶναι ἀλλήν σωτηρίαν, δέισας, καὶ ἅμα ἐλπίζων ὡς καὶ μεταβαλεῖται, ἐνέδωκε.

"Atheniensibus, imminente periculo belli, major salutis quam dignitatis cura fuit. Itaque, permittente populo, imperium ad Senatum transfertur," (Justin, v, 3).

Justin is correct, so far as this vote goes: but he takes no notice of the change of matters afterwards, when the establishment of the Four Hundred was consummated without the promised benefit of Persian alliance, and by simple terrorism.

hetæries, which were habitual and notorious at Athens; associations, bound together by oath, among the wealthy citizens, partly for purposes of amusement, but chiefly pledging the members to stand by each other in objects of political ambition, in judicial trials, in accusation or defence of official men after the period of office had expired, in carrying points through the public assembly, etc. Among these clubs were distributed most of "the best citizens, the good and honorable men, the elegant men, the well known, the temperate, the honest and moderate men,"¹ etc., to employ that complimentary phraseology by which wealthy and anti-popular politicians have chosen to designate each other, in ancient as well as in modern times. And though there were doubtless individuals among them who deserved these appellations in their best sense, yet the general character of the clubs was not the less exclusive and oligarchical. In the details of political life, they had different partialities as well as different antipathies, and were oftener in opposition than in coöperation with each other. But they furnished, when taken together, a formidable anti-popular force; generally either in abeyance or disseminated in the accomplishment of smaller political measures and separate personal successes; but capable, at a special crisis, of being evoked, organized, and put in conjoint attack, for the subversion of the democracy. Such was the important movement now initiated by Peisander. He visited separately each of these clubs, put them into communication with each other, and exhorted them all to joint aggressive action against their common enemy the democracy, at a moment when it was already intimidated and might be finally overthrown.²

¹ Οἱ βέλτιστοι, οἱ καλὸν καὶ ἄγαθον, οἱ χαριεῖς, οἱ ἡρόδοτοι, οἱ σώφρονες, etc.: le parti honnête et modéré, etc.

² About these *ἐταῖρια καὶ δίκαις καὶ ἀρχαῖς*, political and judicial associations, see above, in this History, vol. iv, ch. xxxvii, pp. 399, 400; vol. vi, ch. li, pp. 290, 291; see also Hermann Büttner, Geschichte der politischen Hetærien zu Athen, pp. 75, 79, Leipzig, 1840.

There seem to have been similar political clubs or associations at Carthage, exercising much influence, and holding perpetual banquets as a means of largess to the poor, Aristotel. Polit. ii, 8, 2; Livy, xxxiii, 46; xxxiv, 61; compare Kluge, ad Aristotle. De Polit. Carthag. pp. 46-127, Wratisl. 1824. The like political associations were both of long duration among the

Having taken other necessary measures towards the same purpose, Peisander left Athens with his colleagues to enter upon his

mobility of Rome, and of much influence for political objects as well as judicial success: "coitiones (compare Cicero pro Cluentio, c. 54, s. 148) honorum adipiscendorum causâ factæ, factiones, sodalitates." The incident described in Livy (ix. 26) is remarkable. The senate, suspecting the character and proceedings of these clubs, appointed the dictator Mænius (in 312 B.C.) as commissioner with full power to investigate and deal with them. But such was the power of the clubs, in a case where they had a common interest and acted in coöperation (as was equally the fact under Peisander at Athens), that they completely frustrated the inquiry, and went on as before. "Nec diutius, ut fit, quam dum recens erat, quæstio per clara nomina rorum viguit: inde labi cepit ad viliora capita, donec coitionibus factionibusque, adversus quas comparata erat, oppressa est." (Livy. ix, 26.) Compare Dio. Cass. xxxvii, 57, about the *ἐταῖρικὰ* of the Triumvirs at Rome. Quintus Cicero (de Petition. Consulatus, c. 5) says to his brother, the orator: "Quod si satis grati homines essent, hæc omnia (i. e. all the *subsidia* necessary for success in his coming election) tibi parata esse debebant, sicut patata esse confido. Nam hoc biennio quatuor *sodalitates* civium ad ambitionem gratiosissimorum tibi obligasti.... Horum in causis ad te deferendis quidam eorum sodales tibi receperint et confirmarint, scio; nam in tenui."

See Th. Mommsen, De Collegiis et Sodaliciis Romanorum, Kiel, 1843, ch. iii, sects. 5, 6, 7; also the Dissertation of Wunder, inserted in the Onomasticon Tullianum of Orelli and Baier, in the last volume of their edition of Cicero, pp. 200-210, ad Ind. Legum; *Lex Licinia de Sodalitiis*.

As an example of these clubs or conspiracies for mutual support in *ἐν πολιτείᾳ ἐπὶ δίκαις* (not including *ἀρχαῖς*, so far as we can make out), we may cite the association called οἱ Εἰκαδεῖς, made known to us by an Inscription recently discovered in Attica, and published first in Dr. Wordsworth's Athens and Attica, p. 223; next in Ross, Die Deme von Attica, Preface p. v. These Εἰκαδεῖς are an association, the members of which are bound to each other by a common oath, as well as by a curse which the mythical hero of the association, Eikadeus, is supposed to have imprecated (*ἐνάντιον τῷ ἄνδρι Εἰκαδὲς ἐπηύρατο*); they possess common property, and it was held contrary to the oath for any of the members to enter into a pecuniary process against the *κοινόν*: compare analogous obligations among the Roman Sodales, Mommsen, p. 4. Some members had violated their obligation upon this point: Polyxenus had attacked them at law for false witness: and the general body of the Eikadeis pass a vote of thanks to him for so doing, and choose three of their members to assist him in the cause before the dikastery (*οἵτινες ἀναγωνιεύονται τῷ ἐπεσκημμένῳ τοῖς μάρτυσι*): compare the *ἐταῖρια* alluded to in Demosthenes (cont. Theokrin. c. 11, p. 1335) assisting Theokrinês before the dikastery, and intimidating the witnesses.

negotiation with Tissaphernês. But the coöperation and aggressive movement of the clubs which he had originated was prosecuted with increased ardor during his absence, and even fell into hands more organizing and effective than his own. The rhetorical teacher Antiphon, of the deme Rhamnus, took it in hand especially, acquired the confidence of the clubs, and drew the plan of campaign against the democracy. He was a man estimable in private life, and not open to pecuniary corruption: in other respects, of preëminent ability,—in contrivance, judgment, speech, and action. The profession to which he belonged, generally unpopular among the democracy, excluding him from taking rank as a speaker either in the public assembly or the dikastery: for a rhetorical teacher, contending in either of them against a private speaker, to repeat a remark already once made, was considered to stand at the same unfair advantage, as a fencing-master fighting a duel with a gentleman would be held to stand in modern times. Thus debarred himself from the showy celebrity of Athenian political life, Antiphon became only the more consummate, as a master of advice, calculation, scheming, and rhetorical composition,¹ to assist the celebrity of others; insomuch that

The Guilds in the European cities during the Middle Ages, usually sworn to by every member, and called *conjuraciones Amicitie*, bear in many respects a resemblance to these *ἑνωμοσίαι*; though the judicial proceedings in the mediæval cities, being so much less popular than at Athens, narrowed their range of interference in this direction: their political importance, however, was quite equal. (See Wilda, *Das Gilden Wesen des Mittelalters*, Abschn. ii, p. 167, etc.)

"Omnes autem ad Amicitiam pertinentes villæ per fidem et sacramentum firmaverunt, quod unus subveniat alteri tanquam fratri suo in utili et honesto," (ib. p. 148.)

¹ The person described by Krito, in the *Euthydêmus* of Plato (c. 31, p. 305, C.), as having censured Sokratês for conversing with Euthydêmus and Dionysodôrus, is presented exactly like Antiphon in Thucydides: *ἡκιστα νῆ τὸν Δία ῥήτωρ· οὐδὲ οἶμαι πώποτε αὐτὸν ἐπὶ δικαστήριον ἀναβεβηκέναι· ἀλλ' ἐπαίειν αὐτὸν φασὶ περὶ τοῦ πράγματος, νῆ τὸν Δία, καὶ δεινὸν εἶναι καὶ δεινὸς λόγους ἐντιθέναι.*

Heindorf thinks that Isokratês is here meant: Groen van Prinsterer talks of Lysias; Winkelmann, of Thrasymachus. The description would fit Antiphon as well as either of these three: though Stallbaum may perhaps be right in supposing no particular individual to have been in the mind of Plato.

his silent assistance in political and judicial debates, as a sort of chamber-counsel, was highly appreciated and largely paid. Now such were precisely the talents required for the present occasion; while Antiphon, who hated the democracy for having hitherto kept him in the shade, gladly bent his full talents towards its subversion.

Such was the man to whom Peisander, in departing, chiefly confided the task of organizing the anti-popular clubs, for the consummation of the revolution already in immediate prospect. His chief auxiliary was Theramenês, another Athenian, now first named, of eminent ability and cunning. His father (either natural or by adoption), Agnon, was one of the probûli, and had formerly been founder of Amphipolis. Even Phrynichus — whose sagacity we have already had occasion to appreciate, and who, from hatred towards Alkibiadês, had pronounced himself decidedly against the oligarchical movement at Samos — became zealous in forwarding the movement at Athens, after his dismissal from the command. He brought to the side of Antiphon and Theramenês a contriving head not inferior to theirs, coupled with daring and audacity even superior. Under such skilful leaders, the anti-popular force of Athens was organized with a deep skill, and directed with a dexterous wickedness, never before witnessed in Greece.

At the time when Peisander and the other envoys reached Ionia, seemingly about the end of January or beginning of February 411 B.C., the Peloponnesian fleet had already quitted Miletus and gone to Knidus and Rhodes, on which latter island Leon and Diomedon made some hasty descents, from the neighboring island of Chalkê. At the same time the Athenian armament at Chios was making progress in the siege of that place and the construction of the neighboring fort at Delphinium. Pedaritus, the Lacedæmonian governor of the island, had sent pressing messages to solicit aid from the Peloponnesians at Rhodes, but no aid arrived; and he therefore resolved to attempt a general

Οἱ ἀνδρες ἐπιτάκται, whom Xenophon specifies as being so eminently useful to a person engaged in a lawsuit, are probably the persons who knew how to address the dikastery effectively in support of his case (Xen. *Memorab.* i, 2, 51).

ally and attack upon the Athenians with his whole force, foreign as well as Chian. Though at first he obtained some success, the battle ended in his complete defeat and death, with great slaughter of the Chian troops, and with the loss of many whose shields were captured in the pursuit.¹ The Chians, now reduced to greater straits than before, and beginning to suffer severely from famine, were only enabled to hold out by a partial reinforcement soon afterwards obtained from the Peloponnesian guardships at Milêtus. A Spartan named Leon, who had come out in the vessel of Antisthenês as one of the epibatæ, or marines, conducted this reinforcing squadron of twelve triremes, chiefly Thurian and Syracusan, succeeding Pedaritus in the general command of the island.²

It was while Chios seemed thus likely to be recovered by Athens — and while the superior Peloponnesian fleet was paralyzed at Rhodes by Persian intrigues and bribes — that Peisander arrived in Ionia to open his negotiations with Alkibiadês and Tissaphernês. He was enabled to announce that the subversion of the democracy at Athens was already begun, and would soon be consummated: and he now required the price which had been promised in exchange, Persian alliance and aid to Athens against

¹ Thucyd. viii. 55, 56.

² Thucyd. viii. 61. ἔτυχον δὲ ἐπεὶ ἐν Πάδῳ ὄντος Ἀστυάρχου ἐκ τῆς Μιλήτου λέοντά τε ἄνδρα Σπαρτιατὴν, ὃς Ἀντισθένει ἐπιβάτης ἑνὶ πλοίῳ, τοῦτον κεκομισμένοι μετὰ τὸν Πεδάρиту θάνατον ἄρχοντα, etc.

I do not see why the word ἐπιβάτης should not be construed here, as elsewhere, in its ordinary sense of *miles classarius*. The commentators, see the notes of Dr. Arnold, Poppo, and Gôller start difficulties which seem to me of little importance; and they imagine divers new meanings, for none of which any authority is produced. We ought not to wonder that a common *miles classarius*, or marine, being a Spartan citizen, should be appointed commander at Chios, when, a few chapters afterwards, we find Thrasybulus at Samos promoted, from being a common hoplite in the ranks, to be one of the Athenian generals (viii. 73).

The like remark may be made on the passage cited from Xenophon (Hellenic. i. 3. 17), about Hegesandridas—ἐπιβάτης ὡς Μινδάρου, where also the commentators reject the common meaning (see Schneider's note in the Addenda to his edition of 1791. p. 97). The participle ὡς in that passage must be considered as an inaccurate substitute for γεγεννημένος, since Mindarus was dead at the time. Hegesandridas had been among the epibatæ of Mindarus, and was now in command of a squadron on the coast of Thrace

the Peloponnesians. But Alkibiadês knew well that he had promised what he had not the least chance of being able to perform. The satrap had appeared to follow his advice, — or had rather followed his own inclination, employing Alkibiadês as an instrument and auxiliary, — in the endeavor to wear out both parties, and to keep them nearly on an equality until each should ruin the other. But he was no way disposed to identify himself with the cause of Athens, and to break decidedly with the Peloponnesians, especially at a moment when their fleet was both the greater of the two, and in occupation of an island close to his own satrapy. Accordingly Alkibiadês, when summoned by the Athenian envoys to perform his engagement, found himself in a dilemma from which he could only escape by one of his characteristic manœuvres.

Receiving the envoys himself in conjunction with Tissaphernês, and speaking on behalf of the latter, he pushed his demands to an extent which he knew that the Athenians would never concede, in order that the rupture might seem to be on their side, and not on his. First, he required the whole of Ionia to be conceded to the Great King; next, all the neighboring islands, with some other items besides.¹ Large as these requisitions were, comprehending the cession of Lesbos and Samos as well as Chios, and replacing the Persian monarchy in the condition in which it had stood in 496 B.C., before the Ionic revolt, Peisander and his colleagues granted them all: so that Alkibiadês was on the point of seeing his deception exposed and frustrated. At last, he betought himself of a fresh demand, which touched Athenian pride, as well as Athenian safety, in the tenderest place. He required that the Persian king should be held free to build ships of war in unlimited number, and to keep them sailing along the coast as he might think fit, through all these new portions of territory. After the immense concessions already made, the envoys not only rejected this fresh demand at once, but resented it as an insult, which exposed the real drift and purpose

¹ Thucyd. viii. 56. Ἰωνίαν τε γὰρ πᾶσαν ἡξιοῦν δίδοσθαι, καὶ αὐθις νήσους τε ἐπικειμένους καὶ ἄλλα, οἷς οὐκ ἐναντιούμενων τῶν Ἀθηναίων, etc.

What this *et cetera* comprehended, we cannot divine. The demand was certainly ample enough without it.

of Alkibiadês. Not merely did it cancel the boasted treaty, called the Peace of Kallias, concluded about forty years before between Athens and Persia, and limiting the Persian ships of war to the sea eastward of Phaselis, but it extinguished the maritime empire of Athens, and compromised the security of all the coasts and islands of the Ægean. To see Lesbos, Chios, and Samos, etc., in possession of Persia, was sufficiently painful; but if there came to be powerful Persian fleets on these islands it would be the certain precursor and means of farther conquests to the westward, and would revive the aggressive dispositions of the Great King, as they had stood at the beginning of the reign of Xerxes. Peisander and his comrades, abruptly breaking off the debate, returned to Samos; indignant at the discovery, which they now made for the first time, that Alkibiadês had juggled them from the outset, and was imposing conditions which he knew to be inadmissible.¹ They still appear, however, to have thought that Alkibiadês acted thus, not because he *could* not, but because he *would* not, bring about the alliance under discussion.² They suspected him of playing false with the oligarchical movement which he had himself instigated, and of projecting the accomplishment of his own restoration, coupled with the alliance of Tissaphernês, into the bosom of the democracy which he had begun by denouncing. Such was the light in which they presented his conduct, venting their disappointment in invectives against his duplicity, and in asseverations that he was after all unsuitable for a place in oligarchical society. Such declarations,

¹ Thucyd. viii, 56. *ταῖς ἡμετέροις ἀποδείξαι, καὶ παραδείξαι, τὴν ἐαυτοῦ γὰρ ἐπὶ αὐτῶν καὶ ὅσων αὐτῶν ἐστὶν.*

In my judgment *ἐαυτοῦ* is decidedly the proper reading here, not *ἐαυτῶν*. I agree in this respect with Dr. Arnold, Becker, and Gellier.

In a former volume of this History, I have shown reasons for believing, in opposition to Mitford, Dahlmann, and others, that the treaty called by the name of Kallias, and sometimes miscalled by the name of Kimon, was a real fact and not a boastful fiction: see vol. v. ch. vii, p. 340.

The note of Dr. Arnold, though generally just, gives an inadequate representation of the strong reasons of Athens for rejecting and rejecting this third demand.

² Thucyd. viii, 63. *Καὶ ἐν οἷσιν αὐτοῖς ἀπαρτῆσαι τὴν Σάμον τῶν Ἀθηναίων κοινολογούμενοι ἐπέβησαν, Ἀλκιβιάδην μὲν, ἐπεὶ ἰδὲ ἡ περὶ οὗ βελτίτεται τὴν (καὶ γὰρ οὐκ ἐπιτελείον αὐτὸν εἶναι ἐξ ἀληθείας) ἐλθεῖν, etc.*

circulated at Samos, to account for their unexpected ~~retreat~~ in realizing the hopes which they had raised, created among the armament an impression that Alkibiadês was really favorable to the democracy, at the same time leaving unabated the prestige of his unbounded ascendancy over Tissaphernês and the Great King. We shall presently see the effects resulting from this belief.

Immediately after the rupture of the negotiations, however, the satrap took a step well calculated to destroy the hopes of the Athenians altogether, so far as Persian aid was concerned. Though persisting in his policy of lending no decisive assistance to either party and of merely prolonging the war so as to enfeeble both, he yet began to fear that he was pushing matters too far against the Peloponnesians, who had now been two months inactive at Rhodes, with their large fleet hauled ashore. He had no treaty with them actually in force, since Lichas had disallowed the two previous conventions; nor had he furnished them with pay or maintenance. His bribes to the officers had hitherto kept the armament quiet; yet we do not distinctly see how so large a body of men found subsistence.¹ He was now, however, apprized that they could find subsistence no longer, and that they would probably desert, or commit depredations on the coast of his satrapy, or perhaps be driven to hasten on a general action with the Athenians, under desperate circumstances. Under such apprehensions he felt compelled to put himself again in communication with them, to furnish them with pay, and to conclude with them a third convention, the proposition of which he had refused to entertain at Knidus. He therefore went to Kaunos, invited the Peloponnesian leaders to Miletus, and concluded with them near that town a treaty to the following effect:—

“In this thirteenth year of the reign of Darius, and in the ephorship of Alexippidas at Lacedæmon, a convention is hereby concluded by the Lacedæmonians and their allies, with Tissa-

¹ Thucyd. vii, 44–57. In two parallel cases, one in Chios, the other in Korkyra, the seamen of an unpaid armament found subsistence by hiring themselves out for agricultural labor. But this was only during the summer (see Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 1, 1; vi, 2, 37), while the stay of the Peloponnesians at Rhodes was from January to March.

phernês and Hieramenês and the sons of Pharnakês, respecting the affairs of the king and of the Lacedæmonians and their allies. The territory of the king, as much of it as is in Asia, shall belong to the king. Let the king determine as he chooses respecting his own territory. The Lacedæmonians and their allies shall not approach the king's territory with any mischievous purpose, nor shall the king approach that of the Lacedæmonians and their allies with any like purpose. If any one among the Lacedæmonians or their allies shall approach the king's territory with mischievous purpose, the Lacedæmonians and their allies shall hinder him: if any one from the king's territory shall approach the Lacedæmonians or their allies with mischievous purpose, the king shall hinder him. Tissaphernês shall provide pay and maintenance, for the fleet now present, at the rate already stipulated, until the king's fleet shall arrive; after that, it shall be at the option of the Lacedæmonians to maintain their own fleet, if they think fit; or, if they prefer, Tissaphernês shall furnish maintenance, and at the close of the war the Lacedæmonians shall repay to him what they have received. After the king's fleet shall have arrived, the two fleets shall carry on war conjointly, in such manner as shall seem good to Tissaphernês and the Lacedæmonians and their allies. If they choose to close the war with the Athenians, they shall close it only by joint consent."¹

In comparing this third convention with the two preceding, we find that nothing is now stipulated as to any territory except the continent of Asia; which is insured unreservedly to the king, of course with all the Greek residents planted upon it. But by a diplomatic finesse, the terms of the treaty imply that this is not *all* the territory which the king is entitled to claim, though nothing is covenanted as to any remainder.² Next, this third treaty includes Pharnabazus, the son of Pharnakês, with his satrapy of Daskylium, and Hieramenês, with his district, the extent and position of which we do not know; while in the former

¹ Thucyd. viii, 58.

² Thucyd. viii, 58. χώραν τὴν βασιλείᾳ, ὅση τῆς Ἀσίας ἐστὶ, βασιλείᾳ εἶναι· καὶ περὶ τῆς χώρας τῆς αὐτοῦ βουλευέντω βασιλεὺς ὁπως βούλεται.

treaties no other satrap except Tissaphernês had been concerned. We must recollect that the Peloponnesian fleet included those twenty-seven triremes, which had been brought across by Kalligeitus expressly for the aid of Pharnabazus; and therefore that the latter now naturally became a party to the general operations. Thirdly, we here find, for the first time, formal announcement of a Persian fleet about to be brought up as auxiliary to the Peloponnesians. This was a promise which the satrap now set forth more plainly than before, to amuse them, and to abate the mistrust which they had begun to conceive of his sincerity. It served the temporary purpose of restraining them from any immediate act of despair hostile to his interests, which was all that he looked for. While he renewed his payments, therefore, for the moment, he affected to busy himself in orders and preparations for the fleet from Phenicia.¹

The Peloponnesian fleet was now ordered to move from Rhodes. Before it quitted that island, however, envoys came thither from Eretria and from Orôpus; which latter place, a dependency on the northeastern frontier of Attica, though protected by an Athenian garrison, had recently been surprised and captured by the Bœotians. The loss of Orôpus much increased the facilities for the revolt of Eubœa; and these envoys came to entreat aid from the Peloponnesian fleet, to second that island in that design. The Peloponnesian commanders, however, felt themselves under prior obligation to relieve the sufferers at Chios, towards which island they first bent their course. But they had scarcely passed the Triopian cape, when they saw the Athenian squadron from Chalkê dogging their motions. Though there was no wish on either side for a general battle, yet they saw evidently that the Athenians would not permit them to pass by Samos, and get to the relief of Chios, without one. Renouncing, therefore, the project of relieving Chios, they again concentrated their force at Miletus, while the Athenian fleet was also again united at Samos.² It was about the end of March, 411 B.C., that the two fleets were thus replaced in the stations which they had occupied four months previously.

Thucyd. viii, 59.
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² Thucyd. viii, 60.

After the breach with Alkibiadēs, and still more after this manifest reconciliation of Tissaphernēs with the Peloponnesians, Peisander and the oligarchical conspirators at Samos had to reconsider their plan of action. They would not have begun the movement at first, had they not been instigated by Alkibiadēs, and furnished by him with the treacherous delusion of Persian alliance to cheat and paralyze the people. They had, indeed, motives enough, from their own personal ambition, to originate it of themselves, apart from Alkibiadēs; but without the hopes — equally useful for their purpose, whether false or true — connected with his name, they would have had no chance of achieving the first step. Now, however, that first step had been achieved, before the delusive expectation of Persian gold was dissipated. The Athenian people had been familiarized with the idea of a subversion of their constitution, in consideration of a certain price: it remained to extort from them at the point of the sword, without paying the price, what they had thus consented to sell.¹ Moreover, the leaders of the scheme felt themselves already compromised, so that they could not recede with safety. They had set in motion their partisans at Athens, where the system of murderous intimidation, though the news had not as yet reached Samos, was already in full swing: so that they felt constrained to persevere, as the only chance of preservation to themselves. At the same time, all that faint pretence of public benefit, in the shape of Persian alliance, which had been originally attached to it, and which might have been conceived to enlist in the scheme some timid patriots, was now entirely withdrawn; and nothing remained except a naked, selfish, and unscrupulous scheme of ambition, not only ruining the freedom of Athens at home, but crippling and imperiling her before the foreign enemy, at a moment when her entire strength was scarcely adequate to the contest. The conspirators resolved to persevere, at all hazards, both in breaking down the constitution and in carrying on the foreign war. Most of them being rich men, they were con-

¹ See Aristotel. Politic. v. 3, 8. He cites this revolution as an instance of one begun by deceit and afterwards consummated by force: *οὖν ἐπὶ τῶν τετρακασίων τὸν δῆμον ἐξηπατήσαν, φασκόντες, τὸν βασιλέα χρήματα παρέξειν πρὸς τὸν πόλεμον τὸν πρὸς Λακεδαιμονίους· ψευδόμενοι δὲ, κατέχειν ἐπεύρουτο τὴν πολιτείαν.*

tent. Thucydides observes, to defray the cost out of their own purses, now that they were contending, not for their country, but for their own power and profit.¹

They lost no time in proceeding to execution, immediately after returning to Samos from the abortive conference with Alkibiadēs. While they despatched Peisander with five of the envoys back to Athens, to consummate what was already in progress there, and the remaining five to oligarchize the dependent allies, they organized all their partisan force in the armament, and began to take measures for putting down the democracy in Samos itself. That democracy had been the product of a forcible revolution, effected about ten months before, by the aid of three Athenian triremes. It had since preserved Samos from revolting like Chios: it was now the means of preserving the democracy at Athens itself. The partisans of Peisander, finding it an invincible obstacle to their views, contrived to gain over a party of the leading Samians now in authority under it. Three hundred of these latter, a portion of those who ten months before had risen in arms to put down the preëxisting oligarchy, now enlisted as conspirators along with the Athenian oligarchs, to put down the Samian democracy, and get possession of the government for themselves. The new alliance was attested and cemented, according to genuine oligarchical practice, by a murder without judicial trial, or an assassination, for which a suitable victim was at hand. The Athenian Hyperbolus, who had been ostracized some years before by the coalition of Nikias and Alkibiades, together with their respective partisans, — ostracized as Thucydides tells us, not from any fear of his power and over-ascendent influence, but from his low character, and from his being a disgrace to the city, and thus ostracized by an abuse of the institution, — was now resident at Samos. As he was not a Samian, and had, moreover, been in banishment during the last five or six years, he could have had no power either in the island or the armament, and therefore his death served no prospective

¹ Thucyd. viii, 63. *Αὐτοὺς δὲ ἐπὶ σφῶν αὐτῶν, ὡς ἡδὴ καὶ κινδυνεύοντες, ὅταν ὅτῳ τρόπῳ μὴ ἀνεθήσεται τὰ πράγματα, καὶ τὰ τοῦ πολέμου ὅμα ἀντέχειν, καὶ ἐσφέρειν αὐτοὺς προθύμως χρήματα καὶ ἔν τι ἄλλο δέη, ὡς οὐκ ἐν ἑλλοις ἢ σφίσι αὐτοῖς ταλαιπωροῦντας.*

purpose. But he represented the demagogic and accusatory eloquence of the democracy, the check upon official delinquency so that he served as a common object of antipathy to Athenian and Samian oligarchs. Some of the Athenian partisans, headed by Charminus, one of the generals, in concert with the Samian conspirators, seized Hyperbolus and put him to death, seemingly with some other victims at the same time.¹

But though these joint assassinations served as a pledge to each section of the conspirators for the fidelity of the other, in respect to farther operations, they at the same time gave warning to opponents. Those leading men at Samos who remained attached to the democracy, looking abroad for defence against the coming attack, made earnest appeal to Leon and Diomedon, the two generals most recently arrived from Athens in substitution for Phrynichus and Skironides, — men sincerely devoted to the democracy, and adverse to all oligarchical change, as well as to the trierarch Thrasyllus, to Thrasybulus, son of Lykus, then serving as an hoplite, and to many others of the pronounced democrats and patriots in the Athenian armament. They made appeal not simply in behalf of their own personal safety and of their own democracy, now threatened by conspirators of whom a portion were Athenians, but also on grounds of public interest to Athens; since, if Samos became oligarchized, its sympathy with the Athenian democracy and its fidelity to the alliance would be at an end. At this moment the most recent events which had occurred at Athens, presently to be told, were not

¹ Thucyd. viii. 73. Καὶ Ὑπερβόλῃ τε τῶν Ἀθηναίων, μεγάλῃ δὲ ἀνδρῶν, ὡστρακισμένον οἱ διὰ δυνάμει καὶ ἀξιώματι φερόντι ἀλλὰ διὰ πολιτικῆς καὶ ἀλοχύνῃ τῆς πόλεως, ἀποκτείνουσι μετὰ Χαρμίνῳ τε ἑνὶ τῶν στρατηγῶν καὶ τινῶν τῶν παρὰ σοῖσιν Ἀθηναίων, πιστὴν δίδοντες αὐτοῖς, καὶ ἄλλα μετ' αὐτῶν τοιαῦτα ξυνέπραξαν, τοῖς τε πλείουσιν ὤρμητο ἐπιτίθεσθαι.

I presume that the words, ἀλλὰ τοιαῦτα ξυνέπραξαν, must mean that other persons were assassinated along with Hyperbolus.

The incorrect manner in which Mr. Mitford recounts these proceedings at Samos has been properly commented on by Dr. Thirlwall (Hist. Gr. ch. xxviii, vol. iv, p. 30). It is the more surprising, since the phrase μετὰ Χαρμίνῳ, which Mr. Mitford has misunderstood, is explained in a special note of Duker.

known, and the democracy was considered as still subsisting there.¹

To stand by the assailed democracy of Samos, and to preserve the island itself, now the mainstay of the shattered Athenian empire, were motives more than sufficient to awaken the Athenian leaders thus solicited. Commencing a personal canvass among the soldiers and seamen, and invoking their interference to avert the overthrow of the Samian democracy, they found the general sentiment decidedly in their favor, but most of all, among the parali, or crew of the consecrated public trireme, called the paralus. These men were the picked seamen of the state, — each of them not merely a freeman, but a full Athenian citizen, receiving higher pay than the ordinary seamen, and known as devoted to the democratical constitution, with an active repugnance to oligarchy itself as well as to everything which scented of it.² The vigilance of Leon and Diomedon on the defensive side, counteracted the machinations of their colleague Charminus, along with the conspirators, and provided for the Samian democracy faithful auxiliaries constantly ready for action. Presently, the conspirators made a violent attack to overthrow the government; but though they chose their own moment and opportunity, they still found themselves thoroughly worsted in the struggle, especially through the energetic aid of the parali. Thirty of their number were slain in the contest, and three of the most guilty afterwards condemned to banishment. The victorious party took no farther revenge, even upon the remainder of the three hundred conspirators, granted a general amnesty, and did their best to reestablish constitutional and harmonious working of the democracy.³

¹ Thucyd. viii. 73, 74. οἱ κ' ἔβουν περιδεῖν αὐτοὺς σφᾶς τε διαφθαρέντας, καὶ Σάμον Ἀθηναίους ἀλλοτριωθεῖσαν, etc.

... οἱ γὰρ ἦδισαν πρὸς τοὺς τετρακοσίους ἄρχοντας, etc.

² Thucyd. viii. 73. καὶ οὐκ ἥκιστα τοὺς Παράλους, ἀνδρας Ἀθηναίους τε καὶ Ἰωνεὺς πάντας ἐν τῇ νηὶ πλεόντας, καὶ ἀεὶ δὴ ποτε ὀλιγαρχίᾳ καὶ ἀπὸ παλαιᾶς ἐπεκτεταμένους.

Peitholaus called the paralus ῥόπαλον τοῦ δήμου, "the club, staff, or staff of the people." (Aristotel. Rhetoric. iii. 3.)

³ Thucyd. viii. 73. Καὶ τριακόντα μὲν τινες ἀπέκτειναν τῶν τριακесίων τρις δὲ τοὺς αἰσιματότας φυγὴ ἐξήμιωσαν· τοῖς δ' ἄλλοις οὐ μνησικακοῦντες δημοκρατοῦμεναι τὸ λοιπὸν ξυνεπολίτευον.

Chæreas, an Athenian trierarch, who had been forward in the contest, was sent in the *paralus* itself to Athens, to make communication of what had occurred. But this democratical crew, on reaching their native city, instead of being received with that welcome which they doubtless expected, found a state of things not less odious than surprising. The democracy of Athens had been subverted: instead of the senate of Five Hundred, and the assembled people, an oligarchy of Four Hundred self-installed persons were enthroned with sovereign authority in the senate-house. The first order of the Four Hundred, on hearing that the *paralus* had entered Peiræus, was to imprison two or three of the crew, and to remove all the rest from their own privileged trireme aboard a common trireme, with orders to depart forth with and to cruise near Eubœa. The commander, Chæreas, found means to escape, and returned back to Samos to tell the unwelcome news.¹

The steps, whereby this oligarchy of Four Hundred had been gradually raised up to their new power, must be taken up from the time when Peisander quitted Athens, — after having obtained the vote of the public assembly authorizing him to treat with Alkibiadēs and Tissaphernēs, — and after having set on foot a joint organization and conspiracy of all the anti-popular clubs, which fell under the management especially of Antiphon and Theramēnēs, afterwards aided by Phrynichus. All the members of that Board of Elders called *Probūli*, who had been named after the defeat in Sicily, with Agnon, father of Theramēnēs, at their head,² — together with many other leading citizens, some of whom had been counted among the firmest friends of the democracy, joined the conspiracy; while the oligarchical and the neutral rich came into it with ardor; so that a body of partisans was formed both numerous and well provided with money. Antiphon did not attempt to bring them together, or to make any public demonstration, armed or unarmed, for the purpose of overawing the actual authorities. He permitted the sen-

¹ Thucyd. viii. 74.

² Thucyd. viii. 1. About the countenance which *all* these *probūli* lent to the conspiracy, see Aristotle, *Rhetoric*. iii, 18, 2.

Respecting the activity of Agnon, as one of the *probūli*, in the same case, see Lysias, *Orat.* xii, cont. Eratosthen. c. 11, p. 426, Reisk. sect. 66.

ate and the public assembly to go on meeting and debating as usual; but his partisans, neither the names nor the numbers of whom were publicly known, received from him instructions both when to speak and what language to hold. The great topic upon which they descanted, was the costliness of democratical institutions in the present distressed state of the finances, the heavy tax imposed upon the state by paying the senators, the *dikasts*, the *ekklesiasts*, or citizens who attended the public assembly, etc. The state could now afford to pay only those soldiers who fought in its defence, nor ought any one else to touch the public money. It was essential, they insisted, to exclude from the political franchise all except a select body of Five Thousand, composed of those who were best able to do service to the city by person and by purse.

The extensive disfranchisement involved in this last proposition was quite sufficiently shocking to the ears of an Athenian assembly. But in reality the proposition was itself a juggle, never intended to become reality, and representing something far short of what Antiphon and his partisans intended. Their design was to appropriate the powers of government to themselves simply, without control or partnership, leaving this body of Five Thousand not merely unconvened, but non-existent, as a mere empty name to impose upon the citizens generally. Of this real intention, however, not a word was as yet spoken. The projected body of Five Thousand was the theme preached upon by all the party orators; yet without submitting any substantive motion for the change, which could not be yet done without illegality.

Even thus indirectly advocated, the project of cutting down the franchise to Five Thousand, and of suppressing all the paid civil functions, was a change sufficiently violent to call forth abundant opponents. For such opponents Antiphon was fully prepared. Of the men who thus stood forward in opposition, either all, or at least all the most prominent, were successively taken off by private assassination. The first of them who thus perished was Androklēs, distinguished as a demagogue, or popular speaker, and marked out to vengeance not only by that circumstance, but by the farther fact that he had been among the most vehement accusers of Alkibiadēs before his exile. For at this

time, the breach of Peisander with Tissaphernês and Alkibiadês had not yet become known at Athens, so that the latter was still supposed to be on the point of returning home as a member of the contemplated oligarchical government. After Androklês, many other speakers of similar sentiments perished in the same way, by unknown hands. A band of Grecian youths, strangers, and got together from different cities,¹ was organized for the business: the victims were all chosen on the same special ground, and the deed was so skilfully perpetrated that neither director nor instrument ever became known. After these assassinations — sure, special, secret, and systematic, emanating from an unknown directory, like a Vehmîc tribunal — had continued for some time, the terror which they inspired became intense and universal. No justice could be had, no inquiry could be instituted, even for the death of the nearest and dearest relative. At last, no man dared to demand or even to mention inquiry, looking upon himself as fortunate that he had escaped the same fate in his own person. So finished an organization, and such well-aimed blows, raised a general belief that the conspirators were much more numerous than they were in reality. And as it turned out that there were persons among them who had before been accounted hearty democrats,² so at last dismay and mistrust became

¹ Thucyd. viii. 69. Οἱ εἰκοσι καὶ ἑκατὸν μετ' αὐτῶν (that is, along with the Four Hundred) Ἑλλήνες νεανίσκοι, οἳ ἐχρῶντο εἰς τὸ πόνει διὰ χειρὸς εἶναι.

Dr. Arnold explains the words Ἑλλήνες νεανίσκοι to mean some of the members of the aristocratical clubs, or unions, formerly spoken of. But I cannot think that Thucydides would use such an expression to designate Athenian citizens: neither is it probable that Athenian citizens would be employed in repeated acts of such a character.

² Even Peisander himself had professed the strongest attachment to the democracy, coupled with exaggerated violence against parties suspected of oligarchical plots, four years before, in the investigations which followed on the mutilation of the Hermæ at Athens (Andokidês de Myster. c. 9. 10, sects. 36-43).

It is a fact that Peisander was one of the prominent movers on both these two occasions, four years apart. And if we could believe Isokratês (de Bigis, sects. 4-7, p. 347), the second of the two occasions was merely the continuance and consummation of a plot which had been projected and begun on the first, and in which the conspirators had endeavored to enlist Alkibiadês. The latter refused, so his son, the speaker in the above-mentioned oration, contents, in consequence of his attachment to the democ-

universally prevalent. Nor did any one dare even to express indignation at the murders going on, much less to talk about redress or revenge, for fear that he might be communicating with one of the unknown conspirators. In the midst of this terrorism, all opposition ceased in the senate and public assembly, so that the speakers of the conspiring oligarchy appeared to carry an unanimous assent.¹

Such was the condition to which things had been brought in Athens, by Antiphon and the oligarchical conspirators acting under his direction, at the time when Peisander and the five envoys arrived thither returning from Samos. It is probable that they had previously transmitted home from Samos news of the rupture with Alkibiadês, and of the necessity of prosecuting the conspiracy without farther view either to him or to the Persian alliance. Such news would probably be acceptable both to Antiphon and Phrynichus, both of them personal enemies of Alkibiadês; especially Phrynichus, who had pronounced him to be incapable of fraternizing with an oligarchical revolution.² At any rate, the plans of Antiphon had been independent of all view to Persian aid, and had been directed to carry the revolution by means of naked, exorbitant, and well-directed fear, without any intermixture of hope or any prospect of public benefit. Peisander found the reign of terror fully matured. He had not come direct from Samos to Athens, but had halted in his voyage at various allied dependencies, while the other five envoys, as well as a partisan named Diotrophês, had been sent to Thasos and elsewhere;³ all for the same purpose, of putting down

racy; upon which the oligarchical conspirators, incensed at his refusal, got up the charge of irreligion against him and procured his banishment.

Though Droysen and Wattenbach (De Quadringentorum Athenis Factione, pp. 7, 8, Berlin, 1842) place confidence, to a considerable extent, in this manner of putting the facts, I consider it to be nothing better than complete perversion; irreconcilable with Thucydides, confounding together facts unconnected in themselves as well as separated by a long interval of time, and introducing unreal causes for the purpose of making out, what was certainly not true, that Alkibiadês was a faithful friend of the democracy, and even a sufferer in its behalf.

¹ Thucyd. viii. 66.

² Thucyd. viii. 68. νομίζων οὐκ ἂν ποτε αὐτὸν Ἀλκιβιάδης) κατὰ τὸ εἰκὸς ὅτι ὀλιγαρχίας κατελθεῖν, etc.

³ Thucyd. viii. 64.

democracies in these allied cities where they existed, and establishing oligarchies in their room. Peisander made this change at Tênos, Andros, Karystus, Ægina, and elsewhere; collecting from these several places a regiment of three hundred hoplites, which he brought with him to Athens as a sort of body-guard to his new oligarchy.¹ He could not know until he reached Peiræus the full success of the terrorism organized by Antiphon and the rest; so that he probably came prepared to surmount a greater resistance than he actually found. As the facts stood, so completely had the public opinion and spirit been subdued, that he was enabled to put the finishing stroke at once, and his arrival was the signal for consummating the revolution, first, by an extorted suspension of the tutelary constitutional sanction, next, by the more direct employment of armed force.

First, he convoked a public assembly, in which he proposed a decree, naming ten commissioners with full powers, to prepare propositions for such political reform as they should think advisable, and to be ready by a given day.² According to the usual

¹ Thucyd. viii, 65. Οἱ δὲ ἀμφὶ τὸν Πείσανδρον παραπλέοντες τε, ὥσπερ ἐδέδοκτο, τοὺς δῆμους ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι κατέλυνον, καὶ ἡμῖν ἔστιν ἂν ὅν χωρίων καὶ ὀπλίτας ἔχοντες σφίσιν αὐτοῖς ξυμμάχους ἦν θύειν εἰς τὰς Ἀθήνας. Καὶ καταλαμβάνουσι τὰ πλείστα τοῖς ἐταίροις προειρησμένα.

We may gather from c. 69 that the places which I have named in the text were among those visited by Peisander: all of them lay very much in his way from Samos to Athens.

² Thucyd. viii, 67. Καὶ πρῶτον μὲν τὸν δῆμον συλλέξαντες εἶπον γνώμην, δέκα ἀνδρας ἐλίσθαι ἐν γράφας αὐτοκράτορας, τοὺς δὲ συγγραψαντας γνώμην ἐσενεγκεῖν εἰς τὸν δῆμον εἰς ἡμέραν ῥητήν, καθ' ὅτι ἄριστα ἡ πόλις οἰκησέται.

In spite of certain passages found in Suidas and Harpokration (see K. F. Hermann, *Lehrbuch der Griechischen Staats Alterthümer*, sect. 167, note 12: compare also Wattenbach, *De Quadringentor. Factione*, p. 38). I cannot think that there was any connection between these ten *συγγραφαι*, and the Board of *προβουλοι* mentioned as having been before named (Thucyd. viii, 1). Nor has the passage in Lysias, to which Hermann makes allusion, anything to do with these *συγγραφαι*. The mention of Thirty persons by Androtion and Philochorus, seems to imply that they, or Harpokration, confounded the proceedings ushering in this oligarchy of Four Hundred with those before the subsequent oligarchy of Thirty. The *σύνεδροι*, or *συγγραφεις*, mentioned by Isokratês (Arcopagit. Or. vii, sect. 67) might refer either to the case of the Four Hundred or to that of the Thirty.

practice, this decree must previously have been approved in the senate of Five Hundred, before it was submitted to the people. Such was doubtless the case in the present instance, and the decree passed without any opposition. On the day fixed, a fresh assembly met, which Peisander and his partisans caused to be held, not in the usual place, called the Pnyx, within the city walls, but at a place called Kolônus, ten stadia, rather more than a mile, without the walls,¹ north of the city. Kolônus was a temple of Poseidon, within the precinct of which the assembly was inclosed for the occasion. Such an assembly was not likely to be numerous, wherever held,² since there could be little motive to attend, when freedom of debate was extinguished; but the oligarchical conspirators now transferred it without the walls; selecting a narrow area for the meeting, in order that they might lessen still farther the chance of numerous attendance, an assembly which they fully designed should be the last in the history of Athens. They were thus also more out of the reach of an armed movement in the city, as well as enabled to post their own armed partisans around, under color of protecting the meeting against disturbance by the Lacedæmonians from Dekeleia.

The proposition of the newly-appointed commissioners — probably Peisander, Antiphon, and other partisans themselves — was exceedingly short and simple. They merely moved the abolition

¹ Thucyd. viii, 67. Ἐπειτα, ἐπειδὴ ἡ ἡμέρα ἰσθῆκε, συνέκλησαν τὴν ἐκκλησίαν εἰς τὸν Κολώνον (ἔστι δ' ὑπὸν Ποσειδῶνος ἔξω πόλεως, ἀπέχον σταδίων μάλιστα δέκα), etc.

The very remarkable word *συνέκλησαν*, here used respecting the assembly, appears to me to refer (not as Dr. Arnold supposes in his note, to any existing practice observed even in the usual assemblies which met in the Pnyx, but rather) to a departure from the usual practice, and the employment of a stratagem in reference to this particular meeting.

Kolônus was one of the Attic demes: indeed, there seems reason to imagine that two distinct demes bore this same name (see Boeckh, in the Commentary appended to his translation of the *Antigonê* of Sophoklês, pp. 120, 121: and Ross, *Die Deme von Attika*, pp. 10, 11). It is in the grove of the Eumenidês, hard by this temple of Poseidon, that Sophoklês has laid the scene of his immortal drama, the *Œdipus Koloneus*.

² Compare the statement in Lysias (Orat. xii, cont. Eratosth. s. 76, p. 127) respecting the small numbers who attended and voted at the assembly by which the subsequent oligarchy of Thirty was named.

of the celebrated *Graphê Paranomôn*; that is, they proposed that every Athenian citizen should have full liberty of making any anti-constitutional proposition that he chose, and that every other citizen should be interdicted, under heavy penalties, from prosecuting him by *graphê paranomôn* indictment on the score of informality, illegality, or unconstitutionality, or from doing him any other mischief. This proposition was adopted without a single dissentient. It was thought more formal by the directing chiefs to sever this proposition pointedly from the rest, and to put it, singly and apart, into the mouth of the special commissioners; since it was the legalizing condition of every other positive change which they were about to move afterwards. Full liberty being thus granted to make any motion, however anti-constitutional, and to dispense with all the established formalities, such as preliminary authorization by the senate, Peisander now came forward with his substantive propositions to the following effect:—

1. All the existing democratical magistracies were suppressed at once, and made to cease for the future. 2. No civil functions whatever were hereafter to be salaried. 3. To constitute a new government, a committee of five persons were named forthwith, who were to choose a larger body of one hundred; that is, one hundred including the five choosers themselves. Each individual out of this body of one hundred, was to choose three persons. 4. A body of Four Hundred was thus constituted, who were to take their seat in the senate-house, and to carry on the government with unlimited powers, according to their own discretion. 5. They were to convene the Five Thousand, whenever they might think fit.¹ All was passed without a dissentient voice.

The invention and employment of this imaginary aggregate of Five Thousand was not the least dexterous among the combinations of Antiphon. No one knew who these Five Thousand were: yet the resolution just adopted purported,—not that such a number of citizens should be singled out and constituted, either by choice, or by lot, or in some determinate manner which should exhibit them to the view and knowledge of others,—but that the

¹ Thucyd. viii, 68. Ἐλθόντας δὲ αὐτοὺς τετρακοσίους ὄντας ἰς τὸ βουλευτήριον, ἄρχειν ὅπῃ ἂν ἄριστα γινώσκωσιν, αὐτοκράτορα, καὶ τοὺς πεντακισχιλίους δὲ ἐνυλλέγειν. ὅπου ταν ἀντοῖς δοκῇ.

Four Hundred should convene *The Five Thousand*, whenever they thought proper: thus assuming the latter to be a list already made up and notorious, at least to the Four Hundred themselves. The real fact was, that the Five Thousand existed nowhere except in the talk and proclamations of the conspirators, as a supplement of fictitious auxiliaries. They did not even exist as individual names on paper, but simply as an imposturous nominal aggregate. The Four Hundred, now installed, formed the entire and exclusive rulers of the state.¹ But the mere name of the Five Thousand, though it was nothing more than a name, served two important purposes for Antiphon and his conspiracy. First, it admitted of being falsely produced, especially to the armament at Samos, as proof of a tolerably numerous and popular body of equal, qualified, concurrent citizens, all intended to take their turn by rotation in exercising the powers of government; thus lightening the odium of extreme usurpation to the Four Hundred, and passing them off merely as the earliest section of the Five Thousand, put into office for a few months, and destined at the end of that period to give place to another equal section.² Next,

¹ Thucyd. viii, 66. ἦν δὲ τοῦτο εὐπρεπὲς πρὸς τοὺς πλείους, ἐπεὶ ἔδειν γε τὴν πόλιν οἰκίαν καὶ μετισταναί ἰμελλον.

Plutarch, Alkibiad. c. 26.

² Thucyd. viii, 72. Πέμπουσι δὲ ἐς τὴν Σάμον δέκα ἄνδρας διδάζοντας — πεντακισχιλίοι δὲ ὅτι εἶεν, καὶ οὐ τετρακόσιοι μόνον, οἱ πρῶσοι.

viii, 86. Οἱ δ' ἀπὸ γέγονον ὡς οὔτε ἐπὶ διαφορᾷ τῆς πόλεως ἢ μεταστάσις γένοιτο, ἀλλ' ἐπὶ σωτηρίᾳ τῶν δὲ πεντακισχιλίων ὅτε πάντες ἐν τῷ μέρει μεθέξουσιν, etc.

viii, 89. ἀλλὰ τοὺς πεντακισχιλίους ἔργῳ καὶ μὴ ὀνόματι χρῆναι ὑποδεικνύναι, καὶ τὴν πολιτείαν ἰσχυρὰν καθιστάναι.

viii, 92. (After the Four Hundred had already been much opposed and humbled, and were on the point of being put down) — ἦν δὲ πρὸς τὸν ὄχλον ἢ παράκλησις ὡς χρῆν, ὅστις τοὺς πεντακισχιλίους βούλεται ἄρχειν ἀπὸ τῶν τετρακοσίων, εἶναι ἐπὶ τὸ ἔργον. Ἐπεκρέπτοντο γὰρ ὅμως ἐπὶ τῶν πεντακισχιλίων τῷ ὀνόματι, μὴ ἀντικρὺς δῆμον ὅστις βούλεται ἄρχειν ὀνομάζειν — φοβούμενοι μὴ τῷ ὄντι ὥσι, καὶ πρὸς τινὰ εἰπὼν τίς τι δι' ἀγνοίαν σφαλῇ. Καὶ οἱ τετρακόσιοι διὰ τοῦτο οὐκ ἠθέλων τοὺς πεντακισχιλίους οὔτε εἶναι, οὔτε μὴ ὄντας δῆλους εἶναι. τὸ μὲν καταστήσαι μετόχους τοσούτους, ἀντικρὺς ἂν δῆμον ἡγούμενοι, τὸ δ' αὖ ἀφανὲς φόβον ἐς ἀλλήλους παρέξει.

v.ii, 93. λέγοντες τοὺς πεντακισχιλίους ἀποφανεῖν, καὶ ἐκ

it immensely augmented the means of intimidation possessed by the Four Hundred at home, by exaggerating the impression of their supposed strength. For the citizens generally were made to believe that there were five thousand real and living partners in the conspiracy; while the fact that these partners were not known and could not be individually identified, rather aggravated the reigning terror and mistrust; since every man, suspecting that his neighbor might possibly be among them, was afraid to communicate his discontent or propose means for joint resistance.¹ In both these two ways, the name and assumed existence of the Five Thousand lent strength to the real Four Hundred conspirators. It masked their usurpation, while it increased their hold on the respect and fears of the citizens.

As soon as the public assembly at Kolonus had, with such seeming unanimity, accepted all the propositions of Peisander, they were dismissed; and the new regiment of Four Hundred were chosen and constituted in the form prescribed. It now only remained to install them in the senate-house. But this could not be done without force, since the senators were already within it; having doubtless gone thither immediately from the assembly, where their presence, at least the presence of the prytanes, or senators of the presiding tribe, was essential as legal presidents. They had to deliberate what they would do under the decree just passed, which divested them of all authority. Nor was it impossible that they might organize armed resistance; for which there seemed more than usual facility at the present moment, since the occupation of Dekeleia by the Lacedaemonians kept Athens in a condition like that of a permanent camp, with a large proportion of the citizens day and night under arms.² Against this chance the Four Hundred made provision. They selected that hour of

ταύτων ἐν μέρει, ἢ ἂν τοῖς πεντακισχίλοις δοκῇ, τοὺς τετρακοσίους ἐσεῖναι, τίως δὲ τὴν πόλιν μηδενὶ τρόπῳ διασφείρειν, etc.

Compare also c. 97.

¹ Compare the striking passage (Thucyd. viii, 92) cited in my previous note.

² See the jests of Aristophanes, about the citizens all in armor, buying their provisions in the market-place and carrying them home, in the *Lysistrata*, 560: a comedy represented about December 412 or January 411 B.C. three months earlier than the events here narrated.

the day when the greater number of citizens habitually went home, probably to their morning meal, leaving the military station, with the arms piled and ready, under comparatively thin watch. While the general body of hoplites left the station at this hour, according to the usual practice, the hoplites — Andrian, Tenian, and others — in the immediate confidence of the Four Hundred, were directed, by private order, to hold themselves prepared and in arms, at a little distance off; so that if any symptoms should appear of resistance being contemplated, they might at once interfere and forestall it. Having taken this precaution, the Four Hundred marched in a body to the senate-house, each man with a dagger concealed under his garment, and followed by their special body-guard of one hundred and twenty young men from various Grecian cities, the instruments of the assassinations ordered by Antiphon and his colleagues. In this array they marched into the senate-house, where the senators were assembled, and commanded them to depart; at the same time tendering to them their pay for all the remainder of the year, — seemingly about three months or more down to the beginning of Hecatombeon, the month of new nominations, — during which their functions ought to have continued. The senators were no way prepared to resist the decree just passed under the forms of legality with an armed body now arrived to enforce its execution. They obeyed and departed, each man as he passed the door receiving the salary tendered to him. That they should yield obedience to superior force, under the circumstances, can excite neither censure nor surprise; but that they should accept, from the hands of the conspirators, this anticipation of an unearned salary, was a meanness which almost branded them as accomplices, and dishonored the expiring hour of the last democratical authority. The Four Hundred now found themselves triumphantly installed in the senate-house; without the least resistance, either within its walls, or even without, by any portion of the citizens.¹

Thus perished, or seemed to perish, the democracy of Athens, after an uninterrupted existence of nearly one hundred years since the revolution of Kleisthenes. So incredible did it appear that the numerous, intelligent, and constitutional citizens of Ath-

¹ Thucyd. viii, 69, 70.

ens should suffer their liberties to be overthrown by a band of four hundred conspirators, while the great mass of them not only loved their democracy, but had arms in their hands to defend it, that even their enemy and neighbor Agis, at Dekeleia, could hardly imagine the revolution to be a fact accomplished. We shall see presently that it did not stand,—nor would it probably have stood, had circumstances even been more favorable,—but the accomplishment of it at all, is an incident too extraordinary to be passed over without some words in explanation.

We must remark that the tremendous catastrophe and loss of blood in Sicily had abated the energy of the Athenian character generally, but especially had made them despair of their foreign relations; of the possibility that they could make head against enemies, increased in number by revolts among their own allies, and farther sustained by Persian gold. Upon this sentiment of despair is brought to bear the treacherous delusion of Alkibiades, offering them the Persian aid; that is, means of defence and success against foreign enemies, at the price of their democracy. Reluctantly the people are brought, but they *are* brought, to entertain the proposition: and thus the conspirators gain their first capital point, of familiarizing the people with the idea of such a change of constitution. The ulterior success of the conspiracy—when all prospect of Persian gold, or improved foreign position, was at an end—is due to the combinations, alike nefarious and skilful, of Antiphon, wielding and organizing the united strength of the aristocratical classes at Athens; strength always exceedingly great, but under ordinary circumstances working in fractions disunited and even reciprocally hostile to each other,—restrained by the ascendant democratical institutions,—and reduced to corrupt what it could not overthrow. Antiphon, about to employ this anti-popular force in one systematic scheme, and for the accomplishment of a predetermined purpose, keeps still within the same ostensible constitutional limits. He raises no open mutiny; he maintains inviolate the cardinal point of Athenian political morality, respect to the decision of the senate and political assembly, as well as to constitutional maxims. But he knows well that the value of these meetings, as political securities, depends upon entire freedom of speech; and that, if that freedom be suppressed, the assembly itself becomes a nullity, or rather an instrument

of positive imposture and mischief. Accordingly, he causes all the popular orators to be successively assassinated, so that no man dares to open his mouth on that side; while on the other hand, the anti-popular speakers are all loud and confident, cheering one another on, and seeming to represent all the feeling of the persons present. By thus silencing each individual leader, and intimidating every opponent from standing forward as spokesman, he extorts the formal sanction of the assembly and the senate to measures which the large majority of the citizens detest. That majority, however, are bound by their own constitutional forms; and when the decision of these, by whatever means obtained, is against them, they have neither the inclination nor the courage to resist. In no part of the world has this sentiment of constitutional duty, and submission to the vote of a legal majority, been more keenly and universally felt, than it was among the citizens of democratical Athens.¹ Antiphon thus finds means to employ the constitutional sentiment of Athens as a means of killing the constitution: the mere empty form, after its vital and protective efficacy has been abstracted, remains simply as a cheat to paralyze individual patriotism.

It was this cheat which rendered the Athenians indisposed to stand forward with arms in defence of that democracy to which they were attached. Accustomed as they were to unlimited pacific contention within the bounds of their constitution, they were in the highest degree averse to anything like armed intestine contention. This is the natural effect of an established free and equal polity, to substitute the contests of the tongue for those of the sword, and sometimes, even to create so extreme a disinclination to the latter, that if liberty be energetically assailed, the counter-energy necessary for its defence may probably be found wanting. So difficult is it for the same people to have both the qualities requisite for making a free constitution work well in ordinary times, together with those very different qualities requisite for upholding it against exceptional dangers and under trying emergencies. None but an Athenian of extraordinary ability,

¹ This striking and deep-seated regard of the Athenians for all the forms of an established constitution, makes itself felt even by Mr. Mitford (*Hist. Gr. ch. xix. sect. v. vol. iv. p. 235*)

like Antiphon, would have understood the art of thus making the constitutional feeling of his countrymen subservient to the success of his conspiracy, and of maintaining the forms of legal dealing towards assembled and constitutional bodies, while he violated them in secret and successive stabs directed against individuals. Political assassination had been unknown at Athens, as far as our information reaches, since it was employed, about fifty years before, by the oligarchical party against Ephialtēs, the coadjutor of Periklēs.¹ But this had been an individual case, and it was reserved for Antiphon and Phrynichus to organize a band of assassins working systematically, and taking off a series of leading victims one after the other. As the Macedonian kings in after-times required the surrender of the popular orators in a body, so the authors of this conspiracy found the same enemies to deal with, and adopted another way of getting rid of them; thus reducing the assembly into a tame and lifeless mass, capable of being intimidated into giving its collective sanction to measures which its large majority detested.

As Grecian history has been usually written, we are instructed to believe that the misfortunes, and the corruption, and the degradation of the democratical states are brought upon them by the class of demagogues, of whom Kleon, Hyperbolus, Androkles, etc., stand forth as specimens. These men are represented as mischief-makers and revilers, accusing without just cause, and converting innocence into treason. Now the history of this conspiracy of the Four Hundred presents to us the other side of the picture. It shows that the political enemies — against whom the Athenian people were protected by their democratical institutions, and by the demagogues as living organs of those institutions — were not fictitious but dangerously real. It reveals the continued existence of powerful anti-popular combinations, ready to come together for treasonable purposes when the moment appeared safe and tempting. It manifests the character and morality of the leaders, to whom the direction of the anti-popular force naturally fell. It proves that these leaders, men of uncommon ability, required nothing more than the extinction or silence of the dema-

¹ See Plutarch, Periklēs, c. 10; Diodor xi, 77; and vol. v, of this History chap. xlv. p. 370.

gogues, to be enabled to subvert the popular securities and get possession of the government. We need no better proof to teach us what was the real function and intrinsic necessity of these demagogues in the Athenian system, taking them as a class, and apart from the manner in which individuals among them may have performed their duty. They formed the vital movement of all that was tutelary and public-spirited in democracy. Aggressive in respect to official delinquents, they were defensive in respect to the public and the constitution. If that anti-popular force, which Antiphon found ready-made, had not been efficient, at a much earlier moment, in stifling the democracy, it was because there were demagogues to cry aloud, as well as assemblies to hear and sustain them. If Antiphon's conspiracy was successful, it was because he knew where to aim his blows, so as to strike down the real enemies of the oligarchy and the real defenders of the people. I here employ the term demagogues because it is that commonly used by those who denounce the class of men here under review: the proper neutral phrase, laying aside odious associations, would be to call them popular speakers, or opposition speakers. But, by whatever name they may be called, it is impossible rightly to conceive their position in Athens, without looking at them in contrast and antithesis with those anti-popular forces against which they formed the indispensable barrier, and which come forth into such manifest and melancholy working under the organizing hands of Antiphon and Phrynichus.

As soon as the Four Hundred found themselves formally installed in the senate-house, they divided themselves by lot into separate prytanies, — probably ten in number, consisting of forty members each, like the former senate of Five Hundred, in order that the distribution of the year to which the people were accustomed might not be disturbed, — and then solemnized their installation by prayer and sacrifice. They put to death some political enemies, though not many: they farther imprisoned and banished others, and made large changes in the administration of affairs, carrying everything with a strictness and rigor unknown under the old constitution.¹ It seems to have been proposed

¹ Thucyd. viii, 70. I imagine that this must be the meaning of the words τὰ δὲ ἄλλα ἐνέμουν κατὰ κράτος τὴν πόλιν.

among them to pass a vote of restoration to all persons under sentence of exile. But this was rejected by the majority in order that Alkibiadēs might not be among the number; nor did they think it expedient, notwithstanding, to pass the law, reserving him as a special exception.

They farther despatched a messenger to Agis at Dekeleia, intimating their wish to treat for peace; which, they affirmed, he ought to be ready to grant to them, now that "the faithless Demos" was put down. Agis, however, not believing that the Athenian people would thus submit to be deprived of their liberty, anticipated that intestine dissension would certainly break out, or at least that some portion of the Long Walls would be found unguarded, should a foreign army appear. While therefore he declined the overtures for peace, he at the same time sent for reinforcements out of Peloponnesus, and marched with a considerable army, in addition to his own garrison, up to the very walls of Athens. But he found the ramparts carefully manned: no commotion took place within: even a sally was made, in which some advantage was gained over him. He therefore speedily retired, sending back his newly-arrived reinforcements to Peloponnesus; while the Four Hundred, on renewing their advances to him for peace, now found themselves much better received, and were even encouraged to despatch envoys to Sparta itself.¹

As soon as they had thus got over the first difficulties, and placed matters on a footing which seemed to promise stability, they despatched ten envoys to Samos. Aware beforehand of the danger impending over them in that quarter from the known aversion of the soldiers and seamen to anything in the nature of oligarchy, they had, moreover, just heard, by the arrival of Chæreas and the paralus, of the joint attack made by the Athenian and Samian oligarchs, and of its complete failure. Had this event occurred a little earlier, it might perhaps have deterred even some of their own number from proceeding with the revolution at Athens, which was rendered thereby almost sure of failure, from the first. Their ten envoys were instructed to represent at Samos that the recent oligarchy had been established with no views injurious to the city, but on the contrary for the general

¹ Thucyd. viii, 71.

benefit; that though the Council now installed consisted of Four Hundred only, yet the total number of partisans who had made the revolution, and were qualified citizens under it, was Five Thousand; a number greater, they added, than had ever been actually assembled in the Pnyx under the democracy, even for the most important debates,¹ in consequence of the unavoidable absences of numerous individuals on military service and foreign travel.

What satisfaction might have been given, by this allusion to the fictitious Five Thousand, or by the fallacious reference to the numbers, real or pretended, of the past democratical assemblies, had these envoys carried to Samos the first tidings of the Athenian revolution, we cannot say. They were forestalled by Chæreas, the officer of the paralus; who, though the Four Hundred tried to detain him, made his escape and hastened to Samos to communicate the fearful and unexpected change which had occurred at Athens. Instead of hearing that change described under the treacherous extenuations prescribed by Antiphon and Phrynichus, the armament first learned it from the lips of Chæreas, who told them at once the extreme truth, and even more than the truth. He recounted, with indignation, that every Athenian who ventured to say a word against the Four Hundred rulers of the city, was punished with the scourge; that even the wives and children of persons hostile to them were outraged; that there

¹ Thucyd. viii, 72. This allegation, respecting the number of citizens who attended in the Athenian democratical assemblies, has been sometimes cited as if it carried with it the authority of Thucydides; which is a great mistake, duly pointed out by all the best recent critics. It is simply the allegation of the Four Hundred, whose testimony, as a guarantee for truth, is worth little enough.

That no assembly had ever been attended by so many as five thousand (*πεντακισχίλιοι*) I certainly am far from believing. It is not improbable, however, that five thousand was an unusually large number of citizens to attend.

Dr Arnold, in his note, opposes the allegation in part, by remarking that "the law required not only the presence but the sanction of at least six thousand citizens to some particular decrees of the assembly." It seems to me, however, quite possible that, in cases where this large number of votes was required, as in the ostracism, and where there was no discussion carried on immediately before the voting, the process of voting may have lasted some hours, like our keeping open of a poll. So that though more than six thousand citizens must have voted, altogether, it was not necessary that all should have been present in the same assembly.

was a design of seizing and imprisoning the relatives of the democrats at Samos, and putting them to death, if the latter refused to obey orders from Athens. The simple narrative of what had really occurred would have been quite sufficient to provoke in the armament a sentiment of detestation against the Four Hundred. But these additional details of Chareas, partly untrue, filled them with uncontrollable wrath, which they manifested by open menace against the known partisans of the Four Hundred at Samos, as well as against those who had taken part in the recent oligarchical conspiracy in the island. It was not without difficulty that their hands were arrested by the more reflecting citizens present, who remonstrated against the madness of such disorderly proceedings when the enemy was close upon them.

But though violence and aggressive insult were thus seasonably checked, the sentiment of the armament was too ardent and unanimous to be satisfied without some solemn, emphatic, and decisive declaration against the oligarchs at Athens. A great democratical manifestation, of the most earnest and imposing character, was proclaimed, chiefly at the instance of Thrasybulus and Thrasyllus. The Athenian armament, brought together in one grand assembly, took an oath by the most stringent sanctions: to maintain their democracy; to keep up friendship and harmony with each other; to carry on the war against the Peloponnesians with energy; to be at enmity with the Four Hundred at Athens, and to enter into no amicable communication with them whatever. The whole armament swore to this compact with enthusiasm, and even those who had before taken part in the oligarchical movements were forced to be forward in the ceremony.¹ What lent double force to this touching scene was, that the entire Samian pop-

¹ Thucyd. viii. 75. Μετα δὲ ταῦτα Σαμῖται εὐθὺς ἐπὶ τὴν δημοκρατίαν βουλευόμενοι μεταστῆσαι τὰ ἐν τῇ Σαμῷ ὅ τε Θρασυβούλους καὶ Θρασυλλῶν, ὥρμησαν πάντας τοὺς στρατιώτας τοὺς μεριστοὺς ὅρκον, καὶ αὐτοὺς τοὺς ἐκ τῆς ὀλιγαρχίας μάλιστα, ἢ μὴν δημοκρατῆσθαι καὶ διανοήσασθαι, καὶ τὸν πρὸς Πελοποννησίους πόλεμον προθυμῶς διοίσειν, καὶ τοῖς τετρακοσίοις πολέμοι τε ἵσσεσθαι καὶ οὐδὲν ἐπικηρυκεῖσθαι. Συνωμύσαν δὲ καὶ Σαμίων πάντες τὸν αὐτὸν ὅρκον οἱ ἐν τῇ ἡλικίᾳ, καὶ τὰ πράγματα πάντα καὶ τὰ ἀποδησόμενα ἐκ τῶν κινδύνων ξυνεκοινῶσαντο οἱ στρατιῶται τοῖς Σαμίοις, νομίζοντες οὔτε ἐκείνοις ἀποστροφὴν σωτηρίας οὔτε σφίσιν εἶναι, ἀλλ' ἐὰν τε οἱ τετρακῶσι κρατήσωσιν ἐὰν τε οἱ ἐκ Μελῆτον πολέμοι, διασθαισεσθαι.

ulation, every male of the military age, took the oath along with the friendly armament. Both pledged themselves to mutual fidelity and common suffering or triumph, whatever might be the issue of the contest. Both felt that the Peloponnesians at Milæus, and the Four Hundred at Athens, were alike their enemies, and that the success of either would be their common ruin.

Pursuant to this resolution, — of upholding their democracy and at the same time sustaining the war against the Peloponnesians, at all cost or peril to themselves, — the soldiers of the armament now took a step unparalleled in Athenian history. Feeling that they could no longer receive orders from Athens under her present oligarchical rulers, with whom Charminus and others among their own leaders were implicated, they constituted themselves into a sort of community apart, and held an assembly as citizens to choose anew their generals and trierarchs. Of those already in command, several were deposed as unworthy of trust; others being elected in their places, especially Thrasybulus and Thrasyllus. Nor was the assembly held for election alone; it was a scene of effusive sympathy, animating eloquence, and patriotism generous as well as resolute. The united armament felt that *they* were the real Athens; the guardians of her constitution, the upholders of her remaining empire and glory, the protectors of her citizens at home against those conspirators who had intruded themselves wrongfully into the senate-house; the sole barrier, even for those conspirators themselves, against the hostile Peloponnesian fleet. "*The city has revolted from us,*" exclaimed Thrasybulus and others in pregnant words, which embodied a whole train of feeling.¹ "But let not this abate our courage: for they are only the lesser force, we are the greater and the self-sufficing. We have here the whole navy of the state, whereby we can insure to ourselves the contributions from our dependencies just as well as if we started from Athens. We have the hearty attachment of Samos, second in power only to Athens herself, and serving us as a military station against the enemy, now as in the past. We are better able to obtain supplies for

¹ Thucyd. viii. 76. Καὶ παραινέσεις ἄλλας τε ἐποιούντο ἐν σφίσιν αὐτοῖς ἀνιστῆμενοι, καὶ ὡς οὐ δεῖ ἀθυμεῖν ὅτι ἡ πόλις αὐτῶν ἀφέστηκε· τοὺς γὰρ ἑλασσοὺς ἀπὸ σφῶν τῶν πλεόνων καὶ ἐς πάντα πορρωτέρων μὲν ἔσονται.

ourselves, than those in the city for themselves; for it is only through our presence at Samos that they have hitherto kept the mouth of Peiræus open. If they refuse to restore to us our democratical constitution, we shall be better able to exclude them from the sea than they to exclude us. What, indeed, does the city do now for us to second our efforts against the enemy? Little or nothing. We have lost nothing by their separation. They send us no pay, they leave us to provide maintenance for ourselves; they are now out of condition for sending us even good counsel, which is the great superiority of a city over a camp.¹ As counsellors, we here are better than they; for they have just committed the wrong of subverting the constitution of our common country, while we are striving to maintain it, and will do our best to force them into the same track. Alkibiadēs, if we insure to him a safe restoration, will cheerfully bring the alliance of Persia to sustain us; and, even if the worst comes to the worst, if all other hopes fail us, our powerful naval force will always enable us to find places of refuge in abundance, with city and territory adequate to our wants."

Such was the encouraging language of Thrasyllus and Thrasybulus, which found full sympathy in the armament, and raised among them a spirit of energetic patriotism and resolution, not unworthy of their forefathers when refugees at Salamis under the invasion of Xerxēs. To regain their democracy and to sustain the war against the Peloponnesians, were impulses alike ardent and blended in the same tide of generous enthusiasm; a tide so vehement as to sweep before it the reluctance of that minority who had before been inclined to the oligarchical movement. But besides these two impulses, there was also a third, tending towards the recall of Alkibiadēs; a coadjutor, if in many ways useful, yet bringing with him a spirit of selfishness and

¹ Thucyd. viii, 76. Βραχὺ δέ τι εἶναι καὶ οὐδενὸς ἄξιον, ὥς πρὸς τὸ περιγίγνεσθαι τῶν πολέμιων ἢ πόλις χρήσιμος ἦν, καὶ οὐδὲν ἀπολωλέκεναι, οἱ γὰρ μήτε ἀργύριον ἔτι εἶχον πέμπειν, ἀλλ' αὐτοὶ ἐπορίζοντο οἱ στρατιῶται μήτε βούλευμα χρηστὸν, οὐκ ἔνεκα πόλις στρατοπέδων κρατεῖ· ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν τοῦτοις τοὺς μὲν ἡμαρτηκέναι, τοὺς πατρίους νόμους καταλίπσαντας, αὐτοὺς δὲ σώζειν καὶ ἐκείνους πειράσεσθαι προσαναγκάζειν. ὅστις οὖν τοῦτον, οἶπε, ἐν βουλεύσειν τι χρηστὸν, παρὰ σφίσι χειρὺς εἶναι.

duplicity uncongenial to the exalted sentiment now all-powerful at Samos.¹

This exile had been the first to originate the oligarchical conspiracy, whereby Athens, already scarcely adequate to the exigencies of her foreign war, was now paralyzed in courage and torn by civil discord, preserved from absolute ruin only by that counter-enthusiasm which a fortunate turn of circumstances had raised up at Samos. Having at first duped the conspirators themselves, and enabled them to dupe the sincere democrats, by promising Persian aid, and thus floating the plot over its first and greatest difficulties,—Alkibiadēs had found himself constrained to break with them as soon as the time came for realizing his promises. But he had broken off with so much address as still to keep up the illusion that he *could* realize them if he chose. His return by means of the oligarchy being now impossible, he naturally became its enemy, and this new antipathy superseded his feeling of revenge against the democracy for having banished him. In fact he was disposed, as Phrynichus had truly said about him,² to avail himself indifferently of either, according as the one or the other presented itself as a serviceable agency for his ambitious views. Accordingly, as soon as the turn of affairs at Samos had made itself manifest, he opened communication with Thrasybulus and the democratical leaders,³ renewing to them the same promises of Persian alliance, on condition of his

¹ The application of the Athenians at Samos to Alkibiadēs, reminds us of the emphatic language in which Tacitus characterizes an incident in some respects similar. The Roman army, fighting in the cause of Vitellius against Vespasian, had been betrayed by their general Cæcina, who endeavored to carry them over to the latter: his army, however, refused to follow him, adhered to their own cause, and put him under arrest. Being afterwards defeated by the troops of Vespasian, and obliged to capitulate in Cremona, they released Cæcina, and solicited his intercession to obtain favorable terms. "Primores castrorum nomen atque imagines Vitellii amoliuntur; catenas Cæcinæ (nam etiam tum vinctus erat) exsolvunt, orantque, ut causæ suæ deprecator adistat: aspernantem tumentemque lacrymis fatigant. *Extremum malorum, tot fortissimi viri, proditoris opem invocantes.*" (Tacitus, *Histor.* iii, 31.)

² Thucyd. viii, 48.

³ Thucydides does not expressly mention this communication, but it is implied in the words Ἀλκιβιάδην — ἄσμενον παρέξειν, etc. (viii, 76.)

own restoration, as he had before made to Peisander and the oligarchical party. Thrasybulus and his colleagues either sincerely believed him, or at least thought that his restoration afforded a possibility, not to be neglected, of obtaining Persian aid, without which they despaired of the war. Such possibility would at least infuse spirit into the soldiers; while the restoration was now proposed without the terrible condition which had before accompanied it, of renouncing the democratical constitution.

It was not without difficulty, however, nor until after more than one assembly and discussion,¹ that Thrasybulus prevailed on the armament to pass a vote of security and restoration to Alkibiadês. As Athenian citizens, the soldiers probably were unwilling to take upon them the reversal of a sentence solemnly passed by the democratical tribunal, on the ground of irreligion with suspicion of treason. They were, however, induced to pass the vote, after which Thrasybulus sailed over to the Asiatic coast, brought across Alkibiadês to the island, and introduced him to the assembled armament. The supple exile, who had denounced the democracy so bitterly, both at Sparta, and in his correspondence with the oligarchical conspirators, knew well how to adapt himself to the sympathies of the democratical assembly now before him. He began by deploring the sentence of banishment passed against him, and throwing the blame of it, not upon the injustice of his countrymen, but upon his own unhappy destiny.² He then entered upon the public prospects of the moment, pledging himself with entire confidence to realize the hopes of Persian alliance, and boasting, in terms not merely ostentatious but even extravagant, of the ascendant influence which he possessed over Tissaphernês. The satrap had promised him, so the speech went

¹ Thucyd. viii, 81. Ορισθούσης, ἀεὶ τε τῆς αὐτῆς γνώμης ἔχόμενος, ἐπειδὴ μετέστησε τα πρῆγματα, ὥστε καταγεῖν Ἀλκιβιάδην, καὶ τέλος ἐπ' ἐκκλησίας ἔπεισε τὸ πλῆθος τῶν στρατιωτῶν, etc.

² Thucyd. viii, 81. γενομένης δὲ ἐκκλησίας τὴν τε ἰδίαν ξυμφορὰν τῆς φυγῆς ἐπ'ητιάζατο καὶ ἀνωλοφύρατο ὁ Ἀλκιβιάδης, etc.

Contrast the different language of Alkibiadês, vi, 92; viii, 47.

For the word ξυμφορὰν, compare i, 127.

Nothing can be more false and perverted than the manner in which the proceedings of Alkibiadês, during this period, are presented in the Orations of Isokratês de Bigis, sects. 18-23.

on, never to let the Athenians want for pay, as soon as he once came to trust them, not even if it were necessary to issue out his last daric or to coin his own silver couch into money. Nor would he require any farther condition to induce him to trust them, except that Alkibiadês should be restored and should become their guarantee. Not only would he furnish the Athenians with pay, but he would, besides, bring up to their aid the Phœnician fleet, which was already at Aspendus, instead of placing it at the disposal of the Peloponnesians.

In the communications of Alkibiadês with Peisander and his coadjutors, Alkibiadês had pretended that the Great King could have no confidence in the Athenians unless they not only restored him, but abnegated their democracy. On this occasion, the latter condition was withdrawn, and the confidence of the Great King was said to be more easily accorded. But though Alkibiadês thus presented himself with a new falsehood, as well as with a new vein of political sentiment, his discourse was eminently successful. It answered all the various purposes which he contemplated; partly of intimidating and disuniting the oligarchical conspirators at home, partly of exalting his own grandeur in the eyes of the armament, partly of sowing mistrust between the Spartans and Tissaphernês. It was in such full harmony with both the reigning feelings of the armament, — eagerness to put down the Four Hundred, as well as to get the better of their Peloponnesian enemies in Ionia, — that the hearers were not disposed to scrutinize narrowly the grounds upon which his assurances rested. In the fulness of confidence and enthusiasm, they elected him general along with Thrasybulus and the rest, conceiving redoubled hopes of victory over their enemies both at Athens and at Miletus. So completely, indeed, were their imaginations filled with the prospect of Persian aid, against their enemies in Ionia, that alarm for the danger of Athens under the government of the Four Hundred became the predominant feeling; and many voices were even raised in favor of sailing to Peiræus for the rescue of the city. But Alkibiadês, knowing well — what the armament did not know — that his own promises of Persian pay and fleet were a mere delusion, strenuously dissuaded such a movement, which would have left the dependencies of Ionia defenceless against the Peloponnesians. As soon as the

assembly broke up, he crossed over again to the mainland, under pretence of concerting measures with Tissaphernês to realize his recent engagements.

Relieved substantially, though not in strict form, from the penalties of exile, Alkibiadês was thus launched in a new career. After having first played the game of Athens against Sparta, next, that of Sparta against Athens, thirdly, that of Tissaphernês against both, he now professed to take up again the promotion of Athenian interests. In reality, however, he was and had always been playing his own game, or obeying his own self-interest, ambition, or antipathy. He was at this time eager to make a show of intimate and confidential communication with Tissaphernês, in order that he might thereby impose upon the Athenians at Samos, to communicate to the satrap his recent election as general of the Athenian force, that his importance with the Persians might be enhanced, and lastly, by passing backwards and forwards from Tissaphernês to the Athenian camp, to exhibit an appearance of friendly concert between the two, which might sow mistrust and alarm in the minds of the Peloponnesians. In this tripartite manœuvring, so suitable to his habitual character, he was more or less successful, especially in regard to the latter purpose. For though he never had any serious chance of inducing Tissaphernês to assist the Athenians, he did, nevertheless, contribute to alienate him from the enemy, as well as the enemy from him.¹

Without any longer delay in the camp of Tissaphernês than was necessary to keep up the faith of the Athenians in his promise of Persian aid, Alkibiadês returned to Samos, where he was found by the ten envoys sent by the Four Hundred from Athens, on their first arrival. These envoys had been long in their voyage: having made a considerable stay at Delos, under alarm from intelligence of the previous visit of Chæreas, and the furious indignation which his narrative had provoked.² At length they reached Samos, and were invited by the generals to make their communication to the assembled armament. They had the utmost difficulty in procuring a hearing, so strong was the antipathy against them, so loud were the cries that the subverters of the

¹ Thucyd. viii. 82, 83, 87.

² Thucyd. viii. 77-86.

democracy ought to be put to death. Silence being at length obtained, they proceeded to state that the late revolution had been brought to pass for the salvation of the city, and especially for the economy of the public treasure, by suppressing the salaried civil functions of the democracy, and thus leaving more pay for the soldiers;¹ that there was no purpose of mischief in the change, still less of betrayal to the enemy, which might already have been effected, had such been the intention of the Four Hundred, when Agis advanced from Dekeleia up to the walls; that the citizens now possessing the political franchise, were not Four Hundred only, but Five Thousand in number, all of whom would take their turn in rotation for the places now occupied by the Four Hundred;² that the recitals of Chæreas,

Thucyd. viii. 86. Εἰ δὲ ἐς εὐτίλειαν τι ξυτιτῆται, ὥστε τοὺς στρατιώτας ἔχειν τροφὴν, τὰν ἐπαινεῖν.

This is a part of the answer of Alkibiadês to the envoys, and therefore indicates what they had urged.

¹ Thucyd. viii. 86. τῶν πεντακισχιλίων ὅτι πάντες ἐν τῷ μέρει μετέξουσιν, etc. I dissent from Dr. Arnold's construction of this passage, which is followed both by Poppo and by Gölter. He says, in his note: "The sense must clearly be, that all the citizens should be of the five thousand in their turn; however strange the expression may seem. μετέξουσιν τῶν πεντακισχιλίων. But without referring to the absurdity of the meaning, that all the Five Thousand should partake of the government in their turn,

for they *all* partook of it as being the sovereign assembly,—yet μετεχεῖν, in this sense, would require τῶν πέντε μιλίων after it, and would be at least as harsh, standing alone, as in the construction of μετέξουσιν τῶν πεντακισχιλίων."

Upon this remark, 1. Μετεχεῖν may be construed with a genitive case not actually expressed, but understood out of the words preceding; as we may see by Thucyd. ii. 16, where I agree with the interpretation suggested by Matthæ (Gr. Gr. § 325), rather than with Dr. Arnold's note.

2. In the present instance, we are not reduced to the necessity of gathering a genitive case for μετεχεῖν by implication out of previous phraseology; for the express genitive case stands there a line or two before—τῆς πόλεως, the idea of which is carried down without being ever dropped: οἱ δ' ἀπηγγέλλον, ὡς οὔτε ἐπὶ διαδορᾷ τῆς πόλεως ἢ μετὰ στασις γένοιτο, ἀλλ' ἐπὶ σωτηρίᾳ, οὐδ' ἵνα τοῖς πολέμοις παραδοθῇ (i. e. ἡ πόλις). . . . τῶν πεντακισχιλίων ὅτι πάντες ἐν τῷ μέρει μετέξουσιν (i. e. τῆς πόλεως).

There is therefore no harshness of expression, nor is there any absurdity of meaning, as we may see by the repetition of the very same in viii. 93.

affirming ill-usage to have been offered to the relatives of the soldiers at Athens, were utterly false and calumnious.

Such were the topics on which the envoys insisted, in an apologetic strain, at considerable length, but without any effect in conciliating the soldiers who heard them. The general resentment against the Four Hundred was expressed by several persons present in public speech, by others in private manifestation of feeling against the envoys: and so passionately was this sentiment aggravated, — consisting not only of wrath for what the oligarchy had done, but of fear for what they might do — that the proposition of sailing immediately to the *L'ciræus* was revived with greater ardor than before. Alkibiadēs, who had already once discountenanced this design, now stood forward to repel it again. Nevertheless, all the plenitude of his influence, then greater than that of any other officer in the armament, and seconded by the esteemed character as well as the loud voice of Thrasylbulus,¹ was required to avert it. But for him, it would have been executed. While he reproved and silenced those who were most clamorous against the envoys, he took upon himself to give to the latter a public answer in the name of the collective armament. "We make no objection (he said) to the power of the Five Thousand: but the Four Hundred must go about their business, and reinstate the senate of Five Hundred as it was before. We are much obliged for what you have done in the way of economy, so as to increase the pay available for the soldiers. Above all, maintain the war strenuously, without any flinching before the enemy. For if the city be now safely

ἡ γὰρ τοῖς τοῖς τετρακοσίοις ἀποφρονεῖται, καὶ ἐκ τούτων ἐν μέλει ἡ ἡ πόλις περὶ τετρακοσίων δόκη, τοὺς τετρακοσίους ἐσεσθαι, etc.

Dr. Arnold's designation of these Five Thousand as "the sovereign assembly," is not very accurate. They were not an assembly at all: they had never been called together, nor had anything been said about an intention of calling them together; in reality, they were but a fiction and a name; but even the Four Hundred themselves pretended only to talk of them as partners in the conspiracy and revolution, not as an assembly to be convoked — πεντακισίων — οἱ πρᾶσσοι τε (viii. 72).

As to the idea of bringing all the remaining citizens to equal privileges, in rotation, with the Five Thousand, we shall see that it was never broached until considerably after the Four Hundred had been put down.

¹ Plutarch, Alkibiadēs, c. 2.

held, there is good hope that we may make up the mutual differences between us by amicable settlement; but if once either of us perish, either we here or you at home, there will be nothing left for the other to make up with."¹

With this reply he dismissed the envoys; the armament reluctantly abandoning their wish of sailing to Athens. Thucydides insists much on the capital service which Alkibiadēs then rendered to his country, by arresting a project which would have had the effect of leaving all Ionia and the Hellespont defenceless against the Peloponnesians. His advice doubtless turned out well in the result; yet if we contemplate the state of affairs at the moment when he gave it, we shall be inclined to doubt whether prudential calculation was not rather against him, and in favor of the impulse of the armament. For what was to hinder the Four Hundred from patching up a peace with Sparta, and getting a Lacedæmonian garrison into Athens to help them in maintaining their dominion? Even apart from ambition, this was their best chance, if not their only chance, of safety for themselves; and we shall presently see that they tried to do it; being prevented from succeeding, partly, indeed, by the mutiny which arose against them at Athens, but still more by the stupidity of the Lacedæmonians themselves. Alkibiadēs could not really imagine that the Four Hundred would obey his mandate delivered to the envoys, and resign their power voluntarily. But if they remained masters of Athens, who could calculate what they would do, — after having received this declaration of hostility from Samos, — not merely in regard to the foreign enemy, but even in regard to the relatives of the absent soldiers? Whether we look to the legitimate apprehensions of the soldiers, inevitable while their relatives were thus exposed, and almost unnerving them as to the hearty prosecution of the war abroad, in their utter uncertainty with regard to matters at home, — or to the chance of irreparable public calamity, greater even than the loss of Ionia, by the betrayal of Athens to the enemy, — we shall be disposed to con-

¹ Thucyd. viii. 86. Καὶ τὰλλα ἐκέλευεν ἀντέχειν, καὶ μηδὲν ἐνδιδόναι τοῖς πολεμίοις· πρὸς μὲν γὰρ σφᾶς αὐτοὺς σωζομένης τῆς πόλεως πολλὴν ἐλπίδα εἶναι καὶ ξυμβῆναι, εἰ δὲ ἀπᾶς τὸ ἕτερον σφαλῆσθαι ἢ τὸ ἐν Σάμῳ ἢ ἐκεῖνοι οὐδὲ ὅτῳ διαλλαγῆσθαι τις ἐτι ἐσεσθαι.

clude that the impulse of the armament was not merely natural, but even founded on a more prudent estimate of the actual chances, and that Alkibiadēs was nothing more than fortunate in a sanguine venture. And if, instead of the actual chances, we look to the chances as Alkibiadēs represented, and as the armament conceived them upon his authority,—namely, that the Phenician fleet was close at hand to act against the Lacedæmonians in Ionia.—we shall sympathize yet more with the defensive movement homeward. Alkibiadēs had an advantage over every one else, simply by knowing his own falsehoods.

At the same assembly were introduced envoys from Argos, bearing a mission of recognition and an offer of aid to the Athenian Demos in Samos. They came in an Athenian trireme, navigated by the parali who had brought home Chæreas in the paralus from Samos to Athens, and had been then transferred into a common ship of war and sent to cruise about Eubœa. Since that time, however, they had been directed to convey Laspodias, Aristophon, and Melésias,¹ as ambassadors from the Four Hundred to Sparta. But when crossing the Argolic gulf, probably under orders to land at Prasiæ, they declared against the oligarchy, sailed to Argos, and there deposited as prisoners the three ambassadors, who had all been active in the conspiracy of the Four Hundred. Being then about to depart for Samos, they were requested by the Argeians to carry thither their envoys, who were dismissed by Alkibiadēs with an expression of gratitude, and with a hope that their aid would be ready when called for.

Meanwhile the envoys returned from Samos to Athens, carrying back to the Four Hundred the unwelcome news of their total failure with the armament. A little before, it appears, some of the trierarchs on service at the Hellespont had returned to Athens also,—Eratosthenēs, Iatroklēs, and others, who had tried to turn their squadron to the purposes of the oligarchical conspirators, but had been baffled and driven off by the inflexible democracy of their own seamen.² If at Athens, the calculations of these

¹ Thucyd. viii, 86. It is very probable that the Melésias here mentioned was the son of that Thucydides who was the leading political opponent of Periklēs. Melésias appears as one of the *dramatis personæ* in Plato's dialogue *callo* Lachēs.

² Lysias cont. Eratosthenem, sect. 43, c. 9, p. 411, Reisk. οὐ γὰρ νῦν πρῶτον

conspirators had succeeded more triumphantly than could have been expected beforehand, everywhere else they had completely miscarried; not merely at Samos and in the fleet, but also with the allied dependencies. At the time when Peisander quitted Samos for Athens, to consummate the oligarchical conspiracy even without Alkibiadēs, he and others had gone round many of the dependencies and had effected a similar revolution in their internal government, in hopes that they would thus become attached to the new oligarchy at Athens. But this anticipation, as Phrynichus had predicted, was nowhere realized. The newly-created oligarchies only became more anxious for complete autonomy than the democracies had been before. At Thasos, especially, a body of exiles who had for some time dwelt in Peloponnesus were recalled, and active preparations were made for revolt, by new fortifications as well as by new triremes.¹ Instead of strengthening their hold on the maritime empire, the Four Hundred thus found that they had actually weakened it; while the pronounced hostility of the armament at Samos, not only put an end to all their hopes abroad, but rendered their situation at home altogether precarious.

From the moment when the coadjutors of Antiphon first learned, through the arrival of Chæreas at Athens, the proclamation of the democracy at Samos, discord, mistrust, and alarm began to spread even among their own members; together with a conviction that the oligarchy could never stand except through the presence of a Peloponnesian garrison in Athens. While Antiphon and Phrynichus, the leading minds who directed the majority of the Four Hundred, despatched envoys to Sparta for concluding peace,—these envoys never reached Sparta, being seized by the parali and sent prisoners to Argos, as above stated, and commenced the erection of a special fort at Ectioneia, the projecting mole which contracted and commanded, on the northern side, the narrow entrance of Peiræus, there began to arise even in the bosom of the Four Hundred an opposition minority affect

(Eratosthenēs) τῷ ἑμετέρῳ πλήθει τὰ ἐναντία ἐπραξεν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν Τετρακοσίων ἐν τῷ στοασπέδῳ ὀλιγαρχίαν καθιστὰς ἐφευγεν ἐξ Ἑλλησπόντου τριηράρχος καταλείπων τὴν ναῦν, μετὰ Ἰατροκλέους καὶ ἑτέρων. . . ἀσικὸς μὲν δὲ δεῦρο τὰναντία τοῖς βουλομένοις δημοκρασίαν εἶναι ἐποσάτε.

Thucyd. viii, 64.

ing popular sentiment, among whom the most conspicuous persons were Theramenes and Aristokratēs.¹

Though these men had stood forward prominently as contrivers and actors throughout the whole progress of the conspiracy, they now found themselves bitterly disappointed by the result. Individually, their ascendancy with their colleagues was inferior to that of Peisander, Kalliaschrus, Phrynichus, and others; while, collectively, the ill-gotten power of the Four Hundred was diminished in value, as much as it was aggravated in peril, by the loss of the foreign empire and the alienation of their Samian armament. Now began the workings of jealousy and strife among the successful conspirators, each of whom had entered into the scheme with unbounded expectations of personal ambition for himself, each had counted on stepping at once into the first place among the new oligarchical body. In a democracy, observes Thucydides, contentions for power and preeminence provoke in the unsuccessful competitors less of fierce antipathy and sense of injustice, than in an oligarchy; for the losing candidates acquiesce with comparatively little repugnance in the unfavorable vote of a large miscellaneous body of unknown citizens; but they are angry at being put aside by a few known comrades, their rivals as well as their equals: moreover, at the moment when an oligarchy of ambitious men has just raised itself on the ruins of a democracy, every man of the conspirators is in exaggerated expectation; every one thinks himself entitled to become at once the first man of the body, and is dissatisfied if he be merely put upon a level with the rest.²

¹ Thucyd. viii. 89, 90. The representation of the character and motives of Theramenes, as given by Lysias in the Oration contra Eratosthenem (Orat. xii. sects. 66, 67, 79; Orat. xiii. cont. Agorast. sects. 12-17), is quite in harmony with that of Thucydides (viii. 89); compare Aristophan. Ran. 541-966; Xenoph. Hellen. ii. 3. 27-30.

² Thucyd. viii. 89. *ἦν δὲ τοῦτο μὲν σχῆμα πολιτικὸν τοῦ λόγου αὐτοῖς κατ' ἰδίαν δὲ φιλοτιμίας οἱ πολλοὶ αὐτῶν τῷ τοιούτῳ προσκέντρον, ἐν ᾧ καὶ μάλιστα ὀλιγαρχία ἐκ δημοκρατίας γενομένη ἀπολλύεται. Πάντες γὰρ αἰσθητοὶ ἀξιοῦσιν οὐχ ὅπως ἴσοι, ἀλλὰ καὶ πολλὸν πρῶτος αὐτῶν ἑκάστος εἶναι. Ἐκ δὲ δημοκρατίας αἰρέσεως γενομένης, ῥᾶν τὰ ἀποβαίνοντα ὡς οἱ ἀπὸ τῶν ὁμοίων, ἐλασσούμενός τις φέρεται.*

I give in the text what appears to me the proper sense of this passage, the last words of which are obscure; see the long notes of the commentators.

Such were the feelings of disappointed ambition, mingled with despondency, which sprung up among a minority of the Four

especially Dr. Arnold and Poppo. Dr. Arnold considers τῶν ὁμοίων as a neuter, and gives the paraphrase of the last clause as follows: "Whereas under an old-established government, they (ambitious men of talent) are prepared to fail: they know that the weight of the government is against them, and are thus spared the peculiar pain of being beaten in a fair race, when they and their competitors start with equal advantages, and there is nothing to lessen the mortification of defeat. Ἀπὸ τῶν ὁμοίων ἐλασσούμενος, is, being beaten when the game is equal, when the terms of the match are fair."

I cannot concur in Dr. Arnold's explanation of these words, or of the general sense of the passage. He thinks that Thucydides means to affirm what applies generally "to an opposition minority when it succeeds in revolutionizing the established government, whether the government be a democracy or a monarchy; whether the minority be an aristocratical party or a popular one." It seems to me, on the contrary, that the affirmation bears only on the special case of an oligarchical conspiracy subverting a democracy, and that the comparison taken is applicable only to the state of things as it stood under the preceding democracy.

Next, the explanation given of the words by Dr. Arnold, assumes that "to be beaten in a fair race, or when the terms of the match are fair," causes to the loser the maximum of pain and offence. This is surely not the fact: or rather, the reverse is the fact. The man who loses his cause or his election through unjust favor, jealousy, or antipathy, is more hurt than if he had lost it under circumstances where he could find no injustice to complain of. In both cases, he is doubtless mortified; but if there be injustice, he is offended and angry as well as mortified: he is disposed to take vengeance on men whom he looks upon as his personal enemies. It is important to distinguish the mortification of simple failure, from the discontent and anger arising out of belief that the failure has been unjustly brought about: it is this discontent, tending to break out in active opposition, which Thucydides has present to his mind in the comparison which he takes between the state of feeling which precedes and follows the subversion of the democracy.

It appears to me that the words τῶν ὁμοίων are masculine, and that they have reference, like τῶν πρῶτων and ἴσοι, in the preceding line, to the privileged minority of equal confederates who are supposed to have just got possession of the government. At Sparta, the word οἱ ὅμοιοι acquired a sort of technical sense, to designate the small ascendent minority of wealthy Spartan citizens, who monopolized in their own hands political power, to the practical exclusion of the remainder (see Xenoph. Hellen. iii. 3. 5; Xenoph. Resp. Lac. x. 7; xiii. 1; Demosth. cont. Lept. s. 88). Now these ὅμοιοι, or peers, here indicated by Thucydides as the peers of a recently-formed oligarchy, are not merely equal among themselves, but rivals one with another, and personally known to each other. It is important to bear in mind all these attributes as tacitly implied, though not literally designated or connoted by the word ὅμοιοι,

Hundred, immediately after the news of the proclamation of the democracy at Samos among the armament. Theraménès, the

or peers; because the comparison instituted by Thucydides is founded on all the attributes taken together; just as Aristotle (*Rhetoric*, ii, 8; ii, 13, 4), in speaking of the envy and jealousy apt to arise towards *τοὺς ὁμοίους*, considers them as *ἀντεπάρτας* and *ἀνταγωνιστάς*.

The Four Hundred at Athens were all peers, — equals, rivals, and personally known among one another, — who had just raised themselves by joint conspiracy to supreme power. Theraménès, one of the number, conceives himself entitled to preëminence, but finds that he is shut out from it, the men who shut him out being this small body of known equals and rivals. He is inclined to impute the exclusion to personal motives on the part of this small knot; to selfish ambition on the part of each; to ill-will, to jealousy, to wrongful partiality; so that he thinks himself injured, and the sentiment of injury is embittered by the circumstance that those from whom it proceeds are a narrow, known, and definite body of colleagues. Whereas, if his exclusion had taken place under the democracy, by the suffrage of a large miscellaneous, and personally unknown collection of citizens, he would have been far less likely to carry off with him a sense of injury. Doubtless he would have been mortified; but he would not have looked upon the electors in the light of jealous or selfish rivals, nor would they form a definite body before him for his indignation to concentrate itself upon. Thus Nikomachidès — whom Sokratès (see Xenophon, *Memor.* iii, 4) meets returning mortified because the people had chosen another person and not him as general — would have been not only mortified, but angry and vindictive besides, if he had been excluded by a few peers and rivals.

Such, in my judgment, is the comparison which Thucydides wishes to draw between the effect of disappointment inflicted by the suffrage of a numerous and miscellaneous body of citizens, compared with disappointment inflicted by a small knot of oligarchical peers upon a competitor among their own number, especially at a moment when the expectations of all these peers are exaggerated, in consequence of the recent acquisition of their power. I believe the remark of the historian to be quite just; and that the disappointment in the first case is less intense, less connected with the sentiment of injury, and less likely to lead to active manifestation of enmity. This is one among the advantages of a numerous suffrage.

I cannot better illustrate the jealousies pretty sure to break out among a small number of *ὅμοιοι*, or rival peers, than by the description which Justin gives of the leading officers of Alexander the Great, immediately after that monarch's death (Justin, xii, 2): —

"Cæterum, occiso Alexandro, non, ut latii, ita et securi fuere, omnibus unum locum competentibus: nec minus milites invicem se timebant, quorum et libertas solutior et favor incertus erat. Inter ipsos vero æqualitas discordiam augbat, nemine tantum cæteros excedente, ut ei aliquis se submitteret."

leader of this minority, — a man of keen ambition, clever but unsteady and treacherous, not less ready to desert his party than to betray his country, though less prepared for extreme atrocities than many of his oligarchical comrades, began to look out for a good pretence to disconnect himself from a precarious enterprise. Taking advantage of the delusion which the Four Hundred had themselves held out about the fictitious Five Thousand, he insisted that, since the dangers that beset the newly-formed authority were so much more formidable than had been anticipated, it was necessary to popularize the party by enrolling and producing these Five Thousand as a real instead of a fictitious body.¹ Such an opposition, formidable from the very outset, became still bolder and more developed when the envoys returned from Samos, with an account of their reception by the armament, as well as of the answer, delivered in the name of the armament, whereby Alkibiadès directed the Four Hundred to dissolve themselves forthwith, but at the same time approved of the constitution of the Five Thousand, coupled with the restoration of the old senate. To enroll the Five Thousand at once, would be meeting the army half way; and there were hopes that, at that price, a compromise and reconciliation might be effected, of which Alkibiadès had himself spoken as practicable.² In addition to the formal answer, the envoys

Compare Plutarch, *Lysander*, c. 23.

Haack and Poppo think that *ὅμοιοι* cannot be masculine, because *ἀπὸ τῶν ὁμοίων ἐλασσόμενος* would not then be correct, but ought to be *ἐκ τῶν ὁμοίων ἐλασσόμενος*. I should dispute, under all circumstances, the correctness of this criticism: for there are quite enough parallel cases to defend the use of *ἀπὸ* here. (see Thucyd. i, 17; iii, 82; iv, 115; vi, 28, etc.) But we need not enter into the debate; for the genitive *τῶν ὁμοίων* depends rather upon *τὰ ἀποδαιρόντα* which precedes, than upon *ἐλασσόμενος* which follows; and the preposition *ἀπὸ* is what we should naturally expect. To mark this, I have put a comma after *ἀποδαιρόντα* as well as after *ὁμοίων*.

To show that an opinion is not correct, indeed, does not afford certain evidence that Thucydides may not have advanced it: for he might be mistaken. But it ought to count as good presumptive evidence, unless the words peremptorily bind us to the contrary, which in this case they do not.

¹ Thucyd. viii, 86, 2. Of this sentence, from *φοβούμενοι* down to *καθίσταται*, I only profess to understand the last clause. It is useless to discuss the many conjectural amendments of a corrupt text, none of them satisfactory.

² Thucyd. viii, 86-89. It is alleged by Andokidès (in an oration delivered many years afterwards before the people of Athens, *De Reditu suo*, secta

doubtless brought back intimation of the enraged feelings manifested by the armament, and of their eagerness, uncontrollable by every one except Alkibiadēs, to sail home forthwith and rescue Athens from the Four Hundred. Hence arose an increased conviction that the dominion of the latter could not last: and an ambition, on the part of others as well as Theramēnēs, to stand forward as leaders of a popular opposition against it, in the name of the Five Thousand.¹

Against this popular opposition, Antiphon and Phrynichus

10-15), that during this spring he furnished the armament at Samos with wood proper for the construction of oars, only obtained by the special favor of Archelaus king of Macedonia, and of which the armament then stood in great need. He farther alleges, that he afterwards visited Athens, while the Four Hundred were in full dominion, and that Pisander, at the head of this oligarchical body, threatened his life for having furnished such valuable aid to the armament, then at enmity with Athens. Though he saved his life by clinging to the altar, yet he had to endure bonds and manifold hard treatment.

Of these claims, which Andokidēs prefers to the favor of the subsequent democracy, I do not know how much is true.

¹ Thueyd. viii, 89. σωσάτα δὲ αὐτοὺς ἐπῆρε τὰ ἐν τῇ Σαμῷ τοῦ Ἀλκιβιάδου ἰσχυρὰ ὄντα, καὶ ὅτι αὐτοὺς οὐκ ἰδόκει μόνιμον τὴν τῆς ὀλιγαρχίας ἐκείνης ἡγωνίζετο οὐκ εἰς ἑκάστην προστάτης τοῦ δήμου ἐκείνου.

This is a remarkable passage, as indicating what is really meant by *προστάτης τοῦ δήμου*: "the leader of a popular opposition." Theramēnēs, and the other persons here spoken of, did not even mention the name of the democracy, — they took up simply the name of the Five Thousand, — yet they are still called *πρόσταται τοῦ δήμου*, inasmuch as the Five Thousand were a sort of qualified democracy, compared to the Four Hundred.

The words denote the leader of a popular party, as opposed to an oligarchical party (see Thueyd. iii, 70; iv, 66; vi, 35), in a form of government either entirely democratical, or at least, in which the public assembly is frequently convoked and decides on many matters of importance. Thueydides does not apply the words to any Athenian except in the case now before us respecting Theramēnēs: he does not use the words even with respect to Kleon, though he employs expressions which seem equivalent to it (iii, 36; iv, 21) — *ἀνὴρ δημαγωγὸς κατ' ἐκείνον τὸν χρόνον ὡν καὶ τῷ πλήθει πιθανώτατος*, etc. This is very different from the words which he applies to Periklēs — *ὡν γὰρ δυνατώτατος τῶν κατ' ἐαυτὸν καὶ ἄγων τὴν πολιτείαν* (i, 127). Even in respect to Nikias, he puts him in conjunction with Pleistoanax at Sparta, and talks of both of them as *σπεύδοντες τὰ μάλιστα τῷ δημοσίῳ* (v, 16).

Compare the note of Dr. Arnold on vi, 35.

exerted themselves, with demagogic assiduity, to caress and keep together the majority of the Four Hundred, as well as to uphold their power without abridgment. They were noway disposed to comply with this requisition that the fiction of the Five Thousand should be converted into a reality. They knew well that the enrollment of so many partners¹ would be tantamount to a democracy, and would be, in substance at least, if not in form, an annihilation of their own power. They had now gone too far to recede with safety; while the menacing attitude of Samos, as well as the opposition growing up against them at home, both within and without their own body, served only as instigation to them to accelerate their measures for peace with Sparta, and to secure the introduction of a Spartan garrison.

With this view, immediately after the return of their envoys from Samos, the two most eminent leaders, Antiphon and Phrynichus, went themselves with ten other colleagues in all haste to Sparta, prepared to purchase peace and the promise of Spartan aid almost at any price. At the same time, the construction of the fortress at Ectoneia was prosecuted with redoubled zeal; under pretence of defending the entrance of Peiræus against the armament from Samos, if the threat of their coming should be executed, but with the real purpose of bringing into it a Lacedæmonian fleet and army. For this latter object every facility was provided. The northwestern corner of the fortification of Peiræus, to the north of the harbor and its mouth, was cut off by a cross wall reaching southward so as to join the harbor: from the southern end of this cross wall, and forming an angle with it, a new wall was built, fronting the harbor and running to the extremity of the mole which narrowed the mouth of the harbor on the northern side, at which mole it met the termination of the northern wall of Peiræus. A separate citadel was thus inclosed, defensible against any attack either from Peiræus or from the harbor; furnished, besides, with distinct broad gates and posterns of its own, as well as with facilities for admitting an enemy with-

¹ Thueyd. viii, 92. τὸ μὲν καταστήσαι μετόχους τοσοούτους, ἀντικρὺς ἂν δῆμον ἡγούμενοι, etc.

Aristotle (Polit. v. 5. 4) calls Phrynichus the *demagogue* of the Four Hundred; that is, the person who most strenuously served *their* interests and struggled for *their* favor.

in it.¹ The new cross wall was carried so as to traverse a vast portico, or open market-house, the largest in Peiræus: the larger half of this portico thus became inclosed within the new citadel; and orders were issued that all the corn, both actually warehoused and hereafter to be imported into Peiræus, should be deposited therein and sold out from thence for consumption. As Athens was sustained almost exclusively on corn brought from Eubœa and elsewhere, since the permanent occupation of Dekeleia, the Four Hundred rendered themselves masters by this arrangement of all the subsistence of the citizens, as well as of the entrance into the harbor; either to admit the Spartans or exclude the armament from Samos.²

Though Theramenes, himself one of the generals named under the Four Hundred, denounced, in conjunction with his supporters, the treasonable purpose of this new citadel, yet the majority of the Four Hundred stood to their resolution, and the building made rapid progress under the superintendence of the general Alexiklēs, one of the most strenuous of the oligarchical faction.³ Such was the habit of obedience at Athens to an established authority, when once constituted, — and so great the fear and mistrust arising out of the general belief in the reality of the Five Thousand unknown auxiliaries, supposed to be prepared to enforce the orders of the Four Hundred, — that the people, and even armed citizen hoplites, went on working at the building, in spite of their suspicions as to its design. Though not completed, it was so far advanced as to be defensible, when Antiphon and

¹ Thucyd. viii, 90–92. τὸ τεῖχος τοῦτο, καὶ πύλινδρα ἔχον, καὶ ἐσόδους, καὶ ἐπισαγωγὰς τῶν πολεμίων, etc.

I presume that the last expression refers to facilities for admitting the enemy either from the sea-side, or from the land-side; that is to say, from the northwestern corner of the old wall of Peiræus, which formed one side of the new citadel.

See Leake's Topographie Athens, pp. 269, 270, Germ. transl.

² Thucyd. viii, 90. διωκομένησαν δὲ καὶ στοῖν, etc.

I agree with the note in M. Didot's translation, that this portico, or *hauc*, open on three sides, must be considered as preëxisting; not as having been first built now; which seems to be the supposition of Colonel Leake, and the commentators generally.

³ Thucyd. viii, 91, 92. Ἀλεξικλέα, στρατηγὸν ὄντα ἐκ τῆς ὀλιγαρχίας καὶ κάλιστα πρὸς τοὺς ἐταίρους τετραμμένον, etc.

Phrynichus returned from Sparta. They had gone thither prepared to surrender everything, — not merely their naval force, but their city itself, — and to purchase their own personal safety by making the Lacedæmonians masters of Peiræus.¹ Yet we read with astonishment that the latter could not be prevailed on to contract any treaty, and that they manifested nothing but backwardness in seizing this golden opportunity. Had Alkibiadēs been now playing their game, as he had been doing a year earlier, immediately before the revolt of Chios, — had they been under any energetic leaders, to impel them into hearty coöperation with the treason of the Four Hundred, who combined at this moment both the will and the power to place Athens in their hands, if seconded by an adequate force, — they might now have overpowered their great enemy at home, before the armament at Samos could have been brought to the rescue.

Considering that Athens was saved from capture only by the slackness and stupidity of the Spartans, we may see that the armament at Samos had reasonable excuse for their eagerness previously manifested to come home; and that Alkibiadēs, in combating that intention, braved an extreme danger which nothing but incredible good fortune averted. Why the Lacedæmonians remained idle, both in Peloponnesus and at Dekeleia, while Athens was thus betrayed, and in the very throes of dissolution, we can render no account: possibly, the caution of the ephors may have distrusted Antiphon and Phrynichus, from the mere immensity of their concessions. All that they would promise was, that a Lacedæmonian fleet of forty-two triremes, partly from Tarentum and Lokri, now about to start from Las in the Laconian gulf, and to sail to Eubœa on the invitation of a disaffected party in that island, should so far depart from its straight course as to hover near Ægina and Peiræus, ready to take advantage of any opportunity for attack laid open by the Four Hundred.²

¹ Thucyd. viii, 91. Ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς πολεμίους ἐσαγόμενοι ἀνευ τευχῶν καὶ νεῶν συμβῆναι, καὶ ὅπως τὰ τῆς πόλεως ἔχειν, εἰ τοῖς γε σώμασι σφῶν ἄδεια ἔσται.

² Ibid. ἐπειδὴ οἱ ἐκ τῆς Λακεδαιμονίας πρέσβεις οὐδὲν πράξαντες ἀνεχώρησαν τοῖς πᾶσι συμβατικόν, etc.

³ Thucyd. viii, 91. ἦν δὲ τι καὶ τοιοῦτον ἀπὸ τῶν τὴν κατηγορίαν ἔχόντων καὶ οὐ πάνυ διαβολῇ μόνον τοῦ λόγου.

Of this squadron, however, even before it rounded Cape Malea, Theramenes obtained intelligence, and denounced it as intended to operate in concert with the Four Hundred for the occupation of Ectoneia. Meanwhile Athens became daily a scene of greater discontent and disorder, after the abortive embassy and return from Sparta of Antiphon and Phrynichus. The coercive ascendancy of the Four Hundred was silently disappearing, while the hatred which their usurpation had inspired, together with the fear of their traitorous concert with the public enemy, became more and more loudly manifested in men's private conversations as well as in gatherings secretly got together within numerous houses; especially the house of the peripolarch, the captain of the peripoli, or youthful hoplites, who formed the chief police of the country. Such hatred was not long in passing from vehement passion into act. Phrynichus, as he left the senate-house, was assassinated by two confederates, one of them a peripolus, or youthful hoplite, in the midst of the crowded market-place and in full daylight. The man who struck the blow made his escape, but his comrade was seized and put to the torture by order of the Four Hundred; he was however a stranger, from Argos, and either could not or would not reveal the name of any directing accomplice. Nothing was obtained from him except general indications of meetings and wide-spread disaffection. Nor did the Four Hundred, being thus left without special evidence, dare to lay hands upon Theramenes, the pronounced leader of the opposition, as we shall find Kritias doing six years afterwards, under the rule of the Thirty. The assassins of Phrynichus remaining undiscovered and unpunished, Theramenes and his associates became bolder in their opposition than before. And the approach of the Lacedæmonian fleet under Agesandridas,—which, having now taken station at Epidaurus, had made a descent on Ægina, and was hovering not far off Peiræus, altogether out of the straight course for Eubœa,—lent double

The reluctant language, in which Thucydides admits the treasonable concert of Antiphon and his colleagues with the Lacedæmonians, deserves notice; also c. 94. *ταῦτα μὲν τε καὶ ἀπο ξυγκειμένων λόγων*, etc.

¹ Thucyd. viii, 91. The statement of Plutarch is in many respects different (Alkibiades, c. 25).

force to all their previous assertions about the imminent dangers connected with the citadel at Ectoneia.

Amidst this exaggerated alarm and discord, the general body of hoplites became penetrated with aversion,¹ every day increasing, against the new citadel. At length the hoplites of the tribe in which Aristokratēs, the warmest partisan of Theramenes was taxiarch, being on duty and engaged in the prosecution of the building, broke out into absolute mutiny against it, seized the person of Alexiklēs, the general in command, and put him under arrest in a neighboring house; while the peripoli, or youthful military police, stationed at Munychia, under Hermon, abetted them in the proceeding.² News of this violence was speedily conveyed to the Four Hundred, who were at that moment holding session in the senate-house, Theramenes himself being present. Their wrath and menace were at first vented against him as the instigator of the revolt, a charge against which he could only vindicate himself by volunteering to go among the foremost for the liberation of the prisoner. He forthwith started in haste for the Peiræus, accompanied by one of the generals, his colleague, who was of the same political sentiment as himself. A third among the generals, Aristarchus, one of the fiercest of the oligarchs, followed him, probably from mistrust, together with some of the younger knights, horsemen, or richest class in the state, identified with the cause of the Four Hundred. The oligarchical partisans ran to marshal themselves in arms, alarming exaggerations being rumored, that Alexiklēs had been put to death, and that Peiræus was under armed occupation; while at Peiræus the insurgents imagined that the hoplites from the city were in full march to attack them. For a time all was confusion and angry sentiment, which the slightest untoward accident might have inflamed into sanguinary civil carnage. Nor was it appeased except by earnest intreaty and remonstrance from the elder citizens, aided by Thucydides of Pharsalus, proxenus or public guest of Athens, in his native town, on the ruinous madness of such discord when a foreign enemy was almost at their gates.

¹ Thucyd. viii, 92. *τὸ δὲ μέγιστον, τῶν ὀπλιτῶν τὸ στίφος ταῦτα ἐβόηετο*

² Plutarch, Alkibiades c. 26, represents Hermon as one of the assassins of Phrynichus.

The perilous excitement of this temporary crisis, which brought into full daylight every man's real political sentiments, proved the oligarchical faction, hitherto exaggerated in number to be far less powerful than had been imagined by their opponents. And the Four Hundred had found themselves too much embarrassed how to keep up the semblance of their authority even in Athens itself, to be able to send down any considerable force for the protection of their citadel at Ectoneia; though they were reinforced, only eight days before their fall, by at least one supplementary member, probably in substitution for some predecessor who had accidentally died.¹ Theramenes, on reaching Peiræus, began to address the mutinous hoplites in a tone of simulated displeasure, while Aristarchus and his oligarchical companions spoke in the harshest language, and threatened them with the force which they imagined to be presently coming down from the city. But these menaces were met by equal firmness on the part of the hoplites, who even appealed to Theramenes himself, and called upon him to say whether he thought the construction of this citadel was for the good of Athens, or whether it would not be better demolished. His opinion had been fully pronounced beforehand; and he replied, that if they thought proper to demolish it, he cordially concurred. Without farther delay, hoplites and unarmed people mounted pell-mell upon the walls, and commenced the demolition with alacrity; under the general shout, "Whoever is for the Five Thousand in place of the Four Hundred, let him lend a hand in this work." The idea of the old democracy was in every one's mind, but no man uttered the word: the fear of the imaginary Five Thousand still continuing. The work of demolition seems to have been prosecuted all that day, and not to have been completed until the next day: after which the hoplites released Alexiklès from arrest, without doing him any injury.²

¹ See Lysias, Orat. xx, pro Polystrato. The fact that Polystratus was only eight days a member of the Four Hundred, before their fall, is repeated three distinct times in this Oration (c. 2, 4, 5, pp. 672, 674, 679, Reisk.), as it has all the air of truth.

² Thucyd. viii, 92, 93. In the Oration of Demosthenès, or Deinarchus, against Theokrinès (c. 17, p. 1343), the speaker, Epicharès, makes allusion to this destruction of the fort at Ectoneia by Aristokratès uncle of his

Two things deserve notice, among these details, as illustrating the Athenian character. Though Alexiklès was vehemently oligarchical as well as unpopular, these mutineers do no harm to his person, but content themselves with putting him under arrest. Next, they do not venture to commence the actual demolition of the citadel, until they have the formal sanction of Theramenes, one of the constituted generals. The strong habit of legality, implanted in all Athenian citizens by their democracy, — and the care, even in departing from it, to depart as little as possible, — stand plainly evidenced in these proceedings.

The events of this day gave a fatal shock to the ascendancy of the Four Hundred; yet they assembled on the morrow as usual in the senate-house; and they appear now, when it was too late, to have directed one of their members to draw up a real list, giving body to the fiction of the Five Thousand.¹ Meanwhile the hoplites in Peiræus, having finished the levelling of the new fortifications, took the still more important step of entering, armed as they were, into the theatre of Dionysus hard by, in Peiræus, but on the verge of Munychia, and there holding a formal assembly; probably under the convocation of the general Theramenes, pursuant to the forms of the anterior democracy. They here took the resolution of adjourning their assembly to the Anakeion, or temple of Castor and Pollux, the Dioskuri, in

grandfather. The allusion chiefly deserves notice from its erroneous mention of Kritias and the return of the Demos from exile, betraying a complete confusion between the events in the time of the Four Hundred and those in the time of the Thirty.

¹ Lysias, Orat. xx, pro Polystrato, c. 4, p. 675, Reisk.

This task was confided to Polystratus, a very recent member of the Four Hundred, and therefore probably less unpopular than the rest. In his defence after the restoration of the democracy, he pretended to have undertaken the task much against his will, and to have drawn up a list containing nine thousand names instead of five thousand.

It may probably have been in this meeting of the Four Hundred, that Antiphon delivered his oration strongly recommending concord, *Περὶ ὁμονοίας*. All his eloquence was required just now, to bring back the oligarchical party, if possible, into united action. Philostratus (Vit. Sophistar. c. xv, p. 500, ed. Olear.) expresses great admiration for this oration, which is several times alluded to both by Harpokration and Suidas. See Westermann, Gesch. der Griech. Beredsamkeit, Beilage ii, p. 276.

the city itself and close under the acropolis; whither they immediately marched and established themselves, still retaining their arms. So much was the position of the Four Hundred changed, that they who had on the preceding day been on the aggressive against a spontaneous outburst of mutineers in Peiræus, were now thrown upon the defensive against a formal assembly, all armed, in the city, and close by their own senate-house. Feeling themselves too weak to attempt any force, they sent deputies to the Anakeion to negotiate and offer concessions. They engaged to publish the list of *The Five Thousand*, and to convene them for the purpose of providing for the periodical cessation and renewal of the Four Hundred, by rotation from the Five Thousand, in such order as the latter themselves should determine. But they entreated that time might be allowed for effecting this, and that internal peace might be maintained, without which there was no hope of defence against the enemy without. Many of the hoplites in the city itself joined the assembly in the Anakeion, and took part in the debates. The position of the Four Hundred being no longer such as to inspire fear, the tongues of speakers were now again loosed, and the ears of the multitude again opened, for the first time since the arrival of Peisander from Samos, with the plan of the oligarchical conspiracy. Such renewal of free and fearless public speech, the peculiar life-principle of the democracy, was not less wholesome in tranquillizing intestine discord than in heightening the sentiment of common patriotism against the foreign enemy.¹ The assembly at length dispersed, after naming an early future time for a second assembly, to bring about the reestablishment of harmony in the theatre of Dionysus.²

On the day, and at the hour, when this assembly in the theatre of Dionysus was on the point of coming together, the news ran

¹ Thucyd. viii, 93. Τὸ δὲ πᾶν πλῆθος τῶν ὁπλιτῶν, ἀπὸ πολλῶν καὶ πρὸς πολλοὺς λόγων γιγνομένων, ἡπιώτερον ἦν ἢ πρότερον, καὶ ἐφοβεῖτο μάλιστα περὶ τοῦ παντὸς πολιτικοῦ.

² Thucyd. viii, 93. ξυνεχώρησαν δὲ ὥστ' ἐς ἡμέραν ρητὴν ἐκκλησίαν ποιῆσαι ἐν τῷ Διονυσίῳ περὶ ὁμονοίας.

The definition of time must here allude to the morrow, or to the day following the morrow; at least it seems impossible that the city could be left longer than this interval without a government.

through Peiræus and Athens, that the forty-two triremes under the Lacedæmonian Agesandridas, having recently quitted the harbor of Megara, were sailing along the coast of Salamis in the direction towards Peiræus. Such an event, while causing universal consternation throughout the city, confirmed all the previous warnings of Theramenês as to the treasonable destination of the citadel recently demolished, and every one rejoiced that the demolition had been accomplished just in time. Foregoing their intended assembly, the citizens rushed with one accord down to Peiræus, where some of them took post to garrison the walls and the mouth of the harbor; others got aboard the triremes lying in the harbor: others, again, launched some fresh triremes from the boat-houses into the water. Agesandridas rowed along the shore, near the mouth of Peiræus; but found nothing to promise concert within, or tempt him to the intended attack. Accordingly, he passed by and moved onward to Sunium, in a southerly direction. Having doubled the Cape of Sunium, he then turned his course along the coast of Attica northward, halted for a little while between Thorikus and Prasiæ, and presently took station at Orôpus.¹

Though relieved, when they found that he passed by Peiræus without making any attack, the Athenians knew that his destination must now be against Eubœa; which to them was hardly less important than Peiræus, since their main supplies were derived from that island. Accordingly, they put to sea at once with all the triremes which could be manned and got ready in the harbor. But from the hurry of the occasion, coupled with the mistrust and dissension now reigning, and the absence of their great naval force at Samos, the crews mustered were raw and ill-selected, and the armament inefficient. Polystratus, one of the members of the Four Hundred, perhaps others of them also, were aboard; men who had an interest in defeat rather than victory.² Thymocha-

¹ Thucyd. viii, 94.

² Lysias, Orat. xx, pro Polystrato, c. 4, p. 676, Reisk.

From another passage in this oration, it would seem that Polystratus was in command of the fleet, possibly enough, in conjunction with Thymocharês, according to a common Athenian practice (c. 5, p. 679). His son, who defends him, affirms that he was wounded in the battle.

Diodorus (xiii, 34) mentions the discord among the crews on board these

rês, the admiral, conducted them round Cape Sunium to Eretria in Eubœa, where he found a few other triremes, which made up his whole fleet to thirty-six sail.

He had scarcely reached the harbor and disembarked, when, without allowing time for his men to procure refreshment, he found himself compelled to fight a battle with the forty-two ships of Agesandridas, who had just sailed across from Orôpus, and was already approaching the harbor. This surprise had been brought about by the anti-Athenian party in Eretria, who took care, on the arrival of Thymocharês, that no provisions should be found in the market-place, so that his men were compelled to disperse and obtain them from houses at the extremity of the town; while at the same time a signal was hoisted, visible at Orôpus on the opposite side of the strait, less than seven miles broad, indicating to Agesandridas the precise moment for bringing his fleet across to the attack, with their crews fresh after the morning meal. Thymocharês, on seeing the approach of the enemy, ordered his men aboard; but, to his disappointment, many of them were found to be so far off that they could not be brought back in time, so that he was compelled to sail out and meet the Peloponnesians with ships very inadequately manned. In a battle immediately outside of the Eretrian harbor, he was, after a short contest, completely defeated, and his fleet driven back upon the shore. Some of his ships escaped to Chalkis, others to a fortified post garrisoned by the Athenians themselves, not far from Eretria; yet not less than twenty-two triremes, out of the whole thirty-six, fell into the hands of Agesandridas, and a large proportion of the crews were slain or made prisoners. Of those seamen who escaped, too, many found their death from the hands of the Eretrians, into whose city they fled for shelter. On the news of this battle, not merely Eretria, but also all Eubœa, — except Oreus in the north of the island, which was settled by Athenian kleruchs, — declared its revolt from Athens, which had been intended more than a year before, and took measures for defending itself in concert with Agesandridas and the Bœotians.¹

ships under Thymocharês, almost the only point which we learn from his meagre notice of this interesting period.

¹ Thucyd. viii, 5; viii, 95.

Ill could Athens endure a disaster, in itself so immense and aggravated, under the present distressed condition of the city. Her last fleet was destroyed, her nearest and most precious island torn from her side; an island, which of late had yielded more to her wants than Attica itself, but which was now about to become a hostile and aggressive neighbor.¹ The previous revolt of Eubœa, occurring thirty-four years before, during the maximum of Athenian power, had been even then a terrible blow to Athens, and formed one of the main circumstances which forced upon her the humiliation of the Thirty years' truce. But this second revolt took place when she had not only no means of reconquering the island, but no means even of defending Peiræus against the blockade by the enemy's fleet. The dismay and terror excited by the news at Athens was unbounded, even exceeding what had been felt after the Sicilian catastrophe, or the revolt of Chios. Nor was there any second reserve now in the treasury, such as the thousand talents which had rendered such essential service on the last-mentioned occasion. In addition to their foreign dangers, the Athenians were farther weighed down by two intestine calamities in themselves hardly supportable, — alienation of their own fleet at Samos, and the discord, yet unappeased, within their own walls; wherein the Four Hundred still held provisionally the reins of government, with the ablest and most unscrupulous leaders at their head. In the depth of their despair, the Athenians expected nothing less than to see the victorious fleet of Agesandridas — more than sixty triremes strong, including the recent captures — off the Peiræus, forbidding all importation, and threatening them with approaching famine, in combination with Agis and Dekeleia. The enterprise would have been easy for there were neither ships nor seamen to repel him; and his arrival at this critical moment would most probably have enabled the Four Hundred to resume their ascendancy, with the means as well as the disposition to introduce a Lacedæmonian garrison

¹ Thucyd. viii, 95. To show what Eubœa became at a later period, see Demosthenês, De Fals. Legat. c. 64, p. 409: τὰ ἐν Εὐβοίᾳ κατασκευασθέντα ὀρμητήρια ἐφ' ἡμᾶς, etc.; and Demosthenês, De Coronâ, c. 71; ἡ τοῖς δ' ἡ θάλασσα ὑπὸ τῶν ἐκ τῆς Εὐβοίας βρωμένων ληστῶν γέγονε, etc.

into the city.¹ And though the arrival of the Athenian fleet from Samos would have prevented this extremity, yet it could not have arrived in time, except on the supposition of a prolonged blockade: moreover, its mere transfer from Samos to Athens would have left Ionia and the Hellespont defenceless against the Lacedæmonians and Persians, and would have caused the loss of all the Athenian empire. Nothing could have saved Athens, if the Lacedæmonians at this juncture had acted with reasonable vigor, instead of confining their efforts to Eubœa, now an easy and certain conquest. As on the former occasion, when Antiphon and Phrynichus went to Sparta prepared to make any sacrifice for the purpose of obtaining Lacedæmonian aid and accommodation, so now, in a still greater degree, Athens owed her salvation only to the fact that the enemies actually before her were indolent and dull Spartans, not enterprising Syracusans under the conduct of Gylippus.² And this is the second occasion, we may add, on which Athens was on the brink of ruin in consequence of the policy of Alkibiadēs in retaining the armament at Samos.

Fortunately for the Athenians, no Agesandridas appeared off Peiræus; so that the twenty triremes, which they contrived to man as a remnant for defence, had no enemy to repel.³ Accordingly, the Athenians were allowed to enjoy an interval of repose which enabled them to recover partially both from consternation and from intestine discord. It was their first proceeding, when the hostile fleet did not appear, to convene a public assembly; and that too in the Pnyx itself, the habitual scene of the democratical assemblies, well calculated to reinspire that patriotism which had now been dumb and smouldering for the four last months. In this assembly, the tide of opinion ran vehemently against the Four Hundred:⁴ even those, who, like the Board of

¹ Thucyd. viii. 96. Μαλιστα δ' αὐτοὺς καὶ δὲ ἑγγυτάτου ἔδοξεν, εἰ δὲ πολέμοιοι τολμήσουσι νενικηκότας εἶναι σφῶν ἐπὶ τὴν Πειραιᾶ ἱρμηον δυνάμεων πλεῖν· καὶ ὅσον οἱ ἡδὴ ἐνόμιζον αὐτοὺς παρῆναι. Ὅπερ ἂν, εἰ τολμηρότεροι ἦσαν, βραδίως ἂν ἐποίησαν· καὶ ἡ δειότης ἂν ἦν μᾶλλον τὴν πόλιν ἐφορμοῦντες, ἢ εἰ ἐπολιόρκουν μένοντες, καὶ τὰς ἀπ' ἰωνίας ναὺς κινάγκασαν ἂν βοηθήσαι, etc.

² Thucyd. viii. 96; vii. 21-55.

³ Thucyd. viii. 97.

⁴ It is to this assembly that I refer, with confidence, the remarkable dis-

elders entitled probuli had originally counselled their appointment, now denounced them along with the rest, though severely taunted by the oligarchical leader Peisander for their inconsistency. Votes were finally passed: 1. To depose the Four Hundred; 2. To place the whole government in the hands of *The Five Thousand*; 3. Every citizen, who furnished a panoply, either for himself or for any one else, was to be of right a member of this body of *The Five Thousand*; 4. No citizen was to receive pay for any political function, on pain of becoming solemnly accursed, or excommunicated.¹ Such were the points determined by the

issue of contention between Peisander and Sophoklēs, one of the Athenian probuli, mentioned in Aristotel. Rhetoric. iii. 18. 2. There was no other occasion on which the Four Hundred were ever publicly thrown upon their defence at Athens.

This was not Sophoklēs the tragic poet, but another person of the same name, who appears afterwards as one of the oligarchy of Thirty.

¹ Thucyd. viii. 97. Καὶ ἐκκλησίαν ἐνέλεγον, μίαν μὲν εὐθὺς τότε πρῶτον ἐς τὴν Πύκκα καὶ ἀγῶν, αὐτὴν καὶ ἄλλοτε ἐνόμισαν. ἐν ᾗ περ καὶ τοὺς ἐξ ἀκασσῶν καταπαύσαντες τοῖς πεντακισχιλίοις ἐψηφίσαντο τὰ πράγματα παραδοῦναι· εἶναι δὲ αὐτῶν, ὅποσοι καὶ ἡπῆλα παρέχονται· καὶ μισθὸν μηδὲν φέρειν, μηδεμίαν ἀρχὴν, ἢ δὲ μὴ ἐπύρατον ἐποιήσαντο. Ἐβλήθη δὲ καὶ ἄλλαι ἱστίον πυκναὶ ἐκκλησίαι, αὐτῶν καὶ νομοθέτας καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ἐψηφίσαντο ἐς τὴν πολιτείαν.

In this passage I dissent from the commentators on two points. First, they understand this number Five Thousand as a real definite list of citizens, containing five thousand names, neither more nor less. Secondly, they construe *παρέχοντες*, not in the ordinary meaning which it bears in Athenian constitutional language, but in the sense of *ἐγγεγραμμένοι* (c. 67), "persons to enroll the constitution, corresponding to the *ἐγγεγραμμένοι* appointed by the aristocratical party a little before," to use the words of Dr. Arnold.

As to the first point, which is sustained also by Dr. Thirlwall (Hist. Gr. c. xxviii. vol. iv. p. 51. 2d ed.), Dr. Arnold really admits what is the ground of my opinion, when he says: "Of course the number of citizens capable of providing themselves with heavy arms must have much exceeded five thousand; and it is said in the defence of Polystratus, one of the Four Hundred (Lysias. p. 675. Reisk.), that he drew up a list of nine thousand. But we must suppose that all who could furnish heavy arms were eligible *into the number of the Five Thousand*, whether the members were fixed on by lot, by election, or by rotation; as it had been proposed to appoint the Four Hundred by rotation out of the Five Thousand (viii. 93)."

Dr. Arnold here throws out a supposition which by no means conforms to the exact sense of the words of Thucydides — *εἶναι δὲ αὐτῶν, ὅποσοι καὶ ἡπῆλα παρέχονται*. These words distinctly signify, that all who furnished

first assembly held in the Pnyx. The archons, the senate of Five Hundred, etc., were renewed : after which many other asser-

heavy arms *should be of the Five Thousand, should belong of right to that body*. which is something different from *being eligible* into the number of the Five Thousand, either by lot, rotation, or otherwise. The language of Thucydides, when he describes, in the passage referred to by Dr. Arnold, c. 93, the projected formation of the Four Hundred by rotation out of the Five Thousand, is very different : *καὶ ἐκ τούτων ἐν μέρει τοὺς τετρακοσίους ἐκείσθαι*, etc. M. Boeckh (Public Economy of Athens, bk. ii, ch. 21, p. 268, Eng. Tr.) is not satisfactory in his description of this event.

The idea which I conceive of the Five Thousand, as a number existing from the commencement only in talk and imagination, neither realized nor intended to be realized, coincides with the full meaning of this passage of Thucydides, as well as with everything which he had before said about them.

I will here add that *ὅσοι ὅπλα παρέχονται* means persons furnishing arms, not for themselves alone, but for others also (Xenoph. Hellen. iii, 4.15.)

As to the second point, the signification of *νομοθέτας*, I stand upon the general use of that word in Athenian political language : see the explanation earlier in this History, vol. v, ch. xlv, p. 373. It is for the commentators to produce some justification of the unusual meaning which they assign to it : "persons to model the constitution ; commissioners who drew up the new constitution," as Dr. Arnold, in concurrence with the rest, translates it. Until some justification is produced, I venture to believe that *νομοθέται* is a word which would not be used in that sense with reference to nominees chosen by the democracy, and intended to act with the democracy ; for it implies a final, decisive, authoritative determination ; whereas the *ἐγγράμμοι*, or "commissioners to draw up a constitution," were only invested with the function of submitting something for approbation to the public assembly or competent authority ; that is, assuming that the public assembly remained an efficient reality.

Moreover, the words *καὶ πάντα* would hardly be used in immediate sequence to *νομοθέτας*, if the latter word meant that which the commentators suppose : "Commissioners for framing a constitution, and the other things towards the constitution." Such commissioners are surely far too prominent and initiative in their function to be named in this way. Let us add, that the most material items in the new constitution, if we are so to call it, have already been distinctly specified as settled by public vote, before these *νομοθέται* are even named.

It is important to notice, that even the Thirty, who were named six years afterwards to draw up a constitution, at the moment when Sparta was mistress of Athens, and when the people were thoroughly put down, are not called *Νομοθέται*, but are named by a circumlocution equivalent to *ἐγγράμμοι* — *Ἐδόξε τῷ δήμῳ, τριάκοντα ἄνδρας ἐλέσθαι, οἱ τοὺς πατρίους νόμους ἐν-*

blies were also held, in which *nomothetæ*, *dikasts*, and other institutions essential to the working of the democracy, were constituted. Various other votes were also passed ; especially one, on the proposition of Kritias, seconded by Theramenês,¹ to restore Alkibiadês and some of his friends from exile ; while messages were farther despatched, both to him and to the armament at Samos, doubtless confirming the recent nomination of generals, apprizing them of what had recently occurred at Athens, as well as bespeaking their full concurrence and unabated efforts against the common enemy.

Thucydides bestows marked eulogy upon the general spirit of moderation and patriotic harmony which now reigned at Athens, and which directed the political proceedings of the people.² But he does not countenance the belief, as he has been sometimes understood, nor is it true in point of fact, that they now introduced a new constitution. Putting an end to the oligarchy, and to the rule of the Four Hundred, they restored the old democracy

γραψάσαι, κατ' οἷς πολιτεύσονται. — Αἰρεθέντες δὲ, ἐφ' ᾧ τε ἐγγράψαι νόμους κατ' οἷσιν αὖτε πολιτεύσονται, τοῦτους μὲν αὖτις ἐμελλον ἐγγράφειν τε καὶ ἀποδεκτέναι, etc. (Xenophon, Hellen. ii, 3, 2-11.) Xenophon calls Kritias and Chariklês the *nomothetæ* of the Thirty (Memor. i, 2, 30), but this is not democracy.

For the signification of *Νομοθέτης* (applied most generally to Solon, sometimes to others, either by rhetorical looseness or by ironical taunt), or *Νομοθέται*, a numerous body of persons chosen and sworn, see Lysias cont. Nikomach. sects. 3, 33, 37 ; Andokidês de Mysteriis, sects. 81-85, c. 14, p. 38, where the *nomothetæ* are a sworn body of Five Hundred, exercising, conjointly with the senate, the function of accepting or rejecting laws proposed to them.

¹ Plutarch, Alkibiadês, c. 33. Cornelius Nepos (Alkibiad. c. 5. and Diodorus, xiii, 38-42) mentions Theramenês as the principal author of the decree for restoring Alkibiadês from exile. But the precise words of the elegy composed by Kritias, wherein the latter vindicates this proceeding to himself, are cited by Plutarch, and are very good evidence. Doubtless many of the leading men supported, and none opposed, the proposition.

² Thucyd. viii, 97. *Καὶ οὐχ ἡκιστα δὴ τὸν πρῶτον χρόνον ἐπὶ γε ἐμοῦ Ἀθηναῖοι φαίνονται εὖ πολιτεύσαντες* : μετρία γὰρ ἦ τε ἐς τοὺς δλίγους καὶ τοὺς πολλοὺς ἐὺγκρασις ἐγένετο, καὶ ἐκ πονηρῶν τῶν πραγμάτων γενομένων τούτων πρῶτον ἀνένεγκε τὴν πόλιν.

I refer the reader to a note on this passage in one of my former volumes and on the explanation given of it by Dr. Arnold (see vol. v, ch. xlv, p. 330).

seemingly with only two modifications, first, the partial limitation of the right of suffrage; next, the discontinuance of all payment for political functions. The impeachment against Antiphon, tried immediately afterwards, went before the senate and the dikastery exactly according to the old democratical forms of procedure. But we must presume that the senate, the dikasts, the nomothetæ, the ekklesiasts, or citizens who attended the assembly, the public orators who prosecuted state-criminals, or defended any law when it was impugned, must have worked for the time without pay.

Moreover, the two modifications above mentioned were of little practical effect. The exclusive body of Five Thousand citizens, professedly constituted at this juncture, was neither exactly realized, nor long retained. It was constituted, even now, more as a nominal than as a real limit; a nominal total, yet no longer a mere blank, as the Four Hundred had originally produced it, but containing, indeed, a number of individual names greater than the total, and without any assignable line of demarkation. The mere fact, that every one who furnished a panoply was entitled to be of the Five Thousand, — and not they alone, but others besides,¹ — shows that no care was taken to adhere either to that or to any other precise number. If we may credit a speech composed by Lysias,² the Four Hundred had themselves, after the demolition of their intended fortress at Ectioneia, and when power was passing out of their hands, appointed a committee of their number to draw up for the first time a real list of *The Five Thousand*; and Polystratus, a member of that committee, takes credit with the succeeding democracy for having made the list comprise nine thousand names instead of five thousand. As this list of Polystratus — if, indeed, it ever existed — was never either published or adopted, I merely notice the description given of it, to illustrate my position that the number Five Thousand was now understood on all sides as an indefinite expression for a

¹ The words of Thucydides (viii. 97), *εἶναι δὲ αὐτῶν, ὅποσοι καὶ ὅπλα παρεχοντο*, show that this body was not composed exclusively of those who furnished panoplies. It could never have been intended, for example, to exclude the *hippeis*, or knights.

² Lysias, Orat. xx, pro Polystrato, c. 4, p. 675. Reisk.

suffrage extensive, but not universal. The number had been first invented by Antiphon and the leaders of the Four Hundred, to cloak their own usurpation and intimidate the democracy: next, it served the purpose of Theramenes and the minority of the Four Hundred, as a basis on which to raise a sort of dynastic opposition, to use modern phraseology, within the limits of the oligarchy; that is, without appearing to overstep principles acknowledged by the oligarchy themselves: lastly, it was employed by the democratical party generally as a convenient middle term to slide back into the old system, with as little dispute as possible; for Alkibiades and the armament had sent word home that they adhered to the Five Thousand, and to the abolition of salaried civil functions.¹

But exclusive suffrage of the so-called Five Thousand, especially with the expansive numerical construction now adopted, was of little value either to themselves or to the state;² while it was an insulting shock to the feelings of the excluded multitude, especially to brave and active seamen like the *parali*. Though prudent as a step of momentary transition, it could not stand, nor was any attempt made to preserve it in permanence, amidst a community so long accustomed to universal citizenship, and where the necessities of defence against the enemy called for energetic efforts from all the citizens.

Even as to the gratuitous functions, the members of the Five Thousand themselves would soon become tired, not less than the poorer freemen, of serving without pay, as senators or in other ways; so that nothing but absolute financial deficit would prevent the reestablishment, entire or partial, of the pay.³ And that deficit was never so complete as to stop the disbursement of

¹ Thucyd. viii. 86.

² Thucyd. viii. 92. *το μὲν καταστήσαι μετόχους τοσούτους, ἄντικρυς ἂν δέμων ἔχοιμι ναι*, etc.

³ See the valuable financial inscriptions in M. Boeckh's *Corpus Inscriptionum*, part i, nos. 147, 148, which attest considerable disbursements for the *diobely* in 410-409 B.C.

Nor does it seem that there was much diminution during these same years in the private expenditure and ostentation of the *Chorégi* at the festivals and other exhibitions: see the Oration xxi, of Lysias — *Ἀπολογία Δωροδοτίας*, c. 1, 2, pp. 698-700, Reiske.

the diobely, or distribution of two oboli to each citizen on occasion of various religious festivals. Such distribution continued without interruption; though perhaps the number of occasions on which it was made may have been lessened.

How far or under what restriction, any reestablishment of civil pay obtained footing during the seven years between the Four Hundred and the Thirty, we cannot say. But leaving this point undecided, we can show, that within a year after the deposition of the Four Hundred, the suffrage of the so-called Five Thousand expanded into the suffrage of all Athenians without exception, or into the full antecedent democracy. A memorable decree, passed about eleven months after that event, — at the commencement of the archonship of Glaukippus (June 410 B.C.), when the senate of Five Hundred, the dikasts, and other civil functionaries, were renewed for the coming year, pursuant to the ancient democratical practice, — exhibits to us the full democracy not merely in action, but in all the glow of feeling called forth by a recent restoration. It seems to have been thought that this first renewal of archons and other functionaries, under the revived democracy, ought to be stamped by some emphatic proclamation of sentiment, analogous to the solemn and heart-stirring oath taken in the preceding year at Samos. Accordingly, Demophantus proposed and carried a (psephism or) decree,¹ prescribing the form of an oath to be taken by all Athenians to stand by the democratical constitution.

The terms of his psephism and oath are striking. "If any man subvert the democracy at Athens, or hold any magistracy after the democracy has been subverted, he shall be an enemy of the Athenians. Let him be put to death with impunity, and let his property be confiscated to the public, with the reservation of a tithe to Athênê. Let the man who has killed him, and the accomplice privy to the act, be accounted holy and of good religious

¹ About the date of this psephism, or decree, see Boeckh, *Staatshaushaltung der Athener*, vol. ii, p. 168, in the comment upon sundry inscriptions appended to his work, not included in the English translation by Mr Lewis; also Meier, *De Bonis Damnatorum*, sect. ii, pp. 6-10. Wachsmuth erroneously places the date of it after the Thirty; see *Hellen. Alterth.* i. p. 267.

odor. Let all Athenians swear an oath under the sacrifice of full-grown victims, in their respective tribes and demes, to kill him. Let the oath be as follows: 'I will kill with my own hand, if I am able, any man who shall subvert the democracy at Athens, or who shall hold any office in future after the democracy has been subverted, or shall rise in arms for the purpose of making himself a despot, or shall help the despot to establish himself. And if any one else shall kill him, I will account the slayer to be holy as respects both gods and demons, as having slain an enemy of the Athenians. And I engage by word, by deed, and by vote, to sell his property and make over one-half of the proceeds to the slayer, without withholding anything. If any man shall perish in slaying or in trying to slay the despot, I will be kind both to him and to his children, as to Harmodius and Aristogiton, and their descendants. And I hereby break and renounce all oaths which have been sworn hostile to the Athenian people, either at Athens or at the camp (at Samos) or elsewhere.'² Let all Athenians swear this as the regular oath, immediately before the festival of the Dionysia, with sacrifice and full-grown victims;³ invoking upon him who keeps it, good

¹ Andokides de Mysteriorum, sects. 95-99. (c. 16, p. 48, R.) — 'Ο δ' ἀποκτείνει τὰς παρὰ τὰς πόλιν, καὶ ἡ πόλις ἀποκτείνει, οὗτος ἅπλοσ καὶ ἱερός. Ὅμοσαι δ' Ἀθηναῖοι ἀπ' αὐτῶν, καθ' ἑρπυλίων, κατὰ φύλας καὶ κατὰ δήμους, ἐπὶ τούτοις τὰς ταῦτα ποιήσαντα.

The comment of Sneyers (*Commentationes De Xenophontis Hellenicis*, Berlin, 1833, pp. 18, 19) on the events of this time, is not clear.

² Andokides de Mysteriorum, sects. 95-99. (c. 16, p. 48, R.) Ὅμοσαι δ' ἅρκοι τῶνδε τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἢ ἐν τῷ στρατοῦ, ἢ ἡ πόλις καὶ ἐν τῷ δήμῳ, ἢ ἐν τῷ ἑσπέρῳ, καὶ ἀποκτείνει.

To what particular anti-constitutional oaths allusion is here made, we cannot tell. All those of the oligarchical conspirators, both at Samos and at Athens, are doubtless intended to be abrogated; and this oath, like that of the armament at Samos (Thucyd. viii. 75), is intended to be sworn by every one including those who had before been members of the oligarchical conspiracy. Perhaps it may also be intended to abrogate the covenant sworn by the members of the political clubs or *ἐκκλησίαι* among themselves, in so far as it pledged them to anti-constitutional acts (Thucyd. viii. 54-57).

³ Andokides de Mysteriorum, sects. 95-99. (c. 16, p. 48, R.) Ταῦτα δὲ ὁμοσάτωσαν Ἀθηναῖοι ἀπ' αὐτῶν καθ' ἑρπυλίων, τὸν νομίμον ἄρκον, πρὸ δαίμωνων, &c.

things in abundance; but upon him who breaks it, destruction for himself as well as for his family."

Such was the remarkable decree which the Athenians not only passed in senate and public assembly, less than a year after the deposition of the Four Hundred, but also caused to be engraved on a column close to the door of the senate-house. It plainly indicates, not merely that the democracy had returned, but an unusual intensity of democratical feeling along with it. The constitution which *all* the Athenians thus swore to maintain by the most strenuous measures of defence, must have been a constitution in which *all* Athenians had political rights, not one of Five Thousand privileged persons excluding the rest.¹ This decree became invalid after the expulsion of the Thirty, by the general resolution then passed not to act upon any laws passed before the archonship of Eukleidēs, unless specially reenacted. But the column on which it stood engraved still remained, and the words were read upon it, at least down to the time of the orator Lykurgus, eighty years afterwards.²

The mere deposition of the Four Hundred, however, and the transfer of political power to the Five Thousand, which took place in the first public assembly held after the defeat off Eretria, was sufficient to induce most of the violent leaders of the Four Hundred forthwith to leave Athens. Peisander, Alexiklēs, and others, went off secretly to Dekeleia;³ Aristarchus alone

¹ Those who think that a new constitution was established, after the deposition of the Four Hundred, are perplexed to fix the period at which the old democracy was restored. K. F. Hermann and others suppose, without any special proof, that it was restored at the time when Alkibiadēs returned to Athens in 407 B.C. See K. F. Hermann, *Griech. Staats. Alterthümer*, s. 167, note 13.

² Lykurgus *adv. Leokrat.* sect. 131, c. 31, p. 225: compare *Demosthen. adv. Leptin.* sect. 138, c. 34, p. 506.

If we wanted any proof, how perfectly reckless and unmeaning is the mention of the name of *Solon* by the orators, we should find it in this passage of Andokidēs. He calls this psephism of Demophantus a *law of Solon* (sect. 96): see above in this History, vol. iii, ch. xi, p. 122.

³ Thucyd. viii, 98. Most of these fugitives returned six years afterwards, after the battle of Ægospotami, when the Athenian people again became subject to an oligarchy in the persons of the Thirty. Several of them be

made his flight the means of inflicting a new wound upon his country. Being among the number of the generals, he availed himself of this authority to march — with some of the rudest among those Scythian archers, who did the police duty of the city — to Enoe, on the Boeotian frontier, which was at that moment under siege by a body of Corinthians and Boeotians united. Aristarchus, in concert with the besiegers, presented himself to the garrison, and acquainted them that Athens and Sparta had just concluded peace, one of the conditions of which was that Enoe should be surrendered to the Boeotians. He therefore, as general, ordered them to evacuate the place, under the benefit of a truce to return home. The garrison having been closely blocked up, and kept wholly ignorant of the actual condition of politics, obeyed the order without reserve: so that the Boeotians acquired possession of this very important frontier position, a new thorn in the side of Athens, besides Dekeleia.¹

Thus was the Athenian democracy again restored, and the divorce between the city and the armament at Samos terminated after an interruption of about four months by the successful conspiracy of the Four Hundred. It was only by a sort of miracle — or rather by the incredible backwardness and stupidity of her foreign enemies — that Athens escaped alive from this nefarious aggression of her own ablest and wealthiest citizens. That the victorious democracy should animadvert upon and punish the principal actors concerned in it, — who had satiated their own selfish ambition at the cost of so much suffering, anxiety, and peril to their country, — was nothing more than rigorous justice. But the circumstances of the case were peculiar: for the counter-revolution had been accomplished partly by the aid of a minority among the Four Hundred themselves, — Theramenes, Aristokrates, and others, together with the Board of Elders called Probuli, — all of whom had been, at the outset, either principals or

came members of the senate which worked under the Thirty (*Lysias cont. Agorat.* sect. 80, c. 18, p. 495).

Whether Aristotelēs and Chariklēs were among the number of the Four Hundred who now went into exile, as Wattenbach affirms (*De Quadringent. Ath. Factione*, p. 66), seems not clearly made out.

¹ Thucyd. viii, 89, 90. Ἀριστάρχος, ἀνὴρ ἐν τοῖς μάλιστα καὶ ἐκ πλείστον ἐναντίος τῷ δήμῳ, etc.

accomplices in that system of terrorism and assassination, whereby the democracy had been overthrown and the oligarchical rulers established in the senate-house. The earlier operations of the conspiracy, therefore, though among its worst features, could not be exposed to inquiry and trial without compromising these parties as fellow-criminals. Theramenes evaded this difficulty, by selecting for animadversion a recent act of the majority of the Four Hundred, which he and his partisans had opposed, and on which therefore he had no interests adverse either to justice or to the popular feeling. He stood foremost to impeach the last embassy sent by the Four Hundred to Sparta, sent with instructions to purchase peace and alliance at almost any price, and connected with the construction of the fort at Ectoneia for the reception of an enemy's garrison. This act of manifest treason, in which Antiphon, Phrynichus, and ten other known envoys were concerned, was chosen as the special matter for public trial and punishment, not less on public grounds than with a view to his own favor in the renewed democracy. But the fact that it was Theramenes who thus denounced his old friends and fellow-conspirators, after having lent hand and heart to their earlier and not less guilty deed, was long remembered as a treacherous betrayal, and employed in after days as an excuse for atrocious injustice against himself.¹

Of the twelve envoys who went on this mission, all except Phrynichus, Antiphon, Archeptolemus, and Onomaklès, seem to have already escaped to Dekeleia or elsewhere. Phrynichus, as I have mentioned a few pages above, had been assassinated several days before. Respecting his memory, a condemnatory vote had already been just passed by the restored senate of Five Hundred, decreeing that his property should be confiscated and his house razed to the ground, and conferring the gift of citizenship, together with a pecuniary recompense, on two foreigners who

¹ Lysias cont. Eratosthen. c. 11, p. 427, sects. 66-68. Βουλόμενος δὲ (Theramenes) τῷ ἐμπεύοντι πείθει πιστὸς δοκεῖν εἶναι, Ἀντιφῶντα καὶ Ἀρχεπτόλεμον, φίλους οὖντας αὐτῷ, κατηγορῶν ἀπεκτείνεν· εἰς τοσοῦτον ἐκ κοκίης ἤλθεν, ὥστε ἅμα μὲν διὰ τὴν πρὸς ἐκείνους πίστιν ὑμᾶς κατεδουλώσατο, διὰ δὲ τὴν πρὸς ὑμᾶς τοῖς φίλοις ἀπώλεσεν.

Compare Xenophon, Hellen. ii. 3. 30-33.

claimed to have assassinated him.¹ The other three, Antiphon, Archeptolemus, and Onomaklès,² were presented in name to the senate by the generals, of whom probably Theramenes was one, as having gone on a mission to Sparta for purposes of mischief to Athens, partly on board an enemy's ship, partly through the Spartan garrison at Dekeleia. Upon this presentation, doubtless a document of some length and going into particulars, a senator named Andron moved: That the generals, aided by any ten senators whom they may choose, do seize the three persons accused, and hold them in custody for trial; that the thesmothetæ do send to each of the three a formal summons, to prepare themselves for trial on a future day before the dikastery, on the charge of high treason, and do bring them to trial on the day named; assisted by the generals, the ten senators chosen as auxiliaries, and any other citizen who may please to take part, as their accusers. Each of the three was to be tried separately, and, if condemned,

¹ That these votes, respecting the memory and the death of Phrynichus, preceded the trial of Antiphon, we may gather from the concluding words of the sentence passed upon Antiphon: see Plutarch. Vit. x. Oratt. p. 834, B; compare Schol. Aristoph. Lysistr. 313.

Both Lysias and Lykurgus, the orators, contain statements about the death of Phrynichus which are not in harmony with Thucydides. Both these orators agree in reporting the names of the two foreigners who claimed to have slain Phrynichus, and whose claim was allowed by the people afterwards, in a formal reward and vote of citizenship, Thrasybulus of Kalydon, Apollodorus of Megara (Lysias cont. Agorat. c. 18, 492; Lykurg. cont. Leokrat. c. 29, p. 217).

Lykurgus says that Phrynichus was assassinated by night, "near the fountain, hard by the willow-trees;" which is quite contradictory to Thucydides, who states that the deed was done in daylight, and in the market-place. Agoratus, against whom the speech of Lysias is directed, pretended to have been one of the assassins, and claimed reward on that score.

The story of Lykurgus, that the Athenian people, on the proposition of Kritias, exhumed and brought to trial the dead body of Phrynichus, and that Aristarchus and Alexiklès were put to death for undertaking its defence, is certainly in part false, and probably wholly false. Aristarchus was then at Euboë, Alexiklès at Dekeleia.

² Onomaklès had been one of the colleagues of Phrynichus, as general of the armament in Ionia, in the preceding autumn (Thucyd. viii. 25).

In one of the Biographies of Thucydides (p. xxii. in Dr. Arnold's edition), it is stated that Onomaklès was executed along with the other two: but the document cited in the Pseudo-Plutarch contradicts this.

was to be dealt with according to the penal law of the city against traitors, or persons guilty of treason.¹

Though all the three persons thus indicated were at Athens, or at least were supposed to be there, on the day when this resolution was passed by the senate, yet, before it was executed, Onomaklès had fled; so that Antiphon and Archeptolemus only were imprisoned for trial. They too must have had ample opportunity for leaving the city, and we might have presumed that Antiphon would have thought it quite as necessary to retire as Peisander and Alexiklès. So acute a man as he, at no time very popular, must have known that now at least he had drawn the sword against his fellow-citizens in a manner which could never be forgiven. However, he chose voluntarily to stay; and this man, who had given orders for taking off so many of the democratical speakers by private assassination, received from the democracy, when triumphant, full notice and fair trial on a distinct and specific charge. The speech which he made in his defence, though it did not procure acquittal, was listened to, not merely with patience, but with admiration; as we may judge from the powerful and lasting effect which it produced. Thucydides describes it as the most magnificent defence against a capital charge which had ever come before him;² and the poet Archias, doubtless a hearer, warmly complimented Antiphon on his eloquence; to which the latter replied, that the approval of one such discerning judge was in his eyes an ample compensation for the unfriendly verdict of the multitude. Both he and Archeptolemus were found guilty by the dikastery and condemned to the penalties of treason. They were handed over to the magistrates called the Eleven, the chiefs of executive justice at Athens, to be put to death by the customary draught of hemlock. Their

¹ Plutarch, Vit. x, Oratt. p. 834; compare Xenophon, Hellen. i. 7, 22. Apolèxis was one of the accusers of Antiphon; see Harpokration, s. v. *Ἀπολῆξις*.

² Thucyd. viii, 68; Aristotle, Ethic. Eudæm. iii, 5.

Rühnkens seems quite right (Dissertat. De Antiphoni, p. 818, Rühnk.) in considering the oration *περὶ ἀρταγέρωνος* to be Antiphon's defence of himself; though Westermann (Geschichte der Griech. Beredsamkeit, p. 277) controverts this opinion. This oration is alluded to in several of the articles in Harpokration.

properties were confiscated, their houses were directed to be razed, and the vacant site to be marked by columns, with the inscription: "The residence of Antiphon the traitor, — of Archeptolemus the traitor." They were not permitted to be buried either in Attica, or in any territory subject to Athenian dominion.¹ Their children, both legitimate and illegitimate, were deprived of the citizenship; and the citizen who should adopt any descendant of either of them, was to be himself in like manner disfranchised.

Such was the sentence passed by the dikastery, pursuant to the Athenian law of treason. It was directed to be engraved on the same brazen column as the decree of honor to the slayers of Phrynichus. From that column it was transcribed, and has thus passed into history.¹

¹ So, Themistoklès, as a traitor, was not allowed to be buried in Attica (Thucyd. i, 135; Cornel. Nepos, Vit. Themistocl. ii, 10). His friends are said to have brought his bones thither secretly.

² It is given at length in Pseudo-Plutarch, Vit. x, Oratt. pp. 833, 834. It was preserved by Cæcilius, a Sicilian and rhetorical teacher, of the Augustan age; who possessed sixty orations ascribed to Antiphon, twenty-five of which he considered spurious.

Antiphon left a daughter, whom Kallæschrus sued for in marriage, pursuant to the forms of law, being entitled to do so on the score of near relationship (*ἐπιδίκασται*). Kallæschrus was himself one of the Four Hundred, perhaps a brother of Kritias. It seems singular that the legal power of suing at law for a female in marriage, by right of near kin (*τοῦ ἐπιδικάζεσθαι*), could extend to a female disfranchised and debarred from all rights of citizenship.

If we may believe Harpokration, Andron, who made the motion in the senate for sending Antiphon and Archeptolemus to trial, had been himself a member of the Four Hundred oligarchs, as well as Theramenès (Harp. v. *Ἀνδρων*).

The note of Dr. Arnold upon that passage (viii, 68) wherein Thucydides calls Antiphon *ἀριτῇ αἰδέωνος ὑστερος*, "inferior to no man in virtue," well deserves to be consulted. This passage shows, in a remarkable manner, what were the political and private qualities which determined the esteem of Thucydides. It shows that his sympathies went along with the oligarchical party; and that, while the exaggerations of opposition-speakers, or demagogues, such as those which he imputes to Kleon and Hyperbolus, provoked his bitter hatred, exaggerations of the oligarchical warfare, or multiplied assassinations, did not make him like a man the worse. But it shows, at the same time, his great candor in the narration of facts; for he gives an undisguised revelation both of the assassinations, and of the treason, of Antiphon.

How many of the Four Hundred oligarchs actually came to trial or were punished, we have no means of knowing; but there is ground for believing that none were put to death except Antiphon and Archeptolemus, perhaps also Aristarchus, the betrayer of Ctenoë to the Boeotians. The latter is said to have been formally tried and condemned;¹ though by what accident he afterwards came into the power of the Athenians, after having once effected his escape, we are not informed. The property of Peisander, he himself having escaped, was confiscated, and granted either wholly or in part as a recompense to Apollodorus, one of the assassins of Phrynichus;² probably the property of the other conspicuous fugitive oligarchs was confiscated also. Polystratus, another of the Four Hundred, who had only become a member of that body a few days before its fall, was tried during absence, which absence his defenders afterwards accounted for, by saying that he had been wounded in the naval battle of Eretria, and heavily fined. It seems that each of the Four Hundred was called on to go through an audit and a trial of accountability, according to the practice general at Athens with magistrates going out of office. Such of them as did not appear to this trial were condemned to fine, to exile, or to have their names recorded as traitors: but most of those who did appear seem to have been acquitted; partly, we are told, by bribes to the logistæ, or auditing officers, though some were condemned either to fine or to partial political disability, along with those hoplites who had been the most marked partisans of the Four Hundred.³

¹ Xenoph. Hellenic. i. 7. 28. This is the natural meaning of the passage; though it *may* also mean that a day for trial was named, but that Aristarchus did not appear. Aristarchus may possibly have been made prisoner in one of the engagements which took place between the garrison of Dekeleia and the Athenians. The Athenian exiles in a body established themselves at Dekeleia, and carried on constant war with the citizens at Athens: see Lysias, De Bonis Nicia Fratr. Or. xviii. ch. 4. p. 604; Pro Polystrato, Orat. xx. c. 7. p. 688; Andokidēs de Mysteriis, c. 17. p. 50.

² Lysias, De Oleâ Sacra. Or. vii. ch. ii. p. 263. Reisk.

³ "Quadringentis ipsa dominatio fraudi non fuit; imo qui cum Theramene et Aristocrate steterant, in magno honore habiti sunt: omnibus autem rationes reddendæ fuerunt; qui solum vertissent proditores iudicati sunt, nomina in publico proposita." (Wattenbach De Qua 'ringentorum Athenis Factione, p. 65.)

Indistinctly as we make out the particular proceedings of the Athenian people at this restoration of the democracy, we know

From the psephism of Patrokleidēs, passed six years subsequently, after the battle of Megospotamos, we learn that the names of such among the Four Hundred as did not stay to take their trial, were engraved on pillars distinct from those who were tried and condemned either to fine or to various disabilities. Andokidēs de Mysteriis, sects. 75-78: Καὶ ὅσα ὀνόματα τῶν τετρακισχίλων τῶν ἐγγεγραμμένων ἢ ἄλλο τι περὶ τῶν ἐν τῇ δλιγαρχίᾳ πραχθέντων ἴσται πρὸς γεγραμμένων, πλὴν ὅποσα ἐν στήλαις γέγραπται τῶν ἀντιπαθέμενων. etc. These last names, as the most criminal, were excepted from the amnesty of Patrokleidēs.

We here see that there were two categories among the condemned Four Hundred: 1. Those who remained to stand the trial of accountability, and were condemned either to a fine which they could not pay, or to some political disability. 2. Those who did not remain to stand their trial, and were condemned *par contumace*.

Along with the first category we find other names besides those of the Four Hundred, found guilty as their partisans: ἄλλο τι (ὄνομα) περὶ τῶν ἐν τῇ δλιγαρχίᾳ πραχθέντων. Among these partisans we may rank the soldiers mentioned a little before, sect. 75: οἱ στρατιῶται, οἷς ὅτι ἐπέμεινται ἐπὶ τῶν τετρακισχίλων ἐν τῇ πόλει, τὰ μὲν ἄλλα ἦν ἅπασιν ἀλλοις ἐπὶ τῷ πόλει, ἵππων δ' ἐν τῷ δήμῳ οὐκ ἔστιν ἀπὸ τοῖς οὐδὲ βουλευσαί, where the preposition ἐπὶ seems to signify not simply contemporaneousness, but a sort of intimate connection, like the phrase ἐπὶ προστατοῦ οικεῖν (see Matthiæ, Gr. Gr. sect. 584; Kühner, Gr. Gr. sect. 611).

The oration of Lysias pro Polystrato is on several points obscure: but we make out that Polystratus was one of the Four Hundred who did not come to stand his trial of accountability, and was therefore condemned in his absence. Severe accusations were made against him, and he was falsely asserted to be the cousin, whereas he was in reality only fellow-demot, of Phrynichus (sects. 20, 24, 11). The defence explains his non-appearance, by saying that he had been wounded at the battle of Eretria, and that the trial took place immediately after the deposition of the Four Hundred (sects. 14, 24). He was heavily fined, and deprived of his citizenship (sects. 15, 33, 38). It would appear that the fine was greater than his property could discharge; accordingly this fine, remaining unpaid, would become chargeable upon his sons after his death, and unless they could pay it, they would come into the situation of insolvent public debtors to the state, which would debar them from the exercise of the rights of citizenship, so long as the debt remained unpaid. But while Polystratus was alive, his sons were not liable to the state for the payment of his fine: and they therefore still remained citizens, and in the full exercise of their rights, though he was disfranchised. They were three sons, all of whom had served with credit as hoplites, and even as horsemen, in Sicily and elsewhere. In the speech before us, one of them prefers a petition to the dikastery, that the sentence passed against his father

from Thucydides that their prudence and moderation were exemplary. The eulogy, which he bestows in such emphatic terms upon their behavior at this juncture, is indeed doubly remarkable: first, because it comes from an exile, not friendly to the democracy, and a strong admirer of Antiphon; next, because the juncture itself was one eminently trying to the popular morality, and likely to degenerate, by almost natural tendency, into excess of reactionary vengeance and persecution. The democracy was now one hundred years old, dating from Kleisthenes, and fifty years old, even dating from the final reforms of Ephialtes and Perikles; so that self-government and political equality were a part of the habitual sentiment of every man's bosom, heightened in this case by the fact that Athens was not merely a democracy, but an imperial democracy, having dependencies abroad.² At a moment when, from unparalleled previous disasters, she is barely able to keep up the struggle against her foreign enemies, a small knot of her own wealthiest citizens, taking advantage of her weakness, contrive, by a tissue of fraud and force not less flagitious than skilfully combined, to concentrate in their own hands the powers of the state, and to tear from their countrymen the security against bad government, the sentiment of equal citizenship, and the long-established freedom of speech. Nor is this all: these conspirators not only plant an oligarchical sovereignty in the senate-house, but also sustain that sovereignty by inviting a foreign garrison from without, and by betraying Athens to her Peloponnesian enemies. Two more deadly injuries it is impossi-

may be mitigated; partly on the ground that it was unmerited, being passed while his father was afraid to stand forward in his own defence, partly as recompense for distinguished military services of all the three sons. The speech was delivered at a time later than the battle of Kynossema, in the autumn of this year (sect. 31), but not very long after the overthrow of the Four Hundred, and certainly, I think, long before the Thirty; so that the assertion of Taylor (*Vit. Lysias*, p. 55) that all the extant orations of Lysias bear date after the Thirty, must be received with this exception.

¹ This testimony of Thucydides is amply sufficient to refute the vague assertions in the Oration xxv, of Lysias (*Διπλὴ Κατασκευὴ Ἀποδ.* sects. 34, 35) about great enormities now committed by the Athenians; though Mr. Milford copies these assertions as if they were real history, referring them to a time four years afterwards (*History of Greece*, ch. xx, s. 1, vol. iv, p. 327).

² Thucyd. viii, 68.

ble to imagine; and from neither of them would Athens have escaped, if her foreign enemy had manifested reasonable alacrity. Considering the immense peril, the narrow escape, and the impaired condition in which Athens was left, notwithstanding her escape, we might well have expected in the people a violence of reactionary hostility such as every calm observer, while making allowance for the provocation, must nevertheless have condemned; and perhaps somewhat analogous to that exasperation which, under very similar circumstances, had caused the bloody massacres at Korkyra.¹ And when we find that this is exactly the occasion which Thucydides, an observer rather less than impartial, selects to eulogize their good conduct and moderation, we are made deeply sensible of the good habits which their previous democracy must have implanted in them, and which now served as a corrective to the impulse of the actual moment. They had become familiar with the cementing force of a common sentiment; they had learned to hold sacred the inviolability of law and justice, even in respect to their worst enemy; and what was of not less moment, the frequency and freedom of political discussion had taught them not only to substitute the contentions of the tongue for those of the sword, but also to conceive their situation with its present and prospective liabilities, instead of being hurried away by blind retrospective vengeance against the past.

There are few contrasts in Grecian history more memorable or more instructive, than that between this oligarchical conspiracy, conducted by some of the ablest hands at Athens, and the democratical movement going on at the same time in Samos, among the Athenian armament and the Samian citizens. In the former, we have nothing but selfishness and personal ambition, from the beginning: first, a partnership to seize for their own advantage the powers of government; next, after this object has been accomplished, a breach among the partners, arising out of disappointment alike selfish. We find appeal made to nothing but the worst tendencies; either tricks to practise upon the credulity of the people, or extra-judicial murders to work upon their fear. In the latter, on the contrary, the sentiment invoked is that of common patriotism, and equal, public-minded sympathy. That

¹ See about the events in Korkyra, vol. vi, ch. i, p. 283.

which we read in Thucydides,—when the soldiers of the armament and the Samian citizens, pledged themselves to each other by solemn oaths to uphold their democracy to maintain harmony and good feeling with each other, to prosecute energetically the war against the Peloponnesians, and to remain at enmity with the oligarchical conspirators at Athens,—is a scene among the most dramatic and inspiring which occurs in his history.¹ Moreover, we recognize at Samos the same absence of reactionary vengeance as at Athens, after the attack of the oligarchs, Athenian as well as Samian, has been repelled; although those oligarchs had begun by assassinating Hyperbolus and others. There is throughout this whole democratical movement at Samos a generous exaltation of common sentiment over personal, and at the same time an absence of ferocity against opponents, such as nothing except democracy ever inspired in the Grecian bosom.

It is, indeed, true that this was a special movement of generous enthusiasm, and that the details of a democratical government correspond to it but imperfectly. Neither in the life of an individual, nor in that of a people, does the ordinary and every-day movement appear at all worthy of those particular seasons in which a man is lifted above his own level and becomes capable of extreme devotion and heroism. Yet such emotions, though their complete predominance is never otherwise than transitory, have their foundation in veins of sentiment which are not even at other times wholly extinct, but count among the manifold forces tending to modify and improve, if they cannot govern, human action. Even their moments of transitory predominance leave a luminous track behind, and render the men who have passed through them more apt to conceive again the same generous impulse, though in fainter degree. It is one of the merits of Grecian democracy that it *did* raise this feeling of equal and patriotic communion: sometimes, and on rare occasions, like the scene at Samos, with overwhelming intensity, so as to impassion an unanimous multitude; more frequently, in feebler tide, yet such as gave some chance to an honest and eloquent orator, of making successful appeal to public feeling against corruption or selfishness. If we follow the movements of Antiphon and his

¹ Thucyd. viii, 75

fellow-conspirators at Athens, contemporaneous with the democratical manifestations at Samos, we shall see that not only was no such generous impulse included in it, but the success of their scheme depended upon their being able to strike all common and active patriotism out of the Athenian bosom. Under the "cold shade" of their oligarchy—even if we suppose the absence of cruelty and rapacity, which would probably soon have become rife had their dominion lasted, as we shall presently learn from the history of the second oligarchy of Thirty—no sentiment would have been left to the Athenian multitude except fear, servility, or at best a tame and dumb sequacity to leaders whom they neither chose nor controlled. To those who regard different forms of government as distinguished from each other mainly by the feelings which each tends to inspire in magistrates as well as citizens, the contemporaneous scenes of Athens and Samos will suggest instructive comparisons between Grecian oligarchy and Grecian democracy.

CHAPTER LXIII.

THE RESTORED ATHENIAN DEMOCRACY, AFTER THE DEPOSITION OF THE FOUR HUNDRED, DOWN TO THE ARRIVAL OF CYRUS THE YOUNGER IN ASIA MINOR.

THE oligarchy of Four Hundred at Athens, installed in the senate-house about February or March 411 B.C., and deposed about July of the same year, after four or five months of danger and distraction such as to bring her almost within the grasp of her enemies, has now been terminated by the restoration of her democracy; with what attendant circumstances, has been amply detailed. I now revert to the military and naval operations on the Asiatic coast, partly contemporaneous with the political dissensions at Athens, above described.

It has already been stated that the Peloponnesian fleet of

ninety-four triremes,¹ having remained not less than eighty days idle at Rhodes, had come back to Milêtus towards the end of March; with the intention of proceeding to the rescue of Chios, which a portion of the Athenian armament under Strombichidês had been for some time besieging, and which was now in the greatest distress. The main Athenian fleet at Samos, however, prevented Astyochus from effecting this object, since he did not think it advisable to hazard a general battle. He was influenced partly by the bribes, partly by the delusions, of Tissaphernês, who sought only to wear out both parties by protracted war, and who now professed to be on the point of bringing up the Phœnician fleet to his aid. Astyochus had in his fleet the ships which had been brought over for co-operation with Pharnabazus at the Hellespont, and which were thus equally unable to reach their destination. To meet this difficulty, the Spartan Derkyllidas was sent with a body of troops by land to the Hellespont, there to join Pharnabazus, in acting against Abydos and the neighboring dependencies of Athens. Abydos, connected with Milêtus by colonial ties, set the example of revolting from Athens to Derkyllidas and Pharnabazus; an example followed, two days afterwards, by the neighboring town of Lampsakus.

It does not appear that there was at this time any Athenian force in the Hellespont; and the news of this danger to the empire in a fresh quarter, when conveyed to Chios, alarmed Strombichidês, the commander of the Athenian besieging armament. Though the Chians — driven to despair by increasing famine as well as by want of relief from Astyochus, and having recently increased their fleet to thirty-six triremes against the Athenian thirty-two, by the arrival of twelve ships under Leon, obtained from Milêtus during the absence of Astyochus at Rhodes — had sallied out and fought an obstinate naval battle against the Athenians, with some advantage,² yet Strombichidês felt compelled immediately to carry away twenty-four triremes and a body of hoplites for the relief of the Hellespont. Hence the Chians became sufficiently masters of the sea to provision themselves

¹ Thucyd. viii, 44, 45.

² Thucyd. viii, 61, 62 οὐκ ἔλασσον ἔχοντες means a certain success, not very decisive.

afresh, though the Athenian armament and fortified post still remained on the island. Astyochus also was enabled to recall Leon with the twelve triremes to Milêtus, and thus to strengthen his main fleet.¹

The present appears to have been the time, when the oligarchical party both in the town and in the camp at Samos, were laying their plan of conspiracy as already recounted, and when the Athenian generals were divided in opinion, Charmînus siding with this party, Leon and Diomedon against it. Apprized of the reigning dissension, Astyochus thought it a favorable opportunity for sailing with his whole fleet up to the harbor of Samos, and offering battle; but the Athenians were in no condition to leave the harbor. He accordingly returned to Milêtus, where he again remained inactive, in expectation, real or pretended, of the arrival of the Phœnician ships. But the discontent of his own troops, especially the Syracusan contingent, presently became uncontrollable. They not only murmured at the inaction of the armament during this precious moment of disunion in the Athenian camp, but also detected the insidious policy of Tissaphernês in thus frittering away their strength without result; a policy still more keenly brought home to their feelings by his irregularity in supplying them with pay and provision, which caused serious distress. To appease their clamors, Astyochus was compelled to call together a general assembly, the resolution of which was pronounced in favor of immediate battle. He accordingly sailed from Milêtus with his whole fleet of one hundred and twelve triremes round to the promontory of Mykalê immediately opposite Samos, ordering the Milesian hoplites to cross the promontory by land to the same point. The Athenian fleet, now consisting of only eighty-two sail, in the absence of Strombichidês, was then moored near Glaukê on the mainland of Mykalê; but the public decision just taken by the Peloponnesians to fight becoming known to them, they retired to Samos, not being willing to engage with such inferior numbers.²

It seems to have been during this last interval of inaction on the part of Astyochus, that the oligarchical party in Samos made their attempt and miscarried; the reaction from which at-

¹ Thucyd. viii, 63.

² Thucyd. viii, 78, 79.

tempt brought about, with little delay, the great democratical manifestation, and solemn collective oath, of the Athenian armament, coupled with the nomination of new, cordial and unanimous generals. They were now in high enthusiasm, anxious for battle with the enemy, and Strombichides had been sent for immediately, that the fleet might be united against the main enemy at Milétus. That officer had recovered Lampsakus, but had failed in his attempt on Abydos.¹ Having established a central fortified station at Sestos, he now rejoined the fleet at Samos, which by his arrival was increased to one hundred and eight sail. He arrived in the night, when the Peloponnesian fleet was preparing to renew its attack from Mykalé the next morning. It consisted of one hundred and twelve ships, and was therefore still superior in number to the Athenians. But having now learned both the arrival of Strombichides, and the renewed spirit as well as unanimity of the Athenians, the Peloponnesian commanders did not venture to persist in their resolution of fighting. They returned back to Milétus, to the mouth of which harbor the Athenians sailed, and had the satisfaction of offering battle to an unwilling enemy.²

Such confession of inferiority was well calculated to embitter still farther the discontents of the Peloponnesian fleet at Milétus. Tissaphernés had become more and more parsimonious in furnishing pay and supplies; while the recall of Alkibiades to Samos, which happened just now, combined with the uninterrupted apparent intimacy between him and the satrap, confirmed their belief that the latter was intentionally cheating and starving them in the interest of Athens. At the same time, earnest invitations arrived from Pharnabazus, soliciting the co-operation of the fleet at the Hellespont, with liberal promises of pay and maintenance. Klearchus, who had been sent out with the last squadron from Sparta, for the express purpose of going to aid Pharnabazus, claimed to be allowed to execute his orders; while Astyochus also, having renounced the idea of any united action, thought it now expedient to divide the fleet, which he was at a loss how to support. Accordingly, Klearchus was sent with forty triremes from Milétus to the Hellespont, yet with instructions to evade the Athenians at Samos, by first stretching out westward into the

¹ Thucyd. viii. 62.

² Thucyd. viii. 79.



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Again. Encountering severe storms, he was forced with the greater part of his squadron to seek shelter at Delos, and even suffered so much damage as to return to Milētus, from whence he himself marched to the Hellespont by land. Ten of his triremes, however, under the Megarian Helixus, weathered the storm and pursued their voyage to the Hellespont, which was at this moment unguarded, since Strembichidēs seems to have brought back all his squadron. Helixus passed on unopposed to Byzantium, a Doric city and Megarian colony, from whence secret invitations had already reached him, and which he now induced to revolt from Athens. This untoward news admonished the Athenian generals at Samos, whose vigilance the circuitous route of Klearchus had eluded, of the necessity of guarding the Hellespont, whither they sent a detachment, and even attempted in vain to recapture Byzantium. Sixteen fresh triremes afterwards proceeded from Milētus to the Hellespont and Abydos, thus enabling the Peloponnesians to watch that strait as well as the Bosphorus and Byzantium,¹ and even to ravage the Thracian Chersonese.

Meanwhile, the discontents of the fleet at Milētus broke out into open mutiny against Astyochus and Tissaphernēs. Unpaid, and only half-fed, the seamen came together in crowds to talk over their grievances; denouncing Astyochus as having betrayed them for his own profit to the satrap, who was treacherously ruining the armament under the inspirations of Alkibiadēs. Even some of the officers, whose silence had been hitherto purchased, began to hold the same language; perceiving that the mischief was becoming irreparable, and that the men were actually on the point of desertion. Above all, the incorruptible Hermokratēs of Syracuse, and Dorieus the Thurian commander, zealously espoused the claims of their seamen, who being mostly freemen (in greater proportion than the crews of the Peloponnesian ships), went in a body to Astyochus, with loud complaints and demand of their arrears of pay. But the Peloponnesian general received them with haughtiness and even with menace, lifting up his stick to strike the commander Dorieus while advocating their cause. Such was the resentment of the seamen that they rushed forward to pelt Astyochus with missiles: he took

¹ Thucyd. viii, 80-99

refuge, however, on a neighboring altar, so that no actual mischief was done.¹

Nor was the discontent confined to the seamen of the fleet. The Milesians, also, displeased and alarmed at the fort which Tissaphernês had built in their town, watched an opportunity of attacking it by surprise, and expelled his garrison. Though the armament in general, now full of antipathy against the satrap, sympathized in this proceeding, yet the Spartan commissioner Lichas censured it severely, and intimated to the Milesians that they, as well as the other Greeks in the king's territory, were bound to be subservient to Tissaphernês within all reasonable limits, and even to court him by extreme subservience, until the war should be prosperously terminated. It appears that in other matters also, Lichas had enforced instead of mitigating the authority of the satrap over them; so that the Milesians now came to hate him vehemently,² and when he shortly afterwards died of sickness, they refused permission to bury him in the spot — probably some place of honor — which his surviving countrymen had fixed upon. Though Lichas in these enforcements only carried out the stipulations of his treaty with Persia, yet it is certain that the Milesians, instead of acquiring autonomy, according to the general promises of Sparta, were now farther from it than ever, and that imperial Athens had protected them against Persia much better than Sparta.

The subordination of the armament, however, was now almost at an end, when Mindarus arrived from Sparta as admiral to supersede Astyochus, who was summoned home and took his departure. Both Hermokratês and some Milesian deputies availed themselves of this opportunity to go to Sparta for the purpose of preferring complaints against Tissaphernês; while the latter on his part sent thither an envoy named Gaulites, a Karian, brought up in equal familiarity with the Greek and Karian languages, both to defend himself against the often-repeated charges

¹ Thucyd. viii. 83, 84.

² Thucyd. viii. 84. 'Ο μέντοι Λίχας οὔτε ἠρέσκειτο αὐτοῖς, ἐφη τε χρῆναι Τισσαφέρνην καὶ δουλεῦν Μιλησίους καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ἐν τῇ βασιλείᾳ τα μέτρια, καὶ ἐπιθεραπεύειν ἕως ἂν τὸν πόλεμον εὖ θῶνται. Οἱ δὲ Μιλήσιοι ὠργίζοντό τε αὐτῷ καὶ διὰ τὰ καὶ δι' ἄλλα τοιοῦτοτροπα, etc.

of Hermokratês, that he had been treacherously withholding the pay under concert with Alkibiadês and the Athenians, and to denounce the Milesians on his own side, as having wrongfully demolished his fort.¹ At the same time he thought it necessary to put forward a new pretence, for the purpose of strengthening the negotiations of his envoy at Sparta, soothing the impatience of the armament, and conciliating the new admiral Mindarus. He announced that the Phœnician fleet was on the point of arriving at Aspendus in Pamphylia, and that he was going thither to meet it, for the purpose of bringing it up to the seat of war to coöperate with the Peloponnesians. He invited Lichas to accompany him, and engaged to leave Tamos at Milêtus, as deputy during his absence, with orders to furnish pay and maintenance to the fleet.²

Mindarus, a new commander, without any experience of the mendacity of Tissaphernês, was imposed upon by this plausible assurance, and even captivated by the near prospect of so powerful a reinforcement. He despatched an officer named Philippus with two triremes round the Triopian Cape to Aspendus, while the satrap went thither by land.

Here again was a fresh delay of no inconsiderable length, while Tissaphernês was absent at Aspendus, on this ostensible purpose. Some time elapsed before Mindarus was undeceived, for Philippus found the Phœnician fleet at Aspendus, and was therefore at first full of hope that it was really coming onward. But the satrap soon showed that his purpose now, as heretofore, was nothing better than delay and delusion. The Phœnician ships were one hundred and forty-seven in number; a fleet more than sufficient for concluding the maritime war, if brought up to act zealously. But Tissaphernês affected to think that this was a small force, unworthy of the majesty of the Great King; who had commanded a fleet of three hundred sail to be fitted out for the service.³ He waited for some time in pretended expectation

¹ Thucyd. viii. 85.

² Thucyd. viii. 87.

³ Thucyd. viii. 87. This greater total, which Tissaphernês pretended that the Great King purposed to send, is specified by Diodorus at three hundred sail. Thucydides does not assign any precise number (Diodor. xiii. 38, 42, 46).

On a subsequent occasion, too, we hear of the Phœnician fleet as intended

that more ships were on their way, disregarding all the remonstrances of the Lacedæmonian officers.

Presently arrived the Athenian Alkibiadēs, with thirteen Athenian triremes, exhibiting himself as on the best terms with the satrap. He too had made use of this approaching Phœnician fleet to delude his countrymen at Samos, by promising to go and meet Tissaphernēs at Aspendus, and to determine him, if possible, to send the fleet to the assistance of Athens, but at the very least, *not* to send it to the aid of Sparta. The latter alternative of the promise was sufficiently safe, for he knew well that Tissaphernēs had no intention of applying the fleet to any really efficient purpose. But he was thereby enabled to take credit with his countrymen for having been the means of diverting this formidable reinforcement from the enemy.

Partly the apparent confidence between Tissaphernēs and Alkibiadēs, partly the impudent shifts of the former, grounded on the incredible pretence that the fleet was insufficient in number, at length satisfied Philippos that the present was only a new manifestation of deceit. After a long and vexatious interval, he apprized Mindarus — not without indignant abuse of the satrap — that nothing was to be hoped from the fleet at Aspendus. Yet the proceeding of Tissaphernēs, indeed, in bringing up the Phœnicians to that place, and still withholding the order for farther advance and action, was in every one's eyes mysterious and unaccountable. Some fancied that he did it with a view of levying larger bribes from the Phœnicians themselves, as a premium for being sent home without fighting, as it appears that they actually were. But Thucydides supposes that he had no other motive than that which had determined his behavior during the last year, to protract the war and impoverish both Athens and Sparta, by setting up a fresh deception, which would last for some weeks, and thus procure so much delay.¹ The historian is doubtless right: but without his assurance, it would have been difficult to believe, that the maintenance of a fraudulent pretence, for so inconsiderable a time, should have been held as an adequate

¹ It be augmented to a total of three hundred sail (Xenoph. Hellen. iii. 4. 1). It seems to have been the sort of standing number for a fleet worthy of the Persian king.

² Thucyd. viii. 87, 88, 99.

motive for bringing this large fleet from Phœnicia to Aspendus, and then sending it away unemployed.

Having at length lost all hope of the Phœnician ships, Mindarus resolved to break off all dealing with the perfidious Tissaphernēs; the more so, as Tamos, the deputy of the latter, though left ostensibly to pay and keep the fleet, performed that duty with greater irregularity than ever, and to conduct his fleet to the Hellespont into coöperation with Pharnabazus, who still continued his promises and invitations. The Peloponnesian fleet¹ — seventy-three triremes strong, after deducting thirteen which had been sent under Doriens to suppress some disturbances in Rhodes — having been carefully prepared beforehand, was put in motion by sudden order, so that no previous intimation might reach the Athenians at Samos. After having been delayed some days at Ikarus by bad weather, Mindarus reached Chios in safety. But here he was pursued by Thrasyllus, who passed, with fifty-five triremes, to the northward of Chios, and was thus between the Lacedæmonian admiral and the Hellespont. Believing that Mindarus would remain some time at Chios, Thrasyllus placed scouts both on the high lands of Lesbos and on the continent opposite Chios, in order that he might receive instant notice of any movement on the part of the enemy's fleet.² Meanwhile he employed his Athenian force in reducing the Lesbian town of Eresus, which had been lately prevailed on to revolt by a body of three hundred assailants from Kymē under the Theban Anaxander, partly Methymnean exiles, with some political sympathizers, partly mercenary foreigners, who succeeded in carrying Eresus after failing in an attack on Methymna. Thrasyllus found before Eresus a small Athenian squadron of five triremes under Thrasybulus, who had been despatched from Samos to try and forestall the revolt, but had arrived too late. He was farther joined

¹ Diodor. xiii. 38.

² Thucyd. viii. 100. *Λισδομενος δὲ ἐστὶ ἐν τῇ Χίῳ εἶη, καὶ νομίσας αὐτὸν καθέξειν αὐτὸν, σκοποῦν μὲν κατεστήσατο καὶ ἐν τῇ Λισδοῦ, καὶ ἐν τῇ ἄντιπύρῳ, εἰ πῶς ποὶ κινεῖτο αἱ νῆες, ὅπως μὴ λαθούνη, etc.*

I construe τῇ ἄντιπύρῳ ἡπύρῳ, as meaning the mainland opposite Chios, not opposite Lesbos. The words may admit either sense, since Χίῳ and αὐτὸν follow so immediately before; and the situation for the scouts was much more suitable, opposite the northern portion of Chios.

by two triremes from the Hellespont, and by others from Methymna, so that his entire fleet reached the number of sixty-seven triremes, with which he proceeded to lay siege to Eresus; trusting to his scouts for timely warning, in case the enemy's fleet should move northward.

The course which Thrasyllus expected the Peloponnesian fleet to take, was to sail from Chios northward through the strait which separates the northeastern portion of that island from Mount Mimas on the Asiatic mainland; after which it would probably sail past Eresus on the western side of Lesbos, as being the shortest track to the Hellespont, though it might also go round on the eastern side between Lesbos and the continent, by a somewhat longer route. The Athenian scouts were planted so as to desery the Peloponnesian fleet, if it either passed through this strait or neared the island of Lesbos. But Mindarus did neither; thus eluding their watch, and reaching the Hellespont without the knowledge of the Athenians. Having passed two days in provisioning his ships, receiving besides from the Chians three *teserakosts*, a Chian coin of unknown value, for each man among his seamen, he departed on the third day from Chios, but took a southerly route and rounded the island in all haste on its western or sea-side. Having reached and passed the northern latitude of Chios, he took an eastward course, with Lesbos at some distance to his left hand, direct to the mainland; which he touched at a harbor called Karterii, in the Phokæan territory. Here he stopped to give the crew their morning meal: he then crossed the arc of the gulf of Kynê to the little islets called Arginusæ, close on the Asiatic continent opposite Mitylênê, where he again halted for supper. Continuing his voyage onward during most part of the night, he was at Harmatas, on the continent, directly northward and opposite to Methymna, by the next day's morning meal: then still hastening forward after a short halt, he doubled Cape Lektum, sailed along the Troad and passed Tenedos, and reached the entrance of the Hellespont before midnight; where his ships were distributed at Sigeium, Rhœteium, and other neighboring places.¹

¹ Thucyd. viii, 101. The latter portion of this voyage is sufficiently distinct; the earlier portion less so. I describe it in the text differently

By this well-laid course and accelerated voyage, the Peloponnesian fleet completely eluded the lookers-out of Thrasyllus, and

from all the best and most recent editors of Thucydides; from whom I dissent with the less reluctance, as they all here take the gravest liberty with his text, inserting the negative *οὐ* on pure conjecture, without the authority of a single MS. Niebuhr has laid it down as almost a canon of criticism that this is never to be done: yet here we have Krüger recommending it, and Haack, Götter, Dr. Arnold, Poppo, and M. Didot, all adopting it as a part of the text of Thucydides; without even following the caution of Bekker in his small edition, who admonishes the reader, by inclosing the word in brackets. Nay, Dr. Arnold goes so far as to say in note: "*This correction is so certain and so necessary, that it only shows the intention of the earlier editors that it was not made long since.*"

The words of Thucydides, without this correction, and as they stood universally before Haack's edition (even in Bekker's edition of 1821), are:—

Ὁ δὲ Μινδάρως ἐν τοῦτῳ καὶ αἱ ἐκ τῆς Χίου τῶν Πελοποννησίων νῆες, ἐπισιτισαμέναι δύναιτο ἡμεῖς, καὶ λαβόντες παρὰ τῶν Χίων τρεῖς τεσσαράκωστας ἑκάστος Χίος τῇ τρίτῃ διὰ ταχέων ἀπαίρουσιν ἐκ τῆς Χίου πελάγαι, ἵνα μὴ περιτέχωσι ταῖς ἐν τῇ Ἐρέσῳ ναυσὶν ἀλλὰ ἐν ἀριστέρῃ τὴν Λέσβον ἔχοντες ἐπλεον ἐπὶ τὴν ἡπειρόν. Καὶ προσβαλόντες τῆς Φωκαίδος εἰς τὸν ἐν Καρτερίῳ λιμένα, καὶ ἀριστοποιησάμενοι, παραπλεύσαντες τὴν Κυμαίαν δειπνοποιοῦνται ἐν Ἀργενναῖσιν τῆς ἡπείρου, ἐν τῷ ἀντιπέρασ τῆς Μιτυλήνης, etc.

Haack and the other eminent critics just mentioned, all insist that these words as they stand are absurd and contradictory, and that it is indispensable to insert *οὐ* before *πελάγαι*; so that the sentence stands in their editions *ἀπαίρουσιν ἐκ τῆς Χίου οὐ πελάγαι*. They all picture to themselves the fleet of Mindarus as sailing from the town of Chios northward, and going out at the northern strait. Admitting this, they say, plausibly enough, that the words of the old text involve a contradiction, because Mindarus would be going in the direction towards Eresus, and not away from it; though even then, the propriety of their correction would be disputable. But the word *πελάγαι*, when applied to ships departing from Chios, — though it may perhaps mean that they round the northeastern corner of the island and then strike west round Lesbos, — yet means also as naturally, and more naturally, to announce them as *departing by the outer sea*, or sailing on the sea-side (round the southern and western coast) of the island. Accept this meaning, and the old words construe perfectly well. *Ἀπαίρου ἐκ τῆς Χίου πελάγαι* is the natural and proper phrase for describing the circuit of Mindarus round the south and west coast of Chios. This, too, was the only way by which he could have escaped the scouts and the ships of Thrasyllus: for which same purpose of avoiding Athenian ships, we find (viii, 86) the squadron of Klearchus, on another occasion, making a

reached the opening of the Hellespont when that admiral was barely apprized of its departure from Chios. When it arrived at

long circuit out to sea. If it be supposed, which those who read *οὐ πελάγια* must suppose, that Mindarus sailed first up the northern strait between Chios and the mainland, and then turned his course east towards Phokæa this would have been the course which Thrasyllus expected that he would take; and it is hardly possible to explain why he was not seen both by the Athenian scouts as well as by the Athenian garrison at their station of Delphinium on Chios itself. Whereas, by taking the circuitous route round the southern and western coast, he never came in sight either of one or the other: and he was enabled, when he got round to the latitude north of the island, to turn to the right and take a straight easterly course, *with Lesbos on his left hand*, but at a sufficient distance from land to be out of sight of all scouts. *Ἀναγασθαι ἐκ τῆς Χίου πελάγιον* (Xen. Hellen. ii. 1, 17), means to strike into the open sea, quite clear of the coast of Asia: that passage does not decisively indicate whether the ships rounded the southeast or the northeast corner of the island.

We are here told that the seamen of Mindarus received from the Chians per head *three Chian tessarakoster*. Now this is a small Chian coin, nowhere else mentioned; and it is surprising to find so petty and local a denomination of money here specified by Thucydides, contrasted with the different manner in which Xenophon describes Chian payments to the Peloponnesian seamen (Hellen. i. 6, 12; ii. 1, 5). But the voyage of Mindarus round the south and west of the island explains the circumstance. He must have landed twice on the island during this circumnavigation (perhaps starting in the evening), for dinner and supper; and this Chian coin, which probably had no circulation out of the island, served each man to buy provisions at the Chian landing-places. It was not convenient to Mindarus to take aboard *more* provisions in kind at the town of Chios; because he had already aboard a stock of provisions for two days, the subsequent portion of his voyage, along the coast of Asia to Sigium, during which he could not afford time to halt and buy them, and where indeed the territory was not friendly.

It is enough if I can show that the old text of Thucydides will construe very well, without the violent intrusion of this conjectural *οὐ*. But I can show more: for this negative actually renders even the construction of the sentence awkward at least, if not inadmissible. Surely, *ἀπαρουν οὐ πελάγια, ἀλλὰ*, ought to be followed by a correlative adjective or participle belonging to the same verb *ἀπαρουν*: yet if we take *ἔχοντες* as such correlative participle, how are we to construe *ἐπλεον*? In order to express the sense which Haack brings out, we ought surely to have different words, such as: *οὐκ ἀπῆραν ἐκ τῆς Χίου πελάγια, ἀλλ' ἐν ἀριστίᾳ τὴν Ἀσίαν ἔχοντες ἐπλεον ἐπὶ τὴν ἡπειρόν*. Even the change of tense from present to past, when we follow the construction of Haack, is awkward; while if we

Harmatîs, however, opposite to and almost within sight of the Athenian station at Methymna, its progress could no longer remain a secret. As it advanced still farther along the Troad, the momentous news circulated everywhere, and was promulgated through numerous fire-signals and beacons on the hill, by friend as well as by foe.

These signals were perfectly visible, and perfectly intelligible, to the two hostile squadrons now on guard on each side of the Hellespont: eighteen Athenian triremes at Sestos in Europe, sixteen Peloponnesian triremes at Abydos in Asia. To the former it was destruction, to be caught by this powerful enemy in the narrow channel of the Hellespont. They quitted Sestos in the middle of the night, passing opposite to Abydos, and keeping a southerly course close along the shore of the Chersonese, in the direction towards Eleus at the southern extremity of that peninsula, so as to have the chance of escape in the open sea and of joining Thrasyllus. But they would not have been allowed to pass even the hostile station at Abydos, had not the Peloponnesian guard-ships received the strictest orders from Mindarus, transmitted before he left Chios, or perhaps even before he left Miletus, that, if he should attempt the start, they were to keep a vigilant and special lookout for his coming, and reserve themselves to lend him such assistance as might be needed, in case he were attacked by Thrasyllus. When the signals first announced the arrival of Mindarus, the Peloponnesian guardships at Abydos could not know in what position he was, nor whether the main Athenian fleet might not be near upon him. Accordingly they acted on these previous orders, holding themselves in reserve

understand the words in the same way, I propose, the change of tense is perfectly admissible, since the two verbs do not both refer to the same movement or to the same portion of the voyage. "*The fleet starts from Chios at the signal of the island; but when it came to have Lesbos on the left hand, it sailed straight to the coastward*."

I hope that I am not too late to make good my *γραφὴν ἐνίαι*, or protest, against the unwarranted right of Thucydidean citizenship which the recent editors have conferred upon this word *οὐ*, in c. 101. The old text ought certainly to be restored; or, if these editors maintain their views, they ought at least to inclose the word in brackets. In the edition of Thucydides, published at Leipzig, 1845, by C. A. Koth, I observe that the text is still correctly printed, without the negative.

in their station at Abydos, until daylight should arrive, and they should be better informed. They thus neglected the Athenian Hellespontine squadron in its escape from Sestos to Eleus.¹

¹ Thucyd. viii. 102. Οἱ δὲ Ἀθηναῖοι ἐν τῇ Σηστοῖ, . . . ὥς αὐτοὶ οὐ τε φροντιστοὶ ἐσθμαίνον, καὶ ἡσθάνοντο τὰ περὶ ἐξοίχοντες πολλὰ ἐν τῇ πολέμῳ φαιέντα, ἔργασαν ἐπὶ ἐσπλάουσιν οἱ Πελοποννήσιοι. Καὶ τῆς αὐτῆς ταύτης νυκτός, ὥς εἶχον τάχους, ἐπορεύσαντες τῇ Χερσονήσῳ, παρέπλεον ἐπὶ Ἐλαιούτορος, βουζόμενοι ἐκπλεῖσαι ἐς τὴν εἰρηχωρίαν τὰς τῶν πολέμων ναῖς. Καὶ τὰς μὲν ἐν Ἀβδόφ' ἑκαταίδεκα ναῖς ἐλαθόν, προειρημύνης φυλακῆς τῷ φίλῳ ἐπιπλῶ, ὅπως αὐτῶν ἀνακῶς ἐξουσίαι, ἢ ἐκπλεῖσαι· τὰς δὲ μετὰ τοῦ Μενδάριον ἄμα ἐρκατοδύο, etc.

Here, again, we have a difficult text, which has much perplexed the commentators, and which I venture to translate, as it stands in my text, differently from all of them. The words, *προειρημύνης φυλακῆς τῷ φίλῳ ἐπιπλῶ*, ὅπως αὐτῶν ἀνακῶς ἐξουσίαι ἢ ἐκπλεῖσαι, are explained by the Scholiast to mean: "Although watch had been enjoined to them (i.e. to the Peloponnesian guard-squadron at Abydos) by the friendly approaching fleet (of Mindarus), that they should keep strict guard on the Athenians at Sestos, in case the latter should sail out."

Dr. Arnold, Götter, Poppo, and M. Didot, all accept this construction, though all agree that it is most harsh and confused. The former says: "This again is most strangely intended to mean, *προειρημύνον αὐτοῖς ὅτι τῶν ἐπιπλεόντων φίλων φυλάσσειν τοὺς πολέμους*."

To construe τῷ φίλῳ ἐπιπλῶ as equivalent to ὅτι τῶν ἐπιπλεόντων φίλων, is certainly such a harshness as we ought to be very glad to escape. And the construction of the Scholiast involves another liberty which I cannot but consider as objectionable. He supplies, in his paraphrase, the word *καίτοι*, *although*, from his own imagination. There is no indication of *although*, either express or implied, in the text of Thucydides; and it appears to me hazardous to assume into the meaning so decisive a particle without any authority. The genitive absolute, when annexed to the main predication affirmed in the verb, usually denotes something naturally connected with it in the way of cause, concomitancy, explanation, or modification, not something opposed to it, requiring to be prefaced by an *although*; if this latter be intended, then the word *although* is expressed, not left to be understood. After Thucydides has told us that the Athenians at Sestos escaped their opposite enemies at Abydos, when he next goes on to add something under the genitive absolute, we expect that it should be a new fact which explains why or how they escaped: but if the new fact which he tells us, far from explaining the escape, renders it more extraordinary (such as, that the Peloponnesians had received strict orders to watch them), he would surely prepare the reader for this new fact by an express particle, such as *although* or *notwithstanding*: "The Athenians escaped, *although* the Peloponnesians had received the strictest orders to watch them and

On arriving about daylight near the southern point of the Chersonese, these Athenians were desecrated by the fleet of Min-

block them up." As nothing equivalent to, or implying, the adversative particle *although* is to be found in the Greek words, so I infer, as a high probability, that it is not to be sought in the meaning.

Differing from the commentators, I think that these words, *προειρημύνης οὐδ' αὖτε τῷ φίλῳ ἐπιπλῶ*, ὅπως αὐτῶν ἀνακῶς ἐξουσίαι, ἢ ἐκπλεῖσαι, do assign the reason for the fact which had been immediately before announced, and which was really extraordinary; namely, that the Athenian squadron was allowed to pass by Abydos, and escape from Sestos to Eleus. That reason was, that the Peloponnesian guard-squadron had before received special orders from Mindarus, to concentrate its attention and watchfulness upon the approaching squadron: hence it arose that they left the Athenians at Sestos unmolested.

The words τῷ φίλῳ ἐπιπλῶ are equivalent to τῷ τῶν φίλων ἐπιπλῶ, and the pronoun αὐτῶν, which immediately follows, refers to φίλων (the approaching fleet of Mindarus), not to the Athenians at Sestos, as the Scholiast and the commentators construe it. This mistake about the reference of αὐτῶν seems to me to have put them all wrong.

That τῷ φίλῳ ἐπιπλῶ must be construed as equivalent to τῷ τῶν φίλων ἐπιπλῶ is certain; but it is not equivalent to ὅτι τῶν ἐπιπλεόντων φίλων; nor is it possible to construe the words as the Scholiast would understand them: "orders had been previously given by the approach (or arrival) of their friends;" whereby we should turn ὁ ἐπιπλεῶν into an acting and commanding personality. The "approach of their friends" is an event, which may properly be said to have produced an effect, but which cannot be said to have given previous orders. It appears to me that τῷ φίλῳ ἐπιπλῶ is the dative case, governed by φυλακῆς: "a look-out for the arrival of the Peloponnesians," having been enjoined upon these guardships at Abydos: "They had been ordered to watch for the approaching voyage of their friends." The English preposition *for*, expresses here exactly the sense of the Greek dative; that is, the object, purpose, or persons whose benefit is referred to.

The words immediately succeeding, ὅπως αὐτῶν (τῶν φίλων) ἀνακῶς ἐξουσίαι, ἢ ἐκπλεῖσαι, are an expansion of consequences intended to follow from φυλακῆς τῷ φίλῳ ἐπιπλῶ. "They shall watch for the approach of the main fleet, in order that they may devote special and paramount regard to its safety, in case it makes a start." For the phrase ἀνακῶς ἐξουσίαι, compare Herodot. i. 24; viii. 109. Plutarch, Theseus, c. 33: ἀνακῶς, φροντιστικῶς, ἐπιμελῶς, the notes of Arnold and Götter here; and Kummer, Gr. Gr. sect. 533. ἀνακῶς ἐξουσίαι, for ἐπιμελῶς. The words ἀνακῶς ἐξουσίαι express the anxious and special vigilance which the Peloponnesian squadron at Abydos was directed to keep for the arrival of Mindarus and his fleet, which was a matter of doubt and danger: but they would not be properly applicable to the duty of that squadron as respects the op-

darus, which had come the night before to the opposite stations of Sigeium and Rhœteium. The latter immediately gave chase:

posite Athenian squadron at Sestos, which was hardly of superior force to themselves, and was besides an avowed enemy, in sight of their own port.

Lastly, the words *ἦν ἐκπλέωσι* refer to Mindarus and his fleet about to start from Chios, as their subject, not to the Athenians at Sestos.

The whole sentence would stand thus, if we dismiss the peculiarities of Thucydides, and express the meaning in common Greek: *Καὶ τὰς μετὰ τὴν Ἀβύδον ἑκαταδὲκα ναῦς (Ἀθηναῖοι) ἐλάσαν· προσηγό γὰρ (ἐκτιναῖς τὰς ναῦς) φυλάσσειν τὸν ἐπιπλοῦν τῶν φιλῶν, ὅπως αὐτῶν (τῶν φιλῶν) ἀνταρὰς ἐξουσιν, ἦν ἐκπλέωσι.* The verb *φυλάσσειν* here, and of course the abstract substantive *φυλακή* which represents it, signifies to watch for, or wait for like Thucyd. ii. 3. *φυλάξαντες ἐπὶ νύκτα, καὶ αὐτὰ τὰ περιμένοντες*; also viii. 41, *ἐρίλασσε*.

If we construe the words in this way, they will appear in perfect harmony with the general scheme and purpose of Mindarus. That admiral is bent upon carrying his fleet to the Hellespont, but to avoid an action with Thrasyllus in doing so. This is difficult to accomplish, and can only be done by great secrecy of proceeding, as well as by an unusual route. He sends orders beforehand from Chios, perhaps even from Miletus, before he quitted that place, to the Peloponnesian squadron guarding the Hellespont at Abydos. He contemplates the possible case that Thrasyllus may detect his plan, intercept him on the passage, and perhaps block him up or compel him to fight in some roadstead or bay on the coast opposite Lesbos, or on the Troad, which would indeed have come to pass, had he been seen by a single hostile fishing-boat in rounding the island of Chios. Now the orders sent forward, direct the Peloponnesian squadron at Abydos what they are to do in this contingency; since without such orders, the captain of the squadron would not have known what to do, assuming Mindarus to be intercepted by Thrasyllus; whether to remain on guard at the Hellespont, which was his special duty; or to leave the Hellespont unguarded, keep his attention concentrated on Mindarus, and come forth to help him. "Let your first thought be to insure the safe arrival of the main fleet at the Hellespont, and to come out and render help to it, if it be attacked in its route; even though it be necessary for that purpose to leave the Hellespont for a time unguarded." Mindarus could not tell beforehand the exact moment when he would start from Chios, nor was it, indeed, absolutely certain that he would start at all, if the enemy were watching him: his orders were therefore sent, *conditional* upon his being able to get off (*ἦν ἐκπλέωσι*). But he was lucky enough, by the well-laid plan of his voyage, to get to the Hellespont without encountering an enemy. The Peloponnesian squadron at Abydos, however, having received his special orders, when the fire-signals acquainted them that he was approaching, thought only of keeping themselves in reserve to lend him assistance if he needed it, and neglected the

but the Athenians, now in the wide sea, contrived to escape most of them to Imbros, not without the loss, however, of four triremes, one even captured with all the crew on board, near the temple of Protesilaus at Elæus: the crews of the other three escaped ashore. Mindarus was now joined by the squadron from Abydos, and their united force, eighty-six triremes strong, was employed for one day in trying to storm Elæus. Failing in this enterprise, the fleet retired to Abydos. Before all could arrive there, Thrasyllus with his fleet arrived in haste from Erebus, much disappointed that his scouts had been eluded and all his calculations baffled. Two Peloponnesian triremes, which had been more adventurous than the rest in pursuing the Athenians, fell into his hands. He waited at Elæus the return of the fugitive Athenian squadron from Imbros, and then began to prepare his triremes, seventy-six in number, for a general action.

After five days of such preparation, his fleet was brought to battle, sailing northward towards Sestos up the Hellespont, by single ships ahead, along the coast of the Chersonese, or on the European side. The left or most advanced squadron, under Thrasyllus, stretched even beyond the headland called Kynossema, or the Dog's Tomb, ennobled by the legend and the chapel of the Trojan queen Hecuba: it was thus nearly opposite Abydos, while the right squadron under Thrasybulus was not very far from the southern mouth of the strait, nearly opposite Dardanus. Mindarus on his side brought into action eighty-six triremes, ten more than Thrasyllus in total number, extending from Abydos to Dardanus on the Asiatic shore: the Syracusans under Hermocrates being on the right, opposed to Thrasyllus, while Mindarus with the Peloponnesian ships was on the left opposed to Thrasybulus. The epibatae or maritime hoplites on board the ships of Mindarus are said to have been superior to the Athenians, but the latter had the advantage in skilful pilots and nau-

Athenians opposite. As it was night, probably the best thing which they could do, was to wait in Abydos for daylight, until they could learn particulars of his position, and how or where they could render aid.

We thus see both the general purpose of Mindarus, and in what manner the orders which he had transmitted to the Peloponnesian squadron at Abydos, brought about indirectly the escape of the Athenian squadron without interruption from Sestos.

tical manœuvring: nevertheless, the description of the battle tells us how much Athenian manœuvring had fallen off since the glories of Phormion at the beginning of the Peloponnesian war; nor would that eminent seaman have selected for the scene of a naval battle the narrow waters of the Hellespont. Mindarus took the aggressive, advancing to attack near the European shore, and trying to outflank his opponents on both sides, as well as to drive them up against the land. Thrasyllus on one wing, and Thrasybulus on the other, by rapid movements, extended themselves so as to frustrate this attempt to outflank them; but in so doing, they stripped and weakened the centre, which was even deprived of the sight of the left wing by means of the projecting headland of Kynossema. Thus unsupported, the centre was vigorously attacked and roughly handled by the middle division of Mindarus. Its ships were driven up against the land, and the assailants even disembarked to push their victory against the men ashore. But this partial success threw the central Peloponnesian division itself into disorder, while Thrasybulus and Thrasyllus carried on a conflict at first equal, and presently victorious, against the ships on the right and left of the enemy. Having driven back both these two divisions, they easily chased away the disordered ships of the centre, so that the whole Peloponnesian fleet was put to flight, and found shelter first in the river Meidius, next in Abydos. The narrow breadth of the Hellespont forbade either long pursuit or numerous captures. Nevertheless, eight Chian ships, five Corinthians, two Ambrakian, and as many Boeotian, and from Sparta, Syracuse, Pellene, and Leukas, one each, fell into the hands of the Athenian admirals; who, however, on their own side lost fifteen ships. They erected a trophy on the headland of Kynossema, near the tomb or chapel of Hecuba; not omitting the usual duties of burying their own dead, and giving up those of the enemy under the customary request for truce.¹

¹ Thucyd. viii. 105, 106; Diodor. xiii. 39, 40.

The general account which Diodorus gives of this battle, is, even in its most essential features, not reconcilable with Thucydides. It is vain to try to blend them. I have been able to borrow from Diodorus hardly anything except his statement of the superiority of the Athenian pilots and

A victory so incomplete and indecisive would have been little valued by the Athenians, in the times preceding the Sicilian expedition. But since that overwhelming disaster, followed by so many other misfortunes, and last of all, by the defeat of Thymocharis, with the revolt of Eubœa, their spirit had been so sadly lowered, that the trireme which brought the news of the battle of Kynossema, seemingly towards the end of August 411 B.C., was welcomed with the utmost delight and triumph. They began to feel as if the ebb-tide had reached its lowest point, and had begun to turn in their favor, holding out some hopes of ultimate success in the war. Another piece of good fortune soon happened, to strengthen this belief. Mindarus was compelled to reinforce himself at the Hellespont by sending Hippokratês and Epiklês to bring the fleet of fifty triremes now acting at Eubœa.¹ This was in itself an important relief to Athens, by withdrawing an annoying enemy near home. But it was still further enhanced by the subsequent misfortunes of this fleet, which, in passing round the headland of Mount Athos to get to Asia, was overtaken by a terrific storm and nearly destroyed, with great loss of life among the crews; so that a remnant only, under Hippokratês, survived to join Mindarus.²

But though Athens was thus exempted from all fear of aggression on the side of Eubœa, the consequences of this departure of the fleet were such as to demonstrate how irreparably the island itself had passed out of her supremacy. The inhabitants

the Peloponnesian epibatai. He states that twenty-five fresh ships arrived to join the Athenians in the middle of the battle, and determined the victory in their favor: this circumstance is evidently borrowed from the subsequent conflict a few months afterwards.

We owe to him, however, the mention of the chapel or tomb of Hecuba on the headland of Kynossema.

¹ Thucyd. viii. 107; Diodor. xiii. 41.

² Diodor. xiii. 41. It is probable that this fleet was in great part Boeotian; and twelve seamen who escaped from the wreck commemorated their rescue by an inscription in the temple of Athênê at Korôneia; which inscription was read and copied by Ephorus. By an exaggerated and over-literal confidence in the words of it, Diodorus is led to affirm that these twelve men were the only persons saved, and that every other person perished. But we know perfectly that Hippokratês himself survived, and that he was alive at the subsequent battle of Kyzikus (Xenoph. Hellen. i. 1, 23).

of Chalkis and the other cities, now left without foreign defence against her, employed themselves jointly with the Bœotians, whose interest in the case was even stronger than their own, in divesting Eubœa of its insular character, by constructing a mole or bridge across the Euripus, the narrowest portion of the Eubœan strait, where Chalkis was divided from Bœotia. From each coast a mole was thrown out, each mole guarded at the extremity by a tower, and leaving only an intermediate opening, broad enough for a single vessel to pass through, covered by a wooden bridge. It was in vain that the Athenian Theramenes, with thirty triremes, presented himself to obstruct the progress of this undertaking. The Eubœans and Bœotians both prosecuted it in such numbers, and with so much zeal, that it was speedily brought to completion. Eubœa, so lately the most important island attached to Athens, is from henceforward a portion of the mainland, altogether independent of her, even though it should please fortune to re-establish her maritime power.¹

The battle of Kynossêma produced no very important consequences except that of encouragement to the Athenians. Even just after the action, Kyzikus revolted from them, and on the fourth day after it, the Athenian fleet, hastily refitted at Sestos, sailed to that place to retake it. It was unfortified, so that they succeeded with little difficulty, and imposed upon it a contribution: moreover, in the voyage thither, they gained an additional advantage by capturing, off the southern coast of the Propontis, those eight Peloponnesian triremes which had accomplished, a

¹ Diodor. xiii, 47. He places this event a year later, but I agree with Sievers in conceiving it as following with little delay on the withdrawal of the protecting fleet (Sievers, Comment. in Xenoph. Hellen. p. 9; note p. 66).

See Colonel Leake's Travels in Northern Greece, for a description of the Euripus, and the adjoining ground, with a plan, vol. ii. ch. xix. pp. 251-255.

I cannot make out from Colonel Leake what is the exact breadth of the channel. Strabo talks in his time of a bridge reaching two hundred feet (s. p. 400). But there must have been material alterations made by the inhabitants of Chalkis during the time of Alexander the Great (Strabo. s. p. 447). The bridge here described by Diodorus, covering an open space broad enough for one ship, could scarcely have been more than twenty feet broad, for it was not at all designed to render the passage easy. The ancient ships could all lower their masts. I cannot but think that Colonel Leake (p. 253) must have read, in Diodorus, xiii, 47, *ὅτι ἐν πλάτει* &c.

little while before, the revolt of Byzantium. But, on the other hand, as soon as the Athenian fleet had left Sestos, Mindarus sailed from his station at Abydos to Elæus, and there recovered all the triremes captured from him at Kynossêma, which the Athenians had there deposited, except some of them which were so much damaged that the inhabitants of Elæus set them on fire.¹

But that which now began to constitute a far more important element of the war, was, the difference of character between Tissaphernes and Pharnabazus, and the transfer of the Peloponnesian fleet from the satrapy of the former to that of the latter. Tissaphernes, while furnishing neither aid nor pay to the Peloponnesians, had by his treacherous promises and bribes enervated all their proceedings for the last year, with the deliberate view of wasting both the belligerent parties. Pharnabazus was a brave and earnest man, who set himself to strengthen them strenuously, by men as well as by money, and who labored hard to put down the Athenian power; as we shall find him laboring equally hard, eighteen years afterwards, to bring about its partial renovation. From this time forward, Persian aid becomes a reality in the Grecian war; and in the main — first, through the hands of Pharnabazus, next, through those of the younger Cyrus — the determining reality. For we shall find that while the Peloponnesians are for the most part well paid, out of the Persian treasury, the Athenians, destitute of any such resource, are compelled to rely on the contributions which they can levy here and there, without established or accepted right; and to interrupt for this purpose even the most promising career of success. Twenty-six years after this, at a time when Sparta had lost her Persian allies, the Lacedæmonian Teleutius tried to appease the mutiny of his unpaid seamen, by telling them how much nobler it was to extort pay from the enemy by means of their own swords, than to obtain it by truckling to the foreigner;² and probably the Athenian generals, during these previous years of struggle, tried

¹ Thucyd. viii, 107.

² Xenoph. Hellen. v, 1, 17. Compare a like exclamation, under nobler circumstances, from the Spartan Kallikratidas, Xenoph. Hellen. i, 6, 7. Plutarch, Lysander, c. 6.

similar appeals to the generosity of their soldiers. But it is not the less certain, that the new constant paymaster now introduced, gave fearful odds to the Spartan cause.

The good pay and hearty cooperation which the Peloponnesians now enjoyed from Pharnabazus, only made them the more indignant at the previous deceit of Tissaphernês. Under the influence of this sentiment, they readily lent aid to the inhabitants of Antandrus in expelling his general Arsakes with the Persian garrison. Arsakes had recently committed an act of murderous perfidy, under the influence of some unexplained pique, against the Delians established at Adramyttium: he had summoned their principal citizens to take part as allies in an expedition, and had caused them all to be surrounded, shot down, and massacred during the morning meal. Such an act was more than sufficient to excite hatred and alarm among the neighboring Antandrians, who invited a body of Peloponnesian hoplites from Abydos, across the mountain range of Ida, by whose aid Antandrus was liberated from the Persians.¹

In Milêtus, as well as in Knidus, Tissaphernês had already experienced the like humiliation:² Lichas was no longer alive to back his pretensions: nor do we hear that he obtained any result from the complaints of his envoy Gaulites at Sparta. Under these circumstances, he began to fear that he had incurred a weight of enmity which might prove seriously mischievous, nor was he without jealousy of the popularity and possible success of Pharnabazus. The delusion respecting the Phœnician fleet, now that Mindarus had openly broken with him and quitted Milêtus, was no longer available to any useful purpose. Accordingly, he dismissed the Phœnician fleet to their own homes, pretending to have received tidings that the Phœnician towns were endangered by sudden attacks from Arabia and Egypt;³ while he himself quitted Aspendus to revisit Ionia, as well as to go forward to the Hellespont, for the purpose of renewing personal intercourse with the dissatisfied Peloponnesians. He wished, while trying again

¹ Thucyd. viii, 108; Diodor. xiii, 42.

² Thucyd. viii, 109.

³ Diodor. xiii, 46. This is the statement of Diodorus, and seems probable enough, though he makes a strange confusion in the Persian affairs of this year, leaving out the name of Tissaphernês, and jumbling the acts of Tissaphernês with the name of Pharnabazus.

to excuse his own treachery about the Phœnician fleet, at the same time to protest against their recent proceedings at Antandrus; or, at the least, to obtain some assurance against any repetition of such hostility. His visit to Ionia, however, seems to have occupied some time, and he tried to conciliate the Ionic Greeks by a splendid sacrifice to Artemis at Ephesus.¹ Having quitted Aspendus, as far as we can make out, about the beginning of August

¹ Thucyd. viii, 109. It is at this point that we have to part company with the historian Thucydides, whose work not only closes without reaching any definite epoch or limit, but even breaks off, as we possess it, in the middle of a sentence.

The full extent of this irreparable loss can hardly be conceived, except by those who have been called upon to study his work with the profound and minute attention required from an historian of Greece. To pass from Thucydides to the Hellenica of Xenophon, is a descent truly mournful; and yet, when we look at Grecian history as a whole, we have great reason to rejoice that even so inferior a work as the latter has reached us. The historical purposes and conceptions of Thucydides, as set forth by himself in his preface, are exalted and philosophical to a degree altogether wonderful, when we consider that he had no preëxisting models before him from which to derive them; nor are the eight books of his work, in spite of the unfinished condition of the last, unworthy of these large promises, either in spirit or in execution. Even the peculiarity, the condensation, and the harshness, of his style, though it sometimes hides from us his full meaning, has the general effect of lending great additional force and of impressing his thoughts much more deeply upon every attentive reader.

During the course of my two last volumes, I have had frequent occasion to notice the criticisms of Dr. Arnold in his edition of Thucydides, most generally on points where I dissented from him. I have done this, partly because I believe that Dr. Arnold's edition is in most frequent use among all English readers of Thucydides, partly because of the high esteem which I entertain for the liberal spirit, the erudition, and the judgment, which pervade his criticisms generally throughout the book. Dr. Arnold deserves, especially, the high commendation, not often to be bestowed even upon learned and exact commentators, of conceiving and appreciating antiquity as a living whole, and not merely as an aggregate of words and abstractions. His criticisms are continually adopted by Gœtler in the second edition of his Thucydides, and to a great degree also by Poppe. Desiring, as I do sincerely, that his edition may long maintain its preëminence among English students of Thucydides, I have thought it my duty at the same time to indicate many of the points on which his remarks either advance or imply views of Grecian history different from my own.

(411 B.C.), he did not reach the Hellespont until the month of November.¹

As soon as the Phenician fleet had disappeared, Alkibiadēs returned with his thirteen triremes from Phasēlis to Samos. He too, like Tissaphernēs, made the proceeding subservient to deceit of his own: he took credit with his countrymen for having enlisted the good-will of the satrap more strongly than ever in the cause of Athens, and for having induced him to abandon his intention of bringing up the Phenician fleet.² At this time Dorieus was at Rhodes with thirteen triremes, having been despatched by Mindarus, before his departure from Milētus, in order to stifle the growth of a philo-Athenian party in the island. Perhaps the presence of this force may have threatened the Athenian interest in Kos and Halikarnassus; for we now find Alkibiadēs going to these places from Samos, with nine fresh triremes in addition to his own thirteen. He erected fortifications at the town of Kos, and planted in it an Athenian officer and garrison: from Halikarnassus he levied large contributions; upon what pretence, or whether from simple want of money, we do not know. It was towards the middle of September that he returned to Samos.³

At the Hellespont, Mindarus had been reinforced after the battle of Kynossēma by the squadron from Eubœa, at least by that portion of it which had escaped the storm off Mount Athos. The departure of the Peloponnesian fleet from Eubœa enabled the Athenians also to send a few more ships to their fleet at Sestos. Thus ranged on the opposite sides of the strait, the two fleets came to a second action, wherein the Peloponnesians, under Agesandridas, had the advantage; yet with little fruit. It was about the month of October, seemingly, that Dorieus with his fourteen triremes came from Rhodes to rejoin Mindarus at

¹ Xenoph. Hellen. i, 1. 9.

² Thucyd. viii, 108. Diodorus (xiii, 38) talks of this influence of Alkibiadēs over the satrap as if it were real. Plutarch (Alkibiad. c. 26) speaks in more qualified language.

³ Thucyd. viii, 108. *πρὸς τὸ μετόπιστον*. Haack and Sievers (see Sievers, Comment. ad Xenoph. Hellen. p. 103) construe this as indicating the middle of August, which I think too early in the year.

the Hellespont. He had hoped probably to get up the strait to Abydos during the night, but he was caught by daylight a little way from the entrance, near Rhœteium; and the Athenian scouts instantly gave signal of his approach. Twenty Athenian triremes were despatched to attack him: upon which Dorieus fled, and sought safety by hauling his vessel ashore in the receding bay near Dardanus. The Athenian squadron here attacked him, but were repulsed and forced to sail back to Madytus. Mindarus was himself a spectator of this scene, from a distance; being engaged in sacrificing to Athênê, on the venerated hill of Ilium. He immediately hastened to Abydos, where he fitted out his whole fleet of eighty-four triremes, Pharnabazus cooperating on the shore with his land-force. Having rescued the ships of Dorieus, his next care was to resist the entire Athenian fleet, which presently came to attack him under Thrasybulus and Thrasyllus. An obstinate naval combat took place between the two fleets, which lasted nearly the whole day with doubtful issue; at length, towards the evening, twenty fresh triremes were seen approaching. They proved to be the squadron of Alkibiadēs sailing from Samos: having probably heard of the rejunction of the squadron of Dorieus with the main Peloponnesian fleet, he had come with his own counter-balancing reinforcement.¹ As soon as his purple flag or signal was ascertained, the Athenian fleet became animated with redoubled spirit. The new-comers aided them in pressing the action so vigorously, that the Peloponnesian fleet was driven back to Abydos, and there run ashore. Here the Athenians still followed up their success, and endeavored to tow them all off. But the Persian land-force protected them, and Pharnabazus himself was seen foremost in the combat; even pushing into the water in person, as far as his horse could stand. The main Peloponnesian fleet was thus preserved; yet the Athenians retired with an important victory, carrying off thirty triremes as prizes, and retaking those which they had themselves lost in the two preceding actions.²

Mindarus kept his defeated fleet unemployed at Abydos during

¹ Diodorus (xiii, 46) and Plutarch (Alkibiad. c. 27) speak of his coming to the Hellespont by accident, *κατὰ τύχην*, which is certainly very improbable.

² Xenoph. Hellen. i, 1. 6. 7.

the winter, sending to Peloponnesus as well as among his allies to solicit reinforcements: in the mean time, he engaged jointly with Pharnabazus in operations by land against various Athenian allies on the continent. The Athenian admirals, on their side, instead of keeping their fleet united to prosecute the victory, were compelled to disperse a large portion of it in flying squadrons, for collecting money, retaining only forty sail at Sestos; while Thrasyllus in person went to Athens to proclaim the victory and ask for reinforcements. Pursuant to this request, thirty triremes were sent out under Theramenês; who first endeavored without success to impede the construction of the bridge between Eubœa and Bœotia, and next sailed on a voyage among the islands for the purpose of collecting money. He acquired considerable plunder by descents upon hostile territory, and also extorted money from various parties, either contemplating or supposed to contemplate revolt, among the dependencies of Athens. At Paros, where the oligarchy established by Peisander in the conspiracy of the Four Hundred still subsisted, Theramenês deposed and fined the men who had exercised it, establishing a democracy in their room. From hence he passed to Macedonia, to the assistance and probably into the temporary pay of Archelaus, king of Macedonia, whom he aided for some time in the siege of Pydna; blocking up the town by sea while the Macedonians besieged it by land. The blockade having lasted the whole winter, Theramenês was summoned away before its capture, to join the main Athenian fleet in Thrace: Archelaus, however, took Pydna not long afterwards, and transported the town with its residents from the sea-board to a distance more than two miles inland.¹ We trace in all these proceedings the evidence of that terrible want of money which now drove the Athenians to injustice, extortion, and interference with their allies, such as they had never committed during the earlier years of the war.

It is at this period that we find mention made of a fresh intestine commotion in Korkyra, less stained, however, with savage enormities than that recounted in the seventh year of the war. It appears that the oligarchical party in the island, which had been for the moment nearly destroyed at that period, had since

¹ Diodor. xiii, 47-49.

gained strength, and was encouraged by the misfortunes of Athens to lay plans for putting the island into the hands of the Lacedæmonians. The democratical leaders, apprized of this conspiracy, sent to Naupaktus for the Athenian admiral Konon. He came, with a detachment of six hundred Messenians, by the aid of whom they seized the oligarchical conspirators in the market-place, putting a few to death, and banishing more than a thousand. The extent of their alarm is attested by the fact, that they liberated the slaves and conferred the right of citizenship upon the foreigners. The exiles, having retired to the opposite continent, came back shortly afterwards, and were admitted, by the connivance of a party within, into the market-place. A serious combat took place within the walls, which was at last made up by a compromise and by the restoration of the exiles.¹ We know nothing about the particulars of this compromise, but it seems to have been wisely drawn up and faithfully observed; for we hear nothing about Korkyra until about thirty-five years after this period, and the island is then presented to us as in the highest perfection of cultivation and prosperity.² Doubtless the emancipation of slaves and the admission of so many new foreigners to the citizenship, contributed to this result.

Meanwhile Tissaphernês, having completed his measures in Ionia, arrived at the Hellespont not long after the battle of Abydos, seemingly about November, 411 B.C. He was anxious to regain some credit with the Peloponnesians, for which an opportunity soon presented itself. Alkibiadês, then in command of the Athenian fleet at Sestos, came to visit him in all the pride of

¹ Diodor. xiii, 48. Sievers (Commentat. ad Xenoph. Hellen. p. 12; and p. 65. note 58) controverts the reality of these tumults in Korkyra, here mentioned by Diodorus, but not mentioned in the Hellenika of Xenophon, and contradicted, as he thinks, by the negative inference derivable from Thucyd. iv, 48, ὅσα γὰρ κατὰ τὸν πόλεμον τῶνδε. But it appears to me that F. W. Ullrich (Beiträge zur Erklärung des Thukydides, pp. 95-99), has properly explained this phrase of Thucydides as meaning, in the place here cited, the first ten years of the Peloponnesian war, between the surprise of Plataea and the Peace of Nikias.

I see no reason to call in question the truth of these disturbances in Korkyra, here alluded to by Diodorus.

² Xenoph. Hellen. vi, 2, 25.

victory, bringing the customary presents; but the satrap seized his person and sent him away to Sardis as a prisoner in custody, affirming that he had the Great King's express orders for carrying on war with the Athenians.¹ Here was an end of all the delusions of Alkibiadês, respecting pretended power of influencing the Persian counsels. Yet these delusions had already served his purpose by procuring for him a renewed position in the Athenian camp, which his own military energy enabled him to sustain and justify.

Towards the middle of this winter the superiority of the fleet of Mindarus at Abydos, over the Athenian fleet at Sestos, had become so great,—partly, as it would appear, through reinforcements obtained by the former, partly through the dispersion of the latter into flying squadrons from want of pay,—that the Athenians no longer dared to maintain their position in the Hellespont. They sailed round the southern point of the Chersonese, and took station at Kardia, on the western side of the isthmus of that peninsula. Here, about the commencement of spring, they were rejoined by Alkibiadês; who had found means to escape from Sardis, along with Mantitheus, another Athenian prisoner, first to Klazomenæ, and next to Lesbos, where he collected a small squadron of five triremes. The dispersed squadrons of the Athenian fleet being now all summoned to concentrate, Theramenês came to Kardia from Macedonia, and Thrasybulus from Thasos; whereby the Athenian fleet was rendered superior in number to that of Mindarus. News was brought that the latter had moved with his fleet from the Hellespont to Kyzikus, and was now engaged in the siege of that place, jointly with Pharnabazus and the Persian land-force.

His vigorous attacks had in fact already carried the place, when the Athenian admirals resolved to attack him there, and contrived to do it by surprise. Having passed first from Kardia to Elæûs at the south of the Chersonese, they sailed up the Hellespont to Prokonnesus by night, so that their passage escaped the notice of the Peloponnesian guardships at Abydos.²

¹ Xenoph. Hellen. i, 1, 9; Plutarch, Alkibiadês, c. 27.

² Diodor. xiii, 49. Diodorus specially notices this fact, which must obviously be correct. Without it, the surprise of Mindarus could not have been accomplished.

Resting at Prokonnesus one night, and seizing every boat on the island, in order that their movements might be kept secret, Alkibiadês warned the assembled seamen that they must prepare for a sea-fight, a land-fight, and a wall-fight, all at once. "We have no money (said he), while our enemies have plenty from the Great King." Neither zeal in the men nor contrivance in the commanders was wanting. A body of hoplites were landed on the mainland in the territory of Kyzikus, for the purpose of operating a diversion; after which the fleet was distributed into three divisions under Alkibiadês, Theramenês, and Thrasybulus. The former, advancing near to Kyzikus with his single division, challenged the fleet of Mindarus, and contrived to inveigle him by pretended flight to a distance from the harbor; while the other Athenian divisions, assisted by hazy and rainy weather, came up unexpectedly, cut off his retreat, and forced him to run his ships ashore on the neighboring mainland. After a gallant and hard-fought battle, partly on shipboard, partly ashore,—at one time unpromising to the Athenians, in spite of their superiority of number, but not very intelligible in its details, and differently conceived by our two authorities,—both the Peloponnesian fleet by sea and the forces of Pharnabazus on land were completely defeated. Mindarus himself was slain; and the entire fleet, every single trireme, was captured, except the triremes of Syracuse, which were burnt by their own crews; while Kyzikus itself surrendered to the Athenians, and submitted to a large contribution, being spared from all other harm. The booty taken by the victors was abundant and valuable. The numbers of the triremes thus captured or destroyed is differently given; the lowest estimate states it at sixty, the highest at eighty.¹

This capital action, ably planned and bravely executed by Alkibiadês and his two colleagues, about April 410 B.C., changed sensibly the relative position of the belligerents. The Peloponnesians had now no fleet of importance in Asia, though they probably still retained a small squadron at the station of Milêtus;

¹ Xenoph. Hellen. i, 1, 14–20; Diodor. xiii, 50, 51.

The numerous discrepancies between Diodorus and Xenophon, in the events of these few years, are collected by S. J. Vers, Commentat. in Xenoph. Hellen. note, 62, pp. 65, 66, seq.

while the Athenian fleet was more powerful and menacing than ever. The dismay of the defeated army is forcibly portrayed in the laconic despatch sent by Hippokratēs, secretary of the late admiral Mindarus, to the ephors at Sparta: "All honor and advantage are gone from us: Mindarus is slain: the men are starving: we are in straits what to do."¹ The ephors doubtless heard the same deplorable tale from more than one witness; for this particular despatch never reached them, having been intercepted and carried to Athens. So discouraging was the view which they entertained of the future, that a Lacedæmonian embassy, with Endius at their head, came to Athens to propose peace; or rather perhaps Endius — ancient friend and guest of Alkibiadēs, who had already been at Athens as envoy before — was allowed to come thither now again to sound the temper of the city, in a sort of informal manner, which admitted of being easily disavowed if nothing came of it. For it is remarkable that Xenophon makes no mention of this embassy: and his silence, though not sufficient to warrant us in questioning the reality of the event, — which is stated by Diodorus, perhaps on the authority of Theopompus, and is noway improbable in itself, — nevertheless, leads me to doubt whether the ephors themselves admitted that they had made or sanctioned the proposition. It is to be remembered that Sparta, not to mention her obligation to her confederates generally, was at this moment bound by special convention to Persia to conclude no separate peace with Athens.

According to Diodorus, Endius, having been admitted to speak in the Athenian assembly, invited the Athenians to make peace with Sparta on the following terms: That each party should stand just as they were; that the garrisons on both sides should be withdrawn; that prisoners should be exchanged, one Lacedæmonian against one Athenian. Endius insisted in his speech on the mutual mischief which each was doing to the other by prolonging the war; but he contended that Athens was by far the greater sufferer of the two, and had the deepest interest in accelerating peace. She had no money, while Sparta had the

¹ Xenoph. Hellen. i. 1, 23. Ἐφρεί τὰ καλὰ Μινδαροῦ ἀπεσσεύα πεινῶντι
 ῥῶνδρες ἀπορεομεν τὴν χρῆσιν ὄραν.
 Plutarch, Alkib. c. 28.

Great King as a paymaster: she was robbed of the produce of Attica by the garrison of Dekeleia, while Peloponnesus was undisturbed: all her power and influence depended upon superiority at sea, which Sparta could dispense with, and yet retain her pre-eminence.¹

If we may believe Diodorus, all the most intelligent citizens in Athens recommended that this proposition should be accepted. Only the demagogues, the disturbers, those who were accustomed to blow up the flames of war in order to obtain profit for themselves, opposed it. Especially the demagogue Kleophon, now enjoying great influence, enlarged upon the splendor of the recent victory, and upon the new chances of success now opening to them: inasmuch that the assembly ultimately rejected the proposition of Endius.²

It was easy for those who wrote after the battle of Ægospotamos and the capture of Athens, to be wise after the fact, and to repeat the stock denunciations against an insane people, misled by a corrupt demagogue. But if, abstracting from our knowledge of the final close of the war, we look to the tenor of this proposition, even assuming it to have been formal and authorized, as well as the time at which it was made, we shall hesitate before we pronounce Kleophon to have been foolish, much less corrupt, for recommending its rejection. In reference to the charge of corrupt interest in the continuance of war, I have already made some remarks about Kleon, tending to show that no such interest can fairly be ascribed to demagogues of that character.³ They were essentially unwarlike men, and had quite as much chance personally of losing, as of gaining, by a state of war. Especially this is true respecting Kleophon, during the last years of the war, since the financial posture of Athens was then so unprosperous, that all her available means were exhausted to provide for ships and men, leaving little or no surplus for political speculators. The admirals, who paid the seamen by raising contributions abroad, might possibly enrich themselves, if so inclined: but the politicians at home had much less chance of such gains than they would have had in time of peace. Besides

¹ Diodor. xiii. 52.

² Diodor. xiii. 53.

³ See the preceding vol. vi. ch. liv, p. 455.

even if Kleophon were ever so much a gainer by the continuance of war, yet, assuming Athens to be ultimately crushed in the war, he was certain beforehand to be deprived, not only of all his gains and his position, but of his life also.

So much for the charge against him of corrupt interest. The question whether his advice was judicious, is not so easy to dispose of. Looking to the time when the proposition was made, we must recollect that the Peloponnesian fleet in Asia had been just annihilated, and that the brief epistle itself, from Hippokratês to the ephors, divulging in so emphatic a manner the distress of his troops, was at this moment before the Athenian assembly. On the other hand, the despatches of the Athenian generals, announcing their victory, had excited a sentiment of universal triumph, manifested by public thanksgiving, at Athens: nor can we doubt that Alkibiadês and his colleagues promised a large career of coming success, perhaps the recovery of most part of the lost maritime empire. In this temper of the Athenian people and of their generals, justified as it was to a great degree by the reality, what is the proposition which comes from Endius? What he proposes, is, in reality, no concession at all. Both parties to stand in their actual position; to withdraw garrisons; to restore prisoners. There was only one way in which Athens would have been a gainer by accepting these propositions. She would have withdrawn her garrison from Pylos, she would have been relieved from the garrison of Dekeleia; such an exchange would have been a considerable advantage to her. To this we must add the relief arising from simple cessation of war, doubtless real and important.

Now the question is, whether a statesman like Periklês would have advised his countrymen to be satisfied with such a measure of concession, immediately after the great victory of Kyzikus, and the two smaller victories preceding it? I incline to believe that he would not. It would rather have appeared to him in the light of a diplomatic artifice, calculated to paralyze Athens during the interval while her enemies were defenceless, and to gain time for them to build a new fleet.² Sparta could not pledge herself

¹ Diodor. xiii. 52

² Philochorus (ap. Schol. ad Eurip. Orest. 371) appears to have said that

either for Persia, or for her Peloponnesian confederates; indeed, past experience had shown that she could not do so with effect. By accepting the propositions, therefore, Athens would not really have obtained relief from the entire burden of war; but would merely have blunted the ardor and tied up the hands of her own troops, at a moment when they felt themselves in the full current of success. By the armament, most certainly,—and by the generals, Alkibiadês, Theramenês, and Thrasybulus,—the acceptance of such terms at such a moment would have been regarded as a disgrace. It would have balked them of conquests ardently, and at that time not unreasonably, anticipated; conquests tending to restore Athens to that eminence from which she had been so recently deposed. And it would have inflicted this mortification, not merely without compensating gain to her in any other shape, but with a fair probability of imposing upon all her citizens the necessity of redoubled efforts at no very distant future, when the moment favorable to her enemies should have arrived.

If, therefore, passing from the vague accusation that it was the demagogue Kleophon who stood between Athens and the conclusion of peace, we examine what were the specific terms of peace which he induced his countrymen to reject, we shall find that he had very strong reasons, not to say preponderant reasons, for his advice. Whether he made any use of this proposition, in itself inadmissible, to try and invite the conclusion of peace on more suitable and lasting terms, may well be doubted. Probably no such efforts would have succeeded, even if they had been made; yet a statesman like Periklês would have made the trial, in a conviction that Athens was carrying on the war at a disadvantage which must in the long run sink her. A mere opposition speaker, like Kleophon, even when taking what was probably a right measure of the actual proposition before him, did not look so far forward into the future.

Meanwhile the Athenian fleet reigned alone in the Propontis and its two adjacent straits, the Bosphorus and the Hellespont; although the ardor and generosity of Pharnabazus not only sup-

the Athenians rejected the proposition as insincerely meant *Λακεδαιμονίω προβενσαμένων περί ερήνης ἀπιστήσαντες οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι οὐ προσήκοντο;* compare also Schol. ad Eurip. Orest. 772, Philochori Fragment.

plied maintenance and clothing to the distressed seamen of the vanquished fleet, but also encouraged the construction of fresh ships in the room of those captured. While he armed the seamen, gave them pay for two months, and distributed them as guards along the coast of the satrapy, he at the same time granted an unlimited supply of ship-timber from the abundant forests of Mount Ida, and assisted the officers in putting new triremes on the stocks at Antandrus; near to which, at a place called Aspaneus, the Idaean wood was chiefly exported.¹

Having made these arrangements, he proceeded to lend aid at Chalkêdon, which the Athenians had already begun to attack. Their first operation after the victory, had been to sail to Perinthus and Selymbria, both of which had before revolted from Athens: the former, intimidated by the recent events, admitted them and rejoined itself to Athens; the latter resisted such a requisition, but ransomed itself from attack for the present, by the payment of a pecuniary fine. Alkibiades then conducted them to Chalkêdon, opposite to Byzantium on the southernmost Asiatic border of the Bosphorus. To be masters of these two straits, the Bosphorus and the Hellespont, was a point of first-rate moment to Athens; first, because it enabled her to secure the arrival of the corn ships from the Euxine, for her own consumption; next, because she had it in her power to impose a tithe or due upon all the trading ships passing through, not unlike the dues imposed by the Danes at the Sound, even down to the present time. For the opposite reasons, of course, the importance of the position was equally great to the enemies of Athens. Until the spring of the preceding year, Athens had been undisputed mistress of both the straits. But the revolt of Abydos in the Hellespont (about April, 411 B.C.) and that of Byzantium with Chalkêdon in the Bosphorus (about June, 411 B.C.), had deprived her of this pre-eminence; and her supplies obtained during the last few months could only have come through during those intervals when her fleets there stationed had the preponderance, so as to give them convoy. Accordingly, it is highly probable that her supplies of corn from the Euxine during the autumn of 411 B.C., had been comparatively restricted.

¹ Xenoph. Hellen. i, 1, 24-26; Strabo, xiii, p. 606

Though Chalkêdon itself, assisted by Pharnabazus, still held out against Athens, Alkibiadês now took possession of Chrysopolis, its unfortified seaport, on the eastern coast of the Bosphorus opposite Byzantium. This place he fortified, established in it a squadron with a permanent garrison, and erected it into a regular titling-port for levying toll on all vessels coming out of the Euxine.¹ The Athenians seem to have habitually levied this toll at Byzantium, until the revolt of that place, among their constant sources of revenue: it was now reestablished under the auspices of Alkibiadês. In so far as it was levied on ships which brought their produce for sale and consumption at Athens, it was of course ultimately paid in the shape of increased price by Athenian citizens and metics. Thirty triremes under Theramênês, were left at Chrysopolis to enforce this levy, to convoy friendly merchantmen, and in other respects to serve as annoyance to the enemy.

The remaining fleet went partly to the Hellespont, partly to Thrace, where the diminished maritime strength of the Lacedæmonians already told in respect to the adherence of the cities. At Thasus, especially,² the citizens, headed by Ekphantus, expelled the Lacedæmonian harmost Eteonikus with his garrison, and admitted Thrasybulus with an Athenian force. It will be recollected that this was one of the cities in which Peisander and the Four Hundred conspirators (early in 411 B.C.) had put down the democracy and established an oligarchical government, under pretence that the allied cities would be faithful to Athens as soon as she was relieved from her democratical institutions. All the

¹ See Demosthen. de Coronâ, c. 71; and Xenoph. Hellen. i, 1, 22. καὶ δεκάτην ἐκ τῆς ἐξελέγοντο τῶν ἐκ τοῦ Πόντου πλοίων: compare iv, 8, 27; and v, 1, 28; also Diodor. xiii. 64.

The expression, τὴν δεκάτην, implies that this tithe was something known and preëstablished.

Polybius (iv, 44) gives credit to Alkibiadês for having been the first to suggest this method of gain to Athens. But there is evidence that it was practised long before, even anterior to the Athenian empire, during the times of Persian preponderance (see Herodot. vi. 5).

See a striking passage, illustrating the importance to Athens of the possession of Byzantium, in Lysias, Orat. xxviii, cont. Ergokl. sect. 6.

² Xenoph. Hellen. i, 1, 32; Demosthen. cont. Leptin. s. 48, c. 14, p. 474.

calculations of these oligarchs had been disappointed, as Phrynichus had predicted from the first: the Thasians, as soon as their own oligarchical party had been placed in possession of the government, recalled their disaffected exiles,¹ under whose auspices a Laconian garrison and harmost had since been introduced. Eteonikus, now expelled, accused the Lacedæmonian admiral Pasippidas of being himself a party to the expulsion, under bribes from Tissaphernês; an accusation which seems improbable, but which the Lacedæmonians believed, and accordingly banished Pasippidas, sending Kratesippidas to replace him. The new admiral found at Chios a small fleet which Pasippidas had already begun to collect from the allies, to supply the recent losses.²

The tone at Athens since the late naval victories, had become more hopeful and energetic. Agis, with his garrison at Dekeleia, though the Athenians could not hinder him from ravaging Attica, yet on approaching one day near to the city walls, was repelled with spirit and success by Thrasyllus. But that which most mortified the Lacedæmonian king, was to discern from his lofty station at Dekeleia, the abundant influx into the Peiræus of corn-ships from the Euxine, again renewed in the autumn of 410 B.C. since the occupation of the Bosphorus and Hellespont by Alkibiadês. For the safe reception of these vessels, Thorikus was soon after fortified. Agis exclaimed that it was fruitless to shut out the Athenians from the produce of Attica, so long as plenty of imported corn was allowed to reach them. Accordingly, he provided, in conjunction with the Megarians, a small squadron of fifteen triremes, with which he despatched Klearchus to Byzantium and Chalkêdon. That Spartan was a public guest of the Byzantines, and had already been singled out to command auxiliaries intended for that city. He seems to have begun his voyage during the ensuing winter (B.C. 410-409), and reached Byzantium in safety, though with the destruction of three of his squadron by the nine Athenian triremes who guarded the Hellespont.³

¹ Thucyd. viii, 64.

² Xenoph. Hellen. i, 1, 32.

³ Xenoph. Hellen. i, 1, 35-36. He says that the ships of Klearchus, on being attacked by the Athenians in the Hellespont, fled first to *Sestos*, and

In the ensuing spring, Thrasyllus was despatched from Athens at the head of a large new force to act in Ionia. He commanded fifty triremes, one thousand of the regular hoplites, one hundred horsemen, and five thousand seamen, with the means of arming these latter as peltasts; also transports for his troops besides the triremes.¹ Having reposed his armament for three days at Samos, he made a descent at Pygela, and next succeeded in making himself master of Kolophon, with its port Notium. He next threatened Ephesus, but that place was defended by a powerful force which Tissaphernês had summoned, under proclamation "to go and succor the goddess Artemis;" as well as by twenty-five fresh Syracusan and two Selinusian triremes recently arrived.² From these enemies, Thrasyllus sustained a severe defeat near Ephesus, lost three hundred men, and was compelled to sail off to Notium; from whence, after burying his dead, he proceeded northward towards the Hellespont. On their way thither, while halting for a while at Methymna in the north of Lesbos, Thrasyllus saw the twenty-five Syracusan triremes passing by on their voyage from Ephesus to Abydos. He immediately attacked them, captured four along with the entire crews, and chased the remainder back to their station at Ephesus. All the prisoners taken were sent to Athens, where they were deposited for custody in the stone-quarries of Peiræus, doubtless in retaliation for the treatment of the Athenian prisoners at Syracuse; they contrived, however, during the ensuing winter, to break a way out and escape to Dekeleia. Among the prisoners taken, was found Alkibiades, the Athenian, cousin and fellow-exile of the Athe-

afterwards to Byzantium. But *Sestos* was the Athenian station. The name must surely be put by inadvertence for *Abydos*, the Peloponnesian station.

¹ Xenoph. Hellen. i, 1, 34, i, 2, 1. Diodorus (xiii, 64) confounds Thrasyllus with Thrasyllus.

² Xenoph. Hellen. i, 2, 5-11. Xenophon distinguishes these twenty-five Syracusan triremes into των προτιμων είκοσι νεών, and then αἱ ἑτεραι πέντε, αἱ νεώσσι ἡκούσαι. But it appears to me that the twenty triremes, as well as the five, must have come to Asia since the battle of Kyzikus, though the five may have been somewhat later in their period of arrival. All the Syracusan ships in the fleet of Mindarus were destroyed; and it seems impossible to imagine that that admiral can have left twenty Syracusan ships at Ephesus or Milêtus in addition to those which he took with him to the Hellespont.

nian general of the same name, whom Thrasyllus caused to be set at liberty, while the others were sent to Athens.¹

After the delay caused by this pursuit, he brought back his armament to the Hellespont and joined the force of Alkibiadēs at Sestos. Their joint force was conveyed over, seemingly about the commencement of autumn, to Lampsakus, on the Asiatic side of the strait; which place they fortified and made their headquarters for the autumn and winter, maintaining themselves by predatory excursions, throughout the neighboring satrapy of Pharnabazus. It is curious to learn, however, that when Alkibiadēs was proceeding to marshal them all together,—the hoplites, according to Athenian custom, taking rank according to their tribes,—his own soldiers, never yet beaten, refused to fraternize with those of Thrasyllus, who had been so recently worsted at Ephesus. Nor was this alienation removed until after a joint expedition against Abydos; Pharnabazus presenting himself with a considerable force, especially cavalry, to relieve that place, was encountered and defeated in a battle wherein all the Athenians present took part. The honor of the hoplites of Thrasyllus was now held to be reestablished, so that the fusion of ranks was admitted without farther difficulty.² Even the entire army, however, was not able to accomplish the conquest of Abydos; which the Peloponnesians and Pharnabazus still maintained as their station on the Hellespont.

Meanwhile Athens had so stripped herself of force, by the large armament recently sent with Thrasyllus, that her enemies near home were encouraged to active operations. The Spartans despatched an expedition, both of triremes and of land-force, to attack Pylos, which had remained as an Athenian post and a refuge for revolted Helots ever since its first fortification by Demosthenēs, in B.C. 425. The place was vigorously attacked, both by sea and by land, and soon became much pressed. Not unmindful of its distress, the Athenians sent to its relief thirty triremes under Anytus, who, however, came back without even reaching the place, having been prevented by stormy weather or unfavorable winds from doubling Cape Malea. Pylos was soon after-

¹ Xenoph. Hellen. i, 2, 8-15.

² Xenoph. Hellen. i, 2, 13-17; Plutarch, Alkibiad. c. 29.

wards obliged to surrender, the garrison departing on terms of capitulation.¹ But Anytus, on his return, encountered great displeasure from his countrymen, and was put on his trial for having betrayed, or for not having done his utmost to fulfil, the trust confided to him. It is said that he only saved himself from condemnation by bribing the dikastery, and that he was the first Athenian who ever obtained a verdict by corruption.² Whether he could really have reached Pylos, and whether the obstacles which baffled him were such as an energetic officer would have overcome, we have no means of determining; still less, whether it be true that he actually escaped by bribery. The story seems to prove, however, that the general Athenian public thought him deserving of condemnation, and were so much surprised by his acquittal, as to account for it by supposing, truly or falsely, the use of means never before attempted.

It was about the same time, also, that the Megarians recovered by surprise their port of Nisæa, which had been held by an Athenian garrison since B.C. 424. The Athenians made an effort to recover it, but failed; though they defeated the Megarians in an action.³

Thrasyllus, during the summer of B.C. 409, and even the joint force of Thrasyllus and Alkibiadēs during the autumn of the same year, seem to have effected less than might have been expected from so large a force: indeed, it must have been at some period during this year that the Lacedæmonian Klearchus, with his fifteen Megarian ships, penetrated up the Hellespont to Byzantium, finding it guarded only by nine Athenian triremes.⁴ But the operations of 408 B.C. were more important. The entire force under Alkibiadēs and the other commanders was mustered for the siege of Chalkedon and Byzantium. The Chalkedonians,

¹ Diodor. xiii, 64. The slighting way in which Xenophon (Hellen. i, 2, 18) dismisses this capture of Pylos, as a mere retreat of some runaway Helots from Malea, as well as his employment of the name *Koryphasion*, and not of *Pylos*, prove how much he wrote after Lacedæmonian informants.

² Diodor. xiii, 64; Plutarch, Coriolan. c. 14.

³ Aristotle, *Ἀθηναίων πολιτεία*, ap. Harpokration, v. *Δεκάζων*, and in the Collection of Fragment. Aristotel. no 72, ed. Didot (Fragment. Historic. Græc. vol. ii. p. 127).

⁴ Diodor. xiii, 65.

⁵ Xenoph. Hellen. i, 1, 36.

having notice of the project, deposited their movable property for safety in the hand of their neighbors the Bithynian Thracians; a remarkable evidence of the good feeling and confidence between the two, contrasting strongly with the perpetual hostility which subsisted on the other side of the Bosphorus between Byzantium and the Thracian tribes adjoining.¹ But the precaution was frustrated by Alkibiadēs, who entered the territory of the Bithynians and compelled them by threats to deliver up the effects confided to them. He then proceeded to block up Chalkêdon by a wooden wall carried across from the Bosphorus to the Propontis; though the continuity of this wall was interrupted by a river, and seemingly by some rough ground on the immediate brink of the river. The blockading wall was already completed, when Pharnabazus appeared with an army for the relief of the place, and advanced as far as the Herakleion, or temple of Heraklēs, belonging to the Chalkedonians. Profiting by his approach, Hippokratēs, the Lacedæmonian harmost in the town, made a vigorous sally: but the Athenians repelled all the efforts of Pharnabazus to force a passage through their lines and join him; so that, after an obstinate contest, the sallying force was driven back within the walls of the town, and Hippokratēs himself killed.²

The blockade of the town was now made so sure, that Alkibiadēs departed with a portion of the army to levy money and get together forces for the siege of Byzantium afterwards. During his absence, Theramênēs and Thrasybulus came to terms with Pharnabazus for the capitulation of Chalkêdon. It was agreed that the town should again become a tributary dependency of Athens, on the same rate of tribute as before the revolt, and that the arrears during the subsequent period should be paid up. Moreover, Pharnabazus himself engaged to pay to the Athenians twenty talents on behalf of the town, and also to escort some Athenian envoys up to Susa, enabling them to submit propositions for accommodation to the Great King. Until those envoys should return, the Athenians covenanted to abstain from hostilities against the satrapy of Pharnabazus.³ Oaths to this effect

¹ Polyb. iv. 44-45.

² Xenoph. Hellen. i. 3, 5-7; Diodor. xiii. 66.

³ Xenoph. Hellen. i. 3, 9. Ὑποτελεῖν τὸν φόρον Χαλκηδόνιους Ἀθηναίους

were mutually exchanged, after the return of Alkibiadēs from his expedition. For Pharnabazus positively refused to complete the ratification with the other generals, until Alkibiadēs should be there to ratify in person also; a proof at once of the great individual importance of the latter, and of his known facility in finding excuses to evade an agreement. Two envoys were accordingly sent by Pharnabazus to Chrysopolis, to receive the oaths of Alkibiadēs, while two relatives of Alkibiadēs came to Chalkêdon as witnesses to those of Pharnabazus. Over and above the common oath shared with his colleagues, Alkibiadēs took a special covenant of personal friendship and hospitality with the satrap, and received from him the like.

Alkibiadēs had employed his period of absence in capturing Selybria, from whence he obtained a sum of money, and in getting together a large body of Thracians, with whom he marched by land to Byzantium. That place was now besieged, immediately after the capitulation of Chalkêdon, by the united force of the Athenians. A wall of circumvallation was drawn around it, and various attacks were made by missiles and battering engines. These, however, the Lacedæmonian garrison, under the harmost Klearchus, aided by some Megarians under Helixus, and Boeotians under Kōratadas, was perfectly competent to repel. But the ravages of famine were not so easily dealt with. After the blockade had lasted some time, provisions began to fail; so

ὅσοντιρ εἰσάγαγε, καὶ τὰ ὅρ' ἱλομένη χρηματὰ ἀποδοῖναι. Ἀθηναίους δὲ μὴ πολεμεῖν Χαλκηδόνιους, ὥς ἂν οἱ παρὰ βασιλῆα πρὸς αὐτοὺς ἔλθωσιν.

This passage strengthens the doubts which I threw out in a former chapter, whether the Athenians ever did or could realize their project of commuting the tribute, imposed upon the dependent allies, for an *ad valorem* duty of five per cent. on imports and exports, which project is mentioned by Thucydides (vii. 28) as having been resolved upon at least, if not carried out, in the summer of 413 B.C. In the bargain here made with the Chalkedonians, it seems implied that the payment of tribute was the last arrangement subsisting between Athens and Chalkêdon, at the time of the revolt of the latter.

Next, I agree with the remark made by Schneider, in his note upon the passage, Ἀθηναίους δὲ μὴ πολεμεῖν Χαλκηδόνιους. He notices the tenor of the covenant as it stands in Plutarch, τῇ Φάρναβάζου δὲ χώραν μὴ ἀδικεῖν (Alkib. c. 31), which is certainly far more suitable to the circumstances. Instead of Χαλκηδόνιους, he proposes to read Φαρναβάζω. As any rate, this is the meaning.

that Klearchus, strict and harsh, even under ordinary circumstances, became inexorable and oppressive, from exclusive anxiety for the subsistence of his soldiers; and even locked up the stock of food while the population of the town were dying of hunger around him. Seeing that his only hope was from external relief, he sallied forth from the city to entreat aid from Pharnabazus; and to get together, if possible, a fleet for some aggressive operation that might divert the attention of the besiegers. He left the defence to Kœratadas and Helixus, in full confidence that the Byzantines were too much compromised by their revolt from Athens to venture to desert Sparta, whatever might be their suffering. But the favorable terms recently granted to Chalkêdon, coupled with the severe and increasing famine, induced Kydon and a Byzantine party to open the gates by night, and admit Alkibiadês with the Athenians into the wide interior square called the Thrakion. Helixus and Kœratadas, apprized of this attack only when the enemy had actually got possession of the town on all sides, vainly attempted resistance, and were compelled to surrender at discretion: they were sent as prisoners to Athens, where Kœratadas contrived to escape during the confusion of the landing at Peiræus. Favorable terms were granted to the town, which was replaced in its position of a dependent ally of Athens, and probably had to pay up its arrears of tribute in the same manner as Chalkêdon.¹

So slow was the process of siege in ancient times, that the reduction of Chalkêdon and Byzantium occupied nearly the whole year; the latter place surrendering about the beginning of winter.² Both of them, however, were acquisitions of capital importance to Athens, making her again undisputed mistress of the Bosphorus, and insuring to her two valuable tributary allies. Nor was this all the improvement which the summer had operated in her position. The accommodation just concluded with Pharnabazus was also a step of great value, and still greater

¹ Xenoph. Hellen. i. 3, 15-22; Diodor. xiii, 67; Plutarch, Alkib. c. 31.

The account given by Xenophon of the surrender of Byzantium, which I have followed in the text, is perfectly plain and probable. It does not consist with the complicated stratagem described in Diodorus and Plutarch, as well as in Frontinus, iii, xi, 3; alluded to also in Polyænus, i, 48, 2.

² Xenoph. Hellen. i. 4, 1.

promise It was plain that the satrap had grown weary of bearing all the brunt of the war for the benefit of the Peloponnesians, and that he was well disposed to assist the Athenians in coming to terms with the Great King. The mere withdrawal of his hearty support from Sparta, even if nothing else followed from it, was of immense moment to Athens; and thus much was really achieved. The envoys, five Athenians and two Argeians, — all, probably, sent for from Athens, which accounts for some delay, — were directed, after the siege of Chalkêdon, to meet Pharnabazus at Kyzikus. Some Lacedæmonian envoys, and even the Syracusan Hermokratês, who had been condemned and banished by sentence at home, took advantage of the same escort, and all proceeded on their journey upward to Susa. Their progress was arrested, during the extreme severity of the winter, at Gordium in Phrygia; and it was while pursuing their track into the interior at the opening of spring, that they met the young prince Cyrus, son of king Darius, coming down in person to govern an important part of Asia Minor. Some Lacedæmonian envoys, Bœotius and others, were travelling down along with him, after having fulfilled their mission at the Persian court.¹

CHAPTER LXIV.

FROM THE ARRIVAL OF CYRUS THE YOUNGER IN ASIA MINOR,
DOWN TO THE BATTLE OF ARGINUSÆ.

THE advent of Cyrus, commonly known as Cyrus the younger, into Asia Minor, was an event of the greatest importance, opening what may be called the last phase in the Peloponnesian war.

He was the younger of the two sons of the Persian king Darius Nothus by the cruel queen Parysatis, and was now sent down by his father as satrap of Lydia, Phrygia the greater, and Kapadokia, as well as general of all that military division of which the muster-place was Kastôlus. His command did not at this

¹ Xenoph. Hellen. i, 42-3

time comprise the Greek cities on the coast, which were still left to Tissaphernês and Pharnabazus.¹ But he nevertheless brought down with him a strong interest in the Grecian war, and an intense anti-Athenian feeling, with full authority from his father to carry it out into act. Whatever this young man willed, he willed strongly; his bodily activity, rising superior to those temptations of sensual indulgence which often enervated the Persian grandees, provoked the admiration even of Spartans;² and his energetic character was combined with a certain measure of ability. Though he had not as yet conceived that deliberate plan for mounting the Persian throne which afterwards absorbed his whole mind, and was so near succeeding by the help of the Ten Thousand Greeks, yet he seems to have had from the beginning the sentiment and ambition of a king in prospect, not those of a satrap. He came down, well aware that Athens was the efficient enemy by whom the pride of the Persian kings had been humbled, the insular Greeks kept out of the sight of a Persian ship, and even the continental Greeks on the coast practically emancipated, for the last sixty years. He therefore brought down with him a strenuous desire to put down the Athenian power, very different from the treacherous balancing of Tissaphernês, and much more formidable even than the straightforward enmity of Pharnabazus, who had less money, less favor at court, and less of youthful ardor. Moreover, Pharnabazus, after having heartily espoused the cause of the Peloponnesians for the last three years, had now become weary of the allies whom he had so long kept in pay. Instead of expelling Athenian influence from his coasts with little difficulty, as he had expected to do, he found his satrapy plundered, his revenues impaired or absorbed, and an Athenian fleet all-powerful in the Propontis and Hellespont; while the Lacedæmonian fleet, which he had taken so much pains to invite, was destroyed. Decidedly sick of the Peloponnesian cause, he was even leaning towards Athens; and the envoys whom he was escorting to Susa might perhaps have laid the foundation of an altered Persian policy in Asia Minor, when the journey of Cyrus

¹ The Anabasis of Xenophon (i, 1, 6-8, i, 9, 7-9) is better authority, and speaks more exactly, than the Hellenica, i, 4, 3.

² See the anecdote of Cyrus and Lysander in Xenoph. (Econom. iv, 21-23).

down to the coast overthrew all such calculations. The young prince brought with him a fresh, hearty, and youthful antipathy against Athens, a power inferior only to that of the Great King himself, and an energetic determination to use it without reserve in insuring victory to the Peloponnesians.

From the moment that Pharnabazus and the Athenian envoys met Cyrus, their farther progress towards Susa became impossible. Bœotius, and the other Lacedæmonian envoys travelling along with the young prince, made extravagant boasts of having obtained all that they asked for at Susa: and Cyrus himself announced his powers as unlimited in extent over the whole coast, all for the purpose of prosecuting vigorous war in conjunction with the Lacedæmonians. Pharnabazus, on hearing this intelligence, and seeing the Great King's seal to the words, "I send down Cyrus, as lord of all those who muster at Kastôlus," not only refused to let the Athenian envoys proceed onward, but was even obliged to obey the orders of the young prince, who insisted that they should either be surrendered to him, or at least detained for some time in the interior, in order that no information might be conveyed to Athens. The satrap resisted the first of these requisitions, having pledged his word for their safety; but he obeyed the second, detaining them in Kappadokia for no less than three years, until Athens was prostrate and on the point of surrender, after which he obtained permission from Cyrus to send them back to the sea-coast.¹

This arrival of Cyrus, overruling the treachery of Tissaphernês as well as the weariness of Pharnabazus, and supplying the enemies of Athens with a double flow of Persian gold at a moment when the stream would otherwise have dried up, was a paramount item in that sum of causes which concurred to determine the result of the war.² But important as the event was in itself, it was

¹ Xenoph. Hellen. i, 4, 3-4. The words here employed respecting the envoys, when returning after their three years' detention, *ὅθεν πρὸς τὸ ἄλλο στρατοπέδον ἀπεπλευσαν*, appear to me an inadvertence. The return of the envoys must have been in the spring of 404 B. C., at a time when Athens had no camp: the surrender of the city took place in April 404 B. C. Xenophon incautiously speaks as if that state of things which existed when the envoys departed, still continued at their return.

² The words of Thucydides (ii, 65) imply this as his opinion, *Κύρου τὴν βασιλείαν καὶ τοὺς παῖδας προσγενομένῳ*, etc.

rendered still more important by the character of the Lacedæmonian admiral Lysander, with whom the young prince first came into contact on reaching Sardis.

Lysander had come out to supersede Kratesippidas, about December, 408 B.C., or January, 407 B.C.¹ He was the last, after Brasidas and Gylippus, of that trio of eminent Spartans, from whom all the capital wounds of Athens proceeded, during the course of this long war. He was born of poor parents, and is even said to have been of that class called mothakes, being only enabled by the aid of richer men to keep up his contribution to the public mess, and his place in the constant drill and discipline. He was not only an excellent officer,² thoroughly competent to the

¹ The commencement of Lysander's navy, or year of maritime command, appears to me established for this winter. He had been some time actually in his command before Cyrus arrived at Sardis. *Οι δὲ Λακεδαιμόνιοι, πρότερον τούτων οὐ πολλῷ χρόνῳ Κρατισταπίδα τῆς ναυαρχίας παρέληλυθῆναι, Λυσάνδρον ἐξεπέμψαν ναύαρχον. Ὁ δὲ ἀφικόμενος ἐς Ῥόδον, καὶ ναυς ἐκεῖθεν λαβὼν, ἐς Κω καὶ Μιλήτον ἐπληροῖν ἐκείθεν δὲ ἐς Ἐφέσον καὶ ἐκεῖ ἔμεινε, ναυς ἔχων ἐβδόμηκοντα, μέχρις οὗ Κύρος ἐς Σάρδεεις ἀφικέτο* (Xenoph. Hellen. i. 5, 1).

Mr Fynes Clinton (Fast. H. ad ann. 407 B.C.) has, I presume, been misled by the first words of this passage, *πρότερον τούτων οὐ πολλῷ χρόνῳ*, when he says "During the stay of Alcibiadēs at Athens, Lysander is sent as *ναύαρχος*," Xen. Hellen. i. 5, 1. Then followed the defeat of Antiochus, the deposition of Alcibiadēs, and the substitution of ἄλλους δέκα, between September 407 and September 406, when *Callikratidas* succeeded Lysander.

Now Alcibiadēs came to Athens in the month of Thargelion, or about the end of May, 407, and stayed there till the beginning of September, 407. Cyrus arrived at Sardis before Alcibiadēs reached Athens, and Lysander had been some time at his post before Cyrus arrived, so that Lysander was not sent out "during the stay of Alcibiadēs at Athens," but some months before. Still less is it correct to say that *Kallikratidas* succeeded Lysander in September, 406. The battle of Arginusæ, wherein *Kallikratidas* perished, was fought about August, 406, after he had been admiral for several months. The words *πρότερον τούτων*, when construed along with the context which succeeds, must evidently be understood in a large sense, "these events," mean the general series of events which begins i. 4, 8; the proceedings of Alcibiades, from the beginning of the spring of 407.

² *Ælian*, V. H. xii. 43, *Athenæus*, vi. p. 271. The assertion that Lysander belonged to the class of mothakes is given by *Athenæus* as coming from *Phylarchus*, and I see no reason for calling it in question. *Ælian* states the same thing respecting Gylippus and *Kallikratidas*, also; I do not know on what authority.

duties of military command, but possessed also great talents for intrigue, and for organizing a political party as well as keeping up its disciplined movements. Though indifferent to the temptations either of money or of pleasure,¹ and willingly acquiescing in the poverty to which he was born, he was altogether unscrupulous in the prosecution of ambitious objects, either for his country or for himself. His family, poor as it was, enjoyed a dignified position at Sparta, belonging to the gens of the Herakleidæ, not connected by any near relationship with the kings: moreover, his personal reputation as a Spartan was excellent, since his observance of the rules of discipline had been rigorous and exemplary. The habits of self-constraint thus acquired, served him in good stead when it became necessary to his ambition to court the favor of the great. His recklessness about falsehood and perjury is illustrated by various current sayings ascribed to him; such as, that children were to be taken in by means of dice; men, by means of oaths.² A selfish ambition—for promoting the power of his country not merely in connection with, but in subservience to, his own—guided him from the beginning to the end of his career. In this main quality, he agreed with Alcibiadēs; in reckless immorality of means, he went even beyond him. He seems to have been cruel; an attribute which formed no part of the usual character of Alcibiadēs. On the other hand, the love of personal enjoyment, luxury, and ostentation, which counted for so much in Alcibiadēs, was quite unknown to Lysander. The basis of his disposition was Spartan, tending to merge appetite, ostentation, and expansion of mind, all in the love of command and influence,—not Athenian, which tended to the development of many and diversified impulses; ambition being one, but only one, among the number.

Kratesippidas, the predecessor of Lysander, seems to have enjoyed the maritime command for more than the usual yearly period, having superseded Pasippidas during the middle of the year of the latter. But the maritime power of Sparta was then so weak, having not yet recovered from the ruinous defeat at Kyzikus, that he achieved little or nothing. We hear of him only as further-

¹ Theopompus. Fragm. 21, ed. Didot; Plutarch, Lysand. c. 30.

² Plutarch, Lysander, c. 8.

ing, for his own profit, a political revolution at Chios. Bribed by a party of Chian exiles, he took possession of the acropolis, re-instated them in the island, and aided them in deposing and expelling the party then in office, to the number of six hundred. It is plain that this is not a question between democracy and oligarchy, but between two oligarchical parties, the one of which succeeded in purchasing the factious agency of the Spartan admiral. The exiles whom he expelled took possession of Atarneus, a strong post belonging to the Chians on the mainland opposite Lesbos. From hence they made war, as well as they could, upon their rivals now in possession of the island, and also upon other parts of Ionia; not without some success and profit, as will appear by their condition about ten years afterwards.¹

The practice of reconstituting the governments of the Asiatic cities, thus begun by Kratesippidas, was extended and brought to a system by Lysander; not indeed for private emolument, which he always despised, but in views of ambition. Having departed from Peloponnesus with a squadron, he reinforced it at Rhodes, and then sailed onward to Kôs — an Athenian island, so that he could only have touched there — and Milêtus. He took up his final station at Ephesus, the nearest point to Sardis, where Cyrus was expected to arrive; and while awaiting his coming, augmented his fleet to the number of seventy triremes. As soon as Cyrus reached Sardis, about April or May 407 B.C., Lysander went to pay his court to him, along with some Lacedæmonian envoys, and found himself welcomed with every mark of favor. Preferring bitter complaints against the double-dealing of Tissaphernês, — whom they accused of having frustrated the king's orders, and sacrificed the interests of the empire, under the seductions of Alkibiadês, — they intreated Cyrus to adopt a new policy, and execute the stipulations of the treaty, by lending the most vigorous aid to put down the common enemy. Cyrus replied, that these were the express orders which he had received from his father, and that he was prepared to fulfil them with all his might. He had brought with him, he said, five hundred talents, which

¹ Diodor. xiii, 65; Xenoph. Hellen. iii, 2, 11. I presume that this conduct of Kratesippidas is the fact glanced at by Isokratês de Pace, sect. 128; 240 ed. Bekk.

should be at once devoted to the cause: if these were insufficient, he would resort to the private funds which his father had given him; and if more still were needed, he would coin into money the gold and silver throne on which he sat.¹

Lysander and the envoys returned the warmest thanks for these magnificent promises, which were not likely to prove empty words from the lips of a vehement youth like Cyrus. So sanguine were the hopes which they conceived from his character and proclaimed sentiments, that they ventured to ask him to restore the rate of pay to one full Attic drachma per head for the seamen; which had been the rate promised by Tissaphernês through his envoys at Sparta, when he first invited the Lacedæmonians across the Ægean, and when it was doubtful whether they would come, but actually paid only for the first month, and then reduced to half a drachma, furnished in practice with miserable irregularity. As a motive for granting this increase of pay, Cyrus was assured that it would determine the Athenian seamen to desert so largely, that the war would sooner come to an end, and of course the expenditure also. But he refused compliance, saying that the rate of pay had been fixed both by the king's express orders and by the terms of the treaty, so that he could not depart from it.² In this reply Lysander was forced to acquiesce. The envoys were treated with distinction, and feasted

¹ Xenoph. Hellen. i, 5, 3-4: Diodor. xiii, 70; Plutarch, Lysander, c. 4. This seems to have been a favorite metaphor, either used by, or at least ascribed to, the Persian grandees; we have already had it, a little before, from the mouth of Tissaphernês.

² Xenoph. Hellen. i, 5, 5. εἶναι δὲ καὶ τὰς συνθήκας οὕτως ἐχούσας, τριάκοντα μνας ἑκάστην νηὶ τοῦ μηνὸς δίδοναι, ὅποσας ἂν βούλοιντο τρέφειν Λακεδαιμόνιοι.

This is not strictly correct. The rate of pay is not specified in either of the three conventions, as they stand in Thucyd. viii, 18, 37, 58. It seems to have been, from the beginning, matter of verbal understanding and promise; first, a drachma per day was promised by the envoys of Tissaphernês at Sparta; next, the satrap himself, at Milêtus, cut down this drachma to half a drachma, and promised this lower rate for the future (viii, 29).

Mr. Mitford says: "Lysander proposed that an Attic drachma, which was eight oboli, nearly tenpence sterling, should be allowed for daily pay to every seaman."

Mr. Mitford had in the previous sentence stated three oboli as equal to not quite fourpence sterling. Of course therefore, it is plain that he did not

at a banquet; after which Cyrus, drinking to the health of Lysander, desired him to declare what favor he could do to gratify him most. "To grant an additional obolus per head for each seaman's pay," replied Lysander. Cyrus immediately complied, having personally bound himself by his manner of putting the question. But the answer impressed him both with astonishment and admiration; for he had expected that Lysander would ask some favor or present for himself, judging him not only according to the analogy of most Persians, but also of Astyochus and the officers of the Peloponnesian armament at Miletus, whose corrupt subservience to Tissaphernês had probably been made known to him. From such corruption, as well as from the mean carelessness of Theramenês, the Spartan, respecting the condition of the seamen,¹ Lysander's conduct stood out in pointed and honorable contrast.

The incident here described not only procured for the seamen of the Peloponnesian fleet the daily pay of four oboli, instead of three, per man, but also insured to Lysander himself a degree of esteem and confidence from Cyrus which he knew well how to turn to account. I have already remarked,² in reference to Periklês and Nikias, that an established reputation for personal incorruptibility, rare as that quality was among Grecian leading politicians, was among the most precious items in the capital stock of an ambitious man, even if looked at only in regard to the durability of his own influence. If the proof of such disinterestedness was of so much value in the eyes of the Athenian people, yet more powerfully did it work upon the mind of Cyrus. With his Persian and princely ideas of winning adherents by munificence,³ a man who despised presents was a phenomenon

consider three oboli as the half of a drachma (Hist. Greece, ch. xx, sect. i, vol. iv, p. 317, oct. ed. 1814)

That a drachma was equivalent to six oboli, that is, an Æginæan drachma to six Æginæan oboli, and an Attic drachma to six Attic oboli, is so familiarly known, that I should almost have imagined the word *eight*, in the first sentence here cited, to be a misprint for *six*, if the sentence cited next had not clearly demonstrated that Mr. Mitford really believed a drachma to be equal to eight oboli. It is certainly a mistake surprising to find.

¹ Thucyd. viii, 29.

² See the former volume vi, ch. li, p. 287.

³ See the remarkable character of Cyrus the younger, given in the *Anabasis* of Xenophon, i, 9, 22-28.

commanding the higher sentiment of wonder and respect. From this time forward he not only trusted Lysander with implicit pecuniary confidence, but consulted him as to the prosecution of the war, and even condescended to second his personal ambition to the detriment of this object.¹

Returning from Sardis to Ephesus, after such unexampled success in his interview with Cyrus, Lysander was enabled not only to make good to his fleet the full arrear actually due, but also to pay them for a month in advance, at the increased rate of four oboli per man; and to promise that high rate for the future. A spirit of the highest satisfaction and confidence was diffused through the armament. But the ships were in indifferent condition, having been hastily and parsimoniously got up since the late defeat at Kyzikus. Accordingly, Lysander employed his present affluence in putting them into better order, procuring more complete tackle, and inviting picked crews.² He took another step pregnant with important results. Summoning to Ephesus a few of the most leading and active men from each of the Asiatic cities, he organized them into disciplined clubs, or factions, in correspondence with himself. He instigated these clubs to the most vigorous prosecution of the war against Athens, promising that, as soon as that war should be concluded, they should be invested and maintained by Spartan influence in the government of their respective cities.³ His newly established influence with Cyrus, and the abundant supplies of which he was now master, added double force to an invitation in itself but too seducing. And thus, while infusing increased ardor into the joint warlike efforts of these cities, he at the same time procured for himself an ubiquitous correspondence, such as no successor could manage, rendering the continuance of his own command almost essential to success. The fruits of his factious manœuvres will be seen in the subsequent dekadarchies, or oligarchies of Ten, after the complete subjugation of Athens.

While Lysander and Cyrus were thus restoring formidable efficacy to their side of the contest, during the summer of 407

¹ Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 1, 13; Plutarch, Lysand. c. 4-5.

² Xenoph. Hellen. i, 5, 10.

³ Diodor. xiii, 70; Plutarch, Lysand. c. 5.

B.C., the victorious exile Alkibiadês had accomplished the important and delicate step of reentering his native city for the first time. According to the accommodation with Pharnabazus, concluded after the reduction of Chalkêdon, the Athenian fleet was precluded from assailing his satrapy, and was thus forced to seek subsistence elsewhere. Byzantium and Selymbria, with contributions levied in Thrace, maintained them for the winter: in the spring (407 B.C.), Alkibiadês brought them again to Samos; from whence he undertook an expedition against the coast of Karia, levying contributions to the extent of one hundred talents. Thrasybulus, with thirty triremes, went to attack Thrace, where he reduced Thasos, Abdêra, and all those towns which had revolted from Athens; Thasos being now in especial distress from famine as well as from past seditions. A valuable contribution for the support of the fleet was doubtless among the fruits of this success. Thrasyllus at the same time conducted another division of the army home to Athens, intended by Alkibiadês as precursors of his own return.¹

Before Thrasyllus arrived, the people had already manifested their favorable disposition towards Alkibiadês by choosing him anew general of the armament, along with Thrasybulus and Konon. Alkibiadês was now tending homeward from Samos with twenty triremes, bringing with him all the contributions recently levied: he first stopped at Paros, then visited the coast of Laconia, and lastly looked into the harbor of Gytheion in Laconia, where he had learned that thirty triremes were preparing. The news which he received of his reelection as general, strengthened by the pressing invitations and encouragements of his friends, as well as by the recall of his banished kinsmen at length determined him to sail to Athens. He reached Peiræus on a marked day, the festival of the Plyntêria, on the 25th of the month Thargêlion, about the end of May, 407 B.C. This was a day of melancholy solemnity, accounted unpropitious for any action of importance. The statue of the goddess Athênê was stripped of all its ornaments, covered up from every one's gaze,

¹ Xenoph. Hellen. i, 4, 8-10; Diodor. xiii, 72. The chronology of Xenophon, though not so clear as we could wish, deserves unquestionable preference over that of Diodorus.

and washed or cleansed under a mysterious ceremonial, by the holy gens, called Praxiërgidæ. The goddess thus seemed to turn away her face, and refuse to behold the returning exile. Such at least was the construction of his enemies; and as the subsequent turn of events tended to bear them out, it has been preserved; while the more auspicious counter-interpretation, doubtless suggested by his friends, has been forgotten.

The most extravagant representations, of the pomp and splendor of this return of Alkibiadês to Athens, were given by some authors of antiquity, especially by Duris of Samos, an author about two generations later. It was said that he brought with him two hundred prow-ornaments belonging to captive enemies' ships, or, according to some, even the two hundred captured ships themselves; that his trireme was ornamented with gilt and silvered shields, and sailed by purple sails; that Kallippidês, one of the most distinguished actors of the day, performed the functions of keleustês, pronouncing the chant or word of command to the rowers; that Chrysogonus, a flute-player, who had gained the first prize at the Pythian games, was also on board playing the air of return.¹ All these details, invented with melancholy facility, to illustrate an ideal of ostentation and insolence, are refuted by the more simple and credible narrative of Xenophon. The reëntury of Alkibiadês was not merely unostentatious, but even mistrustful and apprehensive. He had with him only twenty triremes; and though encouraged, not merely by the assurances of his friends, but also by the news that he had just been reëlected general, he was, nevertheless, half afraid to disembark, even at the instant when he made fast his ship to the quay in Peiræus. A vast crowd had assembled there from the city and the port, animated by curiosity, interest, and other emotions of every kind, to see him arrive. But so little did he trust their sentiments that he hesitated at first to step on shore, and stood upon the deck looking about for his friends and kinsmen. Presently, he saw Euryptolemus his cousin, and others, by whom he was heartily welcomed, and in the midst of whom he landed. But they too were so apprehensive of his numerous enemies that they formed themselves into a sort of body-guard, to sur-

¹ Diodor. xiii 68; Plutarch, Alkib. c. 31; Athenæ. xii, p. 535.

round and protect him against any possible assault during his march from Peiræus to Athens.¹

No protection, however, was required. Not merely did his enemies attempt no violence against him, but they said nothing in opposition when he made his defence before the senate and the public assembly. Protesting before the one as well as the other, his innocence of the impiety laid to his charge, he denounced bitterly the injustice of his enemies, and gently, but pathetically, deplored the unkindness of the people. His friends all spoke warmly in the same strain. So strenuous, and so pronounced, was the sentiment in his favor, both of the senate and of the public assembly, that no one dared to address them in the contrary sense.² The sentence of condemnation passed against him was cancelled: the Eumolpidae were directed to revoke the curse which they had pronounced upon his head: the record of the sentence was destroyed, and the plate of lead upon which the curse was engraven, thrown into the sea: his confiscated property was restored: lastly, he was proclaimed general with full powers, and allowed to prepare an expedition of one hundred triremes, fifteen hundred hoplites from the regular muster-roll, and one hundred and fifty horsemen. All this passed, by unopposed vote, amidst silence on the part of enemies and acclamations from friends, amidst unmeasured promises of future achievement from himself, and confident assurances, impressed by his friends on willing hearers, that Alkibiadēs was the only man competent to restore the empire and grandeur of Athens. The general expectation, which he and his friends took every possible pains to excite, was, that his victorious career of the last three years was a preparation for yet greater triumphs during the next.

We may be satisfied, when we advert to the apprehensions of Alkibiadēs on entering the Peiræus, and to the body-guard organized by his friends, that this overwhelming and uncontradicted

¹ Xenoph. Hellen. i, 4, 18, 19. Ἀλκιβιάδης δὲ, πρὸς τὴν γῆν ὁρμισθεὶς ἀπεβαίνει μὲν οὐκ εὐθέως, φοβούμενος τοὺς ἐχθροὺς ἱππαστάς τε ἐπὶ τοῦ καταστρώματος, ἰσχυροὺς αὐτοῦ ἐπιτηδείοις, εἰ παρήσαν. Κατιδὼν δὲ Εὐρυπτολεμον τὸν Πεισιάνακτος, ταυτοῦ δὲ ἀνεψίου, καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους οἰκίους καὶ φίλους μετ' αὐτῶν, τότε ἀποβάς ἀναβαίνει ἐς τὴν πόλιν, μετὰ τῶν παρασκευασμένων, εἰ τις ἄπτοιο, μὴ ἐπιτρέπειν.

² Xenoph. Hellen. i, 4, 20, Plutarch, Alkib. c. 33. Diodor. xiii, 69.

triumph greatly surpassed the anticipations of both. It intoxicated him, and led him to make light of enemies whom only just before he had so much dreaded. This mistake, together with the carelessness and insolence arising out of what seemed to be an unbounded ascendancy, proved the cause of his future ruin. But the truth is, that these enemies, however they might remain silent, had not ceased to be formidable. Alkibiadēs had now been eight years in exile, from about August 415 B.C. to May 407 B.C. Now absence was in many ways a good thing for his reputation, since his overbearing private demeanor had been kept out of sight, and his impieties partially forgotten. There was even a disposition among the majority to accept his own explicit denial of the fact laid to his charge, and to dwell chiefly upon the unworthy manœuvres of his enemies in resisting his demand for instant trial immediately after the accusation was broached, in order that they might calumniate him during his absence. He was characterized as a patriot animated by the noblest motives, who had brought both first-rate endowments and large private wealth to the service of the commonwealth, but had been ruined by a conspiracy of corrupt and worthless speakers, every way inferior to him; men, whose only chance of success with the people arose from expelling those who were better than themselves, while he, Alkibiadēs, far from having any interest adverse to the democracy, was the natural and worthy favorite of a democratical people.¹ So far as the old causes of unpopularity were concerned, therefore, time and absence had done much to weaken their effect, and to assist his friends in countervailing them by pointing to the treacherous political manœuvres employed against him.

But if the old causes of unpopularity had thus, comparatively speaking, passed out of sight, others had since arisen, of a graver and more ineffaceable character. His vindictive hostility to his country had been not merely ostentatiously proclaimed, but acutely manifested, by stabs but too effectively aimed at her vitals. The sending of Gylippus to Syracuse, the fortification of Dekeleia, the revolts of Chios and Milētus, the first origination of the conspiracy of the Four Hundred, had all been emphatically the

¹ Xenoph. Hellen. i, 4, 14-16.

measures of Alkibiadēs. Even for these, the enthusiasm of the moment attempted some excuse: it was affirmed that he had never ceased to love his country, in spite of her wrongs towards him, and that he had been compelled by the necessities of exile to serve men whom he detested, at the daily risk of his life.¹ But such pretences could not really impose upon any one. The treason of Alkibiadēs during the period of his exile remained indefensible as well as undeniable, and would have been more than sufficient as a theme for his enemies, had their tongues been free. But his position was one altogether singular: having first inflicted on his country immense mischief, he had since rendered her valuable service, and promised to render still more. It is true, that the subsequent service was by no means adequate to the previous mischief: nor had it indeed been rendered exclusively by him, since the victories of Abydos and Kyzikus belong not less to Theramenēs and Thrasybulus than to Alkibiadēs:² moreover, the peculiar present or capital which he had promised to bring with him, — Persian alliance and pay to Athens, — had proved a complete delusion. Still, the Athenian arms had been eminently successful since his junction, and we may see that not merely common report, but even good judges, such as Thucydides, ascribed this result to his superior energy and management.

Without touching upon these particulars, it is impossible fully to comprehend the very peculiar position of this returning exile before the Athenian people in the summer of 407 B.C. The more distant past exhibited him as among the worst of criminals; the recent past, as a valuable servant and patriot: the future promised continuance in this last character, so far as there were any positive indications to judge by. Now this was a case in which discussion and recrimination could not possibly answer any useful purpose. There was every reason for reappointing Alkibiadēs to his command; but this could only be done under

¹ Xenoph. Hellen. i, 4, 15.

² This point is justly touched upon, more than once, by Cornelius Nepos. Vit. Alcibiad. c. 6: "Quamquam Theramenēs et Thrasybulus eisdem rebus præfuerant." And again, in the life of Thrasybulus (c. 1). "Primum Peloponnesiaco bello multa hic (Thrasybulus) sine Alcibiade gessit; ille nullam rem sine hoc."

prohibition of censure on his past crimes, and provisional acceptance of his subsequent good deeds, as justifying the hope of yet better deeds to come. The popular instinct felt this situation perfectly, and imposed absolute silence on his enemies.¹ We are not to infer from hence that the people had forgotten the past deeds of Alkibiadēs, or that they entertained for him nothing but unqualified confidence and admiration. In their present very justifiable sentiment of hopefulness, they determined that he should have full scope for prosecuting his new and better career, if he chose; and that his enemies should be precluded from reviving the mention of an irreparable past, so as to shut the door against him. But what was thus interdicted to men's lips as unseasonable, was not effaced from their recollections; nor were the enemies, though silenced for the moment, rendered powerless for the future. All this train of combustible matter lay quiescent, ready to be fired by any future misconduct or negligence, perhaps even by blameless ill-success, on the part of Alkibiadēs.

At a juncture when so much depended upon his future behavior, he showed, as we shall see presently, that he completely misinterpreted the temper of the people. Intoxicated by the unexpected triumph of his reception, according to that fatal susceptibility so common among distinguished Greeks, he forgot his own past history, and fancied that the people had forgotten and forgiven it also; construing their studied and well-advised silence into a proof of oblivion. He conceived himself in assured possession of public confidence, and looked upon his numerous enemies as if they no longer existed, because they were not allowed to speak at a most unseasonable hour. Without doubt, his exultation was shared by his friends, and this sense of false security proved his future ruin.

Two colleagues, recommended by Alkibiadēs himself, Adimantus and Aristokratēs, were named by the people as generals of the hoplites to go out with him, in case of operations ashore.²

¹ Xenoph. Hellen. i, 4, 20. λειχθέντων δὲ καὶ ἄλλων τοιούτων, καὶ οὐδενὸς ἀντεπιδόντος, διὰ τοῦ μὴ ἀνασχέσθαι αὐτὴν ἐκκλησίαν, etc.

² Xenoph. Hellen. i, 4, 21. Both Diodorus (xiii, 69) and Cornelius Nepos.

In less than three months, his armament was ready; but he designedly deferred his departure until that day of the month Boedromion, about the beginning of September, when the Eleusinian mysteries were celebrated, and when the solemn processional march of the crowd of communicants was wont to take place, along the Sacred Way from Athens to Eleusis. For seven successive years, ever since the establishment of Agis at Dekeleia, this march had been of necessity discontinued, and the procession had been transported by sea, to the omission of many of the ceremonial details. Alkibiadēs, on this occasion, caused the land-march to be renewed, in full pomp and solemnity; assembling all his troops in arms to protect, in case any attack should be made from Dekeleia. No such attack was hazarded; so that he had the satisfaction of reviving the full regularity of this illustrious scene, and escorting the numerous communicants out and home, without the smallest interruption; an exploit gratifying to the religious feelings of the people, and imparting an acceptable sense of undiminished Athenian power; while in reference to his own reputation, it was especially politic, as serving to make his peace with the Eumolpidae and the Two Goddesses, on whose account he had been condemned.¹

Immediately after the mysteries, he departed with his armament. It appears that Agis at Dekeleia, though he had not chosen to come out and attack Alkibiadēs when posted to guard the Eleusinian procession, had nevertheless felt humiliated by the defiance offered to him. He shortly afterwards took advantage of the departure of this large force, to summon reinforcements from Peloponnesus and Boeotia, and attempt to surprise the walls of Athens on a dark night. If he expected any connivance within, the plot miscarried: alarm was given in time, and the eldest and youngest hoplites were found at their posts to defend the walls. The assailants — said to have amounted to

Vit. Alcib. c. 7) state Thrasybulus and Adeimantus as his colleagues. Both state also that his colleagues were chosen on his recommendation. I follow Xenophon as to the names, and also as to the fact, that they were named as *κατὰ γῆν στρατηγοί*.

¹ Xenoph. Hellen. i. 4, 20; Plutarch. Alcib. c. 34. Neither Diodorus nor Cornelius Nepos mentions this remarkable incident about the escort of the Eleusinian procession.

twenty-eight thousand men, of whom half were hoplites, with twelve hundred cavalry, nine hundred of them Boeotians — were seen on the ensuing day close under the walls of the city, which were amply manned with the full remaining strength of Athens. In an obstinate cavalry battle which ensued, the Athenians gained the advantage even over the Boeotians. Agis encamped the next night in the garden of Akadēmus; again on the morrow he drew up his troops and offered battle to the Athenians, who are affirmed to have gone forth in order of battle, but to have kept under the protection of the missiles from the walls, so that Agis did not dare to attack them.¹ We may well doubt whether the Athenians went out at all, since they had been for years accustomed to regard themselves as inferior to the Peloponnesians in the field. Agis now withdrew, satisfied apparently with having offered battle, so as to efface the affront which he had received from the march of the Eleusinian communicants in defiance of his neighborhood.

The first exploit of Alkibiadēs was to proceed to Andros, now under a Lacedæmonian harmost and garrison. Landing on the island, he plundered the fields, defeated both the native troops and the Lacedæmonians, and forced them to shut themselves up within the town; which he besieged for some days without avail, and then proceeded onward to Samos, leaving Konon in a fortified post, with twenty ships, to prosecute the siege.² At Samos, he first ascertained the state of the Peloponnesian fleet at Ephesus, the influence acquired by Lysander over Cyrus, the strong anti-Athenian dispositions of the young prince, and the ample rate of pay, put down even in advance, of which the Peloponnesian seamen were now in actual receipt. He now first became convinced of the failure of those hopes which he had conceived, not without good reason, in the preceding year, — and of which he had doubtless boasted at Athens, — that the alliance of Persia might be neutralized at least, if not won over, through the envoys escorted to Susa by Pharnabazus. It was in vain that he prevailed upon Tissaphernēs to mediate with Cyrus, to introduce to

¹ Diodor. xiii, 72, 73.

² Xenoph. Hellen. i. 4, 22; i. 5, 18; Plutarch. Alcib. c. 35; Diodor. xiii. 69. The latter says that Thrasybulus was left at Andros, which cannot be true.

him some Athenian envoys, and to inculcate upon him his own views of the true interests of Persia; that is, that the war should be fed and protracted so as to wear out both the Grecian belligerent parties, each by means of the other. Such a policy, uncongenial at all times to the vehement temper of Cyrus, had become yet more repugnant to him since his intercourse with Lysander. He would not consent even to see the envoys, nor was he probably displeased to put a slight upon a neighbor and rival satrap. Deep was the despondency among the Athenians at Samos, when painfully convinced that all hopes from Persia must be abandoned for themselves; and farther, that Persian pay was both more ample and better assured, to their enemies, than ever it had been before.¹

Lysander had at Ephesus a fleet of ninety triremes, which he employed himself in repairing and augmenting, being still inferior in number to the Athenians. In vain did Alkibiadēs attempt to provoke him out to a general action. This was much to the interest of the Athenians, apart from their superiority of number, since they were badly provided with money, and obliged to levy contributions wherever they could: but Lysander was resolved not to fight unless he could do so with advantage, and Cyrus, not afraid of sustaining the protracted expense of the war, had even enjoined upon him this cautious policy, with additional hopes of a Phœnician fleet to his aid, which in his mouth was not intended to delude, as it had been by Tissaphernēs.² Unable to bring about a general battle, and having no immediate or capital enterprise to constrain his attention, Alkibiadēs became careless, and abandoned himself partly to the love of pleasure, partly to reckless predatory enterprises for the purpose of getting money to pay his army. Thrasybulus had come from his post on the Hellespont, and was now engaged in fortifying Phokæa, probably for the purpose of establishing a post, to be enabled to pillage the interior. Here he was joined by Alkibiadēs, who sailed across with a squadron, leaving his main fleet at Samos. He left it under the com-

¹ Xenophon, *Hellen.* i. 5, 9; Plutarch, *Lysand.* c. 4. The latter tells us that the Athenian ships were presently emptied by the desertion of the seamen; a careless exaggeration.

² Plutarch, *Lysand.* c. 9. I venture to antedate the statements which he there makes, as to the encouragements from Cyrus to Lysander

mand of his favorite pilot Antiochus, but with express orders on no account to fight until his return.

While employed in this visit to Phokæa and Klazomenæ, Alkibiadēs, perhaps hard-pressed for money, conceived the unwarrantable project of enriching his men by the plunder of the neighboring territory of Kymê, an allied dependency of Athens. Landing on this territory unexpectedly, after fabricating some frivolous calumnies against the Kymæans, he at first seized much property and a considerable number of prisoners. But the inhabitants assembled in arms, bravely defended their possessions, and repelled his men to their ships; recovering the plundered property, and lodging it in safety within their walls. Stung with this miscarriage, Alkibiadēs sent for a reinforcement of hoplites from Mitylênê, and marched up to the walls of Kymê, where he in vain challenged the citizens to come forth and fight. He then ravaged the territory at pleasure: nor had the Kymæans any other resource, except to send envoys to Athens, to complain of so gross an outrage, inflicted by the Athenian general upon an unoffending Athenian dependency.¹

This was a grave charge, nor was it the only charge which Alkibiadēs had to meet at Athens. During his absence at Phokæa and Kymê, Antiochus the pilot, whom he had left in command, disobeying the express order pronounced against fighting a battle, first sailed across from Samos to Notium, the harbor of Kolophon, and from thence to the mouth of the harbor of Ephesus, where the Peloponnesian fleet lay. Entering that harbor with his own ship and another, he passed close in front of the prows of the Peloponnesian triremes, insulting them scornfully and defying them to combat. Lysander detached some ships to pursue him, and an action gradually ensued, which was exactly that which Antiochus desired. But the Athenian ships were all in disorder,

¹ Diodor. xiii. 73. I follow Diodorus in respect to this story about Kymê which he probably copied from the Kymæan historian Ephorus. Cornelius Nepos (*Aleib.* c. 7) briefly glances at it.

Xenophon (*Hellen.* i. 5, 11) as well as Plutarch (*Lysand.* c. 5) mention the visit of Alkibiadēs to Thrasybulus at Phokæa. They do not name Kymê, however: according to them, the visit to Phokæa has no assignable purpose or consequences. But the plunder of Kymê is a circumstance both sufficiently probable in itself, and suitable to the occasion.

and came into battle as each of them separately could; while the Peloponnesian fleet was well marshalled and kept in hand, so that the battle was all to the advantage of the latter. The Athenians, compelled to take flight, were pursued to Notium, losing fifteen triremes, several along with their full crews. Antiochus himself was slain. Before retiring to Ephesus, Lysander had the satisfaction of erecting his trophy on the shore of Notium; while the Athenian fleet was carried back to its station at Samos.¹

It was in vain that Alkibiadēs, hastening back to Samos, mustered the entire Athenian fleet, sailed to the mouth of the harbor of Ephesus, and there ranged his ships in battle order, challenging the enemy to come forth. Lysander would give him no opportunity of wiping out the late dishonor. And as an additional mortification to Athens, the Lacedæmonians shortly afterwards captured both Teos and Delphinium; the latter being a fortified post which the Athenians had held for the last three years in the island of Chios.²

Even before the battle of Notium, it appears that complaints and dissatisfactions had been growing up in the armament against Alkibiades. He had gone out with a splendid force, not inferior, in number of triremes and hoplites, to that which he had conducted against Sicily, and under large promises, both from himself and his friends, of achievements to come. Yet in a space of time which can hardly have been less than three months, not a single success had been accomplished; while on the other side there was to be reckoned the disappointment on the score of Persia, which had great effect on the temper of the armament, and which, though not his fault, was contrary to expectations which he had held out, the disgraceful plunder of Kymē, and the defeat at Notium. It was true that Alkibiades had given peremptory orders to Antiochus not to fight, and that the battle had been hazarded in flagrant disobedience to his injunctions. But this cir-

¹ Xenoph. Hellen. i. 5, 12-15; Diodor. xiii. 71; Plutarch, Alkib. c. 35; Plutarch, Lysand. c. 5.

² Xenoph. Hellen. i. 5, 15; Diodor. xiii. 76.

I copy Diodorus, in putting Teos, pursuant to Weiske's note, in place of Eion, which appears in Xenophon. I copy the latter, however, in ascribing these captures to the year of Lysander, instead of to the year of Kallikrates.

cumstance only raised new matter for dissatisfaction of a graver character. If Antiochus had been disobedient,—if, besides disobedience, he had displayed a childish vanity and an utter neglect of all military precautions,—who was it that had chosen him for deputy; and that too against all Athenian precedent, putting the pilot, a paid officer of the ship, over the heads of the trierarchs who paid their pilots, and served at their own cost? It was Alkibiadēs who placed Antiochus in this grave and responsible situation,—a personal favorite, an excellent convivial companion, but destitute of all qualities befitting a commander. And this turned attention on another point of the character of Alkibiadēs, his habits of excessive self-indulgence and dissipation. The loud murmurs of the camp charged him with neglecting the interests of the service for enjoyments with jovial parties and Ionian women, and with admitting to his confidence those who best contributed to the amusement of these chosen hours.¹

It was in the camp at Samos that this general indignation against Alkibiadēs first arose, and was from thence transmitted formally to Athens, by the mouth of Thrasybulus son of Thrason;² not the eminent Thrasybulus, son of Lykus, who has been already often spoken of in this history, and will be so again. There came at the same time to Athens the complaints from Kymē, against the unprovoked aggression and plunder of that place by Alkibiadēs; and seemingly complaints from other places besides.³ It was even urged as accusation against him, that he

¹ Plutarch, Alkib. c. 36. He recounts, in the tenth chapter of the same biography, an anecdote, describing the manner in which Antiochus first won the favor of Alkibiadēs, then a young man, by catching a tame quail, which had escaped from his bosom.

² A person named Thrason is mentioned in the Choiseul Inscription (No. 147, pp. 221, 222, of the Corp. Inser. of Boeckh) as one of the Hellenotamiae in the year 410 B.C. He is described by his Deme as Butades; he is probably enough the father of this Thrasybulus.

³ Xenoph. Hellen. i. 5, 16-17. Ἀλκιβιάδης μὲν οὖν, πονηρῶς καὶ ἐν τῇ στρατιᾷ φερόμενος, etc. Diodor. xiii. 73. ἐγένοντο δὲ καὶ ἄλλαι πολλαὶ διαβολαὶ κατὰ αὐτοῦ, etc.

Plutarch Alkib. c. 36.

One of the remaining speeches of Lysias (Orat. xxi, Ἀπολογία Δωροφόρου) is delivered by the trierarch in this fleet, on board of whose ship Alkibiadēs himself chose to sail. This trierarch complains of Alkibiadēs as

was in guilty collusion to betray the fleet to Pharnabazus and the Lacedæmonians, and that he had already provided three strong forts in the Chersonese to retire to, as soon as this scheme should be ripe for execution.

Such grave and wide-spread accusations, coupled with the disaster at Notium, and the complete disappointment of all the promises of success, were more than sufficient to alter the sentiments of the people of Athens towards Alkibiadēs. He had no character to fall back upon; or rather, he had a character worse than none, such as to render the most criminal imputations of treason not intrinsically improbable. The comments of his enemies, which had been forcibly excluded from public discussion during his summer visit to Athens, were now again set free; and all the adverse recollections of his past life doubtless revived. The people had refused to listen to these, in order that he might have a fair trial, and might verify the title, claimed for him by his friends, to be judged only by his subsequent exploits, achieved since the year 411 B.C. He had now had his trial; he had been found wanting; and the popular confidence, which had been provisionally granted to him, was accordingly withdrawn.

It is not just to represent the Athenian people, however Plutarch and Cornelius Nepos may set before us this picture, as having indulged an extravagant and unmeasured confidence in Alkibiadēs in the month of July, demanding of him more than man could perform, and as afterwards in the month of December passing, with childish abruptness, from confidence into wrathful displeasure, because their own impossible expectations were not already realized. That the people entertained large expectations, from so very considerable an armament, cannot be doubted: the largest of all, probably, as in the instance of the Sicilian expedition, were those entertained by Alkibiadēs himself, and promulgated by his friends. But we are not called upon to determine what the people would have done, had Alkibiadēs, after per-

having been a most uncomfortable and troublesome companion (sect. 7) His testimony on the point is valuable; for there seems no disposition here to make out any case against Alkibiadēs. The trierarch notices the fact, that Alkibiadēs preferred *his* trireme, simply as a proof that it was the best equipped, or among the best equipped, of the whole fleet. Archestratus and Erasimidēs preferred it afterwards, for the same reason.

forming all the duties of a faithful, skilful, and enterprising commander, nevertheless failed, from obstacles beyond his own control, in realizing their hopes and his own promises. No such case occurred: that which did occur was materially different. Besides the absence of grand successes, he had farther been negligent and reckless in his primary duties; he had exposed the Athenian arms to defeat, by his disgraceful selection of an unworthy lieutenant;¹ he had violated the territory and property of an allied dependency, at a moment when Athens had a paramount interest in cultivating by every means the attachment of her remaining allies. The truth is, as I have before remarked, that he had really been spoiled by the intoxicating reception given to him so unexpectedly in the city. He had mistaken a hopeful public, determined, even by forced silence as to the past, to give him the full benefit of a meritorious future, but requiring as condition from him, that that future should really be meritorious, for a public of assured admirers, whose favor he had already earned and might consider as his own. He became an altered man after that visit, like Miltiadēs after the battle of Marathon; or, rather, the impulses of a character essentially dissolute and insolent, broke loose from that restraint under which they had before been partially controlled. At the time of the battle of Kyzikus, when Alkibiadēs was laboring to regain the favor of his injured countrymen, and was yet uncertain whether he should

¹ Xenoph. Hellen. i. 5, 16. Οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι, ὡς ἡγγέλθη ἡ ναυμαχία, χαλεπῶς εἶχον τῷ Ἀλκιβιάδῃ, οἰόμενοι δὲ ὑμῖν λείαν τε καὶ ἀκράτειαν ἀπολῶναι τὰς ναῖς.

The expression which Thucydides employs in reference to Alkibiadēs requires a few words of comment: (vi. 15) καὶ δημοσίᾳ κρᾶτιστε διαθέντα τὰ τοῦ πολέμου, ἰδία ἕκαστοι τοῖς ἐπιτηδεύμασιν αὐτοῖ ἀχθεσθέντες, καὶ ἄλλους ἐπιτρεφάντες (the Athenians), οὐ διὰ μακροῦ ἔσφη λαν τὴν πόλιν.

The "strenuous and effective prosecution of warlike business" here ascribed to Alkibiadēs, is true of all the period between his exile and his last visit to Athens (about September B.C. 415 to September B.C. 407). During the first four years of that time, he was very effective against Athens; during the last four, very effective in her service.

But the assertion is certainly not true of his last command, which ended with the battle of Notium; nor is it more than partially true at least, it is an exaggeration of the truth, for the period before his exile.

succeed, he would not have committed the fault of quitting his fleet and leaving it under the command of a lieutenant like Antiochus. If, therefore, Athenian sentiment towards Alkibiadēs underwent an entire change during the autumn of 407 B.C., this was in consequence of an alteration in his character and behavior; an alteration for the worse, just at the crisis when everything turned upon his good conduct, and upon his deserving at least, if he could not command success.

We may, indeed, observe that the faults of Nikias before Syracuse, and in reference to the coming of Gylippus, were far graver and more mischievous than those of Alkibiadēs during this turning season of his career, and the disappointment of antecedent hopes at least equal. Yet while these faults and disappointment brought about the dismissal and disgrace of Alkibiadēs, they did not induce the Athenians to dismiss Nikias, though himself desiring it, nor even prevent them from sending him a second armament to be ruined along with the first. The contrast is most instructive, as demonstrating upon what points durable esteem in Athens turned; how long the most melancholy public incompetency could remain overlooked, when covered by piety, decorum, good intentions, and high station; how short-lived was the ascendancy of a man far superior in ability and energy, besides an equal station, when his moral qualities and antecedent life were such as to provoke fear and hatred in many, esteem from none. Yet, on the whole, Nikias, looking at him as a public servant, was far more destructive to his country than Alkibiadēs. The mischief done to Athens by the latter was done in the avowed service of her enemies.

On hearing the news of the defeat of Notium and the accumulated complaints against Alkibiadēs, the Athenians simply voted that he should be dismissed from his command; naming

¹ To meet the case of Nikias, it would be necessary to take the converse of the judgment of Thucydides respecting Alkibiadēs, cited in my last note, and to say: καὶ δημοσίᾳ κακίστα διαθίγντα τὰ τοῦ πολέμου, ἰδίᾳ ἑκάστου τὰ ἐπιτηδεύματα αὐτοῦ ἀγασθέντες, καὶ αὐτῷ ἐπιτρέψαντες, οὐδὲν μακροῦ ἐσθλὴν τὴν πόλιν.

The reader will of course understand that these last Greek words are not an actual citation, but a transformation of the actual words of Thucydides for the purpose of illustrating the contrast between Alkibiadēs and Nikias.

new generals to replace him. He was not brought to trial, nor do we know whether any such step was proposed. Yet his proceedings at Kymē, if they happened as we read them, richly deserved judicial animadversion; and the people, had they so dealt with him, would only have acted up to the estimable function ascribed to them by the oligarchical Phrynichus, "of serving as refuge to their dependent allies, and chastising the high-handed oppressions of the optimates against them."¹ In the perilous position of Athens, however, with reference to the foreign war, such a political trial would have been productive of much dissension and mischief. And Alkibiadēs avoided the question by not coming to Athens. As soon as he heard of his dismissal, he retired immediately from the army to his own fortified posts on the Chersonese.

The ten new generals named were Konon, Diomedon, Leon Periklēs, Erasinidēs, Aristokratēs, Archedestratus, Protomachus Thrasyllus, Aristogenēs. Of these, Konon was directed to proceed forthwith from Andros with the twenty ships which he had there, to receive the fleet from Alkibiadēs; while Phanosthenēs proceeded with four triremes to replace Konon at Andros.²

In his way thither, Phanosthenēs fell in with Dorieus the Rhodian and two Thurian triremes, which he captured, with every man aboard. The captives were sent to Athens, where all were placed in custody, in case of future exchange, except Dorieus himself. The latter had been condemned to death, and banished from his native city of Rhodes, together with his kindred, probably on the score of political disaffection, at the time when Rhodes was a member of the Athenian alliance. Having since then become a citizen of Thurii, he had served with distinction in the fleet of Mindarus, both at Miletus and the Hellespont. The Athenians now had so much compassion upon him that they released him at once and unconditionally, without even demanding a ransom or an equivalent. By what particular circumstance their compassion was determined, forming a pleasing

¹ Thucyd. viii, 48. τὸν δὲ δῆμον, σφῶν τε, of the allied dependencies, καταφυγὴν, καὶ ἐκείνων, i. e. of the high persons called ἀριστοκράται, or optimates.

² Xenoph. Hellen. i, 5, 18, Diodor. xiii, 74.

exception to the melancholy habits which pervaded Grecian warfare in both belligerents, we should never have learned from the meagre narrative of Xenophon. But we ascertain from other sources, that Dorieus, the son of Diagoras of Rhodes, was illustrious beyond all other Greeks for his victories in the pankration at the Olympic, Isthmian, and Nemean festivals; that he had gained the first prize at three Olympic festivals in succession, of which Olympiad 88, or 428 B.C. was the second, a distinction altogether without precedent, besides eight Isthmian and seven Nemean prizes; that his father Diagoras, his brothers, and his cousins, were all celebrated as successful athletes; lastly, that the family were illustrious from old date in their native island of Rhodes, and were even descended from the Messenian hero Aristomenes. When the Athenians saw before them as their prisoner a man doubtless of magnificent stature and presence, as we may conclude from his athletic success, and surrounded by such a halo of glory, impressive in the highest degree to Grecian imagination, the feelings and usages of war were at once overruled. Though Dorieus had been one of their most vehement enemies, they could not bear either to touch his person, or to exact from him any condition. Released by them on this occasion, he lived to be put to death, about thirteen years afterwards, by the Lacedaemonians.¹

When Konon reached Samos to take the command, he found the armament in a state of great despondency; not merely from the dishonorable affair of Notium, but also from disappointed hopes connected with Alkibiades, and from difficulties in procuring regular pay. So painfully was the last inconvenience felt, that the first measure of Konon was to contract the numbers of the armament from above one hundred triremes to seventy; and to reserve for the diminished fleet all the ablest seamen of the larger. With this fleet, he and his colleagues roved about the enemies' coasts to collect plunder and pay.²

Apparently about the same time that Konon superseded Alkibiades, that is, about December 407 B.C. or January 406 B.C., the year of Lysander's command expired, and Kallikratidas arrived

¹ Xenoph. Hellen. i, 5, 19; Pausan. vi, 7, 2.

² Xenoph. Hellen. i, 5, 20; compare i, 6, 16; Diodor. xiii, 77.

from Sparta to replace him. His arrival was received with undisguised dissatisfaction by the leading Lacedaemonians in the armament, by the chiefs in the Asiatic cities, and by Cyrus. Now was felt the full influence of those factious correspondences and intrigues which Lysander had established with all of them, for indirectly working out the perpetuity of his own command. While loud complaints were heard of the impolicy of Sparta, in annually changing her admiral, both Cyrus and the rest concurred with Lysander in throwing difficulties in the way of the new successor.

Kallikratidas, unfortunately only shown by the Fates,¹ and not suffered to continue in the Grecian world, was one of the noblest characters of his age. Besides perfect courage, energy, and incorruptibility, he was distinguished for two qualities, both of them very rare among eminent Greeks; entire straightforwardness of dealing, and a Pan-Hellenic patriotism alike comprehensive, exalted, and merciful. Lysander handed over to him nothing but an empty purse; having repaid to Cyrus all the money remaining in his possession, under pretence that it had been confided to himself personally.² Moreover, on delivering up the fleet to Kallikratidas at Ephesus, he made boast of delivering to him at the same time the mastery of the sea, through the victory recently gained at Notium. "Conduct the fleet from Ephesus along the coast of Samos, passing by the Athenian station (replied Kallikratidas), and give it up to me at Miletus: I shall then believe in your mastery of the sea." Lysander had nothing else

¹ Virgil, Æneid, vi, 870.

Ostendent terris hunc tantum fata, neque ulli

Esse sinent.

² How completely this repayment was a manoeuvre for the purpose of crippling his successor,—and not an act of genuine and conscientious obligation to Cyrus, as Mr. Mitford represents it,—we may see by the conduct of Lysander at the close of the war. He then carried away with him to Sparta all the residue of the tributes from Cyrus which he had in his possession, instead of giving them back to Cyrus (Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 3, 8). The obligation to give them back to Cyrus was greater at the end of the war than it was at the time when Kallikratidas came out, and when war was still going on; for the war was a joint business, which the Persians and the Spartans had sworn to prosecute by common efforts.

to say, except that he should give himself no farther trouble, now that his command had been transferred to another.

Kallikratidas soon found that the leading Lacedæmonians in the fleet, gained over to the interests of his predecessor, openly murmured at his arrival, and secretly obstructed all his measures; upon which he summoned them together, and said: "I, for my part, am quite content to remain at home; and if Lysander, or any one else, pretends to be a better admiral than I am, I have nothing to say against it. But sent here as I am by the authorities at Sparta to command the fleet, I have no choice except to execute their orders in the best way that I can. You now know how far my ambition reaches;¹ you know also the murmurs which are abroad against our common city (for her frequent change of admirals). Look to it, and give me your opinion. Shall I stay where I am, or shall I go home, and communicate what has happened here?"

This remonstrance, alike pointed and dignified, produced its full effect. Every one replied, that it was his duty to stay and undertake the command. The murmurs and cabals were from that moment discontinued.

His next embarrassments arose from the manœuvre of Lysander in paying back to Cyrus all the funds from whence the continuous pay of the army was derived. Of course this step was admirably calculated to make every one regret the alteration of command. Kallikratidas, who had been sent out without funds, in full reliance on the unexhausted supply from Sardis, now found himself compelled to go thither in person and solicit a renewal of the bounty. But Cyrus, eager to manifest in every way his partiality for the last admiral, deferred receiving him, first for two days, then for a farther interval, until the patience of Kallikratidas was wearied out, so that he left Sardis in disgust without an interview. So intolerable to his feelings was the humiliation of thus begging at the palace gates, that he bitterly deplored those miserable dissensions among the Greeks which constrained both parties to truckle to the foreigner for money; swearing that, if he survived the year's campaign, he would use

¹ Xenoph. Hellen. i, 6, 5. ἡμεῖς δὲ, πρὸς ᾧ ἐγὼ τε φιλοτιμονοῦμαι, καὶ ἡ πόλις ὅμων αἰτείεται. ἡ πόλις δὲ, ὡς ἔστιν ἐν τῇ πόλει, ἡ πόλις δὲ, ὡς ἔστιν ἐν τῇ πόλει, etc.

every possible effort to bring about an accommodation between Athens and Sparta.¹

In the mean time, he put forth all his energy to obtain money in some other way, and thus get the fleet to sea; knowing well, that the way to overcome the reluctance of Cyrus was, to show that he could do without him. Sailing first from Ephesus to Miletus, he despatched from thence a small squadron to Sparta, disclosing his unexpected poverty, and asking for speedy pecuniary aid. In the mean time he convoked an assembly of the Milesians, communicated to them the mission just sent to Sparta, and asked from them a temporary supply until this money should arrive. He reminded them that the necessity of this demand sprang altogether from the manœuvre of Lysander, in paying back the funds in his hands; that he had already in vain applied to Cyrus for farther money, meeting only with such insulting neglect as could no longer be endured: that they, the Milesians, dwelling amidst the Persians, and having already experienced the maximum of ill-usage at their hands, ought now to be foremost in the war, and to set an example of zeal to the other allies,² in order to get clear the sooner from dependence upon such imperious taskmasters. He promised that, when the remittance from Sparta and the hour of success should arrive, he would richly requite their forwardness. "Let us, with the aid of the gods, show these foreigners (he concluded) that we can punish our enemies without worshipping them."

The spectacle of this generous patriot, struggling against a degrading dependence on the foreigner, which was now becoming unhappily familiar to the leading Greeks of both sides, excites our warm sympathy and admiration. We may add, that his language to the Milesians, reminding them of the misery which they had endured from the Persians as a motive to exertion in the war, is full of instruction as to the new situation opened for the Asiatic Greeks since the breaking-up of the Athenian power. No such evils had they suffered while Athens was com-

¹ Xenoph. Hellen. i, 6, 7; Plutarch, Lysand. c. 6.

² Xenoph. Hellen. i, 6, 9. ἡμᾶς δὲ ἐγὼ ἀξιώ προθυμοτάτους εἶναι ἐς τὸν πόλεμον, διὰ τὸ οἰκοῦντας ἐν βαρβάροις πλείστα κακὰ ἤδη ὑπ' αὐτῶν πεπονθέναι.

petent to protect them, and while they were willing to receive protection from her, during the interval of more than fifty years between the complete organization of the confederacy of Delos and the disaster of Nikias before Syracuse.

The single-hearted energy of Kallikratidas imposed upon all who heard him, and even inspired so much alarm to those leading Milesians who were playing underhand the game of Lysander, that they were the first to propose a large grant of money towards the war, and to offer considerable sums from their own purses — an example probably soon followed by other allied cities. Some of the friends of Lysander tried to couple their offers with conditions; demanding a warrant for the destruction of their political enemies, and hoping thus to compromise the new admiral. But he strenuously refused all such guilty compliances.¹ He was soon able to collect at Milētus fifty fresh triremes in addition to those left by Lysander, making a fleet of one hundred and forty sail in all. The Chians having furnished him with an outfit of five drachmas for each seaman, equal to ten days' pay at the usual rate, he sailed with the whole fleet northward towards Lesbos. Of this numerous fleet, the greatest which had yet been assembled throughout the war, only ten triremes were Lacedæmonian;² while a considerable proportion, and among the best equipped, were Bœotian and Eubœan.³ In his voyage towards Lesbos, Kallikratidas seems to have made himself master of Phokæa and Kymê,⁴ perhaps with the greater facility in consequence of the recent ill-treatment of the Kymæans by Alkibiadēs. He then sailed to attack Methymna, on the northern coast of Lesbos; a town not only strongly attached to the Athenians, but also defended by an Athenian garrison. Though at first repulsed, he renewed his attacks until at length he took the town by storm. The property in it was all plundered by the soldiers, and the slaves collected and sold for their benefit. It was farther demanded by the allies, and expected pursuant to ordinary cus-

¹ Plutarch, Apophthegm. Laconic. p. 222, C, Xenoph. Hellen. i. 6, 12.

² Xenoph. Hellen. i. 6, 34.

³ Diodor. xiii, 99.

⁴ I infer this from the fact, that at the period of the battle of Arginusæ both these towns appear as adhering to the Peloponnesians; whereas during the command of Alkibiadēs they had been both Athenian (Xenoph. Hellen. i. 5, 11; i. 6, 33. Diodor. xiii, 73-99).

tom, that the Methymnæan and Athenian prisoners should be sold also. But Kallikratidas peremptorily refused compliance, and set them all free the next day; declaring that, so long as he was in command, not a single free Greek should be reduced to slavery if he could prevent it.¹

No one, who has not familiarized himself with the details of Grecian warfare, can feel the full grandeur and sublimity of this proceeding, which stands, so far as I know, unparalleled in Grecian history. It is not merely that the prisoners were spared and set free; as to this point, analogous cases may be found, though not very frequent. It is, that this particular act of generosity was performed in the name and for the recommendation of Pan-Hellenic brotherhood and Pan-Hellenic independence of the foreigner: a comprehensive principle, announced by Kallikratidas on previous occasions as well as on this, but now carried into practice under emphatic circumstances, and coupled with an explicit declaration of his resolution to abide by it in all future cases. It is, lastly, that the step was taken in resistance to formal requisition on the part of his allies, whom he had very imperfect means either of paying or controlling, and whom therefore it was so much the more hazardous for him to offend. There cannot be any doubt that these allies felt personally wronged and indignant at the loss, as well as confounded with the proposition of a rule of duty so new, as respected the relations of belligerents in Greece; against which too, let us add, their murmurs would not be without some foundation: "If *we* should come to be Konon's prisoners, he will not treat *us* in this manner." Reciprocity of dealing is absolutely essential to constant moral observance, either public or private; and doubtless Kallikratidas felt a well-grounded confidence, that two or three conspicuous examples would sensibly modify the future practice on both sides. But some one must begin by setting such examples, and the man who does begin —

¹ Xenoph. Hellen. i. 6, 14. Καὶ κελεύοντων τῶν ξυμμάχων ἀποδόσθαι καὶ τοὺς Μηθυμναίους, οἳ καὶ ἑαυτοῦ γε ἀρχόντος οὐδένα Ἑλλήνων ἐς τοῦκείνου δυνάμειν ἀνδραποδισθῆναι.

Compare a later declaration of Agesilaus, substantially to the same purpose, yet delivered under circumstances far less emphatic, in Xenophon, Agesilaus, vii. 6.

having a position which gives reasonable chance that others will follow — is the hero. An admiral like Lysander would not only sympathize heartily with the complaints of the allies, but also condemn the proceeding as a dereliction of duty to Sparta; even men better than Lysander would at first look coldly on it as a sort of Quixotism, in doubt whether the example would be copied: while the Spartan ephors, though probably tolerating it because they interfered very sparingly with their admirals afloat, would certainly have little sympathy with the feelings in which it originated. So much the rather is Kallikratidas to be admired, as bringing out with him not only a Pan-Hellenic patriotism,¹ rare either at Athens or Sparta, but also a force of individual character and conscience yet rarer, enabling him to brave unpopularity and break through routine, in the attempt to make that patriotism fruitful and operative in practice. In his career, so sadly and prematurely closed, there was at least this circumstance to be envied; that the capture of Methymna afforded him the opportunity, which he greedily seized, as if he had known that it would be the last, of putting in act and evidence the full aspirations of his magnanimous soul.

Kallikratidas sent word by the released prisoners to Konon, that he would presently put an end to his adulterous intercourse with the sea;² which he now considered as his wife, and lawfully appertaining to him, having one hundred and forty triremes against the seventy triremes of Konon. That admiral, in spite of his inferior numbers, had advanced near to Methymna, to try and relieve it; but finding the place already captured, had retired to the islands called Hekatonnesoi, off the continent bearing northeast from Lesbos. Thither he was followed by Kallikratidas, who, leaving Methymna at night, found him quitting his moorings at break of day, and immediately made all sail to try and cut him off from the southerly course towards Samos. But Konon,

¹ The sentiment of Kallikratidas deserved the designation of *Ἑλληνικὸν πολιτεῖμα*, far more than that of Nikias, to which Plutarch applies those words (Compar. of Nikias and Crassus, c. 2).

² Xenoph. Hellen. i. 6, 15. *Κόνωνι δὲ εἶπεν, ὅτι παύσει αὐτὸν μοιχῶντα τὴν θάλασσαν*, etc. He could hardly say this to Konon, in any other way than through the Athenian prisoners.

having diminished the number of his triremes from one hundred to seventy, had been able to preserve all the best rowers, so that in speed he outran Kallikratidas and entered first the harbor of Mitylênê. His pursuers, however, were close behind, and even got into the harbor along with him, before it could be closed and put in a state of defence. Constrained to fight a battle at its entrance, he was completely defeated; thirty of his ships were taken, though the crews escaped to land; and he preserved the remaining forty only by hauling them ashore under the wall.¹

The town of Mitylênê, originally founded on a small islet off Lesbos, had afterwards extended across a narrow strait to Lesbos itself. By this strait, whether bridged over or not we are not informed, the town was divided into two portions, and had two harbors, one opening northward towards the Hellespont, the other southward towards the promontory of Kanê on the mainland.² Both these harbors were undefended, and both now fell into the occupation of the Peloponnesian fleet; at least all the outer portion of each, near to the exit of the harbor, which Kallikrati-

¹ Xenoph. Hellen. i. 6, 17; Diodor. xiii. 78, 79.

Here, as on so many other occasions, it is impossible to blend these two narratives together. Diodorus conceives the facts in a manner quite different from Xenophon, and much less probable. He tells us that Konon practised a stratagem during his flight (the same in Polyænus, i. 482), whereby he was enabled to fight with and defeat the foremost Peloponnesian ships before the rest came up: also, that he got into the harbor in time to put it into a state of defence before Kallikratidas came up. Diodorus then gives a prolix description of the battle by which Kallikratidas forced his way in.

The narrative of Xenophon, which I have followed, plainly implies that Konon could have had no time to make preparations for defending the harbor.

² Thucyd. viii. 6. *τοὺς ἰσθμους ἐπ' ἀμφοτέροις τοῖς λιμέσιν ἐποιεῖντο* (Strabo, xiii. p. 617). Xenophon talks only of the harbor, as if it were one, and possibly, in very inaccurate language, it might be described as one harbor with two entrances. It seems to me, however, that Xenophon had no clear idea of the locality.

Strabo speaks of the northern harbor as defended by a mole, the southern harbor, as defended by triremes chained together. Such defences did not exist in the year 406 B.C. Probably, after the revolt of Mitylênê in 427 B.C., the Athenians had removed what defences might have been before provided for the harbor.

das kept under strict watch. He at the same time sent for the full forces of Methymna and for hoplites across from Chios, so as to block up Mitylênê by land as well as by sea. As soon as his success was announced, too, money for the fleet, together with separate presents for himself, which he declined receiving,¹ was immediately sent to him by Cyrus; so that his future operations became easy.

No preparations had been made at Mitylênê for a siege: no stock of provisions had been accumulated, and the crowd within the walls was so considerable, that Konon foresaw but too plainly the speedy exhaustion of his means. Nor could he expect succor from Athens, unless he could send intelligence thither of his condition; of which, as he had not been able to do so, the Athenians remained altogether ignorant. All his ingenuity was required to get a trireme safe out of the harbor, in the face of the enemy's guard. Putting afloat two triremes, the best sailers in his fleet, and picking out the best rowers for them out of all the rest, he caused these rowers to go aboard before daylight, concealing the epibatæ, or maritime soldiers, in the interior of the vessel, instead of the deck, which was their usual place, with a moderate stock of provisions, and keeping the vessel still covered with hides or sails, as was customary with vessels hauled ashore, to protect them against the sun.² These two triremes were thus

¹ Plutarch, Apophth. Laconic. p. 222, E.

² Xenoph. Hellen. i, 6, 19. Κατέκρυπτο (Konon) τῶν νεῶν τὰς ἀριστα πλεούσας δυο, ἐπλήρωσε πρὸ ἡμέρας, ἐξ ἀπασι τῶν νεῶν τοὺς ἀρίστους ἐρέτας ἐκλέξας, καὶ τοὺς ἐπιβάτας ἐς κοίτην ναὶν μεταβιβάσας, καὶ τὰ παραβύματα παραβάλων.

The meaning of παραβύματα is very uncertain. The commentators give little instruction; nor can we be sure that the same thing is meant as is expressed by παραβλήματα (*infra*, ii, 1, 22). We may be quite sure that the matters meant by παραβύματα were something which, if visible at all to a spectator without, would at least afford no indication that the trireme was intended for a speedy start; otherwise, they would defeat the whole contrivance of Konon, whose aim was secrecy. It was essential that this trireme, though afloat, should be made to look as much as possible like to the other triremes which still remained hauled ashore; in order that the Peloponnesians might not suspect any purpose of departure. I have endeavored in the text to give a meaning which answers this purpose, without forsaking the explanations given by the commentators: see Boeckh, Ueber des Attische. See Wesen, ch. x, p. 59.

made ready to depart at a moment's notice, without giving any indication to the enemy that they were so. They were fully manned before daybreak, the crews remained in their position all day, and after dark were taken out to repose. This went on for four days successively, no favorable opportunity having occurred to give the signal for attempting a start. At length, on the fifth day, about noon, when many of the Peloponnesian crews were ashore for their morning meal, and others were reposing, the moment seemed favorable, the signal was given, and both the triremes started at the same moment with their utmost speed; one to go out at the southern entrance towards the sea, between Lesbos and Chios, the other to depart by the northern entrance towards the Hellespont. Instantly, the alarm was given among the Peloponnesian fleet: the cables were cut, the men hastened aboard, and many triremes were put in motion to overtake the two runaways. That which departed southward, in spite of the most strenuous efforts, was caught towards evening and brought back with all her crew prisoners: that which went towards the Hellespont escaped, rounded the northern coast of Lesbos, and got safe with the news to Athens; sending intelligence also, seemingly, in her way, to the Athenian admiral Diomedon at Samos.

The latter immediately made all haste to the aid of Konon, with the small force which he had with him, no more than twelve triremes. The two harbors being both guarded by a superior force, he tried to get access to Mitylênê through the Euripus, a strait which opens on the southern coast of the island into an interior lake, or bay, approaching near to the town. But here he was attacked suddenly by Kallikratidas, and his squadron all captured except two triremes, his own and another; he himself had great difficulty in escaping.¹

¹ Xenoph. Hellen. i, 6, 22. Διομέδων δὲ βοηθῶν Κόνωνι πολιορκουμένῳ δώδεκα ναυσὶν ὤρμιστο ἐς τὸν εὐριπον τὸν Μιτυληναίων.

The reader should look at a map of Lesbos, to see what is meant by the Euripus of Mitylênê, and the other Euripus of the neighboring town of Pyrrha.

Diodorus (xiii, 79) confounds the Euripus of Mitylênê with the harbor of Mitylênê, with which it is quite unconnected. Schneider and Plehn seem to make the same confusion (see Plehn, Lesbiaca, p. 15).

Athens was all in consternation at the news of the defeat of Konon and the blockade of Mitylênê. The whole strength and energy of the city was put forth to relieve him, by an effort greater than any which had been made throughout the whole war. We read with surprise that within the short space of thirty days, a fleet of no less than one hundred and ten triremes was fitted out and sent from Peiræus. Every man of age and strength to serve, without distinction, was taken to form a good crew; not only freemen, but slaves, to whom manumission was promised as reward: many also of the horsemen, or knights,¹ and citizens of highest rank, went aboard as epibatai, hanging up their bridles like Kimon before the battle of Salamis. The levy was in fact as democratical and as equalizing as it had been on that memorable occasion. The fleet proceeded straight to Samos, whither orders had doubtless been sent to get together all the triremes which the allies could furnish as reinforcements, as well as all the scattered Athenian. By this means, forty additional triremes, ten of them Samian, were assembled, and the whole fleet, one hundred and fifty sail, went from Samos to the little islands called Arginusæ, close on the mainland, opposite to Malea, the southeastern cape of Lesbos.

Kallikratidas, apprized of the approach of the new fleet while it was yet at Samos, withdrew the greater portion of his force from Mitylênê, leaving fifty triremes under Eteonikus to continue the blockade. Less than fifty probably would not have been sufficient, inasmuch as two harbors were to be watched; but he was thus reduced to meet the Athenian fleet with inferior numbers, one hundred and twenty triremes against one hundred and fifty. His fleet was off Cape Malea, where the crews took their suppers, on the same evening as the Athenians supped at the opposite islands of Arginusæ. It was his project to sail across the intermediate channel in the night, and attack them in the morning before they were prepared; but violent wind and rain forced him to defer all movement till daylight. On the ensuing morning, both parties prepared for the greatest naval encounter which had taken place throughout the whole war. Kallikratidas was advised by his pilot, the Megarian Hermon, to retire for the present without fighting, inasmuch as the Athenian

¹ Xenoph. Hellen. i, 6. 24-25; Diodor. xiii. 97.

fleet had the advantage of thirty triremes over him in number. He replied that flight was disgraceful, and that Sparta would be no worse off, even if he should perish.¹ The answer was one congenial to his chivalrous nature; and we may well conceive, that, having for the last two or three months been lord and master of the sea, he recollected his own haughty message to Konon, and thought it dishonor to incur or deserve, by retiring, the like taunt upon himself. We may remark too that the disparity of numbers, though serious, was by no means such as to render the contest hopeless, or to serve as a legitimate ground for retreat, to one who prided himself on a full measure of Spartan courage.

The Athenian fleet was so marshalled, that its great strength was placed in the two wings; in each of which there were sixty Athenian ships, divided into four equal divisions, each division commanded by a general. Of the four squadrons of fifteen ships each, two were placed in front, two to support them in the rear. Aristokratês and Diomedon commanded the two front squadrons of the left division, Periklês and Erasimidês the two squadrons in the rear: on the right division, Protomachus and Thrasyllus commanded the two in front, Lysias and Aristogenês the two in the rear. The centre, wherein were the Samians and other allies, was left weak, and all in single line: it appears to have been exactly in front of one of the isles of Arginusæ, while the two other divisions were to the right and left of that isle. We read with some surprise that the whole Lacedæmonian fleet was arranged by single ships, because it sailed better and manœuvred better than the Athenians: who formed their right and left divisions in deep order, for the express purpose of hindering the enemy from performing the nautical manœuvres of the *diekplus* and the *periplus*.² It would seem that the Athenian centre, hav-

¹ Xenoph. Hellen. i, 6. 32; Diodor. xiii. 97-98: the latter reports terrific omens beforehand for the generals.

The answer has been a memorable one, more than once adverted to, Plutarch. Laconic. Apophthegm. p. 832. Cicero, De Off. i. 24.

² Xenoph. Hellen. i, 6. 31. Οὕτω δ' ἐταχθήσαν (οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι) ἵνα μὴ δαίεσθον ἐξόχῃ χειρὶ καὶ ἐπλεον. Αἱ δὲ τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων ἀντιτεταγμέναι ἦσαν ἅπασαι ἐπὶ μιας, ὥς πρὸς δαίεσθον καὶ περίπλεον παρεσκευασμέναι, δὴ τὰ βέλτερον πλεον.

Contrast this with Thucyd. ii. 84-89 (the speech of Phormion), iv, 12: vii, 36.

ing the land immediately in its rear, was supposed to be better protected against an enemy "sailing through the line out to the rear, and sailing round about," than the other divisions, which were in the open waters; for which reason it was left weak, with the ships in single line. But the fact which strikes us the most is, that, if we turn back to the beginning of the war, we shall find that this diekplus and periplus were the special manœuvres of the Athenian navy, and continued to be so even down to the siege of Syracuse; the Lacedæmonians being at first absolutely unable to perform them at all, and continuing for a long time to perform them far less skilfully than the Athenians. Now, the comparative value of both parties is reversed: the superiority of nautical skill has passed to the Peloponnesians and their allies; the precautions whereby that superiority is neutralized or evaded, are forced as a necessity on the Athenians. How astonished would the Athenian admiral Phormion have been, if he could have witnessed the fleets and the order of battle at Arginusæ!

Kallikratidas himself, with the ten Lacedæmonian ships, was on the right of his fleet: on the left were the Boeotians and Eubœans, under the Boeotian admiral Thrasonidas. The battle was long and obstinately contested, first by the two fleets in their original order; afterwards, when all order was broken, by scattered ships mingled together and contending in individual combat. At length the brave Kallikratidas perished. His ship was in the act of driving against the ship of an enemy, and he himself probably, like Brasidas at Pylos, had planted himself on the fore-castle, to be the first in boarding the enemy, or in preventing the enemy from boarding him, when the shock arising from impact threw him off his footing, so that he fell overboard and was drowned.² In spite of the discouragement springing from his death, the ten Lacedæmonian triremes displayed a courage worthy of his, and nine of them were destroyed or disa-

¹ See Thucyd. iv. 11.

² Xenoph. Hellen. i. 6. 33. ἔπειτα δὲ Καλλικράτιδας τὴν ἐμπροστίας τῆς ἐκείνου ἀποτίσαντες ἐν τῇ θαλάσῃ ἤσαντο, &c.

The details given by Diodorus about this battle and the exploits of Kallikratidas are at once prolix and unworthy of confidence. See an excellent note of Dr. Arnold on Thucyd. iv. 12, respecting the description given by Diodorus of the conduct of Brasidas at Pylos.

bled. At length the Athenians were victorious in all parts: the Peloponnesian fleet gave way, and their flight became general, partly to Chios, partly to Phokæa. More than sixty of their ships were destroyed over and above the nine Lacedæmonian, seventy-seven in all; making a total loss of above the half of the entire fleet. The loss of the Athenians was also severe, amounting to twenty-five triremes. They returned to Arginusæ after the battle.¹

The victory of Arginusæ afforded the most striking proof how much the democratical energy of Athens could yet accomplish, in spite of so many years of exhausting war. But far better would it have been, if her energy on this occasion had been less efficacious and successful. The defeat of the Peloponnesian fleet, and the death of their admirable leader, — we must take the second as inseparable from the first, since Kallikratidas was not the man to survive a defeat, — were signal misfortunes to the whole Grecian world; and in an especial manner, misfortunes to Athens herself. If Kallikratidas had gained the victory and survived it, he would certainly have been the man to close the Peloponnesian war; for Mitylênê must immediately have surrendered, and Konon, with all the Athenian fleet there blocked up, must have become his prisoners; which circumstance, coming at the back of a defeat, would have rendered Athens disposed to acquiesce in any tolerable terms of peace. Now to have the terms dictated at a moment when her power was not wholly prostrate, by a man like Kallikratidas, free from corrupt personal ambition and of a generous Pan-Hellenic patriotism, would have been the best fate which at this moment could befall her; while to the Grecian world generally, it would have been an unspeakable benefit, that, in the reorganization which it was sure to undergo at the close of the war, the ascendant individual of the moment should be penetrated with devotion to the great ideas of Hellenic brotherhood at home, and Hellenic independence against the foreigner. The near prospect of such a benefit was opened by that rare chance which threw Kallikratidas into the command, enabled him not only to publish his lofty profession of faith but to show that he was prepared to act upon it, and for a time float-

Xenoph. Hellen. i. 6. 34; Diodor. xiii. 99, 100.

ed him on towards complete success. Nor were the envious gods ever more envious, than when they frustrated, by the disaster of Arginusæ, the consummation which they had thus seemed to promise. The pertinence of these remarks will be better understood in the next chapter, when I come to recount the actual winding-up of the Peloponnesian war under the auspices of the worthless, but able, Lysander. It was into his hands that the command was retransferred, a transfer almost from the best of Greeks to the worst. We shall then see how much the sufferings of the Grecian world, and of Athens especially, were aggravated by his individual temper and tendencies, and we shall then feel by contrast, how much would have been gained if the commander armed with such great power of dictation had been a Pan-Hellenic patriot. To have the sentiment of that patriotism enforced, at a moment of break-up and rearrangement throughout Greece, by the victorious leader of the day, with single-hearted honesty and resolution, would have been a stimulus to all the better feelings of the Grecian mind, such as no other combination of circumstances could have furnished. The defeat and death of Kallikratidas was thus even more deplorable as a loss to Athens and Greece, than to Sparta herself. To his lofty character and patriotism, even in so short a career, we vainly seek a parallel.

The news of the defeat was speedily conveyed to Eteonikus at Mitylênê by the admiral's signal-boat. As soon as he heard it, he desired the crew of the signal-boat to say nothing to any one, but to go again out of the harbor, and then return with wreaths and shouts of triumph, crying out that Kallikratidas had gained the victory and had destroyed or captured all the Athenian ships. All suspicion of the reality was thus kept from Konon and the besieged, while Eteonikus himself, affecting to believe the news, offered the sacrifice of thanksgiving; but gave orders to all the triremes to take their meal and depart afterwards without losing a moment, directing the masters of the trading-ships also to put their property silently aboard, and get off at the same time. And thus, with little or no delay, and without the least obstruction from Konon, all these ships, triremes and merchantmen, sailed out of the harbor and were carried off in safety to Chios, the wind being fair. Eteonikus at the same time withdrew his land-forces

to Methymna, burning his camp. Konon, thus finding himself unexpectedly at liberty, put to sea with his ships when the wind had become calmer, and joined the main Athenian fleet, which he found already on its way from Arginusæ to Mitylênê. The latter presently came to Mitylênê, and from thence passed over to make an attack on Chios; which attack proving unsuccessful, they went forward to their ordinary station at Samos.

The news of the victory at Arginusæ diffused joy and triumph at Athens. All the slaves who had served in the armament were manumitted and promoted, according to promise, to the rights of Plataeans at Athens, a qualified species of citizenship. Yet the joy was poisoned by another incident, which became known at the same time, raising sentiments of a totally opposite character, and ending in one of the most gloomy and disgraceful proceedings in all Athenian history.

Not only the bodies of the slain warriors floating about on the water had been picked up for burial, but the wrecks had not been visited to preserve those who were yet living. The first of these two points, even alone, would have sufficed to excite a painful sentiment of wounded piety at Athens. But the second point, here an essential part of the same omission, inflamed that sentiment into shame, grief, and indignation of the sharpest character.

In the descriptions of this event, Diodorus and many other writers take notice of the first point, either exclusively,¹ or at

¹ Xenoph. Hellen. i. 6, 38, Diodor. xiii. 100.

² See the narrative of Diodorus (xiii. 100, 101, 102), where nothing is mentioned except about picking up the floating *dead* bodies; about the crime, and offence in the eyes of the people, of omitting to secure burial to so many *dead* bodies. He does not seem to have fancied that there were any *living* bodies, or that it was a question between life and death to so many of the crews. Whereas, if we follow the narrative of Xenophon (Hellen. i. 7), we shall see that the question is put throughout about *picking up the living men, the shipwrecked men, or the men belonging to, and still living aboard of, the broken ships*, ἀνελίσθαι τοὺς ναυαγοὺς, τοὺς δυστυχούντας, τοὺς καταδύντας (Hellen. ii. 3, 32) — compare, especially, ii. 3, 35, πλεῖν ἐπὶ τὰς καταδεδυμένας ναῖς καὶ τοὺς ἐπ' αὐτῶν ἀνθρώπους (i. 6, 36). The word *ναυαγός* does not mean a dead body, but a *living man* who has suffered shipwreck. *Ναυαγός* ἦκω ξένος, ἀσέβητον γένος (says Menelaus, Eurip. Helen. 457), also 407, Καὶ νῦν ῥαλας ναυαγός, ἀπολέσας φίλον. Ἐξέπεσον ἐς γλῶττιν, etc.; again, 538. It corresponds with the Latin *naufragus*: "mersa rate naufragus assem. Dum

least with slight reference to the second; which latter, nevertheless, stands as far the gravest in the estimate of every impartial critic, and was also the most violent in its effect upon Athenian feelings. Twenty-five Athenian triremes had been ruined, along with most of their crews; that is, lay heeled over or disabled, with their oars destroyed, no masts, nor any means of moving; mere hulls, partially broken by the impact of an enemy's ship, and gradually filling and sinking. The original crew of each was two hundred men. The field of battle, if we may use that word for a space of sea, was strewn with these wrecks; the men remaining on board being helpless and unable to get away, for the ancient trireme carried no boat, nor any aids for escape. And there were, moreover, floating about, men who had fallen overboard, or were trying to save their lives by means of acci-

rogat, et pictâ se tempestate tuetur," (Juvénal, xiv, 301.) Thucydides does not use the word *ναυαγός*, but speaks of *τοῖς νεκροῖς καὶ τὰ ναυαγία*, meaning by the latter word the damaged ships, with every person and thing on board.

It is remarkable that Schneider and most other commentators on Xenophon. Sturz in his *Lexicon Xenophonticum* (v. *ἀναμίσαι*), Stallbaum ad Platon. *Apol. Socrat.* c. 20, p. 32, Sievers, *Comment. ad Xenoph. Hellen.* p. 31, Forchhammer, *Die Athener und Sokrates*, pp. 30-31, Berlin, 1837, and others, all treat this event as if it were nothing but a question of picking up dead bodies for sepulture. This is a complete misinterpretation of Xenophon; not merely because the word *ναυαγός*, which he uses four several times, means a *living person*, but because there are two other passages, which leave absolutely no doubt about the matter: Παρήλθε δὲ τις ἐς τὴν ἐκκλησίαν, φάσκων ἐπὶ τείχεσσι ἀλφειῶν σωθῆναι· ἐπιστέλλειν δ' αὐτῷ τοὺς ἀπολλυμένους, εὐν σῶθ' ἢ ἀπαγγεῖλαι τῷ δήμῳ, ὅτι οἱ στρατῆγοι οὐκ ἀνείλοντο τοὺς ἀρίστους ἱπὲρ τῆς πατρίδος γενόμενους. Again (ii, 3, 35), Theramenes, when vindicating himself before the oligarchy of Thirty, two years afterwards, for his conduct in accusing the generals, says that the generals brought their own destruction upon themselves by accusing him first, and by saying that the men on the disabled ships might have been saved with proper diligence: φάσκοντες γὰρ (the generals) οἶον τε εἶναι σῶσαι τοὺς ἄνδρας, προέμενοι αὐτοὺς ἀπολέσθαι, ἀποπλέοντες ὤχοντο. These passages place the point beyond dispute, that the generals were accused of having neglected to save the lives of men on the point of being drowned, and who by their neglect afterwards were drowned, not of having neglected to pick up dead bodies for sepulture. The misinterpretation of the commentators is here of the gravest import. It alters completely the criticisms on the proceedings at Athens.

dental spars or empty casks. It was one of the privileges of a naval victory, that the party who gained it could sail over the field of battle, and thus assist their own helpless or wounded comrades aboard the disabled ships,¹ taking captive, or sometimes killing, the corresponding persons belonging to the enemy. According even to the speech made in the Athenian public assembly afterwards, by Euryptolemus, the defender of the accused generals, there were twelve triremes with their crews on board lying in the condition just described. This is an admission by the defence, and therefore the minimum of the reality: there cannot possibly have been fewer, but there were probably several more, out of the whole twenty-five stated by Xenophon.² No step being taken to preserve them, the surviving portion, wounded as well

¹ See Thucyd. i. 50, 51.

² Xenoph. *Hellen.* i. 6, 34. 'Απόλωντο δὲ τῶν μὲν Ἀθηναίων νῆες πέντε καὶ εἴκοσι ἀνδράσιν, ἑκτὸς ὅλγων τῶν πρὸς τὴν γῆν προσεχθέντων.

Schneider in his note, and Mr. Mitford in his *History*, express surprise at the discrepancy between the number *twelve*, which appears in the speech of Euryptolemus, and the number *twenty-five*, given by Xenophon.

But, first, we are not to suppose Xenophon to guarantee those assertions, as to matters of fact which he gives, as coming from Euryptolemus; who as an advocate, speaking in the assembly, might take great liberties with the truth.

Next, Xenophon speaks of the total number of ships ruined or disabled in the action: Euryptolemus speaks of the total number of wrecks afloat and capable of being visited: so as to rescue the sufferers, *at the subsequent moment*, when the generals directed the squadron under Theramenes to go out for the rescue. It is to be remembered that the generals went back to Arginusæ from the battle, and there determined, according to their own statement, to send out from thence a squadron for visiting the wrecks. A certain interval of time must therefore have elapsed between the close of the action and the order given to Theramenes. During that interval, undoubtedly, *some* of the disabled ships went down, or came to pieces: if we are to believe Euryptolemus, thirteen out of the twenty-five must have thus disappeared, so that their crews were already drowned, and no more than twelve remained floating for Theramenes to visit, even had he been ever so active and ever so much favored by weather.

I distrust the statement of Euryptolemus, and believe that he most probably underrated the number. But assuming him to be correct, this will only show how much the generals were to blame, as we shall hereafter remark, for not having seen to the visitation of the wrecks *before* they went back to their moorings at Arginusæ.

as unwounded, of these crews, were left to be gradually drowned as each disabled ship went down. If any of them escaped, it was by unusual goodness of swimming, by finding some fortunate plank or spar, at any rate by the disgrace of throwing away their arms, and by some method such as no wounded man would be competent to employ.

The first letter from the generals which communicated the victory, made known at the same time the loss sustained in obtaining it. It announced, doubtless, the fact which we read in Xenophon, that twenty-five Athenian triremes had been lost, with nearly all their crews; specifying, we may be sure, the name of each trireme which had so perished; for each trireme in the Athenian navy, like modern ships, had its own name.¹ It mentioned, at the same time, that no step whatever had been taken by the victorious survivors to save their wounded and drowning countrymen on board the sinking ships. A storm had arisen, such was the reason assigned, so violent as to render all such intervention totally impracticable.²

It is so much the custom, in dealing with Grecian history, to presume the Athenian people to be a set of children or madmen, whose feelings it is not worth while to try and account for, that I have been obliged to state these circumstances somewhat at length, in order to show that the mixed sentiment excited at Athens by the news of the battle of Arginusæ was perfectly natural and justifiable. Along with joy for the victory, there was blended horror and remorse at the fact that so many of the brave men who had helped to gain it had been left to perish unheeded. The friends and relatives of the crews of these lost triremes were

¹ Boeckh, in his instructive volume, *Urkunden über das Attische Seewesen* (vii. p. 84, *seq.*), gives, from inscriptions, a long list of the names of Athenian triremes, between B.C. 356 and 322. All the names are feminine: some curious. We have a long list also of the Athenian ship-builders; since the name of the builder is commonly stated in the inscription along with that of the ship: Εὐχαρίς, Ἀλεξίμαχον ἔργον; Σειρήν, Ἀριστοκράτους ἔργον; Ἐλευθερία, Ἀρχενίου ἔργον; Ἐπιδηξίς, Δυσιστράτου ἔργον; Δημοκρατία, Χαίρεστράτου ἔργον, etc.

² Xenoph. *Hellen.* i. 7, 4. Ὅτι μὲν γὰρ οὐδενὸς ἄλλου κατήντητο (οἱ στρατηγοὶ) ἐπιστολὴν ἐπεδείκνυε (Theramenes) μαρτυροῦν· οὐδ' ἐπύμασαν οἱ στρατηγοὶ ἐς τὴν βουλὴν καὶ ἐς τὸν δῆμον, ἄλλο οὐδεν αἱ κειμένοι ἢ τὰς χεῖρας.

of course foremost in the expression of such indignant emotion. The narrative of Xenophon, meagre and confused as well as unfair, presents this emotion as if it were something causeless, factitious, pumped up out of the standing irascibility of the multitude by the artifices of Theramenes, Kallixenus, and a few others. But whatever may have been done by these individuals to aggravate the public excitement, or pervert it to bad purposes, assuredly the excitement itself was spontaneous, inevitable, and amply justified. The very thought that so many of the brave partners in the victory had been left to drown miserably on the sinking hulls, without any effort on the part of their generals and comrades near to rescue them, was enough to stir up all the sensibilities, public as well as private, of the most passive nature, even in citizens who were not related to the deceased, much more in those who were so. To expect that the Athenians would be so absorbed in the delight of the victory, and in gratitude to the generals who had commanded, as to overlook such a desertion of perishing warriors, and such an omission of sympathetic duty, is, in my judgment, altogether preposterous; and would, if it were true, only establish one more vice in the Athenian people, besides those which they really had, and the many more with which they have been unjustly branded.

The generals, in their public letter, accounted for their omission by saying that the violence of the storm was too great to allow them to move. First, was this true as matter of fact? Next, had there been time to discharge the duty, or at the least to try and discharge it, before the storm came on to be so intolerable? These points required examination. The generals, while honored with a vote of thanks for the victory, were superseded, and directed to come home; all except Konon, who having been blocked up at Mitylène, was not concerned in the question. Two new colleagues, Philoklés and Adeimantus, were named to go out and join him.¹ The generals probably received the notice of their re-

¹ Xenoph. *Hellen.* i. 7, 1; Diodor. xiii. 101: ἐπεὶ μὲν τῇ νίκῃ τοὺς στρατηγοὺς ἐπύμασαν, ἐπὶ δὲ τῷ περιμένει ἀταφούς τοὺς ὑπὲρ τῆς ἡγεμονίας τετελευτηκότας χαλεπῶς διετίθησαν.

I have before remarked that Diodorus makes the mistake of talking about nothing but *dead bodies*, in place of the living *navarroi* spoken of by Xenophon.

call at Samos, and came home in consequence; reaching Athens seemingly about the end of September or beginning of October, the battle of Arginusæ having been fought in August 406 B.C. Two of the generals, however, Protomachus and Aristogenês, declined to come: warned of the displeasure of the people, and not confiding in their own case to meet it, they preferred to pay the price of voluntary exile. The other six, Periklês, Lysias, Diomedon, Erasinidês, Aristokratês, and Thrasyllus, — Archestratus, one of the original ten, having died at Mitylênê,¹ — came without their two colleagues; an unpleasant augury for the result.

On their first arrival, Archedêmus, at that time an acceptable popular orator, and exercising some magistracy or high office which we cannot distinctly make out,² imposed upon Erasinidês a fine to that limited amount which was within the competence of magistrates without the sanction of the dikastery, and accused him besides before the dikastery; partly for general misconduct in his command, partly on the specific charge of having purloined some public money on its way from the Hellespont. Erasinidês was found guilty, and condemned to be imprisoned, either until the money was made good, or perhaps until farther examination could take place into the other alleged misdeeds.

This trial of Erasinidês took place before the generals were

¹ Lysias, Orat. xxi ('Απολογία Δωροδοκίας), sect. vii.

² Xenoph. Hellen. i, 7, 2. Archedêmus is described as τῆς Δεκελίας ἐπιμολογούμενος. What is meant by these words, none of the commentators can explain in a satisfactory manner. The text must be corrupt. Some conjecture like that of Dobree seems plausible; some word like τῆς δεκάτης or τῆς δεκαετίας, having reference to the levying of the tithe in the Hellespont; which would furnish reasonable ground for the proceeding of Archedêmus against Erasinidês.

The office held by Archedêmus, whatever it was, must have been sufficiently exalted to confer upon him the power of imposing the fine of limited amount called ἐπιβολή.

I hesitate to identify this Archedêmus with the person of that name mentioned in the Memorabilia of Xenophon, ii, 9. There seems no similarity at all in the points of character noticed.

The popular orator Archedêmus was derided by Eupolis and Aristophanês as having sore eyes, and as having got his citizenship without proper title to it (see Aristophan. Ran. 419-508, with the Scholia). He is also charged, in a line of an oration of Lysias, with having embezzled the public money (Lysias cont. Alkibiad. sect. 25, Orat. xiv).

summoned before the senate to give their formal exposition respecting the recent battle, and the subsequent neglect of the drowning men. And it might almost seem as if Archedêmus wished to impute to Erasinidês exclusively, apart from the other generals, the blame of that neglect; a distinction, as will hereafter appear, not wholly unfounded. If, however, any such design was entertained, it did not succeed. When the generals went to explain their case before the senate, the decision of that body was decidedly unfavorable to all of them, though we have no particulars of the debate which passed. On the proposition of the senator Timokratês,¹ a resolution was passed that the other five generals present should be placed in custody, as well as Erasinidês, and thus handed over to the public assembly for consideration of the case.²

The public assembly was accordingly held, and the generals were brought before it. We are here told who it was that appeared as their principal accuser, along with several others; though unfortunately we are left to guess what were the topics on which they insisted. Theramenês was the man who denounced them most vehemently, as guilty of leaving the crews of the disabled triremes to be drowned, and of neglecting all efforts to rescue them. He appealed to their own public letter to the people, officially communicating the victory; in which letter they made no mention of having appointed any one to undertake the duty, nor of having any one to blame for not performing it. The omission, therefore, was wholly their own: they might have performed it, and ought to be punished for so cruel a breach of duty.

The generals could not have a more formidable enemy than Theramenês. We have had occasion to follow him, during the revolution of the Four Hundred, as a long-sighted as well as tortuous politician: he had since been in high military command, a partaker in victory with Alkibiadês at Kyzikus and elsewhere; and he had served as trierarch in the victory of Arginusæ itself. His authority therefore was naturally high, and told for much.

¹ Xenoph. Hellen. i, 7, 3. Τιμοκράτους δ' εἰπόντος, ὅτι καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους χρὴ δεθέντας ἐς τὸν δῆμον παραδοθῆναι, ἡ βουλή τόσσον.

² Xenoph. Hellen. i, 7, 4.

when he denied the justification which the generals had set up founded on the severity of the storm. According to him, they might have picked up the drowning men, and ought to have done so: either they might have done so before the storm came on, or there never was any storm of sufficient gravity to prevent them: upon their heads lay the responsibility of omission.¹ Xenophon, in his very meagre narrative, does not tell us, in express words, that Theramenes contradicted the generals as to the storm. But that he did so contradict them, point blank, is implied distinctly in that which Xenophon alleges him to have said. It seems also that Thrasybulus — another trierarch at Arginusæ, and a man not only of equal consequence, but of far more estimable character — concurred with Theramenes in this same accusation of the generals,² though not standing forward so prominently in the case. He too therefore must have denied the reality of the storm; or at least, the fact of its being so instant after the battle, or so terrible as to forbid all effort for the relief of these drowning seamen.

The case of the generals, as it stood before the Athenian public, was completely altered when men like Theramenes and Thrasybulus stood forward as their accusers. Doubtless what was said by these two had been said by others before, in the senate and elsewhere; but it was now publicly advanced by men of influence, as well as perfectly cognizant of the fact. And we are thus enabled to gather indirectly, what the narrative of Xenophon, studiously keeping back the case against the generals,

¹ Xenoph. Hellen. i. 7, 4. Μὴτα δὲ ταῦτα, ἰσχυροὶ ἄνθρωποι, ὅτι τῶν στρατηγῶν κατηγοροῦν ἄλλοι τε καὶ Θερραμένης μάλιστα, δίκαιους εἶναι λέγων λόγον ἔποισκειν, διότι οὐκ ἐνείλουντο τοὺς ναυαγούς. Ὅτι μὲν γὰρ οὐδένος ἄλλου καθήκοντο, ἐπιστολὴν ἐπέδεικνυε μνηστέρων· καὶ ἐπεισαν αἱ στρατηγοὶ ἐκ τῆς πολλῆς καὶ ἐς τὸν δῆμον, ἄλλο οὐδὲν αἰτιώμενοι τῶν χειμῶνα.

² That Thrasybulus concurred with Theramenes in accusing the generals, is intimated in the reply which Xenophon represents the generals to have made (i. 7, 6): Καὶ οἳ γὰρ καὶ κατηγοροῦνται καὶ οὐκ ἔχουσιν, φερόμενά φασκεῖν αὐτοὺς αἰτιῶντας εἶναι, ἀλλὰ τὸ μέγεθος τοῦ χειμῶνος εἶναι τὸ καθύπερθε τὴν ἀναισθησίαν.

The plural κατηγοροῦσιν shows that Thrasybulus as well as Theramenes stood forward to accuse the generals, though the latter was the most prominent and violent.

does not directly bring forward, that though the generals affirmed the storm, there were others present who denied it, thus putting in controversy the matter of fact which formed their solitary justification. Moreover, we come — in following the answer made by the generals in the public assembly to Theramenes and Thrasybulus — to a new point in the case, which Xenophon lets out as it were indirectly, in that confused manner which pervades his whole narrative of the transaction. It is, however, a new point of extreme moment. The generals replied that if any one was to blame for not having picked up the drowning men, it was Theramenes and Thrasybulus themselves; for it was they two to whom, together with various other trierarchs and with forty-eight triremes, the generals had expressly confided the performance of this duty; it was they two who were responsible for its omission, not the generals. Nevertheless they, the generals, made no charge against Theramenes and Thrasybulus, well knowing that the storm had rendered the performance of the duty absolutely impossible, and that it was therefore a complete justification for one as well as for the other. They, the generals, at least could do no more than direct competent men like these two trierarchs to perform the task, and assign to them an adequate squadron for the purpose; while they themselves with the main fleet went to attack Eteonikus, and relieve Mitylênê. Diomedon, one of their number, had wished after the battle to employ all the ships in the fleet for the preservation of the drowning men, without thinking of anything else until that was done. Erasinidês, on the contrary, wished that all the fleet should move across at once against Mitylênê; Thrasyllus said that they had ships enough to do both at once. Accordingly, it was agreed that each general should set apart three ships from his division, to make a squadron of forty-eight ships under Thrasybulus and Theramenes. In making these statements, the generals produced pilots and others, men actually in the battle as witnesses in general confirmation.

Here, then, in this debate before the assembly, were two new and important points publicly raised. First, Theramenes and Thrasybulus denounced the generals as guilty of the death of these neglected men; next, the generals affirmed that they had delegated the duty to Theramenes and Thrasybulus themselves.

If this latter were really true, how came the generals, in their official despatch first sent home, to say nothing about it? Euryp- tolemus, an advocate of the generals, speaking in a subsequent stage of the proceedings, though we can hardly doubt that the same topics were also urged in this very assembly, while blaming the generals for such omission, ascribed it to an ill-placed good- nature on their part, and reluctance to bring Theramenês and Thrasybulus under the displeasure of the people. Most of the generals, he said, were disposed to mention the fact in their official despatch, but were dissuaded from doing so by Periklês and Dio- medon; an unhappy dissuasion, in his judgment, which The- ramenês and Thrasybulus had ungratefully requited by turning round and accusing them all.¹

This remarkable statement of Euryp- tolemus, as to the inten- tion of the generals in wording the official despatch, brings us to a closer consideration of what really passed between them on the one side, and Theramenês and Thrasybulus on the other; which is difficult to make out clearly, but which Diodorus repre- sents in a manner completely different from Xenophon. Diodo- rus states that the generals were prevented partly by the storm, partly by the fatigue and reluctance and alarm of their own sea- men, from taking any steps to pick up, what he calls, the dead bodies for burial; that they suspected Theramenês and Thrasy- bulus, who went to Athens before them, of intending to accuse them before the people, and that for this reason they sent home intimation to the people that they had given special orders to these two trierarchs to perform the duty. When these letters were read in the public assembly, Diodorus says, the Athenians

¹ Xenoph. Hellen. i, 7, 17. Euryp- tolemus says: Κατηγοροῦμεν οὖν αὐτῶν, ὅτι ἐπεισαν τοὺς ξυναρχόντας, βουλομένους πεμπέν γραμμάτα τῇ τε βουλῇ καὶ ὑμῖν, ὅτι ἐπετασαν τῷ Θηραμένει καὶ Θρασυβούλῳ τετραρακοντα καὶ ἑπτα τριήρεσιν ἀνελίσσθαι τοὺς ναυαγούς, οἱ δὲ οὐκ ἀνείλοντο. Εἴτα νῦν τὴν αἰτίαν κοινὴν ἔχουσιν, ἐκείνων ἰδίᾳ ἁμαρτιῶν· καὶ ἀντὶ τῆς τότε φιλαν- θρωπίας, νῦν ὑπ' ἐκείνων τε καὶ τινῶν ἄλλων ἐπιβουλεύοντες κινδύνους ἀπολέσθαι.

We must here construe ἐπεισαν as equivalent to ἀνέπεισαν or μετέπεισαν, placing a comma after ξυναρχόντας. This is unusual, but not inadmissible. To persuade a man to alter his opinion or his conduct, might be expressed by πείθειν, though it would more properly be expressed by ἀναπειθεῖν; see ἐπίσθη, Thucyd. iii 39

were excessively indignant against Theramenês; who, however defended himself effectively and completely, throwing the blame back upon the generals. He was thus forced, against his own will, and in self-defence, to become the accuser of the generals, carrying with him his numerous friends and partisans at Athens. And thus the generals, by trying to ruin Theramenês, finally brought condemnation upon themselves.¹

Such is the narrative of Diodorus, in which it is implied that the generals never really gave any special orders to Theramenês and Thrasybulus, but falsely asserted afterwards that they had done so, in order to discredit the accusation of Theramenês against themselves. To a certain extent, this coincides with what was asserted by Theramenês himself, two years afterwards, in his defence before the Thirty, that he was not the first to accuse the generals; they were the first to accuse him; affirming that they had ordered him to undertake the duty, and that there was no sufficient reason to hinder him from performing it; they were the persons who distinctly pronounced the performance of the duty to be possible, while he had said, from the beginning, that the violence of the storm was such as even to forbid any move- ment in the water; much more, to prevent rescue of the drown- ing men.²

Taking the accounts of Xenophon and Diodorus together, in combination with the subsequent accusation and defence of The- ramenês at the time of the Thirty, and blending them so as to reject as little as possible of either, I think it probable that the order for picking up the exposed men was really given by the generals to Theramenês, Thrasybulus, and other trierarchs; but

¹ Diodor. xiii, 100, 101

² Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 3, 35. If Theramenês really did say, in the actual discussions at Athens on the conduct of the generals, that which he here asserts himself to have said, namely, that the violence of the storm ren- dered it impossible for any one to put to sea, his accusation against the generals must have been grounded upon alleging that they might have performed the duty at an earlier moment; before they came back from the battle; before the storm arose, before they gave the order to him. But I think it most probable that he misrepresented at the later period what he had said at the earlier, and that he did not, during the actual discussions, admit the sufficiency of the storm as fact and justification.

that, first, a fatal interval was allowed to elapse between the close of the battle and the giving of such order; next, that the forty-eight triremes talked of for the service, and proposed to be furnished by drafts of three out of each general's division, were probably never assembled; or, if they assembled, were so little zealous in the business as to satisfy themselves very easily that the storm was too dangerous to brave, and that it was now too late. For when we read the version of the transaction, even as given by Eurypolemus, we see plainly that none of the generals, except Diomedon, was eager in the performance of the task. It is a memorable fact, that of all the eight generals, not one of them undertook the business in person, although its purpose was to save more than a thousand drowning comrades from death.¹ In a proceeding where every interval even of five minutes was precious, they go to work in the most dilatory manner, by determining that each general shall furnish three ships, and no more, from his division. Now we know from the statement of Xenophon, that, towards the close of the battle, the ships on both sides were much dispersed.² Such collective direction therefore would not be quickly realized; nor, until all the eight fractions were united, together with the Samians and others, so as to make the force complete, would Theramenes feel bound to go out upon his preserving visitation. He doubtless disliked the service, as we see that most of the generals did; while the crews also, who had just got to land after having gained a victory, were thinking most about rest and refreshment, and mutual congratulation.³ All

¹ The total number of ships lost with all their crews was twenty-five, of which the aggregate crews, speaking in round numbers, would be five thousand men. Now we may fairly calculate that each one of the disabled ships would have on board half her crew, or one hundred men, after the action; not more than half would have been slain or drowned in the combat. Even ten disabled ships would thus contain one thousand living men, wounded and unwounded. It will be seen, therefore, that I have understated the number of lives in danger.

² Xenoph. Hellen. i, 6, 33.

³ We read in Thucydides (vii. 73) how impossible it was to prevail on the Syracusans to make any military movement after their last maritime victory in the Great Harbor, when they were full of triumph, felicitation, and enjoyment.

They had visited the wrecks and obtained the living men on board

were glad to find some excuse for staying in their moorings instead of going out again to buffet what was doubtless unfavorable weather. Partly from this want of zeal, coming in addition to the original delay, partly from the bad weather, the duty remained unexecuted, and the seamen on board the damaged ships were left to perish unassisted.

But presently arose the delicate, yet unavoidable question, "How are we to account for the omission of this sacred duty, in our official despatch to the Athenian people?" Here the generals differed among themselves, as Eurypolemus expressly states: Periklès and Diomedon carried it, against the judgment of their colleagues, that in the official despatch, which was necessarily such as could be agreed to by all, nothing should be said about the delegation to Theramenes and others; the whole omission being referred to the terrors of the storm. But though such was the tenor of the official report, there was nothing to hinder the generals from writing home and communicating individually with their friends in Athens as each might think fit; and in these unofficial communications, from them as well as from others who went home from the armament, — communications not less efficacious than the official despatch, in determining the tone of public feeling at Athens, — they did not disguise their convictions that the blame of not performing the duty belonged to Theramenes. Having thus a man like Theramenes to throw the blame upon, they did not take pains to keep up the story of the intolerable storm, but intimated that there had been nothing to hinder *him* from performing the duty if he had chosen. It is this which he accuses them of having advanced against him, so as to place him as the guilty man before the Athenian public: it was this which made him, in retaliation and self-defence, violent and unscrupulous in denouncing them as the persons really blamable.¹ As they

and the floating bodies *before* they went ashore. It is remarkable that the Athenians on that occasion were so completely overpowered by the immensity of their disaster, that they never even thought of asking permission, always granted by the victors when asked, to pick up their dead or visit their wrecks (viii. 72).

¹ Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 3, 32. The light in which I here place the conduct of Theramenes is not only coincident with Diodorus, but with the representations of Kritias, the violent enemy of Theramenes under the govern-

had made light of this alleged storm, in casting the blame upon him, so he again made light of it, and treated it as an insufficient excuse, in his denunciations against them; taking care to make good use of their official despatch, which virtually exonerated him, by its silence, from any concern in the matter.

Such is the way in which I conceive the relations to have stood between the generals on one side and Theramenes on the other, having regard to all that is said both in Xenophon and in Diodorus. But the comparative account of blame and recrimination between these two parties is not the most important feature of the case. The really serious inquiry is, as to the intensity or instant occurrence of the storm. Was it really so instant and so dangerous, that the duty of visiting the wrecks could not be performed, either before the ships went back to Arginusæ, or afterwards? If we take the circumstances of the case, and apply them to the habits and feelings of the English navy, if we suppose more than one thousand seamen, late comrades in the victory, distributed among twenty damaged and helpless hulls, awaiting the moment when these hulls would fill and consign them all to a watery grave, it must have been a frightful storm indeed, which would force an English admiral even to go back to his moorings leaving these men so exposed, or which would deter him, if he were at his moorings, from sending out the very first and nearest ships at hand to save them. And granting the danger to be such that he hesitated to give the order, there

ment of the Thirty, just before he was going to put Theramenes to death: *Οὗτος δὲ τοι ἐστὶν, ὃς ταχέως ἀνέλασσαι ἐπὶ τῶν στρατηγῶν τοὺς καταδόντας Ἀθηναίων ἐν τῇ περὶ Ἀργίνων ναυμαχίᾳ, αὐτὸς οὐκ ἀνελόμενος διὼς τῶν στρατηγῶν κατηγορῶν ἀπέκτεινεν αὐτοὺς, ἵνα αὐτὸς περισσώδει η.* (Xen. *ut sup.*)

Here it stands admitted that the first impression at Athens was, as Diodorus states expressly, that Theramenes was ordered to pick up the men on the wrecks, might have done it if he had taken proper pains, and was to blame for not doing it. Now how did this impression arise? Of course, through communications received from the armament itself. And when Theramenes, in his reply, says that the generals themselves made communications in the same tenor, there is no reason why we should not believe him, in spite of their joint official despatch, wherein they made no mention of him, and in spite of their speech in the public assembly afterwards, where the previous official letter fettered them, and prevented them from accusing

would probably be found officers and men to volunteer, against the most desperate risks, in a cause so profoundly moving all their best sympathies. Now, unfortunately for the character of Athenian generals, officers, and men, at Arginusæ, — for the blame belongs, though in unequal proportions, to all of them, — there exists here strong presumptive proof that the storm on this occasion was not such as would have deterred any Grecian seamen animated by an earnest and courageous sense of duty. We have only to advert to the conduct and escape of Eteonikus and the Peloponnesian fleet from Mitylênê to Chios; recollecting that Mitylênê was separated from the promontory of Kanê on the Asiatic mainland, and from the isles of Arginusæ, by a channel only one hundred and twenty stadia broad,¹ about fourteen English miles. Eteonikus, apprized of the defeat by the Peloponnesian official signal-boat, desired that boat to go out of the harbor, and then to sail into it again with deceptive false news, to the effect that the Peloponnesians had gained a complete victory: he then directed his seamen, after taking their dinners, to depart immediately, and the masters of the merchant vessels silently to put their cargoes aboard, and get to sea also. The whole fleet, triremes and merchant vessels both, thus went out of the harbor of Mitylênê and made straight for Chios, whither they arrived in safety; the merchant vessels carrying their sails, and having what Xenophon calls "a fair wind."² Now it is scarcely possi-

him, forcing them to adhere to the statement first made, of the all-sufficiency of the storm.

The main facts which we here find established, even by the enemies of Theramenes, are: 1. That Theramenes accused the generals because he found himself in danger of being punished for the neglect. 2. That his enemies, who charged him with the breach of duty, did not admit the storm as an excuse for him.

¹ Strabo, xiii, p. 617.

² Xenophon, *Hellen.* i. 6. 37. Ἐτεονίκος δὲ, ἵππειδῃ ἐκείνοι (the signal-boat, with news of the pretended victory) κατέπλεον, ἔθνε τὰ εἰαγγέλια, καὶ τοῖς στρατιώταις παρήγγιλλε διαπνεοποιεῖσθαι, καὶ τοῖς ἐμπόροις, τὰ χρήματα σιωπῇ ἐνθιμένους ἐς τὰ πλοῖα ἀποπλεῖν ἐς Χίον, ἣν δὲ τὸ πνεῦμα οὐρίον, καὶ τὰς τριήρεις τὴν ταχίστην. Αὐτὸς δὲ τὸ πρῶτον ἀπήγεν ἐς τὴν Μηθύμνην, τὸ στρατόπεδον ἐμπρησας. Κόρων δὲ καθελκύσας τὰς ναῖς, ἐπεὶ οἱ τε πολέμιαι ἀποδιόρακεσαν, καὶ ὁ ἀνέμος ἐὺ διαίτερος ἦν, ἀπαντήσας τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις ἤδη ἀνηγμένοις ἐκ τῶν Ἀργινουσῶν, ἔφρασε τὰ περὶ Ἐτεονίκου.

One sees, by the expression used by Xenophon respecting the proceedings

ble that all this could have taken place, had there blown during this time an intolerable storm between Mitylênê and Arginusæ. If the weather was such as to allow of the safe transit of Eteonikus and all his fleet from Mitylênê to Chios, it was not such as to form a legitimate obstacle capable of deterring any generous Athenian seaman, still less a responsible officer, from saving his comrades exposed on the wrecks near Arginusæ. Least of all was it such as ought to have hindered the attempt to save them, even if such attempt had proved unsuccessful. And here the gravity of the sin consists, in having remained inactive while the brave men on the wrecks were left to be drowned. All this reasoning, too, assumes the fleet to have been already brought back to its moorings at Arginusæ, discussing only how much was practicable to effect after that moment, and leaving untouched the no less important question, why the drowning men were not picked up before the fleet went back.

I have thought it right to go over these considerations, indispensable to the fair appreciation of this memorable event, in order that the reader may understand the feelings of the assembly and the public of Athens, when the generals stood before them, rebutting the accusations of Theramênês and recriminating in their turn against him. The assembly had before them the grave and deplorable fact, that several hundreds of brave seamen had been suffered to drown on the wrecks, without the least effort to rescue them. In explanation of this fact, they had not only no justification, at once undisputed and satisfactory, but not even any straightforward, consistent, and uncontradicted statement of facts. There were discrepancies among the generals themselves, comparing their official with their unofficial, as well as with their present statements, and contradictions between them and Theramênês, each having denied the sufficiency of the storm as a vindication for the neglect imputed to the other. It was

of Konon, that he went out of the harbor "as soon as the wind became calmer;" that it blew a strong wind, though in a direction favorable to carry the fleet of Eteonikus to Chios. Konon was under no particular motive to go out immediately: he could afford to wait until the wind became quite calm. The important fact is, that wind and weather were perfectly compatible with, indeed even favorable to, the escape of the Peloponnesian fleet from Mitylênê to Chios.

impossible that the assembly could be satisfied to acquit the generals on such a presentation of the case; nor could they well know how to apportion the blame between them and Theramênês. The relatives of the men left to perish would be doubtless in a state of violent resentment against one or other of the two, perhaps against both. Under these circumstances, it could hardly have been the sufficiency of their defence,—it must have been rather the apparent generosity of their conduct towards Theramênês, in formally disavowing all charge of neglect against him, though he had advanced a violent charge against them,—which produced the result that we read in Xenophon. The defence of the generals was listened to with favor and seemed likely to prevail with the majority.¹ Many individuals present offered themselves as bail for the generals, in order that the latter might be liberated from custody: but the debate had been so much prolonged—we see from hence that there must have been a great deal of speaking—that it was now dark, so that no vote could be taken, because the show of hands was not distinguishable. It was therefore resolved to adjourn the whole decision until another assembly; but that in the mean time the senate should meet, should consider what would be the proper mode of trying and judging the generals, and should submit a proposition to that effect to the approaching assembly.

It so chanced that immediately after this first assembly, during the interval before the meeting of the senate or the holding of the second assembly, the three days of the solemn annual festival called Apaturia intervened; early days in the month of

¹ Xenoph. Hellen. i, 7, 5-7. Μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα οἱ στρατηγοὶ βραχέα ἕκαστος ἀπελογησάτο, ὃν γὰρ προὔτιθεσσι λόγος κατὰ τὸν νόμον.....

Τοιαῦτα λέγοντες ἔπειθον τὸν δῆμον. The imperfect tense ἔπειθον must be noticed: "they were persuading," or, seemed in the way to persuade, the people; not ἐπεισαν the aorist, which would mean that they actually did satisfy the people.

The first words here cited from Xenophon, do not imply that the generals were checked or abridged in their liberty of speaking before the public assembly, but merely that no judicial trial and defence were granted to them. In judicial defence, the person accused had a measured time for defence—by the clepsydra, or water-clock—allotted to him, during which no one could interrupt him; a time doubtless much longer than any single speaker would be permitted to occupy in the public assembly.

October. This was the characteristic festival of the Ionic race, handed down from a period anterior to the constitution of Kleisthenes, and to the ten new tribes each containing so many demes, and bringing together the citizens in their primitive unions of family, gens, phratry, etc., the aggregate of which had originally constituted the four Ionic tribes, now superannuated. At the Apaturia, the family ceremonies were gone through; marriages were enrolled, acts of adoption were promulgated and certified, the names of youthful citizens first entered on the gentile and phratric roll; sacrifices were jointly celebrated by these family assemblages to Zeus Phratrius, Athênê, and other deities, accompanied with much festivity and enjoyment. A solemnity like this, celebrated every year, naturally provoked in each of these little unions, questions of affectionate interest: "Who are those that were with us last year, but are not here now? The absent, where are they? The deceased, where or how did they die?" Now the crews of the twenty-five Athenian triremes, lost at the battle of Arginusæ, at least all those among them who were freemen, had been members of some one of these family unions, and were missed on this occasion. The answer to the above inquiry, in their case, would be one alike melancholy and revolting: "They fought like brave men, and had their full share in the victory: their trireme was broken, disabled, and made a wreck, in the battle: aboard this wreck they were left to perish, while their victorious generals and comrades made not the smallest effort to preserve them." To hear this about fathers, brothers, and friends,—and to hear it in the midst of a sympathizing family circle,—was well calculated to stir up an agony of shame, sorrow, and anger, united; an intolerable sentiment, which required as a satisfaction, and seemed even to impose as a duty, the punishment of those who had left these brave comrades to perish. Many of the gentile unions, in spite of the usually festive and cheerful character of the Apaturia, were so absorbed by this sentiment, that they clothed themselves in black garments and shaved their heads in token of mourning, resolving to present themselves in this guise at the coming assembly, and to appease the manes of their abandoned kinmen by every possible effort to procure retribution on the generals.

¹ Lysias puts into one of his orations a similar expression respecting the

Xenophon in his narrative describes this burst of feeling at the Apaturia as false and factitious, and the men in mourning as a number of hired impostors, got up by the artifices of Theramenes,¹ to destroy the generals. But the case was one in which

feeling at Athens towards these generals; ἡγοῖμενοι χρήναι τῇ τῶν τεθνεώτων ἀρετῇ παρ' ἐκείνων δίκην λαβεῖν; Lysias cont. Eratosth. s. 37.

¹ Xenoph. Hellen. i. 7, 8. Οἱ οὖν περὶ τὸν Θηραμένην παρισκεύασαν ἀνδρά-τους μέλ' αὖτα ἔχοντας, καὶ ἐν χρῶ κεκαρμένους πολ-λοὺς ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ ἐορτῇ, ἵνα πρὸς τὴν ἐκκλησίαν ἦκοιεν, ὡς δὲ ξυγ-γενεῖς οὖντες τῶν ἀπολλωλῶτων.

Here I adopt substantially the statement of Diodorus, who gives a juster and more natural description of the proceeding; representing it as a spontaneous action of mournful and vindictive feeling on the part of the kinsmen of the deceased (xiii, 101).

Other historians of Greece, Dr. Thirlwall not excepted (Hist. of Greece, ch. xxx, vol. iv, pp. 117-125), follow Xenophon on this point. They treat the intense sentiment against the generals at Athens as "popular prejudices;" "excitement produced by the artifices of Theramenes," (Dr. Thirlwall, pp. 117-124.) "Theramenes (he says) hired a great number of persons to attend the festival, dressed in black, and with their heads shaven, as mourning for kinsmen whom they had lost in the sea-fight."

Yet Dr. Thirlwall speaks of the narrative of Xenophon in the most unfavorable terms; and certainly in terms no worse than it deserves (see p. 116, the note): "It looks as if Xenophon had purposely involved the whole affair in obscurity." Compare also p. 123, where his criticism is equally severe.

I have little scruple in deserting the narrative of Xenophon, of which I think as meanly as Dr. Thirlwall, so far as to supply, without contradicting any of his main allegations, an omission which I consider capital and preponderant. I accept his account of what actually passed at the festival of the Apaturia, but I deny his statement of the manœuvres of Theramenes as the producing cause.

Most of the obscurity which surrounds these proceedings at Athens arises from the fact, that no notice has been taken of the intense and spontaneous emotion which the desertion of the men on the wrecks was naturally calculated to produce on the public mind. It would, in my judgment, have been unaccountable if such an effect had not been produced, quite apart from all instigations of Theramenes. The moment that we recognize this capital fact, the series of transactions becomes comparatively perspicuous and explicable.

Dr. Thirlwall, as well as Sievers (Commentat. de Xenophontis Hellen. pp. 25-30), suppose Theramenes to have acted in concert with the oligarchical party, in making use of this incident to bring about the ruin of generals odious to them, several of whom were connected with Alkibiades. I

no artifice was needed. The universal and self-acting stimulants of intense human sympathy stand here so prominently marked, that it is not simply superfluous but even misleading, to look behind for the gold and machinations of a political instigator. Theramenes might do all that he could to turn the public displeasure against the generals, and to prevent it from turning against himself: it is also certain that he did much to annihilate their defence. He may thus have had some influence in directing the sentiment against them, but he could have had little or none in creating it. Nay, it is not too much to say that no factitious agency of this sort could ever have prevailed on the Athenian public to desecrate such a festival as the Apaturia, by all the insignia of mourning. If they did so, it could only have been through some internal emotion alike spontaneous and violent, such as the late event was well calculated to arouse.

Moreover, what can be more improbable than the allegation that a great number of men were hired to personate the fathers or brothers of deceased Athenian citizens, all well known to their really surviving kinsmen? What more improbable, than the story that numbers of men would suffer themselves to be hired, not merely to put on black clothes for the day, which might be taken off in the evening, but also to shave their heads, thus stamping upon themselves an ineffaceable evidence of the fraud, until the hair had grown again? That a cunning man, like Theramenes, should thus distribute his bribes to a number of persons, all presenting naked heads which testified his guilt, when there were real kinsmen surviving to prove the fact of personation? That having done this, he should never be arraigned or accused for it afterwards,—neither during the prodigious reaction of feeling which took place after the condemnation of the generals, which Xenophon himself so strongly attests, and which fell so heavily upon Kallixenus and others,—nor by his bitter enemy Kritias, under the government of the Thirty? Not only Theramenes is never mentioned as having been afterwards accused, but, for aught that appears, he preserved his political influence and standing, with little if any abatement. This is one forcible

confess, that I see nothing to condemn this idea. But at all events, the cause here named is only secondary, not the grand and dominant fact of the period.

reason among many others, for disbelieving the bribes and the all-pervading machinations which Xenophon represents him as having put forth, in order to procure the condemnation of the generals. His speaking in the first public assembly, and his numerous partisans voting in the second, doubtless contributed much to that result, and by his own desire. But to ascribe to his bribes and intrigues the violent and overruling emotion of the Athenian public, is, in my judgment, a supposition alike unnatural and preposterous both with regard to them and with regard to him.

When the senate met, after the Apaturia, to discharge the duty confided to it by the last public assembly, of determining in what manner the generals should be judged, and submitting their opinion for the consideration of the next assembly, the senator Kallixenus — at the instigation of Theramenes, if Xenophon is to be believed — proposed, and the majority of the senate adopted, the following resolution: "The Athenian people having already heard, in the previous assembly, both the accusation and the defence of the generals, shall at once come to a vote on the subject of the tribes. For each tribe two urns shall be placed, and the herald of each tribe shall proclaim: All citizens who think the generals guilty, for not having rescued the warriors who had conquered in the battle, shall drop their pebbles into the foremost urn; all who think otherwise, into the hindmost. Should the generals be pronounced guilty, by the result of the voting, they shall be delivered to the Eleven, and punished with death; their property shall be confiscated, the tenth part being set apart for the goddess Athênê."¹ One single vote was to embrace the case of all the eight generals.²

The unparalleled burst of mournful and vindictive feeling at the festival of the Apaturia, extending by contagion from the relatives of the deceased to many other citizens, — and the probability thus created that the coming assembly would sanction the most violent measures against the generals, — probably emboldened Kallixenus to propose, and prompted the senate to adopt, this deplorable resolution. As soon as the assembly met, it was read and moved by Kallixenus himself, as coming from the senate in discharge of the commission imposed upon them by the people.

Xenoph. Hellen. i, 7, 8, 9.

² Xenoph. Hellen. i, 7, 34.

It was heard by a large portion of the assembly with well-merited indignation. Its enormity consisted in breaking through the established constitutional maxims and judicial practices of the Athenian democracy. It deprived the accused generals of all fair trial; alleging, with a mere faint pretence of truth which was little better than utter falsehood, that their defence as well as their accusation had been heard in the preceding assembly. Now there has been no people, ancient or modern, in whose view the formalities of judicial trial were habitually more sacred and indispensable than in that of the Athenians; formalities including ample notice beforehand to the accused party, with a measured and sufficient space of time for him to make his defence before the dikasts; while those dikasts were men who had been sworn beforehand as a body, yet were selected by lot for each occasion as individuals. From all these securities the generals were now to be debarred; and submitted, for their lives, honors, and fortunes, to a simple vote of the unsworn public assembly, without hearing or defence. Nor was this all. One single vote was to be taken in condemnation or absolution of the eight generals collectively. Now there was a rule in Attic judicial procedure, called the psephism of Kannónus,—originally adopted, we do not know when, on the proposition of a citizen of that name, as a psephism or decree for some particular case, but since generalized into common practice, and grown into great prescriptive reverence,—which peremptorily forbade any such collective trial or sentence, and directed that a separate judicial vote should, in all cases, be taken for or against each accused party. The psephism of Kannónus, together with all the other respected maxims of Athenian criminal justice, was here audaciously trampled under foot.¹

¹ I cannot concur with the opinion expressed by Dr. Thirlwall in Appendix iii, vol. iv, p. 501, of his History, on the subject of the psephism of Kannónus. The view which I give in the text coincides with that of the expositors generally, from whom Dr. Thirlwall dissents.

The psephism of Kannónus was the only enactment at Athens which made it illegal to vote upon the case of two accused persons at once. This had now grown into a practice in the judicial proceedings at Athens; so that two or more prisoners, who were ostensibly tried under some other law, and not under the psephism of Kannónus, with its various provisions, would yet have the benefit of this its particular provision, namely, severance of trial.

As soon as the resolution was read in the public assembly, Euryptolemus, an intimate friend of the generals, denounced it as

In the particular case before us, Euryptolemus was thrown back to appeal to the psephism itself; which the senate, by a proposition unheard of at Athens, proposed to contravene. The proposition of the senate offended against the law in several different ways. It deprived the generals of trial before a sworn dikastery; it also deprived them of the liberty of full defence during a measured time: but farther, it prescribed that they should all be condemned or absolved by one and the same vote; and, in this last respect, it sinned against the psephism of Kannónus. Euryptolemus in his speech, endeavoring to persuade an exasperated assembly to reject the proposition of the senate and adopt the psephism of Kannónus as the basis of the trial, very prudently dwells upon the severe provisions of the psephism, and artfully slurs over what he principally aims at, the severance of the trials, by offering his relative Periklēs to be tried *first*. The words *δίχα ἑκάστων* (see 37) appear to me to be naturally construed with *κατὰ τὸ Καννόνον ψήφισμα*, as they are by most commentators, though Dr. Thirlwall dissents from it. It is certain that this was the capital feature of illegality, among many, which the proposition of the senate presented, I mean the judging and condemning all the generals by *one* vote. It was upon this point that the amendment of Euryptolemus was taken, and that the obstinate resistance of Sokratēs turned (Plato, Apol. 20; Xenoph. Memor. i, 1, 18).

Farther, Dr. Thirlwall, in assigning what he believes to have been the real tenor of the psephism of Kannónus, appears to me to have been misled by the Scholiast in his interpretation of the much-discussed passage of Aristophanēs, Ekkleziās, 1089:—

Τὸτ' ἐπὶ τὸ πρᾶγμα κατὰ τὸ Καννόνον σαφῶς
ψήφισμα, βινεῖν δὲ με διαλελημμένον,
Πῶς οὖν δικωπεῖν ἀμφοτέρους δυνήσομαι;

Upon which Dr. Thirlwall observes, "that the young man is comparing his plight to that of a culprit, who, under the decree of Cannónus, was placed at the bar held by a person on each side. In this sense the Greek Scholiast, though his words are corrupted, clearly understood the passage."

I cannot but think that the Scholiast understood the words completely wrong. The young man in Aristophanēs does not compare his situation with that of the culprit, but with that of the dikastery which tried culprits. The psephism of Kannónus directed that each defendant should be tried separately: accordingly, if it happened that two defendants were presented for trial, and were both to be tried without a moment's delay, the dikastery could only effect this object by dividing itself into two halves, or portions; which was perfectly practicable, whether often practised or not, as it was a numerous body. By doing this, *κρῖνει διαλελημμένον*, it could try both the defendants at once: but in no other way.

Now the young man in Aristophanēs compares himself to the dikastery thus circumstanced; which comparison is signified by the pun of *βινεῖν*

grossly illegal and unconstitutional, presenting a notice of indictment against Kallixenus, under the *Graphê Paranómōn*, for having proposed a resolution of that tenor. Several other citizens supported the notice of indictment, which, according to the received practice of Athens, would arrest the farther progress of the measure until the trial of its proposer had been consummated. Nor was there ever any proposition made at Athens, to which the *Graphê Paranómōn* more closely and righteously applied.

But the numerous partisans of Kallixenus — especially the men who stood by in habits of mourning, with shaven heads, agitated with sad recollections and thirst of vengeance — were in no temper to respect this constitutional impediment to the discussion of what had already been passed by the senate. They loudly clamored, that "it was intolerable to see a small knot of citizens thus hindering the assembled people from doing what they chose;" and one of their number, Lykiskus, even went so far as to threaten that those who tendered the indictment against Kallixenus should be judged by the same vote along with the generals, if they would not let the assembly proceed to consider and determine on the motion just read.¹ The excited disposition of the large party thus congregated, farther inflamed by this menace of Lykiskus, was wound up to its highest pitch by various other speakers; especially by one, who stood forward and said:

δειλιζήμενον in place of *κρείναι διαλεζήμενον*. He is assailed by two obtrusive and importunate customers, neither of whom will wait until the other has been served. Accordingly he says: "Clearly, I ought to be divided into two parts, like a *dikastery* acting under the psephism of *Kannónus*, to deal with this matter: yet how shall I be able to serve both at once?"

This I conceive to be the proper explanation of the passage in *Aristophanes*; and it affords a striking confirmation of the truth of that which is generally received as purport of the psephism of *Kannónus*. The Scholiast appears to me to have puzzled himself, and to have misled every one else.

¹ Xenoph. Hellen. i. 7. Τὸν δὲ Καλλιξένον προσεκαίεσαντο παρὰ νόμα φάσκοντες συγγεγραμέναι, Εὐρυπτολέμος τε καὶ ἄλλοι τινες· τοῦ δὲ δήμου ἔνιστοι ταῦτα ἐπὶ ἤκουον· τὸ δὲ πλῆθος ἰδὼς, δεινὸν εἶναι, εἰ μὴ τις ἐάσει τὸν δῆμον πράττειν, ὃ αὖ βούληται. Καὶ ἐπὶ τούτοις εἰπόντος Λυκίσκου, καὶ τούτους τῇ αὐτῇ ψήφῳ κρίνεσθαι, ὑπὲρ καὶ τοὺς στρατηγοὺς, ἐὰν μὴ ἀφώσι τὴν ἐκκλησίαν, ἐπεθορύβησε πάλιν ὁ ὄχλος, καὶ ἰναγκάσθησαν ἀφέναι τὰς κλήσεις.

All this violence is directed to the special object of getting the proposition discussed and decided on by the assembly, in spite of constitutional obstacles.

"Athenians! I was myself a wrecked man in the battle: I escaped only by getting upon an empty meal-tub; but my comrades, perishing on the wrecks near me, implored me, if I should myself be saved, to make known to the Athenian people, that their generals had abandoned to death warriors who had bravely conquered in behalf of their country." Even in the most tranquil state of the public mind, such a communication of the last words of these drowning men, reported by an ear-witness, would have been heard with emotion; but under the actual predisposing excitement, it went to the inmost depth of the hearers' souls, and marked the generals as doomed men.¹ Doubtless there were

¹ Xenoph. Hellen. i. 7, 11. Παρήλθε δὲ τις ἐς τὴν ἐκκλησίαν φάσκων, ἐπὶ τεύχεος ἀλφίτων σωθῆναι· ἐπιστέλλειν δ' αὐτῷ τοὺς ἀπολλυμένους εἰάν σωθῇ, ἀπαγγεῖλαι τῷ δήμῳ, ὅτι οἱ στρατηγοὶ οὐκ ἀνείλουντο τοὺς ἀρίστους ὑπὲρ τῆς πατρίδος γενομένους.

I venture to say that there is nothing in the whole compass of ancient oratory, more full of genuine pathos and more profoundly impressive, than this simple incident and speech; though recounted in the most bald manner, by an unfriendly and contemptuous advocate.

Yet the whole effect of it is lost, because the habit is to dismiss every thing which goes to inculcate the generals, and to justify the vehement emotion of the Athenian public, as if it was mere stage-trick and falsehood. Dr. Thirlwall goes even beyond Xenophon, when he says (p. 119, vol. iv): "A man was brought forward, who pretended he had been preserved by clinging to a meal-barrel, and that his comrades," etc. So Mr. Mitford: "A man was produced," etc. (p. 347).

Now *παρήλθε* does not mean, "he was brought forward:" it is a common word employed to signify one who comes forward to speak in the public assembly (see Thucyd. iii. 44. and the participle *παρελθὼν*, in numerous places).

Next, *φάσκων*, while it sometimes means *pretending*, sometimes also means simply *affirming*: Xenophon does not guarantee the matter affirmed, but neither does he pronounce it to be false. He uses *φάσκων* in various cases where he himself agrees with the fact affirmed (see Hellen. i. 7, 12; Memorab. i. 2, 29; Cyropæd. viii. 3, 41; Plato. Ap. Socr. c. 6, p. 21).

The people of Athens heard and fully believed this deposition; nor do I see any reason why an historian of Greece should disbelieve it. There is nothing in the assertion of this man which is at all improbable; nay, more, it is plain that several such incidents must have happened. If we take the smallest pains to expand in our imaginations the details connected with this painfully-interesting crisis at Athens, we shall see that numerous stories of the same affecting character must have been in circulation; doubtless many

other similar statements, not expressly mentioned to us, bringing to view the same fact in other ways, and all contributing to aggravate the violence of the public manifestations; which at length reached such a point, that Euryptolemus was forced to withdraw his notice of indictment against Kallixenus.

Now, however, a new form of resistance sprung up, still preventing the proposition from being taken into consideration by the assembly. Some of the prytanes,—or senators of the presiding tribe, on that occasion the tribe Antiochis,—the legal presidents of the assembly, refused to entertain or put the question; which, being illegal and unconstitutional, not only inspired them with aversion, but also rendered them personally open to penalties. Kallixenus employed against them the same menaces which Lykiskus had uttered against Euryptolemus: he threatened, amidst encouraging clamor from many persons in the assembly, to include them in the same accusation with the generals. So intimidated were the prytanes by the incensed manifestations of the assembly, that all of them, except one, relinquished their opposition, and agreed to put the question. The single obstinate prytanis, whose refusal no menace could subdue, was a man whose name we read with peculiar interest, and in whom an impregnable adherence to law and duty was only one among many other titles to reverence. It was the philosopher Sokratês; on this trying occasion, once throughout a life of seventy years, discharging a political office, among the fifty senators taken by lot from the tribe Antiochis. Sokratês could not be induced to withdraw his protest, so that the question was ultimately put by the remaining prytanes without his concurrence.¹ It should be observed that his resistance did not imply any opinion as to the guilt or innocence of the generals, but applied simply to the illegal and unconstitutional proposition now submitted for determining their fate

¹ Xenoph. Hellen. i. 7, 14, 15; Plato, Apol. Socr. c. 20; Xenoph. Memor. i. 1, 18; iv. 4, 2.

In the passage of the Memorabilia, Xenophon says that Sokratês was epistatês, or presiding prytanis, for that actual day. In the Hellenica, he only reckons him as one among the prytanes. It can hardly be accounted certain that he *was* epistatês, the rather as this same passage of the Memorabilia is inaccurate on another point: it names *nine* generals as having been condemned, instead of *eight*.

a proposition, which he must already have opposed once before, in his capacity of member of the senate.

The constitutional impediments having been thus violently overthrown, the question was regularly put by the prytanes to the assembly. At once the clamorous outcry ceased, and those who had raised it resumed their behavior of Athenian citizens, patient hearers of speeches and opinions directly opposed to their own. Nothing is more deserving of notice than this change of demeanor. The champions of the men drowned on the wrecks had resolved to employ as much force as was required to eliminate those preliminary constitutional objections, in themselves indisputable, which precluded the discussion. But so soon as the discussion was once begun, they were careful not to give to the resolution the appearance of being carried by force. Euryptolemus, the personal friend of the generals, was allowed not only to move an amendment negating the proposition of Kallixenus, but also to develop it in a long speech, which Xenophon sets before us.¹

His speech is one of great skill and judgment in reference to the case before him and to the temper of the assembly. Beginning with a gentle censure on his friends, the generals Periklês and Diomedon, for having prevailed on their colleagues to abstain from mentioning, in their first official letter, the orders given to Theramenês, he represented them as now in danger of becoming victims to the base conspiracy of the latter, and threw himself upon the justice of the people to grant them a fair trial. He besought the people to take full time to instruct themselves before they pronounced so solemn and irrevocable a sentence; to trust only to their own judgment, but at the same time to take security that judgment should be pronounced after full information and impartial hearing, and thus to escape that bitter and unavailing remorse which would otherwise surely follow. He proposed that the generals should be tried each separately, according to the psephism of Kannônus, with proper notice, and ample time allowed for the defence as well as for the accusation; but that, if found guilty, they should suffer the heaviest and most disgraceful penalties, his own relation Periklês the first. This

¹ Xenoph. Hellen. i. 7, 16. Μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα, that is, after the cries and threats above recounted, ἀναβὰς Εὐρυπτόλεμος ἔλεξεν ὑπὲρ τῶν στρατηγῶν ταῦτε, etc.

was the only way of striking the guilty, of saving the innocent, and of preserving Athens from the ingratitude and impiety of condemning to death, without trial as well as contrary to law, generals who had just rendered to her so important a service. And what could the people be afraid of? Did they fear lest the power of trial should slip out of their hands, that they were so impatient to leap over all the delays prescribed by the law? To the worst of public traitors, Aristarchus, they had granted a day with full notice for trial, with all the legal means for making his defence: and would they now show such flagrant contrariety of measure to victorious and faithful officers? "Be not ye (he said) the men to act thus, Athenians. The laws are your own work; it is through them that ye chiefly hold your greatness: cherish them, and attempt not any proceeding without their sanction."²

Euryptolemus then shortly recapitulated the proceedings after the battle, with the violence of the storm which had prevented approach to the wrecks; adding that one of the generals, now in peril, had himself been on board a broken ship, and had only escaped by a fortunate accident.³ Gaining courage from his own harangue, he concluded by reminding the Athenians of the brilliancy of the victory, and by telling them that they ought in justice to wreath the brows of the conquerors, instead of following those wicked advisers who pressed for their execution.⁴

It is no small proof of the force of established habits of public discussion, that the men in mourning and with shaven heads, who had been a few minutes before in a state of furious excitement, should patiently hear out a speech so effective and so conflicting with their strongest sentiments as this of Euryptolemus. Perhaps others may have spoken also; but Xenophon does not men-

² It is this accusation of "reckless hurry," *πρόσπειρα*, which Pausanias brings against the Athenians in reference to their behavior toward the six generals (vi. 7, 2).

³ Xenoph. Hellen. i. 7, 30. Μη ὑμεῖς γε, ὦ Ἀθηναῖοι, ἀλλ' αὐτῶν ὄντας τοὺς νόμους, δὲ οὐκ μάλιστα μεγιστοὶ ἐστέ, φυλαττοντες, ἀνεῖν τούτων μὴδὲ πούττεν πειράσθαι.

⁴ Xenoph. Hellen. i. 7, 35. τούτων δὲ μάρτυρες οἱ σωθέντες ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτοῦ κώτου, ὧν εἰς τῶν ὑμετέρων στρατηγῶν ἐπὶ καταδύσεως νεώς σωθεῖς, etc.

The speech is contained in Xenoph. Hellen. i. 7, 16-36.

tion them. It is remarkable that he does not name Theramenês as taking any part in this last debate.

The substantive amendment proposed by Euryptolemus was that the generals should be tried each separately, according to the psephism of Kammônus; implying notice to be given to each, of the day of trial, and full time for each to defend himself. This proposition, as well as that of the senate moved by Kallixenus, was submitted to the vote of the assembly; hands being separately held up, first for one, next for the other. The prytanes pronounced the amendment of Euryptolemus to be carried. But a citizen named Meneklês impeached their decision as wrong or invalid, alleging seemingly some informality or trick in putting the question, or perhaps erroneous report of the comparative show of hands. We must recollect that in this case the prytanes were declared partisans. Feeling that they were doing wrong in suffering so illegal a proposition as that of Kallixenus to be put at all, and that the adoption of it would be a great public mischief, they would hardly scruple to try and defeat it even by some unfair manœuvre. But the exception taken by Meneklês constrained them to put the question over again, and they were then obliged to pronounce that the majority was in favor of the proposition of Kallixenus.¹

¹ Xenoph. Hellen. i. 7, 38. Τούτων δὲ διαχωριστονομήσαν, τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ἔκριναν τῆν Εὐρυπτολίμου· ὑπονομασάμενοι δὲ Μενεκλῆσιν, καὶ πάλιν διαχωριστονομήσαντες, ἔκριναν τῆν τοῦ Κάλλιχενου.

I cannot think that the explanations of this passage given either by Schömann (De Constit. Athen. part ii. l. p. 160, seq.) or by Meier and Schömann (Der Attische Prozess. b. iii. p. 295; b. iv. p. 696) are satisfactory. The idea of Schömann, that, in consequence of the unconquerable resistance of Sokratês, the voting upon this question was postponed until the next day, appears to me completely inconsistent with the account of Xenophon; and, though countenanced by a passage in the Pseudo-Platonic dialogue called Axiochus (c. 12), altogether loose and untrustworthy. It is plain to me that the question was put without Sokratês, and could be legally put by the remaining prytanes, in spite of his resistance. The word *ὑπονομασάμενοι* must doubtless bear a meaning somewhat different here to its technical sense before the dikastery; and different also, I think, to the other sense which Meier and Schömann ascribe to it, of a formal engagement to prefer at some future time an indictment, or *γραφὴ παρανόμων*. It seems to me here to denote an objection taken on formal grounds, and sustained

That proposition was shortly afterwards carried into effect by disposing the two urns for each tribe, and collecting the votes of the citizens individually. The condemnatory vote prevailed, and all the eight generals were thus found guilty; whether by a large or a small majority we should have been glad to learn, but are not told. The majority was composed mostly of those who acted under a feeling of genuine resentment against the generals, but in part also of the friends and partisans of Tharmenès,¹ not inconsiderable in number. The six generals then at Athens, — Perikles (son of the great statesman of that name by Aspasia), Diomedon, Erasinidēs, Thrasyllus, Lysias, and Aristokratēs, — were then delivered to the Eleven, and perished by the usual draught

by oath either tendered or actually taken, to the decision of the prytanes, or presidents. These latter had to declare on which side the show of hands in the assembly preponderated: but there surely must have been some power of calling in question their decision, if they declared falsely, or if they put the question in a treacherous, perplexing, or obscure manner. The Athenian assembly did not admit of an appeal to a division, like the Spartan assembly or like the English House of Commons; though there were many cases in which the votes at Athens were taken by pebbles in an urn, and not by show of hands.

Now it seems to me that Menekles here exercised the privilege of calling in question the decision of the prytanes and constraining them to take the vote over again. He may have alleged that they did not make it clearly understood which of the two propositions was to be put to the vote first; that they put the proposition of ~~Aspasia~~ first, without giving due notice; or perhaps that they misreported the numbers. By what followed, we see that he had good grounds for his objection.

¹ Diodor. xiii, 101. In regard to these two component elements of the majority, I doubt not that the statement of Diodorus is correct. But he represents, quite erroneously, that the generals were condemned by the vote of the assembly, and led off from the assembly to execution. The assembly only decreed that the subsequent urn-voting should take place, the result of which was necessarily uncertain beforehand. Accordingly, the speech which Diodorus represents Diomedon to have made in the assembly, after the vote of the assembly had been declared, cannot be true history: "Athenians, I wish that the vote which you have just passed may prove beneficial to the city. Do you take care to fulfil those vows to Zeus Soter, Apollo, and the Venerable Goddesses, under which we gained our victory since fortune has prevented us from fulfilling them ourselves." It is impossible that Diomedon can have made a speech of this nature, since he was not then a condemned man; and after the condemnatory vote, no assembly was held.

of hemlock; their property being confiscated, as the decree of the senate prescribed.

Respecting the condemnation of these unfortunate men, pronounced without any of the recognized tutelary preliminaries for accused persons, there can be only one opinion. It was an act of violent injustice and illegality, deeply dishonoring the men who passed it, and the Athenian character generally. In either case, whether the generals were guilty or innocent, this censure is deserved, for judicial precautions are not less essential in dealing with the guilty than with the innocent. But it is deserved in an aggravated form, when we consider that the men against whom such injustice was perpetrated, had just come from achieving a glorious victory. Against the democratical constitution of Athens, it furnishes no ground for censure, nor against the habits and feelings which that constitution tended to implant in the individual citizen. Both the one and the other strenuously forbade the deed; nor could the Athenians ever have so dishonored themselves, if they had not, under a momentary ferocious excitement, risen in insurrection not less against the forms of their own democracy, than against the most sacred restraints of their habitual constitutional morality.

If we wanted proof of this, the facts of the immediate future would abundantly supply it. After a short time had elapsed, every man in Athens became heartily ashamed of the deed.¹ A vote of the public assembly was passed,² decreeing that those who had misguided the people on this occasion ought to be brought to judicial trial, that Kallixenus with four others should be among the number, and that bail should be taken for their appearance. This was accordingly done, and the parties were kept under custody of the sureties themselves, who were responsible for their appearance on the day of trial. But presently both foreign misfortunes and internal sedition began to press too heavily on Athens to leave any room for other thoughts, as we shall

¹ I translate here literally the language of Sokratēs in his Defence (Plato A. vol. c. 20), *παρὰ νόμον, ὡς ἐν τῷ ὑστερῷ χρόνῳ πείσιν ὑμῖν ἰδοῖτε*.

² Xenoph. Hellen. i, 7, 39. This vote of the public assembly was known at Athens by the name of Probolē. The assembled people discharged on this occasion an ante-judicial function, something like that of a Grand Jury

see in the next chapter. Kallixenus and his accomplices found means to escape before the day of trial arrived, and remained in exile until after the dominion of the Thirty and the restoration of the democracy. Kallixenus then returned under the general amnesty. But the general amnesty protected him only against legal pursuit, not against the hostile memory of the people. "Detested by all, he died of hunger," says Xenophon;¹ a memorable proof how much the condemnation of these six generals shocked the standing democratical sentiment at Athens.

From what cause did this temporary burst of wrong arise, so foreign to the habitual character of the people? Even under the strongest political provocation, and towards the most hated traitors, — as Eurypolemus himself remarked, by citing the case of Aristarchus, — after the Four Hundred as well as after the Thirty, the Athenians never committed the like wrong, never deprived an accused party of the customary judicial securities. How then came they to do it here, where the generals condemned were not only not traitors, but had just signalized themselves by a victorious combat? No Theramenes could have brought about this phenomenon; no deep-laid oligarchical plot is, in my judgment, to be called in as an explanation.² The true explanation is different, and of serious moment to state. Political hatred, intense as it might be, was never dissociated, in the mind of a citizen of Athens, from the democratical forms of procedure: but the men, who stood out here as actors, had broken loose from the obligations of citizenship and commonwealth, and surrendered themselves, heart and soul, to the family sympathies and antipathies; feelings first kindled, and justly kindled, by the thought that their friends and relatives had been left to perish unheeded on the wrecks; next, inflamed into preternatural and overwhelming violence by the festival of the Apaturia, where all the religious traditions connected with the ancient family tie, all those associations which imposed upon the relatives of a murdered man the duty of pursuing the murderer, were expanded into detail and worked up by their appropriate renovating solemnity. The

¹ Xenophon. Hellen. i. 7, 40. *μνησθέντος (πρὸς) πάντων Ἰωνῶν ἀπεθνήκει.*

² This is the supposition of Seivers, Forchhammer, and some other learned men; but, in my opinion, it is neither proved nor probable.

garb of mourning and the shaving of the head — phenomena unknown at Athens, either in a political assembly or in a religious festival — were symbols of temporary transformation in the internal man. He could think of nothing but his drowning relatives, together with the generals as having abandoned them to death, and his own duty as survivor to insure to them vengeance and satisfaction for such abandonment. Under this self-justifying impulse, the shortest and surest proceeding appeared the best, whatever amount of political wrong it might entail:¹ nay, in this case it appeared the only proceeding really sure, since the interposition of the proper judicial delays, coupled with severance of trial on successive days, according to the psephism of Kammōnus, would probably have saved the lives of five out of the six generals, if not of all the six. When we reflect that such absorbing sentiment was common, at one and the same time, to a large proportion of the Athenians, we shall see the explanation of that misguided vote, both of the senate and of the *ekklesia*, which sent the six generals to an illegal ballot, and of the subsequent ballot which condemned them. Such is the natural behavior of those who, having for the moment forgotten their sense of political commonwealth, become degraded into exclusive family men. The family affections, productive as they are of so large an amount of gentle sympathy and mutual happiness in the interior circle, are also liable to generate disregard, malice, sometimes even ferocious vengeance, towards others. Powerful towards good generally, they are not less powerful occasionally towards evil; and require, not less than the selfish propensities, constant subordinating control from that moral reason which contemplates for its end the security and happiness of all. And

¹ If Thucydides had lived to continue his history so far down as to include this memorable event, he would have found occasion to notice τὸ ξυγγενὲς kinship, as being not less capable of ἀπροφασιστος τόλμα, unscrupulous daring, than τὸ ἴδιον faction. In his reflections on the Korkyraean disturbances (iii. 82), he is led to dwell chiefly on the latter, the antipathies of faction, of narrow political brotherhood or conspiracy for the attainment and maintenance of power, as most powerful in generating evil deeds: had he described the proceedings after the battle of Arginusæ, he would have seen that the sentiment of kinship, looked at on its antipathetic or vindictive side, is pregnant with the like tendencies.

when a man, either from low civilization, has never known this large moral reason, — or when from some accidental stimulus, righteous in the origin, but wrought up into fanaticism by the conspiring force of religious as well as family sympathies, he comes to place his pride and virtue in discarding its supremacy, — there is scarcely any amount of evil or injustice which he may not be led to perpetrate, by a blind obedience to the narrow instincts of relationship. "Ces pères de famille sont capables de tout," was the satirical remark of Talleyrand upon the gross public jobbing so largely practised by those who sought place or promotion for their sons. The same words understood in a far more awful sense, and generalized for other cases of relationship, sum up the moral of this melancholy proceeding at Athens.

Lastly, it must never be forgotten that the generals themselves were also largely responsible in the case. Through the unjustifiable fury of the movement against them, they perished like innocent men, without trial. "*inauditi et indefensi, tamquam innocentes, perierunt*;" but it does not follow that they were really innocent. I feel persuaded that neither with an English, nor French, nor American fleet, could such events have taken place as those which followed the victory of Arginusæ. Neither admiral nor seamen, after gaining a victory and driving off the enemy, could have endured the thoughts of going back to their anchorage, leaving their own disabled wrecks unmanageable on the waters, with many living comrades aboard, helpless, and depending upon extraneous succor for all their chance of escape. That the generals at Arginusæ did this, stands confessed by their own advocate Euryptolemus,¹ though they must have known well the condition of disabled ships after a naval combat, and some ships even of

¹ Xenoph. Hellen. i, 7, 31. Ἐπειδὴ γὰρ κρατήσαντες τῇ ναυμαχίᾳ πρὸς τὴν γῆν κατέπλευσαν, διαμεδὼν μὲν ἐκείνους, ἀναχθὲν τὰ ἐπὶ κέρως ἅπαντας ἀναρεῖσθαι τὰ ναύαγα καὶ τοὺς ναυαγοὺς, Ἐρασινίδης δὲ ἐπὶ τοὺς ἐς Μιτυλήνην πόλεμους τὴν ταχὺν πλεῖν ἅπαντας Ὀρασίλλωσ' ἡμρότερα ἔφη γενέσθαι, ἂν τὰς μὲν αὐτοῦ καταλίπωσι, ταῖς δὲ ἐπὶ τοὺς πόλεμους πλέωσι καὶ δοῦνται τοῖς τῶν, etc.

I remarked, a few pages before, that the case of Erasinides stood in some measure apart from that of the other generals. He proposed, according to this speech of Euryptolemus, that all the fleet should at once go again to Mitylênê which would of course have left the men on the wrecks to their fate.

the victorious fleet were sure to be disabled. If these generals, after their victory, instead of sailing back to land, had employed themselves first of all in visiting the crippled ships, there would have been ample time to perform this duty, and to save all the living men aboard, before the storm came on. This is the natural inference, even upon their own showing; this is what any English, French, or American naval commander would have thought it an imperative duty to do. What degree of blame is imputable to Theramênês, and how far the generals were discharged by shifting the responsibility to him, is a point which we cannot now determine. But the storm, which is appealed to as a justification of both, rests upon evidence too questionable to serve that purpose, where the neglect of duty was so serious, and cost the lives probably of more than one thousand brave men. At least, the Athenian people at home, when they heard the criminations and recriminations between the generals on one side and Theramênês on the other, — each of them in his character of accuser implying that the storm was no valid obstacle, though each, if pushed for a defence, fell back upon it as a resource in case of need, — the Athenian people could not but look upon the storm more as an afterthought to excuse previous omissions, than as a terrible reality nullifying all the ardor and resolution of men bent on doing their duty. It was in this way that the intervention of Theramênês chiefly contributed to the destruction of the generals, not by those manœuvres ascribed to him in Xenophon: he destroyed all belief in the storm as a real and all-covering hindrance. The general impression of the public at Athens — in my opinion, a natural and unavoidable impression — was, that there had been most culpable negligence in regard to the wrecks, through which negligence alone the seamen on board perished. This negligence dishonors, more or less, the armament at Arginusæ as well as the generals: but the generals were the persons responsible to the public at home, who felt for the fate of the deserted seamen more justly as well as more generously than their comrades in the fleet.

In spite, therefore, of the guilty proceeding to which a furious exaggeration of this sentiment drove the Athenians, — in spite of the sympathy which this has naturally and justly procured for

the condemned generals, — the verdict of impartial history will pronounce that the sentiment itself was well founded, and that the generals deserved censure and disgrace. The Athenian people might with justice proclaim to them: "Whatever be the grandeur of your victory, we can neither rejoice in it ourselves, nor allow you to reap honor from it, if we find that you have left many hundreds of those who helped in gaining it to be drowned on board the wrecks without making any effort to save them, when such effort might well have proved successful."

CHAPTER LXV

FROM THE BATTLE OF ARGINUSÆ TO THE RESTORATION OF THE DEMOCRACY AT ATHENS, AFTER THE EXPULSION OF THE THIRTY.

THE victory of Arginusæ gave for the time decisive mastery of the Asiatic seas to the Athenian fleet; and is even said to have so discouraged the Lacedæmonians, as to induce them to send propositions of peace to Athens. But this statement¹ is open to

¹ The statement rests on the authority of Aristotle, as referred to by the Scholiast on the last verse of the *Ranæ* of Aristophanes. And this, so far as I know, is the only authority: for when Mr. Fynes Clinton (*Fast. Hellen.* ad ann. 406) says that Æschines (*De Fals. Legat.* p. 38, c. 24) mentions the overtures of peace, I think that no one who looks at that passage will be inclined to found any inference upon it.

Against it, we may observe: —

- 1 Xenophon does not mention it. This is something, though far from being conclusive when standing alone.
- 2 Diodorus does not mention it.
- 3 The terms alleged to have been proposed by the Lacedæmonians, are exactly the same as those said to have been proposed by them after the death of Mindarus at Kyzikus, namely: —

To evacuate Dekeleia, and each party to stand as they were. Not only the terms are the same, but also the person who stood prominent in opposition is in both cases the same, *Kleophon*. The overtures after Arginusæ are in fact a second edition of those after the battle of Kyzikus.

much doubt, and I think it most probable that no such propositions were made. Great as the victory was, we look in vain for any positive results accruing to Athens. After an unsuccessful attempt on Chios, the victorious fleet went to Samos, where it seems to have remained until the following year, without any farther movements than were necessary for the purpose of procuring money.

Meanwhile Eteonikus, who collected the remains of the defeated Peloponnesian fleet at Chios, being left unsupplied with money by Cyrus, found himself much straitened, and was compelled to leave the seamen unpaid. During the later summer and autumn, these men maintained themselves by laboring for hire on the Chian lands; but when winter came, this resource ceased, so that they found themselves unable to procure even clothes or shoes. In such forlorn condition, many of them entered into a conspiracy to assail and plunder the town of Chios; a day was named for the enterprise, and it was agreed that the conspirators should know each other by wearing a straw, or reed. Informed of the design, Eteonikus was at the same time intimidated by the number of these straw-bearers; he saw that if he dealt with the conspirators openly and ostensibly, they might perhaps rush to arms and succeed in plundering the town; at any rate, a conflict would arise in which many of the allies would be slain, which would produce the worst effect upon all future operations. Accordingly, resorting to stratagem, he took with him a guard of fifteen men armed with daggers, and marched through the town of Chios. Meeting presently one of these straw-bearers, — a man with a complaint in his eyes, coming out of a surgeon's house, — he directed his guards to put the man to death on the spot. A crowd gathered round, with astonishment as well as sympathy,

Now, the supposition that on two several occasions the Lacedæmonians made propositions of peace, and that both are left unnoticed by Xenophon, appears to me highly improbable. In reference to the propositions after the battle of Kyzikus, the testimony of Diodorus outweighed, in my judgment, the silence of Xenophon: but here Diodorus is silent also.

In addition to this, the exact sameness of the two alleged events makes me think that the second is only a duplication of the first, and that the Scholiast, in citing from Aristotle, mistook the battle of Arginusæ for that of Kyzikus, which latter was by far the more decisive of the two.

and inquired on what ground the man was put to death; upon which Eteonikus ordered his guards to reply, that it was because he wore a straw. The news became diffused, and immediately the remaining persons who wore straws became so alarmed as to throw their straws away.¹

Eteonikus availed himself of the alarm to demand money from the Chians, as a condition of carrying away this starving and perilous armament. Having obtained from them a month's pay, he immediately put the troops on shipboard, taking pains to encourage them, and make them fancy that he was unacquainted with the recent conspiracy.

The Chians and the other allies of Sparta presently assembled at Ephesus to consult, and resolved, in conjunction with Cyrus, to despatch envoys to the ephors, requesting that Lysander might be sent out a second time as admiral. It was not the habit of Sparta ever to send out the same man as admiral a second time, after his year of service. Nevertheless, the ephors complied with the request substantially, sending out Arakus as admiral, but Lysander along with him, under the title of secretary, invested with all the real powers of command.

Lysander, having reached Ephesus about the beginning of B.C. 405, immediately applied himself with vigor to renovate both Lacedæmonian power and his own influence. The partisans in the various allied cities, whose favor he had assiduously cultivated during his last year's command, the clubs and factious combinations, which he had organized and stimulated into a partnership of mutual ambition, all hailed his return with exultation. Discountenanced and kept down by the generous patriotism of his predecessor Kallikratidas, they now sprang into renewed activity, and became zealous in aiding Lysander to refit and augment his fleet. Nor was Cyrus less hearty in his preference than before. On arriving at Ephesus, Lysander went speedily to visit him at Sardis, and solicited a renewal of the pecuniary aid. The young prince said in reply that all the funds which he had received from Susa had already been expended, with much more besides; in testimony of which he exhibited a specification of the sums furnished to each Peloponnesian officer.

¹ Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 1, 1-4.

Nevertheless, such was his partiality for Lysander, that he complied even with the additional demand now made, so as to send him away satisfied. The latter was thus enabled to return to Ephesus in a state for restoring the effective condition of his fleet. He made good at once all the arrears of pay due to the seamen, constituted new trierarchs, summoned Eteonikus with the fleet from Chios, together with all the other scattered squadrons, and directed that fresh triremes should be immediately put on the stocks at Antandrus.¹

In none of the Asiatic towns was the effect of Lysander's second advent felt more violently than at Miletus. He had there a powerful faction or association of friends, who had done their best to hamper and annoy Kallikratidas on his first arrival, but had been put to silence, and even forced to make a show of zeal, by the straightforward resolution of that noble-minded admiral. Eager to reimburse themselves for this humiliation, they now formed a conspiracy, with the privity and concurrence of Lysander, to seize the government for themselves. They determined, if Plutarch and Diodorus are to be credited, to put down the existing democracy, and establish an oligarchy in its place. But we cannot believe that there could have existed a democracy at Miletus, which had now been for five years in dependence upon Sparta and the Persians jointly. We must rather understand the movement as a conflict between two oligarchical parties; the friends of Lysander being more thoroughly self-seeking and anti-popular than their opponents, and perhaps even crying them down, by comparison, as a democracy. Lysander lent himself to the scheme, fanned the ambition of the conspirators, who were at one time disposed to a compromise, and even betrayed the government into a false security, by promises of support which he never intended to fulfil. At the festival of the Dionysia, the conspirators, rising in arms, seized forty of their chief opponents in their houses, and three hundred more in the market-place; while the government — confiding in the promises of Lysander, who affected to reprove, but secretly continued instigating the insurgents — made but a faint resistance. The three hundred and forty leaders thus seized, probably men who had gone heartily

¹ Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 1, 10-12.

along with Kallikratidas, were all put to death; and a still larger number of citizens, not less than one thousand, fled into exile. Milētus thus passed completely into the hands of the friends and partisans of Lysander.¹

It would appear that factious movements in other towns, less revolting in respect of bloodshed and perfidy, yet still of similar character to that of Milētus, marked the reappearance of Lysander in Asia; placing the towns more and more in the hands of his partisans. While thus acquiring greater ascendancy among the allies, Lysander received a summons from Cyrus to visit him at Sardis. The young prince had just been sent for to come and visit his father Darius, who was both old and dangerously ill, in Media. About to depart for this purpose, he carried his confidence in Lysander so far as to delegate to him the management of his satrapy and his entire revenues. Besides his admiration for the superior energy and capacity of the Greek character, with which he had only recently contracted acquaintance; and besides his esteem for the personal disinterestedness of Lysander, attested as it had been by the conduct of the latter in the first visit and banquet at Sardis; Cyrus was probably induced to this step by the fear of raising up to himself a rival, if he trusted the like power to any Persian grandee. At the same time that he handed over all his tributes and his reserved funds to Lysander, he assured him of his steady friendship both towards himself and towards the Lacedæmonians; and concluded by entreating that he would by no means engage in any general action with the Athenians, unless at great advantage in point of numbers. The defeat of Arginusæ having strengthened his preference for this dilatory policy, he promised that not only the Persian treasures, but also the Phœnician fleet, should be brought into active employment for the purpose of crushing Athens.²

Thus armed with an unprecedented command of Persian treasure, and seconded by ascendent factions in all the allied cities, Lysander was more powerful than any Lacedæmonian commander had ever been since the commencement of the war. Having his fleet well paid, he could keep it united, and direct it

¹ Diodor. xiii. 104; Plutarch, Lysand. c. 8.

² Xenoph. Hellen. ii. 1, 14; Plutarch, Lysand. c. 9.

whither he chose, without the necessity of dispersing it in roving squadrons for the purpose of levying money. It is probably from a corresponding necessity that we are to explain the inaction of the Athenian fleet at Samos; for we hear of no serious operations undertaken by it, during the whole year following the victory of Arginusæ, although under the command of an able and energetic man, Konon, together with Philoklēs and Adeimantus; to whom were added, during the spring of 405 B.C., three other generals, Tydeus, Menander, and Kephisodotus. It appears that Therimenes also was put up and elected one of the generals, but rejected when submitted to the confirmatory examination called the dokimasy.¹ The fleet comprised one hundred and eighty triremes, rather a greater number than that of Lysander; to whom they in vain offered battle near his station at Ephesus. Finding him not disposed to a general action, they seem to have dispersed to plunder Chios, and various portions of the Asiatic coast; while Lysander, keeping his fleet together, first sailed southward from Ephesus, stormed and plundered a semi-Hellenic town in the Kerameikan gulf, named Kedreia, which was in alliance with Athens, and thence proceeded to Rhodes.² He was even bold enough to make an excursion across the Ægean to the coast of Ægina and Attica, where he had an interview with Agis, who came from Dekeleia to the sea-coast.³ The Athenians were prepared to follow him thither when they learned that he had recrossed the Ægean, and he soon afterwards appeared with all his fleet at the Hellespont, which important pass they had left unguarded. Lysander went straight to Abydos, still the great Peloponnesian station in the strait, occupied by Thorax as harmost with a land force; and immediately proceeded to attack, both by sea and land, the neighboring town of Lampsakus, which was taken by storm. It was wealthy in every way, and abundantly stocked with bread and wine, so that the soldiers obtained a large booty; but Lysander left the free inhabitants untouched.⁴

¹ Lysias, Orat. xiii, cont. Agorat. sect. 13.

² Xenoph. Hellen. ii. 1, 15, 16.

³ This flying visit of Lysander across the Ægean to the coasts of Attica and Ægina is not noticed by Xenophon, but it appears both in Diodorus and in Plutarch (Diodor. xiii, 104; Plutarch, Lysand. c. 9).

⁴ Xenoph. Hellen. ii. 1, 18, 19; Diodor. xiii, 104; Plutarch, Lysand. c. 9.

The Athenian fleet seems to have been employed in plundering Chios, when it received news that the Lacedæmonian commander was at the Hellespont engaged in the siege of Lampsakus. Either from the want of money, or from other causes which we do not understand, Konon and his colleagues were partly inactive, partly behindhand with Lysander, throughout all this summer. They now followed him to the Hellespont, sailing out on the sea-side of Chios and Lesbos, away from the Asiatic coast, which was all unfriendly to them. They reached Elaüs, at the southern extremity of the Chersonese, with their powerful fleet of one hundred and eighty triremes, just in time to hear, while at their morning meal, that Lysander was already master of Lampsakus upon which they immediately proceeded up the strait to Sestos, and from thence, after stopping only to collect a few provisions, still farther up, to a place called Ægospotami.¹

Ægospotami, or Goat's River — a name of fatal sound to all subsequent Athenians — was a place which had nothing to recommend it except that it was directly opposite to Lampsakus, separated by a breadth of strait about one mile and three-quarters. But it was an open beach, without harbor, without good anchorage, without either houses or inhabitants or supplies; so that everything necessary for this large army had to be fetched from Sestos, about one mile and three-quarters distant even by land, and yet more distant by sea, since it was necessary to round a headland. Such a station was highly inconvenient and dangerous to an ancient naval armament, without any organized commissariat; since the seamen, being compelled to go to a distance from their ships in order to get their meals, were not easily reassembled. Yet this was the station chosen by the Athenian generals, with the full design of compelling Lysander to fight a battle. But the Lacedæmonian admiral, who was at Lampsakus, in a good harbor, with a well-furnished town in his rear, and a land-force to coöperate, had no intention of accepting the challenge of his enemies at the moment which suited their convenience. When the Athenians sailed across the strait the next morning, they found all his ships fully manned, — the men having already taken their morning meal, — and ranged in perfect order of bat-

¹ Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 1, 20, 21

tle, with the land-force disposed ashore to lend assistance; but with strict orders to await attack and not to move forward. Not daring to attack him in such a position, yet unable to draw him out by manœuvring all the day, the Athenians were at length obliged to go back to Ægospotami. But Lysander directed a few swift-sailing vessels to follow them, nor would he suffer his own men to disembark until he thus ascertained that their seamen had actually dispersed ashore.¹

For four successive days this same scene was repeated; the Athenians becoming each day more confident in their own superior strength, and more full of contempt for the apparent cowardice of the enemy. It was in vain that Alkibiadês — who from his own private forts in the Chersonese witnessed what was passing — rode up to the station and remonstrated with the generals on the exposed condition of the fleet on this open shore; urgently advising them to move round to Sestos, where they would be both close to their own supplies and safe from attack, as Lysander was at Lampsakus, and from whence they could go forth to fight whenever they chose. But the Athenian generals, especially Tydeus and Menander, disregarded his advice, and even dismissed him with the insulting taunt, that they were now in command, not he.² Continuing thus in their exposed position, the Athenian seamen on each successive day became more and more careless of their enemy, and rash in dispersing the moment they returned back to their own shore. At length, on the fifth

¹ Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 1, 22-24. Plutarch. Lysand. c. 10; Diodor. xiii, 105.

² Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 1, 25; Plutarch. Lysand. c. 10; Plutarch. Alkib. c. 36.

Diodorus (xiii, 105) and Cornelius Nepos (Alkib. c. 8) represent Alkibiadês as wishing to be readmitted to a share in the command of the fleet, and as promising, if that were granted, that he would assemble a body of Thracians, attack Lysander by land, and compel him to fight a battle or retire. Plutarch (Alkib. c. 37) alludes also to promises of this sort held out by Alkibiadês.

Yet it is not likely that Alkibiadês should have talked of anything so obviously impossible. How could he bring a Thracian land-force to attack Lysander, who was on the opposite side of the Hellespont? How could he carry a land-force across in the face of Lysander's fleet.

The representation of Xenophon (followed in my text) is clear and intelligible.

day, Lysander ordered the scout-ships, which he sent forth to watch the Athenians on their return, to hoist a bright shield as a signal, as soon as they should see the ships at their anchorage and the crews ashore in quest of their meal. The moment he beheld this welcome signal, he gave orders to his entire fleet to row across as swiftly as possible from Lampsakus to Ægospotami, while Thorax marched along the strand with the land-force in case of need. Nothing could be more complete or decisive than the surprise of the Athenian fleet. All the triremes were caught at their moorings ashore, some entirely deserted, others with one or at most two of the three tiers of rowers which formed their complement. Out of all the total of one hundred and eighty, only twelve were found in tolerable order and preparation; the trireme of Konon himself, together with a squadron of seven under his immediate orders, and the consecrated ship called *paralus*, always manned by the *élite* of the Athenian seamen, being among them. It was in vain that Konon, on seeing the fleet of Lysander approaching, employed his utmost efforts to get his fleet manned and in some condition for resistance. The attempt was desperate, and the utmost which he could do was to escape himself with the small squadron of twelve, including the *paralus*. All the remaining triremes, nearly one hundred and seventy in number, were captured by Lysander on the shore, defenceless, and seemingly without the least attempt on the part of any one to resist. He landed, and made prisoners most of the crews ashore, though some of them fled and found shelter in the neighboring forts. This prodigious and unparalleled victory was obtained, not merely without the loss of a single ship, but almost without that of a single man.¹

Of the number of prisoners taken by Lysander, — which must have been very great, since the total crews of one hundred and eighty triremes were not less than thirty-six thousand men,² — we

¹ Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 1, 29; Lysias, Orat. xxi, (Ἀπολ. Δωρον.) §. 12.

² Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 1, 28; Plutarch. Lysand. c. 11; Plutarch. Alkibiad. c. 36; Cornel. Nepos, Lysand. c. 8; Polyæn. i, 45, 2.

Diodorus (xiii, 106) gives a different representation of this important military operation; far less clear and trustworthy than that of Xenophon.

³ Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 1, 28. τὰς δ' ἅλλας πύσας (νῆας) Λυσάνδρος ἐλάβε

hear only of three thousand or four thousand native Athenians, though this number cannot represent all the native Athenians in the fleet. The Athenian generals Philoklès and Adeimantus were certainly taken, and seemingly all except Konon. Some of the defeated armament took refuge in Sestos, which, however, surrendered with little resistance to the victor. He admitted them to capitulation, on condition of their going back immediately to Athens, and nowhere else: for he was desirous to multiply as much as possible the numbers assembled in that city, knowing well that the city would be the sooner starved out. Konon too was well aware that, to go back to Athens, after the ruin of the entire fleet, was to become one of the certain prisoners in a doomed city, and to meet, besides, the indignation of his fellow-citizens, so well deserved by the generals collectively. Accordingly, he resolved to take shelter with Evagoras, prince of Salamis in the island of Cyprus, sending the *paralus*, with some others of the twelve fugitive triremes, to make known the fatal news at Athens. But before he went thither, he crossed the strait — with singular daring, under the circumstances — to Cape Abarnis in the territory of Lampsakus, where the great sails of Lysander's triremes, always taken out when a trireme was made ready for fighting, lay seemingly unguarded. These sails he took away, so as to lessen the enemy's powers of pursuit, and then made the best of his way to Cyprus.¹

On the very day of the victory, Lysander sent off the Milesian privateer Theopompus to proclaim it at Sparta, who, by a wonderful speed of rowing, arrived there and made it known on the third day after starting. The captured ships were towed off and the prisoners carried across to Lampsakus, where a general assembly of the victorious allies was convened, to determine in what manner the prisoners should be treated. In this assembly, the most bitter inculpations were put forth against the Athenians, as to the manner in which they had recently dealt with their captives. The Athenian general Philoklès, having captured a Co-

νορος τῇ γῇ· τοὺς δὲ πλείστον ἀνδράς ἐν τῇ γῇ ξυνέλεξεν· οἱ δὲ καὶ ἐφυγον εἰς τὰ τεχνύρια.

¹ Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 1, 29; Diodor. xiii, 106. the latter is discordant, however, on many points.

rinthian and Andrian trireme, had put the crews to death by hurrying them headlong from a precipice. It was not difficult, in Grecian warfare, for each of the belligerents to cite precedents of cruelty against the other; but in this debate, some speakers affirmed that the Athenians had deliberated what they should do with their prisoners, in case they had been victorious at Ægospotami; and that they had determined — chiefly on the motion of Philoklès, but in spite of the opposition of Adeimantus — that they would cut off the right hands of all who were captured. Whatever opinion Philoklès may have expressed personally, it is highly improbable that any such determination was ever taken by the Athenians.¹ In this assembly of the allies, however, besides all that could be said against Athens with truth, doubtless the most extravagant falsehoods found ready credence. All the Athenian prisoners captured at Ægospotami, three thousand or four thousand in number, were massacred forthwith, Philoklès himself at their head.² The latter, taunted by Lysander with his cruel execution of the Corinthian and Andrian crews, disdained to return any answer, but placed himself in conspicuous vestments at the head of the prisoners led out to execution. If we may believe Pausanias, even the bodies of the prisoners were left unburied.

Never was a victory more complete in itself, more overwhelming in its consequences, or more thoroughly disgraceful to the defeated generals, taken collectively, than that of Ægospotami. Whether it was in reality very glorious to Lysander, is doubtful; for it was the general belief afterwards, not merely at Athens, but seemingly in other parts of Greece also, that the Athenian fleet was sold to perdition by the treason of some of its own commanders. Of this suspicion both Konon and Philoklès stand clear. Adeimantus was named as the chief traitor, and Tydeus along with him.³ Konon even preferred an accusation against

¹ Xenoph. Hellen. ii. 1, 31. This story is given with variations in Plutarch, Lysand. c. 9, and by Cicero de Offic. iii. 11. It is there the right thumb which is to be cut off, and the determination is alleged to have been taken in reference to the Æginetans.

² Xenoph. Hellen. ii. 1, 32; Pausan. ix. 32, 6; Plutarch, Lysand. c. 13.

³ Xenoph. Hellen. ii. 1, 32: Lysias cont. Alkib. A. s. 38; Pausan. iv. 17, 2 x, 9, 5; Isokratès ad Philipp. Or. v. sect. 70. Lysias, in his *Λόγος Ἐπιτρόχου* (s. 58), speaks of the treason, yet not as a matter of certainty.

Adeimantus to this effect,¹ probably by letter written home from Cyprus, and perhaps by some formal declaration made several years afterwards, when he returned to Athens as victor from the battle of Knidus. The truth of the charge cannot be positively demonstrated, but all the circumstances of the battle tend to render it probable, as well as the fact that Konon alone among all the generals was found in a decent state of preparation. Indeed we may add, that the utter impotence and inertness of the numerous Athenian fleet during the whole summer of 405 B.C. conspire to suggest a similar explanation. Nor could Lysander, master as he was of all the treasures of Cyrus, apply any portion of them more efficaciously than in corrupting the majority of the six Athenian generals, so as to nullify all the energy and ability of Konon.

The great defeat of Ægospotami took place about September 405 B.C. It was made known at Peiræus by the paralus, which arrived there during the night, coming straight from the Hellespont. Such a moment of distress and agony had never been experienced at Athens. The terrible disaster in Sicily had become known to the people by degrees, without any authorized reporter; but here was the official messenger, fresh from the scene, leaving no room to question the magnitude of the disaster or the irreparable ruin impending over the city. The wailing and cries of woe, first beginning in Peiræus, were transmitted by the guards stationed on the Long Walls up to the city. "On that night (says Xenophon) not a man slept; not merely from sorrow for the past calamity, but from terror for the future fate with which they themselves were now menaced, a retribution for what they had themselves inflicted on the Æginetans, Melians, Skioneans, and others." After this night of misery, they met in public assembly on the following day, resolving to make the best

Cornelius Nepos (Lysand. c. 1; Alcib. c. 8) notices only the disorder of the Athenian armament, not the corruption of the generals, as having caused the defeat. Nor does Diodorus notice the corruption (xiii. 105).

Both these authors seem to have copied from Theopompus, in describing the battle of Ægospotami. His description differs on many points from that of Xenophon (Theopomp. Fragm. 8, ed. Didot).

¹ Demosthen. de Fals. Legat. p. 401. c. 57.

preparations they could for a siege, to put the walls in full state of defence, and to block up two out of the three ports.¹ For Athens thus to renounce her maritime action, the pride and glory of the city ever since the battle of Salamis, and to confine herself to a defensive attitude within her own walls, was a humiliation which left nothing worse to be endured except actual famine and surrender.

Lysander was in no hurry to pass from the Hellespont to Athens. He knew that no farther corn-ships from the Euxine, and few supplies from other quarters, could now reach Athens; and that the power of the city to hold out against blockade must necessarily be very limited; the more limited, the greater the numbers accumulated within it. Accordingly, he permitted the Athenian garrisons which capitulated, to go only to Athens, and nowhere else.² His first measure was to make himself master of Chalkedon and Byzantium, where he placed the Lacedæmonian Stenoklaus as harmost, with a garrison. Next, he passed to Lesbos, where he made similar arrangements at Mitylênê and other cities. In them, as well as in the other cities which now came under his power, he constituted an oligarchy of ten native citizens, chosen from among his most daring and unscrupulous partisans, and called a dekarchy, or dekadarchy, to govern in conjunction with the Lacedæmonian harmost. Eteonikus was sent to the Thracian cities which had been in dependence on Athens, to introduce similar changes. In Thasos, however, this change was stained by much bloodshed: there was a numerous philo-Athenian party whom Lysander caused to be allured out of their place of concealment into the temple of Heraklès, under the false assurance of an amnesty: when assembled under this phylæ, they were all put to death.³ Sanguinary proceedings of the like character, many in the presence of Lysander himself,

¹ Xenoph. Hellen. ii. 2, 3; Diodor. xlii. 107.

² Xenoph. Hellen. ii. 2, 2; Plutarch. Lysand. c. 13.

³ Cornelius Nepos. Lysand. c. 2; Polyæn. i. 45, 4. It would appear that this is the same incident which Plutarch (Lysand. c. 19) recounts as if the Milesians, not the Thasiens, were the parties suffering. It cannot well be the Milesians, however, if we compare chapter 8 of Plutarch's Life of Lysander.

together with large expulsions of citizens obnoxious to his new dekarchies, signalized everywhere the substitution of Sparta for Athenian ascendancy.¹ But nowhere, except at Samos, did the citizens or the philo-Athenian party in the cities continue any open hostility, or resist by force Lysander's entrance and his revolutionary changes. At Samos, they still held out: the people had too much dread of that oligarchy, whom they had expelled in the insurrection of 412 B.C., to yield without a farther struggle.² With this single reserve, every city in alliance or dependence upon Athens submitted without resistance both to the supremacy and the subversive measures of the Lacedæmonian admiral.

The Athenian empire was thus annihilated, and Athens left altogether alone. What was hardly less painful, all her kleruchs, or out-citizens, whom she had formerly planted in Ægina, Melos, and elsewhere throughout the islands, as well as in the Chersonese, were now deprived of their properties and driven home.³

¹ Plutarch. Lysand. c. 13. πολλαῖς παραγινόμενος αὐτὸς σφαγαῖς καὶ συνεκβάλλων τοὺς τῶν πόλεων ἰσθμους, etc.

² Xenoph. Hellen. ii. 2, 6. εἰθὺς δὲ καὶ ἡ ἄλλη Ἑλλὰς ὀρειπτήκει Ἀθηναίων, πλὴν Σαμίων οἷτοι δὲ, σφαγὰς τῶν γενομένων ποιήσαντες, κατέχον τὴν πόλιν.

I interpret the words σφαγὰς τῶν γενομένων ποιήσαντες to refer to the violent revolution at Samos, described in Thucyd. viii. 21, whereby the oligarchy were dispossessed and a democratical government established. The word σφαγὰς is used by Xenophon (Hellen. v. 4, 14), in a subsequent passage, to describe the conspiracy and revolution effected by Pelopidas and his friends at Thebes. It is true that we might rather have expected the preterite participle ποιήσαντες than the aorist ποιήσαντες. But this employment of the aorist participle in a preterite sense is not uncommon with Xenophon: see κατηγορήσας, ἡδύας, i. 1, 31; γενομένους, i. 7, 1; ii. 2, 20.

It appears to me highly improbable that the Samians should have chosen this occasion to make a fresh massacre of their oligarchical citizens, as Mr. Mitford represents. The democratical Samians must have been now humbled and intimidated, seeing their subjugation approaching; and only determined to hold out by finding themselves already so deeply compromised through the former revolution. Nor would Lysander have spared them personally afterwards, as we shall find that he did, when he had them substantially in his power (ii. 3, 6), if they had now committed any fresh political massacre.

³ Xenoph. Memorab. ii. 8, 1; ii. 10, 4; Xenoph. Synops. iv. 31. Compare Demosthen. cont. Leptin. c. 24, p. 491.

The leading philo-Athenians, too, at Thasus, Byzantium, and other dependent cities,¹ were forced to abandon their homes in the like state of destitution, and to seek shelter at Athens. Everything thus contributed to aggravate the impoverishment, and the manifold suffering, physical as well as moral, within her walls. Notwithstanding the pressure of present calamity, however, and yet worse prospects for the future, the Athenians prepared, as best they could, for an honorable resistance.

It was one of their first measures to provide for the restoration of harmony, and to interest all in the defence of the city, by removing every sort of disability under which individual citizens might now be suffering. Accordingly, Patrokleidēs — having first obtained special permission from the people, without which it would have been unconstitutional to make any proposition for abrogating sentences judically passed, or releasing debtors regularly inscribed in the public registers — submitted a decree such as had never been mooted since the period when Athens was in a condition equally desperate, during the advancing march of Xerxes. All debtors to the state, either recent or of long standing; all official persons now under investigation by the Logistæ, or about to be brought before the dikastery on the usual accountability after office; all persons who were liquidating by instalment debts due to the public, or had given bail for sums thus owing; all persons who had been condemned either to total disfranchisement, or to some specific disqualification or disability; nay, even all those who, having been either members or auxiliaries of the Four Hundred, had stood trial afterwards, and had been condemned to any one of the above-mentioned penalties, all these persons were pardoned and released; every register of the penalty or condemnation being directed to be destroyed. From this comprehensive pardon were excepted: Those among the Four Hundred who had fled from Athens without standing their

A great number of new proprietors acquired land in the Chersonese through the Lacedæmonian sway, doubtless in place of these dispossessed Athenians; perhaps by purchase at a low price, but most probably by appropriation without purchase (Xenoph. Hellen. iv, §. 5).

¹ Xenoph. Hellen. i. 2. 1; Demosthen. cont. Leptin. c. 14, p. 474. Ekphantus and the other Thasian exiles received the grant of ἀτιμία, or immunity from the peculiar charges imposed upon metics at Athens.



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trial; those who had been condemned either to exile or to death by the Areopagus, or any of the other constituted tribunals for homicide, or for subversion of the public liberty. Not merely the public registers of all the condemnations thus released were ordered to be destroyed, but it was forbidden, under severe penalties, to any private citizen to keep a copy of them, or to make any allusion to such misfortunes.¹

Pursuant to the comprehensive amnesty and forgiveness adopted by the people in this decree of Patrokleidēs, the general body of citizens swore to each other a solemn pledge of mutual harmony in the acropolis.² The reconciliation thus introduced enabled them the better to bear up under their distress;³ especially as the persons relieved by the amnesty were, for the most part, not men politically disaffected, like the exiles. To restore the latter, was a measure which no one thought of: indeed, a large proportion of them had been and were still at Dekeleia, assisting the Lacedæmonians in their warfare against Athens.⁴ But even the most prudent internal measures could do little for Athens in reference to her capital difficulty, that of procuring subsistence for the numerous population within her walls, augmented every day by outlying garrisons and citizens. She had long been shut out from the produce of Attica by the garrison at Dekeleia; she obtained nothing from Eubœa, and since the late defeat of Ægospotami, nothing from the Euxine, from Thrace, or from the islands. Perhaps some corn may still have reached her from Cyprus, and her small remaining navy did what was possible to keep Peiræus supplied,⁵ in spite of the menacing prohibitions of Lysander, pre-

¹ This interesting decree or psephism of Patrokleidēs is given at length in the Oration of Andokidēs de Mysteriis, sects. 76-80: "Α δ' εἶρηται ἐξαλείψαι μὴ κεκτῆσθαι ἰδίᾳ μηδὲν ἐξεῖναι, μηδὲ μνησικακῆσαι μηδέποτε.

² Andokid. de Myst. s. 76. καὶ πιστεῖν ἀλλήλοις περὶ ὁμονοίας δοῦναι ἐν ἀκροπόλει.

³ Xenoph. Hellen. ii. 2, 11. τοὺς ἀτίμους ἐπιτίμους ποιήσαντες ἐκατέρωθεν.

⁴ Andokidēs de Mysteriis, sects. 80-101; Lysias, Orat. xviii, De Bonis Nisiæ Fratr. sect. 9.

At what particular moment the severe condemnatory decree had been passed by the Athenian assembly against the exiles serving with the Lacedæmonian garrison at Dekeleia, we do not know. The decree is mentioned by Lykurgus, cont. Leokrat. sects. 122, 123, p. 164.

⁵ Isokratēs adv. Kallimachum, sect. 71; compare Andokidēs de Reditu.

ceding his arrival to block it up effectually; but to accumulate any stock for a siege, was utterly impossible.

At length, about November, 405 B.C., Lysander reached the Saronic gulf, having sent intimation beforehand, both to Agis and to the Lacedæmonians, that he was approaching with a fleet of two hundred triremes. The full Lacedæmonian and Peloponnesian force (all except the Argeians), under king Pausanias, was marched into Attica to meet him, and encamped in the precinct of Acadêmus, at the gates of Athens; while Lysander, first coming to Ægina with his overwhelming fleet of one hundred and fifty sail; next, ravaging Salamis, blocked up completely the harbor of Peiræus. It was one of his first measures to collect together the remnant which he could find of the Æginetan and Melian populations, whom Athens had expelled and destroyed; and to restore to them the possession of their ancient islands.¹

Though all hope had now fled, the pride, the resolution, and the despair of Athens, still enabled her citizens to bear up; nor was it until some men actually began to die of hunger, that they sent propositions to entreat peace. Even then their propositions were not without dignity. They proposed to Agis to become allies of Sparta, retaining their walls entire and their fortified harbor of Peiræus. Agis referred the envoys to the ephors at Sparta, to whom he at the same time transmitted a statement of their propositions. But the ephors did not even deign to admit the envoys to an interview, but sent messengers to meet them at Sellasia on the frontier of Laconia, desiring that they would go back and come again prepared with something more admissible, and acquainting them at the same time that no proposition could be received which did not include the demolition of the Long Walls, for a continuous length of ten stadia. With this gloomy reply the envoys returned. Notwithstanding all the suffering in the city, the senate and people would not consent even to take such humiliating terms into consideration. A senator named Archestratus, who advised that they should be accepted, was placed in

quo, sect. 21, and Lysias cont. Diogenet. Or. xxxii. sect. 22, about Cyprus and the Chersonese, as ordinary sources of supply of corn to Athens.

¹ Xenoph. Hellen. ii. 2. 5; Diodor. xiii. 107.

custody, and a general vote was passed,¹ on the proposition of Kleophon, forbidding any such motion in future.

Such a vote demonstrates the courageous patience both of the senate and the people; but unhappily it supplied no improved prospects, while the suffering within the walls continued to become more and more aggravated. Under these circumstances, Theramenes offered himself to the people to go as envoy to Lysander and Sparta, affirming that he should be able to detect what the real intention of the ephors was in regard to Athens, whether they really intended to root out the population and sell them as slaves. He pretended, farther, to possess personal influence, founded on circumstances which he could not divulge, such as would very probably insure a mitigation of the doom. He was accordingly sent, in spite of strong protest from the senate of Areopagus and others, — but with no express powers to conclude, — simply to inquire and report. We hear with astonishment that he remained more than three months as companion of Lysander, who, he alleged, had detained him thus long, and had only acquainted him, after the fourth month had begun, that no one but the ephors had any power to grant peace. It seems to have been the object of Theramenes, by this long delay, to wear out the patience of the Athenians, and to bring them into such a state of intolerable suffering, that they would submit to any terms of peace which would only bring provisions into the town. In this scheme he completely succeeded; and considering how great were the privations of the people even at the moment of his departure, it is not easy to understand how they could have been able to sustain protracted and increasing famine for three months longer.²

We make out little that is distinct respecting these last moments of imperial Athens. We find only an heroic endurance displayed, to such a point that numbers actually died of starvation, without

¹ Xenoph. Hellen. ii. 2, 12-15; Lysias cont. Agorat. sects. 10-12.

² Xenoph. Hellen. ii. 2, 16; Lysias, Orat. xiii, cont. Agorat. sect. 12; Lysias, Orat. x., cont. Eratosthen. sects. 65-71.

See an illustration of the great suffering during the siege, in Xenophon, Apolog. Socrat. s. 18.

any offer to surrender on humiliating conditions.¹ Amidst the general acrimony, and exasperated special antipathies, arising out of such a state of misery, the leading men who stood out most earnestly for prolonged resistance became successively victims to the prosecutions of their enemies. The demagogue Kleophon was condemned and put to death, on the accusation of having evaded his military duty; the senate, whose temper and proceedings he had denounced, constituting itself a portion of the *dikastery* which tried him, contrary both to the forms and the spirit of Athenian judicatures.² Such proceedings, however, though denounced by orators in subsequent years as having contributed to betray the city into the hands of the enemy, appear to have been without any serious influence on the result, which was brought about purely by famine.

By the time that Theramenes returned after his long absence, so terrible had the pressure become, that he was sent forth again with instructions to conclude peace upon any terms. On reaching Sellasia, and acquainting the ephors that he had come with unlimited powers for peace, he was permitted to come to Sparta, where the assembly of the Peloponnesian confederacy was convened, to settle on what terms peace should be granted. The leading allies, especially Corinthians and Thebans, recommended that no agreement should be entered into, nor any farther measure kept, with this hated enemy now in their power; but that the name of Athens should be rooted out, and the population sold for

¹ Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 2, 15-21; compare Isokratēs, Arcopagit. Or. vii, sect. 73.

² Lysias, Orat. xiii, cont. Agorat. sects. 15, 16, 17; Orat. xxx, cont. Nikomach. sects. 13-17.

This seems the most probable story as to the death of Kleophon, though the accounts are not all consistent, and the statement of Xenophon, especially (Hellen. i, 7, 35), is not to be reconciled with Lysias. Xenophon conceived Kleophon as having perished earlier than this period, in a sedition (*στάσεως τινος γενομένης ἐν ᾗ Κλεοφῶν ἀπέθανε*), before the flight of Kallixenus from his recognizances. It is scarcely possible that Kallixenus could have been still under recognizance, during this period of suffering between the battle of Ægospotami and the capture of Athens. He must have escaped before that battle. Neither long detention of an accused party in prison, before trial, nor long postponement of trial when he was under recognizance were at all in Athenian habits.

slaves. Many of the other allies seconded the same views, which would have probably commanded a majority, had it not been for the resolute opposition of the Lacedæmonians themselves; who declared unequivocally that they would never consent to annihilate or enslave a city which had rendered such capital service to all Greece at the time of the great common danger from the Persians.¹ Lysander farther calculated on so dealing with Athens, as to make her into a dependency, and an instrument of increased power to Sparta, apart from her allies. Peace was accordingly granted on the following conditions: That the Long Walls and the fortifications of the Peiræus should be destroyed; that the Athenians should evacuate all their foreign possessions, and confine themselves to their own territory; that they should surrender all their ships of war; that they should readmit all their exiles; that they should become allies of Sparta, following her leadership both by sea and land, and recognizing the same enemies and friends.²

With this document, written according to Lacedæmonian practice on a *skytalē*, — or roll intended to go round a stick, of which

¹ Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 2, 19; vi, 5, 35-46; Plutarch, Lysand. c. 15.

The Thebans, a few years afterwards, when they were soliciting aid from the Athenians against Sparta, disavowed this proposition of their delegate Erianthus, who had been the leader of the Bœotian contingent serving under Lysander at Ægospotami, honored in that character by having his statue erected at Delphi, along with the other allied leaders who took part in the battle, and along with Lysander and Eteonikus (Pausan. x, 9, 4).

It is one of the exaggerations so habitual with Isokratēs, to serve a present purpose, when he says that the Thebans were the *only* parties, among all the Peloponnesian confederates, who gave this harsh anti-Athenian vote (Isokratēs, Orat. Plataic. Or. xiv, sect. 34).

Demosthenēs says that the Phocians gave their vote, in the same synod, against the Theban proposition (Demosth. de Fals. Legat. c. 22, p. 361).

It seems from Diodor. xv, 63, and Polyæn. i, 45, 5, as well as from some passages in Xenophon himself, that the motives of the Lacedæmonians, in thus resisting the proposition of the Thebans against Athens, were founded in policy more than in generosity.

² Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 2, 20; Plutarch, Lysand. c. 14; Diodor. xiii, 107. Plutarch gives the express words of the Lacedæmonian decree, some of which words are very perplexing. The conjecture of G. Hermann, *αἱ χρήδουσι* instead of *ἡ χρὴ δόντες*, has been adopted into the text of Plutarch by Sintenis, though it seems very uncertain.

the Lacedæmonian commander had always one, and the ephors another, corresponding. — Theramenes went back to Athens. As he entered the city, a miserable crowd flocked round him, in distress and terror lest he should have failed altogether in his mission. The dead and the dying had now become so numerous, that peace at any price was a boon; nevertheless, when he announced in the assembly the terms of which he was bearer, strongly recommending submission to the Lacedæmonians as the only course now open, there was still a high-spirited minority who entered their protest, and preferred death by famine to such insupportable disgrace. The large majority, however, accepted them, and the acceptance was made known to Lysander.¹

It was on the 16th day of the Attic month Munychion,² — about the middle or end of March, — that this victorious commander sailed into the Peiræus, twenty-seven years, almost exactly, after that surprise of Plataea by the Thebans, which opened the Peloponnesian war. Along with him came the Athenian exiles, several of whom appear to have been serving with his army,³ and assisting him with their counsel. To the population of Athens generally, his entry was an immediate relief, in spite of the cruel degradation, or indeed political extinction, with which it was accompanied. At least it averted the sufferings and horrors of famine, and permitted a decent interment of the many unhappy victims who had already perished. The Lacedæmonians, both naval and military force, under Lysander and Agis, continued in occupation of Athens until the conditions of the peace had been fulfilled. All the triremes in Peiræus were carried away by Lysander, except twelve, which he permitted the Athenians to retain: the ephors, in their skytalê, had left it to his discretion what number he would thus allow.⁴ The unfinished ships in the dock-

¹ Xenoph. Hellen. ii. 2, 23. Lysias (Orat. xii. cont. Eratosth. s. 71) lays the blame of this wretched and humiliating peace upon Theramenes, who plainly ought not to be required to bear it; compare Lysias, Orat. xiii. cont. Agorat. sects. 12-20.

² Plutarch, Lysand. c. 15. He says, however, that this was also the day on which the Athenians gained the battle of Salamis. This is incorrect: that victory was gained in the month Boedromion.

³ Xenoph. Hellen. ii. 2, 18.

⁴ Xenoph. Hellen. ii. 2, 20; ii. 3, 8; Plutarch, Lysand. c. 14. He gives the contents of the skytalê *verbatim*.

yards were burnt, and the arsenals themselves ruined.¹ To demolish the Long Walls and the fortifications of Peiræus, was however, a work of some time; and a certain number of days were granted to the Athenians, within which it was required to be completed. In the beginning of the work, the Lacedæmonians and their allies all lent a hand, with the full pride and exultation of conquerors; amidst women playing the flute and dancers crowned with wreaths; mingled with joyful exclamations from the Peloponnesian allies, that this was the first day of Grecian freedom.² How many days were allowed for this humiliating duty imposed upon Athenian hands, of demolishing the elaborate, tutelary, and commanding works of their forefathers, we are not told. But the business was not completed within the interval named, so that the Athenians did not come up to the letter of the conditions, and had therefore, by strict construction, forfeited their title to the peace granted.³ The interval seems, however, to have been prolonged; probably considering that for the real labor, as well as the melancholy character of the work to be done, too short a time had been allowed at first.

It appears that Lysander, after assisting at the solemn ceremony of beginning to demolish the walls, and making such a breach as left Athens without any substantial means of resistance, did not remain to complete the work, but withdrew with a portion of his fleet to undertake the siege of Samos which still held out, leaving the remainder to see that the conditions imposed were fulfilled.⁴ After so long an endurance of extreme misery, doubtless the general population thought of little except relief from famine and its accompaniments, without any disposition to con-

¹ Plutarch, Lysand. c. 15. Lysias cont. Agorat. sect. 50 *ἵτι δὲ τὰ τεῖχη ὡς κατεσκαφῆν, καὶ αἱ νῆες τοῖς πολέμοις παρεδόθησαν, καὶ τὰ νεώρια καθηρέθη* etc.

² Xenoph. Hellen. ii. 2, 23. *Καὶ τὰ τεῖχη κατεσκαπτοῦν ὑπ' ἀνλητρίδων πολλῇ προθυμίᾳ, νομίζοντες ἐκείνην τὴν ἡμέραν τῇ Ἑλλάδι ἀρχεῖν τῆς ἐλευθερίας.*

Plutarch, Lysand. c. 15.

³ Lysias cont. Eratosth. Or. xii. sect. 75. p. 431, R.; Plutarch, Lysand. c. 15. Diodor. xiv. 3.

⁴ Lysander dedicated a golden crown to Athênê in the acropolis, which is recorded in the inscriptions among the articles belonging to the goddess. See Boeckh, Corp. Inscr. Attic. Nos. 150-152, p. 235.

tend against the fiat of their conquerors. If some high-spirited men formed an exception to the pervading depression, and still kept up their courage against better days, there was at the same time a party of totally opposite character, to whom the prostrate condition of Athens was a source of revenge for the past, exultation for the present, and ambitious projects for the future. These were partly the remnant of that faction which had set up, seven years before, the oligarchy of Four Hundred, and still more, the exiles, including several members of the Four Hundred,¹ who now flocked in from all quarters. Many of them had been long serving at Dekeleia, and had formed a part of the force blockading Athens. These exiles now revisited the acropolis as conquerors, and saw with delight the full accomplishment of that foreign occupation at which many of them had aimed seven years before, when they constructed the fortress of Ectoneia, as a means of insuring their own power. Though the conditions imposed extinguished at once the imperial character, the maritime power, the honor, and the independence of Athens, these men were as eager as Lysander to carry them all into execution; because the continuance of the Athenian democracy was now entirely at his mercy, and because his establishment of oligarchies in the other subdued cities plainly intimated what he would do in this great focus of Grecian democratical impulse.

Among these exiles were comprised Aristodemus and Aristotelês, both seemingly persons of importance, the former having at one time been one of the Hellenotamiæ, the first financial office of the imperial democracy, and the latter an active member of the Four Hundred;² also Chariklês, who had been so distinguished for his violence in the investigation respecting the Hermæ, and another man, of whom we now for the first time obtain historical

¹ Lysias, Or. xiii, cont. Agorat. s. 80.

² Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 2, 18, ii, 3, 46; Plutarch, Vit. x, Orator. Vit. Lyeurg. init.

M. E. Meier, in his Commentary on Lykurgus, construes this passage of Plutarch differently, so that the person therein specified as exile would be, not Aristodemus, but the grandfather of Lykurgus. But I do not think this construction justified: see Meier, Comm. de Lykurg. Vitâ, p. iv, (Hall 1847).

Respecting Chariklês, see Isokratês, Orat. xvi, De Bigis, s. 52.

knowledge in detail. Kritias, son of Kallæschrus. He had been among the persons accused as having been concerned in the mutilation of the Hermæ, and seems to have been for a long time important in the political, the literary, and the philosophical world of Athens. To all three, his abilities qualified him to do honor. Both his poetry, in the Solonian or moralizing vein, and his eloquence, published specimens of which remained in the Augustan age, were of no ordinary merit. His wealth was large, and his family among the most ancient and conspicuous in Athens: one of his ancestors had been friend and companion of the lawgiver Solon. He was himself maternal uncle of the philosopher Plato,¹ and had frequented the society of Sokratês so much as to have his name intimately associated in the public mind with that remarkable man. We know neither the cause, nor even the date of his exile, except so far, as that he was not in banishment immediately after the revolution of the Four Hundred, and that he *was* in banishment at the time when the generals were condemned after the battle of Arginusæ.² He had passed the time, or a part of the time, of his exile in Thessaly, where he took an active part in the sanguinary feuds carried on among the oligarchical parties of that lawless country. He is said to have embraced, along with a leader named, or surnamed, Prometheus, what passed for the democratical side in Thessaly: arming the penestæ, or serfs, against their masters.³ What the conduct and dispositions of Kritias had been before this period we are unable to say; but he brought with him now, on return

¹ See Stallbaum's Preface to the Charmidês of Plato, his note on the Timæus of Plato, p. 20, E, and the Scholia on the same passage.

Kritias is introduced as taking a conspicuous part in four of the Platonic dialogues; Protagoras, Charmidês, Timæus, and Kritias; the last only a fragment, not to mention the Erxias.

The small remains of the elegiac poetry of Kritias are to be found in Schneidewin, Delect. Poet. Græc. p. 136, seq. Both Cicero (De Orat. ii, 22, 33) and Dionys. Hal. (Judic. de Lysiâ, c. 2, p. 454; Jud. de Isæo, p. 627) notice his historical compositions.

About the concern of Kritias in the mutilation of the Hermæ, as affirmed by Diognêtus, see Andokidês de Mysteriis, s. 47. He was first cousin of Andokidês, by the mother's side.

² Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 3, 35.

³ Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 3, 35. Memorab. i, 2, 24.

ing from exile, not merely an unmeasured and unprincipled lust of power, but also a rancorous impulse towards spoliation and bloodshed¹ which outran even his ambition, and ultimately ruined both his party and himself.

Of all these returning exiles, animated with mingled vengeance and ambition, Kritias was decidedly the leading man, like Antiphon among the Four Hundred; partly from his abilities, partly from the superior violence with which he carried out the common sentiment. At the present juncture, he and his fellow-exiles became the most important persons in the city, as enjoying most the friendship and confidence of the conquerors. But the oligarchical party at home were noway behind them, either in servility or in revolutionary fervor, and an understanding was soon established between the two. Probably the old faction of the Four Hundred, though put down, had never wholly died out: at any rate, the political hetairies, or clubs, out of which it was composed, still remained, prepared for fresh cooperation when a favorable moment should arrive; and the catastrophe of Ægospotami had made it plain to every one that such moment could not be far distant. Accordingly, a large portion, if not the majority, of the senators, became ready to lend themselves to the destruction of the democracy, and only anxious to insure places among the oligarchy in prospect;² while the supple Theramenes — resuming his place as oligarchical leader, and abusing his mission as envoy to wear out the patience of his half-famished countrymen — had, during his three months' absence in the tent of Lysander, concerted arrangements with the exiles for future proceedings.³

As soon as the city surrendered, and while the work of demolition was yet going on, the oligarchical party began to organize itself. The members of the political clubs again came together, and named a managing committee of five, called ephors in com-

¹ Xenoph. Hellen. ii. 2. ἐπεὶ δὲ αὐτὸς μὲν (Kritias) προσηύχετο ἡμῖν ἐπὶ τὸ πολλοὺς ἀποστρεῖναι, ἅτε καὶ οὐκ ὄντος τοῦ δήμου, etc.

² Lysias cont. Agorat. Or. xiii. s. 23, p. 132.

³ Lysias cont. Eratosth. Or. xii. s. 78, p. 128. Theramenes is described, in his subsequent defence, οὐκ ἐδίδωκεν μὲν τοῖς φεύγουσιν ὅτι δι' αὐτὸν κατέλθοιεν, etc.

The general narrative of Xenophon, meagre as it is, harmonizes with this.

pliment to the Lacedæmonians, to direct the general proceedings of the party; to convene meetings when needful, to appoint subordinate managers for the various tribes, and to determine what propositions were to be submitted to the public assembly.¹ Among these five ephors were Kritias and Eratosthenes; probably Theramenes also.

But the oligarchical party, though thus organized and ascendant, with a compliant senate and a dispirited people, and with an auxiliary enemy actually in possession, still thought themselves not powerful enough to carry their intended changes without seizing the most resolute of the democratical leaders. Accordingly, a citizen named Theokritus tendered an accusation to the senate against the general Strombichides, together with several others of the democratical generals and taxiarchs; supported by the deposition of a slave, or lowborn man, named Agoratus. Although Nikias and several other citizens tried to prevail upon Agoratus to leave Athens, furnished him with the means of escape, and offered to go away with him themselves from Manychia, until the political state of Athens should come into a more assured condition;² yet he refused to retire, appeared

¹ Lysias cont. Eratosth. Or. xii. s. 44, p. 124. Ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἡ πανμαχία καὶ ἡ συμφορὰ τῇ πόλει ἐγένετο, δημοκρατίας ἐτι δόσης, οὐκ ὅσον τῆς στασεως ἦσαν, πλείτε ἀνδρες ἱσθόρι κατέστησαν ἑπὶ τῶν καλουμένων ἐταίρων, συνήγαγον μὲν τῶν πολιτῶν, ἀρχαί: τῶν δὲ τῶν στρατοῦ, ἐναντία δὲ τῷ ἡμετέρῳ πλεῖστον πρᾶττοντι.

² Lysias cont. Agorat. Or. xiii. s. 28 (p. 132); s. 35, p. 133. Καὶ παρορῶντες δύο τῶν Μοναρχιστῶν, ἔδιδοντο αὐτῶν (Ἀγορατῶν) παντὶ τρόπῳ ἀπαλῶναι Ἀθήνησιν, καὶ αὐτοὶ ἔρσαν συνεκκλιναμένους, ὥς τὰ πρᾶγματα κατὰ στήθεα, etc.

Lysias represents this accusation of the generals, and this behavior of Agoratus, as having occurred *before* the surrender of the city, but *after* the return of Theramenes, bringing back the final terms imposed by the Lacedæmonians. He thus so colors it, that Agoratus, by getting the generals out of the way was the real cause why the degrading peace brought by Theramenes was accepted. Had the generals remained at large, he affirms, they would have prevented the acceptance of this degrading peace, and would have been able to obtain better terms from the Lacedæmonians (see Lysias cont. Agor. sects. 16-20).

Without questioning generally the matters of fact set forth by Lysias in this oration (delivered a long time afterwards, see s. 90), I believe that he

before the senate, and accused the generals of being concerned in a conspiracy to break up the peace; pretending to be himself their accomplice. Upon his information, given both before the senate and before an assembly at Munychia, the generals, the taxiarchs, and several other citizens, men of high worth and courageous patriots, were put into prison, as well as Agoratus himself, to stand their trial afterwards before a dikastery consisting of two thousand members. One of the parties thus accused, Menestratus, being admitted by the public assembly, on the proposition of Hagnodôrus, the brother-in-law of Kritias, to become accusing witness, named several additional accomplices, who were also forthwith placed in custody.¹

Though the most determined defenders of the democratical constitution were thus eliminated, Kritias and Theramênês still farther insured the success of their propositions by invoking the presence of Lysander from Samos. The demolition of the walls had been completed, the main blockading army had disbanded, and the immediate pressure of famine had been removed, when an assembly was held to determine on future modifications of the constitution. A citizen named Drakontidês,² moved that a Board of Thirty should be named, to draw up laws for the future government of the city, and to manage provisionally the public affairs, until that task should be completed. Among the thirty persons proposed, prearranged by Theramênês and the oligarchical five ephors, the most prominent names were those of Kritias and Theramênês: there were, besides, Drakontidês himself, — Onomaklês, one of the Four Hundred who had escaped, — Aristotelês and Chariklês, both exiles newly returned, Eratosthenês,

misdates them, and represents them as having occurred *before* the surrender, whereas they really occurred *after* it. We know from Xenophon, that when Theramênês came back the second time with the real peace, the people were in such a state of famine, that farther waiting was impossible: the peace was accepted immediately that it was proposed; cruel as it was, the people were glad to get it (Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 2, 22). Besides, how could Agoratus be conveyed with two vessels out of Munychia, when the harbor was closely blocked up? and what is the meaning of *εως τα πρυμνα καταστειν*, referred to a moment just *before* the surrender?

¹ Lysias cont. Agorat. Or. xiii, sects. 38, 60, 68.

² Lysias cont. Eratosth. Or. x i, s. 74: compare Aristotle ap. Schol. ed. Aristophan. Vesp. 157.

and others whom we do not know, but of whom probably several had also been exiles or members of the Four Hundred.¹ Though this was a complete abrogation of the constitution, yet so conscious were the conspirators of their own strength, that they did not deem it necessary to propose the formal suspension of the *graphê paranomôn*, as had been done prior to the installation of the former oligarchy. Still, notwithstanding the seizure of the leaders and the general intimidation prevalent, a loud murmur of repugnance was heard in the assembly at the motion of Drakontidês. But Theramênês rose up to defy the murmur, telling the assembly that the proposition numbered many partisans even among the citizens themselves, and that it had, besides, the approbation of Lysander and the Lacedæmonians. This was presently confirmed by Lysander himself, who addressed the assembly in person. He told them, in a menacing and contemptuous tone, that Athens was now at his mercy, since the walls had not been demolished before the day specified, and consequently the conditions of the promised peace had been violated. He added that, if they did not adopt the recommendation of Theramênês, they would be forced to take thought for their personal safety instead of for their political constitution. After a notice at once so plain and so crushing, farther resistance was vain. The dissentients all quitted the assembly in sadness and indignation; while a remnant — according to Lysias, inconsiderable in number as well as worthless in character — stayed to vote acceptance of the motion.²

Seven years before, Theramênês had carried, in conjunction with Antiphon and Phrynichus, a similar motion for the installation of the Four Hundred; extorting acquiescence by domestic terrorism as well as by multiplied assassinations. He now, in conjunction with Kritias and the rest, a second time extinguished the constitution of his country, by the still greater humiliation of a foreign conqueror dictating terms to the Athenian people assembled in their own Pnyx. Having seen the Thirty regularly constituted, Lysander retired from Athens to finish the siege of Samos, which still held out. Though blocked up both by land

¹ Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 3, 2.

² Lysias cont. Eratosth. Or. xii, sects. 74-77.

and sea, the Samians obstinately defended themselves for ~~some~~ months longer, until the close of the summer. Nor was it until the last extremity that they capitulated; obtaining permission for every freeman to depart in safety, but with no other property except a single garment. Lysander handed over the city and the properties to the ancient citizens, that is, to the oligarchy and their partisans, who had been partly expelled, partly disfranchised, in the revolution eight years before. But he placed the government of Samos, as he had dealt with the other cities, in the hands of one of his dekadarchies, or oligarchy of Ten Samians, chosen by himself; leaving Thorax as Lacedæmonian harmost, and doubtless a force under him.¹

Having thus finished the war, and trodden out the last spark of resistance, Lysander returned in triumph to Sparta. So imposing a triumph never fell to the lot of any Greek, either before or afterwards. He brought with him every trireme out of the harbor of Peiræus, except twelve, left to the Athenians as a concession; he brought the prow-ornaments of all the ships captured at Ægospotami and elsewhere; he was loaded with golden crowns, voted to him by the various cities; and he farther exhibited a sum of money not less than four hundred and seventy talents, the remnant of those treasures which Cyrus had handed over to him for the prosecution of the war.² That sum had been greater, but is said to have been diminished by the treachery of Gylippus, to whose custody it had been committed and who sullied by such mean speculation the laurels which he had so gloriously earned at Syracuse.³ Nor was it merely the triumphant evidences of past exploits which now decorated this returning admiral. He wielded besides an extent of real power greater than any individual Greek either before or after. Imperial Sparta, as she had now become, was as it were personified in Lysander, who was master of almost all the insular, Asiatic, and Thracian cities, by means of the harmost and the native dekadarchies named by himself and selected from his creatures. To this state of things we shall presently return, when we have followed the eventful history of the Thirty at Athens.

¹ Xenoph. Hellen. ii. 3, 6-8.

² Xenoph. Hellen. ii. 3, 8.

³ Plutarch. Lysand. c. 16; Diodor. xiii. 106.

These thirty men — the parallel of the dekadarchies whom Lysander had constituted in the other cities — were intended for the same purpose, to maintain the city in a state of humiliation and dependence upon Lacedæmon, and upon Lysander, as the representative of Lacedæmon. Though appointed, in the pretended view of drawing up a scheme of laws and constitution for Athens, they were in no hurry to commence this duty. They appointed a new senate, composed of compliant, assured, and oligarchical persons; including many of the returned exiles who had been formerly in the Four Hundred, and many also of the preceding senators who were willing to serve their designs.¹ They farther named new magistrates and officers; a new Board of Eleven, to manage the business of police and the public force, with Satyrus, one of their most violent partisans, as chief; a Board of Ten, to govern in Peiræus; ² an archon, to give name to the year, Pythodôrus, and a second, or king-archon, Patroklês,³ to offer the customary sacrifices on behalf of the city. While thus securing their own ascendancy, and placing all power in the hands of the most violent oligarchical partisans, they began by professing reforming principles of the strictest virtue; denouncing the abuses of the past democracy, and announcing their determination to purge the city of evil-doers.⁴ The philosopher Plato — then a young man about twenty-four years old, of anti-democratical politics, and nephew of Kritias — was at first misled, together with various others, by these splendid professions; he conceived hopes, and even received encouragement from his relations, that he might play an active part under the new oligarchy.⁵ Though he soon came to discern how little congenial his feelings were with theirs, yet in the beginning doubtless such honest illusions contributed materially to strengthen their hands.

¹ Xenoph. Hellen. ii. 2, 11; Lysias cont. Agorat. Orat. xiii. sects. 23-30.

Tisias, the brother-in-law of Chariklês, was a member of this senate (Isokratês, Or. xvi. De Bigis, s. 53).

² Plato, Epist. vii. p. 324, B.; Xenoph. Hellen. ii. 3, 54.

³ Isokratês cont. Kallimach. Or. xviii. s. 6, p. 372.

⁴ Lysias, Orat. xii. cont. Eratosth. s. 5, p. 121. 'Ἐπειδὴ δ' οἱ τριάκοντα κνηροὶ μὲν καὶ σφοδρὰνταὶ ὄντες εἰς τὴν ἀρχὴν κατέστησαν, φάσκοντε, χρὴ καὶ τῶν ἀδίκων καθαρὰν ποιῆσαι τὴν πόλιν καὶ τοὺς λοιποὺς πολίτας ἐπ' ἀρετὴν καὶ δικαιοσύνην τραπεῖσθαι, etc.

⁵ Plato, Epist. vii. p. 324, B. C.

In execution of their design to root out evil-doers, the Thirty first laid hands on some of the most obnoxious politicians under the former democracy; "men (says Xenophon) whom every one knew to live by making calumnious accusations, called sycophancy, and who were pronounced in their enmity to the oligarchical citizens." How far most of these men had been honest or dishonest in their previous political conduct under the democracy, we have no means of determining. But among them were comprised Strombichidēs and the other democratical officers who had been imprisoned under the information of Agoratus, men whose chief crime consisted in a strenuous and inflexible attachment to the democracy. The persons thus seized were brought to trial before the new senate appointed by the Thirty, contrary to the vote of the people, which had decreed that Strombichidēs and his companions should be tried before a dikastery of two thousand citizens.¹ But the dikastery, as well as all the other democratical institutions, were now abrogated, and no judicial body was left except the newly constituted senate. Even to that senate, though composed of their own partisans, the Thirty did not choose to intrust the trial of the prisoners, with that secrecy of voting which was well known at Athens to be essential to the free and genuine expression of sentiment. Whenever prisoners were tried, the Thirty were themselves present in the senate-house, sitting on the benches previously occupied by the prytanes: two tables were placed before them, one signifying condemnation, the other, acquittal; and each senator was required to deposit his pebble openly before them, either on one or on the other.² It was not merely judgment by the senate, but judgment by the senate under pressure and intimidation by the all-powerful Thirty. It seems probable that neither any semblance of defence, nor any exculpatory witnesses, were allowed; but even if such formalities were not wholly dispensed with, it is certain that there was no real trial, and that condemnation was assured beforehand. Among the great numbers whom the Thirty brought before the senate, not a single man was acquitted except the informer Agoratus, who was brought to trial as an accomplice along with Strombichidēs and his companions, but was liberated

¹ Lysias cont. Agorat. s. 38.

² Lysias cont. Agorat. s. 40.

in recompense for the information which he had given against them.¹ The statement of Isokratēs, Lysias, and others — that the victims of the Thirty, even when brought before the senate, were put to death untried — is authentic and trustworthy: many were even put to death by simple order from the Thirty themselves, without any cognizance of the senate.²

In regard to the persons first brought to trial, however, — whether we consider them, as Xenophon intimates, to have been notorious evil-doers, or to have been innocent sufferers by the reactionary vengeance of returning oligarchical exiles, as was the case certainly with Strombichidēs and the officers accused along with him, — there was little necessity for any constraint on the part of the Thirty over the senate. That body itself partook of the sentiment which dictated the condemnation, and acted as a willing instrument; while the Thirty themselves were unanimous, Theramēnēs being even more zealous than Kritias in these executions, to demonstrate his sincere antipathy towards the extinct democracy.³ As yet too, since all the persons condemned, justly or unjustly, had been marked politicians, so, all other citizens who had taken no conspicuous part in politics, even if they disapproved of the condemnations, had not been led to conceive any apprehension of the like fate for themselves. Here, then, Theramēnēs, and along with him a portion of the Thirty as well as of the senate, were inclined to pause. While enough had been done to satiate their antipathies, by the death of the most obnoxious leaders of the democracy, they at the same time conceived the oligarchical government to be securely established, and contended that farther bloodshed would only endanger its stability, by spreading alarm, multiplying enemies, and alienating friends as well as neutrals.

But these were not the views either of Kritias or of the Thirty generally, who surveyed their position with eyes very different from the unstable and cunning Theramēnēs, and who had brought

¹ Lysias cont. Agorat. s. 41.

² Lysias cont. Eratosth. s. 18, Xenoph. Hellen. ii. 3, 51; Isokrat. Orat. ix. cont. Lochit. s. 15, p. 397.

³ Xenoph. Hellen. ii. 3, 12, 28, 38. Ἀὐτὸς (Theramēnēs) μάλιστα ἐβουλήσατο ἡμῶν, τοῖς πρώτοις ὑπαγομένοις ἐς ἡμᾶς δίκην ἐπιτεθεῖναι, etc.

with them from exile a long arrear of vengeance yet to be appeased. Kritias knew well that the numerous population of Athens were devotedly attached, and had good reason to be attached, to their democracy; that the existing government had been imposed upon them by force, and could only be upheld by force; that its friends were a narrow minority, incapable of sustaining it against the multitude around them, all armed; that there were still many formidable enemies to be got rid of, so that it was indispensable to invoke the aid of a permanent Lacedæmonian garrison in Athens, as the only condition not only of their stability as a government, but even of their personal safety. In spite of the opposition of Theramenes, Æschines and Aristoteles, two among the Thirty, were despatched to Sparta to solicit aid from Lysander; who procured for them a Lacedæmonian garrison under Kallibius as harpost, which they engaged to maintain without any cost to Sparta, until their government should be confirmed by putting the evil-doers out of the way.¹ Kallibius was not only installed as master of the acropolis, — full as it was of the mementos of Athenian glory, — but was farther so caressed and won over by the Thirty, that he lent himself to everything which they asked. They had thus a Lacedæmonian military force constantly at their command, besides an organized band of youthful satellites and assassins, ready for any deeds of violence; and they proceeded to seize and put to death many citizens, who were so distinguished for their courage and patriotism, as to be likely to serve as leaders to the public discontent. Several of the best men in Athens thus successively perished, while Thrasybulus, Anytus, and many others, fearing a similar fate, fled out of Attica, leaving their property to be confiscated and appropriated by the oligarchs;² who passed a decree of exile against them in their absence, as well as against Alkibiades.³

¹ Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 3, 13. *ὥς δὲ τοὺς πονηροὺς ἐκποδῶν ποιησάμενοι καταστήσαντο τὴν πόλιν.*

² Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 3, 15, 23, 42; Isokrat. cont. Kallimach. Or. xviii, § 30, p. 375.

³ Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 3, 42, ii, 4, 14. *οὐ δὲ καὶ οὕτως ἀδικούντες, ἀλλ' οὐδ' ἐπιδιμούντες ἐφυγάδευθη, etc.*

Isokratēs, Orat. xvi, De Bigis, s. 46, p. 355.

These successive acts of vengeance and violence were warmly opposed by Theramenes, both in the council of Thirty and in the senate. The persons hitherto executed, he said, had deserved their death, because they were not merely noted politicians under the democracy, but also persons of marked hostility to oligarchical men. But to inflict the same fate on others, who had manifested no such hostility, simply because they had enjoyed influence under the democracy, would be unjust: "Even you and I (he reminded Kritias) have both said and done many things for the sake of popularity." But Kritias replied: "We cannot afford to be scrupulous; we are engaged in a scheme of aggressive ambition, and must get rid of those who are best able to hinder us. Though we are Thirty in number, and not one, our government is not the less a despotism, and must be guarded by the same jealous precautions. If you think otherwise, you must be simple-minded indeed." Such were the sentiments which animated the majority of the Thirty, not less than Kritias, and which prompted them to an endless string of seizures and executions. It was not merely the less obnoxious democratical politicians who became their victims, but men of courage, wealth, and station, in every vein of political feeling: even oligarchical men, the best and most high-principled of that party, shared the same fate. Among the most distinguished sufferers were, Lykurgus,¹ belonging to one of the most eminent sacred gentes in the state; a wealthy man named Antiphon, who had devoted his fortune to the public service with exemplary patriotism during the last years of the war, and had furnished two well-equipped triremes at his own cost; Leon, of Salamis; and even Nikeratus, son of Nikias, who had perished at Syracuse; a man who inherited from his father not only a large fortune, but a known repugnance to democratical politics, together with his uncle Eukratēs, brother of the same Nikias.² These were only a few among the numerous victims, who were seized, pronounced to be guilty by the senate or by the Thirty themselves, handed over to Satyrus and the Eleven, and condemned to perish by the customary draught of hemlock.

¹ Plutarch, Vit. x, Orator p. 838.

² Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 3, 39-41; Lysias, Orat. xviii, De Bonis Nicim Fratris, sects. 5-8.

The circumstances accompanying the seizure of Leon deserve particular notice. In putting to death him and the other victims, the Thirty had several objects in view, all tending to the stability of their dominion. First, they thus got rid of citizens generally known and esteemed, whose abhorrence they knew themselves to deserve, and whom they feared as likely to head the public sentiment against them. Secondly, the property of these victims, all of whom were rich, was seized along with their persons, and was employed to pay the satellites whose agency was indispensable for such violences, especially Kallibius and the Lacedæmonian hoplites in the acropolis. But, besides murder and spoliation, the Thirty had a farther purpose, if possible, yet more nefarious. In the work of seizing their victims, they not only employed the hands of these paid satellites, but also sent along with them citizens of station and respectability, whom they constrained by threats and intimidation to lend their personal aid in a service so thoroughly odious. By such participation, these citizens became compromised and imbrued in crime, and as it were, consenting parties in the public eye to all the projects of the Thirty; ¹ exposed to the same general hatred as the latter, and interested for their own safety in maintaining the existing dominion. Pursuant to their general plan of implicating unwilling citizens in their misdeeds, the Thirty sent for five citizens to the tholus, or government-house, and ordered them, with terrible menaces, to cross over to Salamis and bring back Leon as prisoner. Four out of the five obeyed; the fifth was the philosopher Sokratēs, who refused all concurrence and returned to his own house, while the other four

¹ Plato. Apol. Sokratēs c. 20, p. 32. Ἐπειδὴ δὲ ὀλίγοντα ἴκοντο, οἱ τριάντες αἱ μεταπεισθέντες μὴ θέλτον αὐτὰς ἐν τῷ δήμῳ προστάξαν ἀγαγεῖν ἐκ Σαλαμῶνος Ἀνδρῆς τῶν Σαλαμῶνιων, ἵσθ' ἀποθανοὶ οἷα δὴ καὶ ἄλλοις ἐκείνοι πολλοὺς προσέταττον, βουλευόμενοι ὥς πλείστοις ἀναπλῆσαι αἰτίαι.

Isokrat. cont. Kallimach. Or. xviii. sect. 23, p. 374. ἐνίοις καὶ προσέταττον ἐξαμαρτάνειν. Compare also Lyssias. Or. xii. cont. Eratosth. sect. 32.

We learn, from Andokidēs de Myster. sect. 94, that Melētus was one of the parties who actually arrested Leon, and brought him up for condemnation. It is not probable that this was the same person who afterwards accused Sokratēs. It may possibly have been his father, who bore the same name; but there is nothing to determine the point.

went to Salamis and took part in the seizure of Leon. Though he thus braved all the wrath of the Thirty, it appears that they thought it expedient to leave him untouched. But the fact that they singled him out for such an atrocity, — an old man of tried virtue, both private and public, and intellectually commanding, though at the same time intellectually unpopular, — shows to what an extent they carried their system of forcing unwilling participants; while the farther circumstance, that he was the only person who had the courage to refuse, among four others who yielded to intimidation, shows that the policy was for the most part successful.¹ The inflexible resistance of Sokratēs on this occasion, stands as a worthy parallel to his conduct as prytanis in the public assembly held on the conduct of the generals after the battle of Arginusæ, described in the preceding chapter, wherein he obstinately refused to concur in putting an illegal question.

Such multiplied cases of execution and spoliation naturally filled the city with surprise, indignation, and terror. Groups of malcontents got together, and exiles became more and more numerous. All these circumstances furnished ample material for the vehement opposition of Theramenēs, and tended to increase his party: not indeed among the Thirty themselves, but to a certain extent in the senate, and still more among the body of the citizens. He warned his colleagues that they were incurring daily an increased amount of public odium, and that their government could not possibly stand, unless they admitted into partnership an adequate number of citizens, with a direct interest in its maintenance. He proposed that all those competent, by their property, to serve the state either on horseback or with heavy armor, should be constituted citizens; leaving all the poorer freemen, a far larger number, still disfranchised.² Kritias and

¹ Plato. Apol. Sokrat. *ut sup.* Xenoph. Hellen. ii. 4, 9-23.

² Xenoph. Hellen. ii. 3, 17, 19, 48. From sect. 48, we see that Theramenēs actually made this proposition: τῶ μιν τοῖς δυνάμενοις καὶ μετ' ἵππων καὶ μετ' ἀσπίδων ὠφελεῖν τὴν πόλιν, πρόσθεν ἄριστον ἡγούμεν εἶναι, καὶ νυν οὐ μεταβάλλομαι.

This proposition, made by Theramenēs and rejected by the Thirty, explains the comment which he afterwards made, when they drew up their special catalogue or roll of three thousand, which comment otherwise appears unsuitable.

the Thirty rejected this proposition; being doubtless convinced — as the Four Hundred had felt seven years before, when Theramenes demanded of them to convert their fictitious total of Five Thousand into a real list of as many living persons — that “to enroll so great a number of partners, was tantamount to a downright democracy.”² But they were at the same time not insensible to the soundness of his advice: moreover, they began to be afraid of him personally, and to suspect that he was likely to take the lead in a popular opposition against them, as he had previously done against his colleagues of the Four Hundred. They therefore resolved to comply in part with his recommendations, and accordingly prepared a list of three thousand persons to be invested with the political franchise; chosen, as much as possible, from their own known partisans and from oligarchical citizens. Besides this body, they also counted on the adherence of the horsemen, among the wealthiest citizens of the state. These horsemen, or knights, taking them as a class, — the thousand good men of Athens, whose virtues Aristophanes sets forth in hostile antithesis to the alleged demagogic vices of Kleon, — remained steady supporters of the Thirty, throughout all the enormities of their career.³ What privileges or functions were assigned to the chosen three thousand, we do not hear, except that they could not be condemned without the warrant of the senate, while any other Athenian might be put to death by the simple fiat of the Thirty.³

A body of partners thus chosen — not merely of fixed number, but of picked oligarchical sentiments — was by no means the addition which Theramenes desired. While he commented on the folly of supposing that there was any charm in the number three thousand, as if it embodied all the merit of the city, and nothing else but merit, he admonished them that it was still insufficient for their defence; their rule was one of pure force, and yet inferior in force to those over whom it was exercised. Again the Thirty acted upon his admonition, but in a way very different from that which he contemplated. They proclaimed a general muster

¹ Thucyd. viii, 89–92. τὸ μὲν καταστήσαι μετοχὸν τοσούτου, ἀντικρὺς ἀνέστησαν ἡγούμενοι.

² Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 3, 18, 19; ii, 4, 2, 8, 24. ³ Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 3, 51.

and examination of arms to all the hoplites in Athens. The Three Thousand were drawn up in arms all together in the market-place; but the remaining hoplites were disseminated in small scattered companies and in different places. After the review was over, these scattered companies went home to their meal, leaving their arms piled at the various places of muster. But the adherents of the Thirty, having been forewarned and kept together, were sent at the proper moment, along with the Lacedæmonian mercenaries, to seize the deserted arms, which were deposited under the custody of Kallibius in the acropolis. All the hoplites in Athens, except the Three Thousand and the remaining adherents of the Thirty, were disarmed by this crafty manœuvre, in spite of the fruitless remonstrance of Theramenes.¹

Kritias and his colleagues, now relieved from all fear either of Theramenes, or of any other internal opposition, gave loose, more unsparingly than ever, to their malevolence and rapacity, putting to death both many of their private enemies, and many rich victims for the purpose of spoliation. A list of suspected persons was drawn up, in which each of their adherents was allowed to insert such names as he chose, and from which the victims were generally taken.² Among informers, who thus gave in names for destruction, Batrachus and Æschylides³ stood conspicuous. The thirst of Kritias for plunder, as well as for bloodshed, only increased by gratification;⁴ and it was not merely to pay their mercenaries, but also to enrich themselves separately, that the Thirty stretched everywhere their murderous agency, which now mowed down metics as well as citizens. Theognis and Peison, two of the Thirty, affirmed that many of these metics were hostile

¹ Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 3, 20, 41; compare Lysias, Orat. xii, cont. Eratosth. sect. 41.

² Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 3, 21; Isokratēs adv. Euthyrum, sect. 5, p. 401; Isokratēs cont. Kallimach. sect. 23, p. 375; Lysias, Or. xxv, Δημ. Καταλ. Ἀπολ. sect. 21, p. 173.

The two passages of Isokratēs sufficiently designate what this list, or κατάλογος, must have been; but the name by which he calls it — ὁ μετὰ Λυσάνδρου (or Πεισανδρου) κατάλογος — is not easy to explain.

³ Lysias, Orat. vi, cont. Andokid. sect. 46; Or. xii, cont. Eratosth. sect. 49.

⁴ Xenoph. Memor. i, 2, 12. Κριτίας μὲν γὰρ τῶν ἐν τῇ ὀλιγαρχίᾳ πάντων ἐλεπτικώτατος τε καὶ διαίότατος ἐγένετο, etc.

to the oligarchy, besides being opulent men; and the resolution was adopted that each of the rulers should single out any of these victims that he pleased, for execution and pillage; care being taken to include a few poor persons in the seizure, so that the real purpose of the spoilers might be faintly disguised.

It was in execution of this scheme that the orator Lysias and his brother Polemarchus were both taken into custody. Both were metics, wealthy men, and engaged in a manufactory of shields, wherein they employed a hundred and twenty slaves. Theognis and Peison, with some others, seized Lysias in his house, while entertaining some friends at dinner; and having driven away his guests, left him under the guard of Peison, while the attendants went off to register and appropriate his valuable slaves. Lysias tried to prevail on Peison to accept a bribe and let him escape; which the latter at first promised to do, and having thus obtained access to the money-chest of the prisoner, laid hands upon all its contents, amounting to between three and four talents. In vain did Lysias implore that a trifle might be left for his necessary subsistence; the only answer vouchsafed was, that he might think himself fortunate if he escaped with life. He was then conveyed to the house of a person named Damnippus, where Theognis already was, having other prisoners in charge. At the earnest entreaty of Lysias, Damnippus tried to induce Theognis to connive at his escape, on consideration of a handsome bribe; but while this conversation was going on, the prisoner availed himself of an unguarded moment to get off through the back door, which fortunately was open, together with two other doors through which it was necessary to pass. Having first obtained refuge in the house of a friend in Peiraus, he took boat during the ensuing night for Megara. Polemarchus, less fortunate, was seized in the street by Eratosthenes, one of the Thirty, and immediately lodged in the prison, where the fatal draught of hemlock was administered to him, without delay, without trial, and without liberty of defence. While his house was plundered of a large stock of gold, silver, furniture, and rich ornaments; while the golden earrings were torn from the ears of his wife; and while seven hundred shields, with a hundred and twenty slaves, were confiscated, together with the workshop and the two dwelling-houses; the Thirty would not allow even a decent funeral to the deceased, but

caused his body to be carried away on a hired bier from the prison, with covering and a few scanty appurtenances supplied by the sympathy of private friends.¹

Amidst such atrocities, increasing in number and turned more and more to shameless robbery, the party of Theramenès daily gained ground, even in the senate; many of whose members profited nothing by satiating the private cupidity of the Thirty, and began to be weary of so revolting a system, as well as alarmed at the host of enemies which they were raising up. In proposing the late seizure of the metics, the Thirty had desired Theramenès to make choice of any victim among that class, to be destroyed and plundered for his own personal benefit. But he rejected the suggestion emphatically, denouncing the enormity of the measure in the indignant terms which it deserved. So much was the antipathy of Kritias and the majority of the Thirty against him, already acrimonious from the effects of a long course of opposition, exasperated by this refusal; so much did they fear the consequences of incurring the obloquy of such measures for themselves, while Theramenès enjoyed all the credit of opposing them; so satisfied were they that their government could not stand with this dissension among its own members; that they resolved to destroy him at all cost. Having canvassed as many of the senators as they could, to persuade them that Theramenès was conspiring against the oligarchy, they caused the most daring of their satellites to attend one day in the senate-house, close to the railing which fenced in the senators, with daggers concealed under their garments. So soon as Theramenès appeared, Kritias rose and denounced him to the senate as a public enemy, in an harangue which Xenophon gives at considerable length, and which is so full of instructive evidence, as to Greek political feeling, that I here extract the main points in abridgment:—

“If any of you imagine, senators, that more people are perishing than the occasion requires, reflect, that this happens everywhere in a time of revolution, and that it must especially happen in the

¹ Lysias, Or. xii, cont. Eratosthen. sects. 8, 21. Lysias prosecuted Eratosthenes before the dikastery some years afterwards, as having caused the death of Polemarchus. The foregoing details are found in the oration, spoken as well as composed by himself.

establishment of an oligarchy at Athens, the most populous city in Greece, and where the population has been longest accustomed to freedom. You know as well as we do, that democracy is to both of us an intolerable government, as well as incompatible with all steady adherence to our protectors, the Lacedæmonians. It is under their auspices that we are establishing the present oligarchy, and that we destroy, as far as we can, every man who stands in the way of it; which becomes most of all indispensable, if such a man be found among our own body. Here stands the man, Theramenes, whom we now denounce to you as your foe not less than ours. That such is the fact, is plain from his unmeasured censures on our proceedings, from the difficulties which he throws in our way whenever we want to despatch any of the demagogues. Had such been his policy from the beginning, he would indeed have been our enemy, yet we could not with justice have proclaimed him a villain. But it is he who first originated the alliance which binds us to Sparta, who struck the first blow at the democracy, who chiefly instigated us to put to death the first batch of accused persons; and now, when you as well as we have thus incurred the manifest hatred of the people, he turns round and quarrels with our proceedings in order to insure his own safety, and leave us to pay the penalty. He must be dealt with not only as an enemy, but as a traitor, to you as well as to us; a traitor in the grain, as his whole life proves. Though he enjoyed, through his father Agnon, a station of honor under the democracy, he was foremost in subverting it, and setting up the Four Hundred; the moment he saw that oligarchy beset with difficulties, he was the first to put himself at the head of the people against them; always ready for change in both directions, and a willing accomplice in those executions which changes of government bring with them. It is he, too, who — having been ordered by the generals after the battle of Arginusæ to pick up the men on the disabled ships, and having neglected the task — accused and brought to execution his superiors, in order to get himself out of danger. He has well earned his surname of *The Buskin*, sitting both legs, but constant to neither; he has shown himself reckless both of honor and friendship, looking to nothing but his own selfish advancement; and it is for us now to guard against his doublings, in order that he may not play us the same

trick. We cite him before you as a conspirator and a traitor against you as well as against us. Look to your own safety, and not to his. For depend upon it, that if you let him off, you will hold out powerful encouragement to your worst enemies; while if you condemn him, you will crush their best hopes, both within and without the city.

Theramenes was probably not wholly unprepared for some such attack as this. At any rate, he rose up to reply to it at once: —

* First of all, senators, I shall touch upon the charge against me which Kritias mentioned last, the charge of having accused and brought to execution the generals. It was not I who began the accusation against them, but they who began it against me. They said, that they had ordered me upon the duty, and that I had neglected it; my defence was, that the duty could not be executed, in consequence of the storm; the people believed and exonerated me, but the generals were rightfully condemned on their own accusation, because *they* said that the duty might have been performed, while yet it had remained unperformed. I do not wonder, indeed, that Kritias has told these falsehoods against me; for at the time when this affair happened, he was an exile in Thessaly, employed in raising up a democracy, and arming the penestæ against their masters. Heaven grant that nothing of what he perpetrated *there* may occur at Athens! I agree with Kritias, indeed, that, whoever wishes to cut short your government, and strengthens those who conspire against you, deserves justly the severest punishment. But to whom does this charge best apply? To him, or to me? Look at the behavior of each of us, and then judge for yourselves. At first, we were all agreed, so far as the condemnation of the known and obnoxious demagogues. But when Kritias and his friends began to seize men of station and dignity, then it was that I began to oppose them. I knew that the seizure of men like Leon, Nikias, and Antiphon, would make the best men in the city your enemies. I opposed the execution of the metics, well aware that all that body would be alienated. I opposed the disarming of the citizens, and the hiring of foreign guards. And when I saw that enemies at home and exiles abroad were multiplying against you, I dissuaded you from banishing Thrasybulus and Anytus, whereby you only furnished the exiles with compe-

tent leaders The man who gives you this advice, and gives it you openly, is he a traitor, or is he not rather a genuine friend? It is you and your supporters, Kritias, who, by your murders and robberies, strengthen the enemies of the government and betray your friends. Depend upon it, that Thrasybulus and Anytus are much better pleased with your policy than they would be with mine. You accuse me of having betrayed the Four Hundred; but I did not desert them until they were themselves on the point of betraying Athens to her enemies. You call me The Buskin, as trying to fit both parties. But what am I to call *you*, who fit neither of them? who, under the democracy, were the most violent hater of the people, and who, under the oligarchy, have become equally violent as a hater of oligarchical merit? I am, and always have been, Kritias, an enemy both to extreme democracy and to oligarchical tyranny. I desire to constitute our political community out of those who can serve it on horseback and with heavy armor; I have proposed this once, and I still stand to it. I side not either with democrats or despots, to the exclusion of the dignified citizens. Prove that I am now, or ever have been, guilty of such crime, and I shall confess myself deserving of ignominious death."

This reply of Theramenes was received with such a shout of applause by the majority of the senate, as showed that they were resolved to acquit him. To the fierce antipathies of the mortified Kritias, the idea of failure was intolerable; indeed, he had now carried his hostility to such a point, that the acquittal of his enemy would have been his own ruin. After exchanging a few words with the Thirty, he retired for a few moments, and directed the Eleven with the body of armed satellites to press close on the railing whereby the senators were fenced round. — while the court before the senate-house was filled with the mercenary hoplites. Having thus got his force in hand, Kritias returned and again addressed the senate: "Senators (said he), I think it the duty of a good president, when he sees his friends around him duped, not to let them follow their own counsel. This is what I am now going to do; indeed, these men, whom you see pressing upon us from without, tell us plainly that they will not tolerate the acquittal of one manifestly working to the ruin of the oligarchy. It is an article of our new constitution, that no man of the select Three

Thousand shall be condemned without your vote; but that any man not included in that list may be condemned by the Thirty. Now I take upon me, with the concurrence of all my colleagues, to strike this Theramenes out of that list; and we, by our authority, condemn him to death."

Though Theramenes had already been twice concerned in putting down the democracy, yet such was the habit of all Athenians to look for protection from constitutional forms, that he probably accounted himself safe under the favorable verdict of the senate, and was not prepared for the monstrous and despotic sentence which he now heard from his enemy. He sprang at once to the senatorial hearth, — the altar and sanctuary in the interior of the senate-house, — and exclaimed: "I too, senators, stand as your suppliant, asking only for bare justice. Let it be not in the power of Kritias to strike out me or any other man whom he chooses; let my sentence as well as yours be passed according to the law which these Thirty have themselves prepared. I know but too well, that this altar will be of no avail to me as a defence; but I shall at least make it plain, that these men are as impious towards the gods as they are nefarious towards men. As for you, worthy senators, I wonder that you will not stand forward for your own personal safety; since you must be well aware, that your own names may be struck out of the Three Thousand just as easily as mine."

But the senate remained passive and stupefied by fear, in spite of these moving words, which perhaps were not perfectly heard, since it could not be the design of Kritias to permit his enemy to speak a second time. It was probably while Theramenes was yet speaking, that the loud voice of the herald was heard, calling the Eleven to come forward and take him into custody. The Eleven advanced into the senate, headed by their brutal chief Satyrus, and followed by their usual attendants. They went straight up to the altar, from whence Satyrus, aided by the attendants, dragged him by main force, while Kritias said to them: "We hand over to you this man Theramenes, condemned according to the law. Seize him, carry him off to prison, and there do the needful." Upon this, Theramenes was dragged out of the senate-house and carried in custody through the market-place, exclaiming with a loud voice against the atrocious treatment

which he was suffering. "Hold your tongue (said Satyrus to him), or you will suffer for it." "And if I do hold my tongue (replied Theramenes), shall not I suffer for it also?"

He was conveyed to prison, where the usual draught of hemlock was speedily administered. After he had swallowed it, there remained a drop at the bottom of the cup, which he jerked out on the floor (according to the playful convivial practice called the *Kottabus*, which was supposed to furnish an omen by its sound in falling, and after which the person who had just drunk handed the goblet to the guest whose turn came next): "Let this (said he) be for the gentle Kritias."¹

The scene just described, which ended in the execution of Theramenes, is one of the most striking and tragical in ancient history; in spite of the bald and meagre way in which it is recounted by Xenophon, who has thrown all the interest into the two speeches. The atrocious injustice by which Theramenes perished, as well as the courage and self-possession which he displayed at the moment of danger, and his cheerfulness even in the prison, not inferior to that of Sokratēs three years afterwards, naturally enlist the warmest sympathies of the reader in his favor, and have tended to exalt the positive estimation of his character. During the years immediately succeeding the restoration of the democracy,² he was extolled and pitied as one of the first martyrs to oligarchical violence: later authors went so far as to number him among the chosen pupils of Sokratēs.³ But

¹ Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 3, 56.

² See Lysias, C. xii. cont. Eratosth. s. 66.

³ Diodor. xiv, 5. Diodorus tells us that Sokratēs and two of his friends were the only persons who stood forward to protect Theramenes, when Satyrus was dragging him from the altar. Plutarch (Vit. x. Orat. p. 836) ascribes the same act of generous forwardness to Isokratēs. There is no good ground for believing it, either of one or of the other. None but senators were present; and as this senate had been chosen by the Thirty, it is not likely that either Sokratēs or Isokratēs were among its members. If Sokratēs had been a member of it, the fact would have been noticed and brought out in connection with his subsequent trial.

The manner in which Plutarch (Consolat. ad Apollon. c. 6, p. 105) states the death of Theramenes, that he was "tortured to death" by the Thirty is an instance of his loose speaking.

Compare Cicero about the death of Theramenes (Tuscul. Disp. i, 40, 96)

though Theramenes here became the victim of a much worse man than himself, it will not for that reason be proper to accord to him our admiration, which his own conduct will not at all be found to deserve. The reproaches of Kritias against him, founded on his conduct during the previous conspiracy of the Four Hundred, were in the main well founded. After having been one of the foremost originators of that conspiracy, he deserted his comrades as soon as he saw that it was likely to fail; and Kritias had doubtless present to his mind the fate of Antiphon, who had been condemned and executed under the accusation of Theramenes, together with a reasonable conviction that the latter would again turn against his colleagues in the same manner, if circumstances should encourage him to do so. Nor was Kritias wrong in denouncing the perfidy of Theramenes with regard to the generals after the battle of Arginusæ, the death of whom he was partly instrumental in bringing about, though only as an auxiliary cause, and not with that extreme stretch of nefarious stratagem, which Xenophon and others have imputed to him. He was a selfish, cunning, and faithless man, — ready to enter into conspiracies, yet never foreseeing their consequences, — and breaking faith to the ruin of colleagues whom he had first encouraged, when he found them more consistent and thorough-going in crime than himself.¹

Such high-handed violence, by Kritias and the majority of the Thirty, — carried though even against a member of their own Board, by intimidation of the senate, — left a feeling of disgust and dissension among their own partisans from which their power never recovered. Its immediate effect, however, was to render them, apparently, and in their own estimation, more powerful than ever. All open manifestation of dissent being now silenced, they proceeded to the uttermost limits of cruel and licentious tyranny. They made proclamation, that every one not included in the list of Three Thousand, should depart without the

His admiration for the manner of death of Theramenes doubtless contributed to make him rank that Athenian with Themistoklēs and Periklēs (De Orat. iii, 16, 59).

¹ The epithets applied by Aristophanēs to Theramenes (Ran. 541-966, coincide pretty exactly with those in the speech just noticed, which Xenophon ascribes to Kritias against him.

walls, in order that they might be undisturbed masters within the city, a policy before resorted to by Periander of Corinth and other Grecian despots.¹ The numerous fugitives expelled by this order, distributed themselves partly in Peiraus, partly in the various demes of Attica. Both in one and the other, however, they were seized by order of the Thirty, and many of them put to death, in order that their substance and lands might be appropriated either by the Thirty themselves, or by some favored partisan.² The denunciations of Batrachus, Æschylidēs, and other delators, became more numerous than ever, in order to obtain the seizure and execution of their private enemies; and the oligarchy were willing to purchase any new adherent by thus gratifying his antipathies or his rapacity.³ The subsequent orators affirmed that more than fifteen hundred victims were put to death without trial by the Thirty;⁴ on this numerical estimate little stress is to be laid, but the total was doubtless prodigious. It became more and more plain that no man was safe in Attica; so that Athenian emigrants, many in great poverty and destitution, were multiplied throughout the neighboring territories, — in Megara, Thebes, Orópus, Chalkis, Argos, etc.⁵ It was not everywhere that these distressed persons could obtain reception; for the Lacedæmonian government, at the instance of the Thirty, issued an edict prohibiting all the members of their confederacy from harboring fugitive Athenians; an edict which these cities generously disobeyed,⁶ though probably the smaller Peloponnesian cities complied. Without doubt, this decree was

¹ Xenoph. Hellen. ii. 4, 1. Lysias, Orat. xii. cont. Eratosth. s. 97; Orat. cxxi. cont. Philon. s. 8, 9. Herakleid. Pontic. c. 5, Diogen. Laert. i. 98.

² Xenoph. Hellen. i. c. 1, 2. *ἔφυγον δὲ τὰς πόλεις, ἢ αὐτοὶ καὶ οἱ φίλοι τοὺς τούτων ἀγρότας ἐλάττειν φερόμενοι διὰ τὴν Πελοπόννησον, καὶ ἐντεῖθεν πάλιν ἀφίσταντο, καὶ πολλοὶ Μιγαροὶ καὶ Θύβας τῶν ὑποχωρησάντων.*

³ Lysias, Or. xii. cont. Eratosth. s. 49, Or. xxv. Democrat. Subvers. Apolog. s. 20, Or. xxvi. cont. Evandr. s. 23.

⁴ Æschinidēs, Fals. Legat. c. 24, p. 266, and cont. Ktesiph. c. 86, p. 455. Isokratēs, Or. iv. Panegyrr. s. 131, Or. vii. Areopag. s. 76.

⁵ Xenoph. Hellen. ii. 4, 1, Diodor. xiv. 6, Lysias, Or. xxiv. s. 28, Or. cxxi. cont. Philon. s. 10.

⁶ Lysias, Or. xii. cont. Eratosth. sects. 98, 99. *παράγοντες ἐκκληρονομήσαντες* Plutarch, Lysand. c. 99. Diodor. xiv. 6. Demosth. de Rhod. Libert. c. 10.

procured by Lysander, while his influence still continued unimpaired.

But it was not only against the lives, properties, and liberties of Athenian citizens that the Thirty made war. They were not less solicitous to extinguish the intellectual force and education of the city; a project so perfectly in harmony both with the sentiment and practice of Sparta, that they counted on the support of their foreign allies. Among the ordinances which they promulgated was one, expressly forbidding every one¹ "to teach the art of words, if I may be allowed to translate literally the Greek expression, which bore a most comprehensive signification, and denoted every intentional communication of logical, rhetorical, or argumentative improvement, — of literary criticism and composition, — and of command over those political and moral topics which formed the ordinary theme of discussion. Such was the species of instruction which Sokratēs and other sophists, each in his own way, communicated to the Athenian youth. The great foreign sophists, not Athenian, such as Prodikus and Protagoras had been, — though perhaps neither of these two was now alive, — were doubtless no longer in the city, under the calamitous circumstances which had been weighing upon every citizen since the defeat of Ægospotami. But there were abundance of native teachers, or sophists, inferior in merit to these distinguished names, yet still habitually employed, with more or less success, in communicating a species of instruction held indispensable to every liberal Athenian. The edict of the Thirty was in fact a general suppression of the higher class

¹ Xenoph. Memor. i. 2, 31. *Καὶ οὐ τοῖς ναυτοῖς ἐλάττειν, λόγων τέχνην μὴ διδάσκειν.* — Isokratēs, cont. Sophist. Or. xiii. s. 12. *τὴν παιδείαν τῇ τῶν λόγων.*

Plutarch (Themistoklēs, c. 19) affirms that the Thirty oligarchs, during their rule, altered the position of the rostrum in the Pnyx, the place where the democratical public assemblies were held: the rostrum had before looked towards the sea, but they turned it so as to make it look towards the land, because the maritime service and the associations connected with it were the chief stimulants of democratical sentiment. This story has been often copied and reasserted, as if it were an undoubted fact; but M. Forchhammer (Topographie von Athen, p. 289, in Kieler, Philol. Studien. 1841) has shown it to be untrue and even absurd.

of teachers or professors, above the rank of the elementary teacher of letters, or grammarist. If such an edict could have been maintained in force for a generation, combined with the other mandates of the Thirty, the city out of which Sophoklēs and Euripidēs had just died, and in which Plato and Isokratēs were in vigorous age, the former twenty-five, the latter twenty-nine, would have been degraded to the intellectual level of the meanest community in Greece. It was not uncommon for a Grecian despot to suppress all those assemblies wherein youths came together for the purpose of common training, either intellectual or gymnastic; as well as the public banquets and clubs, or associations, as being dangerous to his authority, and tending to elevation of courage, and to a consciousness of political rights among the citizens.¹

The enormities of the Thirty had provoked severe comments from the philosopher Sokratēs, whose life was spent in conversation on instructive subjects with those young men who sought his society, though he never took money from any pupil. These comments had been made known to Kritias and Chariklēs, who sent for him, reminded him of the prohibitive law, and peremptorily commanded him to abstain for the future from all conversation with youths. Sokratēs met this order by putting some questions to those who gave it, in his usual style of puzzling scrutiny, destined to expose the vagueness of the terms; and to draw the line, or rather to show that no definite line could be drawn, between that which was permitted and that which was forbidden. But he soon perceived that his interrogations produced only a feeling of disgust and death, menacing to his own safety. The tyrants ended by repeating their interdict in yet more peremptory terms, and by giving Sokratēs to understand, that they were not ignorant of the censures which he had cast upon them.²

Though our evidence does not enable us to make out the precise dates of these various oppressions of the Thirty, yet it seems probable that this prohibition of teaching must have been among their earlier enactments; at any rate, considerably anterior to the death of Theramēnēs, and the general expulsion out of the walls of all except the privileged Three Thousand. Their

¹ Aristot. Polit. v, 9, 2

² Xenoph. Memorab. i, 2, 33-39

dominion continued, without any armed opposition made to it, for about eight months from the capture of Athens by Lysander, that is, from about April to December 401 B.C. The measure of their iniquity then became full. They had accumulated against themselves, both in Attica and among the exiles in the circumjacent territories, suffering and exasperated enemies, while they had lost the sympathy of Thebes, Megara, and Corinth, and were less heartily supported by Sparta.

During these important eight months, the general feeling throughout Greece had become materially different both towards Athens and towards Sparta. At the moment when the long war was first brought to a close, fear, antipathy, and vengeance against Athens, had been the reigning sentiment, both among the confederates of Sparta and among the revolted members of the extinct Athenian empire; a sentiment which prevailed among them indeed to a greater degree than among the Spartans themselves, who resisted it, and granted to Athens a capitulation at a time when many of their allies pressed for the harshest measures. To this resolution they were determined partly by the still remaining force of ancient sympathy; partly by the odium which would have been sure to follow the act of expelling the Athenian population, however it might be talked of beforehand as a meet punishment; partly too by the policy of Lysander, who contemplated the keeping of Athens in the same dependence on Sparta and on himself, and by the same means, as the other outlying cities in which he had planted his dekadarchies.

So soon as Athens was humbled, deprived of her fleet and walled port, and rendered innocuous, the great bond of common fear which had held the allies to Sparta disappeared; and while the paramount antipathy on the part of those allies towards Athens gradually died away, a sentiment of jealousy and apprehension of Sparta sprang up in its place, on the part of the leading states among them. For such a sentiment there was more than one reason. Lysander had brought home not only a large sum of money, but valuable spoils of other kinds, and many captive triremes, at the close of the war. As the success had been achieved by the joint exertions of all the allies, so the fruits of it belonged in equity to all of them jointly, not to Sparta alone. The Thebans and Corinthians preferred a formal claim to

be allowed to share; and if the other allies abstained from openly backing the demand, we may fairly presume that it was not from any different construction of the equity of the case, but from fear of offending Sparta. In the testimonial erected by Lysander at Delphi, commemorative of the triumph, he had included not only his own brazen statue, but that of each commander of the allied contingents; thus formally admitting the allies to share in the honorary results, and tacitly sanctioning their claim to the lucrative results also. Nevertheless, the demand made by the Thebans and Corinthians was not only repelled, but almost resented as an insult; especially by Lysander, whose influence was at that moment almost omnipotent.¹

That the Lacedæmonians should have withheld from the allies a share in this money, demonstrates still more the great ascendancy of Lysander; because there was a considerable party at Sparta itself, who protested altogether against the reception of so much gold and silver, as contrary to the ordinances of Lykurgus, and fatal to the peculiar morality of Sparta. An ancient Spartan, Skiraphidas, or Phlogidas, took the lead in calling for exclusive adherence to the old Spartan money, heavy iron, difficult to carry; nor was it without difficulty that Lysander and his friends obtained admission for the treasure into Sparta; under special proviso, that it should be for the exclusive purposes of the government, and that no private citizen should ever circulate gold or silver.² The existence of such traditional repugnance among the Spartans would have seemed likely to induce them to be just towards their allies, since an equitable distribution of the treasure would have gone far to remove the difficulty; yet they nevertheless kept it all.

¹ Justin (vi. 10) mentions the demand thus made and refused. Plutarch (Lysand. c. 27) states the demand as having been made by the Thebans alone, which I disbelieve. Xenophon according to the general disorderly arrangement of facts in his Hellenica does not mention the circumstance in its proper place, but alludes to it on a subsequent occasion as having before occurred (Hellen. iii. 5. 5). He also specifies by name no one but the Thebans as having actually made the demand; but there is a subsequent passage, which shows that not only the Corinthians, but other allies also sympathized in it (iii. 5. 12).

² Plutarch, Lysand. c. 17; Plutarch, Institut. Lacon. p. 239.

But besides this special offence given to the allies, the conduct of Sparta in other ways showed that she intended to turn the victory to her own account. Lysander was at this moment all-powerful, playing his own game under the name of Sparta. His position was far greater than that of the regent Pausanias had been after the victory of Plataea; and his talents for making use of the position incomparably superior. The magnitude of his successes, as well as the eminent ability which he had displayed, justified abundant eulogy; but in his case, the eulogy was carried to the length of something like worship. Altars were erected to him; psalms or hymns were composed in his honor; the Ephesians set up his statue in the temple of their goddess Artemis; and the Samians not only erected a statue to him at Olympia, but even altered the name of their great festival, the Heræa, to *Lysandria*.¹ Several contemporary poets—Antiloehus, Chœrilus, Nikêratus, and Antimachus—devoted themselves to sing his glories and profit by his rewards.

Such excess of flattery was calculated to turn the head even of the most virtuous Greek: with Lysander, it had the effect of substituting, in place of that assumed smoothness of manner with which he began his command, an insulting harshness and arrogance corresponding to the really unmeasured ambition which he cherished.² His ambition prompted him to aggrandize Sparta separately, without any thought of her allies, in order to exercise dominion in her name. He had already established dekadarchies, or oligarchies of Ten, in many of the insular and Asiatic cities, and an oligarchy of Thirty in Athens; all composed of vehement partisans chosen by himself, dependent upon him for support, and devoted to his objects. To the eye of an impartial observer in Greece, it seemed as if all these cities had been converted into dependencies of Sparta, and were intended to be held in that condition; under Spartan authority, exercised by and through Lysander.³ Instead of that general freedom which had been

¹ Pausan. vi. 3. 6. The Samian oligarchical party owed their recent restoration to Lysander.

² Plutarch, Lysand. c. 18, 19.

³ Xenoph. Hellen. ii. 4. 30. Ὅτι δὲ προχωροῦντων, Πανσανίας ὁ βασιλεὺς [of Sparta], ἀποστῆναι Λυσάνδρῳ εἰ. κατεργασμένους ταῦτα ἅμα μὲν εὐδονμῆ-

promised as an incentive to revolt against Athens, a Spartan empire had been constituted in place of the extinct Athenian, with a tribute, amounting to a thousand talents annually, intended to be assessed upon the component cities and islands.¹ Such at least was the scheme of Lysander, though it never reached complete execution.

It is easy to see that under such a state of feeling on the part of the allies of Sparta, the enormities perpetrated by the Thirty at Athens and by the Lysandrian dekadarchies in the other cities, would be heard with sympathy for the sufferers, and without that strong anti-Athenian sentiment which had reigned a few months before. But what was of still greater importance, even at Sparta itself, opposition began to spring up against the measures and the person of Lysander. If the leading men at Sparta had felt jealous even of Brasidas, who offended them only by unparalleled success and merit as a commander,² much more would the same feeling be aroused against Lysander, who displayed an overweening insolence, and was worshipped with an ostentatious flattery, not inferior to that of Pausanias after the battle of Plataea. Another Pausanias, son of Pleistoanax, was now king of Sparta, in conjunction with Agis. Upon him the feeling of jealousy against Lysander told with especial force, as it did afterwards upon Agesilaus, the successor of Agis; not unaccompanied probably with suspicion, which subsequent events justified, that Lysander was aiming at some interference with the regal privileges. Nor is it unfair to suppose that Pausanias was animated by motives more patriotic than mere jealousy, and that the rapacious cruelty, which everywhere dishonored the new oligarchies, both shocked his better feelings and inspired him with fears for the stability of the system. A farther circumstance which weakened the influence

σοι, ἡμα δὲ ἰδίᾳς ποιήσοιτο τὰς Ἀθήνας, πείσας τῶν ἑφόρων τρεῖς, ἐξάγει φρουράν. Ξυνεποντο δὲ καὶ οἱ ἐξέμαχοι παντὶς, πλὴν Βοιωτῶν καὶ Κορινθίων. Οὗτοι δ' ἔλεγον μὲν ὅτι οὐ νομίζοιεν ἐνορκεῖν ἄν στρατεύομενοι ἐπ' Ἀθηναίους, μὴδὲν παράσπονδον ποιοῦντας. Ἐπραττον δὲ ταῦτα, ὅτι ἐγίγνωσκον Λακεδαιμονίους βουλομένους τὴν τῶν Ἀθηναίων χώραν οἰκείαν καὶ πιστὴν ποιήσασθαι. Compare also iii, 5, 12, 13, respecting the sentiments entertained in Greece about the conduct of the Lacedæmonians.

¹ Diodor. xiv. 10-13

² Thucyd. iv

of Lysander at Sparta was the annual change of ephors, which took place about the end of September or beginning of October. Those ephors under whom his grand success and the capture of Athens had been consummated, and who had lent themselves entirely to his views, passed out of office in September 404 B.C., and gave place to others more disposed to second Pausanias.

I remarked, in the preceding chapter, how much more honorable for Sparta, and how much less unfortunate for Athens and for the rest of Greece, the close of the Peloponnesian war would have been, if Kallikratidas had gained and survived the battle of Arginusæ, so as to close it then, and to acquire for himself that personal ascendancy which the victorious general was sure to exercise over the numerous rearrangements consequent on peace. We see how important the personal character of the general so placed was, when we follow the proceedings of Lysander during the year after the battle of Ægospotami. His personal views were the grand determining circumstance throughout Greece; regulating both the measures of Sparta, and the fate of the conquered cities. Throughout the latter, rapacious and cruel oligarchies were organized, — of Ten in most cities, but of Thirty in Athens, — all acting under the power and protection of Sparta, but in real subordination to his ambition. Because he happened to be under the influence of a selfish thirst for power, the measures of Sparta were divested not merely of all Pan-Hellenic spirit, but even, to a great degree, of reference to her own confederates, and concentrated upon the acquisition of imperial preponderance for herself. Now if Kallikratidas had been the ascendent person at this critical juncture, not only such narrow and baneful impulses would have been comparatively inoperative, but the leading state would have been made to set the example of recommending, of organizing, and if necessary, of enforcing arrangements favorable to Pan-Hellenic brotherhood. Kallikratidas would not only have refused to lend himself to dekadarchies governing by his force and for his purposes, in the subordinate cities, but he would have discountenanced such conspiracies, wherever they tended to arise spontaneously. No ruffian like Kritias, no crafty schemer like Theramenes, would have reckoned upon his aid as they presumed upon the friendship of Lysander. Probably he would have left the government of each city to its

own natural tendencies, oligarchical or democratical; interfering only in special cases of actual and pronounced necessity. Now the influence of an ascendent state, employed for such purposes, and emphatically discarding all private ends for the accomplishment of a stable Pan-Hellenic sentiment and fraternity; employed too thus, at a moment when so many of the Greek towns were in the throes of reorganization, having to take up a new political course in reference to the altered circumstances, is an element of which the force could hardly have failed to be prodigious as well as beneficial. What degree of positive good might have been wrought, by a noble-minded victor under such special circumstances, we cannot presume to affirm in detail. But it would have been no mean advantage, to have preserved Greece from beholding and feeling such enormous powers in the hands of a man like Lysander; through whose management the worst tendencies of an imperial city were studiously magnified by the exorbitance of individual ambition. It was to him exclusively that the Thirty in Athens, and the dekadarchies elsewhere, owed both their existence and their means of oppression.

It has been necessary thus to explain the general changes which had gone on in Greece and in Grecian feeling during the eight months succeeding the capture of Athens in March 404 B.C., in order that we may understand the position of the Thirty oligarchs, or Tyrants, at Athens, and of the Athenian population both in Attica and in exile, about the beginning of December in the same year, the period which we have now reached. We see how it was that Thebes, Corinth, and Megara, who in March had been the bitterest enemies of the Athenians, had now become alienated both from Sparta and from the Lysandrian Thirty, whom they viewed as viceroys of Athens for separate Spartan benefit. We see how the basis was thus laid of sympathy for the suffering exiles who fled from Attica; a feeling which the recital of the endless enormities perpetrated by Kritias and his colleagues inflamed every day more and more. We discern at the same time how the Thirty, while thus incurring enmity both in and out of Attica, were at the same time losing the hearty support of Sparta from the decline of Lysander's influence, and the growing opposition of his rivals at home.

In spite of formal prohibition from Sparta, obtained doubtless

under the influence of Lysander, the Athenian emigrants had obtained shelter in all the states bordering on Attica. It was from Boeotia that they struck the first blow. Thrasybulus, Anytus, and Archinus, starting from Thebes with the sympathy of the Theban public, and with substantial aid from Ismenias and other wealthy citizens,—at the head of a small band of exiles stated variously at thirty, sixty, seventy, or somewhat above one hundred men,¹—seized Phylé, a frontier fortress in the mountains north of Attica, lying on the direct road between Athens and Thebes. Probably it had no garrison; for the Thirty, acting in the interest of Lacedæmonian predominance, had dismantled all the outlying fortresses in Attica;² so that Thrasybulus accomplished his purpose without resistance. The Thirty marched out from Athens to attack him, at the head of a powerful force, comprising the Lacedæmonian hoplites who formed their guard, the Three Thousand privileged citizens, and all the knights, or horsemen. Probably the small company of Thrasybulus was reinforced by fresh accessions of exiles, as soon as he was known to have occupied the fort. For by the time that the Thirty with their assailing force arrived, he was in condition to repel a vigorous assault made by the younger soldiers, with considerable loss to the aggressors.

Disappointed in this direct attack, the Thirty laid plans for blockading Phylé, where they knew that there was no stock of provisions. But hardly had their operations commenced, when a snow-storm fell, so abundant and violent, that they were forced to abandon their position and retire to Athens, leaving much of their baggage in the hands of the garrison at Phylé. In the language of Thrasybulus, this storm was characterized as providential, since the weather had been very fine until the moment preceding, and since it gave time to receive reinforcements which

¹ Xenoph. Hellen. ii. 4. 2; Diodor. xiv. 32; Pausan. i. 29. 3; Lysias. Or. xiii. cont. Agor. at. sect. 84; Justin. v. 9; Æschinès, cont. Ktesiphon, c. 62. p. 437; Demosth. cont. Timokrat. c. 34. p. 742. Æschinès allots more than one hundred followers to the captors of Phylé.

The sympathy which the Athenian exiles found at Thebes is attested in a fragment of Lysias. c. Dionys. Hal. Jud. de Lysia, p. 594 (Fragm. 47. ed. Bekker).

² Lysias. Or. xii. cont. Eratosth. sect. 41, p. 124.

made him seven hundred strong.¹ Though the weather was such that the Thirty did not choose to keep their main force in the neighborhood of Phylê, and perhaps the Three Thousand themselves were not sufficiently hearty in the cause to allow it, yet they sent their Lacedæmonians and two tribes of Athenian horsemen to restrain the excursions of the garrison. This body Thrasybulus contrived to attack by surprise. Descending from Phylê by night, he halted within a quarter of a mile of their position until a little before daybreak, when the night-watch had just broken up,² and when the grooms were making a noise in rubbing down the horses. Just at that moment, the hoplites from Phylê rushed upon them at a running pace, found every man unprepared, and some even in their beds, and dispersed them with scarcely any resistance. One hundred and twenty hoplites and a few horsemen were slain, while abundance of arms and stores were captured and carried back to Phylê in triumph.³ News of the defeat was speedily conveyed to the city, from whence the remaining horsemen immediately came forth to the rescue, but could do nothing more than protect the carrying off of the dead.

This successful engagement sensibly changed the relative situation of parties in Attica; encouraging the exiles as much as it depressed the Thirty. Even among the partisans of the latter at Athens, dissension began to arise; the minority which had sympathized with Theramenes, as well as that portion of the Three Thousand who were least compromised as accomplices in the recent enormities, began to waver so manifestly in their allegiance, that Kritias and his colleagues felt some doubt of being able to maintain themselves in the city. They resolved to secure Eleusis and the island of Salamis, as places of safety and resource in case of being compelled to evacuate Athens. They accordingly went to Eleusis with a considerable number of

¹ Xenoph. Hellen. ii. 4, 2, 5, 14.

² See an analogous case of a Lacedæmonian army surprised by the Thebans at this dangerous hour, Xenoph. Hellen. vii, 1, 16; compare Xenoph. Magistr. Equit. vii, 12.

³ Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 4, 5, 7. Diodorus (xiv, 32, 33) represents the occasion of this battle somewhat differently. I follow the account of Xenophon.

the Athenian horsemen, under pretence of examining into the strength of the place and the number of its defenders, so as to determine what amount of farther garrison would be necessary. All the Eleusinians disposed and qualified for armed service, were ordered to come in person and give in their names to the Thirty,¹ in a building having its postern opening on to the sea-beach; along which were posted the horsemen and the attendants from Athens. Each Eleusinian hoplite, after having presented himself and returned his name to the Thirty, was ordered to pass out through this exit, where each man successively found himself in the power of the horsemen, and was fettered by the attendants. Lysimachus, the hipparch, or commander of the horsemen, was directed to convey all these prisoners to Athens, and hand them over to the custody of the Eleven.² Having thus seized and carried away from Eleusis every citizen whose sentiments or whose energy they suspected, and having left a force of their own adherents in the place, the Thirty returned to Athens. At the same time, it appears, a similar visit and seizure of prisoners was made by some of them in Salamis.³ On the next day, they convoked at Athens all the Three Thousand privileged hoplites—together with all the remaining horsemen who had not been employed at Eleusis or Salamis—in the Odeon, half of which was occupied by the Lacedæmonian garrison all under arms. "Gentlemen (said Kritias, addressing his countrymen), we keep up the government not less for your benefit than for our own. You must therefore share with us in the danger, as well as in the honor, of our position. Here are these Eleusinian prisoners awaiting sentence; you must pass a vote condemning them all to death, in order that your hopes and fears may be identified with ours." He then

¹ Xenoph. Hellen. ii. 4, 8. I apprehend that ἀπογράφονται here refers to prospective military service; as in vi. 5, 29. and in Cyropæd. ii. 1, 18, 19. The words in the context, ποσὴς οὐλομένης προσδεήσομεντο, attest that such is the meaning; though the commentators, and Sturz in his Lexicon Xenophonticum, interpret differently.

² Xenoph. Hellen. ii. 4, 8.

³ Both Lysias (Orat. xii, cont. Eratosth. s. 53; Orat. xlii, cont. Agorat. s. 47) and Diodorus (xiv, 32) connect together these two similar proceedings at Eleusis and at Salamis. Xenophon mentions only the affair at Eleusis.

pointed to a spot immediately before him and in his view, directing each man to deposit upon it his pebble of condemnation visibly to every one.¹ I have before remarked that at Athens, open voting was well known to be the same thing as voting under constraint; there was no security for free and genuine suffrage except by making it secret as well as numerous. Kritias was obeyed, without reserve or exception; probably any dissentient would have been put to death on the spot. All the prisoners, seemingly three hundred in number,² were condemned by the same vote, and executed forthwith.

Though this atrocity gave additional satisfaction and confidence to the most violent friends of Kritias, it probably alienated a greater number of others, and weakened the Thirty instead of strengthening them. It contributed in part, we can hardly doubt, to the bold and decisive resolution now taken by Thrasybulus, five days after his late success, of marching by night from Phylè to Peiræus.³ His force, though somewhat increased, was still no more than one thousand men; altogether inadequate by itself to any considerable enterprise, had he not counted on positive support and junction from fresh comrades, together with a still greater amount of negative support from disgust or indifference towards the Thirty. He was indeed speedily joined by many sympathizing countrymen; but few of them, since the general disarming manœuvre of the oligarchs, had heavy armor. Some had light shields and darts, but others were wholly unarmed, and could merely serve as throwers of stones.⁴

Peiræus was at this moment an open town, deprived of its fortifications as well as of those Long Walls which had so long connected it with Athens. It was however of large compass, and required an ampler force to defend it than Thrasybulus could

¹ Xenoph. Hellen. ii. 4, 9. Δείξας δὲ τὸ χωρίον, ἐν τούτῳ ἐκείνῳ φανερὰν φέρειν τὴν ψήφον. Compare Lysias, Or. xiii. cont. Agorat. s. 40, and Thucyd. iv. 74, about the conduct of the Megarian oligarchical leaders: καὶ τούτων περὶ ἀναγκασάντες τὸν δῆμον ψήφον φέρειν δὲ ἐν γαίῃ, etc.

² Lysias (Orat. xii. cont. Eratosth. s. 53) gives this number.

³ Xenoph. Hellen. ii. 4, 10, 13. ἡμέραν πεμπτην, etc.

⁴ Xenoph. Hellen. ii. 4, 12.

muster. Accordingly, when the Thirty marched out of Athens the next morning to attack him, with their full force of Athenian hoplites and horsemen, and with the Lacedæmonian garrison besides, he in vain attempted to maintain against them the great carriage-road which led down to Peiræus. He was compelled to concentrate his forces in Munychia, the easternmost portion of the aggregate called Peiræus, nearest to the bay of Phalérum, and comprising one of those three ports which had once sustained the naval power of Athens. Thrasybulus occupied the temple of Artemis Munychia, and the adjoining Bendideion, situated in the midst of Munychia, and accessible only by a street of steep ascent. In the rear of his hoplites, whose files were ten deep, were posted the darters and slingers: the ascent being so steep that these latter could cast their missiles over the heads of the hoplites in their front. Presently Kritias and the Thirty, having first mustered in the market-place of Peiræus, called the Hippodamian agora, were seen approaching with their superior numbers: mounting the hill in close array, with hoplites not less than fifty in depth. Thrasybulus, after an animated exhortation to his soldiers, in which he reminded them of the wrongs which they had to avenge, and dwelt upon the advantages of their position, which exposed the close ranks of the enemy to the destructive effect of missiles, and would force them to crouch under their shields so as to be unable to resist a charge with the spear in front, waited patiently until they came within distance, standing in the foremost rank with the prophet — habitually consulted before a battle — by his side. The latter, a brave and devoted patriot, while promising victory, had exhorted his comrades not to charge until some one on their own side should be slain or wounded: he at the same time predicted his own death in the conflict. When the troops of the Thirty advanced near enough in ascending the hill, the light-armed in the rear of Thrasybulus poured upon them a shower of darts over the heads of their own hoplites, with considerable effect. As they seemed to waver, seeking to cover themselves with their shields, and thus not seeing well before them, the prophet, himself seemingly in arms, set the example of rushing forward, was the first to close with the enemy, and perished in the onset. Thrasybulus with the main body of hoplites followed him, charged vigorously down

the hill, and after a smart resistance, droye them back in disorder, with the loss of seventy men. What was of still greater moment, Kritias and Hippomachus, who headed their troops on the left, were among the slain; together with Charmidēs son of Glaukon, one of the ten oligarchs who had been placed to manage Peiræus.¹

This great and important advantage left the troops of Thrasybulus in possession of seventy of the enemy's dead, whom they stripped of their arms, but not of their clothing, in token of respect for fellow-countrymen.² So disheartened, lukewarm, and disunited were the hoplites of the Thirty, in spite of their great superiority of number, that they sent to solicit the usual truce for burying the dead. This was of course granted, and the two contending parties became intermingled with each other in the performance of the funeral duties. Amidst so impressive a scene, their common feelings as Athenians and fellow-countrymen were forcibly brought back, and many friendly observations were interchanged among them. Kleokritus — herald of the mysts, or communicants in the Eleusinian mysteries, belonging to one of the most respected gentes in the state — was among the exiles. His voice was peculiarly loud, and the function which he held enabled him to obtain silence while he addressed to the citizens serving with the Thirty a touching and emphatic remonstrance: "Why are you thus driving us into banishment, fellow-citizens? Why are you seeking to kill us? We have never done you the least harm; we have partaken with you in religious rites and festivals; we have been your companions in chorus, in school, and in army; we have braved a thousand dangers with you, by land and sea, in defence of our common safety and freedom. I adjure you by our common gods, paternal and maternal, by our common kindred and companionship, desist from thus wronging your country in obedience to these nefarious Thirty, who have slain as many citizens in eight months, for their own private gains, as the Peloponnesians in ten years of war. These are the men who have plunged us into wicked and odious war one against another, when we might live together in peace. Be assured that your slain in this battle have cost us as many tears as they have cost you."³

¹ Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 4, 12, 20.

² Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 4, 19; Cornel. Nepos, Thrasybul. c. 2.

³ Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 4, 22.

Such affecting appeals, proceeding from a man of respected station like Kleokritus, and doubtless from others also, began to work so sensibly on the minds of the citizens from Athens, that the Thirty were obliged to give orders for immediately returning, which Thrasybulus did not attempt to prevent, though it might have been in his power to do so.¹ But their ascendancy had received a shock from which it never fully recovered. On the next day they appeared downcast and dispirited in the senate, which was itself thinly attended; while the privileged Three Thousand, marshalled in different companies on guard, were everywhere in discord and partial mutiny. Those among them who had been most compromised in the crimes of the Thirty, were strenuous in upholding the existing authority; while such as had been less guilty protested against the continuance of such unholy war, and declared that the Thirty should not be permitted to bring Athens to utter ruin. And though the horsemen still continued steadfast partisans, resolutely opposing all accommodation with the exiles,² yet the Thirty were farther weakened by the death of Kritias, the ascendent and decisive head, and at the same time the most cruel and unprincipled among them; while that party, both in the senate and out of it, which had formerly adhered to Theramenēs, now again raised its head. A public meeting among them was held, in which what may be called the opposition-party among the Thirty, that which had opposed the extreme enormities of Kritias, became predominant. It was determined to depose the Thirty, and to constitute a fresh oligarchy of Ten, one from each tribe.³ But the members of the Thirty were individually reeligible; so that two of them, Eratosthenēs and Pheidon, if not more, adherents of Theramenēs and unfriendly to Kritias and Chariklēs,⁴ with others of the same vein of sentiment, were chosen among the Ten. Chariklēs and the more violent members, having thus lost their ascendancy, no longer deemed themselves safe at Athens, but retired to Eleusis, which they had had the precaution to occupy beforehand. Prob-

¹ Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 4, 22; Lysias, Orat. xii, cont. Eratosth. s. 55: οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἐκ Πειραιεύς κρείττους ὄντες εἶσαν αὐτοὺς ἀπελθεῖν, etc.

² Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 4, 24.

³ Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 4, 23.

⁴ Lysias, Orat. xii, cont. Eratosth. sects. 55, 56: οἱ δοκούντες εἶναι ἐναντιώτατοι Χαρίκλει καὶ Κριτίῳ καὶ τῇ τούτων ἐταιρείᾳ, etc.

ably a number of their partisans, and the Lacedæmonian garrison also, retired thither along with them.

The nomination of this new oligarchy of Ten was plainly a compromise, adopted by some from sincere disgust at the oligarchical system, and desire to come to accommodation with the exiles; by others, from a conviction that the only way of maintaining the oligarchical system, and repelling the exiles, was to constitute a new oligarchical Board, dismissing that which had become obnoxious. The latter was the purpose of the horsemen, the main upholders of the first Board as well as of the second; and such also was soon seen to be the policy of Eratosthenes and his colleagues. Instead of attempting to agree upon terms of accommodation with the exiles in Peiræus generally, they merely tried to corrupt separately Thrasybulus and the leaders, offering to admit ten of them to a share of the oligarchical power at Athens, provided they would betray their party. This offer having been indignantly refused, the war was again resumed between Athens and Peiræus, to the bitter disappointment, not less of the exiles than of that portion of the Athenians who had hoped better things from the new Board of Ten.¹

But the forces of oligarchy were seriously enfeebled at Athens,² as well by the secession of all the more violent spirits to Eleusis, as by the mistrust, discord, and dissatisfaction which now reigned within the city. Far from being able to abuse power like their predecessors, the Ten did not even fully confide in their three thousand hoplites, but were obliged to take measures for the defence of the city in conjunction with the hipparch and the horsemen, who did double duty. — on horseback in the day-time, and as hoplites with their shields along the walls at night, for fear of surprise, — employing the Odeon as their head-quarters. The Ten sent envoys to Sparta to solicit farther aid; while the Thirty sent envoys thither also, from Eleusis, for the same purpose; both representing that the Athenian people had revolted from Sparta, and required farther force to reconquer them.³

¹ The facts which I have here set down, result from a comparison of Lysias, Orat. xii. cont. Eratosth. sects. 53. 59. 94; *Φειδωρ, ἀπερὶ τῆς ἑκατονταρχίας καὶ καταστάσεως*. Diodor. xiv. 32; Justin. v. 9.

² Isokratēs, Or. xviii, cont. Kallimach. s. 25.

³ Xenoph. Hellen. ii. 4, 24, 28.

Such foreign aid became daily more necessary to them, since the forces of Thrasybulus in Peiræus grew stronger, before their eyes, in numbers, in arms, and in hope of success; exerting themselves, with successful energy, to procure additional arms and shields, though some of the shields, indeed, were no better than wood-work or wicker-work whitened over.¹ Many exiles flocked in to their aid, while others sent donations of money or arms: among the latter, the orator Lysias stood conspicuous, transmitting to Peiræus a present of two hundred shields as well as two thousand drachms in money, and hiring besides three hundred fresh soldiers; while his friend Thrasydaus, the leader of the democratical interest at Elis, was induced to furnish a loan of two talents.² Others also lent money; some Boeotians furnished two talents, and a person named Gelarchus contributed the large sum of five talents, repaid in after times by the people.³ Proclamation was made by Thrasybulus, that all metics who would lend aid should be put on the footing of isotely, or equal payment of taxes with citizens, exempt from the metic-tax and other special burdens. Within a short time he had got together a considerable force both in heavy-armed and light-armed, and even seventy horsemen; so that he was in condition to make excursions out of Peiræus, and to collect wood and provisions. Nor did the Ten venture to make any aggressive movement out of Athens, except so far as to send out the horsemen, who slew or captured stragglers from the force of Thrasybulus. Lysimachus the hipparch, the same who had commanded under the Thirty at the seizure of the Eleusinian citizens, having made prisoners some young Athenians, bringing in provisions from the country for the consumption of the troops in Peiræus, put them to death, in spite of remonstrances from several even of his own men; for which cruelty Thrasybulus retaliated, by putting to death a horseman named

¹ Xenoph. Hellen. ii. 4, 25.

² Plutarch, Vit. x. Orator. p. 835; Lysias, Or. xxxi. cont. Philon. sects. 10-34.

Lysias and his brother had carried on a manufactory of shields at Athens. The Thirty had plundered it; but some of the stock probably escaped.

³ Demosth. cont. Leptin. c. 32, p. 502; Lysias cont. Nikomach. Or. xxx. c. 29.

Kallistratus, made prisoner in one of their marches to the neighboring villages.¹

In the established civil war which now raged in Attica, Thrasylulus and the exiles in Peiræus had decidedly the advantage; maintaining the offensive, while the Ten in Athens, and the remainder of the Thirty at Eleusis, were each thrown upon their defence. The division of the oligarchical force into these two sections doubtless weakened both, while the democrats in Peiræus were hearty and united. Presently, however, the arrival of a Spartan auxiliary force altered the balance of parties. Lysander, whom the oligarchical envoys had expressly requested to be sent to them as general, prevailed with the ephors to grant their request. While he himself went to Eleusis and got together a Peloponnesian land-force, his brother Libys conducted a fleet of forty triremes to block up Peiræus, and one hundred talents were lent to the Athenian oligarchs out of the large sum recently brought from Asia into the Spartan treasury.²

The arrival of Lysander brought the two sections of oligarchs in Attica again into coöperation, restrained the progress of Thrasylulus, and even reduced Peiræus to great straits by preventing all entry of ships or stores. Nor could anything have prevented it from being reduced to surrender, if Lysander had been allowed free scope in his operations. But the general sentiment of Greece had by this time become disgusted with his ambitious policy, and with the oligarchies which he had everywhere set up as his instruments; a sentiment not without influence on the feelings of the leading Spartans, who, already jealous of his ascendancy, were determined not to increase it farther by allowing him to conquer Attica a second time, in order to plant his own creatures as rulers at Athens.³

¹ Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 4, 27.

² Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 4, 28; Diodor. xiv, 33; Lysias, Orat. xii, cont. Eratosth. s. 60.

³ Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 4, 29. Οὕτω δὲ προχωροῦντων, Πausanίας ὁ βασιλεὺς, φθονήσας Λυσάνδρῳ, εἰ κατεργασμένος ταῦτα ἅμα μὲν εἰδοκιμήσοι, ἅμα δὲ ἰδίας πεισάτο τὰς Ἀθήνας, πείσας τῶν Ἑσθίων τρεῖς, ἐξαγεί οὐρουραν.

Diodor. xiv, 33 Πausanίας δὲ εἰθονων μὲν τῷ Λυσάνδρῳ, θεαρόν δὲ τὴν Σπάρτην ὑποξοῦσαν παρὰ τοῖς Ἕλλησι, etc.

Platarch. Lysand. c. 21.

Under the influence of these feelings, king Pausanias obtained the consent of three out of the five ephors to undertake himself an expedition into Attica, at the head of the forces of the confederacy, for which he immediately issued proclamation. Opposed to the political tendencies of Lysander, he was somewhat inclined to sympathize with the democracy, not merely at Athens, but elsewhere also, as at Mantinea.¹ It was probably understood that his intentions towards Athens were lenient and anti-Lysandrian, so that the Peloponnesian allies obeyed the summons generally; yet the Boeotians and Corinthians still declined, on the ground that Athens had done nothing to violate the late convention; a remarkable proof of the altered feelings of Greece during the last year since, down to the period of that convention, these two states had been more bitterly hostile to Athens than any others in the confederacy. They suspected that even the expedition of Pausanias was projected with selfish Lacedæmonian views, to secure Attica as a separate dependency of Sparta, though detached from Lysander.²

On approaching Athens, Pausanias, joined by Lysander and the forces already in Attica, encamped in the garden of the Academy, near the city gates. His sentiments were sufficiently known beforehand to offer encouragement; so that the vehement reaction against the atrocities of the Thirty, which the presence of Lysander had doubtless stifled, burst forth without delay. The surviving relatives of the victims slain beset him even at the Academy in his camp, with prayers for protection and cries of vengeance against the oligarchs. Among those victims, as I have already stated, were Nikératus the son, and Eukratès the brother, of Nikias who had perished at Syracuse, the friend and proxenus of Sparta at Athens. The orphan children, both of Nikératus and Eukratès, were taken to Pausanias by their relative Diognétus, who implored his protection for them, recounting at the same time the unmerited execution of their respective fathers, and setting forth their family claims upon the justice of Sparta. This affecting incident, which has been specially made known to us,³ doubtless did not stand alone, among so many

¹ Xenoph. Hellen. v, 2, 3.

² Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 4, 30.

³ Lysias, Or. xviii, De Bonis Nicie Frat. sects. 8-10.

families suffering from the same cause. Pausanias was furnished at once with ample grounds, not merely for repudiating the Thirty altogether, and sending back the presents which they tendered to him,¹ but even for refusing to identify himself unservedly with the new oligarchy of Ten which had risen upon their ruins. The voice of complaint — now for the first time set free, with some hopes of redress — must have been violent and unmeasured, after such a career as that of Kritias and his colleagues; while the fact was now fully manifested, which could not well have come forth into evidence before, that the persons despoiled and murdered had been chiefly opulent men, and very frequently even oligarchical men, not politicians of the former democracy. Both Pausanias, and the Lacedæmonians along with him, on reaching Athens, must have been strongly affected by the facts which they learned, and by the loud cry for sympathy and redress which poured upon them from the most innocent and respected families. The predisposition both of the king and the ephors against the policy of Lysander was materially strengthened, as well as their inclination to bring about an accommodation of parties, instead of upholding by foreign force an anti-popular Few.

Such convictions would become farther confirmed as Pausanias saw and heard more of the real state of affairs. At first, he held a language decidedly adverse to Thrasybulus and the exiles, sending to them a herald, and requiring them to disband and go to their respective homes.² The requisition not being obeyed, he made a faint attack upon Peiræus, which had no effect. Next day he marched down with two Lacedæmonian moræ, or large military divisions, and three tribes of the Athenian horsemen, to reconnoitre the place, and see where a line of blockade could be drawn. Some light troops annoyed him, but his troops repulsed

¹ Lysias, *ut sup.* sects. 11, 12. ὁθεν Πausανίας ἤρξατο εἶναι τῷ δήμῳ, παραδειγμὶ παλαιμῶν πρὸς τοὺς ἄλλους Λακεδαιμονίους, τὰς ἡμετέρας συμφορὰς τῆς τῶν τριάκοντα πόλεως.

Ὁὕτω δ' ἤλθοιμεθα, καὶ πᾶσι δεινὰ ἰδοίμεν πεποιθέναι, ὥστε Πausανίας τὰ μὲν παρὰ τῶν τριάκοντα ξένια οἶκ' ἠθέλησε λαβεῖν, τὰ δὲ παρ' ἡμῶν εἰδεῖσθαι.

² Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 4, 31. This seems the meaning of the phrase ἀπείναι ἐπὶ τὰ ἐαυτῶν; as we may see by s. 38.

them, and pursued them even as far as the theatre of Peiræus, where all the forces of Thrasybulus were mustered, heavy-armed, as well as light-armed. The Lacedæmonians were here in a disadvantageous position, probably in the midst of houses and streets, so that all the light-armed of Thrasybulus were enabled to set upon them furiously from different sides, and drive them out again with loss, two of the Spartan polemarchs being here slain. Pausanias was obliged to retreat to a little eminence about half a mile off, where he mustered his whole force, and formed his hoplites into a very deep phalanx. Thrasybulus on his side was so encouraged by the recent success of his light-armed, that he ventured to bring out his heavy-armed, only eight deep, to an equal conflict on the open ground. But he was here completely worsted, and driven back into Peiræus with the loss of one hundred and fifty men; so that the Spartan king was able to retire to Athens after a victory, and a trophy erected to commemorate it.¹

The issue of this battle was one extremely fortunate for Thrasybulus and his comrades; since it left the honors of the day with Pausanias, so as to avoid provoking enmity or vengeance on his part, while it showed plainly that the conquest of Peiræus, defended by so much courage and military efficiency, would be no easy matter. It disposed Pausanias still farther towards an accommodation; strengthening also the force of that party in Athens which was favorable to the same object, and adverse to the Ten oligarchs. This opposition-party found decided favor with the Spartan king, as well as with the ephor Naukleidas, who was present along with him. Numbers of Athenians, even among those Three Thousand by whom the city was now exclusively occupied, came forward to deprecate farther war with Peiræus, and to entreat that Pausanias would settle the quarrel so as to leave them all at amity with Lacedæmon. Xenophon, indeed, according to that narrow and partial spirit which pervades his Hellenica, notices no sentiment in Pausanias except his jealousy of Lysander, and treats the opposition against the Ten at Athens as having been got up by his intrigues.² But it seems

¹ Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 4, 31-34.

² Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 4, 35. Δύστη δὲ καὶ τοὺς ἐν τῷ ἄστει (Pausanias) καὶ ἐκέλευε πρὸς σφᾶς προσεῖναι ὡς πλείστους ξυλλεγομένους, λεγόντας, etc.

plain that this is not a correct account. Pausanias did not create the discord, but found it already existing, and had to choose which of the parties he would adopt. The Ten took up the oligarchical game after it had been thoroughly dishonored and ruined by the Thirty: they inspired no confidence, nor had they any hold upon the citizens in Athens, except in so far as these latter dreaded reactionary violence, in case Thrasybulus and his companions should reënter by force; accordingly, when Pausanias was there at the head of a force competent to prevent such dangerous reaction, the citizens at once manifested their dispositions against the Ten, and favorable to peace with Peiræus. To second this pacific party was at once the easiest course for Pausanias to take, and the most likely to popularize Sparta in Greece; whereas, he would surely have entailed upon her still more bitter curses from without, not to mention the loss of men to herself, if he had employed the amount of force requisite to uphold the Ten, and subdue Peiræus. To all this we have to add his jealousy of Lysander, as an important predisposing motive, but only as auxiliary among many others.

Under such a state of facts, it is not surprising to learn that Pausanias encouraged solicitations for peace from Thrasybulus and the exiles, and that he granted them a truce to enable them to send envoys to Sparta. Along with these envoys went Kephsophon and Melitus, sent for the same purpose of entreating peace, by the party opposed to the Ten at Athens, under the sanction both of Pausanias and of the accompanying ephors. On the other hand, the Ten, finding themselves discountenanced by Pausanias, sent envoys of their own to outbid the others. They tendered themselves, their walls, and their city, to be dealt with as the Lacedæmonians chose; requiring that Thrasybulus, if he pretended to be the friend of Sparta, should make the same unqualified surrender of Peiræus and Munychia. All the three sets of envoys were heard before the ephors remaining at Sparta and the Lacedæmonian assembly; who took the best resolution which the case admitted, to bring to pass an amicable settlement between Athens and Peiræus, and to leave the terms to be fixed by fifteen commissioners, who were sent thither forthwith to sit in conjunction with Pausanias. This Board determined, that the exiles in Peiræus should be readmitted to Athens, that an accommodation

should take place, and that no man should be molested for past acts, except the Thirty, the Eleven (who had been the instruments of all executions), and the Ten who had governed in Peiræus. But Eleusis was recognized as a government separate from Athens, and left, as it already was, in possession of the Thirty and their coadjutors, to serve as a refuge for all those who might feel their future safety compromised at Athens in consequence of their past conduct.¹

As soon as these terms were proclaimed, accepted, and sworn to by all parties, Pausanias with all the Lacedæmonians evacuated Attica. Thrasybulus and the exiles marched up in solemn procession from Peiræus to Athens. Their first act was to go up to the acropolis, now relieved from its Lacedæmonian garrison, and there to offer sacrifice and thanksgiving. On descending from thence, a general assembly was held, in which — unanimously and without opposition, as it should seem — the democracy was restored. The government of the Ten, which could have no basis except the sword of the foreigner, disappeared as a matter of course; but Thrasybulus, while he strenuously enforced upon his comrades from Peiræus a full respect for the oaths which they had sworn, and an unreserved harmony with their newly acquired fellow-citizens, admonished the assembly emphatically as to the past events. "You city-men (he said), I advise you to take just measure of yourselves for the future; and to calculate fairly, what ground of superiority you have, so as to pretend to rule over us? Are you juster than we? Why the demos, though poorer than you, never at any time wronged you for purposes of plunder; while you, the wealthiest of all, have done many base deeds for the sake of gain. Since then you have no justice to boast of, are you superior to us on the score of courage? There cannot be a better trial, than the war which has just ended. Again, can you pretend to be superior in policy? you, who, having a fortified city, an armed force, plenty of money, and the Peloponnesians for your allies, have been overcome by men who had nothing of the kind to aid them? Can you boast of your hold over the Lacedæmonians? Why, they have just handed you over like a vicious dog with a clog tied to him, to the very demos

¹ Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 4, 39, Diodor. xiv, 83.

whom you have wronged, and are now gone out of the country. But you have no cause to be uneasy for the future. I adjure you, my friends from Peiræus, in no point to violate the oaths which we have just sworn. Show, in addition to your other glorious exploits, that you are honest and true to your engagements."

The archons, the senate of Five Hundred, the public assembly and the dikasteries, appear to have been now revived, as they had stood in the democracy prior to the capture of the city by Lysander. This important restoration seems to have taken place some time in the spring of 403 B.C., though we cannot exactly make out in what month. The first archon now drawn was Eukleides, who gave his name to this memorable year; a year never afterwards forgotten by Athenians.

Eleusis was at this time, and pursuant to the late convention, a city independent and separate from Athens, under the government of the Thirty, and comprising their warmest partisans. It was not likely that this separation would last; but the Thirty were themselves the parties to give cause for its termination. They were getting together a mercenary force at Eleusis, when the whole force of Athens was marched to forestall their designs. The generals at Eleusis came forth to demand a conference, but were seized and put to death; the Thirty themselves, and a few of the most obnoxious individuals, fled out of Attica; while the rest of the Eleusinian occupants were persuaded by their friends from Athens to come to an equal and honorable accommodation. Again Eleusis became incorporated in the same community with Athens, oaths of mutual amnesty and harmony being sworn by every one.²

We have now passed that short, but bitter and sanguinary interval, occupied by the Thirty, which succeeded so immediately upon the extinction of the empire and independence of Athens.

¹ Xenoph. Hellen. ii. 4. 40-42.

² Xenoph. Hellen. ii. 4. 43; Justin. v. 11. I do not comprehend the allusion in Lysias. Orat. xxv. *Δὲ κατὰ τὴν Ἀπολ. sect. 11. καὶ δὲ οἱ τινες τῶν Ἑλευσινιάδων ἀπογραφάμενων ἐξελθόντες μεθ' ὑμῶν, ἐπολιόρκουντ' αὐτὸς μετ' αὐτῶν.*

as to leave no opportunity for pause or reflection. A few words respecting the rise and fall of that empire are now required, summing up as it were the political moral of the events recorded in my last two volumes, between 477 and 405 B.C.

I related, in the forty-fifth chapter, the steps by which Athens first acquired her empire, raised it to its maximum, including both maritime and inland dominion, then lost the inland portion of it; which loss was ratified by the Thirty Years Truce concluded with Sparta and the Peloponnesian confederacy in 445 B.C. Her maritime empire was based upon the confederacy of Delos, formed by the islands in the Ægean and the towns on the seaboard immediately after the battles of Plataea and Mykalê, for the purpose not merely of expelling the Persians from the Ægean, but of keeping them away permanently. To the accomplishment of this important object, Sparta was altogether inadequate; nor would it ever have been accomplished, if Athens had not displayed a combination of military energy, naval discipline, power of organization, and honorable devotion to a great Pan-Hellenic purpose, such as had never been witnessed in Grecian history.

The confederacy of Delos was formed by the free and spontaneous association of many different towns, all alike independent; towns which met in synod and deliberated by equal vote, took by their majority resolutions binding upon all, and chose Athens as their chief to enforce these resolutions, as well as to superintend generally the war against the common enemy. But it was, from the beginning, a compact which permanently bound each individual state to the remainder. None had liberty either to recede, or to withhold the contingent imposed by authority of the common synod, or to take any separate step inconsistent with its obligations to the confederacy. No union less stringent than this could have prevented the renewal of Persian ascendancy in the Ægean. Seceding or disobedient states were thus treated as guilty of treason or revolt, which it was the duty of Athens, as chief, to repress. Her first repressions, against Naxos and other states, were undertaken in prosecution of this duty, in which if she had been wanting, the confederacy would have fallen to pieces, and the common enemy would have reappeared.

Now the only way by which the confederacy was saved from falling to pieces, was by being transformed into an Athenian

empire. Such transformation, as Thucydides plainly intimates,¹ did not arise from the ambition or deep-laid projects of Athens, but from the reluctance of the larger confederates to discharge the obligations imposed by the common synod, and from the unwarlike character of the confederates generally, which made them desirous to commute military service for money-payment, while Athens on her part was not less anxious to perform the service and obtain the money. By gradual and unforeseen stages, Athens thus passed from consulate to empire: in such manner that no one could point out the precise moment of time when the confederacy of Delos ceased, and when the empire began. Even the transfer of the common fund from Delos to Athens, which was the palpable manifestation of a change already realized, was not an act of high-handed injustice in the Athenians, but warranted by prudential views of the existing state of affairs, and even proposed by a leading member of the confederacy.²

But the Athenian empire came to include (between 460-446 B.C.) other cities, not parties to the confederacy of Delos. Athens had conquered her ancient enemy the island of Ægina, and had acquired supremacy over Megara, Boeotia, Phocis, and Lok and Achaia in Peloponnesus. The Megarians joined her to escape the oppression of their neighbor Corinth: her influence over Boeotia was acquired by allying herself with a democratical party in the Boeotian cities, against Sparta, who had been actively interfering to sustain the opposite party and to renovate the ascendancy of Thebes. Athens was, for the time, successful in all these enterprises; but if we follow the details, we shall not find her more open to reproach on the score of aggressive tendencies than Sparta or Corinth. Her empire was now at its maximum; and had she been able to maintain it, — or even to keep possession of the Megarid separately, which gave her the means of barring out all invasions from Peloponnesus, — the future course of Grecian history would have been materially altered. But her empire on land did not rest upon the same footing as her empire at sea. The exiles in Megara and Boeotia, etc., and the anti-Athenian party generally in those places, — combined with

¹ Thucyd. i, 97.

² See vol. v, of this History, ch. xlv, p. 343.

the rashness of her general Tolmidēs at Koroneia, — deprived her of all her land-dependencies near home, and even threatened her with the loss of Eubœa. The peace concluded in 445 B.C. left her with all her maritime and insular empire, including Eubœa, but with nothing more; while by the loss of Megara she was now open to invasion from Peloponnesus.

On this footing she remained at the beginning of the Peloponnesian war fourteen years afterwards. I have shown that that war did not arise, as has been so often asserted, from aggressive or ambitious schemes on the part of Athens, but that, on the contrary, the aggression was all on the side of her enemies; who were full of hopes that they could put her down with little delay; while she was not merely conservative and defensive, but even discouraged by the certainty of destructive invasion, and only dissuaded from concessions, alike imprudent and inglorious, by the extraordinary influence and resolute wisdom of Periklēs. That great man comprehended well both the conditions and the limits of Athenian empire. Athens was now understood, especially since the revolt and reconquest of the powerful island of Samos in 440 B.C., by her subjects and enemies as well as by her own citizens, to be mistress of the sea. It was the care of Periklēs to keep that belief within definite boundaries, and to prevent all waste of the force of the city in making new or distant acquisitions which could not be permanently maintained. But it was also his care to enforce upon his countrymen the lesson of maintaining their existing empire unimpaired, and shrinking from no effort requisite for that end. Though their whole empire was now staked upon the chances of a perilous war, he did not hesitate to promise them success, provided that they adhered to this conservative policy.

Following the events of the war, we shall find that Athens did adhere to it for the first seven years; years of suffering and trial, from the destructive annual invasion, the yet more destructive pestilence, and the revolt of Mitylênê, but years which still left her empire unimpaired, and the promises of Periklēs in fair chance of being realized. In the seventh year of the war occurred the unexpected victory at Sphacteria and the capture of the Lacedæmonian prisoners. This placed in the hands of the Athenians a capital advantage, imparting to them prodigious

confidence of future success, while their enemies were in a proportional degree disheartened. It was in this temper that they first departed from the conservative precept of Periklēs, and attempted to recover (in 424 B.C.) both Megara and Boeotia. Had the great statesman been alive,¹ he might have turned this moment of superiority to better account, and might perhaps have contrived even to get possession of Megara — a point of unspeakable importance to Athens, since it protected her against invasion — in exchange for the Spartan captives. But the general feeling of confidence which then animated all parties at Athens, determined them in 424 B.C. to grasp at this and much more by force. They tried to reconquer both Megara and Boeotia: in the former they failed, though succeeding so far as to capture Nisaea; in the latter they not only failed, but suffered the disastrous defeat of Delium.

It was in the autumn of that same year 424 B.C., too, that Brasidas broke into their empire in Thrace, and robbed them of Akanthus, Stageira, and some other towns, including their most precious possession, Amphipolis. Again, it seems that the Athenians, partly from the discouragement caused by the disaster at Delium, partly from the ascendancy of Nikias and the peace party, departed from the conservative policy of Periklēs; not by ambitious over-action, but by inaction, omitting to do all that might have been done to arrest the progress of Brasidas. We must, however, never forget that their capital loss, Amphipolis, was owing altogether to the improvidence of their officers, and could not have been obviated even by Periklēs.

But though that great man could not have prevented the loss, he would assuredly have deemed no efforts too great to recover it; and in this respect his policy was espoused by Kleon, in opposition to Nikias and the peace party. The latter thought it wise to make the truce for a year; which so utterly failed of its effect, that Nikias was obliged, even in the midst of it, to conduct an armament to Pallênē in order to preserve the empire against yet farther losses. Still, Nikias and his friends would hear of nothing but peace; and after the expedition of Kleon against Amphipolis in the ensuing year, which failed partly through his mili-

¹ See vol. vi. ch. lxxv. p. 353 of this History.

tary incapacity, partly through the want of hearty concurrence in his political opponents, they concluded what is called the Peace of Nikias in the ensuing spring. In this, too, their calculations are not less signally falsified than in the previous truce: they stipulate that Amphipolis shall be restored, but it is as far from being restored as ever. To make the error still graver and more irreparable, Nikias, with the concurrence of Alkibiadēs, contracts the alliance with Sparta a few months after the peace, and gives up the captives, the possession of whom being the only hold which Athens as yet had upon the Spartans.

We thus have, during the four years succeeding the battle of Delium (424–420 B.C.), a series of departures from the conservative policy of Periklēs; departures, not in the way of ambitious over-acquisition, but of languor and unwillingness to make efforts even for the recovery of capital losses. Those who see no defects in the foreign policy of the democracy except those of over-ambition and love of war, pursuant to the jest of Aristophanes, overlook altogether these opposite but serious blunders of Nikias and the peace party.

Next comes the ascendancy of Alkibiadēs, leading to the two years' campaign in Peloponnesus in conjunction with Elis, Argos, and Mantinea, and ending in the complete reestablishment of Lacedæmonian supremacy. Here was a diversion of Athenian force from its legitimate purpose of preserving or reestablishing the empire, for inland projects which Periklēs could never have approved. The island of Melos undoubtedly fell within his general conceptions of tenable empire for Athens. But we may regard it as certain that he would have recommended no new projects, exposing Athens to the reproach of injustice, so long as the lost legitimate possessions in Thrace remained unconquered.

We now come to the expedition against Syracuse. Down to that period, the empire of Athens, except the possessions in Thrace, remained undiminished, and her general power nearly as great as it had ever been since 445 B.C. That expedition was the one great and fatal departure from the Periklean policy, bringing upon Athens an amount of disaster from which she never recovered; and it was doubtless an error of over-ambition. Acquisitions in Sicily, even if made, lay out of the condi-

tions of permanent empire for Athens; and however imposing the first effect of success might have been, they would only have disseminated her strength, multiplied her enemies, and weakened her in all quarters. But though the expedition itself was thus indisputably ill-advised, and therefore ought to count to the discredit of the public judgment at Athens, we are not to impute to that public an amount of blame in any way commensurate to the magnitude of the disaster, except in so far as they were guilty of unmeasured and unconquerable esteem for Nicias. Though Periklēs would have strenuously opposed the project, yet he could not possibly have foreseen the enormous ruin in which it would end; nor could such ruin have been brought about by any man existing, save Nicias. Even when the people committed the aggravated imprudence of sending out the second expedition, Demosthenēs doubtless assured them that he would speedily either take Syracuse or bring back both armaments, with a fair allowance for the losses inseparable from failure; and so he would have done, if the obstinacy of Nicias had permitted. In measuring therefore the extent of misjudgment fairly imputable to the Athenians for this ruinous undertaking, we must always recollect, that first the failure of the siege, next the ruin of the armament, did not arise from intrinsic difficulties in the case, but from the personal defects of the commander.

After the Syracusan disaster, there is no longer any question about adhering to, or departing from, the Periklean policy. Athens is like Patroklos in the *Iliad*, after Apollo has stunned him by a blow on the back and loosened his armor. Nothing but the slackness of her enemies allowed her time for a partial recovery, so as to make increased heroism a substitute for impaired force, even against doubled and tripled difficulties. And the years of struggle which she now went through are among the most glorious events in her history. These years present many misfortunes, but no serious misjudgment, not to mention one peculiarly honorable moment, after the overthrow of the Four Hundred. I have in the two preceding chapters examined into the blame imputed to the Athenians for not accepting the overtures of peace after the battle of Kyzikus, and for dismissing Alkibiadēs after the battle of Notium. On both points their conduct has been shown to be justifiable. And after

all, they were on the point of partially recovering themselves in 408 B.C., when the unexpected advent of Cyrus set the seal to their destiny.

The bloodshed after the recapture of Mitylênê and Skionê, and still more that which succeeded the capture of Melos, are disgraceful to the humanity of Athens, and stand in pointed contrast with the treatment of Samos when reconquered by Periklēs. But they did not contribute sensibly to break down her power; though, being recollected with aversion after other incidents were forgotten, they are alluded to in later times as if they had caused the fall of the empire.¹

I have thought it important to recall, in this short summary, the leading events of the seventy years preceding 405 B.C., in order that it may be understood to what degree Athens was politically or prudentially to blame for the great downfall which she then underwent. That downfall had one great cause — we may almost say, one single cause — the Sicilian expedition. The empire of Athens both was, and appeared to be, in exuberant strength when that expedition was sent forth; strength more than sufficient to bear up against all moderate faults or moderate misfortunes, such as no government ever long escapes. But the catastrophe of Syracuse was something overpassing in terrific calamity all Grecian experience and all power of foresight. It was like the Russian campaign of 1812 to the emperor Napoleon; though by no means imputable, in an equal degree, to vice in the original project. No Grecian power could bear up against such a death-wound, and the prolonged struggle of Athens after it is not the least wonderful part of the whole war.

Nothing in the political history of Greece is so remarkable as the Athenian empire; taking it as it stood in its completeness, from about 460-445 B.C., the date of the Syracusan catastrophe, or still more, from 460-424 B.C., the date when Brasidas made his conquests in Thrace. After the Syracusan catastrophe, the conditions of the empire were altogether changed; it was irretrievably broken up, though Athens still continued an energetic

¹ This I apprehend to have been in the mind of Xenophon, *De Reditibus*, v. 6. 'Ἐπειρ', ἐπεὶ ὡμῶς ἀγαν δοξάσα προσπατεῦειν ἡ πόλις ἐταρέρθη τῆς ἀρχῆς, etc.

struggle to retain some of the fragments. But if we view it as it had stood before that event, during the period of its integrity, it is a sight marvellous to contemplate, and its working must be pronounced, in my judgment, to have been highly beneficial to the Grecian world. No Grecian state except Athens could have sufficed to organize such a system, or to hold in partial though regulated, continuous, and specific communion, so many little states, each animated with that force of political repulsion instinctive in the Grecian mind. This was a mighty task, worthy of Athens, and to which no state except Athens was competent. We have already seen in part, and we shall see still farther, how little qualified Sparta was to perform it, and we shall have occasion hereafter to notice a like fruitless essay on the part of Thebes.

As in regard to the democracy of Athens generally, so in regard to her empire, it has been customary with historians to take notice of little except the bad side. But my conviction is, and I have shown grounds for it, in chap. xlvii. that the empire of Athens was not harsh and oppressive, as it is commonly depicted. Under the circumstances of her dominion, at a time when the whole transit and commerce of the Ægean was under one maritime system, which excluded all irregular force; when Persian ships of war were kept out of the waters, and Persian tribute-officers away from the seaboard; when the disputes inevitable among so many little communities could be peaceably redressed by the mutual right of application to the tribunals at Athens, and when these tribunals were also such as to present to sufferers a refuge against wrongs done even by individual citizens of Athens herself, to use the expression of the oligarchical Phrynichus,¹ the condition of the maritime Greeks was materially better than it had been before, or than it will be seen to become afterwards. Her empire, if it did not inspire attachment, certainly provoked no antipathy, among the bulk of the citizens of the subject-communities, as is shown by the party-character of the revelts against her. If in her imperial character she exacted obedience, she also fulfilled duties and insured protection to a degree incomparably greater than was ever

¹ Thuc. i. viii. 48.

realized by Sparta. And even if she had been ever so much disposed to cramp the free play of mind and purpose among her subjects, — a disposition which is no way proved, — the very circumstances of her own democracy, with its open antithesis of political parties, universal liberty of speech, and manifold individual energy, would do much to prevent the accomplishment of such an end, and would act as a stimulus to the dependent communities, even without her own intention.

Without being insensible either to the faults or to the misdeeds of imperial Athens, I believe that her empire was a great comparative benefit, and its extinction a great loss, to her own subjects. But still more do I believe it to have been a good, looked at with reference to Pan-Hellenic interests. Its maintenance furnished the only possibility of keeping out foreign intervention, and leaving the destinies of Greece to depend upon native, spontaneous, untrammelled Grecian agencies. The downfall of the Athenian empire is the signal for the arms and corruption of Persia again to make themselves felt, and for the reenslavement of the Asiatic Greeks under her tribute-officers. What is still worse, it leaves the Grecian world in a state incapable of repelling any energetic foreign attack, and open to the overruling march of "the man of Macedon," half a century afterwards. For such was the natural tendency of the Grecian world to political non-integration or disintegration, that the rise of the Athenian empire, incorporating so many states into one system, is to be regarded as a most extraordinary accident. Nothing but the genius, energy, discipline, and democracy of Athens, could have brought it about; nor even she, unless favored and pushed on by a very peculiar train of antecedent events. But having once got it, she might perfectly well have kept it; and, had she done so, the Hellenic world would have remained so organized as to be able to repel foreign intervention, either from Susa or from Pella. When we reflect how infinitely superior was the Hellenic mind to that of all surrounding nations and races: how completely its creative agency was stifled, as soon as it came under the Macedonian dictation; and how much more it might perhaps have achieved, if it had enjoyed another century or half-century of freedom, under the stimulating headship of the

most progressive and most intellectual of all its separate communities, we shall look with double regret on the ruin of the Athenian empire, as accelerating, without remedy, the universal ruin of Grecian independence, political action, and mental grandeur

CHAPTER LXVI.

FROM THE RESTORATION OF THE DEMOCRACY TO THE DEATH OF ALKIBIADES.

THE period intervening between the defeat of Ægospotami (October, 405 B.C.) and the reestablishment of the democracy as sanctioned by the convention concluded with Pausanias, some time in the summer of 403 B.C., presents two years of cruel and multifarious suffering to Athens. For seven years before, indeed ever since the catastrophe at Syracuse, she had been struggling with hardships; contending against augmented hostile force, while her own means were cut down in every way; crippled at home by the garrison of Dekeleia; stripped to a great degree both of her tribute and her foreign trade, and beset by the snares of her own oligarchs. In spite of circumstances so adverse, she had maintained the fight with a resolution not less surprising than admirable; yet not without sinking more and more towards impoverishment and exhaustion. The defeat of Ægospotami closed the war at once, and transferred her from her period of struggle to one of concluding agony. Nor is the last word by any means too strong for the reality. Of these two years, the first portion was marked by severe physical privation, passing by degrees into absolute famine, and accompanied by the intolerable sentiment of despair and helplessness against her enemies, after two generations of imperial grandeur, not without a strong chance of being finally consigned to ruin and individual slavery; while the last portion comprised all the tyranny, murders, robberies, and expulsions perpetrated by the Thirty, overthrown only by heroic efforts of patriotism on the part of the

exiles; which a fortunate change of sentiment, on the part of Pausanias, and the leading members of the Peloponnesian confederacy, ultimately crowned with success.

After such years of misery, it was an unspeakable relief to the Athenian population to regain possession of Athens and Attica, to exchange their domestic tyrants for a renovated democratical government, and to see their foreign enemies not merely evacuate the country, but even and themselves by treaty to future friendly dealing. In respect of power, indeed, Athens was but the shadow of her former self. She had no empire, no tribute, no fleet, no fortifications at Peiraus, no long walls, not a single fortified place in Attica except the city itself. Of all these losses, however, the Athenians probably made little account, at least at the first epoch of their reestablishment; so intolerable was the pressure which they had just escaped, and so welcome the restitution of comfort, security, property, and independence, at home. The very excess of tyranny committed by the Thirty gave a peculiar zest to the recovery of the democracy. In their hands, the oligarchical principle, to borrow an expression from Mr. Burke,¹ "had produced in fact, and instantly, the grossest of those evils with which it was pregnant in its nature;" realizing the promise of that plain-spoken oligarchical

¹ "I confess, gentlemen, that this appears to me as bad in the principle, and far worse in the consequences, than an universal suspension of the Habeas Corpus Act. . . . Far from softening the features of such a principle, and thereby removing any part of the popular odium or natural terrors attending it, I should be sorry that *anything framed in contradiction to the spirit of our constitution did not instantly produce, in fact, the grossest of the evils with which it was pregnant in its nature*. It is by lying dormant a long time, or being at first very rarely exercised, that arbitrary power steals upon a people. On the next unconstitutional act, all the fashionable world will be ready to say: Your prophecies are ridiculous, your fears are vain; you see how little of the misfortunes which you formerly foreboded is come to pass. Thus, by degrees, that artful softening of all arbitrary power, the alleged infrequency or narrow extent of its operation, will be received as a sort of aphorism; and Mr. Hume will not be singular in telling us that the felicity of mankind is no more disturbed by it, than by earthquakes or thunder, or the other more unusual accidents of nature." (Burke, Letter to the Sheriffs of Bristol, 1777: Burke's Works, vol. iii, pp. 146-150 oct. edit.)

oath, which Aristotle mentions as having been taken in various oligarchical cities, to contrive as much evil as possible to the people.¹ So much the more complete was the reaction of sentiment towards the antecedent democracy, even in the minds of those who had been before discontented with it. To all men, rich and poor, citizens and metics, the comparative excellence of the democracy, in respect of all the essentials of good government, was now manifest. With the exception of those who had identified themselves with the Thirty as partners, partisans, or instruments, there was scarcely any one who did not feel that his life and property had been far more secure under the former democracy, and would become so again if that democracy were revived.²

It was the first measure of Thrasybulus and his companions, after concluding the treaty with Pausanias, and thus reentering the city, to exchange solemn oaths, of amnesty for the past, with those against whom they had just been at war. Similar oaths of amnesty were also exchanged with those in Eleusis, as soon as that town came into their power. The only persons excepted from this amnesty were the Thirty, the Eleven who had presided over the execution of all their atrocities, and the Ten who had governed in Peiraus. Even these persons were not peremptorily banished: opportunity was offered to them to come in and take their trial of accountability (universal at Athens in the case of every magistrate on quitting office); so that, if acquitted, they would enjoy the benefit of the amnesty as well as all others.³ We know that Eratosthenes, one of the Thirty, afterwards returned to Athens; since there remains a powerful harangue of Lysias, invoking justice against him as having brought to death Polemarchus, the brother of Lysias. Eratosthenes was

¹ Aristot. Polit. v. 7, 19. Καὶ τὰ ὀλιγαρχικὰ πόλεις, καὶ δουλείᾳ τὴν πόλιν κακοῦ.

The complimentary epitaph upon the Thirty, cited in the Schol. on Æschinès, — praising them as having curbed, for a short time, the insolence of the accursed Demos of Athens, — is in the same spirit: see K. F. Hermann, Staats-Alterthümer der Griechen, s. 70, note 9.

² Plato, Epist. vii. p. 324. Καὶ ὅσοι δὲ τῶν ἀνδρῶν ἐν χρόνῳ ὀλίγον χρόνον ἀποδείξαντες τὴν ἐμπροσθε πόλιν εἶναι, etc.

³ Andokidès de Mysternis, s. 90.

one of the minority of the Thirty who sided generally with Theramenes, and opposed to a considerable degree the extreme violences of Kritias, although personally concerned in that seizure and execution of the rich metics which Theramenes had resisted, and which was one of the grossest misdeeds even of that dark period. He and Pheidon, being among the Ten named to succeed the Thirty after the death of Kritias, when the remaining members of that deposed Board retired to Eleusis, had endeavored to maintain themselves as a new oligarchy, carrying on war at the same time against Eleusis and against the democratical exiles in Peiraus. Failing in this, they had retired from the country, at the time when these exiles returned, and when the democracy was first reestablished. But after a certain interval, the intense sentiments of the moment having somewhat subsided, they were encouraged by their friends to return, and came back to stand their trial of accountability. It was on that occasion that Lysias preferred his accusation against Eratosthenes, the result of which we do not know, though we see plainly, even from the accusatory speech, that the latter had powerful friends to stand by him, and that the dikasts manifested considerable reluctance to condemn.¹ We learn, moreover, from the same speech, that such was the detestation of the Thirty among several of the states surrounding Attica, as to cause

¹ All this may be collected from various passages of the Orat. xii. of Lysias. Eratosthenes did not stand alone on his trial, but in conjunction with other colleagues; though of course, pursuant to the psephism of Kannonis, the vote of the dikasts would be taken about each separately. ἡ δὲ πρὸς αὐτὸν καὶ τοὺς συνδικαζομένους δίκην λαμβάνειν. . . . ἀπὸ τῶν φίλων καὶ τῶν παλαιῶν (τοὺς ἀλλοτρίους), παρῶντας δ' ἀφῆτε· μηδὲ τῆς πόλεως, ἡ πάλαι καὶ τὰς πόλιν ἐκείνην ἔχειν ἀπὸ τῶν δουλοῦσιν (sects. 80, 81; compare s. 36).

The number of friends proposed to back the defence of Eratosthenes, and to obtain his acquittal, (that is by representing that he had done the least mischief of all the Thirty, that all that he had done had been under fear of his own life; that he had been the partisan and supporter of Theramenes, whose memory was at that time popular, may be seen in sections 31, 56, 65, 87, 88, 94.

There are evidences also of other accusations brought against the Thirty before the senate of Areopagus (Lysias, Or. xi. cont. Theomnest A. s. 31 B. s. 12).

formal decrees for their expulsion, or for prohibiting their coming.¹ The sons, even of such among the Thirty as did not return, were allowed to remain at Athens, and enjoy their rights of citizens, unmolested; a moderation rare in Grecian political warfare.

The first public vote of the Athenians, after the conclusion of peace with Sparta and the return of the exiles, was to restore the former democracy purely and simply, to choose by lot the nine archons and the senate of Five Hundred, and to elect the generals, all as before. It appears that this restoration of the preceding constitution was partially opposed by a citizen named Phormisius, who, having served with Thrasybulus in Peiraus, now moved that the political franchise should for the future be restricted to the possessors of land in Attica. His proposition was understood to be supported by the Lacedæmonians, and was recommended as calculated to make Athens march in better harmony with them. It was presented as a compromise between oligarchy and democracy, excluding both the poorer freemen and those whose property lay either in movables or in land out of Attica: so that the aggregate number of the disfranchised would have been five thousand persons. Since Athens now had lost her fleet and maritime empire, and since the importance of Peiraus was much curtailed not merely by these losses, but by demolition of its separate walls and of the long walls, Phormisius and others conceived the opportunity favorable for striking out the maritime and trading multitude from the roll of citizens. Many of these men must have been in easy and even opulent circumstances, but the bulk of them were poor; and Phormisius had of course at his command the usual arguments, by which it is attempted to prove that poor men have no business with political judgment or action. But the proposition was rejected; the orator Lysias being among its opponents, and composing a speech against it which was either spoken, or intended to be spoken, by some eminent citizen in the assembly.²

Unfortunately, we have only a fragment of the speech remain-

¹ Lysias, Or. xii. cont. Eratosth. s. 36.

² Demosth. adv. Boetium de Dote Matern. c. 6, p. 1018.

³ Dionys. Hal. Jud. de Lysia, c. 32, p. 526; Lysias, Orat. xxxiv, Bekk.

ing, wherein the proposition is justly criticized as mischievous and unseasonable, depriving Athens of a large portion of her legitimate strength, patriotism, and harmony, and even of substantial men competent to serve as hoplites or horsemen, at a moment when she was barely rising from absolute prostration. Never, certainly, was the fallacy which connects political depravity or incapacity with a poor station, and political virtue or judgment with wealth, more conspicuously unmasked, than in reference to the recent experience of Athens. The remark of Thrasybulus was most true,¹ that a greater number of atrocities, both against person and against property, had been committed in a few months by the Thirty, and abetted by the class of horsemen, all rich men, than the poor majority of the Demos had sanctioned during two generations of democracy. Moreover, we know, on the authority of a witness unfriendly to the democracy, that the poor Athenian citizens, who served on shipboard and elsewhere, were exact in obedience to their commanders; while the richer citizens who served as hoplites and horsemen, and who laid claim to higher individual estimation, were far less orderly in the public service.²

The motion of Phormisius being rejected, the antecedent democracy was restored without qualification, together with the ordinances of Drako, and the laws, measures, and weights of Solon. But on closer inspection, it was found that this latter part of the resolution was incompatible with the amnesty which had been just sworn. According to the laws of Solon and Drako, the perpetrators of enormities under the Thirty had rendered themselves guilty, and were open to trial. To escape this consequence, a second psephism or decree was passed, on the proposition of Tisamenus, to review the laws of Solon and Drako, and reenact them with such additions and amendments as might be deemed expedient. Five hundred citizens had been just chosen by the people as nomothetai, or law-makers, at the same time when the senate of Five hundred was taken by lot: out of these nomothetai, the senate now chose a select few, whose duty it was to consider all propositions for amendment or addition to the laws of the old democracy, and post them up for public

¹ Xenoph. Hellen. ii. 4. 41.

² Xenoph. Memor. iii. 5, 19.

inspection before the statues of the eponymous heroes, within the month then running.' The senate, and the entire body of five hundred nomothetæ, were then to be convened, in order that each might pass in review, separately, both the old laws and the new propositions; the nomothetæ being previously sworn to decide righteously. While this discussion was going on, every private citizen had liberty to enter the senate, and to tender his opinion with reasons for or against any law. All the laws which should thus be approved, first by the senate, and afterwards by the nomothetæ, but no others, were to be handed to the magistrates, and inscribed on the walls of the portico called *Peristyle*, for public notoriety, as the future regulators of the city. After the laws were promulgated by such public inscription, the senate of *Areopagus* was enjoined to take care that they should be duly observed and enforced by the magistrates. A provisional committee of twenty citizens was named, to be generally responsible for the city during the time occupied in this revision.⁹

As soon as the laws had been revised and publicly inscribed

[illegible]

Putting together the two senators in which the nomothetae are here mentioned, Leiske and P. A. Wolff (Prolegomena ad Democritum, Leipzig, p. cxxix), think that there were two classes of nomothetae, one class chosen by the senate, the other by the people. This appears to me very improbable. The persons chosen by the senate were invested with no final or decisive function whatever; they were simply chosen to consider what new propositions were fit to be submitted for discussion, and to provide that such propositions should be publicly made known. Now any persons simply invested with this character of a preliminary committee, would not, in my judgment, be called nomothetae. The reason why the persons here mentioned were so called, was, that they were a portion of the five hundred nomothetae, in whom the power of peremptory decision ultimately rested. A small committee would naturally be intrusted with this preliminary duty; and the members of that small committee were to be chosen *by* one of the *colleges* with whom ultimate decision rested, but chosen *out of* the other.

⁸ Andokidês de *Mysteriis* sections 81-85.

in the peakilô, pursuant to the above decree, two concluding laws were enacted, which completed the purpose of the citizens.

The first of these laws forbade the magistrates to act upon, or permit to be acted upon, any law not among those inscribed ; and declared that no psephism, either of the senate or of the people, should overrule any law.¹ It renewed also the old prohibition, dating from the days of Kleisthenès, and the first origin of the democracy, to enact a special law inflicting direct hardship upon any individual Athenian apart from the rest, unless by the votes of six thousand citizens voting secretly.

The second of the two laws prescribed, that all the legal adjudications and arbitrations which had been passed under the antecedent democracy should be held valid and unimpeached, but formally annulled all which had been passed under the Thirty. It further provided, that the laws now revised and inscribed should only take effect from the archonship of Eukleidès; that is, from the nomination of archons made after the recent return of Thrasybulus and renovation of the democracy.²

¹ Andokidēs de Myster. s. 87. ψήφισμα δὲ μολόν, μήτε βουλῆς μήτε δήμου (ἔτι μὲν) ἀρχιμεινιστοὶ ἐλάτ.

It seems that the word *error* ought properly to be inserted here. see Demosth. cont. Aristokrat. c. 23, p. 649.

Compare a similar use of the phrase, *μηδὲν ἀρεστόν ποτε εἶναι*, in Demosthen., cont. Lakrit. c. 9, p. 937.

² Andokidēs de Myster s. 87. We see (from Demosthen. cont. Timokrat. c. 15, p. 718) that Andokidēs has not cited the law fully. He has omitted the words, ἀ-σάα δ' ἐστὶ τῶν τριακοντα ἐπὶ ἑκάστῃ, ἡ ἰδία ἡ δημοσία, ἀκέραια εἶναι, these words not having any material connection with the point at which he was aiming. Compare Aeschines cont. Timarch. c. 9, p. 25, καὶ ἐστὶ ταῦτα ἀκέραια, ὥσπερ τὰ ἐστὶ τῶν τριακοντα, ἡ τὰ πρὸς Εὐκλείδου, ἡ εἰ τις ἀλλοῦ ποσὶ ποσὶ τοιαύτη ἐγένετο προδομένη,

Tisameus is probably the same person of whom Lysias speaks contemptuously, *Or.* xxx. *cont.* *Nikomach.* s. 36.

Meier (*De Bonis Damiatorum*, p. 71) thinks that there is a contradiction between the decree proposed by Tisamenus (*Andok. de Myst.* s. 83), and another decree proposed by Dioklēs, cited in the *Oration of Demosth. cont. Timokr.* c. 11, p. 713. But there is no real contradiction between the two, and the only semblance of contradiction that is to be found, arises from the fact that the law of Dioklēs is not correctly given as it now stands. It ought to be read thus:—

Διακλῆς εἶπε, Τους νόμους τοὺς πρὸ Εὐκλείδου ιεθεύσας ἐν δημοκρατίᾳ

By these ever-memorable enactments, all acts done prior to the nomination of the archon Eukleidēs and his colleagues, in the summer of 403 B.C., were excluded from serving as grounds for criminal process against any citizen. To insure more fully that this should be carried into effect, a special clause was added to the oath taken annually by the senators, as well as to that taken by the Heliastic dikasts. The senators pledged themselves by oath not to receive any impeachment, or give effect to any arrest, founded on any fact prior to the archonship of Eukleidēs, excepting only against the Thirty, and the other individuals expressly shut out from the amnesty, and now in exile.¹ To the oath annually taken by the Heliasts, also, was added the clause: "I will not remember past wrongs, nor will I abet any one else who

καὶ ὅσοι ἐπ' Εὐκλείδου ἐτίθενται, καὶ εἰσὶν ἀναγεγραμμένοι, [ἀπ' Εὐκλείδου] κυρίως εἶναι· τότε δὲ μὴ Εὐκλείδου τεθένται καὶ τοιοῦτον τιθιμένοι; κυρίως εἶναι ἀπὸ τῆς ἡμέρας ἧς ἕκαστος ἐτίθη, πλὴν εἰ τῷ προσγεγραπταί· χρόνος ὅντινα δεῖ ἀρχεῖν. ²Επιγραφῆαι δὲ, τοῖς μὲν νῦν κειμένοις, τὸν γραμματεῖα τῆς βουλῆς, τριμνηστὰ ἡμέρων· τὰ δὲ λοιπὰ, ὡς ἀντεγράψῃ γραμματεῖων, προσγράφῃται παρὰ τὸν ἀρχὸν κίριον εἶναι ἀπὸ τῆς ἡμέρας ἧς ἐτίθη.

The words ἐπ' Εὐκλείδου, which stand between brackets in the second line, are inserted on my own conjecture; and I venture to think that any one who will read the whole law through, and the comments of the orator upon it, will see that they are imperatively required to make the sense complete. The entire scope and purpose of the law is, to regulate clearly the time from which each law shall begin to be valid.

As the first part of the law reads now, without these words, it has no pertinence, no bearing on the main purpose contemplated by Dioklēs in the second part, nor on the reasonings of Demosthenēs afterwards. It is easy to understand how the words ἀπ' Εὐκλείδου should have dropped out, seeing that ἐπ' Εὐκλείδου immediately precedes; another error has been in fact introduced, by putting ἀπ' Εὐκλείδου in the former case instead of ἐπ' Εὐκλείδου, which error has been corrected by various recent editors, on the authority of some MSS.

The law of Dioklēs, when properly read, fully harmonizes with that of Tisamenus. Meier wonders that there is no mention made of the δοκιμασία νόμων by the nomothetæ, which is prescribed in the decree of Tisamenus. But it was not necessary to mention this expressly, since the words ὅσοι εἰσὶν ἀναγεγραμμένοι presuppose the foregoing δοκιμασία.

¹ Andokidēs de Mysteriis, s. 91. καὶ οὐ μνησκαίεσθαι, οὐδὲ ἀπαγορῆν ἑκκα των προτιρον γεγενημένων, πλὴν τῶν φερούτων.

shall remember them; on the contrary, I will give my vote pursuant to the existing laws;" which laws proclaimed themselves as only taking effect from the archonship of Eukleidēs.

A still farther precaution was taken to bar all actions for redress or damages founded on acts done prior to the archonship of Eukleidēs. On the motion of Archinus, the principal colleague of Thrasybulus at Phylē, a law was passed, granting leave to any defendant against whom such an action might be brought, to plead an exception in bar, or paragraphē, upon the special ground of the amnesty and the legal prescription connected with it. The legal effect of this paragraphē, or exceptional plea, in Attic procedure, was to increase both the chance of failure, and the pecuniary liabilities in case of failure, on the part of the plaintiff; also, to better considerably the chances of the defendant. This enactment is said to have been moved by Archinus, on seeing that some persons were beginning to institute actions at law, in spite of the amnesty; and for the better prevention of all such claims.²

¹ Andokidēs de Mysteriis, s. 91. καὶ οὐ μνησκαίεσθαι, οὐδὲ ἀλλὰ μνησκαίεσθαι τῶν ποινῶν, ἡς ἀνέστη δὲ κατὰ τὸν κειμένον νόμον.

This clause does not appear as part of the Heliastic oath given in Demosthen. cont. Timokrat. c. 36, p. 746. It was extremely significant and valuable for the few years immediately succeeding the renovation of the democracy. But its value was essentially temporary, and it was doubtless dropped within twenty or thirty years after the period to which it specially applied.

² The Orat. xviii. of Isokratēs, Paragraphē cont. Kallimachum, informs us on these points, especially sections 1-4.

Kallimachus had entered an action against the client of Isokratēs for ten thousand drachmæ (sects. 15-17), charging him as an accomplice of Patroklēs, — the king-archon under the Ten, who immediately succeeded the Thirty, prior to the return of the exiles, — in seizing and confiscating a sum of money belonging to Kallimachus. The latter, in commencing this action, was under the necessity of paying the fees called *prytaneia*: a sum proportional to what was claimed, and amounting to thirty drachmæ, when the sum claimed was between one thousand and ten thousand drachmæ. Suppose that action had gone to trial directly, Kallimachus, if he lost his cause, would have to forfeit his prytaneia, but he would forfeit no more. Now according to the paragraphē permitted by the law of Archinus, the defendant is allowed to make oath that the action against him is founded upon a fact prior to the archonship of Eukleidēs; and a cause is then

By these additional enactments, security was taken that the proceedings of the courts of justice should be in full conformity with the amnesty recently sworn, and that, neither directly nor indirectly, should any person be molested for wrongs done anterior to Eukleidēs. And, in fact, the amnesty was faithfully observed: the reentering exiles from Peiraus, and the horsemen with other partisans of the Thirty in Athens, blended again together into one harmonious and equal democracy.

Eight years prior to these incidents, we have seen the oligarchical conspiracy of the Four Hundred for a moment successful, and afterwards overthrown; and we have had occasion to notice, in reference to that event, the wonderful absence of all reactionary violence on the part of the victorious people, at a moment of severe provocation for the past and extreme apprehension for the future. We noticed that Thucydides, no friend to the Athenian democracy, selected precisely that occasion — on which some manifestation of vindictive impulse might have been supposed likely and natural — to bestow the most unqualified eulogies on their moderate and gentle bearing. Had the historian lived to describe the reign of the Thirty and the restoration which followed it, we cannot doubt that his expressions would have been still warmer and more emphatic in the same sense. Few events in history, either ancient or modern, are more astonishing than the behavior of the Athenian people, on recovering their democracy after the overthrow of the Thirty: and when we view it in conjunction with the like phenomenon after the deposition of the Four Hundred, we see that neither the one nor the other arose from peculiar caprice or accident of the moment; both depended upon permanent attri-

tuted first, upon that special issue, upon which the defendant is allowed to speak first, before the plaintiff. If the verdict, on this special issue, is given in favor of the defendant, the plaintiff is not only disabled from proceeding further with his action, but is condemned besides to pay to the defendant the forfeit called *epobely*, that is, one-sixth part of the sum claimed. But if, on the contrary, the verdict on the special issue be in favor of the plaintiff, he is held entitled to proceed further with his original action, and to receive besides at once, from the defendant, the like forfeit or *epobely*. Information on these regulations of procedure in the Attic dikasteries may be found in Meier and Schömann, *Attischer Prozess*, p. 647; Platner, *Prozess und Klagen*, vol. i. pp. 156–162.

butes of the popular character. If we knew nothing else except the events of these two periods, we should be warranted in dismissing, on that evidence alone, the string of contemptuous predicates, — giddy, irascible, jealous, unjust, greedy, etc., one or other of which Mr. Mitford so frequently pronounces, and insinuates even when he does not pronounce them, respecting the Athenian people.¹ A people, whose habitual temper and morality merited these epithets, could not have acted as the Athenians acted both after the Four Hundred and after the Thirty. Particular acts may be found in their history which justify severe censure; but as to the permanent elements of character, both moral and intellectual, no population in history has ever afforded stronger evidence than the Athenians on these two memorable occasions.

If we follow the acts of the Thirty, we shall see that the horsemen and the privileged three thousand hoplites in the city

¹ Wachsmuth — who admits into his work, with little or no criticism, everything which has ever been said against the Athenian people, and indeed against the Greeks generally — affirms, contrary to all evidence and probability, that the amnesty was not really observed at Athens. (Wachsm. *Hellen. Alterth.* ch. ix. sect. 71, vol. ii. p. 267.)

The simple and distinct words of Xenophon, coming as they do from the mouth of so very hostile a witness, are sufficient to refute him: *καὶ ὁμοῦσαντες δικαστὴς ἢ μὴ μὴ μνησάκησιν, ἵτι καὶ νυν ὁμοῦ γε πολιτεύονται, καὶ τοὶς ὁμοῦσι ἐμμένει ὁ δῆμος*, *Hellen.* ii. 4, 43.)

The passages to which Wachsmuth makes reference, do not in the least establish his point. Even if actions at law or accusations had been brought, in violation of the amnesty, this would not prove that the people violated it, unless we also knew that the dikastery had affirmed those actions. But he does not refer to any actions or accusations preferred on any such ground. He only notices some cases in which, accusation being preferred on grounds subsequent to Eukleidēs, the accuser makes allusion in his speech to other matters anterior to Eukleidēs. Now every speaker before the Athenian dikastery thinks himself entitled to call up before the dikasts the whole past life of his opponent, in the way of analogous evidence going to attest the general character of the latter, good or bad. For example, the accuser of Sokratēs mentions, as a point going to impeach the general character of Sokratēs, that he had been the teacher of Kritias, while the philosopher, in his defence, alludes to his own resolution and virtue as *prytanis* in the assembly by which the generals were condemned after the battle of Arginusæ. Both these allusions come out as evidences to general character.

had made themselves partisans in every species of flagitious crime which could possibly be imagined to exasperate the feelings of the exiles. The latter, on returning, saw before them men who had handed in their relations to be put to death without trial, who had seized upon and enjoyed their property, who had expelled them all from the city, and a large portion of them even from Attica; and who had held themselves in mastery not merely by the overthrow of the constitution, but also by inviting and subsidizing foreign guards. Such atrocities, conceived and ordered by the Thirty, had been executed by the aid, and for the joint benefit, as Kritias justly remarked,¹ of those occupants of the city whom the exiles found on returning. Now Thrasybulus, Anytus, and the rest of these exiles, saw their property all pillaged and appropriated by others during the few months of their absence: we may presume that their lands — which had probably not been sold, but granted to individual members or partisans of the Thirty² — were restored to them; but the movable property could not be reclaimed, and the losses to which they remained subject were prodigious. The men who had caused and profited by these losses³ — often with great brutality towards the wives and families of the exiles, as we know by the case of

¹ Xenoph. Hellen. ii. 4, 9.

² Xenoph. Hellen. ii. 4, 1. ἤγον δὲ ἐκ τῶν χωρίων (οἱ τριάκοντα) ἐν αὐτοῖς καὶ οἱ φίλοι τοῖς τοῦτων ἄγρους ἔχουσιν.

³ Isokratēs cont. Kallimach. Or. xviii, sect. 30.

Θρασυβούλος μὲν καὶ Ἄνυτος, ἀγρίστου μὲν δυνάμενοι τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει, πολλῶν δὲ ἀπεστερημένοι χρημάτων, εἰδότες δὲ τοὺς ἀποζημιωμένους, οἷως οὐ πολὺ αὐτοῖς δίκας λαμβάνειν οἷδε μνησικακεῖν, ἀλλ' εἰ καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων μᾶλλον ἐτέρων δύνανται διαπραττεσθαι, ἀλλ' οὐ περὶ γε τῶν ἐν ταῖς συνθήκαις ἴσους ἔχειν τοῖς ἄλλοις ἀξίωσιν.

On the other hand, the young Alkibiadēs (in the Orat. xvi, of Isokratēs De Bigis, sect. 56) is made to talk about others recovering their property τῶν ἄλλων κομιζομένων τὰς οὐσίας. My statement in the text reconciles these two. The young Alkibiadēs goes on to state that the people had passed a vote to grant compensation to him for the confiscation of his father's property, but that the power of his enemies had disappointed him in it. We may well doubt whether such vote ever really passed.

It appears, however, that Batrachus, one of the chief informers who brought in victims for the Thirty, thought it prudent to live afterwards out of Attica (Lysias cont. Andokid. Or. vi, sect. 46), though he would have been legally protected by the amnesty.

the orator Lysias — were now at Athens, all individually well known to the sufferers. In like manner, the sons and brothers of Leon and the other victims of the Thirty, saw before them the very citizens by whose hands their innocent relatives had been consigned without trial to prison and execution.¹ The amount of wrong suffered had been infinitely greater than in the time of the Four Hundred, and the provocation, on every ground, public and private, violent to a degree never exceeded in history. Yet with all this sting fresh in their bosoms, we find the victorious multitude, on the latter occasion as well as on the former, burying the past in an indiscriminate amnesty, and anxious only for the future harmonious march of the renovated and all-comprehensive democracy. We see the sentiment of commonwealth in the Demos, twice contrasted with the sentiment of faction in an ascendent oligarchy;² twice triumphant over the strongest counter-motives, over the most bitter recollections of wrongful murder and spoliation, over all that passionate rancour of reactionary appetite which characterizes the moment of political restoration. "Bloody will be the reign of that king who comes back to his kingdom from exile," says the Latin poet: bloody, indeed, had been the rule of Kritias and those oligarchs who had just come back from exile: "Harsh is a Demos (observes Æschylus) which has just got clear of misery."³ But the Athenian Demos, on coming back from Peiræus, exhibited the rare phenomenon of a restoration, after cruel wrong suffered, sacrificing all the strong impulse of retaliation to a generous and deliberate regard for the future march of the commonwealth. Thucydides remarks that the moderation of political antipathy which prevailed at Athens after the victory of the people over the Four Hundred, was the main cause which revived Athens from her great public depres-

¹ Andokidēs de Mysteriis, sect. 94. Μέλητος δ' αὐ οὐτοσὶ ἀπήγαγεν ἐπὶ τῶν τριάκοντα Λεόντα, ὡς ἡμεῖς ἅπαντες ἴσμε, καὶ ἀπέθανεν ἐκεῖνος ἄκριτος. . . . Μέλητον τοίνυν τοῖς παῖσι τοῖς τοῦ Λέοντος οὐκ ἔστι φόνου διώκειν, οἷς τοῖς νόμοις δεῖ χρῆσθαι ἀπ' Εὐκλείδου ἀρχοντος ἐπεὶ ὡς γε οὐκ ἀπήγαγεν, οὐκ οὐτος ἀντιλέγει.

² Thucyd. vi, 39. δῆμον, ξύμπαν ὀνομάσθαι, ὀλιγαρχίαν ἔξ, μέρος.

³ Æschylus, Sept. ad Thebas, v, 1047.

Τραχὺς γε μέντοι δῆμος ἐκφυγῶν κακῶ.

sion and danger.¹ Much more forcibly does this remark apply to the restoration after the Thirty, when the public condition of Athens was at the lowest depth of abasement, from which nothing could have rescued her except such exemplary wisdom and patriotism on the part of her victorious Demos. Nothing short of this could have enabled her to accomplish that partial resurrection — into an independent and powerful single state, though shorn of her imperial power — which will furnish material for the subsequent portion of our History.

While we note the memorable resolution of the Athenian people to forget that which could not be remembered without ruin to the future march of the democracy, we must at the same time observe that which they took special pains to preserve from being forgotten. They formally recognized all the adjudged cases and all the rights of property as existing under the democracy anterior to the Thirty. "You pronounced, fellow-citizens (says Andokidēs), that all the judicial verdicts and all the decisions of arbitrators passed under the democracy should remain valid, in order that there might be no abolition of debts, no reversal of private rights, but that every man might have the means of enforcing contracts due to him by others."² If the Athenian people had been animated by that avidity to despoil the rich, and that subjection to the passion of the moment, which Mr. Mitford imputes to them in so many chapters of his history, neither motive nor opportunity was now wanting for wholesale confiscation, of which the rich themselves, during the dominion of the Thirty, had set abundant example. The amnesty as to political wrong, and the indelible memory as to the rights of property, stand alike conspicuous as evidences of the real character of the Athenian Demos.

If we wanted any farther proof of their capacity of taking the largest and soundest views on a difficult political situation, we should find it in another of their measures at this critical period.

¹ Thucyd. viii. 97.

² Andokidēs de Mysteriis, sect. 88. Τὰς μὲν δίκας, ὧ ἀνδρες, καὶ τὰς δαίτας ἐποιήσατε κτλ. εἶναι, ὅποσαι ἐν δημοκρατίᾳ τῇ ἡμῶν ἐγένοντο, ὅπως μὴτε χρεῶν ἀποκοταί εἶναι μὴτε δίκαι ἀναιδέα καὶ γινώσκοντο, ἀλλὰ τῶν ἰδίων συμβολαίων αἱ πράξεις εἶεν.

The Ten who had succeeded to the oligarchical presidency of Athens after the death of Kritias and the expulsion of the Thirty, had borrowed from Sparta the sum of one hundred talents, for the express purpose of making war on the exiles in Peiraus. After the peace, it was necessary that such sum should be repaid, and some persons proposed that recourse should be had to the property of those individuals and that party who had borrowed the money. The apparent equity of the proposition was doubtless felt with peculiar force at a time when the public treasury was in the extreme of poverty. But nevertheless both the democratical leaders and the people decidedly opposed it, resolving to recognize the debt as a public charge; in which capacity it was afterwards liquidated, after some delay arising from an unsupplied treasury.¹

All that was required from the horsemen, or knights, who had been active in the service of the Thirty, was that they should repay the sums which had been advanced to them by the latter as outfit. Such advance to the horsemen, subject to subsequent repayment, and seemingly distinct from the regular military pay, appears to have been a customary practice under the previous democracy;² but we may easily believe that the Thirty had carried it to an abusive excess, in their anxiety to enlist or stimulate partisans, when we recollect that they resorted to means more nefarious for the same end. There were of course great individual differences among these knights, as to the degree in which each had lent himself to the misdeeds of the oligarchy. Even the most guilty of them were not molested, and they were sent, four

¹ Isokratēs, Arcopagit. Or. vii. sect. 77: Demosth. cont. Leptin. Or. i. p. 460.

² Lysias pro Mantitheo. Or. xvi. sects. 6-8. I accept substantially the explanation which Harpokration and Photius give of the word καταστάσις, in spite of the objections taken to it by M. Boeckh, which appear to me not founded upon any adequate ground. I cannot but think that Reiske is right in distinguishing καταστάσις from the πείρασις.

See Boeckh, Public Economy of Athens, b. ii. sect. 19, p. 250. In the Appendix to this work, which is not translated into English along with the work itself, he further gives the text of an inscription, which he considers to bear upon this restoration of καταστάσις from the horsemen, or knights, after the Thirty. But the Fragment is so very imperfect, that nothing can be affirmed with any certainty concerning it: see the Staatshaush. der Athener, Appendix, vol. ii. pp. 207, 208.

years afterwards, to serve with Agesilaus in Asia, at a time when the Lacedæmonians required from Athens a contingent of cavalry;¹ the Demos being well pleased to be able to provide for them an honorable foreign service. But the general body of knights suffered so little disadvantage from the recollection of the Thirty, that many of them in after days became senators, generals, hipparchs, and occupants of other considerable posts in the state.²

Although the decree of Tisamenus—prescribing a revision of the laws without delay, and directing that the laws, when so revised, should be posted up for public view, to form the sole and exclusive guide of the dikasteries—had been passed immediately after the return from Peiræus and the confirmation of the amnesty, yet it appears that considerable delay took place before such enactment was carried into full effect. A person named Nikomachus was charged with the duty, and stands accused of having performed it tardily as well as corruptly. He, as well as Tisamenus,³ was a scribe, or secretary; under which name were included a class of paid officers, highly important in the detail of business at Athens, though seemingly men of low birth, and looked upon as filling a subordinate station, open to sneers from unfriendly orators. The boards, the magistrates, and the public bodies were so frequently changed at Athens, that the continuity of public business could only have been maintained by paid secretaries of this character, who devoted themselves constantly to the duty.⁴

¹ Xenoph. Hellen. iii, 1, 4.

² Lysias, Or. xvi, pro Mantitheo, sects. 9, 10; Lysias, cont. Evandr. Or. xxvi, sects. 21–25.

We see from this latter oration (sect. 26) that Thrasybulus helped some of the chief persons, who had been in the city, and had resisted the return of the exiles, to get over the difficulties of the dokimasy, or examination into character, previously to being admitted to take possession of any office, to which a man had been either elected or drawn by lot, in after years. He spoke in favor of Evander, in order that the latter might be accepted as king-archon.

³ I presume confidently that Tisamenus the scribe, mentioned in Lysias cont. Nikomach. sect. 37, is the same person as Tisamenus named in Andokidēs de Mysteriis (sect. 83) as the proposer of the memorable psephism.

⁴ See M. Boeckh's Public Economy of Athens, b. ii, c. 8, p. 186, Eng. Tr., for a summary of all that is known respecting these γραμματεῖς, or secretaries. The expression in Lysias cont. Nikomach. sect. 38, *ὅτι ὑπογραμματεῖσσι τὰς ἐξέτασι διὰ τὸν αὐτὸν τῇ ἀρχῇ τῇ αὐτῇ*, is correctly explained by M. Boeckh

Nikomachus had been named, during the democracy anterior to the Thirty, for the purpose of preparing a fair transcript, and of posting up afresh, probably in clearer characters, and in a place more convenient for public view, the old laws of Solon. We can well understand that the renovated democratical feeling, which burst out after the expulsion of the Four Hundred, and dictated the vehement psephism of Demophantus, might naturally also produce such a commission as this, for which Nikomachus, both as one of the public scribes, or secretaries, and as an able speaker,¹ was a suitable person. His accuser, for whom Lysias composed his thirtieth oration, now remaining, denounces him as having not only designedly lingered in the business, for the purpose of prolonging the period of remuneration, but even as having corruptly tampered with the old laws, by new interpolations, as well as by omissions. How far such charges may have been merited, we have no means of judging; but even assuming Nikomachus to have been both honest and diligent, he would find no small difficulty in properly discharging his duty of anagrapheus,² or "writer-up" of all the old laws of Athens, from Solon downward. Both the phraseology of these old laws, and the alphabet in which they were written, were in many cases antiquated and obsolete;³ while there were doubtless also cases in which one law was at variance, wholly or partially, with another. Now such contradictions and archaisms would be likely to prove offensive, if set up in a fresh place, and with clean, new characters; while Nikomachus had no authority to make the smallest alteration, and might

as having a very restricted meaning, and as only applying to two successive years. And I think we may doubt whether, in practice, it was rigidly adhered to; though it is possible to suppose that these secretaries alternated, among themselves, from one board or office to another. Their great usefulness consisted in the fact that they were constantly in the service, and thus kept up the continuous march of the details.

¹ Lysias, Or. xxx, cont. Nikomach. sect. 32.

² Lysias, Or. xxx, cont. Nikomach. sect. 33. Wachsmuth calls him erroneously antigrapheus instead of anagrapheus (Hellen. Alterth. vol. ii, ix, p. 269).

It seems by Orat. vii, of Lysias (sects. 20, 36, 39) that Nikomachus was at enmity with various persons who employed Lysias as their logograph, or speech-writer.

³ Lysias, Or. x, cont. Theomnest. A. sects. 16–20.

naturally therefore be tardy in a commission which did not promise much credit to him in its result.

These remarks tend to show that the necessity of a fresh collection and publication, if we may use that word, of the laws, had been felt prior to the time of the Thirty. But such a project could hardly be realized without at the same time revising the laws, as a body, removing all flagrant contradictions, and rectifying what might glaringly displease the age, either in substance or in style. Now the psephism of Tisamenus, one of the first measures of the renewed democracy after the Thirty, both prescribed such revision and set in motion a revising body; but an additional decree was now proposed and carried by Archinus, relative to the alphabet in which the revised laws should be drawn up. The Ionic alphabet — that is, the full Greek alphabet of twenty-four letters, as now written and printed — had been in use at Athens universally, for a considerable time, apparently for two generations; but from tenacious adherence to ancient custom, the laws had still continued to be consigned to writing in the old Attic alphabet of only sixteen or eighteen letters. It was now ordained that this scanty alphabet should be discontinued, and that the revised laws, as well as all future public acts, should be written up in the full Ionic alphabet.¹

Partly through this important reform, partly through the revising body, partly through the agency of Nikomachus, who was still continued as anagrapheus, the revision, inscription, and publication of the laws in their new alphabet was at length completed. But it seems to have taken two years to perform, or at least two years elapsed before Nikomachus went through his trial of accountability.² He appears to have made various new propositions of his own, which were among those adopted by the nomothetæ: for these his accuser attacks him, on the trial of accountability, as well as on the still graver allegation, of having corruptly falsified the decisions of that body; writing up what

¹ See Taylor, *Vit. Lysias*, pp. 53, 54; Franz, *Element. Epigraphicæ Græc.* *Introd.* pp. 18–24.

² *Lysias* cont. *Nikom.* sect. 3. His employment had lasted six years altogether: four years before the Thirty, two years after them, sect. 7. At least this seems the sense of the orator.

they had not sanctioned, or suppressing that which they had sanctioned.³

The archonship of Eukleidēs, succeeding immediately to the anarchy, — as the archonship of Pythodōrus, or the period of the Thirty, was denominated, — became thus a cardinal point or epoch in Athenian history. We cannot doubt that the laws came forth out of this revision considerably modified, though unhappily we possess no particulars on the subject. We learn that the political franchise was, on the proposition of Aristophan, so far restricted for the future, that no person could be a citizen by birth except the son of citizen-parents, on both sides; whereas previously, it had been sufficient if the father alone was a citizen.⁴ The rhetor Lysias, by station a metiek, had not only suffered great loss, narrowly escaping death from the Thirty, who actually put to death his brother Polemarchus, but had contributed a large sum to assist the armed efforts of the exiles under Thrasybulus in Peiræus. As a reward and compensation for such antecedents, the latter proposed that the franchise of citizen should be conferred upon him; but we are told that this decree, though adopted by the people, was afterwards indicted by Archinus as illegal or informal, and cancelled. Lysias, thus disappointed of the citizenship, passed the remainder of his life as an isoteles, or non-freeman on the best condition, exempt from the peculiar burdens upon the class of metics.⁵

Such refusal of citizenship to an eminent man like Lysias, who had both acted and suffered in the cause of the democracy, when combined with the decree of Aristophan above noticed, implies a degree of augmented strictness which we can only partially explain. It was not merely the renewal of her democracy for which Athens had now to provide. She had also to accommodate her legislation and administration to her future march as an

¹ I presume this to be the sense of sect. 21 of the *Oration* of Lysias against *Amikles* (ὁ ἀνὴρ τοῦ ἀνδρὸς τῆς ἀνδρὸς πατρὸς, etc.; also sects. 33–45: *παπα-κατασκευασμένη τῇ τῇ κρῆσιν*); *ἐν ἀρχαῖς τοῖς ἔτεσιν ἐπὶ τῇ ἀρχῇ τῆς ἀρχῆς*, etc.

The tenor of the oration, however, is unfortunately obscure.

² *Isæus*, *Or. viii.* De *Kiron* (Sect. 61); *Demosthen.* cont. *Eubulid.* c. 11, p. 1307.

³ *Plutarch.* *Vit. A. Chat.* (*Lysias*) p. 365. Taylor, *Vit. Lysias*, p. 53.

isolated state, without empire or foreign dependencies. For this purpose, material changes must have been required: among others, we know that the Board of Hellenotamie — originally named for the collection and management of the tribute at Delos, but attracting to themselves gradually more extended functions, until they became ultimately, immediately before the Thirty, the general paymasters of the state — was discontinued, and such among its duties as did not pass away along with the loss of the foreign empire, were transferred to two new officers, the treasurer at war, and the manager of the theōrikon, or religious festival-fund.¹ Respecting these two new departments, the latter of which especially became so much extended as to comprise most of the disbursements of a peace-establishment, I shall speak more fully hereafter; at present, I only notice them as manifestations of the large change in Athenian administration consequent upon the loss of the empire. There were doubtless many other changes arising from the same cause, though we do not know them in detail; and I incline to number among such the alteration above noticed respecting the right of citizenship. While the Athenian empire lasted, the citizens of Athens were spread over the Ægean in every sort of capacity, as settlers, merchants, navigators, soldiers, etc.; which must have tended materially to encourage intermarriages between them and the women of other Grecian insular states. Indeed, we are even told that an express permission of connubium with Athenians was granted to the inhabitants of Eubœa,² a fact, noticed by Lysias, of some moment in illustrating the tendency of the Athenian empire to multiply family ties between Athens and the allied cities. Now, according to the law which prevailed before Eukleides, the son of every such marriage was by birth an Athenian citizen, an arrangement at that time useful to Athens, as strengthening the bonds of her empire, and eminently useful in a larger point of view, among the causes of Pan-Hellenic sympathy. But when Athens was deprived both of her empire and her fleet, and confined within the limits of Attica,

¹ See respecting this change Boeckh, *Public Econ. of Athens*, ii. 7, p. 180, seq. Eng. Tr.

² Lysias, *Fragm. Or.* xxxiv, *De non dissolvendâ Republicâ*, sect. 3. ἄλλα καὶ Εὐβοέσιν ἐπιγαμίαν ἐποίησμεθα, etc.

there no longer remained any motive to continue such a regulation, so that the exclusive city-feeling, instinctive in the Grecian mind, again became predominant. Such is, perhaps, the explanation of the new restrictive law proposed by Aristophon.

Thrasybulus and the gallant handful of exiles who had first seized Phylê, received no larger reward than one thousand drachmæ for a common sacrifice and votive offering, together with wreaths of olive as a token of gratitude from their countrymen.¹ The debt which Athens owed to Thrasybulus was indeed such as could not be liquidated by money. To his individual patriotism, in great degree, we may ascribe not only the restoration of the democracy, but its good behavior when restored. How different would have been the consequences of the restoration and the conduct of the people, had the event been brought about by a man like Alkibiadēs, applying great abilities principally to the furtherance of his own cupidity and power!

At the restoration of the democracy, however, Alkibiadēs was already no more. Shortly after the catastrophe at Ægospotami, he had sought shelter in the satrapy of Pharnabazus, no longer thinking himself safe from Lacedæmonian persecution in his forts on the Thracian Chersonese. He carried with him a good deal of property, though he left still more behind him, in these forts; how acquired, we do not know. But having crossed apparently to Asia by the Bosphorus, he was plundered by the Thracians in Bithynia, and incurred much loss before he could reach Pharnabazus in Phrygia. Renewing the tie of personal hospitality which he had contracted with Pharnabazus four years before,² he now solicited from the satrap a safe-conduct up to Susa. The Athenian envoys — whom Pharnabazus, after his former pacification with Alkibiadēs in 408 B.C., had engaged to escort to Susa, but had been compelled by the mandate of Cyrus to detain as prisoners — were just now released from their three years' detention, and enabled to come down to the Propontis;³ and Alkibiadēs, by whom this mission had originally been pro-

¹ Æschinēs, *cont. Ktesiphon*, c. 62, p. 437, *Cornel. Nepos, Thrasybul.* c. 4.

² Xenoph. *Hellen.* i. 3, 12. τὸν τε κοινὸν ὄρκον καὶ ἰδίᾳ ἀλλήλοις τίστεται, etc.

³ Xenoph. *Hellen.* i. 4, 7.

jected, tried to prevail on the satrap to perform the promise which he had originally given, but had not been able to fulfil. The hopes of the sanguine exile, reverting back to the history of Themistoklēs, led him to anticipate the same success at Susa as had fallen to the lot of the latter; nor was the design impracticable, to one whose ability was universally renowned, and who had already acted as minister to Tissaphernēs.

The court of Susa was at this time in a peculiar position. King Darius Nothus, having recently died, had been succeeded by his eldest son Artaxerxes Mnemon; but the younger son Cyrus, whom Darius had sent for during his last illness, tried after the death of the latter to supplant Artaxerxes in the succession, or at least was suspected of so trying. Being seized and about to be slain, the queen-mother Parysatis prevailed upon Artaxerxes to pardon him, and send him again down to his satrapy along the coast of Ionia, where he labored strenuously, though secretly, to acquire the means of dethroning his brother; a memorable attempt, of which I shall speak more fully hereafter. But his schemes, though carefully masked, did not escape the observation of Alkibiadēs, who wished to make a merit of revealing them at Susa, and to become the instrument of defeating them. He communicated his suspicions as well as his purpose to Pharnabazus; whom he tried to awaken by alarm of danger to the empire, in order that he might thus get himself forwarded to Susa as informant and auxiliary.

Pharnabazus was already jealous and unfriendly in spirit towards Lysander and the Lacedæmonians, of which we shall soon see plain evidence, and perhaps towards Cyrus also, since such were the habitual relations of neighboring satraps in the Persian empire. But the Lacedæmonians and Cyrus were now all-powerful on the Asiatic coast, so that he probably did not dare to exasperate them, by identifying himself with a mission so hostile and an enemy so dangerous to both. Accordingly, he refused compliance with the request of Alkibiadēs; granting him, nevertheless, permission to live in Phrygia, and even assigning to him a revenue. But the objects at which the exile was aiming soon became more or less fully divulged, to those against

¹ Xenoph. Anab. i. 1; Diodor. xiii. 108.

whom they were intended. His restless character, enterprise, and capacity, were so well known as to raise exaggerated fears as well as exaggerated hopes. Not merely Cyrus, but the Lacedæmonians, closely allied with Cyrus, and the dekadarchies, whom Lysander had set up in the Asiatic Grecian cities, and who held their power only through Lacedæmonian support, all were uneasy at the prospect of seeing Alkibiadēs again in action and command, amidst so many unsettled elements. Nor can we doubt that the exiles whom these dekadarchies had banished, and the disaffected citizens who remained at home under their government in fear of banishment or death, kept up correspondence with him, and looked to him as a probable liberator. Moreover, the Spartan king, Agis, still retained the same personal antipathy against him, which had already some years before procured the order to be despatched, from Sparta to Asia, to assassinate him. Here are elements enough, of hostility, vengeance, and apprehension, atfloat against Alkibiadēs, without believing the story of Plutarch, that Kritias and the Thirty sent to apprise Lysander that the oligarchy at Athens could not stand, so long as Alkibiadēs was alive. The truth is, that though the Thirty had included him in the list of exiles, they had much less to dread from his assaults or plots, in Attica, than the Lysandrian dekadarchies in the cities of Asia. Moreover, his name was not popular even among the Athenian democrats, as will be shown hereafter, when we come to recount the trial of Sokratēs. Probably, therefore, the alleged intervention of Kritias and the Thirty, to procure the murder of Alkibiadēs, is a fiction of the subsequent encomiasts of the latter at Athens, in order to create for him claims to esteem as a friend and fellow-sufferer with the democracy.

A special despatch, or skytalē, was sent out by the Spartan authorities to Lysander in Asia, enjoining him to procure that Alkibiadēs should be put to death. Accordingly Lysander communicated this order to Pharnabazus, within whose satrapy Alkibiadēs was residing, and requested that it might be put in execution. The whole character of Pharnabazus shows that he

¹ Xenoph. Hellen. ii. 3. 42. Isokrates, Or. xvi. De Bigis. s. 46.

would not perpetrate such a deed, towards a man with whom he had contracted ties of hospitality, without sincere reluctance and great pressure from without: especially: it would have been easy for him to connive underhand at the escape of the intended victim. We may therefore be sure that it was Cyrus, who, informed of the revelations contemplated by Alkibiadēs, enforced the requisition of Lysander; and that the joint demand of the two was too formidable even to be evaded, much less openly disobeyed. Accordingly, Pharnabazus despatched his brother Magaeus and his uncle Sisamithres with a band of armed men, to assassinate Alkibiadēs in the Phrygian village where he was residing. These men, not daring to force their way into his house, surrounded it and set it on fire; but Alkibiadēs, having contrived to extinguish the flames, rushed out upon his assailants with a dagger in his right hand, and a cloak wrapped round his left to serve as a shield. None of them dared to come near him; but they poured upon him showers of darts and arrows until he perished, undefended as he was either by shield or by armor. A female companion with whom he lived, Timandra, wrapped up his body in garments of her own, and performed towards it all the last affectionate solemnities.¹

Such was the deed which Cyrus and the Lacedæmonians did not scruple to enjoin, nor the uncle and brother of a Persian satrap to execute, and by which this celebrated Athenian perished, before he had attained the age of fifty. Had he lived, we cannot doubt that he would again have played some conspicuous part, — for neither his temper nor his abilities would have allowed him to remain in the shade, — but whether to the advantage of Athens or not, is more questionable. Certain it is, that taking his life throughout, the good which he did to her bore no

¹ I put together what seems to me the most probable account of the death of Alkibiadēs from Plutarch, *Alkib.* c. 38, 39; Diodorus, xiv, 11 (who cites Ephorus, compare *Ephor. Fragm.* 126, ed. Didot); Cornelius Nepos, *Alkibiad.* c. 10; Justin, v, 8; Isokratēs, *Or.* xvi, *De Bigis*, s. 50.

There were evidently different stories, about the antecedent causes and circumstances, among which a selection must be made. The extreme perfidy ascribed by Ephorus to Pharnabazus appears to me not at all in the character of that satrap.

proportion to the far greater evil. Of the disastrous Sicilian expedition, he was more the cause than any other individual, though that enterprise cannot properly be said to have been caused by any individual, but rather to have emanated from a national impulse. Having first, as a counsellor, contributed more than any other man to plunge the Athenians into this imprudent adventure, he next, as an exile, contributed more than any other man, except Nikias, to turn that adventure into ruin, and the consequences of it into still greater ruin. Without him, Gylippus would not have been sent to Syracuse, Dekeleia would not have been fortified, Chios and Miletus would not have revolted, the oligarchical conspiracy of the Four Hundred would not have been originated. Nor can it be said that his first three years of political action as Athenian leader, in a speculation peculiarly his own, — the alliance with Argos, and the campaigns in Peloponnesus, — proved in any way advantageous to his country. On the contrary, by playing an offensive game where he had hardly sufficient force for a defensive, he enabled the Lacedæmonians completely to recover their injured reputation and ascendancy through the important victory of Mantinea. The period of his life really serviceable to his country, and really glorious to himself, was that of three years ending with his return to Athens in 407 B.C. The results of these three years of success were frustrated by the unexpected coming down of Cyrus as satrap: but, just at the moment when it behooved Alkibiadēs to put forth a higher measure of excellence, in order to realize his own promises in the face of this new obstacle, at that critical moment we find him spoiled by the unexpected welcome which had recently greeted him at Athens, and falling miserably short even of the former merit whereby that welcome had been earned.

If from his achievements we turn to his dispositions, his ends, and his means, there are few characters in Grecian history who present so little to esteem, whether we look at him as a public or as a private man. His ends are those of exorbitant ambition and vanity, his means rapacious as well as reckless, from his first dealing with Sparta and the Spartan envoys, down to the end of his career. The manœuvres whereby his political enemies first procured his exile were indeed base and guilty in a high degree; but we must recollect that if his enemies were

more numerous and violent than those of any other politician in Athens, the generating seed was sown by his own overweening insolence, and contempt of restraints, legal as well as social.

On the other hand, he was never once defeated either by land or sea. In courage, in ability, in enterprise, in power of dealing with new men and new situations, he was never wanting; qualities, which, combined with his high birth, wealth, and personal accomplishments, sufficed to render him for the time the first man in every successive party which he espoused; Athenian, Spartan, or Persian; oligarchical or democratical. But to none of them did he ever inspire any lasting confidence; all successively threw him off. On the whole, we shall find few men in whom eminent capacities for action and command are so thoroughly marred by an assemblage of bad moral qualities, as Alkibiadēs.¹

¹ Cornelius Nepos says (Alcib. c. 11) of Alkibiadēs, "Hunc infamatum a plerisque tres gravissimi historici summis laudibus extulerunt: Thucydides, qui ejusdem ætatis fuit; Theopompus, qui fuit post aliquando natus, et Timæus: qui quidem duo maledicentissimi, nescio quo modo, in illo uno laudando consenserunt."

We have no means of appreciating what was said by Theopompus and Timæus. But as to Thucydides, it is to be recollected that he extols only the capacity and warlike enterprise of Alkibiadēs, nothing beyond; and he had good reason for doing so. His picture of the dispositions and conduct of Alkibiadēs is the reverse of eulogy.

The Oration xvi, of Isokrates, De Bigis, spoken by the son of Alkibiadēs, goes into a labored panegyric of his father's character, but is prodigiously inaccurate, if we compare it with the facts stated in Thucydides and Xenophon. But he is justified in saying: οὐδεποτὶ τὸν πατέρα ἡγουμένον τροπαίων οὐκ ἔστησαν οἱ πολέμιοι (s. 23).

CHAPTER LXVII.

THE DRAMA. — RHETORIC AND DIALECTICS. — THE SOPHISTS.

RESPECTING the political history of Athens during the few years immediately succeeding the restoration of the democracy, we have unfortunately little or no information. But in the spring of 399 B.C., between three and four years after the beginning of the archonship of Eukleides, an event happened of paramount interest to the intellectual public of Greece as well as to philosophy generally, the trial, condemnation, and execution of Sokratēs. Before I recount that memorable incident, it will be proper to say a few words on the literary and philosophical character of the age in which it happened. Though literature and philosophy are now becoming separate departments in Greece, each exercises a marked influence on the other, and the state of dramatic literature will be seen to be one of the causes directly contributing to the fate of Sokratēs.

During the century of the Athenian democracy between Kleisthenēs and Eukleides, there had been produced a development of dramatic genius, tragic and comic, never paralleled before or afterwards. Aeschylus, the creator of the tragic drama, or at least the first composer who rendered it illustrious, had been a combatant both at Marathon and Salamis; while Sophokles and Euripides, his two cadrent followers, the former one of the generals of the Athenian armada against Samos in 440 B.C., expired both of them only a year before the battle of Egospotami, just in time to escape the bitter humiliation and suffering of that mournful period. Out of the once numerous compositions of these poets we possess only a few, yet sufficient to enable us to appreciate in some degree the grandeur of Athenian tragedy; and when we learn that they were frequently beaten, even with the best of their dramas now remaining, in fair competition for the prize against other poets whose names only have reached us, we are warranted in presuming that the

best productions of these successful competitors, if not intrinsically finer, could hardly have been inferior in merit to theirs.¹

The tragic drama belonged essentially to the festivals in honor of the god Dionysus; being originally a chorus sung in his honor, to which were successively superadded, first, an Iambic monologue; next, a dialogue with two actors; lastly, a regular plot with three actors, and the chorus itself interwoven into the scene. Its subjects were from the beginning, and always continued to be, persons either divine or heroic, above the level of historical life, and borrowed from what was called the mythical past: the *Persæ* of Æschylus forms a splendid exception; but the two analogous dramas of his contemporary, Phrynichus, the *Plænisæ* and the capture of Miletus, were not successful enough to invite subsequent tragedians to meddle with contemporary events. To three serious dramas, or a trilogy, at first connected together by sequence of subject more or less loose, but afterwards unconnected and on distinct subjects, through an innovation introduced by Sophoklēs, if not before, the tragic poet added a fourth or satyrical drama; the characters of which were satyrs, the companions of the god Dionysus, and other heroic or mythical persons exhibited in farce. He thus made up a total of four dramas, or a tetralogy, which he got up and brought forward to contend for the prize at the festival. The expense of training the chorus and actors was chiefly furnished by the chorēgi, wealthy citizens, of whom one was named for each of the ten tribes, and whose honor and vanity were greatly interested in obtaining the prize. At first, these exhibitions took place on a temporary stage, with nothing but wooden supports and scaffolding; but shortly after the year 500 B.C., on an occasion when the poets Æschylus and Pratinas were contending for the prize, this stage gave way during the ceremony, and lamentable mischief was the result. After that misfortune, a permanent theatre of stone was provided. To what extent the

¹ The *Œdipus Tyrannus* of Sophoklēs was surpassed by the rival composition of Philoklēs. The *Medea* of Euripidēs stood only third for the prize; Euphorion, son of Æschylus, being first, Sophoklēs second. Yet these two tragedies are the masterpieces now remaining of Sophoklēs and Euripidēs.

project was realized before the invasion of Xerxes, we do not accurately know; but after his destructive occupation of Athens, the theatre, if any existed previously, would have to be rebuilt or renovated along with other injured portions of the city.

It was under that great development of the power of Athens which followed the expulsion of Xerxes, that the theatre with its appurtenances attained full magnitude and elaboration, and Attic tragedy its maximum of excellence. Sophoklēs gained his first victory over Æschylus in 468 B.C.: the first exhibition of Euripidēs was in 455 B.C. The names, though unhappily the names alone, of many other competitors have reached us: Philoklēs, who gained the prize even over the *Œdipus Tyrannus* of Sophoklēs; Euphorion son of Æschylus, Xenoklēs, and Nikomachus, all known to have triumphed over Euripidēs; Neophron, Achaus, Ion, Agathon, and many more. The continuous stream of new tragedy, poured out year after year, was something new in the history of the Greek mind. If we could suppose all the ten tribes contending for the prize every year, there would be ten tetralogies — or sets of four dramas each, three tragedies and one satyrical farce — at the Dionysiac festival, and as many at the Lenæan. So great a number as sixty new tragedies composed every year,¹ is

¹ The careful examination of Welcker (*Griech. Tragödie*, vol. i. p. 76) makes out the titles of eighty tragedies unquestionably belonging to Sophoklēs, over and above the satyrical dramas in his tetralogies. Welcker has considerably cut down the number admitted by previous authors, carried by Fabricius as high as one hundred and seventy-eight, and even, by Bœckh, as high as one hundred and nine (Welcker, *ut sup.* p. 62).

The number of dramas ascribed to Euripidēs is sometimes ninety-two, sometimes seventy-five. Elmsley, in his remarks on the Argument to the *Medea*, p. 72, thinks that even the larger of these numbers is smaller than what Euripidēs probably composed: since the poet continued composing for fifty years, from 455 to 405 B.C., and was likely during each year to have composed one, if not two, tetralogies: if he could prevail upon the archon to grant him a chorus, that is, the opportunity of representing. The didaskalies took no account of any except such as gained the first, second, or third prize. Welcker gives the titles, and an approximative guess at the contents, of fifty-one lost tragedies of the poet, besides the seventeen remaining (p. 443).

Aristarchus the tragedian is affirmed by Suidas to have composed seventy tragedies, of which only two gained the prize. As many as a hundred and

not to be thought of; yet we do not know what was the usual number of competing tetralogies: it was at least three; since the first, second, and third are specified in the didaskalies, or theatrical records, and probably greater than three. It was rare to repeat the same drama a second time unless after considerable alterations; nor would it be creditable to the liberality of a chorégus to decline the full cost of getting up a new tetralogy. Without pretending to determine with numerical accuracy how many dramas were composed in each year, the general fact of unexampled abundance in the productions of the tragic muse is both authentic and interesting.

Moreover, what is not less important to notice, all this abundance found its way to the minds of the great body of the citizens, not excepting even the poorest. For the theatre is said to have accommodated thirty thousand persons:¹ here again it is unsafe to rely upon numerical accuracy, but we cannot doubt that it was sufficiently capacious to give to most of the citizens, poor as well as rich, ample opportunity of profiting by these beautiful compositions. At first, the admission to the theatre was gratuitous; but as the crowd of strangers as well as freemen, was found both excessive and disorderly, the system was adopted of asking a price, seemingly at the time when the permanent theatre was put in complete order after the destruction caused by Xerxes. The theatre was let by contract to a manager, who engaged to defray either in whole or part, the habitual cost incurred by the state in the representation, and who was allowed to sell tickets of admission. At first, it appears that the price of tickets was not fixed, so that the poor citizens were overbid, and could not get places. Accordingly, Periklēs introduced a new system, fixing the price of places at three oboli, or half a drachma, for the better, and one obolus for the less good. As there were two days of representation, tickets covering both days were sold respectively for a drachma and two oboli. But in order that the poor citizens might be enabled to attend, two oboli were given out from the public treasure to each citizen — rich as well as poor, if they chose to

twenty compositions are ascribed to Neophron, forty-four to Aeschylus, forty to Ion (Welcker, *ib.* p. 889).

¹ Plato, *Symposium*, c. 3, p. 175.

receive it — on the occasion of the festival. A poor man was thus furnished with the means of purchasing his place and going to the theatre without cost, on both days, if he chose; or, if he preferred it, he might go on one day only; or might even stay away altogether, and spend both the two oboli in any other manner. The higher price obtained for the better seats purchased by the richer citizens, is here to be set against the sum disbursed to the poorer; but we have no data before us for striking the balance, nor can we tell how the finances of the state were affected by it.¹

Such was the original *theōrikon*, or festival-pay, introduced by Periklēs at Athens; a system of distributing the public money, gradually extended to other festivals in which there was no theatrical representation, and which in later times reached a mischievous excess; having begun at a time when Athens was full of money from foreign tribute, and continuing, with increased demand at a subsequent time, when she was comparatively poor and without extraneous resources. It is to be remembered that all these festivals were portions of the ancient religion, and that, according to the feelings of that time, cheerful and multitudinous assemblages were essential to the satisfaction of the god in whose honor the festival was celebrated. Such disbursements were a portion of the religious, even more than of the civil establishment. Of the abusive excess which they afterwards reached, however, I shall speak in a future volume: at present, I deal with the *theōrikon* only in its primitive function and effect, of enabling all Athenians indiscriminately to witness the representation of the tragedies.

We cannot doubt that the effect of these compositions upon the public sympathies, as well as upon the public judgment and intelligence, must have been beneficial and moralizing in a high degree. Though the subjects and persons are legendary, the relations between them are all human and simple, exalted above the

¹ For these particulars, see chiefly a learned and valuable compilation — G. C. Schneider, *Leis. Attische Theater*, Wiesbaden, 1855 — furnished with copious notes, though I do not fully concur in all his details, and have differed from him on some points. I cannot, however, say that more than two oboli were given to any one citizen at the same festival, at least not until the distribution became extended, in times posterior to the Thirty — see M. Schneider's book, p. 17, also Notes, 24, 196.

level of humanity only in such measure as to present a stronger claim to the hearer's admiration or pity. So powerful a body of poetical influence has probably never been brought to act upon the emotions of any other population; and when we consider the extraordinary beauty of these immortal compositions, which first stamped tragedy as a separate department of poetry, and gave to it a dignity never since reached, we shall be satisfied that the tastes, the sentiments, and the intellectual standard, of the Athenian multitude, must have been sensibly improved and exalted by such lessons. The reception of such pleasures through the eye and the ear, as well as amidst a sympathizing crowd, was a fact of no small importance in the mental history of Athens. It contributed to exalt their imagination, like the grand edifices and ornaments added during the same period to their acropolis. Like them, too, and even more than they, tragedy was the monopoly of Athens; for while tragic composers came thither from other parts of Greece — Achaus from Eretria, and Ion from Chios, at a time when the Athenian empire comprised both those places — to exhibit their genius, nowhere else were original tragedies composed and acted, though hardly any considerable city was without a theatre.¹

The three great tragedians — Æschylus, Sophoklès, and Euripides — distinguished above all their competitors, as well by contemporaries as by subsequent critics, are interesting to us, not merely from the positive beauties of each, but also from the differences between them in handling, style, and sentiment, and from the manner in which these differences illustrate the insensible modification of the Athenian mind. Though the subjects, persons, and events of tragedy always continued to be borrowed from the legendary world, and were thus kept above the level of contemporaneous life,² yet the dramatic manner of handling them is sensibly modified, even in Sophoklès as compared with Æschylus; and still more in Euripidès, by the atmosphere of democracy, political and judicial contention, and philosophy, encompassing and acting upon the poet.

¹ See Plato, *Lachès*, c. 6, p. 183, B.; and Welcker, *Griech. Tragod.* p. 230.

² Upon this point, compare Welcker, *Griech. Tragod.* vol. ii, p. 1102.

In Æschylus, the ideality belongs to the handling not less than to the subjects; the passions appealed to are the masculine and violent, to the exclusion of Aphrodité and her inspirations:¹ the figures are vast and majestic, but exhibited only in half-light and in shadowy outline: the speech is replete with bold metaphor and abrupt transition, "grandiloquent even to a fault," as Quintilian remarks, and often approaching nearer to Oriental vagueness than to Grecian perspicuity. In Sophoklès, there is evidently a closer approach to reality and common life: the range of emotions is more varied, the figures are more distinctly seen, and the action more fully and conspicuously worked out. Not only we have a more elaborate dramatic structure, but a more expanded dialogue, and a comparative simplicity of speech like that of living Greeks: and we find too a certain admixture of rhetorical declamation, amidst the greatest poetical beauty which the Grecian drama ever attained. But when we advance to Euripidès, this rhetorical element becomes still more prominent and developed. The ultra-natural sublimity of the legendary characters disappears: love and compassion are invoked to a degree which Æschylus would have deemed inconsistent with the dignity of the heroic person: moreover, there are appeals to the reason, and argumentative controversies, which that grandiloquent poet would have despised as petty and forensic cavils. And — what was worse still, judging from the Æschylean point of view — there was a certain novelty of speculation, an intimation of doubt on reigning opinions, and an air of scientific refinement, often spoiling the poetical effect.

Such differences between these three great poets are doubtless referable to the working of Athenian politics and Athenian philosophy on the minds of the two later. In Sophoklès, we may trace the companion of Herodotus;² in Euripidès, the hearer of

¹ See Aristophan *Ran.* 1046. The *Antigone* (780, seq.) and the *Trachiniae* (498) are sufficient evidence that Sophoklès did not agree with Æschylus in this renunciation of Aphrodité.

² The comparison of Herodot. iii, 119 with *Soph. Antig.* 905, proves a community of thought which seems to me hardly explicable in any other way. Which of the two obtained the thought from the other, we cannot determine.

The reason given, by a woman whose father and mother were dead, for

Anaxagoras, Sokratês, and Prodikus;¹ in both, the familiarity with that wide-spread popularity of speech, and real, serious debate of politicians and competitors before the dikastery, which both had ever before their eyes, but which the genius of Sophoklês knew how to keep in due subordination to his grand poetical purpose.

The transformation of the tragic muse from Æschylus to Euripidês is the more deserving of notice, as it shows us how Attic tragedy served as the natural prelude and encouragement to the rhetorical and dialectical age which was approaching. But the democracy, which thus insensibly modified the tragic drama, imparted a new life and ampler proportions to the comic; both the one and the other being stimulated by the increasing prosperity and power of Athens during the half century following 480 B.C. Not only was the affluence of strangers and visitors to Athens continually augmenting, but wealthy men were easily found to incur the expense of training the chorus and actors. There was no manner of employing wealth which seemed so appropriate to procure influence and popularity to its possessors, as that of contributing to enhance the magnificence of the national and religious festivals.² This was the general sentiment both among rich and

preferring a brother either to husband or child — that she might find another husband and have another child, but could not possibly have another brother, — is certainly not a little far-fetched.

¹ See Valerianus, *Diatribe in Eurip. Frag. c. 23*. Quintilian, who had before him many more tragedies than those which we now possess, remarks how much more useful was the study of Euripidês than that of Æschylus or Sophoklês, to a young man preparing himself for forensic oratory: —

Illud quidem nemo non fateatur, ut qui se ad agendum comparaverint, utiliore longe Euripidem fore. Namque is et vi et sermone (quo ipsum reprehendunt quibus gravitas et eothurnus et sonus Sophoclis videtur esse sublimior) magis accedit oratorio generi et sententiis densus, et rebus ipsis, et in his quæ a sapientibus tradita sunt, pæne ipsis par, et in dicendo et respondendo cuilibet eorum, qui fuerunt in foro disert, comparandus. In affectibus vero tum omnibus mirus, tum in his qui miseratione constant facile præcipuus. (Quintil. *Inst. Orat.* x. 1.)

² Aristophan. *Plutus*, 1160 —

Πλὺνται γὰρ ἐστὶ τοῖς ἀποφροσιν,
Πολλὴν ἀγῶναι γυναικῶν καὶ υἱοῦ.

Compare the speech of Alkibiadês, *Thuc.* vi. 16. and Theophrastus ap. *Cic. de Officiis*, ii. 16.

among poor; nor is there any criticism more unfounded than that which represents such an obligation as hard and oppressive upon rich men. Most of them spent more than they were legally compelled to spend in this way, from the desire of exalting their popularity. The only real sufferers were the people, considered as interested in a just administration of law; since it was a practice which enabled many rich men to acquire importance who had no personal qualities to deserve it, and which provided them with a stock of factitious merits to be pleaded before the dikastery, as a set-off against substantive accusations.

The full splendor of the comic muse was considerably later than that of the tragic. Even down to 460 B.C. (about the time when Periklês and Ephialtês introduced their constitutional reforms), there was not a single comic poet of eminence at Athens; nor was there apparently a single undisputed Athenian comedy before that date, which survived to the times of the Alexandrine critics Magnês, Kratês, and Kratinus — probably also Chionidês and Ekphantidês¹ — all belong to the period beginning about (Olympiad 80 or) 460 B.C.; that is, the generation preceding Aristophanês, whose first composition dates in 427 B.C. The condition and growth of Attic comedy before this period seems to have been unknown even to Aristotle, who intimates that the archon did not begin to grant a chorus for comedy, or to number it among the authoritative solemnities of the festival, until long after the practice had been established for tragedy. Thus the comic chorus in that early time consisted of volunteers, without any chorêgus publicly assigned to bear the expense of teaching them or getting up the piece; so that there was little motive for authors to bestow care or genius in the preparation of their song, dance, and scurrilous monody, or dialogue. The exuberant revelry of the phallic festival and procession, with full license of scoffing at any one present, which the god Dionysus was supposed to enjoy, and with the most plain-spoken grossness as well in language as in ideas, formed the primitive germ, which under Athenian genius

¹ See Meineke, *Hist. Critic. Com. rer. Græcor.* vol. i. p. 26. *sq.*

Grysar and Mr. Clinton, following Suidas, place Chionidês before the Persian invasion; but the words of Aristotle rather countenance the later date (*Poetic.* c. 2).

ripened into the old comedy.¹ It resembled in many respects the satyric drama of the tragedians, but was distinguished from it by dealing not merely with the ancient mythical stories and persons, but chiefly with contemporary men and subjects of common life: dealing with them often, too, under their real names, and with ridicule the most direct, poignant, and scornful. We see clearly how fair a field Athens would offer for this species of composition, at a time when the bitterness of political contention ran high, — when the city had become a centre for novelties from every part of Greece, — when tragedians, rhetors, and philosophers, were acquiring celebrity and incurring odium, — and when the democratical constitution laid open all the details of political and judicial business, as well as all the first men of the state, not merely to universal criticism, but also to unmeasured libel.

¹ See respecting these licentious processions, in connection with the iambus and Archilochus, vol. iv. of this History, ch. xxix, p. 81.

Aristotle (*Poetic.* c. 4) tells us that these phallic processions, with liberty to the leaders (*οἱ ἐξαρχοὶ*) of scoffing at every one, still continued in many cities of Greece in his time. See Herod. v. 83. and Sémus apud Athenæum, xiv, p. 622; also the striking description of the rural Dionysia in the *Acharnais* of Aristophanès, 235, 236, 1115. The scoffing was a part of the festival, and supposed to be agreeable to Dionysus. *ἢ τοὺς Διονυσίους ἐδαιμονίου αὐτοῦ δαίει καὶ πᾶσι καὶ μὲν τὸ ἰδοῦναι τῆς γούργης καὶ ὁ θεὸς ἴσως χαίρει, φιλοχέλιος τὸς ὄν* (Lucian, *Piscator* c. 25). Compare Aristophanès, *Ranae*, 367, where the poet seems to imply that no one has a right to complain of being ridiculed in the *παγὰν τιλοῦσας Διονυσίαν*.

The Greek word for comedy — *κωμῳδία*, τὸ *κωμῳδεῖν* — at least in its early sense, had reference to a bitter, insulting, imitative ridicule: *κωμῳδεῖν καὶ κακῶς λέγειν* (Xenophon, *Repub. Ath.* ii. 23) — *κακηγοριῶντας τε καὶ κωμῳδοῦντας ἀλλήλους καὶ ἀποχολογοῦντας* (Plato de *Repub.* iii. 8, p. 332). A remarkable definition of *κωμῳδία* appears in Bekker's *Anecdota Græca*, ii, 747, 10: *Κωμῳδία ἐστὶν ἡ ἐν μέσῳ λαοῦ κατηγορία, ἔχουσα δημοσιεύσεις*; "public exposure to scorn before the assembled people" — and this idea of it as a penal visitation of evil-doers is preserved in Platonius and the anonymous writers on comedy, prefixed to Aristophanès. The definition which Aristotle (*Poetic.* c. 11) gives of it, is too mild for the primitive comedy; for he tells us himself that Kratès, immediately preceding Aristophanès, was the first author who departed from the *ἱαμβικὴ ἰδέα*: this "iambic vein" was originally the common character. It doubtless included every variety of ridicule, from innocent mirth to scornful contempt and shame, but the predominant character tended decidedly to the latter.

Out of all the once abundant compositions of Attic comedy, nothing has reached us except eleven plays of Aristophanès. That poet himself singles out Magnès, Kratès, and Kratinus, among predecessors whom he describes as numerous, for honorable mention; as having been frequently, though not uniformly, successful. Kratinus appears to have been not only the most copious, but also the most distinguished, among all those who preceded Aristophanès, a list comprising Hermippus, Telekleidès, and the other bitter assailants of Periklès. It was Kratinus who first extended and systematized the license of the phallic festival, and the "careless laughter of the festive crowd,"¹ into a drama of regular structure, with actors three in number, according to the analogy of tragedy. Standing forward, against particular persons exhibited or denounced by their names, with a malignity of personal slander not inferior to the iambist Archilochus, and with an abrupt and dithyrambic style somewhat resembling Æschylus, Kratinus made an epoch in comedy as the latter had made in tragedy; but was surpassed by Aristophanès, as much as Æschylus had been surpassed by Sophoklès. We are told that his compositions were not only more rudely bitter and extensively libellous than those of Aristophanès,² but also destitute of that richness of illustration and felicity of expression which pervades all the wit of the latter, whether good-natured or malignant. In Kratinus, too, comedy first made herself felt as a substantive agent and partisan in the political warfare of Athens. He espoused the cause of Kimon against Periklès;³ eulogizing the

Compare Will. Schneider, *Attisches Theater-Wesen*, Notes, pp. 22-25, Bernhardt, *Griechische Litteratur*, sect. 67, p. 292.

¹ Χαῖρ', ὦ μὲν' ἀχρειογέλωτος ὄμιλε τὰς ἐπιβόλους.

² Τὰς ἡμετέρας σοφίας κριτὴς ἀρίστη πάντων, etc.

Kratini *Fragm.* Incert. 51, Meineke, *Fr. Com. Græcor.* ii, p. 193.

³ Respecting Kratinus, see Platonius and the other writers on the Attic comedy, prefixed to Aristophanès in Bekker's edition, pp. vi, ix, xi, xiii, etc.; also Meineke, *Historia Comic. Græc.* vol. i, p. 50, seq.

.....Ὁ δὲ γὰρ, ὡς περ' Ἀριστοφάνης, ἐπιτρέχειν τὴν χάριν τοῖς σκαμνίστοις (Κρατίνος), ἀλλ' ἀπ' ὧς, καὶ, κατὰ τὴν παροιμίαν, γυμνῇ τῇ κεφαλῇ τὶ θήσει τὰς βλασφημίας κατὰ τῶν ἀμαρτανόντων.

⁴ See Kratinus — Ἀρχιλοχοί — *Frag.* 1, and Plutarch, *Kimón*, 10. *Ἡ κωμῳδία πολιτεύεται ἐν τοῖς δράμασι καὶ φιλοσοφεῖ, ἡ τῶν περὶ τὸν Κρατίνου καὶ Ἀριστοφάνη καὶ Εὐπόλου, etc.* (Dionys. *Halikarn.* *Ars Rhetoric.* c. 11.)

former, while he bitterly derided and vituperated the latter Hermippus, Telekleidēs, and most of the contemporary comic writers followed the same political line in assailing that great man, together with those personally connected with him, Aspasia and Anaxagoras: indeed, Hermippus was the person who indicted Aspasia for impiety before the dikastery. But the testimony of Aristophanēs¹ shows that no comic writer, of the time of Periklēs, equalled Kratinus, either in vehemence of libel or in popularity.

It is remarkable that, in 440 B.C., a law was passed forbidding comic authors to ridicule any citizen by name in their compositions; which prohibition, however, was rescinded after two years, an interval marked by the rare phenomenon of a lenient comedy from Kratinus.² Such enactment denotes a struggle in the Athenian mind, even at that time, against the mischief of making the Dionysiac festival an occasion for unmeasured libel against citizens publicly named and probably themselves present. And there was another style of comedy taken up by Kratēs, distinct from the iambic or Archiloehian vein worked by Kratinus, in which comic incident was attached to fictitious characters and woven into a story, without recourse to real individual names or direct personality. This species of comedy, analogous to that which Epicharmus had before exhibited at Syracuse, was continued by Pherekratēs as the successor of Kratēs. Though for a long time less popular and successful than the poignant food served up by Kratinus and others, it became finally predominant after the close of the Peloponnesian war, by the gradual transition of what is called the Old Comedy into the Middle and New Comedy.

But it is in Aristophanēs that the genius of the old libellous comedy appears in its culminating perfection. At least we have

¹ Aristophan. *Equit.* 525. *seq.*

² A comedy called *Odessaia* (plur. numb. corresponding to the title of another of his comedies, *Ἀσπασιαίαι*). It had a chorus, as one of the *Fragments* shows, but few or no choric songs; nor any parabasis, or address by the chorus, assuming the person of the poet, to the spectators.

See Bergk, *De Reliquis Comed. Antiq.* p. 142. *seq.*; Meineke, *Frag. Cratini*, vol. ii, p. 93. *Odessaia* compare also the first volume of the same work, p. 43; also Runkel, *Cratini Fragm.* p. 38 (Leipz. 1827).

before us enough of his works to enable us to appreciate his merits; though perhaps Eupolis, Ameipsias, Phrynichus, Plato (Comicus), and others, who contended against him at the festivals with alternate victory and defeat, would be found to deserve similar praise, if we possessed their compositions. Never probably will the full and unshackled force of comedy be so exhibited again. Without having Aristophanēs actually before us, it would have been impossible to imagine the unmeasured and unsparing licence of attack assumed by the old comedy upon the gods, the institutions, the politicians, philosophers, poets, private citizens specially named, and even the women, whose life was entirely domestic, of Athens. With this universal liberty in respect of subject, there is combined a poignancy of derision and satire, a fecundity of imagination and variety of turns, and a richness of poetical expression, such as cannot be surpassed, and such as fully explains the admiration expressed for him by the philosopher Plato, who in other respects must have regarded him with unquestionable disapprobation. His comedies are popular in the largest sense of the word, addressed to the entire body of male citizens on a day consecrated to festivity, and providing for them amusement or derision with a sort of drunken abundance, out of all persons or things standing in any way prominent before the public eye. The earliest comedy of Aristophanēs was exhibited in 427 B.C., and his muse continued for a long time prolific, since two of the dramas now remaining belong to an epoch eleven years after the Thirty and the renovation of the democracy, about 392 B.C. After that renovation, however, as I have before remarked, the unmeasured sweep and libellous personality of the old comedy was gradually discontinued: the comic chorus was first cut down, and afterwards suppressed, so as to usher in what is commonly termed the Middle Comedy, without any chorus at all. The *“Plutus”* of Aristophanēs indicates some approach to this new phase, but his earlier and more numerous comedies, from the *“Acharneis,”* in 425 B.C. to the *“Frogs,”* in 405 B.C., only a few months before the fatal battle of *Ægospotami*, exhibit the continuous, unexhausted, untempered flow of the stream first opened by Kratinus.

Such abundance both of tragic and comic poetry, each of first-rate excellence, formed one of the marked features of Athenian

life, and became a powerful instrument in popularizing new combinations of thought with variety and elegance of expression. While the tragic muse presented the still higher advantage of inspiring elevated and benevolent sympathies, more was probably lost than gained by the lessons of the comic muse; not only bringing out keenly all that was really ludicrous or contemptible in the phenomena of the day, but manufacturing scornful laughter, quite as often, out of that which was innocent or even meritorious, as well as out of boundless private slander. The "Knights" and the "Wasps" of Aristophanes, however, not to mention other plays, are a standing evidence of one good point in the Athenian character; that they bore with good-natured indulgence the full outpouring of ridicule and even of calumny interwoven with it, upon those democratical institutions to which they were sincerely attached. The democracy was strong enough to tolerate unfriendly tongues either in earnest or in jest; the reputations of men who stood conspicuously forward in politics, on whatever side, might also be considered as a fair mark for attacks; inasmuch as that measure of aggressive criticism which is tutelary and indispensable, cannot be permitted without the accompanying evil, comparatively much smaller, of excess and injustice; though even here we may remark that excess of bitter personality is among the most conspicuous sins of Athenian literature generally. But the warfare of comedy, in the persons of Aristophanes and other composers, against philosophy, literature, and eloquence, in the name of those good old times of ignorance, "when an Athenian seaman knew nothing more than how to call for his barley-cake, and cry, Yo-ho;"

¹ Aristophanes boasts that he was the first comic composer who selected great and powerful men for his objects of attack. His predecessors, he affirms, had meddled only with small vermin and rags. *ἐξ τὰ ρυστὰ σκωπτοντας αἰεὶ, καὶ τοῖς σθεῖραϊν πολέμοινας* (Pac. 724-736, Vesp. 1030).

But this cannot be true in point of fact, since we know that no man was more bitterly assailed by the comic authors of his day than Periklēs. It ought to be added, that though Aristophanes doubtless attacked the powerful men, he did not leave the smaller persons unmolested.

² Aristoph. Ran. 1067, also Vesp. 1095. Æschylus reproaches Euripides:—

Εἴτ' αὖ λαλίαν ἐπιτηδεύσαι καὶ στωμυλίαν ἐδάδας,

Ἦ' ἐκένωσεν τὰς τε παλαιστράς, καὶ τὰς πυγὰς ἐνέτριψε

Τῶν μειρακίων στωμυλλομένων, καὶ τοὺς παραλοὺς ἀνέπεισεν

and the retrograde spirit which induces them to exhibit moral turpitude as the natural consequence of the intellectual progress of the age, are circumstances going far to prove an unfavorable and degrading influence of comedy on the Athenian mind.

In reference to individual men, and to Sokratēs¹ especially, the Athenians seem to have been unfavorably biased by the misapplied wit and genius of Aristophanes, in "The Clouds," aided by other comedies of Eupolis, and Ameipsias and Eupolis; but on the general march of politics, philosophy, or letters, these composers had little influence. Nor were they ever regarded at Athens in the light in which they are presented to us by modern criticism; as men of exalted morality, stern patriotism, and genuine discernment of the true interests of their country; as animated by large and steady views of improving their fellow-citizens, but compelled,

¹ Ἀναγορεύουσιν τοῖς ἀρχαίοις. Καίτοι τότε γ', ἦν καὶ ἐγὼ ζῶν,

Ὅκα ἡπίσταντ' ἀλλ' ἡ μᾶζαν καλεῖσαι καὶ ρυππαπαλ εἰπεῖν.

Τὸ ρυππαπαλ seems to have been the peculiar cry or chorus of the seamen on shipboard, probably when some joint pull or effort of force was required: compare Vesp. 909.

² See about the effect on the estimation of Sokratēs, Ranke, *Commentat. de Vita Aristophanis*, p. cxlii.

Compare also the remarks of Cicero (*De Repub.* iv, 11; vol. iv, p. 476, ed. Orell.) upon the old Athenian comedy and its unrestrained license. The laws of the Twelve Tables at Rome condemned to death any one who composed and published libellous verses against the reputation of another citizen.

Among the constant butts of Aristophanes and the other comic composers, was the dithyrambic poet Kinesias, upon whom they discharged their wit and bitterness, not simply as an indifferent poet, but also on the ground of his alleged impiety, his thin and feeble bodily frame, and his wretched health. We see the effect of such denunciations in a speech of the orator Lysias; composed on behalf of Phanias, against whom Kinesias had brought an indictment, or *graphē paranomōn*. Phanias treats these abundant lampoons as if they were good evidence against the character of Kinesias: *Θαυμάζω δ' εἰ μὴ βάρως οἴεσθε ὅτι Κινησίας ἐστὶν ὁ τοῖς νόμοις βοηθός, ὃν ὑμεῖς πάντες ἐπιστάσθε ἀσεβέστατον ἀπάντων καὶ παρανομοτατον γεγονέναι. Οὐχ οὕτως ἐστὶν ὁ τοιαῦτα περὶ θύοις ἐξαμαρτάνων, αἱ τοῖς μὲν ἄλλοις αἰσχρὸν ἐστὶ καὶ λέγειν, τῶν κωμῶδο διδασκαλῶν δ' ἀκούετε καθ' ἑκάστον ἐν ἑαυτῶν*; see Lysias, *Fragm.* 31, ed. Bekker; *Athenæus*, xii, p. 551.

Dr. Thirlwall estimates more lightly than I do the effect of these abundant libels of the old comedy: see his review of the Attic tragedy and comedy, in a very excellent chapter of his *History of Greece*, ch. xviii vol. iii, p. 42

in consequence of prejudice or opposition, to disguise a far-sighted political philosophy under the veil of satire; as good judges of the most debatable questions, such as the prudence of making war or peace, and excellent authority to guide us in appreciating the merits or demerits of their contemporaries, insomuch that the victims of their lampoons are habitually set down as worthless men.¹ There cannot be a greater misconception of the old comedy

¹ The view which I am here combating, is very general among the German writers; in proof of which, I may point to three of the ablest recent critics on the old comedy, Bergk, Meineke, and Ranke; all most useful writers for the understanding of Aristophanês.

Respecting Kratinus, Bergk observes: "Erat enim Cratinus, pariter atque ceteri principes antiqui comicorum, uti cetera, moratus, idemque antiqui moris tenax. . . . Cum Cratinus quasi de civitate eideret ex hac libertate mox tanquam ex stirpe aliquam nimiam licentiam existere et nasci, statim his iniuriis graviter adversatus est, videturque Cimonem tanquam exemplum boni et honesti civis proposuisse." etc.

"Nam Cratinus cum esset magno ingenio et animâ moram gravitate, ægerime tulit rem publicam præcipis in perniciem ruere: omnem igitur operam atque omne studium eo contulit, ut ipse ipsos rite ante oculos posita omnes et res dicere et homines emendarentur, hominumque animi ad honestatem colendam moderarentur. Hoc sibi primus et proposuit Cratinus, et propositum strenue persecutus est. Sed si ipsam Veritatem, cuius imago oculis observabatur, oculis subieceret, pericula erat ne tandem derideret eos qui spectarent, nihilque prorsus eorum, quæ summo studio persequeretur, obtineret. Quare eximiâ quidam arte pulchram effigiem hilaremque formam finxit, ita tamen ut ad veritatem sublimemque ipsius speciem referret omnia. sic cum Iulicis miscuit seria, ut et vulgus haberet qui delectaretur; et qui plus ingenio valeret, ipsam veritatem, quæ ex omnibus fabularum partibus perlucet, mente et cogitatione comprehenderent." . . . "Jam vero Cratinum in fabulis componendis id unum spectasse quod esset verum, ne veteres quidem latuit. . . . Aristophanes autem idem et secutus semper est et sæpe professus." (Bergk, De Reliquiis Comæd. Antiq. pp. 1, 10, 20, 233, etc.)

The criticism of Ranke (Commentatio de Vita Aristophanis, pp. cexli, cccxiv, cccxlii, cccxix, cccxxiii, cccxxiv, etc.) adopts the same strain of eulogy as to the lofty and virtuous purposes of Aristophanês. Compare also the eulogy bestowed by Meineke on the monitorial value of the old comedy (Historia Comæ. Græc. pp. 39, 50, 165, etc.), and similar praises by Westermann; Geschichte der Beredsamkeit in Griechenland und Rom. sect. 36.

In one of the arguments prefixed to the "Pax" of Aristophanês, the author is so full of the conception of these poets as public instructors or advisers, that he tells us, absurdly enough, they were for that reason called *διδασκαλοι*: οὐδὲν γὰρ συμβολῶν διδασκόντων· ὅθεν αὐτοὺς καὶ διδάσκαλοι.

than to regard it in this point of view; yet it is astonishing how many subsequent writers, from Diodorus and Plutarch down to

ἄλλους ὀνόμαζον· ὅτι πάντα τὰ πρόσφορα διὰ δραμάτων αὐτοῦ τοῦτο ἐδίδασκον (p. 244, ed. Bekk.).

"Eupolis, atque Cratinus, Aristophanesque poetæ,
Atque alii, quorum Comœdia prisea virorum est.
Si quis erat dignus describi, quod malus, aut fur,
Aut mæchus foret, aut sicarius, aut alioqui
Famosus, multâ cum libertate notabant."

This is the early judgment of Horace (Serm. i, 4, 1): his later opinion on the *Fescennina licentia*, which was the same in spirit as the old Grecian comedy, is much more judicious (Epistol. ii, 1, 145): compare Art. Poetic. 224. To assume that the persons derided or vilified by these comic authors must always have deserved what was said of them, is indeed a striking evidence of the value of the maxim: "Fortiter calumniare; semper aliquid restat." Without doubt, their indiscriminate libel sometimes wounded a suitable subject; in what proportion of cases, we have no means of determining: but the perusal of Aristophanês tends to justify the epithets which Lucian puts into the mouth of *Diogenes* respecting Aristophanês and Eupolis — not to favor the opinions of the authors whom I have cited above (Lucian, Jov. Accus. vol. ii, p. 832). He calls Eupolis and Aristophanês *δεινὸς ἀνδρας* ἐπὶ κερτομίσαι τὰ σέλινα καὶ χλυσάσαι τὰ κατὰ ἰχθυα.

When we notice what Aristophanês himself says respecting the other comic poets, his predecessors and contemporaries, we shall find it far from countenancing the exalted censorial function which Bergk and others ascribe to them (see the Parabasis in the Nubes, 530, seq., and in the Pax, 723). It seems especially preposterous to conceive Kratinus in that character; of whom what we chiefly know, is his habit of drunkenness, and the downright, unadorned vituperation in which he indulged: see the Fragments and story of his last play, *Περὶ τῆς* (in Meineke, vol. ii, p. 116; also Meineke, vol. i, p. 48, seq.).

Meineke copies (p. 46) from Suidas a statement (γ. Ἐπειὶ τοῦ δειλοτέρου) to the effect that Kratinus was *τῆς ἀποχρῆς τῆς οὐκ ἰσχυρῆς φωνῆς*. He construes this as a real fact — but there can hardly be a doubt that it is only a joke made by his contemporary comedians upon his fondness for wine; and not one of the worst among the many such jests which seem to have been then current. Runkel also, another editor of the fragments of Kratinus (Cratini Fragmenta, Lips. 1827, p. 2, M. M. Runkel), construes this *ταπεινὸς τῆς ὀνημῆδος φωνῆς*, as if it were a serious function; though he tells us about the general character of Kratinus: "De vitâ iusâ et moribus paucè nihil dicere possumus: hoc solum constat, Cratinum poculis et pueroꝝ amorē caldè dedicatum fuisse."

Great numbers of Aristophanic jests have been transcribed as serious

the present day, have thought themselves entitled to deduce their facts of Grecian history, and their estimate of Grecian men, events, and institutions, from the comedies of Aristophanês. Standing pre-eminent as the latter does in comic genius, his point of view is only so much the more determined by the ludicrous associations suggested to his fancy, so that he thus departs the more widely from the conditions of a faithful witness or candid critic. He presents himself to provoke the laugh, mirthful or spiteful, of the festival crowd, assembled for the gratification of these emotions, and not with any expectation of serious or reasonable impressions.¹ Nor does he at all conceal how much he is mortified by failure; like the professional jester, or "laughter-maker," at the banquets of rich Athenian citizens;² the parallel of Aristophanês as to purpose, however unworthy of comparison in every other respect.

This rise and development of dramatic poetry in Greece — so abundant, so varied, and so rich in genius — belongs to the fifth century B.C. It had been in the preceding century nothing more than an unpretending graft upon the primitive chorus, and was then even denounced by Solon, or in the dictum ascribed to Solon, as a vicious novelty, tending — by its simulation of a

matter-of-fact, and have found their way into Grecian history. Whoever follows chapter vii of K. F. Hermann's *Griechische Staats-Alterthümer*, containing the *innere Geschichte* of the Athenian democracy, will see the most sweeping assertions made against the democratical institutions, on the authority of passages of Aristophanês: the same is the case with several of the other most learned German manuals of Grecian affairs.

Horat. de Art. Poetic. 212-224.

"Indoctus quid enim saperet, liberque laborum,
Rusticus urbano confusus, turpis honesto
Illecebris erat et gratâ novitate morandus
Spectator, functusque sacris, et potus, et exlex."

¹ See the *Parabasis* of Aristophanês in the *Nubes* (533, *seq.*) and in the *Vespæ* (1015-1045).

Compare also the description of Philippus the *γέλωποποιός*, or Jester, in the *Symposium* of Xenophon, most of which is extremely Aristophantic, ii, 10, 14. The comic point of view is assumed throughout that piece, and Sokratês is introduced on one occasion as apologizing for the intrusion of a serious reflection (*τὸ σπουδαιολογεῖν*, viii, 41). The same is the case throughout much of the *Symposium* of Plato, though the scheme and purpose of this latter are very difficult to follow.

false character, and by its effusion of sentiments not genuine or sincere — to corrupt the integrity of human dealings;¹ a charge of corruption, not unlike that which Aristophanês worked up, a century afterwards, in his "Clouds," against physics, rhetoric, and dialectics, in the person of Sokratês. But the properties of the graft had overpowered and subordinated those of the original stem; so that dramatic poetry was now a distinct form, subject to laws of its own, and shining with splendor equal, if not superior, to the elegiac, choric, lyric, and epic poetry which constituted the previous stock of the Grecian world.

Such transformations in the poetry, or, to speak more justly, in the literature — for before the year 500 B.C. the two expressions were equivalent — of Greece, were at once products, marks, and auxiliaries, in the expansion of the national mind. Our minds have now become familiar with dramatic combinations, which have ceased to be peculiar to any special form or conditions of political society. But if we compare the fifth century B.C. with that which preceded it, the recently born drama will be seen to have been a most important and impressive novelty: and so assuredly it would have been regarded by Solon, the largest mind of his own age, if he could have risen again, a century and a quarter after his death, to witness the *Antigonê* of Sophoklês, the *Medea* of Euripidês, or the *Acharneis* of Aristophanês.

Its novelty does not consist merely in the high order of imagination and judgment required for the construction of a drama at once regular and effective. This, indeed, is no small addition to Grecian poetical celebrity as it stood in the days of Solon, Alkæus, Sappho, and Stesichorus: but we must remember that the epical structure of the *Odyssey*, so ancient and long acquired to the Hellenic world, implies a reach of architectonic talent quite equal to that exhibited in the most symmetrical drama of Sophoklês. The great innovation of the dramatists consisted in the rhetorical, the dialectical, and the ethical spirit which they breathed into their poetry. Of all this, the undeveloped germ doubtless existed in the previous epic, lyric, and gnomic composition; but the drama stood distinguished from all three by

¹ Plutarch, Solon, c. 29. See the previous volumes of this History, ch. xxi, vol. ii, p. 145; ch. xxix, vol. iv, pp. 83, 84.

bringing it out into conspicuous amplitude, and making it the substantive means of effect. Instead of recounting exploits achieved, or sufferings undergone by the heroes, — instead of pouring out his own single-minded impressions in reference to some given event or juncture, — the tragic poet produces the mythical persons themselves to talk, discuss, accuse, defend, confute, lament, threaten, advise, persuade, or appease; among one another, but before the audience. In the *drama*, a singular misnomer, nothing is actually done: all is talk; assuming what is done, as passing, or as having passed, elsewhere. The dramatic poet, speaking continually, but at each moment through a different character, carries on the purpose of each of his characters by words calculated to influence the other characters, and appropriate to each successive juncture. Here are rhetorical exigencies from beginning to end: while, since the whole interest of the piece turns upon some contention or struggle carried on by speech; since debate, consultation, and retort, never cease; since every character, good or evil, temperate or violent, must be supplied with suitable language to defend his proceedings, to attack or repel opponents, and generally to make good the relative importance assigned to him, here again dialectical skill in no small degree is indispensable.

Lastly, the strength and variety of ethical sentiment infused into the Grecian tragedy, is among the most remarkable characteristics which distinguish it from the anterior forms of poetry. "To do or suffer terrible things," is pronounced by Aristotle to be its proper subject-matter; and the internal mind and motives of the doer or sufferer, on which the ethical interest fastens, are laid open by the Greek tragedians with an impressive minuteness which neither the epic nor the lyric could possibly parallel. Moreover, the appropriate subject-matter of tragedy is pregnant not only with ethical sympathy, but also with ethical debate and speculation. Characters of mixed good and evil; distinct rules of duty, one conflicting with the other; wrong done, and justified to the conscience of the doer, if not to that of the spectator, by

¹ Respecting the rhetorical cast of tragedy see Plato, *Gorgias*, c. 57, p. 502, D.

Plato disapproves of tragedy on the same grounds as of rhetoric.

previous wrong suffered, all these are the favorite themes of Æschylus and his two great successors. Klytæmnestra kills her husband Agamemnon on his return from Troy: her defence is, that he had deserved this treatment at her hands for having sacrificed his own and her daughter, Iphigeneia. Her son Orestes kills her, under a full conviction of the duty of avenging his father, and even under the sanction of Apollo. The retributive Eumenides pursue him for the deed, and Æschylus brings all the parties before the court of Areopagus, with Athênê as president, where the case is fairly argued, with the Eumenides as accusers, and Apollo as counsel for the prisoner, and ends by an equality of votes in the court: upon which Athênê gives her casting-vote to absolve Orestes. Again; let any man note the conflicting obligations which Sophoklês so forcibly brings out in his beautiful drama of the *Antigonê*. Kreon directs that the body of Polyneikês, as a traitor and recent invader of the country, shall remain unburied: Antigonê, sister of Polyneikês, denounces such interdict as impious, and violates it, under an overruling persuasion of fraternal duty. Kreon having ordered her to be buried alive, his youthful son Hæmon, her betrothed lover, is plunged into a heart-rending conflict between abhorrence of such cruelty on the one side, and submission to his father on the other. Sophoklês sets forth both these contending rules of duty in an elaborate scene of dialogue between the father and the son. Here are two rules both sacred and respectable, but the one of which cannot be observed without violating the other. Since a choice must be made, which of the two ought a good man to obey? This is a point which the great poet is well pleased to leave undetermined. But if there be any among the audience in whom the least impulse of intellectual speculation is alive, he will by no means leave it so, without some mental effort to solve the problem, and to discover some grand and comprehensive principle from whence all the moral rules emanate; a principle such as may instruct his conscience in those cases generally, of not unfrequent occurrence, wherein two obligations conflict with each other. The tragedian not only appeals more powerfully to the ethical sentiment than poetry had ever done before, but also, by raising these grave and touch-

ing questions, addresses a stimulus and challenge to the intellect, spurring it on to ethical speculation.

Putting all these points together, we see how much wider was the intellectual range of tragedy, and how considerable is the mental progress which it betokens, as compared with the lyric and gnomic poetry, or with the Seven Wise Men and their authoritative aphorisms, which formed the glory, and marked the limit, of the preceding century. In place of unexpanded results, or the mere communication of single-minded sentiment, we have even in Æschylus, the earliest of the great tragedians, a large latitude of dissent and debate, a shifting point of view, a case better or worse, made out for distinct and contending parties, and a divination of the future advent of sovereign and instructed reason. It was through the intermediate stage of tragedy that Grecian literature passed into the rhetoric, dialectics, and ethical speculation, which marked the fifth century B.C.

Other simultaneous causes, arising directly out of the business of real life, contributed to the generation of these same capacities and studies. The fifth century B.C. is the first century of democracy at Athens, in Sicily, and elsewhere: moreover, at that period, beginning from the Ionic revolt and the Persian invasions of Greece, the political relations between one Grecian city and another became more complicated, as well as more continuous; requiring a greater measure of talent in the public men who managed them. Without some power of persuading or confuting, — of defending himself against accusation, or in case of need, accusing others, — no man could possibly hold an ascendent position. He had probably not less need of this talent for private, informal, conversations to satisfy his own political partisans, than for addressing the public assembly formally convoked. Even as commanding an army or a fleet, without any laws of war or habits of professional discipline, his power of keeping up the good-humor, confidence, and prompt obedience of his men, depended not a little on his command of speech.¹ Nor was it only to the leaders in political life that such an accomplishment was indispensable. In all the democracies, — and probably in

¹ See the discourse of Sokratēs, insisting upon this point, as part of the duties of a commander (Xen. Mem. iii, 3, 11).

several governments which were not democracies, but oligarchies of an open character, — the courts of justice were more or less numerous, and the procedure oral and public: in Athens, especially, the dikasteries — whose constitution has been explained in a former chapter — were both very numerous, and paid for attendance. Every citizen had to go before them in person, without being able to send a paid advocate in his place, if he either required redress for wrong offered to himself, or was accused of wrong by another.¹ There was no man, therefore, who might not be cast or condemned, or fail in his own suit, even with right on his side, unless he possessed some powers of speech to unfold his case to the dikasts, as well as to confute the falsehoods, and disentangle the sophistry, of an opponent. Moreover, to any man of known family and station, it would be a humiliation hardly less painful than the loss of the cause, to stand before the dikastery with friends and enemies around him, and find himself unable to carry on the thread of a discourse without halting or confusion. To meet such liabilities, from which no citizen, rich or poor, was exempt, a certain training in speech became not less essential than a certain training in arms. Without the latter, he could not do his duty as an hoplite in the ranks for the defence of his country; without the former, he could not escape danger to his fortune or honor, and humiliation in the eyes of his friends, if called before a dikastery, nor lend assistance to any of those friends who might be placed under the like necessity.

Here then were ample motives, arising out of practical prudence not less than from the stimulus of ambition, to cultivate the power both of continuous harangue, and of concise argumentation, or interrogation and reply:² motives for all, to acquire a

¹ This necessity of some rhetorical accomplishments, is enforced not less emphatically by Aristotle (Rhetoric i. 1. 3.) than by Kalliklēs in the *Gorgias* of Plato, c. 91, p. 486. B.

² See the description which Cicero gives, of his own laborious oratorical training: —

³ *Ego hoc tempore omni, noctes et dies, in omnium doctrinarum meditatione versabar. Eram cum Stoico Diodoto, qui cum habitavisset apud me mecumque vixisset, nuper est domi meæ mortuus. A quo quum in aliis rebus, tum studiosissime in dialecticâ versabar, quæ quasi contracta et astricta*

certain moderate aptitude in the use of these weapons; for the ambitious few, to devote much labor and to shine as accomplished orators.

Such political and social motives, it is to be remembered, though acting very forcibly at Athens, were by no means peculiar to Athens, but prevailed more or less throughout a large portion of the Grecian cities, especially in Sicily, when all the governments became popularized after the overthrow of the Gelonian dynasty. And it was in Sicily and Italy, that the first individuals arose, who acquired permanent name both in rhetoric and dialectics; Empedoklēs of Agrigentum in the former; Zeno of Elea, in Italy, in the latter.¹

Both these distinguished men bore a conspicuous part in politics, and both on the popular side; Empedoklēs against an oligarchy, Zeno against a despot. But both also were yet more distinguished as philosophers, and the dialectical impulse in Zeno, if not the rhetorical impulse in Empedoklēs, came more from his philosophy than from his politics. Empedoklēs (about 470-440 B.C.) appears to have held intercourse at least, if not partial communion of doctrine, with the dispersed philosophers of the Pythagorean league; the violent subversion of which, at Kroton and elsewhere, I have related in a previous chapter.² He constructed a system of physics and cosmogony, distinguished for first broaching the doctrine of the four elements, and set forth in a poem composed by himself: besides which he seems to have had much of the mystical tone and miraculous pretensions of Pythagoras; professing not only to cure pestilence and other distempers, but to teach how old age might be averted and the dead raised from Hades; to prophesy, and to raise and calm the winds at his pleasure. Gorgias, his pupil, deposed to having been present at the magical ceremonies of Empedoklēs.³ The

eloquentia putanda est; sine quâ etiam tu, Brute, judicavisti, te illam justam eloquentiam, quam dialecticam dilatatam esse putant, consequi non posse. Huic ego doctore, et ejus artibus variis et multis, ita eram tamen deditus, ut ab exercitationibus oratoriis nullus dies vacaret." (Cicero, Brutus, 90, 309.)

¹ Aristotel. ap. Diog. Laërt. viii, 57.

² See my preceding vol. iv, ch. xxxvii.

³ Diogen. Laërt. viii, 58, 59, who gives a remarkable extract from the poem of Empedoklēs, attesting these large pretensions.

impressive character of his poem is sufficiently attested by the admiration of Lucretius,¹ and the rhetoric ascribed to him may have consisted mainly in oral teaching or exposition of the same doctrines. Tisias and Korax of Syracuse, who are also mentioned as the first teachers of rhetoric, and the first who made known any precepts about the rhetorical practice, were his contemporaries; and the celebrated Gorgias was his pupil.

The dialectical movement emanated at the same time from the Eleatic school of philosophers, — Zeno, and his contemporary the Samian Melissus, 460-440, — if not from their common teacher Parmenidēs. Melissus also, as well as Zeno and Empedoklēs, was a distinguished citizen as well as a philosopher; having been in command of the Samian fleet at the time of the revolt from Athens, and having in that capacity gained a victory over the Athenians.

All the philosophers of the fifth century B.C., prior to Sokratēs, inheriting from their earliest poetical predecessors the vast and unmeasured problems which had once been solved by the supposition of divine or superhuman agents, contemplated the world, physical and moral, all in a mass, and applied their minds to find some hypothesis which would give them an explanation of this totality,² or at least appease curiosity by something which looked like an explanation. What were the elements out of which sensible things were made? What was the initial cause or principle of those changes which appeared to our senses? What was

See Brandis, *Handbuch der Gr. Rom. Philos.* part i sects. 47, 48, p. 192; Sturz. ad Empedoclis Frag. p. 36.

¹ De Rerum Natura, i, 719.

² Some striking lines of Empedoklēs are preserved by Sextus Empiricus, adv. Mathemat. vii, 115; to the effect that every individual man gets through his short life, with no more knowledge than is comprised in his own slender fraction of observation and experience: he struggles in vain to find out and explain the totality; but neither eye, nor ear, nor reason can assist him. —

Παῖρον δὲ ζωῆς ἄβυσσος ἀνθρώπων,
Ὀκύνωροι, καπνοῖα δίκην ἀρτέντες, ἀπείπταν
Αὐτὸ μόνον πεισθέντες, ὅτῳ προσέκυρσεν ἑκάστος
Παντός· ἔλαυνόμενοι. Τὸ δὲ οἶόν ἐπεύχεται εἶρεν
Αἴτιος οἷτ' ἐπιδιρκτὰ τὰδ' ἀνθρώπων, οὐτ' ἐπακουσίδ,
Ὅδ' ἔτι καὶ περιλήπτῳ.

change?—was it generation of something integrally new and destruction of something preexistent,—or was it a decomposition and recombination of elements still continuing. The theories of the various Ionic philosophers, and of Empedoklēs after them, admitting one, two, or four elementary substances, with Friendship and Enmity to serve as causes of motion or change; the Homœomeries of Anaxagoras, with Nous, or Intelligence, as the stirring and regularizing agent; the atoms and void of Leukippus and Demokritus, all these were different hypotheses answering to a similar vein of thought. All of them, though assuming that the sensible appearances of things were delusive and perplexing, nevertheless, were borrowed more or less directly from some of these appearances, which were employed to explain and illustrate the whole theory, and served to render it plausible when stated as well as to defend it against attack. But the philosophers of the Eleatic school—first Xenophanēs, and after him Parmenidēs—took a distinct path of their own. To find that which was real, and which lay as it were concealed behind or under the delusive phenomena of sense, they had recourse only to mental abstractions. They supposed a Substance or Something not perceivable by sense, but only cogitable or conceivable by reason; a One and All, continuous and finite, which was not only real and self-existent, but was the only reality; eternal, immovable, and unchangeable, and the only matter knowable. The phenomena of sense, which began and ended one after the other, they thought, were essentially delusive, uncertain, contradictory among themselves, and open to endless diversity of opinion.¹ Upon these, nevertheless, they announced an opinion; adopting two elements, heat and cold, or light and darkness.

Parmenidēs set forth this doctrine of the One and All in a poem, of which but a few fragments now remain, so that we understand very imperfectly the positive arguments employed to recommend it. The matter of truth and knowledge, such as he

¹ See Parmenidis Fragmenta, ed. Karsten, v, 30, 55, 60. also the Dissertation annexed by Karsten, sects. 3, 4, p. 148, *seq.*; sect. 19, p. 221, *seq.*

Compare also Mullach's edition of the same Fragments, annexed to his edition of the Aristotelian treatise, *De Melisso, Xenophane, et Gorgia* p. 144.

alone admitted, was altogether removed from the senses and divested of sensible properties, so as to be conceived only as an Ens Rationis; and described and discussed only in the most general words of the language. The exposition given by Parmenidēs in his poem,¹ though complimented by Plato, was vehemently controverted by others, who deduced from it many contradictions and absurdities. As a part of his reply, and doubtless the strongest part, Parmenidēs retorted upon his adversaries; an example followed by his pupil Zeno with still greater acuteness and success. Those who controverted his ontological theory, that the real, ultra-phenomenal substance was One, affirmed it to be not One, but Many; divisible, movable, changeable, etc. Zeno attacked this latter theory, and proved that it led to contradictions and absurdities still greater than those involved in the proposition of Parmenidēs.² He impugned the testimony of sense, affirming that it furnished premises for conclusions which contradicted each other, and that it was unworthy of trust.³ Parmenidēs⁴ had denied that there was any such thing as real change either of place or color: Zeno maintained change of place, or motion, to be impossible and self-contradictory; propounding many logical difficulties, derived from the infinite divisibility of matter, against some of the most obvious affirmations respecting sensible phenomena. Melissus appears to have argued in a vein similar to that of Zeno, though with much less acuteness; demonstrating indirectly the doctrine of Parmenidēs, by deducing impossible inferences from the contrary hypothesis.⁵

¹ Plato, *Parmenidēs*, p. 128, B. σὺ μὲν (*Parmenidēs*) γὰρ ἐν τοῖς ποιήμασιν ἐν φῆς εἶναι τὸ πᾶν, καὶ τούτων τεκμήρια παρέχεις καλῶς τε καὶ εὖ, etc.

² See the remarkable passage in the *Parmenidēs* of Plato, p. 128, B, C, D.

³ Ἐστὶ δὲ τὸ γε ἄληθες δοῦναι τις ταῦτα τὰ γράμματα τῷ Παρμενίδῳ λόγῳ πρὸς τοὺς ἐπιχειροῦντας αὐτὸν κομφοῦν, ὥς εἰ ἐν ἐστὶ, πολλὰ καὶ γελοία συμβαίνει πασχειν τῷ λόγῳ καὶ ἐνάντια αὐτῷ. Ἀντιλέγει δὲ οὖν τοῦτο τὸ γράμμα πρὸς τοὺς τὰ πολλὰ λέγοντας, καὶ ἀνταποδίδωσι ταῦτα καὶ πλείω, τοῦτο βουλόμενον δηλοῦν, ὥς ἐτι γελοιότερα πάσχοι ἂν αὐτῶν ἢ ὑποθέσεις—ἢ εἰ πολλὰ ἐστίν—ἢ ἡ τοῦ ἐν εἶναι, εἰ τις ἱκανῶς ἐπεξίτοι.

⁴ Plato, *Phædrus*, c. 44, p. 261, D. See the citations in Brandis, *Gesch. der Gr. Röm. Philosophie*, part i, p. 417, *seq.*

⁵ *Parmenid. Fragm.* v, 101, ed. Mullach.

⁶ See the Fragments of Melissus collected by Mullach, in his publication cited in a previous note, p. 81, *seq.*

Zeno published a treatise to maintain the thesis above described, which he also upheld by personal conversations and discussions, in a manner doubtless far more efficacious than his writing; the oral teaching of these early philosophers being their really impressive manifestation. His subtle dialectic arguments were not only sufficient to occupy all the philosophers of antiquity, in confuting them more or less successfully, but have even descended to modern times as a fire not yet extinguished.¹ The great effect produced among the speculative minds of Greece by his writing and conversation, is attested both by Plato and Aristotle. He visited Athens, gave instruction to some eminent Athenians, for high pay, and is said to have conversed both with Periklēs and with Sokratēs, at a time when the latter was very young; probably between 450-440 B.C.²

¹ The reader will see this in Bayle's Dictionary, article, Zeno of Elea.

Simplicius (in his commentary on Aristot. Physic. p. 255) says that Zeno first composed written dialogues, which cannot be believed without more certain evidence. He also particularizes a puzzling question addressed by Zeno to Protagoras. See Brandis, Gesch. der Griech. Röm. Philos. i, p. 409. Zeno ἰδιον μὲν οὐδὲν ἐξέθετο (sc. περὶ τῶν πᾶτων), διηγοῖται δὲ περὶ τούτων ἐπὶ πλείον. Plutarch. ap. Eusebium, Praepar. Evangel. i, 23. D

² Compare Plutarch, Periklēs, c. 3; Plato, Parmenidēs, pp. 126, 127; Plato, Alkibiad. i. ch. 14, p. 119, A.

That Sokratēs had in his youth conversed with Parmenidēs, when the latter was an old man, is stated by Plato more than once, over and above his dialogue called Parmenidēs, which professes to give a conversation between the two, as well as with Zeno. I agree with Mr. Fynes Clinton, Brandis and Karsten, in thinking that this is better evidence, about the date of Parmenidēs than any of the vague indications which appear to contradict it, in Diogenes Laërtius and elsewhere. But it will be hardly proper to place the conversation between Parmenidēs and Sokratēs — as Mr. Clinton places it, Fast. H. vol. ii, App. c. 21, p. 364 — at a time when Sokratēs was only fifteen years of age. The ideas which the ancients had about youthful propriety, would not permit him to take part in conversation with an eminent philosopher at so early an age as fifteen, when he would not yet be entered on the roll of citizens, or be qualified for the smallest function, military or civil.* I cannot but think that Sokratēs must have been more than twenty years of age when he thus conversed with Parmenidēs.

Sokratēs was born in 469 B.C. (perhaps 468 B.C.); he would therefore be twenty years of age in 449: assuming the visit of Parmenidēs to Athens to have been in 448 B.C., since he was then sixty-five years of age, he would be born in 513 B.C. It is objected that, if this date be admitted, Parmenidēs

His appearance constitutes a remarkable era in Grecian philosophy, because he first brought out the extraordinary aggressive or negative force of the dialectic method. In this discussion respecting the One and the Many, positive grounds on either side were alike scanty: each party had to set forth the contradictions deducible from the opposite hypothesis, and Zeno professed to show that those of his opponents were the more flagrant. We thus see that, along with the methodized question and answer, or dialectic method, employed from henceforward more and more in philosophical inquiries, comes out at the same time the negative tendency, the probing, testing, and scrutinizing force, of Grecian speculation. The negative side of Grecian speculation stands quite as prominently marked, and occupies as large a measure of the intellectual force of their philosophers, as the positive side. It is not simply to arrive at a conclusion, sustained by a certain measure of plausible premise, — and then to proclaim it as an authoritative dogma, silencing or disparaging all objectors, — that Grecian speculation aspires. To unmask not only positive falsehood, but even affirmation without evidence, exaggerated confidence in what was only doubtful, and show of knowledge without the reality; to look at a problem on all sides, and set forth all the difficulties attending its solution, to take account of deductions from the affirmative evidence, even in the case of conclusions accepted as true upon the balance, all this will be found pervading the march of their greatest thinkers. As a condition of all progressive philosophy, it is not less essential that the grounds of negation should be freely exposed, than the grounds of affirmation. We shall find the two going hand in hand, and the negative vein, indeed, the more impressive and characteristic of the two, from Zeno downwards in our history. In one of the earliest memoranda illustrative of Grecian dialectics, — the sentences in which Plato represents Parmenidēs and Zeno as bequeathing their mantle to the youthful Sokratēs, and giving him precepts for successfully prosecuting those researches which his marked inquisitive impulse promised, — this large and comprehensive

could not have been a pupil of Xenophanēs. we should thus be compelled to admit, which perhaps is the truth, that he learned the doctrine of Xenophanēs at second-hand.

point of view is emphatically inculcated. He is admonished to set before him both sides of every hypothesis, and to follow out both the negative and the affirmative chains of argument with equal perseverance and equal freedom of scrutiny; neither daunted by the adverse opinions around him, nor deterred by sneers against wasting time in fruitless talk; since the multitude are ignorant that without thus travelling round all sides of a question, no assured comprehension of the truth is attainable.¹

We thus find ourselves, from the year 450 B.C., downwards, in presence of two important classes of men in Greece, unknown to Solon or even to Kleisthenês, the Rhetoricians, and the Dialecticians; for whom, as has been shown, the ground had been gradually prepared by the politics, the poetry, and the speculation, of the preceding period.

Both these two novelties — like the poetry and other accomplishments of this memorable race — grew up from rude indigenous beginnings, under native stimulus unborrowed and unassisted from without. The rhetorical teaching was an attempt to assist and improve men in the power of continuous speech as addressed to assembled numbers, such as the public assembly or the dikastery; it was therefore a species of training sought for by men of active pursuits and ambition, either that they might succeed in public life, or that they might maintain their rights and dignity

¹ Plato, *Parmenid.* pp. 135, 136.

*Parmenidês speaks to Sokratês: Καλὴ μὲν οὖν καὶ θεία, εὐ ἰσθί, ἡ ὁρμή, ἣν ὁρμας ἐπὶ τοὺς λόγους· ἐλκυσσον δὲ παντὸν καὶ γυμνάσαι μᾶλλον διὰ τῆς δοκουσῆς ἀχρήστου εἶναι καὶ καλουμένης ὑπὸ τῶν πολλῶν ἀδόλεσχας, ὥς ἐτι νέος εἰ· εἰ δὲ μὴ, σὲ διαφεύξεται ἡ ἀλήθεια. Τίς οὖν ὁ τρόπος, φάναι (τὸν Σωκράτη), ὦ Παρμενίδη, τῆς γυμνασίας; Οὗτος, εἰπεῖν (τὸν Παρμενίδην) δυνπερ ἤκουσας Ζήνωνος· . . . Χρὴ δὲ καὶ τοῦδε ἐτι πρὸς τοῦτω σκοπεῖν, μὴ μόνον, εἰ ἔστιν ἑκαστον, ὑποτιθέμενον, σκοπεῖν τὰ ξυμβαίνοντα ἐκ τῆς ὑποθέσεως — ἀλλὰ καὶ, εἰ μὴ ἔστι τὸ αὐτὸ τοῦτο ὑποτίθεσθαι — εἰ βούλει μᾶλλον γυμνασθῆναι. . . . Ἀγνοοῦσι γάρ οἱ πολλοὶ ὅτι ἀνεν ταύτης τῆς διὰ πάντων διεξόδου καὶ πλάνης, ἀδύνατον τυγχόντα τῷ ἀληθεῖ νοῦν σχεῖν. See also Plato's *Kratylus*, p. 428, E, about the necessity of the investigator looking both before and behind — ἄμα πρόσω καὶ ὀπίσω.*

See also the *Parmenidês*, p. 130, E, — in which Sokratês is warned respecting the *ἰνθρώπων δοξας*, against enslaving himself to the opinions of men: compare Plato, *Sophistes*, p. 227, B. C.

if called before the court of justice. On the other hand, the dialectic business had no direct reference to public life, to the judicial pleading, or to any assembled large number. It was a dialogue carried on by two disputants, usually before a few hearers, to unravel some obscurity, to reduce the respondent to silence and contradiction, to exercise both parties in mastery of the subject, or to sift the consequences of some problematical assumption. It was spontaneous conversation¹ systematized and turned into some predetermined channel; furnishing a stimulus to thought, and a means of improvement not attainable in any other manner; furnishing to some, also, a source of profit or display. It opened a line of serious intellectual pursuit to men of a speculative or inquisitive turn, who were deficient in voice, in boldness, in continuous memory, for public speaking; or who desired to keep themselves apart from the political and judicial animosities of the moment.

Although there were numerous Athenians, who combined, in various proportions, speculative with practical study, yet generally speaking, the two veins of intellectual movement — one towards active public business, the other towards enlarged opinions and greater command of speculative truth, with its evidences — continued simultaneous and separate. There subsisted between them a standing polemical controversy and a spirit of mutual detraction. If Plato despised the sophists and the rhetors, Isokratês thinks himself not less entitled to disparage those who employed their time in debating upon the unity or plurality of virtue.² Even among different teachers, in the same intellectual walk, also, there prevailed but too often an acrimonious feeling of personal rivalry, which laid them all so much the more open

¹ See Aristotel. *De Sophist. Elenchis*, c. 11, p. 172, ed. Bekker; and his *Topica*, ix, 5, p. 154; where the different purposes of dialogue are enumerated and distinguished.

² See Isokratês, *Orat. x*; *Helenæ Encomium*, sects. 2-7; compare *Orat. xv*, *De Permutatione*, of the same author, s. 90.

I hold it for certain, that the first of these passages is intended as a criticism upon the Platonic dialogues (as in *Or. v*, ad Philip. s. 84), probably the second passage also. Isokratês, evidently a cautious and timid man, avoids mentioning the names of contemporaries, that he may provoke the less animosity.

to assault from the common enemy of all mental progress; a feeling of jealous ignorance, stationary or wistfully retrospective, of no mean force at Athens, as in every other society, and of course blended at Athens with the indigenous democratical sentiment. This latter sentiment¹ of antipathy to new ideas, and new mental accomplishments, has been raised into factitious importance by the comic genius of Aristophanês, whose point of view modern authors have too often accepted; thus allowing some of the worst feelings of Grecian antiquity to influence their manner of conceiving the facts. Moreover, they have rarely made any allowance for that force of literary and philosophical antipathy, which was no less real and constant at Athens than the political; and which made the different literary classes or individuals perpetually unjust one towards another.² It was the blessing and the glory of Athens, that every man could speak out his sentiments and his criticisms with a freedom unparalleled in the ancient world, and hardly paralleled even in the modern, in which a vast body of dissent both is, and always has been, condemned to absolute silence. But this known latitude of censure ought to have imposed on modern authors a peremptory

¹ Isokratês alludes much to this sentiment, and to the men who looked upon gymnastic training with greater favor than upon philosophy, in the Orat. xv, De Permutatione, s. 267, et seq. A large portion of this oration is in fact a reply to accusations, the same as those preferred against mental cultivation by the Δικαιος Λόγος in the Nubes of Aristophanês, 947, seq., favorite topics in the mouths of the pugilists "with smashed ears." (Plato, Gorgias, c. 71, p. 515. Ε: πον τὰ ὦτα καταγόντων.)

² There is but too much evidence of the abundance of such jealousies and antipathies during the times of Plato, Aristotle, and Isokrates; see Stahr's Aristotelia, ch. iii, vol. i, pp. 37, 68.

Aristotle was extremely jealous of the success of Isokratês, and was himself much assailed by pupils of the latter. Kephisodôrus and others, as well as by Dikæarchus, Eubulidês, and a numerous host of writers in the same tone: στρατὸν ὅλον τῶν ἐπιθεμένων Ἀριστοτέλει; see the Fragments of Dikæarchus, vol. ii, p. 225, ed. Didot. "De ingenio ejus (observes Cicero, in reference to Epicurus, de Finibus, ii, 25, 80) in his disputationibus, non de moribus, quæritur. Sit ista in Græcorum levitate perversitas, qui maledictis insectantur eos, a quibus de veritate dissentiunt." This is a taint no way peculiar to Grecian philosophical controversy; but it has nowhere been more infectious than among the Greeks, and modern Aristotilians cannot be too much on their guard against it.

necessity of not accepting implicitly the censure of any one, where the party inculpated has left no defence; at the very least, of construing the censure strictly, and allowing for the point of view from which it proceeds. From inattention to this necessity, almost all the things and persons of Grecian history are presented to us on their bad side; the libels of Aristophanês, the sneers of Plato and Xenophon, even the interested generalities of a plaintiff or defendant before the dikastery, are received with little cross-examination as authentic materials for history.

If ever there was need to invoke this rare sentiment of candor, it is when we come to discuss the history of the persons called sophists, who now for the first time appear as of note; the practical teachers of Athens and of Greece, misconceived as well as misesteemed.

The primitive education at Athens consisted of two branches; gymnastics, for the body; music, for the mind. The word *music* is not to be judged according to the limited signification which it now bears. It comprehended, from the beginning, everything appertaining to the province of the Nine Muses; not merely learning the use of the lyre, or how to bear part in a chorus; but also the hearing, learning, and repeating, of poetical compositions, as well as the practice of exact and elegant pronunciation; which latter accomplishment, in a language like the Greek, with long words, measured syllables, and great diversity of accentuation between one word and another, must have been far more difficult to acquire than it is in any modern European language. As the range of ideas enlarged, so the words *music* and musical teachers acquired an expanded meaning, so as to comprehend matter of instruction at once ampler and more diversified. During the middle of the fifth century B.C., at Athens, there came thus to be found, among the musical teachers, men of the most distinguished abilities and eminence; masters of all the learning and accomplishments of the age, teaching what was known of astronomy, geography, and physics, and capable of holding dialectical discussions with their pupils, upon all the various problems then afloat among intellectual men. Of this character were Lamprus, Agathoklês, Pythokleidês, Damon, etc. The two latter were instructors of Periklês; and Damon was even rendered so unpopular at Athens, partly by his large and free speculations, partly

through the political enemies of his great pupil, that he was ostracized, or at least sentenced to banishment.¹ Such men were competent companions for Anaxagoras and Zeno, and employed in part on the same studies; the field of acquired knowledge being not then large enough to be divided into separate, exclusive compartments. While Euripidēs frequented the company, and acquainted himself with the opinions, of Anaxagoras, Ion of Chios, his rival as a tragic poet, as well as the friend of Kimon, bestowed so much thought upon physical subjects, as then conceived, that he set up a theory of his own, propounding the doctrine of three elements in nature; ² air, fire, and earth.

Now such musical teachers as Damon and the others above mentioned, were sophists, not merely in the natural and proper Greek sense of that word, but, to a certain extent, even in the special and restricted meaning which Plato afterwards thought proper to confer upon it.³ A sophist, in the genuine sense of the word, was a wise man, a clever man; one who stood prominently before the public as distinguished for intellect or talent of some kind. Thus Solon and Pythagoras are both called sophists;

¹ See Plato (Protagoras, c. 8, p. 316, D.; Laches, c. 3, p. 180, D.; Menexenus, c. 3, p. 236, A.; Alkibiad. i. c. 14, p. 118, C); Plutarch, Perikles, c. 4. Periklēs had gone through dialectic practice in his youth (Xenoph. Memor. i, 2, 46).

² Isokratēs, Or. xv. De Permutat. sect. 287.

Compare Brandis, Gesch. der Gr. Röm. Philosophie, part i, sect. 48, p. 196.

³ Isokratēs calls both Anaxagoras and Damon, sophists (Or. xv, De Perm. sect. 251), Plutarch, Periklēs, c. 4. 'Ο δὲ Δάμων ἵσκειν, ἄκρος ὢν σοφιστῆς, καταδυσθαι μὲν εἰς τὸ τῆς μουσικῆς ὄνομα, ἐπικρεπτομένης πρὸς τοὺς πολλοὺς τὴν δεινότητα.

So Protagoras too (in the speech put into his mouth by Plato, Protag. c. 8, p. 316) says, very truly, that there had been sophists from the earliest times of Greece. But he says also, what Plutarch says in the citation just above, that these earlier men refused, intentionally and deliberately, to call themselves sophists, for fear of the odium attached to the name; and that he, Protagoras, was the first person to call himself openly a sophist.

The denomination by which a man is known, however, seldom depends upon himself, but upon the general public, and upon his critics, friendly or hostile. The unfriendly spirit of Plato did much more to attach the title of sophists specially to these teachers, than any assumption of their own.

Thamyras the skilful bard, is called a sophist:¹ Sokratēs is so denominated, not merely by Aristophanēs, but by Æschinēs:² Aristotle himself calls Aristippus, and Xenophon calls Antisthenēs, both of them disciples of Sokratēs, by that name:³ Xenophon,⁴ in describing a collection of instructive books, calls them "the writings of the old poets and sophists," meaning by the latter word prose-writers generally: Plato is alluded to as a sophist, even by Isokratēs:⁵ Isokratēs himself was harshly criticized as a sophist, and defends both himself and his profession: lastly, Timon, the friend and admirer of Pyrrho, about 300-280 B.C., who bitterly satirized all the philosophers, designated them all, including Plato and Aristotle, by the general name of sophists.⁶

¹ Herodot. i, 29, ii, 49, iv, 95. Diogenēs of Apollonia, contemporary of Herodotus, called the Ionic philosophers or physiologists by the name sophists: see Brandis, Gesch. der Griech. Röm. Philosophie, c. lvii, note (1). About Thamyras, see Welcker, Griech. Tragöd., Sophoklēs, p. 421. — Εἰτ' οὖν σοφιστῆς καλὰ παραπαιῶν χελυν, etc.

The comic poet Kratinus called all the poets, including Homer and Hesiod, σοφισταί: see the Fragments of his drama Ἀρχιλοχοί in Meineke, Fragm. Comicor. Græcor. vol. ii, p. 16.

² Æschinēs cont. Timarch. c. 34. Æschinēs calls Demosthenēs also a sophist, c. 27.

We see plainly from the terms in Plato's Politicus, c. 38, p. 299, Β αἰτιωρολογον, ἀδολεσχὴν τινα σοφιστὴν, that both Sokratēs and Plato himself were designated as sophists by the Athenian public.

³ Aristotel. Metaphysic. iii, 2, p. 996; Xenophon, Sympos. iv, 1.

Aristippus is said to have been the first of the disciples of Sokratēs who took money for instruction (Diogen. Laërt. ii, 65).

⁴ Xenoph. Memor. iv, 2, 1 γράμματα πολλὰ συνειλεγμένον ποιητῶν τε καὶ σοφιστῶν τῶν εὐδοκίμωντων.

The word σοφιστῶν is here used just in the same sense as τοὺς θησαύρους τῶν παλαισοφῶν ἀνδρῶν, οὓς ἐκείνοι κατέλιπον ἐν βιβλίοις γράψαντες, etc. (Memor. i, 6, 14.) It is used in a different sense in another passage (i, 1, 11), to signify teachers who gave instruction on physical and astronomical subjects, which Sokratēs and Xenophon both disapproved.

⁵ Isokratēs, Orat. v, ad Philipp. sect. 14: see Heindorf's note on the Euthydemus of Plato, p. 305, C. sect. 79.

⁶ Diogen. Laërt. ix, 65. Ἐσπετε νῦν μοι, ὅσοι πολυπράγμονες ἐσσι σοφισταί (Diogen. Laërt. viii, 74).

Demetrius of Træzen numbered Empedoklēs as a sophist. Isokratēs speaks of Empedoklēs, Ion, Alkmæon, Parmenidēs, Melissus, Gorgias, all as οἱ παλαιοὶ σοφισταί; all as having taught different περιτολόγας about the elements of the physical world (Isok. de Permut. sect. 288).

In this large and comprehensive sense the word was originally used, and always continued to be so understood among the general public. But along with this idea, the title sophist also carried with it or connoted a certain invidious feeling. The natural temper of a people generally ignorant towards superior intellect, — the same temper which led to those charges of magic so frequent in the Middle Ages, — appears to be a union of admiration with something of an unfavorable sentiment; ¹ dislike, or apprehension, as the case may be, unless where the latter element has become neutralized by habitual respect for an established profession or station: at any rate, the unfriendly sentiment is so often intended, that a substantive word, in which it is implied without the necessity of any annexed predicate, is soon found convenient. Timon, who hated the philosophers, thus found the word sophist exactly suitable, in sentiment as well as meaning, to his purpose in addressing them.

Now when (in the period succeeding 450 B.C.) the rhetorical and musical teachers came to stand before the public at Athens in such increased eminence, they of course, as well as other men intellectually celebrated, became designated by the appropriate name of sophists. But there was one characteristic peculiar to themselves, whereby they drew upon themselves a double measure of that invidious sentiment which lay wrapped up in the name. They taught for pay: of course, therefore, the most eminent among them taught only the rich, and earned large sums; a fact naturally provocative of envy, to some extent, among the many who benefited nothing by them, but still more among the inferior members of their own profession. But even great minds, like Sokratēs and Plato, though much superior to any such envy, cherished in that age a genuine and vehement repugnance against receiving pay for teaching. We read in Xen-

¹ Eurip. Med. 289: —

Χρὴ δ' οὐποθ' ὅστις ὑπὸ φρονιῶν πικρὸν ἀνὴρ,
Παῖδας περισσῶς ἐκδιδασκεσθαι σοφους.
Χωρὶς γὰρ ἄλλης, ἥς ἔχουσιν, ἀργίας,
Φθόνον πρὸς ἁπλῶν ὑλφάνονσι δυσμενῇ.

The words ὁ περισσῶς σοφός seem to convey the same unfriendly sentiment as the word σοφιστής.

ophon,¹ that Sokratēs considered such a bargain as nothing less than servitude, robbing the teacher of all free choice as to persons or proceeding; and that he assimilated the relation between teacher and pupil to that between two lovers or two intimate friends; which was thoroughly dishonored, robbed of its charm and reciprocity, and prevented from bringing about its legitimate reward of attachment and devotion, by the intervention of money payment. However little in harmony with modern ideas, such was the conscientious sentiment of Sokratēs and Plato; who therefore considered the name sophists, denoting intellectual celebrity combined with an odious association, as preëminently suitable to the leading teachers for pay. The splendid genius, the lasting influence, and the reiterated polemics, of Plato, have stamped it upon the men against whom he wrote as if it were their recognized, legitimate, and peculiar designation: though it is certain, that if, in the middle of the Peloponnesian war, any Athenian had been asked, "Who are the principal sophists in your city?" he would have named Sokratēs among the first; for

¹ Xenoph. Memor. i, 2, 6. In another passage, the sophist Antiphon — whether this is the celebrated Antiphon of the deme Rhamnus, is uncertain; the commentators lean to the negative — is described as conversing with Sokratēs, and saying that Sokratēs of course must imagine his own conversation to be worth nothing, since he asked no price from his scholars. To which Sokratēs replies: —

Ὁ μὲν Ἀντιφών, παρ' ἡμῶν νομίζεται, τὴν ὥραν καὶ τὴν σοφίαν ὁμοίως μὲν καλὸν, ὁμοίως δὲ ἀσχρόν, διατίθεσθαι εἶναι. Τὴν τε γὰρ ὥραν, εἰ μὲν τις ἀργυρίου πωλῇ τῷ βουλομένῳ, πονηρὸν αὐτὸν ἀποκαλοῦσιν· εἰ δέ τις, ὃν ἂν γνῶ καλὸν τε καὶ ἀγαθὸν ἐραστὴν ὦντα, τοῦτον φίλον ἑαυτῷ ποιῇται, σώφρονα νομίζομεν. Καὶ τὴν σοφίαν ὡσαύτως τοὺς μὲν ἀργυρίου τῷ βουλομένῳ πωλοῦντας, σοφιστὰς ὡς περ πόνηρους ἀποκαλοῦσιν· ὅστις δὲ, ὃν ἂν γνῶ εἰσὶν ὦντα, διδάσκων ὃ, τι ἂν ἔχῃ ἀγαθόν, φίλον ποιεῖται, τοῦτον νομίζομεν, ὃ τῷ καλῷ καὶ ἀγαθῷ πόλιν προσίχει, ταῦτα ποιεῖν (Xenoph. Memor. i, 6, 13).

As an evidence of the manners and sentiment of the age, this passage is extremely remarkable. Various parts of the oration of Æschinēs against Timarchus and the Symposium of Plato, pp. 217, 218, both receive and give light to it.

Among the numerous passages in which Plato expresses his dislike and contempt of teaching for money, see his Sophistes, c. 9, p. 223. Plato, indeed, thought that it was unworthy of a virtuous man to accept salary for the discharge of any public duty. see the Republic, i, 19, p. 347.

Sokratês was at once eminent as an intellectual teacher and personally unpopular, not because he received pay, but on other grounds, which will be hereafter noticed: and this was the precise combination of qualities which the general public naturally expressed by a sophist. Moreover, Plato not only stole the name out of general circulation, in order to fasten it specially upon his opponents, the paid teachers, but also connected with it express discreditable attributes, which formed no part of its primitive and recognized meaning, and were altogether distinct from, though grafted upon, the vague sentiment of dislike associated with it. Aristotle, following the example of his master, gave to the word sophist a definition substantially the same as that which it bears in the modern languages: ¹ "an impostrous pretender to knowledge; a man who employs what he knows to be fallacy, for the purpose of deceit and of getting money." And he did this at a time when he himself, with his estimable contemporary Isokratês, were considered at Athens to come under the designation of sophists, and were called so by every one who disliked either their profession or their persons.²

Great thinkers and writers, like Plato and Aristotle, have full right to define and employ words in a sense of their own, provided they give due notice. But it is essential that the reader

¹ Aristot. Rhetoric. i, 1, 4; where he explains the sophist to be a person who has the same powers as the dialectician, but abuses them for a bad purpose: *ἡ γὰρ σοφιστικὴ, οὐκ ἐν τῇ δυνάμει, ἀλλ' ἐν τῇ προαιρέσει...* 'Εκεῖ δὲ, σοφιστὴς μὲν, κατὰ τὴν προαίρεσιν, διαλεκτικὸς δὲ, οὐ κατὰ τὴν προαίρεσιν ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὴν δυνάμιν. Again, in the first chapter of the treatise de Sophisticis Elenchis: *ὁ σοφιστὴς, χρηματιστὴς ἀπὸ φαινόμενης σοφίας, ἀλλ' οὐκ οὐσίας, etc.*

² Respecting Isokratês, see his Orat. xv, De Permutatione, wherein it is evident that he was not only ranked as a sophist by others, but also considered himself as such, though the appellation was one which he did not like. He considers himself as such, as well as Gorgias: *οἱ καλούμενοι σοφισταί;* sects. 166, 169, 213, 231.

Respecting Aristotle, we have only to read not merely the passage of Timon cited in a previous note, but also the bitter slander of Timæus (Frag. 70. ed. Didot, Polybius, xii, 8), who called him *σοφιστὴν ὀψιμαυτὴ καὶ μισητὸν ὑπάρχοντα, καὶ τὸ πολυτιμητὸν λατρεῖον ἰστίως ἀποκεκλεικῶτα, πρὸς δὲ τοῦτοις, εἰς πᾶσαν αὐλὴν καὶ σκηνὴν ἐμπεπηδῶστα πρὸς δὲ, γαστρομαχόν, ὀφθαλμύτην, ἐπὶ στομα φεροῖ ἐν πᾶσι.*

should keep in mind the consequences of such change, and not mistake a word used in a new sense for a new fact or phenomenon. The age with which we are now dealing, the last half of the fifth century B.C., is commonly distinguished in the history of philosophy as the age of Sokratês and the sophists. The sophists are spoken of as a new class of men, or sometimes in language which implies a new doctrinal sect, or school, as if they then sprang up in Greece for the first time; ostentatious imposters, flattering and duping the rich youth for their own personal gain; undermining the morality of Athens, public and private, and encouraging their pupils to the unscrupulous prosecution of ambition and cupidity. They are even affirmed to have succeeded in corrupting the general morality, so that Athens had become miserably degenerated and vicious in the latter years of the Peloponnesian war, as compared with what she was in the time of Miltiadês and Aristeidês. Sokratês, on the contrary, is usually described as a holy man combating and exposing these false prophets, standing up as the champion of morality against their insidious artifices.¹ Now though the appearance of a man so very original as Sokratês was a new fact of unspeakable importance, the appearance of the sophists was no new fact; what was new was the peculiar use of an old word, which Plato took out of its usual meaning, and fastened upon the eminent paid teachers of the Socratic age.

The paid teachers, with whom, under the name of The Sophists, he brings Sokratês into controversy, were Protagoras of Abdera, Gorgias of Leontini, Polus of Agrigentum, Hippias of Elis, Prodikus of Keos, Thrasymachus of Chalkêdon, Euthydêmus and Dionysodôrus of Chios; to whom Xenophon adds Antiphon of Athens. These men — whom modern writers set down as the sophists, and denounce as the moral pestilence of their age — were not distinguished in any marked or generic way from their predecessors. Their vocation was to train up

¹ In the general point of view here described, the sophists are presented by Ritter, Geschichte der Griech. Philosophie, vol. i, book vi, chaps. 1-3, p. 577, seq. 629, seq.; by Brandis, Gesch. der Gr. Röm. Philos. sects. lxxxiv-lxxxvii, vol. i, p. 516, seq.; by Zeller, Geschichte der Philosoph. ii, pp. 65, 69, 165, etc.; and, indeed, by almost all who treat of the sophists.

youth for the duties, the pursuits, and the successes, of active life, both private and public. Others had done this before; but these teachers brought to the task a larger range of knowledge with a greater multiplicity of scientific and other topics; not only more impressive powers of composition and speech, serving as a personal example to the pupil, but also a comprehension of the elements of good speaking, so as to be able to give him precepts conducive to that accomplishment;¹ a considerable treasure of accumulated thought on moral and political subjects, calculated to make their conversation very instructive, and discourse ready prepared, on general heads or *common places*, for their pupils to learn by heart.² But this, though a very important extension, was nothing more than an extension, differing merely in degree of that which Damon and others had done before them. It arose from the increased demand which had grown up among the Athenian youth, for a larger measure of education and other accomplishments; from an elevation in the standard of what was required from every man who aspired to occupy a place in the eyes of his fellow-citizens. Protagoras, Gorgias, and the rest, supplied this demand with an ability and success unknown before their time; hence they gained a distinction such as none of their predecessors had attained, were prized all over Greece, travelled from city to city with general admiration, and obtained considerable pay. While such success, among men personally strangers to them, attests unequivocally their talent and personal dignity, of course it also laid them open to increased jealousy, as well from inferior teachers as from the lovers of ignorance generally: such jealousy manifesting itself, as I have before explained, by a greater readiness to stamp them with the obnoxious title of sophists.

The hostility of Plato against these teachers, — for it is by and not Sokratēs, who was peculiarly hostile to them, as may be seen by the absence of any such marked antithesis in the *Memorabilia* of Xenophon, — may be explained without at all supposing in them that corruption which modern writers have been so ready not only to admit but to magnify. It arose from

¹ Compare Isokratēs, *Orat.* xiii. cont. *Sophistas*, sects 10-11.

² *Aristot. Sophist. Elench.* c. 33; *Cicero, Brut.* c. 12.

the radical difference between his point of view and theirs. He was a great reformer and theorist; they undertook to qualify young men for doing themselves credit, and rendering service to others, in active Athenian life. Not only is there room for the concurrent operation of both these veins of thought and action, in every progressive society, but the intellectual outfit of the society can never be complete without the one as well as the other. It was the glory of Athens that both were there adequately represented, at the period which we have now reached. Whoever peruses Plato's immortal work, "The Republic," will see that he dissented from society, both democratical and oligarchical, on some of the most fundamental points of public and private morality; and throughout most of his dialogues his quarrel is not less with the statesmen, past as well as present, than with the paid teachers of Athens. Besides this ardent desire for radical reform of the state, on principles of his own, distinct from every recognized political party or creed, Plato was also unrivalled as a speculative genius and as a dialectician — both which capacities he put forth, to amplify and illustrate the ethical theory and method first struck out by Sokrates, as well as to establish comprehensive generalities of his own.

Now his reforming, as well as his theorizing tendencies, brought him into polemical controversy with all the leading agents by whom the business of practical life at Athens was carried on. In so far as Protagoras or Gorgias talked the language of theory, they were doubtless much inferior to Plato, nor would their doctrines be likely to hold against his acute dialectics. But it was neither their duty, nor their engagement, to reform the state, or discover and vindicate the best theory on ethics. They professed to qualify young Athenians for an active and honorable life, private as well as public, *in Athens*, or in any other given city; they taught them "to think, speak, and act," *in Athens*; they of course accepted, as the basis of their teaching, that type of character which estimable men exhibited and which the public approved, *in Athens*, not undertaking to recast the type, but to arm it with new capacities and adorn it with fresh accomplishments. Their direct business was with ethical precept, not with ethical theory; all that was required of them, as to the latter, was, that their theory should be sufficiently sound to lead

to such practical precepts as were accounted virtuous by the most estimable society in Athens. It ought never to be forgotten, that those who taught for active life were bound, by the very conditions of their profession, to adapt themselves to the place and the society as it stood. With the theorist Plato, not only there was no such obligation, but the grandeur and instructiveness of his speculations were realized only by his departing from it, and placing himself on a loftier pinnacle of vision; and he himself not only admits, but even exaggerates, the unfitness and repugnance of men, taught in his school, for practical life and duties.

To understand the essential difference between the practical and the theoretical point of view, we need only look to Isokratēs, the pupil of Gorgias, and himself a sophist. Though not a man of commanding abilities, Isokratēs was one of the most estimable men of Grecian antiquity. He taught for money; and taught young men to "think, speak, and act," all with a view to an honorable life of active citizenship; not concealing his marked disparagement² of speculative study and debate, such as the dialogues

¹ See a striking passage in Plato, Theaet. c. 24, pp. 173, 174.

² Isokratēs, Orat. v (ad. Philip.), sect. 14; Orat. x (Enc. Hel.), sect. 2; Orat. xiii (adv. Sophist.), sect. 9 (compare Heindorf's note ad Platon. Euthydem. sect. 79); Orat. xii (Panath.), sect. 126; Orat. xv (Perm.), sect. 90.

Isokratēs, in the beginning of his Orat. x, Encom. Helenæ, censures all the speculative teachers; first, Antisthenēs and Plato (without naming them, but identifying them sufficiently by their doctrines; next, Protagoras, Gorgias, Melissus, Zeno, etc., by name, as having wasted their time and teaching on fruitless paradox and controversy. He insists upon the necessity of teaching with a view to political life and to the course of actual public events, abandoning these useless studies (sect. 6).

It is remarkable that what Isokratēs recommends is just what Protagoras and Gorgias are represented as actually doing — each doubtless in his own way — in the dialogues of Plato, who censures them for being too practical while Isokratēs, commenting on them from various publications which they left, treats them only as teachers of useless speculations.

In the Oration De Permutatione, composed when he was eighty-two years of age (sect. 10, the orations above cited are earlier compositions, especially Orat. xiii, against the sophists, see sect. 206). Isokratēs stands upon the defensive, and vindicates his profession against manifold aspersions. It is a most interesting oration, as a defence of the educators of Athens generally, and would serve perfectly well as a vindication of the teaching of Protagoras, Gorgias, Hippias, etc., against the reproaches of Plato.

of Plato and the dialectic exercises generally. He defends his profession much in the same way as his master Gorgias, or Protagoras, would have defended it, if we had before us vindications from their pens. Isokratēs at Athens, and Quintilian, a man equally estimable at Rome, are, in their general type of character and professional duty, the fair counterpart of those whom Plato arraigns as the sophists.

We know these latter chiefly from the evidence of Plato, their pronounced enemy; yet even his evidence, when construed candidly and taken as a whole, will not be found to justify the charges of corrupt and immoral teaching, imposturous pretence of

This oration should be read, if only to get at the genuine Athenian sense of the word sophists, as distinguished from the technical sense which Plato and Aristotle fasten upon it. The word is here used in its largest sense, as distinguished from *ιδιωταις* (sect. 159): it meant, literary men or philosophers generally, but especially the professional teachers: it carried, however, an obnoxious sense, and was therefore used as little as possible by themselves, as much as possible by those who disliked them.

Isokratēs, though he does not willingly call himself by this unpleasant name, yet is obliged to acknowledge himself unreservedly as one of the profession, in the same category as Gorgias (sects. 165, 179, 211, 213, 231, 256), and defends the general body as well as himself; distinguishing himself of course from the bad members of the profession, those who pretended to be sophists, but devoted themselves to something different in reality (sect. 230).

This professional teaching, and the teachers, are signified indiscriminately by these words — *οι σοφισταί* — *οι περι την φιλοσοφίαν διατριβοντες* — *την φιλοσοφίαν ἀδίκως διαδεβλημένην* (sects. 44, 157, 159, 179, 211, 217, 219) — *η των λόγων παιδεία* — *η των λόγων μελέτη* — *η φιλοσοφία* — *η της φρονήσεως άσκησις* — *της λόγου, είτε βαλύνσθε λόγην δυνάμειος, είτε φιλοσοφίας, είτε διατριβής* (sects. 53, 187, 189, 193, 196). All these expressions mean the same process of training; that is, general mental training as opposed to bodily (sects. 194, 199), and intended to cultivate the powers of thought, speech, and action: *προς το λείπειν και φρονειν* — *τον φρονειν εν και λείπειν* — *το λείπειν και πραττειν* (sects. 221, 261, 285, 296, 330).

Isokratēs does not admit any such distinction between the philosopher and dialectician on the one side, and the sophist on the other, as Plato and Aristotle contend for. He does not like dialectical exercises: yet he admits them to be useful for youth, as a part of intellectual training, on condition that all such speculations shall be dropped, when the youth come into active life (sects. 280, 287).

This is the same language as that of Kalliklés in the Gorgias of Plato. c. 40, p. 484.

knowledge, etc., which the modern historians pour forth in loud chorus against them. I know few characters in history who have been so hardly dealt with as these so-called sophists. They bear the penalty of their name, in its modern sense; a misleading association, from which few modern writers take pains to emancipate either themselves or their readers, though the English or French word sophist is absolutely inapplicable to Protagoras or Gorgias, who ought to be called rather "professors, or public teachers." It is really surprising to read the expositions prefixed by learned men like Stallbaum and others, to the Platonic dialogues entitled Protagoras, Gorgias, Euthydēmus, Theætētus, etc., where Plato introduces Sokratēs either in personal controversy with one or other of these sophists, or as canvassing their opinions. We continually read from the pen of the expositor, such remarks as these: "Mark, how Plato puts down the shallow and worthless sophist;" the obvious reflection, that it is Plato himself who plays both games on the chess-board, being altogether overlooked. And again: "This or that argument, placed in the mouth of Sokratēs, is not to be regarded as the real opinion of Plato: he only takes it up and enforces it at this moment, in order to puzzle and humiliate an ostentatious pretender;"¹ a remark which con-

¹ Stallbaum, Proleg. ad Platon. Protagor. p. 23. "Hoc vero ejus iudicio ita utitur Socrates, ut eum dehinc dialecticā subtilitate in summam consilii inopiam conjiciat. Colligit enim inde satis captiose rebus ita comparatis justitiam, quippe quæ a sanctitate diversa sit, plane nihil sanctitatis habituram, ac vicissim sanctitati nihil fore commune cum justitiā. Respondet quidem ad hæc Protagoras, justitiam ac sanctitatem non per omnia sibi similes esse, nec tamen etiam prorsus dissimiles videri. Sed etsi verissima est hæc ejus sententia, tamen comparatione illa a partibus faciei repetitā, in fraudem inducitur, et quid sit, in quo omnis virtutis natura contineatur, ignarus, sese ex his difficultatibus adeo non potest expedire," etc.

Again, p. 24: "Itaque Socrates, missā hujus rei disputatione, repente alia progreditur, scilicet similibus loquens hominem deinceps denique irretiturus. . . . "Nemini facile obscurum erit, hoc quoque loco, Protagoram arguit conclusiunculis deludi atque callide eo permoveri," etc. . . . p. 25. "Quamquam nemo erit, quin videat callide deludi Protagoram," etc. . . . p. 34. "Quod si autem ea, quæ in Protagorā Sophistæ ridendi causā e vulgi atque sophistarum ratione disputantur, in Gorgiā ex ipsius philosophi mente et sententiā vel brevius proponuntur vel copiosius disputantur," etc.

Compare similar observations of Stallbaum, in his Prolegom. ad Theætet. pp. 12, 22; ad Menon. p. 16; ad Euthydēmum, pp. 26, 30; ad Lachetum p. 11; ad Lysidem, pp. 79, 80, 87; ad Hippiam Major. pp. 154-156.

verts Plato into an insincere disputant, and a sophist in the modern sense, at the very moment when the commentator is extolling his pure and lofty morality as an antidote against the alleged corruption of Gorgias and Protagoras.

Plato has devoted a long and interesting dialogue to the inquiry, What is a sophist?¹ and it is curious to observe that the definition which he at last brings out suits Sokratēs himself, intellectually speaking, better than any one else whom we know. Cicero defines the sophist to be one who pursues philosophy for the sake of ostentation or of gain;² which, if it is to be held as a reproach, will certainly bear hard upon the great body of modern teachers, who are determined to embrace their profession and to discharge its important duties, like other professional men, by the prospect either of deriving an income or of making a figure in it, or both, whether they have any peculiar relish for the occupation or not. But modern writers, in describing Protagoras or Gorgias, while they adopt the sneering language of Plato against teaching for pay, low purposes, tricks to get money from the rich, etc., use terms which lead the reader to believe that there was something in these sophists peculiarly greedy, exorbitant, and truckling; something beyond the mere fact of asking and receiving remuneration. Now not only there is no proof that any of them were thus dishonest or exorbitant, but in the case of Protagoras, even his enemy Plato furnishes a proof that he was not so. In the

¹ Facile apparet Socratem arguit, quæ verbo φαίνομαι inest, διὰ τὴν ἐκτενέστερον (Hippiam Sophistam) in fraudem inducere. . . . "Illud quidem pro certo et explorato habemus, non serio sed ridendi vacanteque Sophistæ gratiā gravissimam illam sententiam in dubitationem vocari, ideoque iis conclusiunculis labefactari, quas quilibet paulo attentior facile intelligat non ad fidem faciendam, sed ad lusum jocumque, esse comparatas."

² Plato, Sophistes, c. 52, p. 268.

² Cicero, Academ. iv, 23. Xenophon, at the close of his treatise De Venatione (c. 13), introduces a sharp censure upon the sophists, with very little that is specific or distinct. He accuses them of teaching command and artifice of words, instead of communicating useful maxims, of speaking for purposes of deceit, or for their own profit, and addressing themselves to rich pupils for pay, while the philosopher gives his lessons to every one gratuitously, without distinction of persons. This is the same distinction as that taken by Sokratēs and Plato, between the sophist and the philosopher: compare Xenoph. De Vectigal. 7, 4.

Platonic dialogue termed *Protagoras*, that sophist is introduced as describing the manner in which he proceeded respecting remuneration from his pupils. "I make no stipulation beforehand: when a pupil parts from me, I ask from him such a sum as I think the time and the circumstances warrant; and I add, that if he deems the demand too great, he has only to make up his own mind what is the amount of improvement which my company has procured to him, and what sum he considers an equivalent for it. I am content to accept the sum so named by himself, only requiring him to go into a temple and make oath that it is his sincere belief."¹ It is not easy to imagine a more dignified way of dealing than this, nor one which more thoroughly attests an honorable reliance on the internal consciousness of the scholar, on the grateful sense of improvement realized, which to every teacher constitutes a reward hardly inferior to the payment that proceeds from it, and which, in the opinion of Sokratēs, formed the only legitimate reward. Such is not the way in which the corruptors of mankind go to work.

That which stood most prominent in the teaching of Gorgias and the other sophists, was, that they cultivated and improved the powers of public speaking in their pupils; one of the most essential accomplishments to every Athenian of consideration. For this, too, they have been denounced by Ritter, Brandis, and other learned writers on the history of philosophy, as corrupt and immoral. "Teaching their pupils rhetoric (it has been said), they only enabled them to second unjust designs, to make the worse appear the better reason, and to delude their hearers, by trick and artifice, into false persuasion and show of knowledge without

¹ Plato, *Protagoras*, c. 16, p. 328, B. Diogenes Laërtius (ix, 58) says that Protagoras demanded one hundred minæ as pay: little stress is to be laid upon such a statement, nor is it possible that he could have had one fixed rate of pay. The story told by Aulus Gellius (v, 10) about the suit at law between Protagoras and his disciple Euathlus, is at least amusing and ingenious. Compare the story of the rhetor Skopelianus, in Philostratus, *Vit. Sophist.* i, 21, 4.

Isokratēs (*Or. xv*, de *Perm.* sect. 166) affirms that the gains made by Gorgias, or by any of the eminent sophists, had never been very high; that they had been greatly and maliciously exaggerated; that they were very inferior to those of the great dramatic actors (sect. 168).

reality. Rhetoric (argues Plato, in the dialogue called *Gorgias*) is no art whatever, but a mere unscientific knack, enslaved to the dominant prejudices, and nothing better than an impostrous parody on the true political art." Now though Aristotle, following the Platonic vein, calls this power of making the worse appear the better reason, "the promise of Protagoras,"¹ the accusation ought never to be urged as if it bore specially against the teachers of the Sokratic age. It is an argument against rhetorical teaching generally; against all the most distinguished teachers of pupils for active life, throughout the ancient world, from Protagoras, Gorgias, Isokratēs, etc., down to Quintilian. Not only does the argument bear equally against all, but it was actually urged against all. Isokratēs² and Quintilian both defend themselves against it: Aristotle replies to it in the beginning of his treatise on rhetoric: nor was there ever any man, indeed, against whom it was pressed with greater bitterness of calumny than Sokratēs, by Aristophanēs, in his comedy of the "Clouds," as well as by other comic composers. Sokratēs complains of it in his defence before his judges;³ characterizing such accusations

¹ Aristot. *Rhetoric*, ii, 26. Ritter (p. 582) and Brandis (p. 521) quote very unfairly the evidence of the "Clouds" of Aristophanēs, as establishing this charge, and that of corrupt teaching generally, against the sophists as a body. If Aristophanēs is a witness against any one, he is a witness against Sokratēs, who is the person singled out for attack in the "Clouds." But these authors, not admitting Aristophanēs as an evidence against Sokratēs, whom he *does* attack, nevertheless quote him as an evidence against men like Protagoras and Gorgias, whom he *does not* attack.

² Isokratēs, *Or. xv*, (De *Permut.*) sect. 16: *ἴστω δὲ ὅτι μὴν* (the accuser) *ὡς ἴστω τοῦ ἐπὶ τοῦ λόγου κρείττω δυνάμει ποιεῖν*, etc.

Ibid. sect. 32: *πεινῶται μὲν διαβάλλειν, ὡς διαστρέφει τοὺς νεωτέρους, λέγειν δὲ δάσκαλον καὶ παρὰ τὸ δίκαιον ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις πλεονεκτηῖν*, etc.

Again, sects. 59, 65, 95, 98, 187 (where he represents himself, like Sokratēs in his Defence, as vindicating philosophy generally against the accusation of corrupting youth), 233, 256.

³ Plato, *Sok. Apolog.* c. 10, p. 23, D. *τὰ κατὰ πάντων τῶν φιλοσοφούντων προεῖρα ταῦτα λέγεσθαι, ὅτι τὰ μετῴρα καὶ τὰ ὑπὸ γῆς, καὶ θεοῦ μὴ νομίζω, καὶ τὸν ἥττω λόγον κρείττω ποιεῖν (δάσκαλον)*. Compare a similar expression in Xenophon, *Memorab.* i, 2, 31. *τὸ κοινὸν τῆς φιλοσοφίας ὑπὸ τοῖς πολλοῖς ἐπιτιμώμενον*, etc.

The same unfairness, in making this point tell against the sophists exclusively, is to be found in Westermann, *Geschichte der Griech. Beredsamkeit* sects. 30, 64.

in their true point of view, as being "the stock reproaches against all who pursue philosophy." They are indeed only one of the manifestations, ever varying in form though the same in spirit, of the antipathy of ignorance against dissenting innovation or superior mental accomplishments; which antipathy, intellectual men themselves, when it happens to make on their side in a controversy, are but too ready to invoke. Considering that we have here the materials of defence, as well as of attack, supplied by Sokratēs and Plato, it might have been expected that modern writers would have refrained from employing such an argument to discredit Gorgias or Protagoras; the rather, as they have before their eyes, in all the countries of modern Europe, the profession of lawyers and advocates, who lend their powerful eloquence without distinction to the cause of justice or injustice, and who, far from being regarded as the corrupters of society, are usually looked upon, for that very reason among others, as indispensable auxiliaries to a just administration of law.

Though writing was less the business of these sophists than personal teaching, several of them published treatises. Thrasy-machus and Theodōrus both set forth written precepts on the art of rhetoric;¹ precepts which have not descended to us, but which appear to have been narrow and special, bearing directly upon practice, and relating chiefly to the proper component parts of an oration. To Aristotle, who had attained that large and comprehensive view of the theory of rhetoric which still remains to instruct us in his splendid treatise, the views of Thrasy-machus appeared unimportant, serving to him only as hints and materials. But their effect must have been very different when they first appeared, and when young men were first enabled to analyze the parts of an harangue, to understand the dependence of one upon the other, and call them by their appropriate names; all illustrated, let us recollect, by oral exposition on the part of the master, which was the most impressive portion of the whole.

Prodikus, again, published one or more treatises intended to

¹ See the last chapter of Aristotle *De Sophisticis Elenchis*. He notices these early rhetorical teachers, also, in various parts of the treatise on rhetoric.

Quintilian, however, still thought the precepts of Theodōrus and Thrasy-machus worthy of his attention (*Inst. Orat.* iii, 3).

elucidate the ambiguities of words, and to point out the different significations of terms apparently, but not really, equivalent. For this Plato often ridicules him, and the modern historians of philosophy generally think it right to adopt the same tone. Whether the execution of the work was at all adequate to its purpose, we have no means of judging; but assuredly the purpose was one preeminently calculated to aid Grecian thinkers and dialecticians; for no man can study their philosophy without seeing how lamentably they were hampered by enslavement to the popular phraseology, and by inferences founded on mere verbal analogy. At a time when neither dictionary nor grammar existed, a teacher who took care, even punctilious care, in fixing the meaning of important words of his discourse, must be considered as guiding the minds of his hearers in a salutary direction; salutary, we may add, even to Plato himself, whose speculations would most certainly have been improved by occasional hints from such a monitor.

Protagoras, too, is said to have been the first who discriminated and gave names to the various modes and forms of address, an analysis well calculated to assist his lessons on right speaking;¹ he appears also to have been the first who distinguished the three genders of nouns. We hear further of a treatise which he wrote on wrestling, or most probably on gymnastics generally, as well as a collection of controversial dialogues.² But his most celebrated treatise was one entitled "Truth," seemingly on philosophy generally. Of this treatise, we do not even know the general scope or purport. In one of his treatises, he confessed his inability to satisfy himself about the existence of the gods, in these words:³ "Respecting the gods, I neither know whether they exist, nor

¹ Quintilian, *Inst. Orat.* iii, 4, 10; Aristotle *Rhetor.* iii, 5. See the passages cited in Preller, *Histor. Philos.* ch. iv, p. 132, note *d*, who affirms respecting Protagoras: "alia inani grammaticorum principiorum ostentatione novare conabatur," which the passages cited do not prove.

² Isokratēs, *Or.* x, *Encom. Helen* sect. 3; Diogen. Laërt. ix, 54.

³ Diogen. Laërt. ix, 51; Sext. *Empir. adv. Math.* ix, 56. *Περὶ μὲν θεῶν οὐκ ἔχω περὶ δὲ οὐτὲ ἐλπίσιν, οὐδ' ὁποῖον τινος εἶναι. τὰ γὰρ τὰ κωλύοντα εἶδεναι, ἢ τε ἀδηλότης, καὶ ἀπαρεὶν ὧν ἂν διὰ τὸν ἀνθρώπον.*

I give the words partly from Diogenes, partly from Sextus, as I think they would be most likely to stand.

what are their attributes: the uncertainty of the subject, the shortness of human life, and many other causes, debar me from this knowledge." That the believing public of Athens were seriously indignant at this passage, and that it caused the author to be threatened with prosecution, and forced to quit Athens, we can perfectly understand; though there seems no sufficient proof of the tale that he was drowned in his outward voyage. But that modern historians of philosophy, who consider the pagan gods to be fictions, and the religion to be repugnant to any reasonable mind, should concur in denouncing Protagoras on this ground as a corrupt man, is to me less intelligible. Xenophanes,¹ and probably many other philosophers, had said the same thing before him. Nor is it easy to see what a superior man was to do, who could not adjust his standard of belief to such fictions; or what he could say, if he said anything, less than the words cited above from Protagoras; which appear, as far as we can appreciate them, standing without the context, to be a brief mention, in modest and circumspect phrases, of the reason why he said nothing about the gods, in a treatise where the reader would expect to find much upon the subject.² Certain it is that in the Platonic dialogue, called "Protagoras," that sophist is introduced speaking about the gods exactly in the manner that any orthodox pagan might naturally adopt.

The other fragment preserved of Protagoras, relates to his view of the cognitive process, and of truth generally. He taught, that "Man is the measure of all things; both of that which exists, and of that which does not exist:" a doctrine canvassed and controverted by Plato, who represents that Protagoras affirmed knowledge to consist in sensation, and considered the sensations of each individual man to be, to him, the

¹ Xenophanes ap. Sext. Emp. adv. Mathem. vii. 49.

² The satirical writer Timon (ap. Sext. Emp. ix. 57), speaking in very respectful terms about Protagoras, notices particularly the guarded language which he used in this sentence about the gods; though this precaution did not enable him to avoid the necessity of flight. Protagoras *σπῆκε*—

Πᾶσαν ἔχων φυλακὴν ἐπεικεΐης· τὰ μὲν οὐ οὐ
Χραΐσμησ', ἀλλὰ φυγῆς ἐπειμαίτο δόρα μὴ οὕτως
Σωκρατικὸν πίνων ψυχρὸν πότον Ἀἰδᾶ δέσῃ.

It would seem, by the last line as if Protagoras had survived Sokrates

canon and measure of truth. We know scarce anything of the elucidations or limitations with which Protagoras may have accompanied his general position: and if even Plato, who had good means of knowing them, felt it ungenerous to insult an orphan doctrine whose father was recently dead, and could no longer defend it,¹ much more ought modern authors, who speak with mere scraps of evidence before them, to be cautious how they heap upon the same doctrine insults much beyond those which Plato recognizes. In so far as we can pretend to understand the theory, it was certainly not more incorrect than several others then afloat, from the Eleatic school and other philosophers; while it had the merit of bringing into forcible relief, though in an erroneous manner, the essentially relative nature of cognition,² relative, not indeed to the sensitive faculty alone,

¹ Plato, Theætet. 18, p. 164, E. Οἷτι ἀν, οἶμαι, ὦ φίλε, εἴπερ γε ὁ πατὴρ τοῦ ἱτέρου λόγον ἐξῆ — ἀλλὰ πολλὰ ἂν ἤμυνε· νῦν δὲ ὀφθαλμὸν αὐτὸν ὄντα ἡμῖς προσηλακίζομεν. . . ἀλλὰ δὴ αὐτοὶ κινδυνεύσομεν τοῦ δικαίου ἐνεκ' αὐτῷ βοηθεῖν.

This theory of Protagoras is discussed in the dialogue called Theætetus, p. 152, seq., in a long but desultory way.

See Sextus Empiric. Pyrrhonic. Hypol. i. 216-219, et contra Mathematicos, vii. 60-64. The explanation which Sextus gives of the Protagorean doctrine, in the former passage, cannot be derived from the treatise of Protagoras himself; since he makes use of the word *ὑλη* in the philosophical sense, which was not adopted until the days of Plato and Aristotle.

It is difficult to make out what Diogenes Laërtius states about other tenets of Protagoras, and to reconcile them with the doctrine of "man being the measure of all things," as explained by Plato (Diog. Laërt. ix. 51, 57).

² Aristotle (in one of the passages of his Metaphysica, wherein he discusses the Protagorean doctrine, x. i. p. 1053. B.) says that this doctrine comes to nothing more than saying, that man, so far as cognizant, or so far as percipient, is the measure of all things: in other words, that knowledge, or perception, is the measure of all things. This, Aristotle says, is trivial, and of no value, though it sounds like something of importance: Πρωταγόρας δ' ἀνθρώπων φησι πάντων εἶναι μέτρον, ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ τοῦ ἐπιστήμονα εἰπῶν ἢ τοῦ αἰσθανόμενον· τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶν ὅτι ἔχουσιν ὁ μὲν αἰσθῆσαι ὁ δὲ ἐπιστήμην· ἃ φάμεν εἶναι μέτρα τῶν ὑποκειμένων. Οὐδὲν δὲ λέγων περιττὸν φαίνεται τι λέγειν.

It appears to me, that to insist upon the essentially relative nature of cognizable truth, was by no means a trivial or unimportant doctrine, as Aristotle pronounces it to be, especially when we compare it with the

but to that reinforced and guided by the other faculties of man memorial and ratiocinative. And had it been even more incorrect than it really is, there would be no warrant for those imputations which modern authors build upon it, against the morality of Protagoras. No such imputations are countenanced in the discussion which Plato devotes to the doctrine: indeed, if the vindication which he sets forth against himself on behalf of Protagoras be really ascribable to that sophist, it would give an exaggerated importance to the distinction between Good and Evil, into which the distinction between Truth and Falsehood is considered by the Platonic Protagoras as resolvable. The subsequent theories of Plato and Aristotle respecting cognition, were much more systematic and elaborate, the work of men greatly superior in speculative genius to Protagoras: but they would not have been what they were, had not Protagoras, as well as others gone before them, with suggestions more partial and imperfect.

From Gorgias there remains one short essay, preserved in one of the Aristotelian, or Pseudo-Aristotelian treatises,¹ on a metaphysical thesis. He professes to demonstrate that nothing exists that if anything exist, it is unknowable; and granting it even to exist and to be knowable by any one man, he could never communicate it to others. The modern historians of philosophy here prefer the easier task of denouncing the skepticism of the

unmeasured conceptions of the objects and methods of scientific research, which were so common in the days of Protagoras.

Compare *Metaphysic. iii*, 5, pp. 1008, 1009, where it will be seen how many other thinkers of that day carried the same doctrine, seemingly, further than Protagoras.

Protagoras remarked that the observed movements of the heavenly bodies did not coincide with that which the astronomers represented them to be, and to which they applied their mathematical reasonings. This remark was a criticism on the mathematical astronomers of his day — *ἐλέγχων τοὺς γεωμέτρους* (*Aristot. Metaph. iii*, 2, p. 998, A). We know too little how far his criticism may have been deserved, to assent to the general strictures of Ritter, *Gesch. der Phil.* vol. i, p. 633.

¹ See the treatise entitled *De Melisso, Xenophane et Gorgia* in Bekker's edition of *Aristotle's Works*, vol. i, p. 973, *seq.*; also the same treatise, with a good preface and comments, by Mullach, p. 62. *seq.*: compare *Sextus Emp. adv. Mathemat.* vii, 65, 87.

sophist, instead of performing the duty incumbent on them of explaining his thesis in immediate sequence with the speculations which preceded it. In our sense of the words, it is a monstrous paradox: but construing them in their legitimate filiation from the Eleatic philosophers immediately before him, it is a plausible, not to say conclusive, deduction from principles which they would have acknowledged.¹ The word existence, as they understood it, did not mean phenomenal, but ultra-phenomenal existence. They looked upon the phenomena of sense as always coming and going, as something essentially transitory, fluctuating, incapable of being surely known, and furnishing at best grounds only for conjecture. They searched by cogitation for what they presumed to be the really existent something or substance — the noumenon, to use a Kantian phrase — lying behind or under the phenomena, which noumenon they recognized as the only appropriate subject of knowledge. They discussed much, as I have before remarked, whether it was one or many; noumenon in the singular, or noumena in the plural. Now the thesis of Gorgias related to this ultra-phenomenal existence, and bore closely upon the arguments of Zeno and Melissus, the Eleatic reasoners of his elder contemporaries. He denied that any such ultra-phenomenal something, or noumenon, existed, or could be known, or could be described. Of this tripartite thesis, the first negation was neither more untenable, nor less untenable, than that of those philosophers who before him had argued for the affirmative: on the two last points, his conclusions were neither paradoxical nor improperly skeptical, but perfectly just, and have been ratified by the gradual abandonment, either avowed or implied, of such ultra-phenomenal researches among the major part of philosophers. It may fairly be presumed that these doctrines were urged by Gorgias for the purpose of diverting his disciples from studies which he considered as unpromising and fruitless: just as we shall find his pupil Isokratês afterwards enforcing the same view, discouraging speculations of this nature, and recommending rhetorical exercise as preparation

¹ See the note of Mullach, on the treatise mentioned in the preceding note, p. 72. He shows that Gorgias followed in the steps of Zeno and Melissus.

for the duties of an active citizen.¹ Nor must we forget that Sokratēs himself discouraged physical speculations even more decidedly than either of them.

If the censures cast upon the alleged skepticism of Gorgias and Protagoras are partly without sufficient warrant, partly without any warrant at all, much more may the same remark be made respecting the graver reproaches heaped upon their teaching on the score of immorality or corruption. It has been common with recent German historians of philosophy to translate from Plato and dress up a fiend called "Die Sophistik," (Sophistic,) whom they assert to have poisoned and demoralized, by corrupt teaching, the Athenian moral character, so that it became degenerate at the end of the Peloponnesian war, compared with what it had been in the time of Miltiadēs and Aristeidēs.

Now, in the first place, if the abstraction "Die Sophistik" is to have any definite meaning, we ought to have proof that the persons styled sophists had some doctrines, principles, or method, both common to them all and distinguishing them from others. But such a supposition is untrue: there were no such common doctrines, or principles, or method, belonging to them; even the name by which they are known did not belong to them, any more than to Sokratēs and others; they had nothing in common except their profession, as paid teachers, qualifying young men "to think, speak, and act," these are the words of Isokratēs, and better words it would not be easy to find, with credit to themselves as citizens. Moreover, such community of profession did not at that time imply near so much analogy of character as it does now, when the path of teaching has been beaten into a broad and visible high road, with measured distances and stated intervals: Protagoras and Gorgias found predecessors, indeed, but no binding precedents to copy; so that each struck out more or less a road of his own. And accordingly, we find Plato, in his dialogue called "Protagoras," wherein Protagoras, Prodikus, and Hippias, are all introduced, imparting a distinct type of character and distinct method to each, not without a strong admixture of reciprocal jealousy between them; while Thrasymachus, in the Republic

¹ Isokratēs *De Permutatione*, Or. xv, s. 287; Xenoph. *Memorab.* i, 1, 14.

and Euthydēmus, in the dialogue so called, are again painted each with colors of his own, different from all the three above named. We have not the least reason for presuming that Gorgias agreed in the opinion of Protagoras: "Man is the measure of all things;" and we may infer, even from Plato himself, that Protagoras would have opposed the views expressed by Thrasymachus in the first book of the Republic. It is impossible therefore to predicate anything concerning doctrines, methods, or tendencies, common and peculiar to all the sophists. There were none such; nor has the abstract word, "Die Sophistik," any real meaning, except such qualities, whatever they may be, as are inseparable from the profession or occupation of public teaching. And if, at present, every candid critic would be ashamed to cast wholesale aspersions on the entire body of professional teachers, much more is such censure unbecoming in reference to the ancient sophists, who were distinguished from each other by stronger individual peculiarities.

If, then, it were true that in the interval between 480 B.C. and the end of the Peloponnesian war, a great moral deterioration had taken place in Athens and in Greece generally, we should have to search for some other cause than this imaginary abstraction called sophistic. But — and this is the second point — the matter of fact here alleged is as untrue, as the cause alleged is unreal. Athens, at the close of the Peloponnesian war, was not more corrupt than Athens in the days of Miltiadēs and Aristeidēs. If we revert to that earlier period, we shall find that scarcely any acts of the Athenian people have drawn upon them sharper censure — in my judgment, unmerited — than their treatment of these very two statesmen; the condemnation of Miltiadēs, and the ostracism of Aristeidēs. In writing my history of that time, far from finding previous historians disposed to give the Athenians credit for public virtue, I have been compelled to contend against a body of adverse criticism, imputing to them gross ingratitude and injustice. Thus the contemporaries of Miltiadēs and Aristeidēs, when described as matter of present history, are presented in anything but flattering colors; except their valor at Marathon and Salamis, which finds one unanimous voice of encomium. But when these same men have become numbered among the mingled recollections and fancies belonging to the past, — when a future

generation comes to be present, with its appropriate stock of complaint and denunciation,—then it is that men find pleasure in dressing up the virtues of the past, as a count in the indictment against their own contemporaries. Aristophanes,¹ writing during the Peloponnesian war, denounced the Demos of his day as degenerated from the virtue of that Demos which had surrounded Miltiadēs and Aristeidēs: while Isokratēs,² writing as an old man, between 350-340 B.C., complains in like manner of his own time, boasting how much better the state of Athens had been in his youth: which period of his youth fell exactly during the life of Aristophanes, in the last half of the Peloponnesian war.

Such illusions ought to impose on no one without a careful comparison of facts; and most assuredly that comparison will not bear out the allegation of increased corruption and degeneracy, between the age of Miltiadēs and the end of the Peloponnesian war. Throughout the whole of Athenian history, there are no acts which attest so large a measure of virtue and judgment pervading the whole people, as the proceedings after the Four Hundred and after the Thirty. Nor do I believe that the contemporaries of Miltiadēs would have been capable of such heroism; for that appellation is by no means too large for the case. I doubt whether they would have been competent to the steady self-denial of retaining a large sum in reserve during the time of peace, both prior to the Peloponnesian war and after the Peace of Nikias; or of keeping back the reserve fund of one thousand talents, while they were forced to pay taxes for the support of the war; or of acting upon the prudent, yet painfully trying, policy recommended by Periklēs, so as to sustain an annual invasion without either going out to fight or purchasing peace by ignominious concessions. If bad acts such as Athens committed during the later years of the war, for example, the massacre of the Melian population, were not done equally by the contemporaries of Miltiadēs, this did not arise from any superior humanity or principle on their part, but from the fact that they were not exposed to the like temptation, brought upon them by the possession of imperial power. The condemnation of the six generals

¹ Aristophan. Equit. 1316-1321

² Isokratēs, Or. xv, De Permutation, s. 170.

after the battle of Arginusa, if we suppose the same conduct on their part to have occurred in 490 B.C., would have been decreed more rapidly and more unceremoniously than it was actually decreed in 406 B.C. For at that earlier date there existed no psephism of Kannōnus, surrounded by prescriptive respect; no graphē paranomōn; no such habits of established deference to a dikastery solemnly sworn, with full notice to defendants and full time of defence measured by the clock; none of those securities which a long course of democracy had gradually worked into the public morality of every Athenian, and which, as we saw in a former chapter, interposed a serious barrier to the impulse of the moment, though ultimately overthrown by its fierceness. A far less violent impulse would have sufficed for the same mischief in 490 B.C., when no such barriers existed. Lastly, if we want a measure of the appreciating sentiment of the Athenian public, towards a strict and decorous morality in the narrow sense, in the middle of the Peloponnesian war, we have only to consider the manner in which they dealt with Nikias. I have shown, in describing the Sicilian expedition, that the gravest error which the Athenians ever committed, that which shipwrecked both their armament at Syracuse and their power at home, arose from their unmeasured esteem for the respectable and pious Nikias, which blinded them to the grossest defects of generalship and public conduct. Disastrous as such misjudgment was, it counts at least as a proof that the moral corruption alleged to have been operated in their characters, is a mere fiction. Nor let it be supposed that the nerve and resolution which once animated the combatants of Marathon and Salamis, had disappeared in the latter years of the Peloponnesian war. On the contrary, the energetic and protracted struggle of Athens, after the irreparable calamity at Syracuse, forms a worthy parallel to her resistance in the time of Xerxes, and maintained unabated that distinctive attribute which Periklēs had set forth as the main foundation of her glory, that of never giving way before misfortune.¹ Without any disparagement to the armament at Salamis, we may remark that the patriotism of the fleet at Samos, which rescued Athens from the

¹ Thucyd. ii, 64 γινώσκοντες δ' ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν ἄλλος (τὴν πόλιν) ἔχουσαν ἐκ παλαιῶν ἀνδρῶν, οὐκ ἔστιν ἄλλος (τὴν πόλιν) ἔχουσαν ἐκ παλαιῶν ἀνδρῶν, οὐκ ἔστιν ἄλλος (τὴν πόλιν) ἔχουσαν ἐκ παλαιῶν ἀνδρῶν.

Four Hundred, was equally devoted and more intelligent; and that the burst of effort, which sent a subsequent fleet to victory at Arginusæ, was to the full as strenuous.

If, then, we survey the eighty-seven years of Athenian history, between the battle of Marathon and the renovation of the democracy after the Thirty, we shall see no ground for the assertion, so often made, of increased and increasing moral and political corruption. It is my belief that the people had become both morally and politically better, and that their democracy had worked to their improvement. The remark made by Thucydides, on the occasion of the Korkyran bloodshed, — on the violent and reckless political antipathies, arising out of the confluence of external warfare with internal party-feud,¹ — wherever else it may find its application, has no bearing upon Athens: the proceedings after the Four Hundred and after the Thirty prove the contrary. And while Athens may thus be vindicated on the moral side, it is indisputable that her population had acquired a far larger range of ideas and capacities than they possessed at the time of the battle of Marathon. This, indeed, is the very matter of fact deplored by Aristophanes, and admitted by those writers, who, while denouncing the sophists, connect such enlarged range of ideas with the dissemination of the pretended sophistical poison. In my judgment, not only the charge against the sophists as poisoners, but even the existence of such poison in the Athenian system, deserves nothing less than an emphatic denial.

Let us examine again the names of these professional teachers, beginning with Prodikus, one of the most renowned. Who is there that has not read the well-known fable called "The Choice of Hercules," which is to be found in every book professing to

¹ Thucydides (iii, 82) specifies very distinctly the cause to which he ascribes the bad consequences which he depicts. He makes no allusion to sophists or sophistical teaching; though Brandis (*Gesch. der Gr. Röm. Philos.* i, p. 518, not. f.) drags in "the sophistical spirit of the statesmen of that time," as if it were the cause of the mischief, and as if it were to be found in the speeches of Thucydides, i, 76, v, 105.

There cannot be a more unwarranted assertion; nor can a learned man like Brandis be ignorant, that such words as "the sophistical spirit," (*Der sophistische Geist*,) are understood by a modern reader in a sense totally different from its true Athenian sense.

collect impressive illustrations of elementary morality? Who does not know that its express purpose is, to kindle the imaginations of youth in favor of a life of labor for noble objects, and against a life of indulgence? It was the favorite theme on which Prodikus lectured, and on which he obtained the largest audience.¹ If it be of striking simplicity and effect even to a modern reader, how much more powerfully must it have worked upon the audience for whose belief it was specially adapted, when set off by the oral expansions of its author! Xenophon wondered that the Athenian dikasts dealt with Sokratēs as a corruptor of youth, — Isokratēs wondered that a portion of the public made the like mistake about him, — and I confess my wonder to be not less, that not only Aristophanes,² but even the modern writers on Grecian philosophy, should rank Prodikus in the same unenviable catalogue. This is the only composition³ remaining from him; indeed, the only composition remaining from any one of the sophists, excepting the thesis of Gorgias, above noticed. It served, not merely as a vindication of Prodikus against such reproach, but also as a warning against implicit confidence in the sarcastic remarks of Plato, — which include Prodikus as well as the other sophists, — and in the doctrines which he puts into the mouth of the sophists generally, in order that Sokratēs may confute them. The commonest candor would teach us, that if a polemical writer of dialogue chooses to put indefensible doctrine

¹ Xenoph. Memor. ii, 1, 21-34. *Καὶ Πρόδικος δὲ ὁ σοφὸς ἐν τῷ συγγράμματι περὶ Ἡρακλέους, ὃ περὶ δὴ καὶ πλείστοις ἐπιδεικνύται, ὡσαύτως περὶ τῆς αὐτῆς ἀποδίδεται, etc.*

Xenophon here introduces Sokratēs himself as bestowing much praise on the moral teaching of Prodikus.

² See Fragment iii, of the *Ταγηνιστά* of Aristophanes, Meineke, Fragment. Aristoph. p. 1140.

³ Xenophon gives only the substance of Prodikus's lecture, not his exact words. But he gives what may be called the whole substance, so that we can appreciate the scope as well as the handling of the author. We cannot say the same of an extract given (in the Pseudo-Platonic Dialogue *Axiarchus*, c. 7, 8) from a lecture said to have been delivered by Prodikus, respecting the miseries of human life, pervading all the various professions and occupations. It is impossible to make out distinctly, either how much really belongs to Prodikus, or what was his scope and purpose, if any such lecture was really delivered.

into the mouth of the opponent, we ought to be cautious of condemning the latter upon such very dubious proof.

Weleker and other modern authors treat Prodikus as "the most innocent" of the sophists, and except him from the sentence which they pass upon the class generally. Let us see, therefore, what Plato himself says about the rest of them, and first about Protagoras. If it were not the established practice with readers of Plato to condemn Protagoras beforehand, and to put upon every passage relating to him not only a sense as bad as it will bear, but much worse than it will fairly bear, they would probably carry away very different inferences from the Platonic dialogue called by that sophist's name, and in which he is made to bear a chief part. That dialogue is itself enough to prove that Plato did not conceive Protagoras either as a corrupt, or unworthy, or incompetent teacher. The course of the dialogue exhibits him as not master of the theory of ethics, and unable to solve various difficulties with which that theory is expected to grapple; moreover, as no match for Sokratēs in dialectics, which Plato considered as the only efficient method of philosophical investigation. In so far, therefore, as imperfect acquaintance with the science or theory upon which rules of art, or the precepts bearing on practice, repose, disqualifies a teacher from giving instruction in such art or practice, to that extent Protagoras is exposed as wanting. And if an expert dialectician, like Plato, had passed Isokratēs or Quintilian, or the large majority of teachers past or present, through a similar cross-examination as to the theory of their teaching, an ignorance not less manifest than that of Protagoras would be brought out. The antithesis which Plato sets forth, in so many of his dialogues, between precept or practice, accompanied by full knowledge of the scientific principles from which it must be deduced, if its rectitude be disputed, — and unscientific practice, without any such power of deduction or defence, is one of the most valuable portions of his speculations: he exhausts his genius to render it conspicuous in a thousand indirect ways, and to shame his readers, if possible, into the loftier and more rational walk of thought. But it is one thing to say of a man, that he does not know the theory of what he teaches, or of the way in which he teaches; it is another thing to say, that he actually teaches that which scientific theory would

not prescribe as the best; it is a third thing, graver than both, to say that his teaching is not only below the exigences of science, but even corrupt and demoralizing. Now of these three points, it is the first only which Plato in his dialogue makes out against Protagoras: even the second, he neither affirms nor insinuates; and as to the third, not only he never glances at it, even indirectly, but the whole tendency of the discourse suggests a directly contrary conclusion. As if sensible that when an eminent opponent was to be depicted as puzzled and irritated by superior dialectics, it was but common fairness to set forth his distinctive merits also, Plato gives a fable, and expository harangue, from the mouth of Protagoras,¹ upon the question whether virtue is teachable. This harangue is, in my judgment, very striking and instructive; and so it would have been probably accounted, if commentators had not read it with a preestablished persuasion that whatever came from the lips of a sophist must be either ridiculous or immoral.² It is the only part of Plato's works wherein any account is rendered of the growth of that floating, uncertified, self-propagating body of opinion, upon which the cross-examining analysis of Sokratēs is brought to bear, as will be seen in the following chapter.

Protagoras professes to teach his pupils "good counsel" in their domestic and family relations, as well as how to speak and act in the most effective manner for the weal of the city. Since this comes from Protagoras, the commentators of Plato pronounce it to be miserable morality; but it coincides, almost to the letter, with that which Isokratēs describes himself as teaching, a generation afterwards, and substantially even with that which Xenophon represents Sokratēs as teaching; nor is it easy to set forth,

¹ Plato, *Protagoras*, p. 320, D. c. 11, *et seq.*, especially p. 322, D, where Protagoras lays it down that no man is fit to be a member of a social community, who has not in his bosom both *dike* and *arête*, — that is, a sense of reciprocal obligation and right between himself and others, — and a sensibility to esteem or reproach from others. He lays these fundamental attributes down as what a good ethical theory must assume or exact in every man.

² Of the unjust asperity and contempt with which the Platonic commentators treat the sophists, see a specimen in Ast, *Ueber Platons Leben und Schriften*, pp. 70, 71, where he comments on Protagoras and this fable.

in a few words, a larger scheme of practical duty.¹ And if the measure of practical duty, which Protagoras devoted himself to teach, was thus serious and extensive, even the fraction of theory

¹ Protagoras says: Τὸ δὲ μαθητὴν ἐστὶν, εὐδονῆσαι περὶ τῶν οἰκτιῶν ὅπως ἂν ἄριστα τὴν αὐτοῦ οἰκίαν διοικῇ, καὶ περὶ τῶν τῆς πόλεως, ὅπως τῇ πόλει δυνατότατος εἴη καὶ πράττειν καὶ λέγειν. (Plato, Protagoras, c. 9, p. 318, E.)

A similar description of the moral teaching of Protagoras and the other sophists, yet comprising a still larger range of duties, towards parents, friends, and fellow-citizens in their private capacities, is given in Plato, Meno. p. 91, B, E.

Isokratēs describes the education which he wished to convey, almost in the same words. Τὸν τα τοιαῦτα μαθάνοντα καὶ μελετῶντα ἔξω καὶ τὸν ἴδιον οἶκον καὶ τὰ κοινὰ τὰ τῆς πόλεως καλῶς διακρίσσειν, ὥστε ἴσκει καὶ ποιητὴν καὶ φιλοσοφῆτον καὶ πάντα πρακτικὸν ἐστί (Or. xv, De Periculis, s. 304; compare 289).

Xenophon also describes, almost in the same words, the teaching of Sokratēs. Kriton and others sought the society of Sokratēs: οὐκ ἵνα δημογῶν καὶ δικαστῶν γένωιντο, ἀλλ' ἵνα καλοὶ τε καὶ ἀγαθοὶ γένωιντο, καὶ οἶκῳ καὶ οἰκέταις καὶ οἰκείοις καὶ φίλοις καὶ πόλει καὶ πολίταις δύναιτο καλῶς χρῆσθαι (Memor. i, 2, 48). Again, i, 2, 64: Φανερόν ἦν Σωκράτους τῶν συνόντων τοὺς πολλοὺς ἐπιστήμης ἔχοντας, τοῦτων μὲν παύων, τῆς δὲ καλλίστης καὶ μεγάλῃς ἐπιστάτης ἀρετῆς, ἣ πόλεις τε καὶ οἶκοι εὖ οἰκοῦσιν, προτρέπων ἐπιστρέφειν. Compare also i, 6, 15; ii, 1, 19; iv, 1, 2; iv, 5, 10.

When we perceive how much analogy Xenophon establishes — so far as regards practical precept, apart from theory or method — between Sokratēs, Protagoras, Prodikus, etc., it is difficult to justify the representations of the commentators respecting the sophists; see Stallbaum, Proleg. ad Platon Menon. p. 8. "Etenim virtutis nomen, cum propter ambitus magnitudinem valde esset ambiguum et obscurum, sophistæ interpretabantur sic, ut, missâ veræ honestatis et probitatis vi, unice de prudentiâ civili ac domesticâ cogitari vellent, eoque modo totam virtutem ad callidam quoddam utilitatis vel privatim vel publice consequendæ artificium revocarent." "Pervidit hanc opinionis istius perversitatem, ejusque turpitudinem intimo sensit pectore, vir sanctissimi animi, Sokratēs, etc." Stallbaum speaks to the same purpose in his Prolegomena to the Protagoras, pp. 10, 11; and to the Euthydemus, pp. 21, 22.

Those who, like these censors on the sophists, think it base to recommend virtuous conduct by the mutual security and comfort which it procures to all parties, must be prepared to condemn on the same ground a large portion of what is said by Sokratēs throughout the Memorabilia of Xenophon, Μὴ καταφρόνει τῶν οἰκονομικῶν ἀνδρῶν, etc. (ii, 4, 12); see also his Economic. xi, 10.

assigned to him in his harangue, includes some points better than that of Plato himself. For Plato seems to have conceived the ethical end, to each individual, as comprising nothing more than his own permanent happiness and moral health; and in this very dialogue, he introduces Sokratēs as maintaining virtue to consist only in a right calculation of a man's own personal happiness and misery. But here we find Protagoras speaking in a way which implies a larger, and, in my opinion, a juster, appreciation of the ethical end, as including not only reference to a man's own happiness, but also obligations towards the happiness of others. Without at all agreeing in the harsh terms of censure which various critics pronounce upon that theory which Sokratēs is made to set forth in the Platonic Protagoras, I consider his conception of the ethical end essentially narrow and imperfect, not capable of being made to serve as basis for deduction of the best ethical precepts. Yet such is the prejudice with which the history of the sophists has been written, that the commentators on Plato accuse the sophists of having originated what they ignorantly term, "the base theory of utility," here propounded by Sokratēs himself; complimenting the latter on having set forth those larger views which in this dialogue belong only to Protagoras!

¹ Stallbaum, Prolegomena ad Platonis Menonem, p. 9: "Etenim sophistæ, primum virtutis exercitationem et ad utilitates externas referent, et facultate quadam atque consuetudine ejus, quod utile videretur, reperiendi, absolvi statuerent. — Sokrates ipse, rejecta utilitatis turpitudine, vim naturamque virtutis unice ad id quod bonum honestumque est, revocavit, voluitque esse in eo, ut quis recti bonique sensu ac scientia polleret, ad quam tanquam ad certissimam normam atque regulam actiones suas omnes dirigeret atque poveret."

Whoever will compare this criticism with the Protagoras of Plato, c. 36, 37, especially p. 357, B, wherein Sokratēs identifies good with pleasure and evil with pain, and wherein he considers right conduct to consist in justly calculating the items of pleasure and pain one against the other, ἡ μετρητικὴ τέχνη, will be astonished how a critic on Plato could write what is above cited. I am aware that there are other parts of Plato's dialogues in which he maintains a doctrine different from that just alluded to. Accordingly, Stallbaum (in his Prolegomena to the Protagoras, p. 30) contends that Plato is here setting forth a doctrine not his own, but is reasoning on the principles of Protagoras, for the purpose of entrapping and confounding him: "Quæ hic de fortitudine disseruntur, ea item cavendum est non

So far as concerns Protagoras, therefore, the evidence of Plato himself may be produced to show that he was not a corrupt teacher, but a worthy companion of Prodikus; worthy also of that which we know him to have enjoyed, the society and conversation of Periklēs. Let us now examine what Plato says about a third sophist, Hippias of Elis; who figures both in the dialogue called "Protagoras," and in two distinct dialogues known by the titles of "Hippias Major and Minor." Hippias is represented as distinguished for the wide range of his accomplishments, of which in these dialogues he ostentatiously boasts. He could teach astronomy, geometry, and arithmetic, which subjects Protagoras censured him for enforcing too much upon his pupils; so little did these sophists agree in any one scheme of doctrine or education. Besides this, he was a poet, a musician, an expositor of the poets, and a lecturer with a large stock of composed matter, — on sub-

protenus pro decretis mere Platoniciis habeantur. Disputat enim Socrates pleraque omnia ad mentem ipsius Protagoræ, ita quidem ut eum per suam ipsius rationem in fraudem et errorem inducat."

I am happy to be able to vindicate Plato against the disgrace of so dishonest a spirit of argumentation as that which Stallbaum ascribes to him. Plato most certainly does not reason here upon the doctrines or principles of Protagoras; for the latter begins by positively denying the doctrine, and is only brought to admit it in a very qualified manner, c. 35, p. 351, D. He says, in reply to the question of Sokratēs: Οὐκ οἶδα ἀπὸ πᾶσι οὕτως, ὡς σὺ ἐρωτᾷς, εἰ ἐμοὶ ἀποκρίτεον ἔστιν, ὡς τὰ ἡδέα τε ἀγαθὰ ἔστιν ἅπαντα καὶ τὰ ἀνίαρ᾽ ἀκάκ᾽ ἄλλα μοι δοκεῖ σὺ μόνον πρὸς ἡνέκην ἀποκρίσιν ἐμοὶ ἀσφαλίστερον εἶναι ἀποκρίνασθαι, ἀλλὰ καὶ πρὸς πάντα τὸν ἄλλον βίον τὸν ἐμὸν, ὅτι ἐστὶ μὲν ἅ τῶν ἡδέων οὐκ ἔστιν ἀγαθὰ ἔστι δὲ αὖ καὶ ἅ τῶν ἀνιάρων οὐκ ἔστι κακά, ἐστὶ δὲ ἅ ἔστι, καὶ τρίτον ἃ οὐδὲ τέρα, οὔτε κακὰ οὔτε ἀγαθὰ.

There is something peculiarly striking in this appeal of Protagoras to his whole past life, as rendering it impossible for him to admit what he evidently looked upon as a *base theory*, as Stallbaum pronounces it to be. Yet the latter actually ventures to take it away from Sokratēs, who not only propounds it confidently, but reasons it out in a clear and forcible manner, and of fastening it on Protagoras, who first disclaims it and then only admits it under reserve! I deny the theory to be *base*, though I think it an imperfect theory of ethics. But Stallbaum, who calls it so, was bound to be doubly careful in looking into his proof before he ascribed it to any one. What makes the case worse is, that he fastens it not only on Protagoras, but on the sophists collectively, by that monstrous fiction which treats them as a doctrinal sect.

jects moral, political, and even legendary, — treasured up in a very retentive memory. He was a citizen much employed as envoy by his fellow-citizens: to crown all, his manual dexterity was such that he professed to have made with his own hands all the attire and ornaments which he wore on his person. If, as is sufficiently probable, he was a vain and ostentatious man, — defects not excluding an useful and honorable career, — we must at the same time give him credit for a variety of acquisitions such as to explain a certain measure of vanity.¹ The style in which Plato handles Hippias is very different from that in which he treats Protagoras. It is full of sneer and contemptuous banter, insomuch that even Stallbaum,² after having repeated a great many times that this was a vile sophist, who deserved no better treatment, is forced to admit that the petulance is carried rather too far, and to suggest that the dialogue must have been a juvenile work of Plato. Be this as it may, amidst so much unfriendly handling, not only we find no imputation against Hippias, of having preached a low or corrupt morality, but Plato inserts that which furnishes good, though indirect, proof of the contrary. For Hippias is made to say that he had already delivered, and was about to deliver again, a lecture composed by himself with great care, wherein he enlarged upon the aims and pursuits which a young man ought to follow. The scheme of his discourse was, that after the capture of Troy, the youthful Neoptolemus was introduced as asking the advice of Nestor about his own future conduct: in reply to which, Nestor sets forth to him what was the plan of life incumbent on a young man of honorable aspirations, and unfolds to him the full details of regulated and virtuous conduct by which it ought to be filled up.³ The selection of two such names, among the most venerated in all Grecian legend, as monitor and pupil, is a stamp clearly attesting the vein of sentiment which animated the composition. Morality preached by Nestor for the edification of Neoptolemus, might possibly be too

¹ See about Hippias, Plato, Protagoras, c. 9, p. 318, E.; Stallbaum, Prolegom. ad Platon. Hipp. Maj. p. 147, seq.; Cicero, de Orator. iii, 33; Plato Hipp. Minor, l. 10, p. 368, B.

² Stallbaum, Proleg. ad Plat. Hipp. Maj. p. 150.

³ Plato, Hippias Major, p. 286, A, B.

high for Athenian practice; but most certainly it would not err on the side of corruption, selfishness, or over-indulgence. We may fairly presume that this discourse composed by Hippias would not be unworthy, in spirit and purpose, to be placed by the side of "The Choice of Hercules," nor its author by that of Prodicus as a moral teacher.

The dialogue entitled "Gorgias," in Plato, is carried on by Sokratēs with three different persons one after the other, — Gorgias, Polus, and Kalliklēs. Gorgias of Leontini in Sicily, as a rhetorical teacher, acquired greater celebrity than any man of his time, during the Peloponnesian war: his abundant powers of illustration, his florid ornaments, his artificial structure of sentences distributed into exact antithetical fractions, all spread a new fashion in the art of speaking, which for the time was very popular, but afterwards became discredited. If the line could be clearly drawn between rhetors and sophists, Gorgias ought rather to be ranked with the former.¹ In the conversation with Gorgias, Sokratēs exposes the fallacy and imposture of rhetoric and rhetorical teaching, as cheating an ignorant audience into persuasion without knowledge, and as framed to satisfy the passing caprice, without any regard to the permanent welfare and improvement of the people. Whatever real inculcation may be conveyed in these arguments against a rhetorical teacher, Gorgias must bear in common with Isokratēs and Quintilian, and under the shield of Aristotle. But save and except rhetorical teaching, no dissemination of corrupt morality is ascribed to him by Plato; who, indeed, treats him with a degree of respect which surprises the commentators.²

The tone of the dialogue changes materially when it passes to Polus and Kalliklēs, the former of whom is described as a writer on rhetoric, and probably a teacher also.³ There is much insolence in Polus, and no small asperity in Sokratēs. Yet the former maintains no arguments which justify the charge of immorality against himself or his fellow-teachers. He defends the tastes

¹ Plato Menon, p. 95, A.; Foss, De Gorgia Leontino, p. 27, seq.

² See the observations of Groen van Prinsterer and Stallbaum, Stallbaum ad Platon. Gorg. c. 1.

³ Plato Gorgias, c. 17, p. 462, B.

and sentiments common to every man in Greece, and shared even by the most estimable Athenians, Periklēs, Nikias, and Aristokratēs; while Sokratēs prides himself on standing absolutely alone, and having no support except from his irresistible dialectics, whereby he is sure of extorting reluctant admission from his adversary. How far Sokratēs may be right, I do not now inquire: it is sufficient that Polus, standing as he does amidst company at once so numerous and so irreproachable, cannot be fairly denounced as a poisoner of the youthful mind.

Polus presently hands over the dialogue to Kalliklēs, who is here represented, doubtless, as laying down doctrines openly and avowedly anti-social. He distinguishes between the law of nature and the law — both written and unwritten, for the Greek word substantially includes both — of society. According to the law of nature, Kalliklēs says, the strong man — the better or more capable man — puts forth his strength to the full for his own advantage, without limit or restraint; overcomes the resistance which weaker men are able to offer; and seizes for himself as much as he pleases of the matter of enjoyment. He has no occasion to restrain any of his appetites or desires; the more numerous and pressing they are, so much the better for him, since his power affords him the means of satiating them all. The many, who have the misfortune to be weak, must be content with that which he leaves them, and submit to it as best they can. This, Kalliklēs says, is what actually happens in a state of nature; this is what is accounted just, as is evident by the practice of independent communities, not included in one common political society, towards each other; this is *justice*, by nature, or according to the law of nature. But when men come into society, all this is reversed. The majority of individuals know very well that they are weak, and that their only chance of security or

¹ Plato. Gorgias. c. 27, p. 472, A. Καὶ νῦν (say Sokratēs) περὶ ὧν σὺ λέγεις ὀλίγον σοὶ πάντες συμφησούνσι ταῦτα Ἀθηναῖοι καὶ ξένοι — μαρτυρήσουσι σοὶ, ἐὰν μὲν βούλῃ, Νικίας ὁ Νικηράτου καὶ οἱ ἀδελφοὶ μετ' αὐτοῦ — ἐὰν δὲ βούλῃ, Ἀριστοκράτης ὁ Σκελλίου — ἐὰν δὲ βούλῃ, ἡ Περικλέους ὅλη οἰκία, ἢ ἄλλη συγγένεια, ἥτινα ἂν βούλῃ τῶν ἐνθάδε ἐκλέξασθαι. Ἀλλ' ἐγὼ σοὶ εἰς ὧν οὐχ ὁμολογῶ..... Ἐγὼ δὲ ἂν μὴ σὲ αὐτὸν εἶνα ὄντα μάρτυρα παράσχωμαι ὁμολογοῦντα περὶ ὧν λέγω, οὐδὲν οἶμαι ἄξιον λόγου καὶ πεπεράνθαι περὶ ὧν ἡμῖν ὁ λόγος ῥ.

comfort consists in establishing laws to restrain this strong man, reinforced by a moral sanction of praise and blame devoted to the same general end. They catch him, like a young lion, whilst his mind is yet tender, and fascinate him by talk and training into a disposition conformable to that measure and equality which the law enjoins. Here, then, is justice according to the law of society; a factitious system, built up by the many for their own protection and happiness, to the subversion of the law of nature, which arms the strong man with a right to encroachment and license. Let a fair opportunity occur, and the favorite of Nature will be seen to kick off his harness, tread down the laws, break through the magic circle of opinion around him, and stand forth again as lord and master of the many; regaining that glorious position which nature has assigned to him as his right. Justice by nature, and justice by law and society, are thus, according to Kalliklēs, not only distinct, but mutually contradictory. He accuses Sokratēs of having jumbled the two together in his argument.¹


It has been contended by many authors that this anti-social reasoning — true enough, in so far as it states simple matter of fact and probability; immoral, in so far as it erects the power of the strong man into a right; and inviting many comments, if I could find a convenient place for them — represents the morality commonly and publicly taught by the persons called sophists at Athens.² I deny this assertion emphatically. Even if I had ne

¹ This doctrine asserted by Kalliklēs will be found in Plato, *Gorgias*, c. 39, 40, pp. 483, 484.

² See the same matter of fact strongly stated by Sokratēs in the *Memorabilia* of Xenophon, ii. 1, 13.

³ Schleiermacher (in the *Prolegomena* to his translation of the *Theætetus*, p. 183) represents that Plato intended to refute Aristippus in the person of Kalliklēs, which supposition he sustains, by remarking that Aristippus affirmed that there was *no such thing as justice by nature*, but only by law and convention. But the affirmation of Kalliklēs is the direct contrary of that which Schleiermacher ascribes to Aristippus. Kalliklēs not only does not deny justice by nature, but affirms it in the most direct manner, — explains what it is, that it consists in the right of the strongest man to make use of his strength without any regard to others, — and puts it above the justice of law and society, in respect to authority.

Ritter and Brandis are yet in *re* incorrect in their accusations of the



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other evidence to sustain my denial, except what has been already extracted, from the unfriendly writings of Plato himself, respecting Protagoras and Hippias, — with what we know from Xenophon about Prodikus, — I should consider my case made out as vindicating the sophists generally from such an accusation. If refutation to the doctrine of Kalliklès were needed, it would be obtained quite as efficaciously from Prodikus and Protagoras as from Sokratès and Plato.

But this is not the strongest part of the vindication.

First, Kalliklès himself is not a sophist, nor represented by Plato as such. He is a young Athenian citizen, of rank and station, belonging to the deme Acharnæ: he is intimate with other young men of condition in the city, has recently entered into active political life, and bends his whole soul towards it; he disparages philosophy, and speaks with utter contempt about the sophists.¹ It, then, it were even just, which I do not admit, to infer from opinions put into the mouth of one sophist, that the

sophists, founded upon this same doctrine. The former says (p. 581) "It is affirmed as a common tenet of the sophists, there is no right by nature, but only by convention," compare Brandis, p. 521. The very passages to which these writers refer, as far as they prove anything, prove the contrary of what they assert, and Preller actually imputes the contrary tenet to the sophists (Histo. Philosoph. c. 4, p. 130, Hamburg, 1838) with just as little authority. Both Ritter and Brandis charge the sophists with wickedness for this alleged tenet, for denying that there was any right by nature, and allowing no right except by convention, a doctrine which had been maintained before them by Archelaus (Diogen. Laert. ii. 16). Now Plato (Legg. x. p. 889), whom these writers refer to, charges certain wise men — σοφούς ὁνομαζομένους καὶ ποιητάς (he does not mention sophists) — with wickedness, but on the ground directly opposite, because they did acknowledge a right by nature, of greater authority than the right laid down by the legislator, and because they encouraged pupils to follow this supposed right of nature, disobeying the law, interpreting the right of nature as Kalliklès does in the Gorgias!

Teachers are thus branded as wicked men by Ritter and Brandis, for the negative, and by Plato, if he here means the sophists, for the affirmative doctrine.

¹ Plato, Gorgias, c. 37, p. 481, D. c. 41, p. 485, B, D; c. 42, p. 487, C; c. 50, p. 495, B; c. 70, p. 515, A. *σεμνὸν αὐτὸς ἀπὸ ἀρχῆς πρᾶττεν τὰ τῆς πόλεως ποταμίᾳ*, compare c. 55, p. 500, C. His contempt for the sophists, c. 75, p. 519, E. with the note of Heindorf.

same were held by another or by all of them, it would not be the less unjust to draw the like inference from opinions professed by one who is not a sophist, and who despises the whole profession.

Secondly, if any man will read attentively the course of the dialogue, he will see that the doctrine of Kalliklēs is such as no one dared publicly to propound. So it is conceived both by Kalliklēs himself, and by Sokratēs. The former first takes up the conversation, by saying that his predecessor Polus had become entangled in a contradiction, because he had not courage enough openly to announce an unpopular and odious doctrine; but he, Kalliklēs, was less shamefaced, and would speak out boldly that doctrine which others kept to themselves for fear of shocking the hearers. "Certainly (says Sokratēs to him) your audacity is abundantly shown by the doctrine which you have just laid down; you set forth plainly that which other people think, but do not choose to utter."¹ Now, opinions of which Pōlus, an insolent young man, was afraid to proclaim himself the champion, must have been revolting indeed to the sentiments of hearers. How then can any reasonable man believe, that such opinions were not only openly propounded, but seriously inculcated as truth upon audiences of youthful hearers, by the sophists? We know that the teaching of the latter was public in the highest degree; publicity was pleasing as well as profitable to them; among the many disparaging epithets heaped upon them, ostentation and vanity are two of the most conspicuous. Whatever they taught, they taught publicly; and I contend, with full conviction, that, had they even agreed with Kalliklēs in this

¹ Plato, *Gorgias*, c. 38, p. 482, E. ἐκ ταύτης γὰρ αὐτῆς ὁμολογίας αὐτοῦ ὑπο σου συμπάσαντες ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ἐπιστομισθῆναι (Polus). αἰσχυνθεὶς ἂν ἐννοεῖ εἰπεῖν· σὺ γὰρ τῷ ὄντι, ὦ Σωκράτης, εἰς τοιαῦτα ἀγείς φορτικά καὶ δημηγορικά, φασκὼν τὴν ἀληθειαν διακεῖν. . . . εἰδὼν οὖν τις αἰσχυνηταὶ καὶ μὴ τολμᾷ λέγειν ἄπειρ νοεῖ, ἀναγκάζεται ἐναντία λέγειν.

Καὶ μὴν (says Sokratēs to Kalliklēs, c. 42, p. 487, D.) ὅτι γε οἷός ἐστι παρ ῥησιν αἰσχεσθαι καὶ μὴ αἰσχυνησθαι, αὐτοῦ τε φησὶ, καὶ ὁ λόγος, ὅν ὀλίγον προτερον ἔλεγε, ὁμολογεῖ σοι. Again, c. 47, p. 492, D. Οὐκ ἀγεννὴς γε, ὦ Καλλικλείς, ἐπεξέρχει τῷ λόγῳ παρρησιαζόμενος· σαφὲς γὰρ σὺ νῦν λέγεις ἃ οἱ ἄλλοι διανοοῦνται μὲν, λέγειν δὲ οὐκ ἐθέλουσι.

Again, from Kalliklēs, ὃ ἐγὼ σοι νῦν παρρησιαζόμενος λέγω, c. 46, p. 491, E.

opinion, they could neither have been sufficiently audacious, nor sufficiently their own enemies, to make it a part of their public teaching; but would have acted like Pōlus, and kept the doctrine to themselves.

Thirdly, this latter conclusion will be rendered doubly certain, when we consider of what city we are now speaking. Of all places in the world, the democratical Athens is the last in which the doctrine advanced by Kalliklēs could possibly have been professed by a public teacher; or even by Kalliklēs himself, in any public meeting. It is unnecessary to remind the reader how profoundly democratical was the sentiment and morality of the Athenians.—how much they loved their laws, their constitution, and their political equality.—how jealous their apprehension was of any nascent or threatening despotism. All this is not simply admitted, but even exaggerated, by Mr. Mitford, Wachsmuth, and other anti-democratical writers, who often draw from it materials for their abundant censures. Now the very point which Sokratēs, in this dialogue, called "*Gorgias*," seeks to establish against Kalliklēs, against the rhetors, and against the sophists, is, that they courted, flattered, and truckled to the sentiment of the Athenian people, with degrading subservience; that they looked to the immediate gratification simply, and not to permanent moral improvement of the people; that they had not courage to address to them any unpalatable truths, however salutary, but would shift and modify opinions in every way, so as to escape giving offence; that no man who put himself prominently forward at Athens had any chance of success, unless he became moulded and assimilated, from the core, to the people and their type of

¹ This quality is imputed by Sokratēs to Kalliklēs in a remarkable passage of the *Gorgias*, c. 37, p. 481, D, E, the substance of which is thus stated by Stallbaum in his note—"Carpit Socrates Callielis levitatem, mobili populi turbæ nunquam non blandientis et adulantis."

It is one of the main points of Sokratēs in the dialogue, to make out that the practice, for he will not call it an art, of sophists, as well as rhetors, aims at nothing but the immediate gratification of the people, without any regard to their ultimate or durable benefit, that they are branches of the widely-extended knack of flattery (*Gorgias*, c. 19, p. 464, D; c. 20, p. 465, C; c. 56, p. 501, C, c. 75, p. 520, B).

sentiment.¹ Granting such charges to be true, how is it conceivable that any sophist, or any rhetor, could venture to enforce upon an Athenian public audience the doctrine laid down by Kallikles? To tell such an audience: "Your laws and institutions are all violations of the law of nature, contrived to disappoint the Alkibiadês or Napoleon among you of his natural right to become your master, and to deal with you petty men as his slaves. All your unnatural precautions, and conventional talk, in favor of legality and equal dealing, will turn out to be nothing better than pitiful impotence,² as soon as *he* finds a good opportunity of standing forward in his full might and energy, so as to put you into your proper places, and show you what privileges Nature intends for her favorites!" Conceive such a doctrine propounded by a lecturer to assembled Athenians! A doctrine just as revolting to Nikias as to Kleon, and which even Alkibiadês would be forced to affect to disapprove: since it is not simply anti-popular, not simply despotic, but the drunken extravagance of despotism. The Great man, as depicted by Kalliklês, stands in the same relation to ordinary mortals, as Jonathan Wild the Great, in the admirable parody of Fielding.

That sophists, whom Plato accuses of slavish flattery to the democratical ear, should gratuitously insult it by the proposition of such tenets, is an assertion not merely untrue, but utterly absurd. Even as to Sokratês, we know from Xenophon how much the Athenians were offended with him, and how much it was urged by the accusers on his trial, that in his conversations he was wont to cite with peculiar relish the description, in the second book of the Iliad, of Odysseus following the Grecian crowd, when running away from the agora to get on shipboard, and prevailing upon them to come back, by gentle words ad-

¹ Plato, Gorgias, c. 68, p. 513. Οὐ γὰρ μνηστὴν δεῖ εἶναι, ἀλλ' αἰσχροφῶς ἔσθαι τοῦτοιοι, εἰ μὲλλεις τι γνησίον ἀπεργάζεσθαι εἰς φίλιαν τῶ Ἀθηναίων δῆμῳ. . . . Ὅστις οὖν σε τοιούτοις ομιώτατον ἀπεργασέται, οὗτος σε ποιήσει, ὥς ἐπιθυμῆς πολιτικός εἶναι, πολιτικὸν καὶ ῥητορικόν τῳ αὐτῶν γὰρ ἔστι λεγόμενων τῶν λόγων ἕκαστοι χαίρονσι, τῷ δὲ ἀλλοτρίῳ ἀχθόνται.

² Plato, Gorgias, c. 46, p. 492, C (the words of Kalliklês). Τα δὲ ἄλλα ταῦτ' ἐστὶ τὰ καλλωπισμὰτα, τὰ παρὰ φύσιν ἐννθημὰτα, ἀνθρώπων ἐλυσσεία καὶ οὐδενὸς ἄξια.

dressed to the chiefs, but by blows of his stick, accompanied with contemptuous reprimand, to the common people. The indirect evidence thus afforded, that Sokratês countenanced unequal dealing and ill usage towards the many, told much against him in the minds of the dikasts. What would they have felt then towards a sophist who publicly professed the political morality of Kalliklês? The truth is, not only was it impossible that any such morality, or anything of the same type even much diluted, could find its way into the educational lectures of professors at Athens, but the fear would be in the opposite direction. If the sophist erred in either way, it would be in that which Sokratês imputes, by making his lectures over-democratical. Nay, if we suppose any opportunity to have arisen of discussing the doctrine of Kalliklês, he would hardly omit to flatter the ears of the surrounding democrats by enhancing the beneficent results of legality and equal dealing, and by denouncing this "natural despot," or undisclosed Napoleon, as one who must either take his place under such restraints, or find a place in some other city.

I have thus shown, even from Plato himself, that the doctrine ascribed to Kalliklês neither did enter, nor could have entered, into the lectures of a sophist or professed teacher. The same conclusion may be maintained respecting the doctrine of Thrasymachus in the first book of the "Republic." Thrasymachus was a rhetorical teacher, who had devised precepts respecting the construction of an oration and the training of young men for public speaking. It is most probable that he confined himself, like Gorgias, to this department, and that he did not profess to give moral lectures, like Protagoras and Prodikus. But granting him to have given such, he would not talk about justice in the way in which Plato makes him talk, if he desired to give any satisfaction to an Athenian audience. The mere brutality and ferocious impudence of demeanor even to exaggeration, with which Plato invests him, is in itself a strong proof that the doctrine, ushered in with such a preface, was not that of a popular and acceptable teacher, winning favor in public audiences. He defines justice to be "the interest of the superior power; that rule, which, in every society, the dominant power prescribes, as being for its own advantage." A man is just, he says, for the advantage of another, not for his own: he is weak, cannot help himself,

and must submit to that which the stronger authority, whether despot, oligarchy, or commonwealth, commands.

This theory is essentially different from the doctrine of Kallikles, as set forth a few pages back; for Thrasymachus does not travel out of society to insist upon anterior rights dating from a supposed state of nature; he takes societies as he finds them, recognizing the actual governing authority of each as the canon and constituent of justice or injustice. Stallbaum and other writers have incautiously treated the two theories as if they were the same; and with something even worse than want of caution, while they pronounce the theory of Thrasymachus to be detestably immoral, announce it as having been propounded not by him only, but by *The Sophists*; thus, in their usual style, dealing with the sophists as if they were a school, sect, or partnership with mutual responsibility. Whoever has followed the evidence which I have produced respecting Protagoras and Prodikos, will know how differently these latter handled the question of justice.

But the truth is, that the theory of Thrasymachus, though incorrect and defective, is not so detestable as these writers represent. What makes it seem detestable, is the style and manner in which he is made to put it forward; which causes the just man to appear petty and contemptible, while it surrounds the unjust man with enviable attributes. Now this is precisely the circumstance which revolts the common sentiments of mankind, as it revolts also the critics who read what is said by Thrasymachus. The moral sentiments exist in men's minds in complex and powerful groups, associated with some large words and emphatic forms of speech. Whether an ethical theory satisfies the exigencies of reason, or commands and answers to all the phenomena, a common audience will seldom give themselves the trouble to consider with attention; but what they imperiously exact, and what is indispensable to give the theory any chance of success, is, that it shall exhibit to their feelings the just man as respectable and dignified, and the unjust man as odious and repulsive. Now that which offends in the language ascribed to Thrasymachus is, not merely the absence, but the reversal, of this condition; the presentation of the just man as weak and silly, and of injustice in all the *prestige* of triumph and dignity. And for this very reason, I venture to infer that such a theory

was never propounded by Thrasymachus to any public audience in the form in which it appears in Plato. For Thrasymachus was a rhetor, who had studied the principles of his art: now we know that these common sentiments of an audience, were precisely what the rhetors best understood, and always strove to conciliate. Even from the time of Gorgias, they began the practice of composing beforehand declamations upon the general heads of morality, which were ready to be introduced into actual speeches as occasion presented itself, and in which appeal was made to the moral sentiments foreknown as common, with more or less of modification, to all the Grecian assemblies. The real Thrasymachus, addressing any audience at Athens, would never have wounded these sentiments, as the Platonic Thrasymachus is made to do in the "Republic." Least of all would he have done this, if it be true of him, as Plato asserts of the rhetors and sophists generally, that they thought about nothing but courting popularity, without any sincerity of conviction.

Though Plato thinks fit to bring out the opinion of Thrasymachus with accessories unnecessarily offensive, and thus to enhance the dialectical triumph of Sokratès by the brutal manners of the adversary, he was well aware that he had not done justice to the opinion itself, much less confuted it. The proof of this is, that in the second book of the "Republic," after Thrasymachus has disappeared, the very same opinion is taken up by Glaukon and Adeimantus, and set forth by both of them, though they disclaim entertaining it as their own, as suggesting grave doubts and difficulties which they desire to hear solved by Sokratès. Those who read attentively the discourses of Glaukon and Adeimantus, will see that the substantive opinion ascribed to Thrasymachus, apart from the brutality with which he is made to state it, does not even countenance the charge of immoral teaching against *him*, much less against the sophists generally. Hardly anything in Plato's compositions is more powerful than those discourses. They present, in a perspicuous and forcible manner, some of the most serious difficulties with which ethical theory is required to grapple. And Plato can answer them only in one way, by taking society to pieces, and reconstructing it in the form of his imaginary republic. The speeches of Glaukon and Adeimantus form the immediate preface to the striking and elaborate description

which he goes through, of his new state of society, nor do they receive any other answer than what is implied in that description. Plato indirectly confesses that he cannot answer them, assuming social institutions to continue unreformed: and his reform is sufficiently fundamental.¹

¹ I omitted to notice the Dialogue of Plato entitled Euthydemus, wherein Sokratēs is introduced in conversation with the two persons called sophists, Euthydemus and Dionysodorus, who are represented as propounding a number of verbal quibbles, assertions of double sense, arising from equivocal grammar or syntax,—fallacies of mere diction, without the least plausibility as to the sense,—specimens of jests and hoax, p. 278, B. They are described as extravagantly conceited, while Sokratēs is painted with his usual affectation of deference and modesty. He himself, during a part of the dialogue, carries on conversation in his own dialectical manner with the youthful Kleinias; who is then handed over to be taught by Euthydemus and Dionysodorus; so that the contrast between their style of questioning, and that of Sokratēs, is forcibly brought out.

To bring out this contrast, appears to me the main purpose of the dialogue, as has already been remarked by Socher and others (see Stallbaum, Prolegom. ad Euthydem. pp. 15–65); but its construction, its manner, and its result, previous to the concluding conversation between Sokratēs and Kriton separately, is so thoroughly comic, that Ast, on this and other grounds, rejects it as spurious and unworthy of Plato (see Ast, über Platons Leben und Schriften, pp. 414–418).

Without agreeing in Ast's inference, I recognize the violence of the caricature which Plato has here presented under the characters of Euthydemus and Dionysodorus. And it is for this reason, among many others, that I protest the more emphatically against the injustice of Stallbaum and the commentators generally, who consider these two persons as disciples of Protagoras, and samples of what is called "Sophistry," the sophistical practice, the sophists generally. There is not the smallest ground for considering these two men as disciples of Protagoras, who is presented to us, even by Plato himself, under an aspect as totally different from them as it is possible to imagine. Euthydemus and Dionysodorus are described by Plato himself in this very dialogue, as old men who had been fencing-masters, and who had only within the last two years applied themselves to the eristic or controversial dialogue (Euthydem. i. p. 272, C; ii. p. 273, E). Schleiermacher himself accounts their personal importance so mean, that he thinks Plato could not have intended to attack them, but meant to attack Antisthenēs and the Megarian school of philosophers (Prolegom. ad Euthydem. vol. iii. pp. 403, 404 of his translation of Plato). So contemptible does Plato esteem them, that Kriton blames Sokratēs for having so far degraded himself as to be seen talking with them before many persons (p. 305, B, c. 30).

I call particular attention to this circumstance, without which we cannot fairly estimate the sophists, or practical teachers of Athens, face to face with their accuser-general, Plato. He was a great and systematic theorist, whose opinions on ethics, politics, cognition, religion, etc., were all wrought into harmony by his own mind, and stamped with that peculiarity which is the mark of an original intellect. So splendid an effort of speculative genius is among the marvels of the Grecian world. His dissent from all the societies which he saw around him, not merely democratical, but oligarchical and despotic also, was of the deepest and most radical character. Nor did he delude himself by the belief, that any partial amendment of that which he saw around could bring about the end which he desired: he looked to nothing short of a new genesis of the man and the citizen, with institutions calculated from the beginning to work out the full measure of perfectibility. His fertile scientific imagination realized this idea in the "Republic." But that very systematic and original char-

The name of Protagoras occurs only once in the dialogue, in reference to the doctrine, stated by Euthydemus, that false propositions or contradictory propositions were impossible, because no one could either think about or talk about *that which was not*, or *the non-existent* (p. 284, A; 286, C). This doctrine is said by Sokratēs to have been much talked of "by Protagoras, and by men yet earlier than he." It is idle to infer from such a passage, any connection or analogy between these men and Protagoras, as Stallbaum labors to do throughout his Prolegomena, affirming (in his note on p. 286, C) most incorrectly, that Protagoras maintained this doctrine about *to pōteron*, or *the non-existent*, because he had *no great faith* in the evidence of the senses; whereas we know from Plato that it had its rise with Parmenides, who rejected the evidence of the senses entirely (see Plato, Sophist. 24 p. 257, A, with Heindorf and Stallbaum's notes). Diogenes Laertius (ix. 8, 9) falsely asserts that Protagoras was the *first* to broach the doctrine, and even cites as his witness Plato in the Euthydemus, where the exact contrary is stated. Whoever broached it first, it was a doctrine following philosophy from the then received Realism, and Plato was long perplexed before he could solve the difficulty to his own satisfaction (Theatet. p. 187, D).

I do not doubt that there were in Athens persons who abused the dialectical exercise for frivolous puzzles, and it was well for Plato to compose a dialogue exhibiting the contrast between these men and Sokratēs. But to treat Euthydemus and Dionysodorus as samples of "The Sophists," is altogether unwarranted.

acter, which lends so much value and charm to the substantive speculations of Plato, counts as a deduction from his trustworthiness as critic or witness, in reference to the living agents whom he saw at work in Athens and other cities, as statesmen, generals, or teachers. His criticisms are dictated by his own point of view, according to which the entire society was corrupt, and all the instruments who carried on its functions were of essentially base metal. Whoever will read either the "Gorgias" or the "Republic," will see in how sweeping and indiscriminate a manner he passes his sentence of condemnation. Not only all the sophists and all the rhetors,¹ but all the musicians and dithyrambic or tragic poets; all the statesmen, past as well as present, not excepting even the great Periklēs, receive from his hands one common stamp of dishonor. Every one of these men are numbered by Plato among the numerous category of flatterers, who minister to the immediate gratification and to the desires of the people, without looking to their permanent improvement, or making them morally better. "Periklēs and Kimon (says Sokratēs in the "Gorgias") are nothing but servants or ministers who supply the immediate appetites and tastes of the people; just as the baker and the confectioner do in their respective departments, without knowing or caring whether the food will do any real good, a point which the physician alone can determine. As ministers, they are clever enough: they have provided the city amply with tribute, walls, docks, ships, and *such other follies*: but I (Sokratēs) am the only man in Athens who aim, so far as my strength permits, at the true purpose of politics, the mental improvement of the people."² So wholesale a condemna-

¹ Plato, Gorgias, c. 57, 58; pp. 502, 503.

² Plato, Gorgias, c. 72, 73, p. 517 (Sokratēs speaks). Ἀληθεὶς ἄρα οἱ ὑμπεροσθεν λόγοι ἦσαν, ὅτι οὐδένα ἡμεῖς ἴσμεν ἄνδρα ἀγαθὸν γεγονότα τὰ πολιτικά ἐν τῇδε τῇ πόλει.

Ὡς δαίμονες, οὐδ' ἐγὼ ψέγω τοὺς (Periklēs and Kimon) ὥς γε διακόνους εἶναι πόλεως, ἀλλὰ μοι δοκοῦσι τῶν γε νῦν διακονικώτεροι γεγονέναι καὶ μᾶλλον οἷοι τε ἐκποιεῖν τῇ πόλει ὥν ἐπαιθμεῖ. Ἀλλὰ γὰρ μεταβιβάζειν τὰς ἐπιθυμίας καὶ μὴ ἐπιτρέπειν, πειθόντες καὶ βιαζόμενοι ἐπὶ οὗτο, ὅθεν ἐμελλόν ἀμείνους ἐσεσθαι οἱ πολῖται, ὥς ἐπος εἰπεῖν, οὐδὲν τούτων διέφερον ἐκείνοι. ὅπερ μόνον ἔργον ἐστὶν ἀγαθοῦ πολιτοῦ.

Ἀνεῦ γὰρ σωφροσύνης καὶ δικαιοσύνης, λιμένων καὶ τειχῶν καὶ νεωρίων καὶ

tion betrays itself as the offspring, and the consistent offspring, of systematic peculiarity of vision, the prejudice of a great and able mind.

It would be not less unjust to appreciate the sophists or the statesmen of Athens from the point of view of Plato, than the present teachers and politicians of England or France from that of Mr. Owen or Fourier. Both the one and the other class labored for society as it stood at Athens: the statesmen carried on the business of practical politics, the sophist trained up youth for practical life in all its departments, as family men, citizens, and leaders, to obey as well as to command. Both accepted the system as it stood, without contemplating the possibility of a new birth of society: both ministered to certain exigencies, held their anchorage upon certain sentiments, and bowed to a certain morality, actually felt among the living men around them. That which Plato says of the statesmen of Athens is perfectly true, that they were only servants or ministers of the people. He, who tried the people and the entire society by comparison with an imaginary standard of his own, might deem all these ministers worthless in the lump, as carrying on a system too bad to be mended; but, nevertheless, the difference between a competent and an incompetent minister, between Periklēs and Nikias, was of unspeakable moment to the security and happiness of the Athenians. What the sophists on their part undertook was, to educate young men so as to make them better qualified for statesmen or ministers; and Protagoras would have thought it sufficient honor to himself, — as well as sufficient benefit to Athens, which assuredly it would have been, — if he could have inspired any young Athenian with the soul and the capacities of his friend and companion Periklēs.

So far is Plato from considering the sophists as the corruptors of Athenian morality, that he distinctly protests against that

φόρων καὶ τοιοῦτων ὀλυβριῶν ὑμπεπληκασί τὴν πόλιν (c. 74, p. 519, A).

Οἶμαι (says Sokratēs, c. 77, p. 521, D) μετ' ὀλίγων Ἀθηναίων, ἵνα μὴ εἶπω μόνος, ἐπιχειρεῖν τῇ ὡς ἀληθῶς πολιτικῇ τέχνῃ καὶ πράττειν. τὰ πολιτικά μόνος τῶν νῦν, ἅτε οὐκ οὐ πρὸς χάριν λέγων τοὺς λόγους αὐτῶν· λέγω ἐκαστοτεῖ, ἰλλὰ πρὸς τὸ βελτιστόν, οὐ πρὸς τὸ ἥδιστόν, etc.

supposition, in a remarkable passage of the "Republic." It is, he says, the whole people, or the society, with its established morality, intelligence, and tone of sentiment, which is intrinsically vicious; the teachers of such a society must be vicious also, otherwise their teaching would not be received; and even if their private teaching were ever so good, its effect would be washed away, except in some few privileged natures, by the overwhelming deluge of pernicious social influences.¹ Nor let any one imagine, as modern readers are but too ready to understand it, that this poignant censure is intended for Athens so far forth as a democracy. Plato was not the man to preach king-worship, or wealth-worship, as social or political remedies: he declares emphatically that not one of the societies then existing was such that a truly philosophical nature could be engaged in active functions under it.² These passages would be alone sufficient to repel the assertions of those who denounce the sophists as poisoners of Athenian morality, on the alleged authority of Plato.

Nor is it at all more true that they were men of mere words, and made their pupils no better, — a charge just as vehemently pressed against Sokratēs as against the sophists, — and by the same class of enemies, such as Anytus,³ Aristophanes, Eupolis, etc. It was mainly from sophists like Hippias that the Athenian youth learned what they knew of geometry, astronomy, and

¹ This passage is in *Republ.* vi, 6, p. 492, *seq.* I put the first words of the passage (which is too long to be cited, but which richly deserves to be read, entire) in the translation given by Stallbaum in his note.

Sokratēs says to Adeimantus: "An tu quoque putas esse quidem sophistas, homines privatos, qui corrumpunt juventutem in quacunque re mentione dignā; nec illud tamen animadvertisti et tibi persuasisti, quod multo magis debebas, ipsos Athenienses turpissimos esse aliorum corruptores?"

Yet the commentator who translates this passage, does not scruple (in his *Prolegomena* to the *Republic*, pp. xliy, xlv, as well as to the *Dialogues*) to heap upon the sophists aggravated charges, as the actual corruptors of Athenian morality.

² Plato, *Repub.* vi, 11, p. 497, B *μηδεμιν ἀξίαν εἶναι τῶν νυν καταστάσεων τῆς φιλοσοφίας φασίως*, etc.

Compare Plato, *Epistol.* vii, p. 325, A.

³ Anytus was the accuser of Sokratēs: his enmity to the sophists may be seen in Plato, *Meno* p. 91, C.

arithmetic: but the range of what is called special science, possessed even by the teacher, was at that time very limited; and the matter of instruction communicated was expressed under the general title of "Words, or Discourses," which were always taught by the sophists, in connection with thought, and in reference to a practical use. The capacities of thought, speech, and action, are conceived in conjunction by Greeks generally, and by teachers like Isokrates and Quintilian especially; and when young men in Greece, like the Boeotian Proxenus, put themselves under training by Gorgias or any other sophist, it was with a view of qualifying themselves, not merely to speak, but to act.¹

Most of the pupils of the sophists, as of Sokratēs² himself, were young men of wealth; a fact, at which Plato sneers, and others copy him, as if it proved that they cared only about high pay. But I do not hesitate to range myself on the side of Isokrates,³ and to contend that the sophist himself had much to lose by corrupting his pupils. — an argument used by Sokratēs in defending himself before the dikastery, and just as valid in defence of Protagoras or Prodikos,⁴ — and strong personal interest in sending them forth accomplished and virtuous; that the best-taught youth were decidedly the most free from crime and the most active towards good: that among the valuable ideas and feelings which a young Athenian had in his mind, as well as among the good pursuits which he followed, those which he learned from the sophists counted nearly as the best; that, if the contrary had been the fact, fathers would not have continued so to send their sons, and pay their money. It was not merely

¹ Xenoph. *Anab.* ii, 6. Προξένος — ἰσθμὸς μετακίον ὃν ἐπέθυμει γενέσθαι ἀπὸ τοῦ αἵματος, ἀλλὰ πρᾶττεν ἱκανός· καὶ διὰ ταύτην τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν ἔδωκε Γοργίᾳ ἀργύριον τῷ Λεοντίῳ. . . . Τῶντων δ' ἐπιθυμῶν, σφόδρα ἐνδοχὸν αὐτῷ καὶ τούτῳ εἶχεν, ὅτι τούτων οὐδὲν ἂν θίλοι κτᾶσθαι μετὰ ἀδικίας, ἀλλὰ σὺν τῷ δικαίῳ καὶ καλῷ ὡς τοῦ τούτων τυχεῖν, ἀντὶ δὲ τούτων μὴ.

Proxenus, as described by his friend Xenophon, was certainly a man who did no dishonor to the moral teaching of Gorgias.

The connection between thought, speech, and action, is seen even in the jests of Aristophanes upon the purposes of Sokratēs and the sophists: —

Νικᾶν πρᾶττεν καὶ δουλείαν καὶ τῇ γλώττῃ παλαίειν (*Nubes*, 418).

² Plato, *Apol. Sokr.* c. 10, p. 23, C, Protagoras, p. 328, C.

³ See Isokr. *Or.* xy, *De Perm.* sects. 218, 233, 235, 245, 254, 257.

⁴ Plato, *Apol. Sokrat.* c. 13, p. 25, D.

that these teachers countervailed in part the temptations to dissipated enjoyment, but also that they were personally unconcerned in the acrimonious slander and warfare of party in his native city; that the topics with which they familiarized him were, the general interests and duties of men and citizens; that they developed the germs of morality in the ancient legends, as in Prodikus's fable, and amplified in his mind all the undefined cluster of associations connected with the great words of morality; that they vivified in him the sentiment of Pan-Hellenic brotherhood; and that, in teaching him the art of persuasion,¹ they could not but make him feel the dependence in which he stood towards those who were to be persuaded, together with the necessity under which he lay of so conducting himself as to conciliate their good-will.

The intimations given in Plato, of the enthusiastic reception which Protagoras, Prodikus, and other sophists² met with in the various cities; the description which we read, in the dialogue called Protagoras, of the impatience of the youthful Hippokratês, on hearing of the arrival of that sophist, inasmuch that he awakens Sokratês before daylight, in order to obtain an introduction to the new-comer and profit by his teaching; the readiness of such rich young men to pay money, and to devote time and trouble, for the purpose of acquiring a personal superiority apart from their wealth and station; the ardor with which Kallias is represented as employing his house for the hospitable entertainment, and his fortune for the aid, of the sophists; all this makes upon my mind an impression directly the reverse of that ironical and contemptuous phraseology with which it is set forth by Plato. Such sophists had nothing to recommend them except superior knowledge and intellectual force, combined with an imposing personality, making itself felt in their lectures and conversation. It is to this that the admiration was shown; and the fact that it was so shown, brings to

¹ See these points strikingly put by Isokratês, in the Orat. xv, De Permutatione, throughout, especially in sects 294, 297, 305, 307, and again by Xenoph. Memorab. i, 2 10, in reference to the teaching of Sokratês.

² See a striking passage in Plato's Republic, x, c, 4, p. 600, C.

view the best attributes of the Greek, especially the Athenian mind. It exhibits those qualities of which Periklês made emphatic boast in his celebrated funeral oration;¹ conception of public speech as a practical thing, not meant as an excuse for inaction, but combined with energetic action, and turning it to good account by full and open discussion beforehand; profound sensibility to the charm of manifested intellect, without enervating the powers of execution or endurance. Assuredly, a man like Protagoras, arriving in a city with all this train of admiration laid before him, must have known very little of his own interest or position, if he began to preach a low or corrupt morality. If it be true generally, as Voltaire has remarked, that "any man who should come to preach a relaxed morality would be pelted," much more would it be true of a sophist like Protagoras, arriving in a foreign city with all the prestige of a great intellectual name, and with the imagination of youths on fire to hear and converse with him, that any similar doctrine would destroy his reputation at once. Numbers of teachers have made their reputation by inculcating overstrained ascetism; it will be hard to find an example of success in the opposite vein.

CHAPTER LXVIII.

SOKRATES.

THAT the professional teachers called sophists, in Greece, were intellectual and moral corruptors, and that much corruption grew up under their teaching in the Athenian mind, are common statements, which I have endeavored to show to be erroneous. Corresponding to these statements is another, which repre-

¹ Thucyd. ii, 40. φιλοσοφούμεν ἀνευ μαλακίας — οὐ τοὺς λόγους τοῖς ἐ γοῖς βλαβὴν ἡγούμενοι — διαφερόντως δὲ καὶ τοῦδε ἔχομεν, ὥστε τοῖσιν τε αἱ εὐτοὶ μάλιστα καὶ περὶ ὧν ἐπιχειροῦμεν ἐκλογίζεσθαι.

sents Sokratēs as one whose special merit it was to have rescued the Athenian mind from such demoralizing influences; a reputation which he neither deserves nor requires. In general, the favorable interpretation of evidence, as exhibited towards Sokratēs, has been scarcely less marked than the harshness of presumption against the sophists. Of late, however, some authors have treated his history in an altered spirit, and have manifested a disposition to lower him down to that which they regard as the sophistical level. M. Forchhammer's treatise: "The Athenians and Sokratēs, or Lawful Dealing against Revolution," goes even further, and maintains confidently that Sokratēs was most justly condemned as an heretic, a traitor, and a corrupter of youth. His book, the conclusions of which I altogether reject, is a sort of retribution to the sophists, as extending to their alleged opponent the same bitter and unfair spirit of construction with that under which they have so long unjustly suffered. But when we impartially consider the evidence, it will appear that Sokratēs deserves our admiration and esteem; not, indeed, as an anti-sophist, but as combining with the qualities of a good man, a force of character and an originality of speculation as well as of method, and a power of intellectually working on others, generically different from that of any professional teacher, without parallel either among contemporaries or successors.

The life of Sokratēs comprises seventy years, from 469 to 399 B.C. His father, Sophroniskus, being a sculptor, the son began by following the same profession, in which he attained sufficient proficiency to have executed various works; especially a draped group of the Charites, or Graces, preserved in the acropolis, and shown as his work down to the time of Pausanias.¹ His mother, Phanaretē, was a mid-wife, and he had a brother by the mother's side named Patroklēs.² Respecting his wife Xanthippē, and his three sons, all that has passed into history is the violent temper of the former, and the patience of her husband in enduring it. The position and family of Sokratēs, with all being absolutely poor, were humble and unimportant but he

¹ Pausanias, i, 22, 8; ix. 35, 2.

² Plato, Euthydem. c. 24, p. 297, D.

was of genuine Attic breed, belonging to the ancient gens Dædalidæ, which took its name from Dædalus, the mythical artist as progenitor.

The personal qualities of Sokratēs, on the other hand, were marked and distinguishing, not less in body than in mind. His physical constitution was healthy, robust, and enduring, to an extraordinary degree. He was not merely strong and active as an hoplite on military service, but capable of bearing fatigue or hardship, and indifferent to heat or cold, in a measure which astonished all his companions. He went barefoot in all seasons of the year, even during the winter campaign at Potidæa, under the severe frosts of Thrace; and the same homely clothing sufficed to him for winter as well as for summer. Though his diet was habitually simple as well as abstemious, yet there were occasions, of religious festival or friendly congratulation, on which every Greek considered joviality and indulgence to be becoming. On such occasions, Sokratēs could drink more wine than any guest present, yet without being overcome or intoxicated.¹ He abstained, on principle, from all extreme gymnastic training, which required, as necessary condition, extraordinary abundance of food.² It was his professed purpose to limit, as much as possible, the number of his wants, as a distant approach to the perfection of the gods, who wanted nothing, to control such as were natural, and prevent the multiplication of any that were artificial.³ Nor can there be any doubt that his admirable

¹ See the Symposium of Plato as well as that of Xenophon, both of which profess to depict Sokratēs at one of these jovial moments. Plato, Symposium. c. 31, p. 214, A; c. 35, etc., 39, *ad finem*; Xenoph. Symp. ii, 26, where Sokratēs requests that the wine may be handed round in small glasses, but that they may succeed each other quickly, like drops of rain in a shower.

The view which Plato takes of indulgence in wine, as affording a sort of test of the comparative self-command of individuals and measuring the facility with which any man may be betrayed into folly and extravagance, and the regulation to which he proposes to submit the practice, may be seen in his treatise De Legibus, i, p. 649; ii, pp. 671-674. Compare Xenoph. Memorab. i, 2, 1; i, 6, 10.

² Xenoph. Memorab. i, 2, 4. τὸ μὲν ἐπιπεσθὶοντα ἐπερπονεῖν ἀπεδοκιμασε, etc.

³ Xenoph. Mem. i, 6, 10. Even Antisthenēs (disciple of Sokratēs, and the originator of what was called the Cynic philosophy), while he pro-

bodily temperament contributed materially to facilitate such a purpose, and assist him in the maintenance of that self-mastery, contented self-sufficiency, and independence of the favor¹ as well as of the enmity of others, which were essential to his plan of intellectual life. His friends, who communicate to us his great bodily strength and endurance, are at the same time full of jests upon his ugly physiognomy; his flat nose, thick lips, and prominent eyes, like a satyr, or silen². Nor can we implicitly trust the evidence of such very admiring witnesses, as to the philosopher's exemption from infirmities of temper; for there seems good proof that he was by natural temperament violently irascible; a defect which he generally kept under severe control, but which occasionally betrayed him into great improprieties of language and demeanor.³

Of those friends, the best known to us are Xenophon and Plato, though there existed in antiquity various dialogues com-

nounced virtue to be self-sufficient for conferring happiness, was obliged to add that the strength and vigor of Sokratês were required as a farther condition: *αὐτάρκη τὴν ἀρετὴν πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν, μηδενὸς προσδεομένην ὅτι μὴ τῆς Σωκρατικῆς ἰσχύος*; Winckelman, Antisthen. Fragment. p. 47; Diog. Laërt. vi, 11.

¹ See his reply to the invitation of Archelaus, king of Macedonia, indicating the repugnance to accept favors which he could not return (Aristot. Rhetor. ii, 24).

² Plato, Sympos. c. 32, p. 215, A; Xenoph. Sympos. c. 5; Plato, Theætet. p. 143, D.

³ This is one of the traditions which Aristoxenus, the disciple of Aristotle, heard from his father Spintharus, who had been in personal communication with Sokratês. See the Fragments of Aristoxenus. Fragm. 27, 28; ap. Frag. Hist. Græc. p. 280, ed. Didot.

It appears to me that Frag. 28 contains the statement of what Aristoxenus really said about the irascibility of Sokratês; while the expressions of Fragm. 27, ascribed to that author by Plutarch, are unmeasured.

Fragm. 28 also substantially contradicts Fragm. 26, in which Diogenes asserts, on the authority of Aristoxenus, — what is not to be believed, even if Aristoxenus had asserted it, — that Sokratês made a regular trade of his teaching, and collected perpetual contributions. see Xenoph. Memor. i, 2, 6; i, 5, 6.

I see no reason for the mistrust with which Preller (Hist. Philosophie, c. v, p. 139) and Ritter (Geschich. d. Philos. vol. ii, ch. 2, p. 11) regard the general testimony of Aristoxenus about Sokratês.

posed, and memoranda put together, by other hearers of Sokratês, respecting his conversations and teaching, which are all now lost.¹ The "Memorabilia" of Xenophon profess to record actual conversations held by Sokratês, and are prepared with the announced purpose of vindicating him against the accusations of Melêtus and his other accusers on the trial, as well as against unfavorable opinions, seemingly much circulated respecting his character and purposes. We thus have in it a sort of partial biography, subject to such deductions from its evidentiary value as may be requisite for imperfection of memory, intentional decoration, and partiality. On the other hand, the purpose of Plato, in the numerous dialogues wherein he introduces Sokratês, is not so clear, and is explained very differently by different commentators. Plato was a great speculative genius, who came to form opinions of his own distinct from those of Sokratês, and employed the name of the latter as spokesman for these opinions in various dialogues. How much, in the Platonic Sokratês, can be safely accepted either as a picture of the man or as a record of his opinions, — how much, on the other hand, is to be treated as Platonism; or in what proportions the two are intermingled, — is a point not to be decided with certainty or rigor. The "Apology of Sokratês," the "Kriton," and the "Phædon," — in so far as it is a moral picture, and apart from the doctrines advocated in it, — appear to belong to the first category; while the political and social views of the "Republic" and of the treatise "De Legibus," the cosmic theories in the "Timæus," and the hypothesis of Ideas, as substantive existences apart from the phenomenal world, in the various dialogues wherever it is stated, certainly belong to the second. Of the ethical dialogues, much

¹ Xenophon (Mem. i, 4, 1) alludes to several such biographers, or collectors of anecdotes about Sokratês. Yet it would seem that most of these *Socratici viri* (Cicero, ad Attic. xiv, 9, 1) did not collect anecdotes or conversations of the master, after the manner of Xenophon; but composed dialogues, manifesting more or less of his method and *hêθος*, after the type of Plato. Simon the leather-cutter, however, took memoranda of conversations held by Sokratês in his shop, and published several dialogues purporting to be such. (Diog. Laert. ii, 123.) The *Socratici viri* are generally praised by Cicero (Tus. D. ii, 3, 8) for the elegance of their style.

may be probably taken to represent Sokratēs, more or less Platonized.

But though the opinions put by Plato into the mouth of Sokratēs are liable to thus much of uncertainty, we find, to our great satisfaction, that the pictures given by Plato and Xenophon of their common master are in the main accordant; differing only as drawn from the same original by two authors radically different in spirit and character. Xenophon, the man of action, brings out at length those conversations of Sokratēs which had a bearing on practical conduct, and were calculated to correct vice or infirmity in particular individuals; such being the matter which served his purpose as an apologist, at the same time that it suited his intellectual taste. But he intimates, nevertheless, very plainly, that the conversation of Sokratēs was often, indeed usually, of a more negative, analytical, and generalizing tendency; not destined for the reproof of positive or special defect, but to awaken the inquisitive faculties and lead to the rational comprehension of vice and virtue as referable to determinate general principles. Now this latter side of the master's physiognomy, which Xenophon records distinctly, though without emphasis or development, acquires almost exclusive prominence in the Platonic picture. Plato leaves out the practical, and consecrates himself to the theoretical Sokratēs; whom he divests in part of his identity, in order to enrol him as chief speaker in certain larger theoretical views of his own. The two pictures, therefore, do not contradict each other, but mutually supply each other's defects, and admit of being blended into one consistent whole. And respecting the method of Sokrates, a point more characteristic than either his precepts or his theory, — as well as respecting the effect of that method on the minds of hearers, — both Xenophon and Plato are witnesses substantially in unison: though, here again, the latter has made the method his own,

¹ Xenophon, Memor. i. 1, 16. Αὐτός δὲ περὶ τῶν ἀνδρωπεύων ἀεὶ διελέγετο, σκοπῶν, τι εὐσεβές, τι ἄσεβές, τι καλόν, τι αἰσχρόν, τί δίκαιον, τί ἀδίκον, τι ἀνδρία, τι δειλία, τι σωφροσύνη, τι μανία, τι πολυς, τι πολιτικός, τι ἀρχὴ ἀνθρώπων, τι ἀρχικὸς ἀνθρώπων, &c.

Compare i. 2, 50; iii. 8, 3, 4; iii. 9; iv. 4, 5; iv. 6, 1. σκοπῶν σὲ τοὺς ἐννοῦσι, τί ἕκαστον εἴη τῶν διτῶν, οὐδέποτε ἐληγε.

worked it out on a scale of enlargement and perfection, and given to it a permanence which it could never have derived from its original author, who only talked and never wrote. It is fortunate that our two main witnesses about him, both speaking from personal knowledge, agree to so great an extent.

Both describe in the same manner his private life and habits; his contented poverty, justice, temperance in the largest sense of the word, and self-sufficing independence of character. On most of these points too, Aristophanēs and the other comic writers, so far as their testimony counts for anything, appear as confirmatory witnesses; for they abound in jests on the coarse fare, shabby and scanty clothing, bare feet, pale face, poor and joyless life, of Sokratēs.¹ Of the circumstances of his life we are almost wholly ignorant: he served as an hoplite at Potidæa, at Delium, and at Amphipolis; with credit apparently in all, though exaggerated encomiums on the part of his friends provoked an equally exaggerated skepticism on the part of Athenæus and others. He seems never to have filled any political office until the year (B.C. 406) in which the battle of Arginusæ occurred, in which year he was member of the senate of Five Hundred, and one of the prytanes on that memorable day when the proposition of Kallixenus against the six generals was submitted to the public assembly: his determined refusal, in spite of all personal hazard, to put an unconstitutional question to the vote, has been already recounted. That during his long life he strictly obeyed the laws,² is proved by the fact that none of his numerous enemies ever arraigned him before a court of justice: that he discharged all the duties of an upright man and a brave as well as pious citizen, may also be confidently asserted. His friends lay special stress upon his piety; that is, upon his exact discharge

¹ Aristoph. Nubes, 105, 121, 362, 414; Aves, 1282; Eupolis, Fragment. Incert. ix, x, xi. ap. Meineke, p. 552; Ameipsias, Fragmenta, Konnus, p. 763, Meineke; Diogen. Laërt. ii. 28.

The later comic writers ridiculed the Pythagoreans, as well as Zeno the Stoic, on grounds very similar: see Diogenes Laërt. vii. 1. 24.

² Plato, Apol. Sokr. c. 1. Νῦν γὰρ πρῶτον ἐπὶ δικαστηρίῳ ἀναβέβηκα ἐν γέλωτι πλείῳ ἐξομῶντα.

of all the religious duties considered as incumbent upon an Athenian.¹

Though these points are requisite to be established, in order that we may rightly interpret the character of Sokratēs, it is not from them that he has derived his eminent place in history. Three peculiarities distinguish the man. 1. His long life passed in contented poverty, and in public, apostolic dialectics. 2. His strong religious persuasion, or belief, of acting under a mission and signs from the gods; especially his dæmon, or genius; the special religious warning of which he believed himself to be frequently the subject. 3. His great intellectual originality, both of subject and of method, and his power of stirring and forcing the germ of inquiry and ratiocination in others. Though these three characteristics were so blended in Sokratēs that it is not easy to consider them separately; yet, in each respect, he stood distinguished from all Greek philosophers before or after him.

At what time Sokratēs relinquished his profession as a statuary we do not know; but it is certain that all the middle and later part of his life, at least, was devoted exclusively to the self-imposed task of teaching; excluding all other business, public or private, and to the neglect of all means of fortune. We can hardly avoid speaking of him as a teacher, though he himself disclaimed the appellation:² his practice was to talk or converse, or to *prattle without end*,³ if we translate the derisory word by which the enemies of philosophy described dialectic conversation. Early in the morning he frequented the public walks, the gymnasia for bodily training, and the schools where youths were receiving instruction: he was to be seen in the market-place at the hour when it was most crowded, among the booths and tables where goods were exposed for sale: his whole day was usually spent in this

¹ Xenoph. Memor. i, 1, 2-20; i, 3, 1-3.

² Plato, Apol. Sokr. c. 21, p. 33, A. ἐγὼ δὲ διδασκαλὸς μὲν οὐδένος πώποτε ἐγενομην: compare c. 4, p. 19, E.

Xenoph. Memor. iii, 11, 16. Sokratēs ἐπισκοπτῶν τὴν ἑαυτοῦ ἰσχυρὰν νοσοῦντην; Plat. Ap. Sok. c. 18, p. 31, B.

³ Ἀδολέσχειν, see Ruhnken's Animadversiones in Xenoph. Memor. p. 293, of Schneider's edition of that treatise. Compare Plato, Sophistēs, c. 23, p. 225, E.

public manner.¹ He talked with any one, young or old, rich or poor, who sought to address him, and in the hearing of all who chose to stand by: not only he never either asked or received any reward, but he made no distinction of persons, never withheld his conversation from any one, and talked upon the same general topics to all. He conversed with ponticians, sophists, military men, artisans, ambitious or studious youths, etc. He visited all persons of interest in the city, male or female: his friendship with Aspasia is well known, and one of the most interesting chapters² of Xenophon's Memorabilia recounts his visit to and dialogue with Theodotē, a beautiful hetæra, or female companion. Nothing could be more public, perpetual, and indiscriminate as to persons than his conversation. But as it was engaging, curious, and instructive to hear, certain persons made it their habit to attend him in public as companions and listeners. These men, a fluctuating body, were commonly known as his disciples, or scholars; though neither he nor his personal friends ever employed the terms *teacher* and *disciple* to describe the relation between them.³ Many of them came, attracted by his reputation,

¹ Xenoph. Mem. i, 1, 10; Plato, Apol. Sok. l, p. 17, D; 18, p. 31, A. οἷον δὲ μοι δοκεῖ ὁ θεὸς ἰμὲ τῇ πόλει προστεθεικέναι τοιοῦτόν τινα, ὃς ὑμᾶς ἐγείρων καὶ πείθων, καὶ ὀνειδίζων ἕνα ἕκαστον, οὐδὲν παύομαι, τὴν ἡμέραν δὲ πᾶντα χρόνῳ προσκαθίζων.

² Xen. Mem. iii, 11.

³ Xenophon in his Memorabilia speaks always of the *companions* of Sokratēs, not of his *disciples*: οἱ συνόντες αὐτῷ — οἱ συννοσίσασται (i, 6, 1) — οἱ συνδιατρίβοντες — οἱ συζητούντες — οἱ ἑταῖροι — οἱ ὁμιλοῦντες αὐτῷ — οἱ συνήθεις (iv, 8, 2) — οἱ μετ' αὐτοῦ (iv, 2, 1) — οἱ ἐπιθύμητα. (i, 2, 60). Aristippus also, in speaking to Plato, talked of Sokratēs as ὁ ἑταῖρος ἡμῶν; Aristot. Rhetor. ii, 24. His enemies spoke of his *disciples*, in an invidious sense; Plato, Ap. Sok. c. 21, p. 33, A.

It is not to be believed that any companions can have made frequent visits, either from Megara and Thebes, to Sokratēs at Athens, during the last years of the war, before the capture of Athens in 404 B.C. And in point of fact, the passage of the Platonic Theætetus represents Eukleidēs of Megara as alluding to his conversations with Sokratēs only a short time before the death of the latter (Plato, Theætetus, c. 2, p. 142, E). The story given by Aulus Gellius — that Eukleidēs came to visit Sokratēs by night, in women's clothes, from Megara to Athens — seems to me an absurdity, though Deycks (De Megaricarum Doctrinā, p. 5) is inclined to believe it.

during the later years of his life, from other Grecian cities; **Me-**
gara, Thebes, Elis, Kyrênê, etc.

Now no other person in Athens, or in any other Grecian city, appears ever to have manifested himself in this perpetual and indiscriminate manner as a public talker for instruction. All teachers either took money for their lessons, or at least gave them apart from the multitude in a private house or garden, to special pupils, with admissions and rejections at their own pleasure. By the peculiar mode of life which Sokratês pursued, not only his conversation reached the minds of a much wider circle, but he became more abundantly known as a person. While acquiring a few attached friends and admirers, and raising a certain intellectual interest in others, he at the same time provoked a large number of personal enemies. This was probably the reason why he was selected by Aristophanês and the other comic writers, to be attacked as a general representative of philosophical and rhetorical teaching; the more so, as his marked and repulsive physiognomy admitted so well of being imitated in the mask which the actor wore. The audience at the theatre would more readily recognize the peculiar figure which they were accustomed to see every day in the market-place, than if Prodikus or Protagoras, whom most of them did not know by sight, had been brought on the stage; nor was it of much importance, either to them or to Aristophanês, whether Sokratês was represented as teaching what he did really teach, or something utterly different.

This extreme publicity of life and conversation was one among the characteristics of Sokratês, distinguishing him from all teachers either before or after him. Next, was his persuasion of a special religious mission, restraints, impulses, and communications, sent to him by the gods. Taking the belief in such supernatural intervention generally, it was indeed noway peculiar to Sokratês: it was the ordinary faith of the ancient world; insomuch that the attempts to resolve phenomena into general laws were looked upon with a certain disapprobation, as indirectly setting it aside. And Xenophon¹ accordingly avails himself of this general fact, in replying to the indictment for religious innovation, of which

¹ Xenoph. Mem. i, 1, 2, 3.

his master was found guilty, to affirm that the latter pretended to nothing beyond what was included in the creed of every pious man. But this is not an exact statement of the matter in debate; for it slurs over at least, if it does not deny, that speciality of inspiration from the gods, which those who talked with Sokratês — as we learn even from Xenophon — believed, and which Sokratês himself believed also.¹ Very different is his own representation, as put forth in the defence before the dikastery. He had been accustomed constantly to hear, even from his childhood, a divine voice, interfering, at moments when he was about to act, in the way of restraint, but never in the way of instigation. Such prohibitory warning was wont to come upon him very frequently, not merely on great, but even on small occasions, intercepting what he was about to do or to say.² Though later writers speak

¹ See the conversation of Sokratês (reported by Xenophon, Mem. i, 4, 15) with Aristodemus, respecting the gods. "What will be sufficient to persuade you (asks Sokratês) that the gods care about you?" "When they send me special monitors, as you say that they do to you (replies Aristodemus); to tell me what to do, and what not to do." To which Sokratês replied, that they answer the questions of the Athenians, by replies of the oracle, and that they send prodigies (τερατα) by way of information to the Greeks generally. He further advises Aristodemus to pay assiduous court (θιαραπειαν) to the gods, in order to see whether they will not send him monitorial information about doubtful events (i, 4, 18).

So again in his conversation with Euthydemus, the latter says to him: Σοι δὲ, ὦ Σωκράτης, τοίκασιν ἐστὶ φιλικώτερον ἢ τοῖς ἄλλοις χρῆσθαι, οἷός γε μὴδε ἐπιρωτώμενοι ὑπὸ σοῦ προσημαινόμενοι, ἅτε χρῆ ποιεῖν καὶ ἀμῇ (iv, 3, 12).

Compare i, 1, 19; and iv, 8, 11, where this perpetual communication and advice from the gods is employed as an evidence to prove the superior piety of Sokratês.

² Plato, Ap. Sok. c. 19, p. 31, D. Τούτου δὲ αἰτίον ἐστίν (that is, the reason why Sokratês had never entered on public life) ὁ ὕμεις ἐμοὶ πολλὰκις ἀκηκόατε πολλὰχον λεγόντος, ὅτι μοι θεῖόν τι καὶ δαίμονιον γίγνεται, ὃ δὴ καὶ ἐν τῇ γραφῇ ἐπικωμῶδων Μελήτος ἐγράψατο. Εὐοὶ δὲ τοῦτ' ἐστίν ἐκ παιδὸς ἀξιαμένον, φωνὴ τις γιγνομένη, ἥ δταν γένηται, αὐτὴ ἀποτρέπει με τοῦτον ὃ ἐν πολλῷ πρᾶττειν, προτρέπει δὲ οὐποτε. Τοῦτ' ἐστὶν ὃ μοι ἐναγίζονται τὰ πολιτικά πρᾶττειν.

Again, c. 31, p. 40, A. he tells the dikasts, after his condemnation: Ἡ γὰρ εἰσθὲν μοι μαντικὴ ἢ τὸν δαίμονιον ἐν μὲν τῷ προσθεῖν χρόνῳ παντὶ παννυκνὴ ἄει ἦν καὶ παννυκτὶ ἐπὶ μικροῖς ἐναγίζον κερνῇ, εἰ τι μέλλοιμι μὴ ὀρθῶς πράξαι. Νῦν δὲ συμβεβηκε

of this as the daemon or genius of Sokratēs, he himself does not personify it, but treats it merely as a "divine sign, a prophetic or supernatural voice."¹ He was accustomed not only to obey it implicitly, but to speak of it publicly and familiarly to others, so that the fact was well known both to his friends and to his enemies. It had always forbidden him to enter on public life; it forbade him, when the indictment was hanging over him, to take any thought for a prepared defence;² and so completely did he march with a consciousness of this bridle in his mouth, that when he felt no check, he assumed that the turning which he was about to take was the right one. Though his persuasion on the subject was unquestionably sincere, and his obedience constant, yet he never dwelt upon it himself as anything grand, or awful, or entitling him to peculiar deference; but spoke of it often in his usual strain of familiar playfulness. To his friends generally, it seems to have constituted one of his titles to reverence, though neither Plato nor Xenophon scruple to talk of it in that jesting

τοι, ἀπερ ὁρᾶτε καὶ αὐτοὶ, ταῦτ', ἃ γε δὴ οἰηθεὶς ἂν τις καὶ νομιζέται ἐσχάτα κακῶν εἶναι. Ἐμοὶ δὲ οὐτε ἐξίστημι βωθὲν οἰκόνειν ἡναντιώσθῃ τὸ τοῦ θεοῦ σημεῖον, οὐτε ἡμῶν ἀνβαίνον ἐνταυθοὶ ἐπὶ τὸ δικαστήριον οὐτ' ἐν τῷ λόγῳ μέλλοντι τι ἐρεῖν· καί τοι ἐν ἀλλοῖς λόγοις πολλαχόθεν δὴ μεῖσε λέγοντα μεταξὺ.

He goes on to infer that his line of defence has been right, and that his condemnation is no misfortune to him, but a benefit, seeing that the sign has not manifested itself.

I agree in the opinion of Schleiermacher (in his Preface to his translation of the Apology of Sokratēs, part i, vol. ii, p. 185, of his general translation of Plato's works), that this defence may be reasonably taken as a reproduction by Plato of what Sokratēs actually said to the dikasts on his trial. In addition to the reasons given by Schleiermacher there is one which may be noticed. Sokratēs predicts to the dikasts that, if they put him to death, a great number of young men will forthwith put themselves forward to take up the vocation of cross-questioning, who will give them more trouble than he has ever done (Plat. Ap. Sok. c. 30, p. 39, D). Now there is no reason to believe that this prediction was realized. If, therefore, Plato puts an erroneous prophecy into the mouth of Sokratēs, this is probably because Sokratēs really made one.

¹ The words of Sokratēs plainly indicate this meaning: see also a good note of Schleiermacher, appended to his translation of the Platonic Apology, Platons Werke, part i, vol. ii, p. 432.

² Xenoph. Mem. iv. 8, 5.

way which doubtless they caught from himself.¹ But to his enemies and to the Athenian public, it appeared in the light of an offensive heresy; an impious innovation on the orthodox creed, and a desertion of the recognized gods of Athens.

Such was the daemon or genius of Sokratēs, as described by himself and as conceived in the genuine Platonic dialogues; a voice always prohibitory, and bearing exclusively upon his own personal conduct.² That which Plutarch and other admirers of Sokratēs conceived as a daemon, or intermediate being between gods and men, was looked upon by the fathers of the Christian church as a devil; by LeClerc, as one of the fallen angels; by some other modern commentators, as mere ironical phraseology on the part of Sokratēs himself.³ Without presuming to determine the question raised in the former hypotheses, I believe the last to be untrue, and that the conviction of Sokratēs on the point was quite sincere. A circumstance little attended to, but deserving peculiar notice, and stated by himself, is, that the restraining voice began when he was a child, and continued even down to the end of his life: it had thus become an established persuasion, long before his philosophical habits began. But though this peculiar form of inspiration belonged exclusively to him, there were

¹ Xenoph. Sympos. viii, 5; Plato, Euthydem. c. 5, p. 272, E.

² See Plato (Theatet. c. 7, p. 151, A; Phædrus, c. 20, p. 242, C; Republic, vi, 10, p. 496, C) — in addition to the above citations from the Apology.

The passage in the Euthyphron (c. 2, p. 3, B) is somewhat less specific. The Pseudo-Platonic dialogue, Theagēs, retains the strictly prohibitory attribute of the voice, as never in any case impelling; but extends the range of the warning, as if it was heard in cases not simply personal to Sokratēs himself, but referring to the conduct of his friends also (Theagēs, c. 11, 12, pp. 128, 129).

Xenophon also neglects the specific attributes, and conceives the voice generally as a divine communication with instruction and advice to Sokratēs, so that he often prophesied to his friends, and was always right (Memor. i, 1, 2-4; iv, 8, 1).

³ See Dr. Forster's note on the Euthyphron of Plato, c. 2, p. 3.

The treatise of Plutarch (De Genio Socratis) is full of speculation on the subject, but contains nothing about it which can be relied upon as matter of fact. There are various stories about prophecies made by Sokratēs, and verified by the event, c. 11, p. 582.

See also this matter discussed, with abundant references, in Zeller Philosophie der Griechen, v. ii, pp. 25-28.

also other ways in which he believed himself to have received the special mandates of the gods, not simply checking him when he was about to take a wrong turn, but spurring him on, directing, and peremptorily exacting from him, a positive course of proceeding. Such distinct mission had been imposed upon him by dreams, by oracular intimations, and by every other means which the gods employed for signifying their special will.¹

Of these intimations from the oracle, he specifies particularly one, in reply to a question put at Delphi, by his intimate friend, and enthusiastic admirer, Chærephon. The question put was, whether any other man was wiser than Sokratès; to which the Pythian priestess replied, that no other man was wiser.² Sokratès affirms that he was greatly perplexed on hearing this declaration from so infallible an authority, being conscious to himself that he possessed no wisdom on any subject, great or small. At length, after much meditation and a distressing mental struggle, he resolved to test the accuracy of the infallible priestess, by taking measure of the wisdom of others as compared with his own. Selecting a leading politician, accounted wise both by others and by himself, he proceeded to converse with him and put scrutinizing questions; the answers to which satisfied him that this man's supposed wisdom was really no wisdom at all. Having made such a discovery, Sokratès next tried to demonstrate to the politician himself how much he wanted of being wise; but this was impossible; the latter still remained as fully persuaded of his own wisdom as before. "The result which I acquired (says Sokratès) was, that I was a wiser man than he, for neither he nor I knew anything of what was truly good and honorable; but the difference between us was, that he fancied he knew them, while I was fully conscious of my own ignorance; I was thus wiser than he, inasmuch as I was exempt from that capital error." So far, therefore, the oracle was proved to be right.

¹ Plato, Ap. Sok. c. 22, p. 33. C. Ἐπεὶ δὲ τοῦτο, ὡς ἔγω φημι, προστίθεται ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ πράττειν καὶ ἐκ μαντείων καὶ ἐξ ἐνυπνίων, καὶ παντὶ τρόπῳ, ὥπὲρ τίς ποτε καὶ ἄλλη θεία μοῖρα ἀνθρώπου καὶ ὁτιοῦν προσέταξε πράττειν.

² Plato, Apol. Sok. c. 5, p. 21, A. Sokratès offers to produce the testimony of the brother of Chærephon, the latter himself being dead, to attest the reality of this question and answer.

Sokratès repeated the same experiment successively upon a great number of different persons, especially those in reputation for distinguished abilities; first, upon political men and rhetors, next upon poets of every variety, and upon artists as well as artisans. The result of his trial was substantially the same in all cases. The poets, indeed, composed splendid verses, but when questioned even about the words, the topics, and the purpose, of their own compositions, they could give no consistent or satisfactory explanations; so that it became evident that they spoke or wrote, like prophets, as unconscious subjects under the promptings of inspiration. Moreover, their success as poets filled them with a lofty opinion of their own wisdom on other points also. The case was similar with artists and artisans; who, while highly instructed, and giving satisfactory answers, each in his own particular employment, were for that reason only the more convinced that they also knew well other great and noble subjects. This great general mistake more than countervailed their special capacities, and left them, on the whole, less wise than Sokratès.¹

"In this research and scrutiny (said Sokratès, on his defence) I have been long engaged, and am still engaged. I interrogate every man of reputation; I prove him to be defective in wisdom; but I cannot prove it so as to make him sensible of the defect. Fulfilling the mission imposed upon me, I have thus established the veracity of the god, who meant to pronounce that human wisdom was of little reach or worth; and that he who, like Sokratès, felt most convinced of his own worthlessness, as to wisdom, was really the wisest of men.² My service to the god has not only constrained me to live in constant poverty³ and neglect of political estimation, but has brought upon me a host

¹ Plato, Ap. Sok. c. 7, §. p. 22.

² Plato, Ap. Sok. c. 9, p. 23. I give here the sense rather than the exact words: Οὗτος γὰρ σοφώτατος ἐστίν, ὅστις ὡς περ Σωκράτης ἐνόηκεν ὅτι σοφίαν ἔχειν ἐστὶ τῇ ἀληθείᾳ πρὸς σοφίαν.

Ταῦτ' ἐγὼ μὲν ἐπὶ καὶ νῦν περιῶν ζητῶ καὶ ἐρευνῶ κατὰ τὸν θεόν, καὶ τῶν ἀσάν καὶ τῶν ξένων ἂν τίνα οἶμαι σοφόν εἶναι καὶ ἐπιδαν μοι μὴ δοκῇ τῷ θεῷ δοῆθ' ὅτι ἐνδεκάμηναι ὅτι οὐκ ἐστὶ σοφός.

³ Plato, Ap. Sok. c. 9, p. 23, A-C.

ἐν πείρᾳ ἀντὶ εἶμι, διὰ τὴν τοῦ θεοῦ εὐτρεσίαν.

of bitter enemies in those whom I have examined and exposed while the bystanders talk of me as a wise man, because they give me credit for wisdom respecting all the points on which my exposure of others turns." — "Whatever be the danger and obloquy which I may incur, it would be monstrous indeed, if, having maintained my place in the ranks as an hoplite under your generals at Delium and Potidæa, I were now, from fear of death or anything else, to disobey the oracle and desert the post which the god has assigned to me, the duty of living for philosophy and cross-questioning both myself and others.¹ And should you even now offer to acquit me, on condition of my renouncing this duty, I should tell you, with all respect and affection, that I will obey the god rather than you, and that I will persist, until my dying day, in cross-questioning you, exposing your want of wisdom and virtue, and reproaching you until the defect be remedied.² My mission as your monitor is a mark of the special favor of the god to you; and if you condemn me, it will be your loss; for you will find none other such.³ Perhaps you will ask me, Why cannot you go away, Sokratēs, and live among us in peace and silence? This is the hardest of all questions for me to answer to your satisfaction. If I tell you that silence on my part would be disobedience to the god, you will think me in jest, and not believe me. You will believe me still less, if I tell you that the greatest blessing which can happen to man is, to carry on discussions every day about virtue and those other matters which you hear me canvassing when I cross-examine myself as well as others; and that life, without such examination, is no life at all. Nevertheless, so stands the fact, incredible as it may seem to you."⁴

¹ Plato Ap. Sok. c. 17, p. 29. Τοῦ δὲ θ. οὗ τὰ τριτάτα, ὡς ἔγωγε ὤθην καὶ ἐπιλάθων, φιλοσοφοῦντά με δεῖν εἶναι, καὶ ἐξετάζοντα ἑαυτὸν καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους, ἐνταῦθα δὲ φοβηθεὶς ἢ θάνατον ἢ ἄλλο ὅτιον πρᾶγμα λίσσασθαι τὴν ταξίν.

² Plato, Ap. Sok. c. 17, p. 29, C.

³ Plato, Ap. Sok. c. 18, p. 30, D.

⁴ Plato, Ap. Sok. c. 28, p. 38, A. Ἐάν τε γὰρ λέγω, ὅτι τῷ θεῷ ἀπειθεῖν τοῦτ' ἐστὶ, καὶ διὰ τοῦτ' ἀδύνατον ἡσυχίαν ἄγειν, οὐ πείσεσθαι μοι ὡς ἱππαινομένην· εἴαν τ' αὖ λέγω ὅτι καὶ τυγχάνει μέγιστον ἄγαθον ὅν ἀνθρώπῳ τοιοῦτο, ἐκάστης ἡμέρας περὶ ἀρετῆς τοὺς λόγους ποιεῖσθαι καὶ τῶν ἄλλων, περὶ οἷς ὑμεῖς ἐμοῦ ἀκούετε διαλεγόμενον καὶ ἑαυτὸν καὶ ἄλλους ἐξετάζοντος — ὃ δὲ ἀνέχεται τὸς βίος οὐ βιωτὸς ἀνθρώπῳ (these last striking words are selected

I have given rather ample extracts from the Platonic Apology, because no one can conceive fairly the character of Sokratēs who does not enter into the spirit of that impressive discourse. We see in it plain evidence of the marked supernatural mission which he believed himself to be executing, and which would not allow him to rest or employ himself in other ways. The oracular answer brought by Chærephon from Delphi, was a fact of far more importance in his history than his so-called dæmon, about which so much more has been said. That answer, together with the dreams and other divine mandates concurrent to the same end, came upon him in the middle of his life, when the intellectual man was formed, and when he had already acquired a reputation for wisdom among those who knew him. It supplied a stimulus which brought into the most pronounced action a pre-existing train of generalizing dialectics and Zenonian negation, an intellectual vein with which the religious impulse rarely comes into confluence. Without such a motive, to which his mind was peculiarly susceptible, his conversation would probably have taken the same general turn, but would assuredly have been restricted within much narrower and more cautious limits. For nothing could well be more unpopular and obnoxious than the task which he undertook of cross-examining, and convicting of ignorance, every distinguished man whom he could approach. So violent, indeed, was the enmity which he occasionally provoked, that there were instances, we are told, in which he was struck or maltreated,¹ and very frequently laughed to scorn. Though he acquired much admiration from auditors, especially youthful auditors, and from a few devoted adherents, yet the philosophical motive alone would not have sufficed to prompt him to that systematic, and even obtrusive, cross-examination which he adopted as the business of his life.

This, then, is the second peculiarity which distinguishes Sokratēs, in addition to his extreme public life and indiscriminate conversation. He was not simply a philosopher, but a religious missionary doing the work of philosophy; "an elench-

by Dr. Hutcheson, as the motto for his *Synopsis Philosophiæ Moraliæ*) — αὐτὰ δὲ ἐτι ἥττον πείσεσθαι μοι λέγουσι.

¹ Diogen. Laert. ii. 2.

tic,—or cross-examining god,—to use an expression which Plato puts into his mouth respecting an Eleatic philosopher going about to examine and convict the infirm in reason.¹ Nothing of this character belonged either to Parmenides and Anaxagoras before him, or to Plato and Aristotle after him. Both Pythagoras and Empedoklēs did, indeed, lay claim to supernatural communications, mingled with their philosophical teaching. But though there be thus far a general analogy between them and Sokratēs, the modes of manifestation were so utterly different, that no fair comparison can be instituted.

The third and most important characteristic of Sokratēs — that, through which the first and second became operative — was his intellectual peculiarity. His influence on the speculative mind of his age was marked and important; as to subject, as to method, and as to doctrine.

He was the first who turned his thoughts and discussions distinctly to the subject of ethics. With the philosophers who preceded him, the subject of examination had been Nature, or the *Kosmos*,² as one undistinguishable whole, blending together cosmogony, astronomy, geometry, physics, metaphysics, etc. The Ionic as well as the Eleatic philosophers, Pythagoras as well as Empedoklēs, all set before themselves this vast and undefined problem; each framing some system suited to his own vein of imagination; religious, poetical, scientific, or skeptical. According to that honorable ambition for enlarged knowledge, however, which marked the century following 480 B.C., and of which the professional men called sophists were at once the products and the instruments, arithmetic, geometry, and astronomy, as much as was then known, were becoming so far detached sciences as to

¹ Plato, *Sophistēs*, c. I, p. 216, the expression is applied to the Eleatic stranger, who sustains the chief part in that dialogue. Ταχ' ἄν σὺ καὶ σοὶ ταῦτα οὕτως τῶν κοινῶν συνεταῖα φαίνοις ἡμῶς ὅτις ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ἐποφύμενος καὶ ἐλεγεῖν. Θέλει δὲ αὖτις ἐλεγεῖν ἑκός.

² Xenoph. *Mem.* i. 1, 11. Οὐδὲ γὰρ περὶ τῆς τῶν πάντων φύσεως, ἥπερ τῶν ἄλλων οἱ πλείστοι, δεξιότατον, τὰς ὁπῶν ὁπῶν ὁ καλούμενος ὑπὸ τῶν σοφιστῶν *Kosmos* ἔχει, etc.

Plato, *Phædon*, c. 45, p. 96, B. πρὸς τῆς φύσεως, ἢ δὲ καλοῦσι περὶ αὐσίων, ἵστασιν.

be taught separately to youth. Such appears to have been the state of science when Sokratēs received his education. He received at least the ordinary amount of instruction in all:¹ he devoted himself as a young man to the society and lessons of the physical philosopher Archelaus,² the disciple of Anaxagoras, whom he accompanied from Athens to Samos; and there is even reason to believe that, during the earlier part of his life, he was much devoted to what was then understood as the general study of Nature.³ A man of his earnest and active intellect was likely first to manifest his curiosity as a learner: "to run after and track the various discourses of others, like a Laconian hound," if I may borrow an expression applied to him by Plato,⁴ before he

¹ Xenoph. *Memor.* iv, 7, 3-5.

² Ion, Chios, *Fragm.* 9. ap. Didot. *Fragm. Historic. Græcor.* Diogen. Laërt. ii, 16-19.

Ritter (*Gesch. der Philos.* vol. ii, ch. 2, p. 19) calls in question the assertion that Sokratēs received instruction from Archelaus; in my judgment, without the least reason, since Ion of Chios is a good contemporary witness. He even denies that Sokratēs received any instruction in philosophy at all, on the authority of a passage in the *Symposium* of Xenophon, where Sokratēs is made to speak of himself as ἡμᾶς δὲ ὅπως αὐτοῦργους τινας τῆς φιλοσοφίας ὄντας (1. 5). But it appears to me that that expression implies nothing more than a sneering antithesis, so frequent both in Plato and Xenophon, with the costly lessons given by Protagoras, Gorgias, and Prodikus. It cannot be understood to deny instruction given to Sokratēs in the earlier portion of his life.

³ I think that the expression in Plato's *Phædo*, c. 102, p. 96, A, applies to Sokratēs himself, and not to Plato: τὰ γὰρ ἐμὰ πάθη, means the mental tendencies of Sokratēs when a young man.

Respecting the physical studies probably sought and cultivated by Sokratēs in the earlier years of his life, see the instructive *Dissertation* of Tychsen, *Ueber den Prozess des Sokratēs*, in the *Bibliothek der Alten Literatur und Kunst*; Erstes Stück, p. 43.

⁴ Plato, *Parmenid.* p. 128, C. καὶ τοὶ ὥσπερ γὰρ αἱ Λακωναὶ σκύλακες, εἰ μὲν παῖδες καὶ ἰσχυρὸς τὰ χεῖρ' ἔχει, etc.

Whether Sokratēs can be properly said to have been the pupil of Anaxagoras and Archelaus, is a question of little moment, which hardly merited the skepticism of Bayle (*Anaxagoras*, note R; *Archelaus*, note A: compare Schänbach, *Anaxagoræ Fragmenta*, pp. 23, 27). That he would seek to acquaint himself with their doctrines, and improve himself by communicating personally with them, is a matter so probable, that the slenderest testimony suffices to make us believe it. Moreover, as I have before

struck out any novelties of his own. And in Plato's dialogue called "Parmenidès," Sokratès appears as a young man full of ardor for the discussion of the Parmenidean theory, looking up with reverence to Parmenidès and Zeno, and receiving from them instructions in the process of dialectical investigation. I have already, in the preceding chapter,¹ noted the tenor of that dialogue, as illustrating the way in which Grecian philosophy presents itself, even at the first dawn of dialectics, as at once negative and positive, recognizing the former branch of method no less than the latter as essential to the attainment of truth. I construe it as an indication respecting the early mind of Sokratès, imbibing this conviction from the ancient Parmenidès and the mature and practised Zeno, and imposing upon himself, as a condition of assent to any hypothesis or doctrine, the obligation of setting forth conscientiously all that could be said against it, not less than all that could be said in its favor: however laborious such a process might be, and however little appreciated by the multitude.² Little as we know the circumstances which went to form the remarkable mind of Sokratès, we may infer from this dialogue that he owes in part his powerful negative vein of dialectics to "the double-tongued and all-objecting Zeno."³

To a mind at all exigent on the score of proof, physical science as handled in that day was indeed likely to appear not only unsatisfactory, but hopeless; and Sokratès, in the maturity of his life, deserted it altogether. The contradictory hypotheses which he heard, with the impenetrable confusion which overhung the subject, brought him even to the conviction, that the gods intended the machinery by which they brought about astronomical and physical results to remain unknown, and that it was impious, as

remarked, we have here a good contemporary witness, Ion of Chios, to the fact of his intimacy with Archelaus. In no other sense than this could a man like Sokratès be said to be the pupil of any one.

¹ See the chapter immediately preceding, p. 472.

² See the remarkable passage in Plato's *Parmenidès*, p. 135 to 136, 2 of which a portion has already been cited in my note to the preceding chapter, referred to in the note above.

³ Timon the Sillographer ap. Diogen. Laërt. ix. 23.

⁴ *Ἀποκρίσεις* ἡρώων ἐπὶ ἀπορίας καὶ ἀπορίας ἐπὶ ἀπορίας.

well as useless, to pry into their secrets.¹ His master Archelaus, though mainly occupied with physics, also speculated more or less concerning moral subjects; concerning justice and injustice, the laws, etc.; and is said to have maintained the tenet, that justice and injustice were determined by law or convention, not by nature. From him, perhaps, Sokratès may have been partly led to turn his mind in this direction. But to a man disappointed with physics, and having in his bosom a dialectical impulse powerful, unemployed, and restless, the mere realities of Athenian life, even without Archelaus, would suggest human relations, duties, action and suffering, as the most interesting materials for contemplation and discourse. Sokratès could not go into the public assembly, the dikastery, or even the theatre, without hearing discussions about what was just or unjust, honorable or base, expedient or hurtful, etc., nor without having his mind conducted to the inquiry, what was the meaning of these large words which opposing disputants often invoked with equal reverential confidence. Along with the dialectic and generalizing power of Sokratès, which formed his bond of connection with such minds as Plato, there was at the same time a vigorous practicality, a large stock of positive Athenian experience, with which Xenophon chiefly sympathized, and which he has brought out in his "Memorabilia." Of these two intellectual tendencies, combined with a strong religious sentiment, the character of Sokratès is composed; and all of them were gratified at once, when he devoted himself to admonitory interrogation on the rules and purposes of human life; from which there was the less to divert him, as he had neither talents nor taste for public speaking.

That "the proper study of mankind is man,"² Sokratès was the first to proclaim: he recognized the security and happiness of man both as the single end of study, and as the limiting principle

¹ Xenoph. *Mem.* iv, 7, 6. "Ὅπως δὲ τῶν οὐρανίων, ἢ ἑκάστα ὁ θεὸς μηχανάται, φροντιστὴν γίγνεται ἀπιτρέπεν· οὐτε γὰρ εὐρετα ἀνθρώποις αὐτὰ ἐνδύειν εἶναι, οὔτε γὰρ εὐρετα θεοῖς ἀν' ἡγεῖται τὸν ζητοῦντα, ἀ ἐκεῖνοι σαφηνισαὶ οὐκ ἐβούληθησαν. Κινδυνεύσαι δ' ἂν ἐφ' ἡ καὶ παραφρονήσαι τὸν ταῦτα μηχανάται, οἳ δὲν ἤπτον ἢ Ἀναξαγόρας παρεφρόνησεν, ὁ τὰ μέγιστα φρονήσας ἐπὶ τῷ τῶν θεῶν μηχανὰς ἐξηγεῖσθαι."

² Xenoph. *Mem.* i, 1, 16. *Αὐτὸς δὲ περὶ τῶν ἀνθρωπείων ἀεὶ λέγει*, etc. Compare the whole of this chapter.

whereby it ought to be circumscribed. In the present state, which science has attained, nothing is more curious than to look back at the rules which this eminent man laid down. Astronomy — now exhibiting the maximum of perfection, with the largest and most exact power of predicting future phenomena which human science has ever attained — was pronounced by him to be among the divine mysteries which it was impossible to understand, and madness to investigate, as Anaxagoras had foolishly pretended to do. He admitted, indeed, that there was advantage in knowing enough of the movements of the heavenly bodies to serve as an index to the change of seasons, and as guides for voyages, journeys by land, or night-watches: but thus much, he said, might easily be obtained from pilots and watchmen, while all beyond was nothing but waste of valuable time, exhausting that mental effort which ought to be employed in profitable acquisitions. He reduced geometry to its literal meaning of land-measuring, necessary so far as to enable any one to proceed correctly in the purchase, sale, or division of land, which any man of common attention might do almost without a teacher; but silly and worthless, if carried beyond, to the study of complicated diagrams.¹ Respecting arithmetic, he gave the same qualified permission of study; but as to general physics, or the study of Nature, he discarded it altogether: "Do these inquirers (he asked) think that they already know *human affairs* well enough, that they thus begin to meddle with *divine*? Do they think that they shall be able to excite or calm the winds and the rain at pleasure, or have they no other view than to gratify an idle curiosity? Surely, they must see that such matters are beyond human investigation. Let them only recollect how much the greatest men, who have attempted the investigation, differ in their pretended results, holding opinions extreme and opposite to each other, like those of madmen!" Such was the view which Sokratēs took of physical science and its prospects.² It is the

¹ Xenoph. Mem. iv. 7, 5.

² Xenoph. Mem. i. 1, 12-15. Plato entertained much larger views on the subject of physical and astronomical studies than either Sokratēs or Xenophon: see Plato, Phædrus, c. 120, p. 270, A., and Republic, vii, c. 6-11 p. 522, see

very same skepticism in substance, and carried farther in degree, though here invested with a religious coloring, for which Ritter and others so severely denounce Gorgias. But looking at matters as they stood in 440-430 B.C., it ought not to be accounted even surprising, much less blamable. To an acute man of that day, physical science as then studied may well be conceived to have promised no result; and even to have seemed worse than barren, if, like Sokratēs, he had an acute perception how much of human happiness was forfeited by immorality, and by corrigible ignorance; how much might be gained by devoting the same amount of earnest study to this latter object. Nor ought we to omit remarking, that the objection of Sokratēs: "You may judge how unprofitable are these studies, by observing how widely the students differ among themselves," remains in high favor down to the present day, and may constantly be seen employed against theoretical men, or theoretical arguments, in every department.

Sokratēs desired to confine the studies of his hearers to *human* matters as distinguished from *divine*, the latter comprehending astronomy and physics. He looked at all knowledge from the point of view of human practice, which had been assigned by the gods to man as his proper subject for study and learning, and with reference to which, therefore, they managed all the current phenomena upon principles of constant and intelligible sequence, so that every one who chose to learn, might learn, while those who took no such pains suffered for their neglect. Even in these, however, the most careful study was not by itself completely sufficient; for the gods did not condescend to submit *all* the phenomena to constant antecedence and consequence, but reserved to themselves the capital turns and junctures for special sentence.¹ Yet here again, if a man had been diligent in learning all that

His treatise De Legibus, however, written in his old age, falls below this tone.

¹ Xenoph. Mem. i. 1, 7. Καὶ τοὺς πολλοὺς οἴκους τε καὶ πόλεις καλῶς οἰκίσαι, μαντικὴς ἔφη προσδεῖσθαι. Τεκτονικὸν μὲν γὰρ, ἢ χαλκευτικόν, ἢ γεωργικόν, ἢ ἀνθρώπων ἀρχικόν, ἢ τῶν τοιούτων ἔργων ἐξεταστικόν, ἢ λογιστικόν, ἢ οἰκονομικόν, ἢ στρατηγικόν γενέσθαι — πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα μεθ' ἡμᾶς καὶ ἀνθρώπων γνώμη αἰρετέα ἐνόμειν εἶναι. Τὰ δὲ μέγιστα τῶν ἐν τούτοις ἔφη τοὺς θεοὺς ἑαυτοῖς καταλείπεσθαι ὡς οὐδὲν δῆλον εἶναι τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, &c.

the gods permitted to be learned; and if, besides, he was assiduous in pious court to them, and in soliciting special information by way of prophecy, they would be gracious to him, and signify beforehand how they intended to act in putting the final hand and in settling the undecipherable portions of the problem.¹ The kindness of the gods in replying through their oracles, or sending information by sacrificial signs or prodigies, in cases of grave difficulty, was, in the view of Sokratēs, one of the most signal evidences of their care for the human race.² To seek access to these prophecies, or indications of special divine intervention to come, was the proper supplementary business of any one who had done as much for himself as could be done by patient study.³ But as it was madness in a man to solicit special information from the gods on matters which they allowed him to learn by his own diligence, so it was not less madness in him to investigate as a learner that which they chose to keep back for their own speciality of will.⁴

Such was the capital innovation made by Sokratēs in regard to the subject of Athenian study, bringing down philosophy, to use the expression of Cicero,⁵ from the heavens to the earth; and such his attempt to draw the line between that which was, and was not, scientifically discoverable; an attempt remarkable, inasmuch as it shows his conviction that the scientific and the religious point of view mutually excluded one another, so that where the latter began, the former ended. It was an innovation, inestimable, in respect to the new matter which it let in; of little import, as regards that which it professed to exclude. For in point of fact, physical science, though partially discouraged, was never absolutely excluded, through any prevalence of that systematic disapproval which he, in common with the multitude of his day,

¹ Xenoph. Mem. i. 1. 9-19. Ἐφ' ὃν δὲ δύναιτο, ἂν μὲν μάθοντας ποιεῖν ἰδοίεν οἱ θεοὶ, μάθαιεν· ἂν δὲ μὴ δεῖα τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἴσται, πειράσθαι διὰ ναυτικῆς παρὰ τῶν θεῶν πειρασθῆναι· τοὺς γὰρ θεοὺς, οἷς ἂν ἴδωμεν, ὡς σημαίνειν.

² Xenoph. Mem. i. 4. 15, iv. 3. 12. When Xenophon was deliberating whether he should take military service under Cyrus the younger, he consulted Sokratēs, who advised him to go to Delphi and submit the case to the oracle (Xen. Anab. iii. 1. 5).

³ Xenoph. Mem. i. 9, iv. 7, 5.

⁴ Cicero, Tusc. Disp. v. 4, 10.

entertained: if it became comparatively neglected, this arose rather from the greater popularity, and the more abundant and accessible matter, of that which he introduced. Physical or astronomical science was narrow in amount, known only to few, and even with those few it did not admit of being expanded, enlivened, or turned to much profitable account in discussion. But the moral and political phenomena on which Sokratēs turned the light of speculation were abundant, varied, familiar, and interesting to every one; comprising — to translate a Greek line which he was fond of quoting — “all the good and evil which has befallen you in your home;”¹ connected too, not merely with the realities of the present, but also with the literature of the past, through the gnomie and other poets.

The motives which determined this important innovation, as to the subject of study, exhibits Sokratēs chiefly as a religious man and a practical, philanthropic preceptor, the Xenophontic hero. His innovations, not less important, as to method and doctrine, place before us the philosopher and dialectician; the other side of his character, or the Platonic hero; faintly traced, indeed, yet still recognized and identified by Xenophon.

“Sokratēs,” says the latter,² “continued incessantly discussing human affairs (the sense of this word will be understood by what has been said above, page 420); investigating: What is piety? What is impiety? What is the honorable and the base? What is the just and the unjust? What is temperance or unsound mind? What is courage or cowardice? What is a city? What is the character fit for a citizen? What is authority over men? What is the character befitting the exercise of such authority? and other similar questions. Men who knew these matters he accounted good and honorable; men who were ignorant of them he assimilated to slaves.”

Sokratēs, says Xenophon again, in another passage, considered that the *dialectic process* consisted in coming together and taking common counsel, to distinguish and distribute things into genera or families, so as to learn what each separate thing really was. To go through this process carefully was indispensable, as the

¹ Ὅτι τοὶ ἐν μεγάροισι κακὸν τ' ἀγαθὸν ἐκείνεται.

² Xenoph. Mem. i. 1. 16.

only way of enabling a man to regulate his own conduct, at least at good objects and avoiding bad. To be so practised as to be able to do it readily, was essential to make a man a good leader or adviser of others. Every man who had gone through the process, and come to know what each thing was, could also of course define it and explain it to others; but if he did not know, it was no wonder that he went wrong himself, and put others wrong besides. Moreover, Aristotle says: "To Sokratēs we may unquestionably assign two novelties; inductive discourses, and the definitions of general terms."²

¹ Xenoph. Mem. iv, 5, 11, 12. Ἄλλα τὸς ἡγεμῶνι μόνους ἐξίστι σκοπεῖν τὰ κράτιστα τῶν πραγμάτων, καὶ λόγῳ καὶ ἔργῳ διαλέγοντας κατὰ γένη, τὰ μὲν ἀγαθὰ προαινεῖσθαι, τὰ δὲ κακὰ ἀπειλεῖσθαι. Καὶ οὕτως ἐφ' ἁριστοῦς τε καὶ εὐδαιμονιστάτους ἀνδρας γίγνεται, καὶ διαλέγεσθαι δυνατώτατους. Ἐφ' ὧν καὶ τὸ διαλέγεσθαι ἐκαστὸν ἐκ τῶν συνιόντων κοινῇ βουλευεῖσθαι διαλέγοντας κατὰ γένη τὰ πρᾶγματα· δεῖν οὖν πειράσθαι ὅτι μάλιστα πρὸς τοῦτο ἔτοιμον ἑαυτὸν παρασκευάζειν, καὶ τοῦτον μάλιστα ἐπιμελεῖσθαι· ἐκ τούτου γὰρ γίγνεται ἀνδρας ἀριστοῦς τε καὶ ἡγεμονικωτάτους καὶ δαλιτικωτάτους.

Surely, the etymology here given by Xenophon or Sokratēs, of the word *διαλέγεσθαι*, cannot be considered as satisfactory.

Again, iv, 6, 1. Σωκράτης δὲ τὸν μὲν εἰδὼς τι ἑκάστων εἰη τῶν ὄντων, ἐνομιζέ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἂν ἐξηγεῖσθαι θέλει· τοὺς δὲ μὴ εἰδὼς, οἷόν τι ἐφ' ὅταν μαστὸν εἶναι, αὐτοὺς δὲ σφάλλεσθαι καὶ ἄλλους σφάλλειν. Μὴ ἴσκα σκοπῶν οὖν τοῖς συνοῖσι, τι ἑκάστων εἰη τῶν ὄντων, οὐδέποτε ἔλγει. Ποῦτα μὲν οὖν, ἣ διωρίζετο, πόλιν ἂν ἔργον εἰη διεξιλέγειν· ἐν ὅσῳ δὲ καὶ τὸν τρόπον τῆς ἐπισκέψεως δηλώσειν οἶμαι, τοσαῦτα λέξω.

² Aristot. Metaphys. i, 6, 3, p. 987, b. Σωκράτους δὲ περὶ μὲν τὰ ἠθικὰ πραγματευομένου, περὶ δὲ τῆς ὅλης φύσεως οὐδὲν — ἐν μὲντοι τοιούτοις τὸ καθόλου ζητοῦντος καὶ περὶ οὐσιμῶν ἐπιστησαντος πρῶτον τὴν διανοίαν, etc. Again, xiii, 4, 6-8, p. 1078, b. Διὸ γὰρ ἔστιν ἃ τις ἂν ἀποδοίη Σωκράτει δίκαιως, τοὺς τ' ἐπακτικὸν λόγον καὶ τὸ ὀρίζεσθαι καθ' ὅλουν: compare xiii, 9, 35, p. 1086, b; Cicero, Topic. x, 42.

These two attributes, of the discussions carried on by Sokratēs, explain the epithet attached to him by Timon the Sillographer, that he was the leader and originator of the accurate talkers:—

Ἐκ δ' ἄρα τῶν ἀπέκλινε λιδοζῶος, ἐννομοθέτης.

Ἐλλήνων ἐπαίδος ἀκριβολόγους ἀποφύλας.

Μυκτῆρ, ῥητορὸμυκτος, ἐπαττικός, εἰρωνεύτης.

(ap. Diog. Laërt. ii. 19.)

To a large proportion of hearers of that time, as of other times, *accurate thinking and talking* appeared petty and in bad taste: ἡ ἀκριβολογία

I borrow here intentionally from Xenophon in preference to Plato; since the former, tamely describing a process which he imperfectly appreciated, identifies it so much the more completely with the real Sokratēs, and is thus a better witness than Plato, whose genius not only conceived but greatly enlarged it, for didactic purposes of his own. In our present state of knowledge, some mental effort is required to see anything important in the words of Xenophon; so familiar has every student been rendered with the ordinary terms and gradations of logic and classification,—such as genus, definition, individual things as comprehended in a genus; what each thing is, and to what genus it belongs, etc. But familiar as these words have now become, they denote a mental process, of which, in 440-430 B.C., few men besides Sokratēs had any conscious perception. Of course, men conceived and described things in classes, as is implied in the very form of language, and in the habitual junction of predicates with subjects in common speech. They explained their meaning clearly and forcibly in particular cases: they laid down maxims, argued questions, stated premises, and drew conclusions, on trials in the dikastery, or debates in the assembly: they had an abundant poetical literature, which appealed to every variety of emotion: they were beginning to compile historical narrative, intermixed with reflection and criticism. But though all this was done, and often admirably well done, it was wanting in that analytical consciousness which would have enabled any one to describe, explain, or vindicate what he was doing. The ideas of men—speakers as well as hearers, the productive minds as well as the recipient multitude—were associated together in groups favorable rather to emotional results, or to poetical, rhetorical narrative and descriptive effect, than to methodical generalization, to scientific conception, or to proof either inductive or deductive. That reflex act of attention which enables men to understand, compare, and rectify their own mental process, was only just beginning. It was a recent novelty on the part of the rhetorical teachers, to analyze

μικροπρετές (Aristot. Ethic. Nikomach. iv, 4, p. 1122, b; also Aristot. Metaphys. ii, 3, p. 995, a). Even Plato thinks himself obliged to make a sort of apology for it (Theætet. c. 102, p. 184, C). No doubt Timon used the word ἀκριβολόγους in a sneering sense.

the component parts of a public harangue, and to propound some precepts for making men tolerable speakers. Protagoras was just setting forth various grammatical distinctions, while Prodikus discriminated the significations of words nearly equivalent and liable to be confounded. All these proceedings appeared then so new! as to incur the ridicule even of Plato: yet they were branches of that same analytical tendency which Sokratēs now carried into scientific inquiry. It may be doubted whether any one before him ever used the words genus and species, originally meaning family and form, in the philosophical sense now exclusively appropriated to them. Not one of those many names — called by logicians *names of the second intention* — which imply distinct attention to various parts of the logical process, and enable us to consider and criticize it in detail, then existed. All of them grew out of the schools of Plato, Aristotle, and the subsequent philosophers, so that we can thus trace them in their beginning to the common root and father, Sokratēs.

To comprehend the full value of the improvements struck out by Sokratēs, we have only to examine the intellectual paths pursued by his predecessors or contemporaries. He set to himself distinct and specific problems: "What is justice? What is piety, courage, political government? What is it which is really denoted by such great and important names, bearing upon the conduct or happiness of man?" Now it has been already remarked that Anaxagoras, Empedoklēs, Demokritus, the Pythagoreans, all had still present to their minds those vast and undivided problems which had been transmitted down from the old poets; bending their minds to the invention of some system which would explain them all at once, or assist the imagination in conceiving both how the Kosmos first began, and how it continued to move on.² Ethics and physics, man and nature, were all

How slowly grammatical analysis proceeded among the Greeks, and how long it was before they got at what are now elementary ideas in every instructed man's mind, may be seen in Gräfenhahn Geschichte der Klassischen Philologie im Alterthum, sects. 89-92, etc. On this point, these sophists seem to have been decidedly in advance of their age.

² This same tendency, to break off from the vague aggregate then conceived as physics, is discernible in the Hippokratic treatises, and even in the treatise De Antiqua Medicinā, which M. Littré places first in his edition

blended together; and the Pythagoreans, who explained all nature by numbers and numerical relations, applied the same explanation to moral attributes, considering justice to be symbolized by a perfect equation, or by four, the first of all square numbers.¹ These early philosophers endeavored to find out the beginnings, the component elements, the moving cause or causes, of things in the mass;² but the logical distribution into genus, species, and individuals, does not seem to have suggested itself to them, or to have been made a subject of distinct attention by any one before Sokratēs. To study ethics, or human dispositions and ends, apart from the physical world, and according to a theory of their own, referring to human good and happiness as the sovereign and

and considers to be the production of Hippokratēs himself, in which case it would be contemporary with Sokratēs. On this subject of authorship, however, other critics do not agree with him: see the question examined in his vol. i, ch. xii, p. 295, seq.

Hippokratēs, if he be the author, begins by deprecating the attempt to connect the study of medicine with physical or astronomical hypothesis (c. 2), and he further protests against the procedure of various medical writers and sophists, or philosophers, such as Empedoklēs, who set themselves to make out "what man was from the beginning, how he began first to exist, and in what manner he was constructed," (c. 20.) This does not belong, he says, to medicine, which ought indeed to be studied as a comprehensive whole, but as a whole determined by and bearing reference to its own end: "You ought to study the nature of man: what he is with reference to that which he eats and drinks, and to all his other occupations or habits, and to the consequences resulting from each?" ὁ, τι ἐστὶν ἄνθρωπος πρὸς τὰ ἐσθιωμένα καὶ πινόμενα, καὶ ὁ, τι πρὸς τὰ ἄλλα ἐπιτηδεύματα, καὶ ὁ, τι ἀφ' ἑκάστου ἑκάστω ἐνυψήσεται.

The spirit, in which Hippokratēs here approaches the study of medicine, is exceedingly analogous to that which dictated the innovation of Sokratēs in respect to the study of ethics. The same character pervades the treatise, De Aere, Locis et Aquis, a definite and predetermined field of inquiry, and the Hippokratic treatises generally.

¹ Aristotel. Metaphys. i. 5, p. 985, 986. τὸ μὴ ποιόνδε τῶν ἀριθμῶν πάθος δικαιοσύνη, τὸ δὲ ποιόνδε ψυχῇ καὶ τοῦς, ἕτερον δὲ καὶ τοῦς, etc. Ethica Magna, i. 1. ἡ δικαιοσύνη ἀριθμῶς ἰσότης ἰσος: see Brandis, Gesch. der Gr. Röm. Philos. lxxxii, lxxxiii, p. 492.

² Aristotel. Metaphys. iii, 3, p. 998, A. Οἶον Ἐμπεδοκλῆς πῦρ καὶ ὕδωρ καὶ τὰ μετὰ ταύτων, στοιχεῖα φησὶν εἶναι ἐξ ὧν ἐστὶ τὰ ὄντα ἐνυπαρχόντων, ἀλλ' οὐκ ὥς γένη λέγει ταῦτα τῶν ὄντων. That generic division and subdivision was unknown or unpractised by these early men, is noticed by Plato (Sophist. c. 114, p. 267, D.)

comprehensive end;¹ to treat each of the great and familiar words designating moral attributes, as logical aggregates comprehending many judgments in particular cases, and connoting a certain harmony or consistency of purpose among the separate judgments, to bring many of these latter into comparison, by a scrutinizing dialectical process, so as to test the consistency and completeness of the logical aggregate or general notion, as it stood in every man's mind: all these were parts of the same forward movement which Sokratēs originated.

It was at that time a great progress to break down the unwieldy mass conceived by former philosophers as science; and to study ethics apart, with a reference, more or less distinct, to their own appropriate end. Nay, we see, if we may trust the "Phædon" of Plato,² that Sokratēs, before he resolved on such pronounced severance, had tried to construct, or had at least yearned after, an undivided and reformed system, including physics also under the ethical end; a scheme of optimistic physics, applying the general idea, "*What was best*," as the commanding principle, from whence physical explanations were

Aristotle thinks that the Pythagoreans had some faint and obscure notion of the logical genus. *τὸ πρῶτον τὸ διὰ τὸ ἐν ὁμογενεῖ καὶ ὁμοειδέσει, ὡς ἀπὸ τοῦ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀριθμῶν* (Metaphys. i. 5, 29, p. 986, B). But we see by comparing two other passages in that treatise (xiii, 4, 6, p. 1078, b, with i. 5, 2, p. 985, b) that the Pythagorean definitions of *καρπὸς*, *τὸ δίκαιον*, etc., were nothing more than certain numerical fancies; so that these words cannot fairly be said to have designated, in their view, logical *γενεῖα*. Nor can the ten Pythagorean *συνταγὰς*, or parallel series of contraries, be called by that name; arranged in order to gratify a fancy about the perfection of the number ten, which fancy afterwards seems to have passed to Aristotle himself, when drawing up his ten predicaments.

See a valuable Excursus upon the Aristotelian expressions *τι ἐστὶ* — *τί ἐστι* *εἶναι*, etc., appended to Schweigler's edition of Aristotle's *Metaphysica*, vol. ii, p. 369, p. 378.

About the few and imperfect definitions which Aristotle seems also to ascribe to Demokritus, see Trendelenburg, *Comment. ad Aristot. De Animā*, p. 212.

¹ Aristotle remarks about the Pythagoreans, that they referred the virtues to number and numerical relations, not giving to them a theory of their own: *τὰς γὰρ ἀρετὰς εἰς τοὺς ἀριθμοὺς ἀναγὰν οὐκ οἶκεσαν τῶν ἄρῃ τῶν τῇν θεωρίαν ἐποιεῖτο* (Ethic. Magn. i, 1).

² Plato, *Phædon*, c. 102, seq. pp. 96, 97.

to be deduced; which he hoped to find, but did not find, in Anaxagoras. But it was a still greater advance to seize, and push out in conscious application, the essential features of that logical process, upon the correct performance of which all our security for general truth depends. The notions of genius, subordinate genera, and individuals as comprehended under them, — we need not here notice the points on which Plato and Aristotle differed from each other and from the modern conceptions on that subject, — were at that time newly brought into clear consciousness in the human mind. The profusion of logical distribution employed in some of the dialogues of Plato, such as the *Sophistēs* and the *Politicus*, seems partly traceable to his wish to familiarize hearers with that which was then a novelty, as well as to enlarge its development, and diversify its mode of application. He takes numerous indirect opportunities of bringing it out into broad light, by putting into the mouths of his dialogists answers implying complete inattention to it, exposed afterwards in the course of the dialogue by Sokratēs.¹ What was now begun by Sokratēs, and improved by Plato, was embodied as part in a comprehensive system of formal logic by the genius of Aristotle; a system which was not only of extraordinary value in reference to the processes and controversies of its time, but which also, having become insensibly worked into the minds of instructed men, has contributed much to form what is correct in the habits

¹ As one specimen among many, see Plato, *Theætet.* c. 11, p. 146, D. It is maintained by Brandis, and in part by C. Heyder (see Heyder, *Kritische Darstellung und Vergleichung der Aristotelischen und Hegelschen Dialektik*, part i. pp. 85, 129), that the logical process, called division, is not to be considered as having been employed by Sokratēs along with definition; but begins with Plato; in proof of which they remark that, in the two Platonic dialogues called *Sophistēs* and *Politicus*, wherein this process is most abundantly employed, Sokratēs is not the conductor of the conversation.

Little stress is to be laid on this circumstance, I think; and the terms in which Xenophon describes the method of Sokratēs (*διαλέγοντας κατὰ γένη τὰ πράγματα*, *Mem.* iv, 5, 12) seem to imply the one process as well as the other: indeed, it was scarcely possible to keep them apart, with so abundant a talker as Sokratēs. Plato doubtless both enlarged and systematized the method in every way, and especially made greater use of the process of division, because he pushed the dialogue further into positive scientific research than Sokratēs.

of modern thinking. Though it has been now enlarged and recast, by some modern authors — especially by Mr. John Stuart Mill, in his admirable *System of Logic* — into a structure commensurate with the vast increase of knowledge and extension of positive method belonging to the present day, we must recollect that the distance, between the best modern logic and that of Aristotle, is hardly so great as that between Aristotle and those who preceded him by a century, Empedoklēs, Anaxagoras, and the Pythagoreans; and that the movement in advance of these latter commences with Sokratēs.

By Xenophon, by Plato, and by Aristotle, the growth as well as the habitual use of logical classification is represented as concurrent with and dependent upon dialectics. In this methodized discussion, so much in harmony with the marked sociability of the Greek character, the quick recurrence of short question and answer was needful as a stimulus to the attention, at a time when the habit of close and accurate reflection on abstract subjects had been so little cultivated. But the dialectics of Sokratēs had far greater and more important peculiarities than this. We must always consider his method in conjunction with the subjects to which he applied it. As those subjects were not recondite or special, but bore on the practical life of the house, the market-place, the city, the dikastery, the gymnasium, or the temple, with which every one was familiar, so Sokratēs never presented himself as a teacher, nor as a man having new knowledge to communicate. On the contrary, he disclaimed such pretensions, uniformly and even ostentatiously. But the subjects on which he talked were just those which every one professed to know perfectly and thoroughly, and on which every one believed himself in a condition to instruct others, rather than to require instruction for himself. On such questions as these: What is justice? What is piety? What is a democracy? What is a law? every man fancied that he could give a confident opinion, and even wondered that any other person should feel a difficulty. When Sokrates, professing ignorance, put any such question, he found no difficulty in obtaining an answer, given off-hand, and with very little reflection. The answer purported to be the explanation or definition of a term — familiar, indeed, but of wide and comprehensive import — given by one who had never before tried to

render to himself an account of what it meant. Having got this answer, Sokratēs put fresh questions, applying it to specific cases, to which the respondent was compelled to give answers inconsistent with the first; thus showing that the definition was either too narrow, or too wide, or defective in some essential condition. The respondent then amended his answer; but this was a prelude to other questions, which could only be answered in ways inconsistent with the amendment; and the respondent, after many attempts to disentangle himself, was obliged to plead guilty to the inconsistencies, with an admission that he could make no satisfactory answer to the original query, which had at first appeared so easy and familiar. Or, if he did not himself admit this, the hearers at least felt it forcibly. The dialogue, as given to us, commonly ends with a result purely negative, proving that the respondent was incompetent to answer the question proposed to him, in a manner consistent and satisfactory even to himself. Sokratēs, as he professed from the beginning to have no positive theory to support, so he maintains to the end the same air of a learner, who would be glad to solve the difficulty if he could, but regrets to find himself disappointed of that instruction which the respondent had promised.

We see by this description of the cross-examining path of this remarkable man, how intimate was the bond of connection between the dialectic method and the logical distribution of particulars into species and genera. The discussion first raised by Sokratēs turns upon the meaning of some large generic term, the queries whereby he follows it up, bring the answer given into collision with various particulars which it ought not to comprehend, yet does; or with others, which it ought to comprehend, but does not. It is in this manner that the latent and undefined cluster of association, which has grown up round a familiar term, is as it were penetrated by a penetrating heaven, forcing it to expand into discernible portions, and bringing the appropriate function which the term ought to fulfil, to become a subject of distinct consciousness. The inconsistencies into which the hearer is betrayed in his various answers, proclaim to him the fact that he has not yet acquired anything like a clear and full conception of the common attribute which binds together the various particulars embraced under some term which is ever upon his lips or perhaps enable him to detect a different fact, not less impor-

tant, that there is no such common attribute, and that the generalization is merely nominal and fallacious. In either case, he is put upon the train of thought which leads to a correction of the generalization, and lights him on to that which Plato¹ calls, seeing the one in the many, and the many in the one. Without any predecessor to copy, Sokratēs, fell as it were instinctively into that which Aristotle² describes as the double track of the dialectic process; breaking up the one into many, and recombining the many into one; the former duty, at once the first and the most essential, Sokratēs performed directly by his analytical string of questions; the latter, or synthetical process, was one which he did not often directly undertake, but strove so to arm and stimulate the hearer's mind, as to enable him to do it for himself. This one and many denote the logical distribution of a multifarious subject-matter under generic terms, with clear understanding of the attributes implied or connoted by each term, so as to discriminate those particulars to which it really applies. At a moment when such logical distribution was as yet novel as a subject of consciousness, it could hardly have been probed and laid out in the mind by any less stringent process than the cross-examining dialectics of Sokratēs, applied to the analysis of some attempts at definition hastily given by respondents; that "inductive discourse and search for (clear general notions or) definitions of general terms," which Aristotle so justly points out as his peculiar innovation.

I have already adverted to the persuasion of religious mission under which Sokratēs acted in pursuing this system of conversation and interrogation. He probably began it in a tentative way,³

¹ Plato, Phædrus, c. 109, p. 265, D; Sophistēs, c. 83, p. 253, E.

² Aristot. Topic. viii, 14, p. 164, b. 2. Ἔστι μὲν γὰρ ὡς ἀπλῶς εἰπεῖν διαλεκτικὸς, ὁ προτατικὸς καὶ ἰνστατικὸς. Ἔστι δὲ τὸ μὲν προτείνεισθαι, ἐν ποιεῖν τὰ πλείω (δεῖ γὰρ ἐν ὅλῳς ληθῆναι πρὸς ὃ ὁ λόγος) τὸ δ' ἰνστασθαι, τὸ ἐν πολλῷ ἢ γὰρ διαιρεῖ ἢ ἀναιρεῖ, τὸ μὲν διδούς, τὸ δ' οὐ, τῶν προτεινομένων.

It was from Sokratēs that dialectic skill derived its great extension and development (Aristot. Metaphys. xiii, 4, p. 1078, b).

³ What Plato makes Sokratēs say in the Euthyphron, c. 12, p. 11, D, ἄγε εἰ σοφός, etc., may be accounted as true at least in the beginning of the active career of Sokratēs; compare the Hippias Minor, c. 18, p. 376, B; Lachēs, c. 33, p. 200, E.

upon a modest scale, and under the pressure of logical embarrassment weighing on his own mind. But as he proceeded, and found himself successful, as well as acquiring reputation among a certain circle of friends, his earnest soul became more and more penetrated with devotion to that which he regarded as a duty. It was at this time probably, that his friend Chærephon came back with the oracular answer from Delphi, noticed a few pages above, to which Sokratēs himself alludes as having prompted him to extend the range of his conversation, and to question a class of persons whom he had not before ventured to approach, the noted politicians, poets, and artisans. He found them more confident than humbler individuals in their own wisdom, but quite as unable to reply to his queries without being driven to contradictory answers.

Such scrutiny of the noted men in Athens is made to stand prominent in the "Platonic Apology," because it was the principal cause of that unpopularity which Sokratēs at once laments and accounts for before the dikasts. Nor can we doubt that it was the most impressive portion of his proceedings, in the eyes both of enemies and admirers, as well as the most flattering to his own natural temper. Nevertheless, it would be a mistake to present this part of the general purpose of Sokratēs — or of his divine mission, if we adopt his own language — as if it were the whole; and to describe him as one standing forward merely to unmask select leading men, politicians, sophists, poets, or others, who had acquired unmerited reputation, and were puffed up with foolish conceit of their own abilities, being in reality shallow and incompetent. Such an idea of Sokratēs is at once inadequate and erroneous. His conversation, as I have before remarked, was absolutely universal and indiscriminate; while the mental defect which he strove to rectify was one not at all peculiar to leading men, but common to them with the mass of mankind, though seeming to be exaggerated in them, partly because more is expected from them, partly because the general feeling of self-estimation stands at a higher level, naturally and reasonably, in their bosoms, than in those of ordinary persons. That defect was, the "seeming and conceit of knowledge without the reality," on human life with its duties, purposes, and con-

ditions, the knowledge of which Sokratēs called emphatically "human wisdom," and regarded as essential to the dignity of a freeman; while he treated other branches of science as above the level of man,¹ and as a stretch of curiosity, not merely superfluous, but reprehensible. His warfare against such false persuasion of knowledge, in one man as well as another, upon those subjects — for with him, I repeat, we must never disconnect the method from the subjects — clearly marked even in Xenophon, is abundantly and strikingly illustrated by the fertile genius of Plato, and constituted the true missionary scheme which pervaded the last half of his long life; a scheme far more comprehensive, as well as more generous, than those anti-sophistic polemics which are assigned to him by so many authors as his prominent object.²

In pursuing the thread of his examination, there was no topic upon which Sokratēs more frequently insisted, than the contrast

¹ Xenoph. Memor. i. 1, 12-16. Ποτερόν ποτε νομισάντες ἰκανῶς ἤδη τὰνθρώπεια εἶδέναι ἐρχομαι (the physical philosophers) ἐπὶ τὸ περὶ τῶν τοιούτων φροντίζειν ἢ τὰ μὲν ἀνθρώπεια παρῶντες, τὰ δὲ δαιμόνια σκοποῦντες, ἡγούμεναι τὰ προσήκοντα πράττειν. . . . Αὐτὸς δὲ περὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων πείων ἀεὶ διελέγετο σκοπῶν, τί εἴησις, τί ἀσέβης καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἃ τοῦς μὲν εἰδότες ἡγεῖτο καλοῦς καὶ καλοῦς εἶναι, τοὺς δὲ ἀγνοοῦντας ἀνδραποδισαίης ἂν δέκα ὡς κελύξασθαι.

Plato, Apolog. Sok. c. 5, p. 20, D. γὰρ ἔστιν ἰσως ἀνθρωπίνη σοφία τῇ ὅτι γὰρ καὶ τὴν ταύτην εἶναι σοφίαν· οἱ τοὶ δὲ τὰ γ' ἂν, οἷς ἄρτι ἔλεγον, μέγα πρὸς τὴν ἀνθρωπίνην σοφίαν σοφὸν εἶναι, etc. Compare c. 9, p. 23, A.

² It is this narrow purpose that Plutarch ascribes to Sokratēs, *Questiones Platonicæ*, p. 399. Compare also Tennemann, *Geschicht. der Philos.* part ii. art. i. vol. ii. p. 11.

Amidst the extraordinary outpouring of groundless censure against the sophists, which Tennemann here gives, one assertion is remarkable. He tells us that it was the more easy for Sokratēs to put down the sophists, since their shallowness and worthlessness, after a short period of vogue, had already been detected by intelligent men, and was becoming discredited.

It is strange to find such an assertion made, for a period between 420-399 B.C., the era when Protagoras, Prodikos, Hippias, etc., reached the maximum of celebrity.

And what are we to say about the statement, that Sokratēs put down the sophists, when we recollect that the Megaric school and Antisthenēs, both emanating from Sokratēs, are more frequently attacked than any one else in the dialogues of Plato, as having all those skeptical and disputatious propensities with which the sophists are reproached?

between the state of men's knowledge on the general topics of man and society, and that which artists or professional men possessed in their respective special crafts. So perpetually did he reproduce this comparison, that his enemies accused him of wearing it threadbare.¹ Take a man of special vocation — a carpenter, a brazier, a pilot, a musician, a surgeon — and examine him on the state of his professional knowledge, you will find him able to indicate the persons from whom and the steps by which he first acquired it: he can describe to you his general aim, with the particular means which he employs to realize the aim, as well as the reason why such means must be employed and why precautions must be taken to combat such and such particular obstructions: he can teach his profession to others: in matters relating to his profession, he counts as an authority, so that no extra-professional person thinks of contesting the decision of a surgeon in case of disease, or of a pilot at sea. But while such is the fact in regard to every special art, how great is the contrast in reference to the art of righteous, social, and useful living, which forms, or ought to form, the common business alike important to each and to all! On this subject, Sokratēs² remarked that every

¹ Plato, Gorgias, c. 101, p. 491, A.

Kalliklēs. Ὡς αἱ ταῦτ' ἀλέγεις, ὦ Σωκράτης. Σωκράτης. Οὐ μόνον γέ, ὦ Κάλλικλέης, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τῶν αὐτῶν. Κalliklēs. Νη τοὺς θεοὺς, ἀτεχνῶς γέ γ' εἰς σκυτέας καὶ κισθίας καὶ μαγειροὺς λέγων καὶ ἰατροὺς, οὐδὲν παρῶ. Compare Plato, Symposium, p. 221, E.; also Xenoph. Memor. i. 2, 37, iv, 5, 5.

² It is not easy to refer to specific passages in manifestation of the contrast set forth in the text, which, however, runs through large portions of many Platonic dialogues, under one form or another: see the Menon, c. 27-33, pp. 90-94; Protagoras, c. 28, 29, pp. 319, 320; Politicus, c. 38, p. 299, D; Lachēs, c. 11, 12, pp. 185, 186; Gorgias, c. 121, p. 501, A; Alkibiadēs, i, c. 12-14, pp. 108, 109, 110; c. 20, p. 113, C, D.

Xenoph. Mem. iii, 5, 21, 22; iv, 2, 20-23; iv, 4, 5; iv, 6, 1. Of these passages, iv, 2, 20, 23 is among the most remarkable.

It is remarkable that Sokratēs (in the Platonic Apology, c. 7, p. 22), when he is describing his wanderings (πλανήν) to test supposed knowledge, first in the statesmen, next in the poets, lastly in the artisans and craftsmen, finds satisfaction only in the answers which these latter made to him on matters concerning their respective trades or professions. They would have been wise men, had it not been for the circumstance that, because they knew these particular things, they fancied that they knew other things also.

one felt perfectly well-informed, and confident in his own knowledge; yet no one knew from whom, or by what steps, he had learned: no one had ever devoted any special reflection either to ends, or means, or obstructions: no one could explain or give a consistent account of the notions in his own mind, when pertinent questions were put to him: no one could teach another, as might be inferred, he thought, from the fact that there were no professed teachers, and that the sons of the best men were often destitute of merit: every one knew for himself, and laid down general propositions confidently, without looking up to any other man as knowing better; yet there was no end of dissension and dispute on particular cases.¹

Such was the general contrast which Sokratês sought to impress upon his hearers by a variety of questions bearing on it, directly or indirectly. One way of presenting it, which Plato devoted much of his genius to expand in dialogue, was, to discuss, Whether virtue be really teachable. How was it that superior men, like Aristeidês and Periklês,² acquired the eminent qualities essential for guiding and governing Athens, since they neither learned them under any known master, as they had studied music and gymnastics, nor could insure the same excellences to their sons, either through their own agency or through that of any master? Was it not rather the fact that virtue, as it was never expressly taught, so it was not really teachable; but was vouchsafed or withheld according to the special volition and grace of the gods? If a man has a young horse to be broken, or trained, he finds without difficulty a professed trainer, thoroughly conversant with the habits of the race,³ to communicate to the animal the excellence required; but whom can he find to teach virtue to his sons, with the like preliminary knowledge and assured result? Nay, how can any one either teach virtue, or affirm virtue to be teachable, unless he be prepared to explain what virtue is, and what are the points of analogy and difference between its various branches; justice, temperance, fortitude, prudence, etc.? In several of the Platonic dialogues, the discussion turns on the

¹ Plato, Euthyphrôn c. 8, p. 7, D; Xen. Mem. iv, 4, 8.

² Xenoph. Mem. iv, 2, 2; Plato, Meno, c. 23, p. 94.

³ Compare Plato, Apol. Sok. c. 4, p. 20, A, Xen. Mem. iv, 2, 25.

analysis of these last-mentioned words: the "Lachês" and "Protagoras" on courage, the "Charmidês" on temperance, the "Euthyphrôn" on holiness.

By these and similar discussions did Sokratês, and Plato amplifying upon his master, raise indirectly all the important questions respecting society, human aspirations and duties, and the principal moral qualities which were accounted virtuous in individual men. As the general terms, on which his conversation turned, were among the most current and familiar in the language, so also the abundant instances of detail, whereby he tested the hearer's rational comprehension and consistent application of such large terms, were selected from the best known phenomena of daily life; bringing home the inconsistency, if inconsistency there was, in a manner obvious to every one. The answers made to him,—not merely by ordinary citizens, but by men of talent and genius, such as the poets or the rhetors, when called upon for an explanation of the moral terms and ideas set forth in their own compositions,²—revealed alike that state of mind against which his crusade, enjoined and consecrated by the Delphian oracle, was directed, the semblance and conceit of knowledge without real knowledge. They proclaimed confident, unhesitating persuasion, on the greatest and gravest questions concerning man and society, in the bosoms of persons who had never bestowed upon them sufficient reflection to be aware that they involved any difficulty. Such persuasion had grown up gradually and unconsciously, partly by authoritative communication, partly by insensible transfusion, from others; the process beginning antecedent to reason as a capacity, continuing itself with little aid and no control from reason, and never being finally revised. With the great terms and current propositions concerning human life and society, a complex body of association had become accumulated from countless particulars, each separately trivial and lost to the memory, knit together by a powerful sentiment, and imbibed as it were by each man from the atmosphere of authority and example around

¹ Xenoph. Memor. iv, 6, 15. "Ὅποτε δὲ αὐτὸς τι τῷ λόγῳ διεξίει, διὰ τῶν μάλιστα ὁμολογουμένων ἐπαρτέτο, νομίζων ταύτην τὴν ἀσφάλειαν εἶναι λόγον· τοιγαροῦν πολλὰ μάλιστα ὧν ἐγὼ οἶδα, ὅτε λέγοι, τοὺς ἀκούοντες ὁμολογούντας παρείχε." ² Plato, Apol. Sok. c. 7, p. 22, C: compare Plato, Ion. pp. 533, 554.

him. Upon this basis the fancied knowledge really rested; and reason, when invoked at all, was called in simply as an handmaid, expositor, or apologist of the preexisting sentiment; as an accessory after the fact, not as a test or verification. Every man found these persuasions in his own mind, without knowing how they became established there; and witnessed them in others, as portions of a general fund of unexamined common-place and credence. Because the words were at once of large meaning, embodied in old and familiar mental processes, and surrounded by a strong body of sentiment, the general assertions in which they were embodied appeared self-evident and imposing to every one: so that, in spite of continual dispute in particular cases, no one thought himself obliged to analyze the general propositions themselves, or to reflect whether he had verified their import, and could apply them rationally and consistently.¹

The phenomenon here adverted to is too obvious, even at the present day, to need further elucidation as matter of fact. In morals, in politics, in political economy, on all subjects relating to man and society, the like confident persuasion of knowledge without the reality is sufficiently prevalent: the like generation and propagation, by authority and example, of unverified convictions, resting upon strong sentiment, without consciousness of the steps or conditions of their growth; the like enlistment of reason as the one-sided advocate of a preestablished sentiment; the like illusion, because every man is familiar with the language, that therefore every man is master of the complex facts, judgments, and tendencies, involved in its signification, and competent both to apply comprehensive words and to assume the truth or falsehood of large propositions, without any special analysis or study.²

¹ Ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν (says Sokratēs to Euthydēmus) ὥς δὲ τὰ σπουδαῖα πιστεῖν ἔχοντες, οὐδ' ἐκρίψω (Xen. Mem. iv, 2, 36): compare Plato, Alkibiad. i, c. 14, p. 110, A.

² "Moins une science est avancée, moins elle a été bien traitée, et plus elle a besoin d'être enseignée. C'est ce qui me fait beaucoup désirer qu'on ne renonce pas en France à l'enseignement des sciences idéologiques, morales, et politiques; qui, après tout, sont des sciences comme les autres — à la différence près, que ceux qui ne les ont pas étudiées sont persuadés de sa bonne foi et les suivent, qu'ils se croient en état d'en décider" (Destutt de Tracy, *Éléments d'Idéologie*, Préface, p. xxxiv, ed. Paris, 1827)

There is one important difference, however, to note, between our time and that of Sokratēs. In his day, the impressions not only respecting man and society, but also respecting the physical world, were of this same self-sown, self-propagating, and unscientific character. The popular astronomy of the Sokratic age was an aggregate of primitive, superficial observations and imaginative inferences, passing unexamined from elder men to younger, accepted with unsuspecting faith, and consecrated by intense sentiment. Not only men like Nikias, or Anytus and Melētus, but even Sokratēs himself, protested against the impudence of Anaxagoras, when he degraded the divine Helios and Selênê into a sun and moon of calculable motions and magnitudes. But now, the development of the scientific point of view, with the vast increase of methodized physical and mathematical knowledge, has taught every one that such primitive astronomical and physical convictions were nothing better than "a fancy of knowledge without the reality."¹ Every one renounces them without hesitation, seeks his conclusions from the scientific teacher, and looks to the proofs alone for his guarantee. A man who has never bestowed special study on astronomy, knows that he is ignorant of it: to fancy that he knows it, without such preparation, would be held an absurdity. While the scientific point of view has thus acquired complete predominance in reference to the physical world, it has made little way comparatively on topics regarding man and society, wherein "fancy of knowledge without the

¹ "There is no science which, more than astronomy, stands in need of such a preparation, or draws more largely on that intellectual liberality which is ready to adopt whatever is demonstrated, or concede whatever is rendered highly probable, however new and uncommon the points of view may be, in which objects the most familiar may thereby become placed. Almost all its conclusions stand in open and striking contradiction with those of superficial and vulgar observation, and with what appears to every one, until he has understood and weighed the proofs to the contrary, the most positive evidence of his senses. Thus the earth on which he stands, and which has served for ages as the unshaken foundation of the firmest structures either of art or nature, is divested by the astronomer of its attribute of fixity, and conceived by him as turning swiftly on its centre, and at the same time moving onward through space with great rapidity, etc." (Sir John Herschel, *Astronomy*, Introduction, sect. 2.)

reality" continues to reign, not without criticism and opposition, yet still as a paramount force. And if a new Sokratēs were now to put the same questions in the market-place to men of all ranks and professions, he would find the like confident persuasion and unsuspecting dogmatism as to generalities; the like faltering, blindness, and contradiction, when tested by cross-examining details.

In the time of Sokratēs, this last comparison was not open; since there did not exist, in any department, a body of doctrine scientifically constituted: but the comparison which he actually took, borrowed from the special trades and professions, brought him to an important result. He was the first to see, and the idea pervades all his speculations, that as in each art or profession there is an end to be attained, a theory laying down the means and conditions whereby it is attainable, and precepts deduced from that theory, such precepts collectively taken directing and covering nearly the entire field of practice, but each precept separately taken liable to conflict with others, and therefore liable to cases of exception; so all this is not less true, or admits not less of being realized, respecting the general art of human living and society. There is a grand and all-comprehensive End,—the security and happiness, as far as practicable, of each and all persons in the society:¹ there may be a theory, laying

¹ Xenoph. Memor. iv, 1, 2. Ἐπεκτινάζοιτο (Sokratēs) διὰ τὰς ἀγαθὰς φύσεις, ἐκ τοῦ ταχὺ τε μάθαιεν αἷς προσήκουσι, καὶ μνημονεύειν ἃ ἀνμάθοιεν, καὶ ἐπιθυμεῖν τῶν μαθημάτων περὶ τῶν, δι' ὧν ἴσται οὐκ αὖτε καλῶς οἰκεῖν καὶ πόλιν, καὶ τὸ ὅλον ἀνθρώπων τε καὶ ἀνθρωπίνους πραγμασίαι εὖ χρῆσθαι. Τὸν γὰρ τοιοῦτον ἡγεῖτο παιδεύεσθαι οὐκ ἂν μόνον αὐτοῖς τε εὐδαιμόνας εἶναι καὶ τοῖς ἑαυτῶν οἴκους καλῶς οἰκεῖν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἄλλους ἀνθρώπους καὶ πόλεις δύνασθαι εὐδαιμόνας ποιῆσαι.

Ib. iii, 2, 4. Καὶ οὕτως ἐπισκοπῶν, τίς εἴη ἀγαθὸν ἡγεμονος ἀρετὴ, τὰ μὲν ἄλλα περιήρει, κατέλειπε δὲ, τὸ εὐδαιμόνας ποιεῖν, ὧν ἂν ἡγήται.

Ib. iii, 8, 3, 4, 5; iv, 6, 8. He explains τὸ ἀγαθὸν to mean τὸ ὠφέλιμον—μέχρι δὲ τοῦ ὠφελίμου πάντα καὶ αὐτὸς συνεπισκοπεῖ καὶ συνεδέξῃ τοῖς συνοῦσι (iv, 7, 8). Compare Plato, Gorgias, c. 66, 67, p. 474, D; 475, A.

Things are called ἀγαθὰ καὶ καλὰ on the one hand, and κακὰ καὶ αἰσχρὰ on the other, in reference each to its distinct end, of averting or mitigating in the one case, of bringing on or increasing in the other, different modes of human suffering. So again, iii, 9-4, we find the phrases: ἃ δὲ πράττειν—

down those means and conditions under which the nearest approach can be made to that end: there may also be precepts, prescribing to every man the conduct and character which best enables him to become an auxiliary towards its attainment, and imperatively restraining him from acts which tend to hinder it; precepts deduced from the theory, each one of them separately

ἐὼς πραττεῖν—τὰ συμφορώτατα αὐτοῖς πραττεῖν, all used as equivalents.

Plato, Symposium, p. 205, A. Κτῆσαι γὰρ ἀγαθῶν εὐδαιμόνες ἴσονται—καὶ οὐκέτι προσδοεῖ ἱκανοῦν, ἵνατι δὲ βούλεται εὐδαιμόν εἶναι; ἀλλὰ τέλος δοκεῖ εἶναι ἡ ἀπόκρισις: compare Euthydēm. c. 20, p. 279, A; c. 25, p. 281, D.

Plato, Alkibiadēs, ii, c. 13, p. 145, C. Ὅστις ἀρα τι τῶν τοιούτων οἶδεν, ἴδαν μὲν παρεπιηται αὐτῷ ἢ τοῦ βέλτιστου ἐπιστήμη—αὐτῇ δ' ἢ ἢ αὐτῇ δὲ πῶς ἢ περ καὶ ἢ τοῦ ὠφελίμου—φρόνιμον γε αὐτὸν φησομέν καὶ ἀποχρώτα ξυμβούλον, καὶ τῇ πόλει καὶ αὐτὸν ἑαυτῷ τὸν δὲ μὴ ποιοῦντα, ταραττα τούτων: compare Plato, Republic, vi, p. 504, E. The fact that this dialogue, called Alkibiadēs II, was considered by some as belonging not to Plato, but to Xenophon or Æschinēs Socraticus, does not detract from its value as evidence about the speculations of Sokratēs (see Diogen. Laert. ii. 61, 62; Athenaeus, v, p. 220).

Plato, Apol. Sok. c. 17, p. 30, A. οἶδεν γὰρ ἄλλο πρῶτον περιέρχομαι, ἢ πείθει ἑμὸν καὶ ἰσχυρόν καὶ πρεσβύτερον, μήτε σωμάτων ἐπιμελεῖσθαι ἀπὲρ χρημάτων προτιόν μῆτε οὕτω σφικτὰ, ὥς τῆς ψυχῆς, ὅπως ὡς ἀρίστη ἴσται: λέγων δὲ οὐκ ἐκ χρημάτων ἀρετὴ γίγνεται, ἀλλ' ἐξ ἀρετῆς χρῆματα καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ἀγαθὰ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἅπαντα καὶ ἰδίᾳ καὶ δημοσίᾳ.

Zeller (Die Philosophie der Griechen, vol. ii, pp. 61-64) admits as a fact this reference of the Sokratic ethics to human security and happiness as their end, while Brandis (Gesch. der Gr. Röm. Philosoph. ii, p. 40, seq.) resorts to inadmissible suppositions, in order to avoid admitting it, and to explain away the direct testimony of Xenophon. Both of these authors consider this doctrine as a great taint in the philosophical character of Sokratēs. Zeller even says, what he intends for strong censure, that "the eudaimonistic basis of the Sokratic ethics differs from the *sophistical moral philosophy*, not in principle, but only in result." (p. 61.)

I protest against this allusion to a *sophistical moral philosophy*, and have shown my grounds for the protest in the preceding chapter. There was no such thing as *sophistical moral philosophy*. Not only the sophists were no sect or school, but further, not one of them ever aimed, so far as we know, at establishing any ethical theory: this was the great innovation of Sokratēs. But it is perfectly true that, between the preceptorial exhortation of Sokratēs, and that of Protagoras or Prodikos, there was no great material difference; and this Zeller seems to admit.

taken being subject to exceptions, but all of them taken collectively governing practice, as in each particular art.¹ Sokratēs and Plato talk of "the art of dealing with human beings," "the art of behaving in society," "that science which has for its object to make men happy:" and they draw a marked distinction between art, or rules of practice deduced from a theoretical survey of the subject-matter and taught with precognition of the end, and mere artless, irrational knack, or dexterity, acquired by simple copying, or assimilation, through a process of which no one could render account.²

Plato, with that variety of indirect allusion which is his characteristic, continually constrains the reader to look upon human and social life as having its own ends and purposes no less than each separate profession or craft; and impels him to transfer to the former that conscious analysis as a science, and intelligent practice as an art, which are known as conditions of success in the latter.³ It was in furtherance of these rational conceptions, "Science and Art," that Sokratēs carried on his crusade against

¹ The existence of cases forming exceptions to each separate moral precept, is brought to view by Sokratēs in Xen. Mem. iv, 2, 15-19; Plato, Republic, i, 6, p. 331, C, D, E, ii, p. 382, C.

² Plato, Phaedon, c. 88, p. 89, E. *ἀνευ τέχνης τῆς περὶ τὰνθρώπινα ἡ τοιοῦτος χρῆσθαι ἐπιχειρεῖ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους: εἰ γὰρ πᾶν μετὰ τέχνης ἐχρητο, ὥσπερ ἐρεῖ, οὕτως ἂν ἡγήσατο, etc. ἡ πολιτικὴ τέχνη, Protagor. c. 27, p. 319, A, Gorgias, c. 163, p. 521, D.*

Compare Apol. Sok. c. 4, p. 20, A, B, Euthydēmus, c. 50, p. 292, E: *τίς 'στ' ἐστὶν ἐπιστήμη ἐκείνη, ἣ ἡμᾶς εὐδαίμονας ποιεῖται;*...

The marked distinction between *τέχνη*, as distinguished from *ἀτεχνος* *ἐργασία* — *ἀλόγος ἐργασία* or *ἐμπειρία*, is noted in the Phaedrus, c. 95, p. 260, E, and in Gorgias, c. 42, p. 463, B, c. 45, p. 465, A, c. 121, p. 501, A, a remarkable passage. That there is in every art some assignable end, to which its precepts and conditions have reference, is again laid down in the Sophistēs, c. 37, p. 232, A.

³ This fundamental analogy, which governed the reasoning of Sokratēs, between the special professions and social living generally, — transferring to the latter the idea of a preconceived end, a theory, and a regulated practice, or art, which are observed in the former, — is strikingly stated in one of the aphorisms of the emperor Marcus Antoninus, v, 35: *Οὐχ ὅπως πᾶσι δὲ βαναυσὶ τεχνίται ἀρμόζονται μὲν ἄλλο τινα πᾶσι τοῖς ἰσχυροῦς, οὐδὲν ἥσσον μέντοι ἀντεχόνται τοῦ λόγου τῆς τέχνης, καὶ τούτου ἀποστῆναι οὐχ ὑπομένουσιν. Οὐ δὲ μὲν, εἰ δὲ ἀρχαῖα καὶ ὁ ἴσας*

"that conceit of knowledge without reality," which reigned undisturbed in the moral world around him, and was only beginning to be slightly disturbed even as to the physical world. To him the precept, inscribed in the Delphian temple, "Know Thyself," was the holiest of all texts, which he constantly cited, and strenuously enforced upon his hearers; interpreting it to mean, Know what sort of a man thou art, and what are thy capacities, in reference to human use.¹ His manner of enforcing it was alike original and effective, and though he was dexterous in varying his topics,² and queries according to the individual person with whom he had to deal, it was his first object to bring the hearer to take just measure of his own real knowledge or real ignorance. To preach, to exhort, even to confute particular errors, appeared to Sokratēs useless, so long as the mind lay wrapped up in its habitual mist or illusion of wisdom: such mist must be dissipated before any new light could enter. Accordingly, the hearer being usually forward in announcing positive declarations on those general doctrines, and explanations of those terms, to which he was most attached and in which he had the most implicit confidence, Sokratēs took them to pieces, and showed that they involved contradiction and inconsistency; professing himself to be without any positive opinion, nor ever advancing any until the hearer's mind had undergone the proper purifying cross-examination.³

πᾶσι ἀνδραγατῶν τὸν τῆς ἰδίας τέχνης λόγον, ἢ ὁ ἀνθρώπος τοῦ ἐν τούτῳ, καὶ αὐτὸ καὶ ἐστὶ πρὸς τοὺς θεοὺς.

¹ Plato (Phaedr. c. 8, p. 229, E, Charmidēs, c. 26, p. 164, E, Alkibiad. i, p. 124, A, 129, A, 131, A).

Xenoph. Mem. iv, 2, 24-26. *οὕτως ἑαυτὸν ἐπισκευόμενος, ὁποῖός ἐστι πρὸς τὴν ἐκείνου πύλιν χρεῖται, ἐγγινώσκων αὐτὸν δόξαμιν.* Cicero (de Legib. i, 22, 59) gives a paraphrase of this well-known text, far more vague and tardy than the conception of Sokratēs.

² See the striking conversations of Sokratēs with Glaukon and Charmidēs, especially that with the former, in Xen. Mem. iii, c. 6, 7.

³ There is no part of Plato in which this doxosophy, or false conceit of wisdom, is more earnestly reprobated than in the Sophistēs, with notice of the elenchus, or cross-examining exposure, as the only effectual cure for such fundamental vice of the mind, as the true purifying process (Sophistēs, c. 23-25, pp. 230, 231).

See the same process illustrated by Sokratēs, after his questions put to

It was this indirect and negative proceeding, which, though only a part of the whole, stood out as his most original and most conspicuous characteristic, and determined his reputation with a large number of persons who took no trouble to know anything else about him. It was an exposure no less painful than surprising to the person questioned, and produced upon several of them an effect of permanent alienation, so that they never came near him again,¹ but reverted to their former state of mind without any permanent change. But on the other hand, the ingenuity and novelty of the process was highly interesting to hearers, especially youthful hearers, sons of rich men, and enjoying leisure; who not only carried away with them a lofty admiration of Sokratês, but were fond of trying to copy his negative polemics.² Probably men like Alkibiadês and Kritias frequented his society chiefly for the purpose of acquiring a quality which they might turn to some account in their political career. His constant habit of never suffering a general term to remain undetermined, but applying it at once to particulars; the homely and effective instances of

the slave of Menon (Plato, Menon, c. 18, p. 84, B, Charmidês, c. 30, p. 166, D).

As the Platonic Sokratês, even in the Defence, where his own personality stands most manifest, denounces as the worst and deepest of all mental defects, this conceit of knowledge without reality, *ἡ ἀμαθία αἰτὴ ἢ ἰσχυρὸς διστος, ἢ τοῦ οἰεσθαι εἶδεναι αὐτὸς οὐκ οἶδεν*, c. 17, p. 29, B,—so the Xenophontic Sokratês, in the same manner, treats this same mental infirmity as being near to madness, and distinguishes it carefully from simple want of knowledge, or conscious ignorance: *Μανίαν γὰρ μὴ ἐναντίον μὲν εἶναι σοφία, οὐ μέντοι γὰρ τὴν ἀνεπιστημοσύνην μανίαν ἐννοεῖν. Τὸ δὲ ἀγνοεῖν ἑαυτὸν, καὶ ὃ μὴ τις οἶδε δοξάζειν, καὶ οἰεσθαι γινώσκειν, ἐγγυτάτω μανίας ἐλογίζετο εἶναι* (Mem. iii. 9, 6). This conviction thus stands foremost in the mental character of Sokratês, and on the best evidence, Plato and Xenophon united.

¹ Xenoph. Mem. iv. 2, 40. Πολλοὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν οὕτω διατεθέντων ἐπὶ Σωκράτους οὐκέτι αὐτῷ προσήσαν, οἷς καὶ βλακωτέροις ἐνόμιζεν.

² Plato, Apol. Sok. c. 9, p. 23, A. Οἴονται γὰρ με ἑκάστητε οἱ παρόντες τεύετα αὐτὸν εἶναι σοφὸν, ἢ ἂν ἄλλον ἐξελέγξω.

Ibid. c. 10, p. 23, C. Πρὸς δὲ τοῦτοις, οἱ νεοὶ μοι ἐπακολουθοῦντες, οἷς μάλιστα σχολή ἐστιν, οἱ τῶν πλουσιωτάτων, αὐτόματοι χαίρουσιν ἀκούοντες ἐξεταζομένων τῶν ἀνθρώπων, καὶ αὐτοὶ πολλὰκις ἐμὲ μιμούμεται, εἴτα ἐπ' αὐτοῖς ἄλλους ἐξετάζειν, etc.

Compare also ibid. c. 22, p. 33, C, c. 27, p. 37, D.

which he made choice; the string of interrogatories each advancing towards a result, yet a result not foreseen by any one; the indirect and circuitous manner whereby the subject was turned round, and at last approached and laid open by a totally different face, all this constituted a sort of prerogative in Sokratês, which no one else seems to have approached. Its effect was enhanced by a voice and manner highly plausible and captivating, and to a certain extent by the very eccentricity of his silenic physiognomy.¹ What is termed "his irony," or assumption of the character of an ignorant learner, asking information from one who knew better than himself, while it was essential² as an excuse for his practice as a questioner, contributed also to add zest and novelty to his conversation; and totally banished from it both didactic pedantry and seeming bias as an advocate; which, to one who talked so much, was of no small advantage. After he had acquired celebrity, this uniform profession of ignorance in debate was usually construed as mere affectation; and those who merely heard him occasionally, without penetrating into his intimacy, often suspected that he was amusing himself with ingenious paradox.³ Timon the Satirist, and Zeno the Epicurean, accordingly described him as a buffoon, who turned every one into ridicule, especially men of eminence.⁴

¹ This is an interesting testimony preserved by Aristoxenus, on the testimony of his father Spintharus, who heard Sokratês (Aristox. Frag. 28, c. 1, D. 10). Spintharus said, respecting Sokratês: *ὅτι οὐ πολλοῖς αὐτὸς γὰρ πρὸς αὐτὸν ἐπὶ τῇ γλώσσῃ εἶναι τὴν τε φωνὴν καὶ τὸ στόμα καὶ τὸ πρὸς αὐτοῖς ἦσαν, καὶ πρὸς πᾶσι τῇ τοῖς ἐκρηγμένοις τὴν τοῦ εἶδους ἰδέσθαι*.

It seems evident also, from the remarkable passage in Plato's Symposium, c. 20, p. 215, A, that he too must have been much affected by the singular physiognomy of Sokratês: compare Xenoph. Sympos. iv. 19.

² Aristot. de Sophist. Elench. c. 32, p. 183, b. 6. Compare also Plutarch, Quæst. Platonicæ, p. 99, E. *Τὴν δὲ ἐξηρητικὴν ζωὴν ὡς πρὸς καθαρτικὸν ἔχειν, οὐ μόνον, ὁ Σωκράτης ἀεὶ ἀποποιεῖται, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν ἀποφαινομένην, καὶ μὴ ἐπὶ τῇ δόξῃ, ἀλλὰ ἐπὶ τῇ ἀληθείᾳ, οὐκ αὐτὸς ἰδίᾳ ἀλλὰ ἰσχυρῶς*.

³ Xenoph. Mem. iv. 4, 9.

Plato, Gorgias, c. 81, p. 481, B. *σπουδαῖα πάντα Σωκράτης ἢ παίζει; Republic, i. c. 11, p. 337, A. αἰτὴ ἐστὶν ἡ εἰσέναι ἐμπροσθέν Σωκράτους, etc. (Apol. Sok. c. 28, p. 38, A.)*

⁴ Diog. Laert. ii. 16, Cicero, De Nat. Deor. i. 34, 93 Cicero (Brutus

It is by Plato that the negative and indirect vein of Sokratēs has been worked out and immortalized; while Xenophon, who sympathized little in it, complains that others looked at his master too exclusively on this side, and that they could not conceive him as a guide to virtue, but only as a stirring and propulsive force.¹ One of the principal objects of his "Memorabilia" is, to show that Sokratēs, after having worked upon novices sufficiently with the negative line of questions, altered his tone, desisted from embarrassing them, and addressed to them precepts not less plain and simple than directly useful in practice.² I do not at all doubt that this was often the fact, and that the various dialogues in which Xenophon presents to us the philosopher inculcating self-control, temperance, piety, duty to parents, brotherly love, fidelity in friendship, diligence, benevolence, etc., on positive grounds, are a faithful picture of one valuable side of his character, and an essential part of the whole. Such direct admonitory influence was common to Sokratēs with Prodikos and the best of the sophists.

It is, however, neither from the virtue of his life, nor from the

85, 292) also treats the irony of Sokratēs as intended to mock and humiliate his fellow-dialogists, and it sometimes appears so in the dialogues of Plato. Yet I doubt whether the real Sokratēs could have had any pronounced purpose of this kind.

¹ The beginning of Xen. Mem. i, 4, 1, is particularly striking on this head: Εἰ δὲ τίς, Σωκράτην νομίζουσι (ὡς ἐναι γρηγορεῖν τε καὶ λέγειν πρὸς αὐτοὺς τεκμαίρονται) προτρέψασθαι μὴ ἀδρανῶς ἐπ' αὐτὴν κριθεῖν τοι γένοιται, προαγαγεῖν δὲ ἐπ' αὐτὴν οὐκ ἔστιν—ἀποφασίζουσι δὲ αὐτὸν ἢ ἐκείνους κολαστήριον εἶναι καὶ τοὺς πάντας οἰόμενοι εἶδεναι ἐρωτῶν ἡλεγχῆναι, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἂν λέγων ἀνδραγαθῶς τοὺς συνδιδάσκουσιν, δοκιμαζόντων, εἰ ἔστιν ἢ δὲ ζήτων πρὸς τοὺς συνοῦντας.

² Xenophon, after describing the dialogue wherein Sokratēs cross-examines and humiliates Euthydēmos, says at the end: Ὁ δὲ (Sokratēs) ὡς ἔγω αὐτὸν οὕτως ἔχοντα, ἤκιστα μὲν αὐτὸν διεταράττειν, ἀπλούστατα δὲ καὶ σαφίστατα ἐξηγεῖτο ἃ τε ἐνομιζεν εἶδεναι εἶναι καὶ ἃ ἐπιτηδεύειν κράτιστα εἶναι.

Again, iv, 7, 1: Ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἁπλῶς τὴν αὐτὴν γνώμην ἀπερρατίζῃ Σωκράτης πρὸς τοὺς ἀμύχαντας αὐτῷ, δοκεῖ μοι δῆλον ἐκ τῶν ἐξηγημένων εἶναι, etc.

His readers were evidently likely to doubt, and required proof, that Sokratēs could speak *plainly, directly, and positively*: so much better known was the other side of his character.

goodness of his precepts — though both were essential features in his character — that he derives his peculiar title to fame, but from his originality and prolific efficacy in the line of speculative philosophy. Of that originality, the first portion, as has been just stated, consisted in his having been the first to conceive the idea of an ethical science with its appropriate end, and with precepts capable of being tested and improved; but the second point, and not the least important, was, his peculiar method, and extraordinary power of exciting scientific impulse and capacity in the minds of others. It was not by positive teaching that this effect was produced. Both Sokratēs and Plato thought that little mental improvement could be produced by expositions directly communicated, or by new written matter lodged in the memory.¹ It was necessary that mind should work upon mind, by short question and answer, or an expert employment of the dialectic process,² in order to generate new thoughts and powers; a process which Plato, with his exuberant fancy, compares to copulation and pregnancy, representing it as the true way, and the only effectual way, of propagating the philosophic spirit.

We should greatly misunderstand the negative and indirect vein of Sokratēs, if we suppose that it ended in nothing more than simple negation. On busy or ungifted minds, among the indiscriminate public who heard him, it probably left little permanent effect of any kind, and ended in a mere feeling of admiration for ingenuity, or perhaps dislike of paradox: on practical minds like Xenophon, its effect was merged in that of the preceptorial exhortation: but where the seed fell upon an intellect having the least predisposition or capacity for systematic thought, the negation had only the effect of driving the hearer back at first, giving him a new impetus for afterwards springing forward. The Sokratic dialectics, clearing away from the mind its mist of

¹ Plato, Sophistēs, c. 17, p. 230, A. μετὰ δὲ πολλοῦ πόνου τὸ νοουμένην ἀν εἶδος τῆς παιδείας σικκρὸν ἀνύτειν, etc. Compare a fragment of Demokritus, in Mullach's edition of the Fragm. Demokrit. p. 175. Fr. Moral 59. Τὸν οἰόμενον νόον ἔχειν ὁ νοουμένων καταιοπνέει.

Compare Plato, Epistol. vii, pp. 343, 344.

² Compare two passages in Plato's Protagoras, c. 49, p. 329, A, and c. 94, p. 348, D, and the Phædrus, c. 128-140, p. 276, A, E.

fancied knowledge, and laying bare the real ignorance,] *Arceus* an immediate effect like the touch of the torpedo:¹ the newly-created consciousness of ignorance was alike unexpected, painful, and humiliating, — a season of doubt and discomfort; yet combined with an internal working and yearning after truth, never before experienced. Such intellectual quickening, which could never commence until the mind had been disabused of its original illusion of false knowledge, was considered by Sokratēs not merely as the index and precursor, but as the indispensable condition, of future progress. It was the middle point in the ascending mental scale; the lowest point being ignorance unconscious, self-satisfied, and mistaking itself for knowledge; the next above, ignorance conscious, unmasked, ashamed of itself, and thirsting after knowledge as yet unpossessed; while actual knowledge, the third and highest stage, was only attainable after passing through the second as a preliminary.² This second, was a sort of pregnancy; and every mind either by nature incapable of it, or in which, from want of the necessary conjunction, it had never arisen, was barren for all purposes of original or self-appropriated thought. Sokratēs regarded it as his peculiar vocation and skill, employing another Platonic metaphor, while he had himself no power of reproduction, to deal with such pregnant and troubled minds in the capacity of a midwife; to assist them in that mental parturition whereby they were to be relieved, but at the same time to scrutinize narrowly the offspring which they brought forth; and if it should prove distorted or unpromising, to cast it away with the rigor of a Lykurgian nurse, whatever might be the reluctance of the mother-mind to part with its new-born.³

¹ Plato, Men. c. 13, p. 80. A. *ἀνοϊότατος τῇ πλατεῖα ναρκῇ τῇ θάλασσῃ*

² This tripartite graduation of the intellectual scale is brought out by Plato in the Symposium, c. 29, p. 204. A. and in the Lysis, c. 33, p. 218. A.

The intermediate point of the scale is what Plato here, though not always, expresses by the word *φιλοσοφία*, in its strict etymological sense, "a lover of knowledge," one who is not yet wise, but who, having learned to know and feel his own ignorance, is anxious to become wise. — and has thus made what Plato thought the greatest and most difficult step towards really becoming so.

³ The effect of the interrogatory procedure of Sokratēs, in forcing on the minds of youth a humiliating consciousness of ignorance and an eager

There is nothing which Plato is more fertile in illustrating, than this relation between the teacher and the scholar, operating not by what it put into the latter, but by what it evolved out of him; by creating an uneasy longing after truth, aiding in the elaboration necessary for obtaining relief, and testing whether the doctrine elaborated possessed the real lineaments, or merely the delusive semblance, of truth.

There are few things more remarkable than the description given of the colloquial magic of Sokrates and its vehement effects, by those who had themselves heard it and felt its force. Its suggestive and stimulating power was a gift so extraordinary, as well to justify any abundance of imagery on the part of Plato to illustrate it.¹ On the subjects to which he applied himself, man and society, his hearers had done little but feel and affirm:

anxiety to be relieved from it, is not less powerfully attested in the simpler language of Xenophon, than in the metaphorical variety of Plato. See the conversation with Euthydēmus, in the Memorabilia of Xenophon, iv, 2; a long dialogue which ends by the confession of the latter (c. 39): *Ἀναγκάζει με ταῦτα συνολοῖν δηλονοῦν ἢ ἐμὴ φαυλοτήης· καὶ φροντιστῶ μὴ κρατιστον· ἢ μοι σιγῇ κινδυνεύω γὰρ ἀπλῶς οὐδὲν εἶδέναι. Καὶ πάνν ἀνύμως ἔχων ἀπῆλθε· καὶ τομίσας τῷ θυτὶ ἀνδράποδον εἶναι:* compare i, 1, 16.

This same expression, "thinking himself no better than a slave," is also put by Plato into the mouth of Alkibiadēs, when he is describing the powerful effect wrought on his mind by the conversation of Sokratēs (Symposium, c. 39, p. 215, 216): *Περικλέους δὲ ἀκουὼν καὶ ἄλλων ἀγαθῶν ῥητόρων ἐν μὲν ἡγουμένη, τοιοῦτον δ' οὐδὲν ἐπασχον, οὐδὲ τεθορύβητό μου ἡ ψυχὴ οὐδ' ἡγανακτεῖ ὡς ἀνδράποδω δῶς διακειμένον. Ἀλλ' ὑπὸ τούτου τῶν Μαρσίου πολλὰκις δὴ οὕτω διετεθην, ὥστε μοι δοῖται μὴ βιωτὸν εἶναι ἔχοντι ὡς ἐγώ.*

Compare also the Meno, c. 13, p. 79, E, and Theætet. c. 17, 22, p. 148, E, 151, C, where the metaphor of pregnancy, and of the obstetric art of Sokratēs, is expanded: *πασχονσι δὲ διὰ οἱ ἐμοὶ ξεγγιγνομενοὶ καὶ τοῦτο ταῦτόν ταῖς τεικτοῦσαις· ὠδονοῦσι γὰρ καὶ ἀπορίας ἐμπιπλῶνται νυκτὰς τε καὶ ἡμέρας πολὺν αἰλῶνα ἢ ἐκείναι. Ταύτην τε τὴν ὠδὴν ἐχειρεῖν τε καὶ ἀποπαύειν ἢ ἐμὴ τελετὴ δόξαται — Ἐννοτε δέ, οἱ ἂν μὴ μοι δόξωσιν ἐγκύμονες εἶναι, γνοῦς ὅτι οὐδὲν ἐμοῦ δέονται, πάνν εὐμένως προμνήσασθαι, etc.*

¹ There is a striking expression of Xenophon, in the Memorabilia, about Sokratēs and his conversation (i, 2, 14): —

"He dealt with every one just as he pleased in his discussions," says Xenophon *τοῖς δὲ διαλεγόμενοις αἰτῶ πασι χρωμένον ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ἕτως ἐβούλετο.*

Sokratēs undertook to make them think, weigh, and examine themselves and their own judgments, until the latter were brought into consistency with each other, as well as with a known and venerable end. The generalizations embodied in their judgments had grown together and coalesced in a manner at once so intimate, so familiar, yet so unverified, that the particulars implied in them had passed out of notice: so that Sokratēs, when he recalled these particulars out of a forgotten experience, presented to the hearer his own opinions under a totally new point of view. His conversations — even as they appear in the reproduction of Xenophon, which presents but a mere skeleton of the reality — exhibit the main features of a genuine inductive method, struggling against the deep-lying, but unheeded, errors of the early intellect acting by itself, without conscious march or scientific guidance, — of the *intellectus sibi permissus*, — upon which Bacon so emphatically dwells. Amidst abundance of *instantiæ negativæ*, the scientific value of which is dwelt upon in the "*Novum Organon*,"¹ and

¹ I know nothing so clearly illustrating both the subjects and the method chosen by Sokratēs, as various passages of the immortal criticisms in the *Novum Organon*. When Sokratēs, as Xenophon tells us, devoted his time to questioning others: What is piety? What is justice? What is temperance, courage, political government? etc., we best understand the spirit of his procedure by comparing the sentence which Bacon pronounces upon the first notions of the intellect, — as radically vicious, confused, badly abstracted from things, and needing complete re-examination and revision, — without which, he says, not one of them could be trusted: —

"Quod vero attinet ad notiones primas intellectūs, nihil est eorum, quās intellectus sibi permissus congressit, quā nobis pro suspecto sit, nec ullo modo ratum nisi novo iudicio se scriterit, et secundum illud pronuntiatum fuerit." (Distributio Operis, prefixed to the N. O. p. 163, of Mr. Montagu's edition.) "Serum sane rebus perditis adhibetur remedium, postquam mens ex quotidianā vitæ consuetudine, et auditionibus, et doctrinis inquinatis occupata, et vanissimis idolis obsessa fuerit. . . . Restat unica salus ac sanitas, ut *opis mentis universum de integro resumatur*; ac mens, jam ab ipso principio, nullo modo sibi permittatur, sed perpetuo regatur." (Ib. Præfatio, p. 186.) "Syllogismus ex propositionibus constat, propositiones ex verbis, verba notionum tesserae sunt. Itaque si notiones ipsæ (id quod basis rei est) confusæ sunt et temere a rebus abstractæ, nihil in iis quæ superstruuntur est firmitudinis. Itaque spes est una in inductione verā. In notione nihil sanum est, nec in logicis, nec in physicis. Non Substantia, non Qualitas, Accid. Pati, *ipsa esse*, *bonæ notæ* sunt; multa in eis Chrys. Lysis, Desum. I. — de Humi-
dum Desum. generatio. C. ratiō. Alimēto, Fugare, Elementar, Matena

negative instances, too, so dexterously chosen as generally to show the way to new truth, in place of that error which they set aside,

Forma, et id Genus; sed omnes phantasticæ et male terminatæ. Notiones infimarum specierum, Hominis, Canis, et prehensionum immediatarum sensus, Albi, Nigri, non fallunt magnopere: *reliquæ omnes (quibus homines hactenus uti sunt) aberrationes sunt, nec debitis modis a rebus abstractæ et excitatæ.*" (Aphor. 14, 15, 16.) "Nemo adhuc tantā mentis constantiā et rigore inventus est, ut decreverit et sibi imposuerit, *theorias et notiones communes penitus abolere, et intellectum abrasum et æquum ad particularia de integro applicare.* Itaque ratio illa quam habemus, ex multā fide et multo etiam casu, *non ex paucibus, quas primo hausimus, notionibus, farrago quadam est et confusio.*" (Aphor. 97.) "Nil magis philosophiæ officisse deprehendimus, quam quod res quæ familiares sunt et frequenter occurrunt, contemplationem hominum non morentur et detineant, sed recipiantur obiter, neque earum causæ quasi soleant; ut non sapius requiratur informatio de rebus ignotis, quam attentio in notis." (Aphor. 119.)

These passages, and many others to the same effect which might be extracted from the *Novum Organon*, afford a clear illustration and an interesting parallel to the spirit and purpose of Sokratēs. He sought to test the fundamental notions and generalizations respecting man and society, in the same spirit in which Bacon approached those of physics: he suspected the unconscious process of the growing intellect, and desired to revise it, by comparison with particulars; and from particulars too the most clear and certain, but which, from being of vulgar occurrence, were least attended to. And that which Sokratēs described in his language as "conceit of knowledge without the reality," is identical with what Bacon designates as the *primary notions*, the *prima notions*, the *abstractions*, of the intellect left to itself which have become so familiar and appear so certainly known, that the mind cannot shake them off, and has lost all habit, we might almost say all power, of examining them.

The stringent process — or electric shock, to use the simile in Plato's *Menon* — of the Socratic elenchus, afforded the best means of resuscitating this lost power. And the manner in which Plato speaks of this cross-examining elenchus, as "the great and sovereign purification, without which every man, be he the great king himself, is unschooled, dirty, and full of uncleanness in respect to the main conditions of happiness," — *καὶ τὸν ἀνέλεγκτον ἀνὴρ ἰσχυροῦς καὶ κεκοσμημένον τὰν καθαρῶν ἔσται, καὶ τὸν ἀνέλεγκτον ἀνὴρ ἰσχυροῦς, ἀνὴρ καὶ περὶ πολλῆς βασιλείας ὢν, τὰ μέγιστα ἀκαθάρτοι ὄντα ἀπαιδύονται τε καὶ ἀσάφους γέγονται ταῦτα, ἃ καθαρατάτων καὶ καλλίστων ἔσονται τὰς ὁρὰς ἰσχυροῦς ἐνδαιμόνια εἶναι*, Plato, *Sophist.* c. 34, p. 230, E. — precisely corresponds to that "*cross-examination of human reason in its native or spontaneous process*," which Bacon specifies as one of the three things essential to the expurgation of the intellect, so as to qualify it for the attainment of truth. — Itaque doctrina ista de expurgatione intellectūs, ut ipse ad veritatem habilis sit, tribus redargutionibus absolvitur

— there is a close pressure on the hearer's mind, to keep it in the distinct tract of particulars, as conditions of every just and consistent generalization; and to divert it from becoming enslaved to unexamined formulæ, or from delivering mere intensity of persuasion under the authoritative phrase of reason. Instead of anxiety to plant in the hearer a conclusion ready-made and accepted on trust, the questioner keeps up a prolonged suspense with special emphasis laid upon the particulars tending both affirmatively and negatively; nor is his purpose answered, until that state of knowledge and apprehended evidence is created, out of which the conclusion starts as a living product, with its own root and self-sustaining power consciously linked with its premises. If this conclusion so generated be not the same as that which the questioner himself adopts, it will at least be some other, worthy of a competent and examining mind taking its own

redargutione philosophiarum, redargutione demonstrationum, et redargutione rationis humane nature" (Noy. Organ. Distributio Operis, p. 170, ed. Montagu)

To show further how essential it is, in the opinion of the best judges, that the native intellect should be purged or purified, before it can properly apprehend the truths of physical philosophy, I transcribe the introductory passage of Sir John Herschel's "Astronomy":—

"In entering upon any scientific pursuit, one of the student's first endeavors ought to be to prepare his mind for the reception of truth, by dismissing, or at least loosening his hold on, all such crude and hastily adopted notions respecting the objects and relations he is about to examine, as may tend to embarrass or mislead him, and to strengthen himself, by something of an effort and a resolve, for the unprejudiced admission of any conclusion which shall appear to be supported by careful observation and logical argument, even should it prove adverse to notions he may have previously formed for himself, or taken up, without examination on the credit of others. Such an effort is, in fact, a commencement of that intellectual discipline which forms one of the most important ends of all science. It is the first movement of approach towards that state of mental purity which alone can fit us for a full and steady perception of moral beauty as well as physical adaptation. It is the "euphrasy and rue," with which we must purge our sight before we can receive, and contemplate as they are, the lineaments of truth and nature" (Sir John Herschel, Astronomy; Introduction.)

I could easily multiply citations from other eminent writers on physical philosophy, to the same purpose. All of them prescribe this intellectual purification: Sokratès not only prescribed it, but actually administered it, by means of his elenchus, in reference to the subjects on which he talked.

Independent view of the appropriate evidence. And amidst all the variety and divergence of particulars which we find enforced in the language of Sokratès, the end, towards which all of them point, is one and the same, emphatically signified, the good and happiness of social man.

It is not, then, to multiply proselytes, or to procure authoritative assent, but to create earnest seekers, analytical intellects, foreknowing and consistent agents, capable of forming conclusions for themselves and of teaching others, as well as to force them into that path of inductive generalization whereby alone trustworthy conclusions can be formed, that the Sokratic method aspires. In many of the Platonic dialogues, wherein Sokratès is brought forward as the principal disputant, we read a series of discussions and arguments, distinct, though having reference to the same subject, but terminating either in a result purely negative, or without any definite result at all. The commentators often attempt, but in my judgment with little success, either by arranging the dialogues in a supposed sequence or by various other hypotheses, to assign some positive doctrinal conclusion as having been indirectly contemplated by the author. But if Plato had aimed at any substantive demonstration of this sort, we cannot well imagine that he would have left his purpose thus in the dark, visible only by the microscope of a critic. The didactic value of these dialogues — that wherein the genuine Sokratic spirit stands most manifest — consists, not in the positive conclusion proved, but in the argumentative process itself, coupled with the general importance of the subject, upon which evidence negative and affirmative is brought to bear.

This connects itself with that which I remarked in the preceding chapter, when mentioning Zeno and the first manifestations of dialectics, respecting the large sweep, the many-sided argumentation, and the strength as well as forwardness of the negative arm, in Grecian speculative philosophy. Through Sokratès, this amplitude of dialectic range was transmitted from Zeno, first to Plato and next to Aristotle. It was a proceeding natural to men who were not merely interested in establishing, or refuting some given particular conclusion, but who also — like expert mathematicians in their own science — loved, esteemed, and sought to improve the dialectic process itself, with the means of

verification which it afforded; a feeling, of which abundant evidence is to be found in the Platonic writings.¹ Such pleasure in the scientific operation,—though not merely innocent, but valuable both as a stimulant and as a guarantee against error, and though the corresponding taste among mathematicians is always treated with the sympathy which it deserves,—incurs much unmerited reprobation from modern historians of philosophy, under the name of love of disputation, cavilling, or skeptical subtlety.

But over and above any love of the process, the subjects to which dialectics were applied, from Sokratēs downwards,—man and society, ethics, politics, metaphysics, etc., were such as particularly called for this many-sided handling. On topics like these, relating to sequences of fact which depend upon a multitude of cooperating or conflicting causes, it is impossible to arrive, by any one thread of positive reasoning or induction, at absolute doctrine, which a man may reckon upon finding always true, whether he remembers the proof or not; as is the case with mathematical, astronomical, or physical truth. The utmost which science can ascertain, on subjects thus complicated, is an aggregate, not of peremptory theorems and predictions, but of tendencies;² by studying the action of each separate cause, and combining them together as well as our means admit. The knowledge of tendencies thus obtained, though falling much short of certainty, is highly important for guidance: but it is plain that conclusions of this nature, resulting from multifarious threads of evidence, true only on a balance, and always liable to limitation, can never be safely detached from the proofs on which they rest, or taught as absolute and consecrated formula.³ They require to be kept

¹ See particularly the remarkable passage in the *Philēbus*, c. 18, p. 16. *Sup.*

² See this point instructively set forth in Mr. John Stuart Mill's *System of Logic*, vol. ii, book vi, p. 565, 1st edition.

³ Lord Bacon remarks, in the *Novum Organon* (Aph. 71):—

"Erat autem sapientiā Græcorum professoria, et in disputationes effusa, quod genus inquisitioni veritatis adversissimum est. Itaque nomen illud Sophistarum—quod per contemptum ab iis, qui se philosophos haberi volebant, in antiquos rhetores rejectum et traductum est, Gorgium, Protagoram, Hippium, Polum—etiam universo generi competit, Platoni, Aristoteli, Zenoni, Epicuro, Theophrasto, et eorum successoribus Chrysippo Carneadi, reliquis."

in perpetual and conscious association with the evidences, affirmative and negative, by the joint consideration of which their truth is established; nor can this object be attained by any other means than by ever-renovated discussion, instituted from new and distinct points of view, and with free play to that negative arm which is indispensable as stimulus not less than as control. To ask for nothing but results, to decline the labor of verification, to be satisfied with a ready-made stock of established positive arguments as proof, and to decry the doubter or negative reasoner, who starts new difficulties, as a common enemy, this is a proceeding sufficiently common, in ancient as well as in modern times. But it is, nevertheless, an abnegation of the dignity, and even of the functions, of speculative philosophy. It is the direct reverse of the method both of Sokratēs and Plato, who, as inquirers, felt that, for the great subjects which they treated, multiplied threads of reasoning, coupled with the constant presence of the cross-examining elenchus, were indispensable. Nor is it less at variance with the views of Aristotle,—though a man very different from either of them,—who goes round his subject on all sides, states and considers all its difficulties, and insists emphatically on the necessity of having all these difficulties brought out in full force, as the incitement and guide to positive philosophy, as well as the test of its sufficiency.¹

Bacon is quite right in effacing the distinction between the two lists of persons whom he compares; and in saying that the latter were just as much sophists as the former, in the sense which he here gives to the word, as well as in every other legitimate sense. But he is not justified in imputing to either of them this many-sided argumentation as a fault, looking to the subjects upon which they brought it to bear. His remark has application to the simpler physical sciences, but none to the moral. It had great pertinence and value, at the time when he brought it forward, and with reference to the important reforms which he was seeking to accomplish in physical science. In so far as Plato, Aristotle, or the other Greek philosophers, apply their deductive method to physical subjects, they come justly under Bacon's censure. But here again, the fault consisted less in disputing too much, than in too hastily admitting false or inaccurate axioms without dispute.

¹ Aristotel. *Metaphysic.* iii, 1, 2-5, p. 995, a.

The indispensable necessity, to a philosopher, of having before him all the difficulties and doubts of the problem which he tries to solve, and of

Understanding thus the method of Sokratēs, we shall be at no loss to account for a certain variance on his part — and a still greater variance on the part of Plato, who expanded the method in writing so much more — with the sophists, without supposing the latter to be corrupt teachers. As they aimed at qualifying young men for active life, they accepted the current ethical and political sentiment, with its unexamined commonplaces and inconsistencies, merely seeking to shape it into what was accounted a meritorious character at Athens. They were thus exposed,

looking at a philosophical question with the same alternate attention to its affirmative and negative side, as is shown by a judge to two litigants, is strikingly set forth in this passage. I transcribe a portion of it: 'Εστὶ δὲ τοῖς εὐπορήσαι βουλομένοις προὔργον τὸ διαπορῆσαι καλῶς· ἡ γὰρ ἔστιν εὐπορία λύσις των προτίμων ἀπορουμένων ἐστὶ, λύνει δ' οὐκ ἔστιν ἀγνοῦνται τὸν διαιών. . . . Διὸ δὲ τὰς δυσχερείας τεθωρηκέναι πάσας προτίμων, τούτων τε χάριν, καὶ διὰ τὸ τοὺς ζητούντας ἀνεν τοῦ διαπορῆσαι πρώτοι, διουσι εἶναι τοῖς πᾶσι δὲ βαδίζειν ἀγνοῦσι, καὶ πρὸς τοῖς οὐδ' εἰ ποτὶ τὸ ζητούμενον εἴρηκεν, ἢ μὴ, γινώσκουσιν· τὸ γὰρ τέλος τούτων μὲν οὐ δῆλον, τὸ δὲ προηπορηκὸς δῆλον. *Ετι δὲ βέλτιον ἀναγκὴ ἔχειν πρὸς τὸ κρῖναι, τὸν ὡς περ ἀντιδικῶν καὶ των ἀμφισζητούντων λόγων ἀκηροῦστα πάντων.

A little further on, in the same chapter (iii, 1, 19, p. 996, a), he makes a remarkable observation. Not merely it is difficult, on these philosophical subjects, to get at the truth, but it is not easy to perform well even the preliminary task of discerning and setting forth the ratiocinative difficulties which are to be dealt with: Περὶ γὰρ τούτων ἀπάντων οὐ μόνον χαλεπὸν τὸ εὐπορῆσαι τῆς ἀληθείας, ἀλλ' οὐδὲ τὸ διαπορῆσαι λόγῳ ῥαδίον καλῶς. Διαπορῆσαι means the same as διεξελεῖν τὰς ἀπορίας (Bomitz not *ad loc.*), "to go through the various points of difficulty."

This last passage illustrates well the characteristic gift of Sokratēs, which was exactly what Aristotle calls τὸ διαπορῆσαι λόγῳ καλῶς, to force on the hearer's mind those ratiocinative difficulties which served both as spur and as guide towards solution and positive truth, towards comprehensive and correct generalization, with clear consciousness of the common attribute binding together the various particulars included.

The same care to admit and even invite the development of the negative side of a question, to accept the obligation of grappling with all the difficulties, to assimilate the process of inquiry to a judicial pleading, is to be seen in other passages of Aristotle: see *Ethic. Nikomach.* vii, 1, 5; *De Animā*, i, 2, p. 403, b; *De Caelo*, i, 10, p. 279, b; *Topica*, i, 2, p. 101, a; (*Χρησμός δὲ ἡ διαλεκτική*) πρὸς τὰς κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν ἐπιστήμας, ὅτι δυνάμεις πρὸς ἀμφοτέρω διαπορῆσαι, ῥᾶν ἐν ἑκάστης κατονομασθῆναι τὰληθὺς τε καὶ τὸ ψεῦδος. Compare also Cicero, *Tusc. Disput.* ii, 3, 9.

along with others — and more than others, in consequence of their reputation — to the analytical cross-examination of Sokratēs, and were quite as little able to defend themselves against it.

Whatever may have been the success of Protagoras or any other among these sophists, the mighty originality of Sokratēs achieved results not only equal at the time, but incomparably grander and more lasting in reference to the future. Out of his intellectual school sprang not merely Plato, himself a host, but all the other leaders of Grecian speculation for the next half-century, and all those who continued the great line of speculative philosophy down to later times. Eukleidēs and the Megaric school of philosophers, — Aristippus and the Kyrenaic, — Antisthenēs and Diogenēs, the first of those called the Cynics, all emanated more or less directly from the stimulus imparted by Sokratēs, though each followed a different vein of thought.¹ Ethics continue to be what Sokratēs had first made them, a distinct branch of philosophy, alongside of which politics, rhetoric, logic, and other speculations relating to man and society, gradually arranged themselves; all of them more popular, as well as more keenly controverted, than physics, which at that time presented comparatively little charm, and still less of attainable certainty. There can be no doubt that the individual influence of Sokratēs permanently enlarged the horizon, improved the method, and multiplied the ascendent minds, of the Grecian speculative world, in a manner never since paralleled. Subsequent philosophers may have had a more elaborate doctrine, and a larger number of disciples who imbibed their ideas; but none of them applied the same stimulating method with the same efficacy; none of them struck out of other minds that fire which sets light to original thought; none of them either produced in others the pains of intellectual pregnancy, or extracted from others the fresh and unborrowed offspring of a really parturient mind.

Having thus touched upon Sokratēs, both as first opener of

¹ Cicero (*de Orator.* iii, 16, 61; *Tuscul. Disput.* v, 4, 11): "Cujus (Sokratidis) multiplex ratio disputandi, rerumque varietas, et ingenii magnitudo, Platonis ingenio et literis consecrata, plura genera effecit dissentientium philosophorum." Ten distinct varieties of Sokratic philosophers are enumerated, but I lay little stress on the exact number.

the field of ethics to scientific study, and as author of a method, little copied and never paralleled since his time, for stimulating in other men's minds earnest analytical inquiry, I speak last about his theoretical doctrine. Considering the fanciful, far fetched ideas, upon which alone the Pythagoreans and other predecessors had shaped their theories respecting virtues and vices, the wonder is that Sokratès, who had no better guides to follow, should have laid down an ethical doctrine which has the double merit of being true, as far as it goes, legitimate, and of comprehensive generality: though it errs, mainly by stating a part of the essential conditions of virtue¹ — sometimes also a part of the ethical end — as if it were the whole. Sokratès resolved all virtue into knowledge or wisdom; all vice, into ignorance or folly. To do right was the only way to impart happiness, or the least degree of unhappiness compatible with any given situation: now this was precisely what every one wished for and aimed at; only that many persons, from ignorance, took the wrong road; and no man was wise enough always to take the right. But as no man was willingly his own enemy, so no man ever did wrong willingly; it was because he was not fully or correctly informed of the consequences of his own actions; so that the proper remedy to apply was enlarged teaching of consequences and improved judgment.² To make him willing to be taught, the only condition required was to make him conscious of his own ignorance; the want of which consciousness was the real cause both of indocility and of vice.

That this doctrine sets forth one portion of the essential condi-

¹ In setting forth the ethical end, the language of Sokratès, as far as we can judge from Xenophon and Plato, seems to have been not always consistent with itself. He sometimes stated it as if it included a reference to the happiness, not merely of the agent himself, but of others besides; both as coördinate elements; at other times, he seems to speak as if the end was nothing more than the happiness of the agent himself, though the happiness of others was among the greatest and most essential means. The former view is rather countenanced by Xenophon, the best witness about his master, so that I have given it as belonging to Sokratès, though it is not always adhered to. The latter view appears most in Plato, who assimilates the health of the soul to the health of the body, an end essentially self-regarding.

² Cicero. de Orator. i. 47, 204.

tions of virtue, is certain; and that too the most commanding portion, since there can be no assured moral conduct except under the supremacy of reason. But that it omits to notice, what is not less essential to virtue, the proper condition of the emotions, desires, etc., taking account only of the intellect, is also certain; and has been remarked by Aristotle¹ as well as by many others. It is fruitless, in my judgment, to attempt by any refined explanation to make out that Sokratès meant, by "knowledge," something more than what is directly implied in the word. He had present to his mind, as the grand depravation of the human being, not so much vice, as madness; that state in which a man does not know what he is doing. Against the vicious man, securities both public and private may be taken, with considerable effect; against the madman there is no security except perpetual restraint. He is incapable of any of the duties incumbent on social man, nor can he, even if he wishes, do good either to himself or to others. The sentiment which we feel towards such an unhappy being is, indeed, something totally different from moral reprobation, such as we feel for the vicious man who does wrong knowingly. But Sokratès took measure of both with reference to the purposes of human life and society, and pronounced that the latter was less completely spoiled for those purposes than the former. Madness was ignorance at its extreme pitch, accompanied, too, by the circumstance that the madman himself was unconscious of his own ignorance, acting under a sincere persuasion that he knew what he was doing. But short of this extremity, there were many varieties and gradations in the scale of ignorance, which, if accompanied by false conceit of knowledge, differed from madness only in degree, and each of which disqualified a man from doing right, in proportion to the ground which it covered. The worst of all ignorance — that which stood nearest to madness — was when a man was ignorant of himself, fancying that he knew what he did not really know, and that he could do, or avoid, or endure, what was quite beyond his capacity; when, for example, intending to speak the same truth, he sometimes said one thing, sometimes another; or, casting up the same

¹ Xenoph. Mem. iii. 9, 4; Aristot. Ethic. Nikomach. vi. 13, 3-5; Ethic. Eudem. i. 5; Ethic. Magn. i. 35.

arithmetical figures, made sometimes a greater sum, sometimes a less. A person who knows his letters, or an arithmetician, may doubtless write bad orthography or cast-up incorrectly, by design, but can also perform the operations correctly, if he chooses; while one ignorant of writing or of arithmetic, *cannot* do it correctly, even though he should be anxious to do so. The former, therefore, comes nearer to the good orthographer or arithmetician than the latter. So, if a man knows what is just, honorable, and good, but commits acts of a contrary character, he is juster, or comes nearer to being a just man, than one who does not know what just acts are, and does not distinguish them from unjust; for this latter *cannot* conduct himself justly, even if he desires it ever so much.¹

The opinion here maintained illustrates forcibly the general doctrine of Sokratês. I have already observed that the fundamental idea which governed his train of reasoning, was, the analogy of each man's social life and duty to a special profession or trade. Now what is principally inquired after in regard to these special men, is their professional capacity; without this, no person would ever think of employing them, let their dispositions be ever so good; with it, good dispositions and diligence are presumed, unless there be positive grounds for suspecting the contrary. But why do we indulge such presumption? Because their pecuniary interest, their professional credit, and their place among competitors, are staked upon success, so that we reckon upon their best efforts. But in regard to that manifold and indefinite series of acts which constitute the sum total of social duty, a man has no such special interest to guide and impel him, nor can we presume in him those dispositions which will insure his doing right, wherever he knows what right is. Mankind are

¹ Xenoph. Mem. iii, 9, 6; iv, 2, 19-22. δικαιοτέρον δὲ τὸν ἐπιστάμενον τὰ δίκαια τοῦ μὴ ἐπιστάμενον. To call him the *juster* man of the two, when neither are just, can hardly be meant. I translate it according to what seems to me the meaning intended. So γρηναϊκώτερος in the sentence before, means, comes nearer to a good orthographer. The Greek derivative adjectives in -*teos* are very difficult to render precisely.

Compare Plato, Hippias Minor, c. 15, p. 372, D, where the same opinion is maintained. Hippias tells Sokratês, in that dialogue (c. 11, p. 369, B), that he fixes his mind on a part of the truth, and omits to notice the rest.

obliged to give premiums for these dispositions, and to attach penalties to the contrary, by means of praise and censure; moreover, the natural sympathies and antipathies of ordinary minds, which determine so powerfully the application of moral terms, run spontaneously in this direction, and even overshoot the limit which reason would prescribe. The analogy between the paid special duty and the general social duty, fails in this particular. Even if Sokratês were correct as to the former, — and this would be noway true, — in making the intellectual conditions of good conduct stand for the whole, no such inference could safely be extended to the latter.

Sokratês affirmed that "well-doing" was the noblest pursuit of man. "Well-doing" consisted in doing a thing well after having learned it and practised it, by the rational and proper means; it was altogether disparate from good fortune, or success without rational scheme and preparation. "The best man (he said), and the most beloved by the gods, is he who, as an husbandman, performs well the duties of husbandry; as a surgeon, those of medical art; in political life, his duty towards the commonwealth. But the man who does nothing well, is neither useful, nor agreeable to the gods."¹ This is the Sokratic view of human life; to look at it as an assemblage of realities and practical details; to translate the large words of the moral vocabulary into those homely particulars to which at bottom they refer; to take account of acts, not of dispositions apart from act (in contradiction to the ordinary flow of the moral sympathies); to enforce upon every one, that what he chiefly required was teaching and practice, as preparations for act; and that therefore ignorance, especially ignorance mistaking itself for knowledge, was his capital deficiency. The religion of Sokratês, as well as his ethics, had reference to practical human ends; nor had any man ever less of that transcendentalism in his mind, which his scholar Plato exhibits in such abundance.

It is indisputable, then, that Sokratês laid down a general ethical theory which is too narrow, and which states a part of the truth as if it were the whole. But, as it frequently happens with philosophers who make the like mistake, we find that he

¹ Xenoph. Memor. iii, 9, 14, 15.

did not confine his deductive reasonings within the limits of the theory, but escaped the erroneous consequences by a partial inconsistency. For example; no man ever insisted more emphatically than he, on the necessity of control over the passions and appetites, of enforcing good habits, and on the value of that state of the sentiments and emotions which such a course tended to form.¹ In truth, this is one particular characteristic of his admonitions. He exhorted men to limit their external wants, to be sparing in indulgence, and to cultivate, even in preference to honors and advancement, those pleasures which would surely arise from a performance of duty, as well as from self-examination and the consciousness of internal improvement. This earnest attention, in measuring the elements and conditions of happiness,

¹ Xenoph. Mem. ii, 6, 39. ὅσα δ' ἐν ἀνθρώποις ἀρεταὶ λέγονται ταύτας πᾶσας σκοποῦμενος εὐρησάτω μόνος τε καὶ μελέτη ἀναισθημένος. Again, the necessity of practise or discipline is inculcated. iii. 9. 1. When Sokratēs enumerates the qualities requisite in a good friend, it is not merely superior knowledge which he talks of, but of moral excellence; continence, a self-sufficing temper, mildness, a grateful disposition (c. ii, 6, 1-5).

Moreover, Sokratēs laid it down that continence, or self-control, was the very basis of virtue: τὴν ἐγκράτειαν ἀρετῆς κρηπίδα (i, 5, 4). Also, that continence was indispensable in order to enable a man to acquire knowledge (iv, 5, 10, 11).

Sokratēs here plainly treats ἐγκράτειαν (continence, or self-control) as not being a state of the intellectual man, and yet as being the very basis of virtue. He therefore does not seem to have applied consistently his general doctrine, that virtue consisted in knowledge, or in the excellence of the intellectual man, alone. Perhaps he might have said: Knowledge alone will be sufficient to make you virtuous; but before you can acquire knowledge, you must previously have disciplined your emotions and appetites. This merely eludes the objection, without saying the sufficiency of the general doctrine.

I cannot concur with Ritter (Gesch. der Philos. vol. ii, ch. 2, p. 78) in thinking that Sokratēs meant by knowledge, or wisdom, a transcendental attribute, above humanity, and such as is possessed only by a god. This is by no means consistent with that practical conception of human life and its ends, which stands so plainly marked in his character.

Why should we think it wonderful that Sokratēs should propose a defective theory, which embraces only one side of a large and complicated question? Considering that his was the first theory derived from data really belonging to the subject, the wonder is, that it was so near as approach to the truth.

to the state of the internal associations as contrasted with the effect of external causes, as well as the pains taken to make it appear how much the latter depend upon the former for their power of conferring happiness, and how sufficient is moderate good fortune in respect to externals, provided the internal man be properly disciplined, is a vein of thought which pervades both Sokratēs and Plato, and which passed from them, under various modifications, to most of the subsequent schools of ethical philosophy. It is probable that Protagoras or Prodikus, training rich youth for active life, without altogether leaving out such internal element of happiness, would yet dwell upon it less; a point of decided superiority in Sokratēs.

The political opinions of Sokratēs were much akin to his ethical, and deserve especial notice, as having in part contributed to his condemnation by the dikastery. He thought that the functions of government belonged legitimately to those who knew best how to exercise them for the advantage of the governed. "The legitimate king or governor was not the man who held the sceptre, nor the man elected by some vulgar persons, nor he who had got the post by lot, nor he who had thrust himself in by force or by fraud, but he alone who knew how to govern well."¹ Just as the pilot governed on shipboard, the surgeon in a sick man's house, the trainer in a palæstra; every one else being eager to obey these professional superiors, and even thanking and recompensing them for their directions, simply because their greater knowledge was an admitted fact. It was absurd, Sokratēs used to contend, to choose public officers by lot, when no one would trust himself on shipboard under the care of a pilot selected by hazard,² nor would any one pick out a carpenter or a musician in like manner.

We do not know what provision Sokratēs suggested for applying his principle to practice, for discovering who was the fittest man in point of knowledge, or for superseding him in case of his becoming unfit, or in case another fitter than he should arise. The analogies of the pilot, the surgeon, and professional men generally, would naturally conduct him to election by the people, renewable after temporary periods; since no one of these profes-

Xen. Mem. iii, 9, 10, 11.

² Xen. Mem. i. 2. 2.

sional persons, whatever may be his positive knowledge, is ever trusted or obeyed except by the free choice of those who confide in him, and who may at any time make choice of another. But it does not appear that Sokratēs followed out this part of the analogy. His companions remarked to him that his first-rate intellectual ruler would be a despot, who might, if he pleased, either refuse to listen to good advice, or even put to death those who gave it. "He will not act thus," replied Sokratēs, "for if he does, he will himself be the greatest loser."¹

We may notice in this doctrine of Sokratēs the same imperfection as that which is involved in the ethical doctrine; a disposition to make the intellectual conditions of political fitness stand for the whole. His negative political doctrine is not to be mistaken: he approved neither of democracy, nor of oligarchy. As he was not attached, either by sentiment or by conviction, to the constitution of Athens, so neither had he the least sympathy with oligarchical usurpers, such as the Four Hundred and the Thirty. His positive ideal state, as far as we can divine it, would have been something like that which is worked out in the "Cyropaedia" of Xenophon.

In describing the persevering activity of Sokratēs, as a religious and intellectual missionary, we have really described his life; for he had no other occupation than this continual intercourse with the Athenian public: his indiscriminate conversation, and invincible dialectics. Discharging faithfully and bravely his duties as an hoplite on military service,—but keeping aloof from official duty in the dikastery, the public assembly, or the senate-house, except in that one memorable year of the battle of Arginusæ,—he incurred none of those party animosities which an active public life at Athens often provoked. His life was legally blameless, nor had he ever been brought up before the dikastery until his one final trial, when he was seventy years of age. That he stood conspicuous before the public eye in 423 B. C., at the time when the "Clouds" of Aristophanēs were brought on the stage, is certain: he may have been, and probably was, conspicuous even earlier: so that we can hardly allow him less than thirty years of public, notorious, and efficacious discoursing, down to his trial in 399 B. C.

¹ Xen. Mem. iii, 9, 12: compare Plato, Gorgias, c. 56, pp. 469, 470.

It was in that year that Melētus, seconded by two auxiliaries, Anytus and Lykon, presented against him, and hung up in the appointed place, the portico before the office of the second or king-archon, an indictment against him in the following terms: "Sokratēs is guilty of crime: first, for not worshipping the gods whom the city worships, but introducing new divinities of his own; next, for corrupting the youth. The penalty due is—death."

It is certain that neither the conduct nor the conversation of Sokratēs had undergone any alteration for many years past; since the sameness of his manner of talking is both derided by his enemies and confessed by himself. Our first sentiment, therefore, apart from the question of guilt or innocence, is one of astonishment, that he should have been prosecuted, at seventy years of age, for persevering in an occupation which he had publicly followed during twenty-five or thirty years preceding. Xenophon, full of reverence for his master, takes up the matter on much higher ground, and expresses himself in a feeling of indignant amazement that the Athenians could find anything to condemn in a man every way so admirable. But whoever attentively considers the picture which I have presented of the purpose, the working, and the extreme publicity of Sokratēs, will rather be inclined to wonder, not that the indictment was presented at last, but that some such indictment had not been presented long before. Such certainly is the impression suggested by the language of Sokratēs himself, in the "Platonic Apology." He there proclaims, emphatically, that though his present accusers were men of consideration, it was neither *their* enmity, nor *their* eloquence, which he had now principally to fear; but the accumulated force of antipathy,—the numerous and important personal enemies, each with sympathizing partisans,—the long-standing and uncontradicted calumnies,¹ raised against him throughout his cross-examining career.

¹ Plato, Apol. Sok. c. 2, p. 18, B; c. 16, p. 28, A. "Ὁ δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἱμνοῦσιν εἶπεν, ὅτι πολλὴ μοι ἀπεχθεὶα γέγονε καὶ πρὸς πολλοὺς, εὐ ἵσται ὅτι ἀληθὲς ἐστίν. Καὶ τοῦτ' ἐστὶν ὃ ἐμὲ αἰρήσει, ἵνα περ αἰρή — οὐ Μέλητος, οὐδὲ Ἄνιππος, ἀλλ' ἡ τῶν πολλῶν διαβολὴ καὶ οὐσία."

The expression τῶν πολλῶν in this last line is not used in its most common signification, but is equivalent to τούτων τῶν πολλῶν.

In truth, the mission of Sokratēs, as he himself describes it, could not but prove eminently unpopular and obnoxious. To convince a man that, of matters which he felt confident of knowing, and had never thought of questioning or even of studying, he is really profoundly ignorant, insomuch that he cannot reply to a few pertinent queries without involving himself in flagrant contradictions, is an operation highly salutary, often necessary, to his future improvement; but an operation of painful surgery, in which, indeed, the temporary pain experienced is one of the conditions almost indispensable to the future beneficial results. It is one which few men can endure without hating the operator at the time; although doubtless such hatred would not only disappear, but be exchanged for esteem and admiration, if they persevered until the full ulterior consequences of the operation developed themselves. But we know, from the express statement of Xenophon, that many, who underwent this first pungent thrust of his dialectics, never came near him again: he disregarded them as laggards,¹ but their voices did not the less count in the hostile chorus. What made that chorus the more formidable, was the high quality and position of its leaders. For Sokratēs himself tells us, that the men whom he chiefly and expressly sought out to cross-examine, were the men of celebrity as statesmen, rhetors, poets, or artisans; those at once most sensitive to such humiliation, and most capable of making their enmity effective.

When we reflect upon this great body of antipathy, so terrible both from number and from constituent items, we shall wonder only that Sokratēs could have gone on so long standing in the market-place to aggravate it, and that the indictment of Melētus could have been so long postponed; since it was just as applicable earlier as later, and since the sensitive temper of the people, as to charges of irreligion, was a well-known fact.² The truth is, that as history presents to us only one man who ever devoted his life to prosecute this duty of an elenchic, or cross-examining missionary, so there was but one city, in the ancient world at

¹ Xen. Mem. iv, 2, 40. Πολλοὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν αὐτῶ διατεθέντων ὑπὸ Σωκράτους οὐκ ἔτι αὐτῷ προσήσαν, οὐκ καὶ βλακωτέρους ἐνομίζεν.

² Plato, Euthyphron, c. 2, p. 3, C. εἶδως ὅτι εὐδαίμονα τὰ τοιαῦτα πρὸς πολλοὺς.

least, wherein he would have been allowed to prosecute it for twenty-five years with safety and impunity; and that city was Athens. I have in a previous volume noted the respect for individual dissent of opinion, taste, and behavior, among one another, which characterized the Athenian population, and which Periklēs puts in emphatic relief as a part of his funeral discourse. It was this established liberality of the democratical sentiment at Athens which so long protected the noble eccentricity of Sokratēs from being disturbed by the numerous enemies which he provoked: at Sparta, at Thebes, at Argos, Milētus, or Syracuse, his blameless life would have been insufficient as a shield, and his irresistible dialectic power would have caused him to be only the more speedily silenced. Intolerance is the natural weed of the human bosom, though its growth or development may be counteracted by liberalizing causes; of these, at Athens, the most powerful was, the democratical constitution as there worked, in combination with diffused intellectual and æsthetical sensibility, and keen relish for discourse. Liberty of speech was consecrated, in every man's estimation, among the first of privileges; every man was accustomed to hear opinions, opposite to his own, constantly expressed, and to believe that others had a right to their opinions as well as himself. And though men would not, as a general principle, have extended such toleration to religious subjects, yet the established habit in reference to other matters greatly influenced their practice, and rendered them more averse to any positive severity against avowed dissenters from the received religious belief. It is certain that there was at Athens both a keener intellectual stimulus, and greater freedom as well of thought as of speech, than in any other city of Greece. The long toleration of Sokratēs is one example of this general fact, while his trial proves little, and his execution nothing, against it, as will presently appear.

There must doubtless have been particular circumstances, of which we are scarcely at all informed, which induced his accusers to prefer their indictment at the actual moment, in spite of the advanced age of Sokratēs.

In the first place, Anytus, one of the accusers of Sokratēs, appears to have become incensed against him on private grounds. The son of Anytus had manifested interest in his conversation.

and Sokratês, observing in the young man intellectual impulse and promise, endeavored to dissuade his father from bringing him up to his own trade of a leather-seller.¹ It was in this general way that a great proportion of the antipathy against Sokratês was excited, as he himself tells us in the "Platonic Apology." The young men were those to whom he chiefly addressed himself, and who, keenly relishing his conversation, often carried home new ideas which displeased their fathers;² hence the general charge against Sokratês, of corrupting the youth. Now this circumstance had recently happened in the peculiar case of Anytus, a rich tradesman, a leading man in politics, and just now of peculiar influence in the city, because he had been one of the leading fellow-laborers with Thrasybulus in the expulsion of the Thirty, manifesting an energetic and meritorious patriotism. He, like Thrasybulus and many others, had sustained great loss of property³ during the oligarchical dominion; which perhaps made him the more strenuous in requiring that his son should pursue trade with assiduity, in order to restore the family fortunes. He seems, moreover, to have been an enemy of all teaching which went beyond the narrowest practicality, hating alike Sokratês and the sophists.⁴

While we can thus point out a recent occurrence, which had brought one of the most ascendent politicians in the city into special exasperation against Sokratês, another circumstance which weighed him down was, his past connection with the deceased Kritias and Alkibiadês. Of these two men, the latter, though he had some great admirers, was on the whole odious; still more from his private insolence and enormities than from his public treason as an exile. But the name of Kritias was detested, and deservedly detested, beyond that of any other man in Athenian history, as the chief director of the unmeasured spoliation and atrocities committed by the Thirty.

¹ See Xenoph. Apol. Sok. sects. 29, 30. This little piece bears a very erroneous title, and may possibly not be the composition of Xenophon, as the commentators generally affirm; but it has every appearance of being a work of the time.

² Plato, Apol. Sok. c. 10, p. 23, C; c. 27, p. 37, E.

³ Isokrat. Or. xviii. cont. Kallimach. s. 30.

⁴ See Plato, Menon, c. 27-28, pp. 90, 91.

That Sokratês had educated both Kritias and Alkibiadês, was affirmed by the accusers, and seemingly believed by the general public, both at the time and afterwards.¹ That both of them had been among those who conversed with him, when young men, is an unquestionable fact; to what extent, or down to what period, the conversation was carried, we cannot distinctly ascertain. Xenophon affirms that both of them frequented his society when young, to catch from him an argumentative facility which might be serviceable to their political ambition; that he curbed their violent and licentious propensities, so long as they continued to come to him; that both of them manifested a respectful obedience to him, which seemed in little consonance with their natural tempers; but that they soon quitted him, weary of such restraint, after having acquired as much as they thought convenient of his peculiar accomplishment. The writings of Plato, on the contrary, impress us with the idea that the association of both of them with Sokratês must have been more continued and intimate; for both of them are made to take great part in the Platonic dialogues, while the attachment of Sokratês to Alkibiadês is represented as stronger than that which he ever felt towards any other man; a fact not difficult to explain, since the latter, notwithstanding his ungovernable dispositions, was distinguished in his youth not less for capacity and forward impulse, than for beauty; and since youthful beauty fired the imagination of the Greeks, especially that of Sokratês, more than the charms of the other sex.² From the year 420 B.C., in which the activity of Alkibiadês as a political leader commenced, it seems unlikely that he could have seen much of Sokratês, and after the year 415 B.C. the fact is impossible; since in that year he became a permanent exile, with the exception of three or four months in the year 407 B.C. At the moment of the trial of Sokratês, therefore, his connection with Alkibiadês must at least have been a fact long past and gone. Respecting Kritias, we make out less; and as he was a kinsman

¹ Æschinês, cont. Timarch. c. 34, p. 74. *ὑμεῖς Σωκράτη τὸν σοφιστὴν ἀπεκτείνετε, ὅτι Κριτίαν ἐφάνη πεπαιδευκός*, etc. Xenoph. Mém. i, 2, 12.

² See Plato (Charmidês, c. 3, p. 154, C; Lyéis, c. 2, p. 204, B; Protagoras, c. 1, p. 309, A), etc.

of Plato, one of the well-known companions of Sokratēs, and present at his trial, and himself an accomplished and literary man, his association with Sokratēs may have continued longer; at least a color was given for so asserting. Though the supposition that any of the vices either of Kritias or Alkibiadēs were encouraged, or even tolerated, by Sokratēs, can have arisen in none but prejudiced or ill-informed minds, yet it is certain that such a supposition was entertained; and that it placed him before the public in an altered position after the enormities of the Thirty. Anytus, incensed with him already on the subject of his son, would be doubly incensed against him as the reputed tutor of Kritias.

Of Melētus, the primary, though not the most important accuser, we know only that he was a poet; of Lykon, that he was a rhetor. Both these classes had been alienated by the cross-examining dialectics to which many of their number had been exposed by Sokratēs. They were the last men to bear such an exposure with patience, and their enmity, taken as a class rarely unanimous, was truly formidable when it bore upon any single individual.

We know nothing of the speeches of either of the accusers before the dikastery, except what can be picked out from the remarks in Xenophon and the defence of Plato. Of the three counts of the indictment, the second was the easiest for them to support, on plausible grounds. That Sokratēs was a religious innovator, would be considered as proved by the peculiar divine sign, of which he was wont to speak freely and publicly, and which visited no one except himself. Accordingly, in the "Platonic Defence," he never really replies to this second charge. He questions Melētus before the dikastery, and the latter is represented as answering, that he meant to accuse Sokratēs of not believing in the gods at all;¹ to which imputed disbelief Sokratēs answers with an emphatic negative. In support of the first count, however, — the charge of general disbelief in the gods recognized by the city, — nothing in his conduct could be cited; for he was exact in his legal worship like other citizens, and even more than others, if Xenophon is correct.² But it would

¹ Plat. Apol. Sok. c. 14, p. 26, C.

² Xen. Mem. i. 2, 64; i. 3, 1.

appear that the old calumnies of the Aristophanic "Clouds" were revived, and that the effect of that witty drama, together with similar efforts of Eupolis and others, perhaps hardly less witty, was still enduring; a striking proof that these comedians were no impotent libellers. Sokratēs manifests greater apprehension of the effect of the ancient impressions, than of the speeches which had been just delivered against him: but these latter speeches would of course tell, by refreshing the sentiments of the past, and reviving the Aristophanic picture of Sokratēs, as a speculator on physics as well as a rhetorical teacher for pleading, making the worse appear the better reason.¹ Sokratēs, in the "Platonic Defence," appeals to the number of persons who had heard him discourse, whether any of them had ever heard him say one word on the subject of physical studies;² while Xenophon goes further, and represents him as having positively discountenanced them, on the ground of impiety.³

As there were three distinct accusers to speak against Sokratēs, so we may reasonably suppose that they would concert beforehand on what topics each should insist; Melētus undertaking that which related to religion, while Anytus and Lykon would dwell on the political grounds of attack. In the "Platonic Apology," Sokratēs comments emphatically on the allegations of Melētus, questions him publicly before the dikasts, and criticizes his replies: he makes little allusion to Anytus, or to anything except what is formally embodied in the indictment; and treats the last count, the charge of corrupting youth, in connection with the first, as if the corruption alleged consisted in irreligious teaching. But Xenophon intimates that the accusers, in enforcing this allegation of pernicious teaching, went into other matters quite distinct from the religious tenets of Sokratēs, and denounced him as having taught them lawlessness and disrespect, as well towards their parents as towards their country. We find mention made in Xenophon of accusatory grounds similar to those in the "Clouds;" similar also to those which modern authors usually advance against the sophists.

Sokratēs, said Anytus and the other accusers, taught young

¹ Plat. Apol. Sok. c. 3, p. 19, B.

² Plat. Apol. Sok. c. 3, p. 19, C.

³ Xen. Mem. i. 1, 13.

men to despise the existing political constitution, by remarking that the Athenian practice of naming archons by lot was silly, and that no man of sense would ever choose in this way a pilot or a carpenter, though the mischief arising from bad qualification, was in these cases far less than in the case of the archons.¹ Such teaching, it was urged, destroyed in the minds of the hearers respect for the laws and constitution, and rendered them violent and licentious. As examples of the way in which it had worked, his two pupils Kritias and Alkibiadēs might be cited, both formed in his school; one, the most violent and rapacious of the Thirty recent oligarchs; the other, a disgrace to the democracy, by his outrageous insolence and licentiousness;² both of them authors of ruinous mischief to the city.

Moreover, the youth learned from him conceit of their own superior wisdom, and the habit of insulting their fathers as well as of slighting their other kinsmen. Sokratēs told them, it was urged, that even their fathers, in case of madness, might be lawfully put under restraint; and that when a man needed service, those whom he had to look to, were not his kinsmen, as such, but the persons best qualified to render it: thus, if he was sick, he must consult a surgeon; if involved in a lawsuit, those who were most conversant with such a situation. Between friends also, mere good feeling and affection was of little use; the important circumstance was, that they should acquire the capacity of rendering mutual service to each other. No one was worthy of esteem except the man who knew what was proper to be done, and could explain it to others: which meant, urged the accuser, that Sokratēs was not only the wisest of men, but the only person capable of making his pupils wise; other advisers being worthless compared with him.³

He was in the habit too, the accusation proceeded, of citing the worst passages out of distinguished poets, and of perverting them to the mischievous purpose of spoiling the dispositions of youth, planting in them criminal and despotic tendencies. Thus he quoted a line of Hesiod: "No work is disgraceful; but indolence is disgraceful:" explaining it to mean, that a man might

¹ Xen. Mem. i, 2, 9.

² Xen. Mem. i, 2, 49-53.

³ Xen. Mem. i, 2, 12.

without scruple do any sort of work, base or unjust as it might be, for the sake of profit. Next, Sokratēs was particularly fond of quoting those lines of Homer, in the second book of the Iliad, wherein Odysseus is described as bringing back the Greeks, who had just dispersed from the public agora in compliance with the exhortation of Agamemnōn, and were hastening to their ships. Odysseus caresses and flatters the chiefs, while he chides and even strikes the common men; though both were doing the same thing, and guilty of the same fault; if fault it was, to obey what the commander-in-chief had himself just suggested. Sokratēs interpreted this passage, the accuser affirmed, as if Homer praised the application of stripes to poor men and the common people.¹

Nothing could be easier than for an accuser to find matter for inculcation of Sokratēs, by partial citations from his continual discourses, given without the context or explanations which had accompanied them; by bold invention, where even this partial basis was wanting; sometimes also by taking up real error, since no man who is continually talking, especially extempore, can always talk correctly. Few teachers would escape, if penal sentences were permitted to tell against them, founded upon evidence such as this. Xenophon, in noticing the imputations, comments upon them all, denies some, and explains others. As to the passages out of Hesiod and Homer, he affirms that Sokratēs drew from them inferences quite contrary to those alleged;² which latter seem, indeed, altogether unreasonable, invented to call forth the deep-seated democratical sentiment of the Athenians, after the accuser had laid his preliminary ground by connecting Sokratēs with Kritias and Alkibiadēs. That Sokratēs improperly depreciated either filial duty or the domestic affections, is in like manner highly improbable. We may much more reasonably believe the assertion of Xenophon, who represents him to have exhorted the hearer "to make himself as wise, and as capable of rendering service, as possible; so that, when he wished to acquire esteem from father or brother or friend, he might not sit still; in reliance on the simple fact of relationship, but might earn such feeling by doing them positive good."³ To tell a young

¹ Xen. Mem. i, 2, 56-59.

² Xen. Mem. i, 2, 59.

³ Xen. Mem. i, 2, 55. Καὶ παρεκάλει ἐπιμελῆσθαι τοῦ ὡς φρονιμώτατος

man that mere good feeling would be totally insufficient, unless he were prepared and competent to carry it into action, is a lesson which few parents would wish to discourage. Nor would any generous parent make it a crime against the teaching of Sokratēs, that it rendered his son wiser than himself, which probably it would do. To restrict the range of teaching for a young man, because it may make him think himself wiser than his father, is only one of the thousand shapes in which the pleading of ignorance against knowledge was then, and still continues occasionally to be, presented.

Nevertheless, it is not to be denied that these attacks of Anytus bear upon the vulnerable side of the Sokratic general theory of ethics, according to which virtue was asserted to depend upon knowledge. I have already remarked that this is true, but not the whole truth; a certain state of the affections and dispositions being not less indispensable, as conditions of virtue, than a certain state of the intelligence. An enemy, therefore, had some pretence for making it appear that Sokratēs, stating a part of the truth as the whole, denied or degraded all that remained. But though this would be a criticism not entirely unfounded against his general theory, it would not hold against his precepts or practical teaching, as we find them in Xenophon; for these, as I have remarked, reach much wider than his general theory, and inculcate the cultivation of habits and dispositions not less strenuously than the acquisition of knowledge.

The censures affirmed to have been cast by Sokratēs against the choice of archons by lot at Athens, are not denied by Xenophon. The accuser urged that "by such censures Sokratēs excited the young men to despise the established constitution, and to become lawless and violent in their conduct."¹ This is just the same pretence, of tendency to bring the government into hatred and contempt, on which in former days prosecutions for public libel were instituted against writers in England, and

τινα καὶ ὠφελιμώτατον, ὅπως, ἐὰν τε ὑπὸ πατρός ἢ ὑπὸ ἀδελφοῦ ἢ ὑπὸ ἄλλου τινος βούληται τιμᾶσθαι, μὴ τῷ οἰκείῳ εἶναι πιστεύων ἀμελῇ, ἀλλὰ τειρᾶται, ὅφ' ἂν βούληται τιμᾶσθαι, τοῦτοις ὠφελίμος εἶναι.

¹ Xen. Mem. i, 2, 9. τοὺς δὲ τοιούτους λόγους ἐπαίρειν ἔφη τοὺς νέους καταφρονεῖν τῆς καθέσθαι ὅσης πολιτείας, καὶ ποιεῖν βίαιους.

on which they still continue to be abundantly instituted in France, under the first President of the Republic. There can hardly be a more serious political mischief than such confusion of the disapproving critic with a conspirator, and imposition of silence upon dissident minorities. Nor has there ever been any case in which such an imputation was more destitute of color than that of Sokratēs, who appealed always to men's reason and very little to their feelings; so little, indeed, that modern authors make his coldness a matter of charge against him; who never omitted to inculcate rigid observance of the law, and set the example of such observance himself. Whatever may have been his sentiments about democracy, he always obeyed the democratical government, nor is there any pretence for charging him with participation in oligarchical schemes. It was the Thirty who, for the first time in his long life, interdicted his teaching altogether, and were on the point almost of taking his life; while his intimate friend Chærephon was actually in exile with the democrats.¹

Xenophon lays great emphasis on two points, when defending Sokratēs against his accusers. First, that his own conduct was virtuous, self-denying, and strict in obedience to the law. Next, that he accustomed his hearers to hear nothing except appeals to their reason, and impressed on them obedience only to their rational convictions. That such a man, with so great a weight of presumption in his favor, should be tried and found guilty as a corruptor of youth, — the most undefined of all imaginable charges, — is a grave and melancholy fact in the history of mankind. Yet when we see upon what light evidence modern authors are willing to admit the same charge against the sophists, we have no right to wonder that the Athenians when addressed, not through that calm reason to which Sokratēs appealed, but through their antipathies, religious as well as political, public as well as private — were exasperated into dealing with him as the type and precursor of Kritias and Alkibiadēs.

After all, the exasperation, and the consequent verdict of guilty, were not wholly the fault of the dikasts, nor wholly brought about by his accusers and his numerous private enemies. No such verdict would have been given, unless by what we must

Plato, Apol. Sok. c. 3, p. 21, A, c. 20, p. 32, E; Xen. Mem. i, 2, 31

call the consent and concurrence of Sokratēs himself. This is one of the most important facts of the case, in reference both to himself and to the Athenians.

We learn from his own statement in the "Platonic Defence," that the verdict of guilty was only pronounced by a majority of five or six, amidst a body so numerous as an Athenian dikastery; probably five hundred and fifty-seven in total number,¹ if a confused statement in Diogenes Laërtius can be trusted. Now any one who reads that defence, and considers it in conjunction with the circumstances of the case and the feelings of the dikasts, will see that its tenor is such as must have turned a much greater number of votes than six against him. And we are informed by the distinct testimony of Xenophon,² that Sokratēs approached his trial with the feelings of one who hardly wished to be acquitted. He took no thought whatever for the preparation of his defence; and when his friend Hermogenēs remonstrated with him on the serious consequences of such an omission, he replied, first, that the just and blameless life, which he was conscious of having passed, was the best of all preparations for defence; next, that having once begun to meditate on what it would be proper for him to say, the divine sign had interposed to forbid him from proceeding. He went on to say, that it was no wonder that the gods should deem it better for him to die now, than to live longer. He had hitherto lived in perfect satisfaction, with a consciousness of progressive moral improvement, and with esteem, marked and

¹ Plato, Apol. Sok. c. 25, p. 36, A; Diog. Laërt. ii, 41. Diogenes says that he was condemned by two hundred and eighty-one *πλεονεξίας* *ἀπολυσίων*. If he meant to assert that the verdict was found by a majority of two hundred and eighty-one above the acquitting votes, this would be contradicted by the "Platonic Apology," which assures us beyond any doubt that the majority was not greater than five or six, so that the turning of three votes would have altered the verdict. But as the number two hundred and eighty-one seems precise, and is not in itself untrustworthy, some commentators construe it, though the words as they now stand are perplexing, as the aggregate of the majority. Since the "Platonic Apology" proves that it was a majority of five or six, the minority would consequently be two hundred and seventy-six, and the total five hundred and fifty-seven.

² Xen. Mem. iv, 8, 4, *seq.* He learned the fact from Hermogenēs, who heard it from Sokratēs himself.

unabated, from his friends. If his life were prolonged, old age would soon overpower him; he would lose in part his sight, his hearing, or his intelligence; and life with such abated efficacy and dignity would be intolerable to him. Whereas, if he were condemned now, he should be condemned unjustly, which would be a great disgrace to his judges, but none to him; nay, it would even procure for him increase of sympathy and admiration, and a more willing acknowledgment from every one that he had been both a just man and an improving preceptor.¹

These words, spoken before his trial, intimate a state of belief which explains the tenor of the defence, and formed one essential condition of the final result. They prove that Sokratēs not only cared little for being acquitted, but even thought that the approaching trial was marked out by the gods as the term of his life, and that there were good reasons why he should prefer such a consummation as best for himself. Nor is it wonderful that he should entertain that opinion, when we recollect the entire ascendancy within him of strong internal conscience and intelligent reflection, built upon an originally fearless temperament, and silencing what Plato² calls "the child within us, who trembles before death;" his great love of colloquial influence, and incapacity of living without it; his old age, now seventy years, rendering it impossible that such influence could much longer continue, and the opportunity afforded to him, by now towering above ordinary men under the like circumstances, to read an impressive lesson, as well as to leave behind him a reputation yet more exalted than that which he had hitherto acquired. It was in this frame of mind that Sokratēs came to his trial, and undertook his unpremeditated defence, the substance of which we now read in the "Platonic Apology." His calculations, alike high-minded and well-balanced, were completely realized. Had he been acquitted after such a defence, it would have been not only a triumph over his personal enemies, but would have been a sanction on the part of the people and the popular dikastery to his teaching, which,

¹ Xen. Mem. iv, 8, 9, 10.

² Plato, Phædon, c. 60, p. 77, E *ἀλλ' ἴσως ἐν τῇ καὶ ἐν ἡμῖν παῖς, ὅστις τὰ τοιαῦτα φοβεῖται. Τοῦτον οὖν πειρωμένα πείθειν μὴ δεδιέναι τὸν θάνατον, ὥσπερ τὰ μορμολύκεια*

indeed, had been enforced by Anytus,¹ in his accusing argument, in reference to acquittal generally, even before he heard the defence: whereas his condemnation, and the feelings with which he met it, have shed double and triple lustre over his whole life and character.

Prefaced by this exposition of the feelings of Sokratēs, the "Platonic Defence" becomes not merely sublime and impressive, but also the manifestation of a rational and consistent purpose. It does, indeed, include a vindication of himself against two out of the three counts of the indictment; against the charge of not believing in the recognized gods of Athens, and that of corrupting the youth; respecting the second of the three, whereby he was charged with religious innovation, he says little or nothing. But it bears no resemblance to the speech of one standing on his trial, with the written indictment concluding "Penalty, Death," hanging up in open court before him. On the contrary, it is an emphatic lesson to the hearers, embodied in the frank outpouring of a fearless and self-confiding conscience. It is undertaken, from the beginning, because the law commands; with a faint wish, and even not an unqualified wish, but no hope, that it may succeed.² Sokratēs first replies to the standing antipathies against him without, arising from the number of enemies whom his cross-examining elenchus had aroused against him, and from those false reports which the Aristophanic "Clouds" had contributed so much to circulate. In accounting for the rise of these antipathies, he impresses upon the dikasts the divine mission under which he was acting, not without considerable doubts whether they will believe him to be in earnest;³ and gives that interesting exposition of his intellectual campaign, against "the conceit of knowledge without the reality," of which I have already

¹ Plato, Apol. Sok. c. 17, p. 29, C.

² Plato, Apol. Sok. c. 2, p. 19, A. Βουλομένη μὲν οὖν ἂν ταῦτο οὕτω γενέσθαι, εἴ τι ἄμεινον καὶ ὑμῖν καὶ ἐμοὶ, καὶ πλεον τι με ποιῆσαι ἀπολογουμένου· εἰμὶ δὲ αὐτοῦ χαλεπὸν εἶναι, καὶ αὐτὸ πᾶν με λαυθάνει οἷόν ἐστι. "Ὅμως δὲ τοῦτο μὲν ἴτω ὅπη τῷ θεῷ φίλον, τῷ δὲ νόμῳ πειστέον καὶ ἀπολογητέον.

³ Plato, Apol. Sok. c. 5, p. 20, D. Καὶ ἴσως μὲν δοξῶ τισιν ὑμῶν παίζειν — εὐ μέντοι ἴστε, πᾶσαν ὑμῖν τὴν ἀλήθειαν ἐρῶ. Again, c. 28, p. 37, E. Ἐάν τε γὰρ λέγω, ὅτι τῷ θεῷ ἀπειθεῖν τοῦτ' ἐστὶ, καὶ διὰ τοῦτ' ἄδυνατον ἔσυχον ἀγεῖν, οὐ πείσεσθε μοι ὥς εἰρωνευομένῳ.

spoken. He then goes into the indictment, questions Melētus in open court, and dissects his answers. Having rebutted the charge of irreligion, he reverts again to the imperative mandate of the gods under which he is acting, "to spend his life in the search for wisdom, and in examining himself as well as others;" a mandate, which if he were to disobey, he would be then justly amenable to the charge of irreligion;¹ and he announces to the dikasts distinctly, that, even if they were now to acquit him, he neither could nor would relax in the course which he had been pursuing.² He considers that the mission imposed upon him is among the greatest blessings ever conferred by the gods upon Athens.³ He deprecates those murmurs of surprise or displeasure, which his discourse evidently called forth more than once,⁴ though not so much on his own account as on that of the dikasts, who will be benefited by hearing him, and who will hurt themselves and their city much more than him, if they should now pronounce condemnation.⁵ It was not on his own account that he sought to defend himself, but on account of the Athenians, lest they by condemning him should sin against the gracious blessing of the god; they would not easily find such another, if they should put him to death.⁶ Though his mission had spurred him on to indefatigable activity in individual colloquy, yet the divine sign had always forbidden him from taking active part in public proceedings; on the two exceptional occasions when he had stood publicly forward, — once under the democracy, once under the oligarchy, — he had shown the same resolution as at present; not to be deterred by any terrors from that course which he believed to be just.⁷ Young men were

¹ Plato, Apol. Sok. c. 17, p. 29, A. ² Plato Apol. Sok. c. 17, p. 30, B.

³ Plato, Apol. Sok. c. 17, p. 30, A, B. οἶμαι οὐδὲν πῶ ὑμῖν μείζον ἄγαθόν γενέσθαι ἢ τὴν ἐμὴν τῷ θεῷ ὑπηρεσίαν.

⁴ Plato, Apol. Sok. c. 18, p. 30, B.

⁵ Plato, Apol. Sok. c. 18, p. 30, B. καὶ γὰρ, ὥς ἐγὼ οἶμαι, ἐνήσεσθε ἀκούοντες — εἴν ἐμὲ ἀποκτείνητε τοιοῦτον ὄντα οἷον ἐγὼ λέγω, οὐκ ἔμε μείζω βλάψετε ἢ ὑμᾶς αὐτοὺς.

⁶ Plato, Apol. Sok. c. 18, p. 30, E. πολλοὺ δὲ ἐγὼ ὑπὲρ ἐμαυτοῦ ἀπολογεῖσθαι, ὥς τις ἂν οἶοιτο, ἀλλ' ὑπὲρ ὑμῶν μὴ τι ἐξαμάρτητε περὶ τὴν τοῦ θεοῦ δόξαν ὑμῖν ἐμοῦ καταψηφισάμεν· εἴν γὰρ ἐμὲ ἀποκτείνητε, οὐ βράδιως ἄλλω τοιοῦτον εὐρήσετε, etc.

⁷ Plato, Apol. Sok. c. 20, 21, p. 33.

delighted as well as improved by listening to his cross-examinations; in proof of the charge that he had corrupted them, no evidence had been produced; neither any of themselves, who, having been once young when they enjoyed his conversation, had since grown elderly; nor any of their relatives; while he on his part could produce abundant testimony to the improving effect of his society, from the relatives of those who had profited by it.¹

"No man (says he) knows what death is; yet men fear it as if they knew well that it was the greatest of all evils, which is just a case of that worst of all ignorance, the conceit of knowing what you do not really know. For my part, this is the exact point on which I differ from most other men, if there be any one thing in which I am wiser than they; as I know nothing about Hades, so I do not pretend to any knowledge; but I do know well, that disobedience to a person better than myself, either god or man, is both an evil and a shame; nor will I ever embrace evil certain, in order to escape evil which may for aught I know be a good.² Perhaps you may feel indignant at the resolute tone of my defence; you may have expected that I should do as most others do in less dangerous trials than mine; that I should weep, beg and entreat for my life, and bring forward my children and relatives to do the same. I have relatives like other men, and three children; but not one of them shall appear before you for any such purpose. Not from any insolent dispositions on my part, nor any wish to put a slight upon you, but because I hold such conduct to be degrading to the reputation which I enjoy; for I have a reputation for superiority among you, deserved or undeserved as it may be. It is a disgrace to Athens, when her esteemed men lower themselves, as they do but too often, by such mean and cowardly supplications; and you dikasts, instead of being prompted thereby to spare them, ought rather to condemn them the more for so dishonoring the city.³ Apart from

¹ Plato, Apol. Sok. c. 22.

² Plato, Apol. Sok. c. 17, p. 29, B. Contrast this striking and truly Socratic sentiment about the fear of death, with the commonplace way in which Sokratês is represented as handling the same subject in Xenoph. Memor. i, 4, 7.

³ Plato, Apol. Sok. c. 23, pp. 34-35. I translate the substance and not the words.

any reputation of mine, too, I should be a guilty man, if I sought to bias you by supplications. My duty is to instruct and persuade you, if I can; but you have sworn to follow your convictions in judging according to the laws, not to make the laws bend to your partiality; and it is your duty so to do. Far be it from me to habituate you to perjury; far be it from you to contract any such habit. Do not, therefore, require of me proceedings dishonorable in reference to myself, as well as criminal and impious in regard to you, especially at a moment when I am myself rebutting an accusation of impiety advanced by Melêtus. I leave to you and to the god, to decide as may turn out best both for me and for you."¹

No one who reads the "Platonic Apology" of Sokratês will ever wish that he had made any other defence. But it is the speech of one who deliberately foregoes the immediate purpose of a defence, persuasion of his judges; who speaks for posterity, without regard to his own life: "*solâ posteritatis curâ, et abruptis vitæ blandimentis.*"² The effect produced upon the dikasts was such as Sokratês anticipated beforehand, and heard afterwards without surprise as without discomposure, in the verdict of guilty. His only surprise was, at the extreme smallness of the majority whereby that verdict was passed.³ And this is the true matter for astonishment. Never before had the Athenian dikasts heard such a speech addressed to them. While all of them, doubtless, knew Sokratês as a very able and very eccentric man, respecting his purposes and character they would differ; some regarding him with unqualified hostility, a few others with respectful admiration, and a still larger number with simple admiration for ability, without any decisive sentiment either of antipathy or esteem.

¹ Plato, Apol. Sok. c. 24, p. 35.

² These are the striking words of Tacitus (Hist. ii, 54) respecting the last hours of the emperor Otho, after his suicide had been fully resolved upon, but before it had been consummated: an interval spent in the most careful and provident arrangements for the security and welfare of those around him: "*ipsum viventem quidem relictum, sed solâ posteritatis curâ, et abruptis vitæ blandimentis.*"

³ Plato, Apol. Sok. c. 25, p. 36, A. Οὐκ ἀνέλπιστόν μοι γέγονε τὸ γεγονὸς τοῦτο, ἀλλὰ πολὺ μᾶλλον θαυμάζω ἑκατέρων τῶν ψήφων τὸν γεγονότα ἀριθμόν. Οὐ γὰρ ὥμην ἔγωγε οὕτω παρ' ὀλίγον εἰσεῖναι, ἀλλὰ παρὰ πολλόν, etc.

But by all these three categories, hardly excepting even his admirers, the speech would be felt to carry one sting which never misses its way to the angry feelings of the judicial bosom, whether the judges in session be one or a few or many, the sting of "affront to the court." The Athenian dikasts were always accustomed to be addressed with deference, often with subservience: they now heard themselves lectured by a philosopher who stood before them like a fearless and invulnerable superior, beyond their power, though awaiting their verdict; one who laid claim to a divine mission, which probably many of them believed to be an imposture, and who declared himself the inspired uprooter of "conceit of knowledge without the reality," which purpose many would not understand, and some would not like. To many, his demeanor would appear to betray an insolence not without analogy to Alkibiadês or Kritias, with whom his accuser had compared him. I have already remarked, in reference to his trial, that, considering the number of personal enemies whom he made, the wonder is not that he was tried at all, but that he was not tried until so late in his life: I now remark in reference to the verdict, that, considering his speech before the dikastery, we cannot be surprised that he was found guilty, but only that such verdict passed by so small a majority as five or six.

That the condemnation of Sokratês was brought on distinctly by the tone and tenor of his defence, is the express testimony of Xenophon. "Other persons on trial (he says) defended themselves in such manner as to conciliate the favor of the dikasts, or flatter, or entreat them, contrary to the laws, and thus obtained acquittal. But Sokratês would resort to nothing of this customary practice of the dikastery contrary to the laws. Though he might easily have been let off by the dikasts, if he would have done anything of the kind even moderately, he preferred rather to adhere to the laws and die, than to save his life by violating them."¹ Now no one in Athens except Sokratês, probably, would have construed the laws as requiring the tone of oration which he adopted; nor would he himself have so construed them, if he had been twenty

¹ Xenoph. Mem. iv, 4, 4. Ἐκεῖνος οὐδὲν ἠθέλησε τῶν εἰωθότων ἐν τοῖς δικάσθησιν παρὰ τοῖς νόμοις ποιῆσαι· ἀλλὰ βῆδ' ἂν ἀφ' ὧν ὑπὸ τῶν δικαστῶν· εἰ καὶ μετρίως τὰ τούτων ἐποιήσε, προεῖλετο μᾶλλον τοῖς νόμοις ἑμμένον ἀποθανεῖν ἢ παρανομῶν ζῆν.

years younger, with less of acquired dignity, and more years of possible usefulness open before him. Without debasing himself by unbecoming flattery or supplication, he would have avoided lecturing them as a master and superior,¹ or ostentatiously asserting a divine mission for purposes which they would hardly understand, or an independence of their verdict which they might construe as defiance. The rhetor Lysias is said to have sent to him a composed speech for his defence, which he declined to use, not thinking it suitable to his dignity. But such a man as Lysias would hardly compose what would lower the dignity even of the loftiest client, though he would look to the result also; nor is there any doubt that if Sokratês had pronounced it, — or even a much less able speech, if inoffensive, — he would have been acquitted. Quintilian,² indeed, expresses his satisfaction that Sokratês maintained that towering dignity which brought out the rarest and most exalted of his attributes, but which at the same time renounced all chance of acquittal. Few persons will dissent from this criticism: but when we look at the sentence, as we ought in fairness to do, from the point of view of the dikasts, justice will compel us to admit that Sokratês deliberately brought it upon himself.

If the verdict of guilty was thus brought upon Sokratês by his own consent and cooperation, much more may the same remark be made respecting the capital sentence which followed it. In Athenian procedure, the penalty inflicted was determined by a separate vote of the dikasts, taken after the verdict of guilty. The accuser having named the penalty which he thought suitable, the accused party on his side named some lighter penalty upon himself; and between these two the dikasts were called on to make their option, no third proposition being admissible. The prudence of an accused party always induced him to propose, even against himself, some measure of punishment which the dikasts

¹ Cicero (de Orat. i, 54, 231) — "Socrates ita in iudicio capitis pro se ipso dixit, ut non supplex aut reus, sed magister aut dominus videretur esse iudicum." So Epiktêus also remarked, in reference to the defence of Sokratês: "By all means, abstain from supplication for mercy; but do not put it specially forward, that you will abstain, unless you intend, like Sokratês, purposely to provoke the judges." (Arrian, Epiktêt. Diss. ii, 2, 18.)

² Quintilian, Inst. Or. ii, 15, 30, xi, 1, 10, Diog. Laërt. ii, 40.

might be satisfied to accept, in preference to the heavier sentence invoked by his antagonist.

Now Melêtus, in his indictment and speech against Sokratês, had called for the infliction of capital punishment. It was for Sokratês to make his own counter-proposition, and the very small majority, by which the verdict had been pronounced, afforded sufficient proof that the dikasts were no way inclined to sanction the extreme penalty against him. They doubtless anticipated, according to the uniform practice before the Athenian courts of justice, that he would suggest some lesser penalty; fine, imprisonment, exile, disfranchisement, etc. And had he done this purely and simply, there can be little doubt that the proposition would have passed. But the language of Sokratês, after the verdict, was in a strain yet higher than before it; and his resolution to adhere to his own point of view, disdaining the smallest abatement or concession, only the more emphatically pronounced. "What counter proposition shall I make to you (he said) as a substitute for the penalty of Melêtus? Shall I name to you the treatment which I think I deserve at your hands? In that case, my proposition would be that I should be rewarded with a subsistence at the public expense in the prytaneum; for that is what I really deserve as a public benefactor; one who has neglected all thought of his own affairs, and embraced voluntary poverty, in order to devote himself to your best interests, and to admonish you individually on the serious necessity of mental and moral improvement. Assuredly, I cannot admit that I have deserved from you any evil whatever; nor would it be reasonable in me to propose exile or imprisonment, which I know to be certain and considerable evils, in place of death, which may perhaps be not an evil, but a good. I might, indeed, propose to you a pecuniary fine; for the payment of *that* would be no evil. But I am poor, and have no money: all that I could muster might perhaps amount to a mina: and I therefore propose to you a fine of one mina, as punishment on myself. Plato, and my other friends near me, desire me to increase this sum to thirty minæ, and they engage to pay it for me. A fine of thirty minæ, therefore, is the counter penalty which I submit for your judgment."¹

¹ Plato, *Apol. Sok.* c. 26, 27, 28, pp. 37, 38. I give, as well as I can, the substantive propositions, apart from the emphatic language of the original

Subsistence in the prytaneum at the public expense, was one of the greatest honorary distinctions which the citizens of Athens ever conferred; an emphatic token of public gratitude. That Sokratês, therefore, should proclaim himself worthy of such an honor, and talk of assessing it upon himself in lieu of a punishment, before the very dikasts who had just passed against him a verdict of guilty, would be received by them as nothing less than a deliberate insult; a defiance of judicial authority, which it was their duty to prove, to an opinionated and haughty citizen, that he could not commit with impunity. The persons who heard his language with the greatest distress, were doubtless Plato, Krito, and his other friends around him; who, though sympathizing with him fully, knew well that he was assuring the success of the proposition of Melêtus,¹ and would regret that he should thus throw away his life by what they would think an ill-placed and unnecessary self-exaltation. Had he proposed, with little or no preface, the substitute-fine of thirty minæ with which this part of his speech concluded, there is every reason for believing that the majority of dikasts would have voted for it.

The sentence of death passed against him, by what majority we do not know. But Sokratês neither altered his tone, nor manifested any regret for the language by which he had himself seconded the purpose of his accusers. On the contrary, he told the dikasts, in a short address prior to his departure for the prison, that he was satisfied both with his own conduct and with the result. The divine sign, he said, which was wont to restrain him, often on very small occasions, both in deeds and in words, had never manifested itself once to him throughout the whole day, neither when he came thither at first, nor at any one point throughout his whole discourse. The tacit acquiescence of this infallible monitor satisfied him not only that he had spoken rightly, but that the sentence passed was in reality no evil to him; that to die now was the best thing which could befall him.² Either death was tantamount to a sound, perpetual, and dreamless sleep, which in his judgment would be no loss, but rather a gain, compared with the present life; or else, if the common

¹ See Plato, *Krito*, c. 5, p. 45, B.

² Plato, *Apol. Sok.* c. 31, p. 40, B, c. 33, p. 41, D.

mythes were true, death would transfer him to a second life in Hades, where he would find all the heroes of the Trojan war, and of the past generally, so as to pursue in conjunction with them the business of mutual cross-examination, and debate on ethical progress and perfection.¹

There can be no doubt that the sentence really appeared to Sokratês in this point of view, and to his friends also, after the event had happened, though doubtless not at the time when they were about to lose him. He took his line of defence advisedly, and with full knowledge of the result. It supplied him with the fittest of all opportunities for manifesting, in an impressive manner, both his personal ascendancy over human fears and weakness, and the dignity of what he believed to be his divine mission. It took him away in his full grandeur and glory, like the setting of the tropical sun, at a moment when senile decay might be looked upon as close at hand. He calculated that his defence and bearing on the trial would be the most emphatic lesson which he could possibly read to the youth of Athens; more emphatic, probably, than the sum total of those lessons which his remaining life might suffice to give, if he shaped his defence otherwise. This anticipation of the effect of the concluding scene of his life, setting the seal on all his prior discourses, manifests itself in portions of his concluding words to the dikasts, wherein he tells them that they will not, by putting him to death, rid themselves of the importunity of the cross-examining elenchus; that numbers of young men, more restless and obtrusive than he, already carried within them that impulse, which they would now proceed to apply; his superiority having hitherto kept them back.² It was thus the persuasion of Sokratês, that his removal would be the signal for numerous apostles, putting forth with increased energy that process of interrogatory test and spur to which he had devoted his life, and which doubtless was to him far dearer and more sacred than his life. Nothing could be more effective than his lofty bearing on his trial, for inflaming the enthusiasm of young men thus predisposed; and

¹ Plato, *Apol. Sok.* c. 32, p. 40, C, p. 41, B.

² Plato, *Apol. Sok.* c. 30, p. 39, C.

the loss of life was to him compensated by the missionary successors whom he calculated on leaving behind.

Under ordinary circumstances, Sokratês would have drunk the cup of hemlock in the prison, on the day after his trial. But it so happened that the day of his sentence was immediately after that on which the sacred ship started on its yearly ceremonial pilgrimage from Athens to Delos, for the festival of Apollo. Until the return of this vessel to Athens, it was accounted unholy to put any person to death by public authority. Accordingly, Sokratês remained in prison, — and we are pained to read, actually with chains on his legs, — during the interval that this ship was absent, thirty days altogether. His friends and companions had free access to him, passing nearly all their time with him in the prison; and Krito had even arranged a scheme for procuring his escape, by a bribe to the jailer. This scheme was only prevented from taking effect by the decided refusal of Sokratês to become a party in any breach of the law; ¹ a resolution, which we should expect as a matter of course, after the line which he had taken in his defence. His days were spent in the prison, in discourse respecting ethical and human subjects, which had formed the charm and occupation of his previous life: it is to the last of these days that his conversation with Simmias, Kebês, and Phædon, on the immortality of the soul is referred, in the Platonic dialogue called "*Phædon*." Of that conversation the main topics and doctrines are Platonic rather than Sokratic. But the picture which the dialogue presents of the temper and state of mind of Sokratês, during the last hours of his life, is one of immortal beauty and interest, exhibiting his serene and even playful equanimity, amidst the uncontrollable emotions of his surrounding friends, — the genuine, unforced persuasion, governing both his words and his acts, of what he had pronounced before the dikasts, that the sentence of death was no calamity to him,² — and the unabated maintenance of that earnest interest in the improvement of man and society, which had for so many years formed both his paramount motive and his active occupation. The details of the last scene are given with minute fidelity, even down to the moment of his dis-

¹ Plato, *Krito*, c. 2, 3, seq.

² Plato, *Phædon* c. 77, p. 84, E.

solution; and it is consoling to remark that the cup of hemlock — the means employed for executions by public order at Athens — produced its effect by steps far more exempt from suffering than any natural death which was likely to befall him. Those who have read what has been observed above respecting the strong religious persuasions of Sokratês, will not be surprised to hear that his last words, addressed to Krito immediately before he passed into a state of insensibility, were: "Krito, we owe a cock to Æsculapius: discharge the debt, and by no means omit it."¹

Thus perished the "parens philosophiæ," the first of ethical philosophers; a man who opened to science both new matter, alike copious and valuable; and a new method, memorable not less for its originality and efficacy, than for the profound philosophical basis on which it rests. Though Greece produced great poets, orators, speculative philosophers, historians, etc., yet other countries having the benefit of Grecian literature to begin with, have nearly equalled her in all these lines, and surpassed her in some. But where are we to look for a parallel to Sokratês, either in or out of the Grecian world? The cross-examining elenchus, which he not only first struck out, but wielded with such matchless effect and to such noble purposes, has been mute ever since his last conversation in the prison; for even his great successor Plato was a writer and lecturer, not a colloquial dialectician. No man has ever been found strong enough to bend his bow; much less, sure enough to use it as he did. His life remains as the only evidence, but a very satisfactory evidence, how much can be done by this sort of intelligent interrogation; how powerful is the interest which it can be made to inspire; how energetic the stimulus which it can apply in awakening dormant reason and generating new mental power.

It has been often customary to exhibit Sokratês as a moral preacher, in which character probably he has acquired to himself the general reverence attached to his name. This is, indeed, a true attribute, but not the characteristic or salient attribute, nor that by which he permanently worked on mankind. On the other hand, Arkesilaus, and the New Academy,¹ a century and

¹ Plato, Phædon, c. 155, p. 118, A.

² Cicero, Academ. Post. i. 12. 44. "Cum Zenone Arkesilas sibi magis

more afterwards, thought that they were following the example of Sokratês — and Cicero seems to have thought so too — when they reasoned against everything; and when they laid it down as a system, that, against every affirmative position, an equal force of negative argument might be brought up as counterpoise. Now this view of Sokratês is, in my judgment, not merely partial, but incorrect. He entertained no such systematic distrust of the powers of the mind to attain certainty. He laid down a clear, though erroneous line of distinction between the knowable and the unknowable. About physics, he was more than a skeptic; he thought that man could know nothing; the gods did not intend that man should acquire any such information, and therefore managed matters in such a way as to be beyond his ken, for all except the simplest phenomena of daily wants; moreover, not

certamen instituit, non pertinaciâ aut studio vincendi (ut mihi quidem videtur), sed earum rerum obscuritate, quæ ad confessionem ignorationis adduxerant Socratem, et jam ante Socratem, Democritum, Anaxagoram, Empedoclem, omnes pene veteres; qui nihil cognosci, nihil percipi, nihil sciri, posse, dixerunt. . . . Itaque Arcesilas negabat, esse quidquam, quod sciri posset, ne illud quidem ipsum, quod Socrates sibi reliquisset: sic omnia latere in occulto." Compare Academ. Prior. ii, 23, 74: de Nat. Deor. i, 5, 11.

In another passage (Academ. Post. i, 4, 17) Cicero speaks (or rather introduces Varro as speaking) rather confusedly. He talks of "illam Socraticam dubitationem de omnibus rebus, et nullâ affirmatione adhibitâ, consuetudinem disserendi;" but a few lines before, he had said what implies that men might, in the opinion of Sokratês, come to learn and know what belonged to human conduct and human duties.

Again (in Tusc. Disp. i, 4, 8), he admits that Sokratês had a positive ulterior purpose in his negative questioning: "vetus et Socratica ratio contra alterius opinionem disserendi: nam ita facillime, quid veri simillimum esset, inveniri posse Socrates arbitrabatur."

Tennemann (Gesch. der Philos. ii, 5, vol. ii, pp. 169-175) seeks to make out considerable analogy between Sokratês and Pyrrho. But it seems to me that the analogy only goes thus far, that both agreed in repudiating all speculations not ethical (see the verses of Timon upon Pyrrho, Diog. Laërt. ix, 65). But in regard to ethics, the two differed materially. Sokratês maintained that ethics were matter of science, and the proper subject of study. Pyrrho, on the other hand, seems to have thought that speculation was just as useless, and science just as unattainable, upon ethics as upon physics; that nothing was to be attended to except feelings, and nothing cultivated except good dispositions.

only man could not acquire such information, but ought not to labor after it. But respecting the topics which concern man and society, the views of Sokratês were completely the reverse. This was the field which the gods had expressly assigned, not merely to human practice, but to human study and acquisition of knowledge; a field, wherein, with that view, they managed phenomena on principles of constant and observable sequence, so that every man who took the requisite pains might know them. Nay, Sokratês went a step further; and this forward step is the fundamental conviction upon which all his missionary impulse hinges. He thought that every man not only might know these things but ought to know them; that he could not possibly act well, unless he did know them; and that it was his imperious duty to learn them as he would learn a profession; otherwise, he was nothing better than a slave, unfit to be trusted as a free and accountable being. Sokratês felt persuaded that no man could behave as a just, temperate, courageous, pious, patriotic agent, unless he taught himself to know correctly what justice, temperance, courage, piety, and patriotism, etc., really were. He was possessed with the truly Baconian idea, that the power of steady moral action depended upon, and was limited by, the rational comprehension of moral ends and means. But when he looked at the minds around him, he perceived that few or none either had any such comprehension, or had ever studied to acquire it; yet at the same time every man felt persuaded that he did possess it, and acted confidently upon such persuasion. Here, then, Sokratês found that the first outwork for him to surmount, was, that universal "conceit of knowledge without the reality," against which he declares such emphatic war; and against which, also, though under another form of words and in reference to other subjects, Bacon declares war not less emphatically, two thousand years afterwards: "*Opinio copiæ inter causas inopiæ est.*" Sokratês found that those notions respecting human and social affairs, on which each man relied and acted, were nothing but spontaneous products of the "*intellectus sibi permissus*," of the intellect left to itself either without any guidance, or with only the blind guidance of sympathies, antipathies, authority, or silent assimilation. They were products got together, to use Bacon's language, "from much faith and much chance, and from

the primitive suggestions of boyhood," not merely without care or study, but without even consciousness of the process, and without any subsequent revision. Upon this basis the sophists, or professed teachers for active life, sought to erect a superstructure of virtue and ability; but to Sokratês, such an attempt appeared hopeless and contradictory — not less impracticable than Bacon in his time pronounced it to be, to carry up the tree of science into majesty and fruit-bearing, without first clearing away those fundamental vices which lay unmolested and in poisonous influence round its root. Sokratês went to work in the Baconian manner and spirit; bringing his cross-examining process to bear, as the first condition to all further improvement, upon these rude, self-begotten, incoherent generalizations, which passed in men's minds for competent and directing knowledge. But he, not less than Bacon, performs this analysis, not with a view to finality in the negative, but as the first stage towards an ulterior profit; as the preliminary purification, indispensable to future positive result. In the physical sciences, to which Bacon's attention was chiefly turned, no such result could be obtained without improved experimental research, bringing to light facts new and yet unknown; but on those topics which Sokratês discussed, the elementary data of the inquiry were all within the hearer's experience, requiring only to be pressed upon his notice, affirmatively as well as negatively, together with the appropriate ethical and political end; in such manner as to stimulate within him the rational effort requisite for combining them anew upon consistent principles.

If, then, the philosophers of the New Academy considered Sokratês either as a skeptic, or as a partisan of systematic negation, they misinterpreted his character, and mistook the first stage of his process — that which Plato, Bacon, and Herschel call the purification of the intellect — for the ultimate goal. The elenchus, as Sokratês used it, was animated by the truest spirit of positive science, and formed an indispensable precursor to its attainment.¹

There are two points, and two points only, in topics concerning man and society, with regard to which Sokratês is a skeptic; or

¹ Plato, *Apol. Sok.* c. 7, p. 22, A. δει δὲ ὑμῖν τὴν ἐμὴν πλάνην ἐπαδείξαι ὥσπερ τινὰς κενούς κενούντας, etc.

rather, which he denies; and on the negation of which, his whole method and purpose turn. He denies, first, that men can know that on which they have bestowed no conscious effort, no deliberate pains, no systematic study, in learning. He denies, next, that men can practise what they do not know;¹ that they can be just, or temperate, or virtuous generally, without knowing what justice, or temperance, or virtue is. To imprint upon the minds of his hearers his own negative conviction, on these two points is, indeed, his first object, and the primary purpose of his multi-form dialectical manœuvring. But though negative in his means, Sokratês is strictly positive in his ends; his attack is undertaken only with distinct view to a positive result; in order to shame them out of the illusion of knowledge, and to spur them on and arm them for the acquisition of real, assured, comprehensive, self-explanatory knowledge, as the condition and guarantee of virtuous practice. Sokratês was, indeed, the reverse of a skeptic; no man ever looked upon life with a more positive and practical eye; no man ever pursued his mark with a clearer perception of the road which he was travelling; no man ever combined, in like manner, the absorbing enthusiasm of a missionary,² with the acuteness, the originality, the inventive resource, and the generalizing comprehension, of a philosopher.

His method yet survives, as far as such method can survive, in some of the dialogues of Plato. It is a process of eternal value and of universal application. That purification of the intellect, which Bacon signalized as indispensable for rational or scientific progress, the Sokratic elenchus affords the only known instrument for at least partially accomplishing. However little that instrument may have been applied since the death of its

¹ So Demokritus, Fragm. ed. Mullach, p. 185, Fr. 131. οὐτε τέχνη, οὐτε σοφία, ἐφικτόν, ἢν μὴ μάθῃ τις.....

² Aristotle (Problem. c. 30, p. 953, Bek.) numbers both Sokratês and Plato (compare Plutarch, Lysand. c. 2) among those to whom he ascribes φύσιν μελαγχολικὴν, the black bile and ecstatic temperament. I do not know how to reconcile this with a passage in his Rhetoric (ii, 17), in which he ranks Sokratês among the *sedate* persons (σάσιμον). The first of the two assertions seems countenanced by the anecdotes respecting Sokratês (in Plato, Symposion, p. 175, B; p. 220, C), that he stood in the same posture quite unmoved, even for several hours continuously, absorbed in meditation upon some idea which had seized his mind.

inventor, the necessity and use of it neither have disappeared, nor ever can disappear. There are few men whose minds are not more or less in that state of sham knowledge against which Sokratês made war: there is no man whose notions have not been first got together by spontaneous, unexamined, unconscious, uncertified association, resting upon forgotten particulars, blending together disparates or inconsistencies, and leaving in his mind old and familiar phrases, and oracular propositions, of which he has never rendered to himself account: there is no man, who, if he be destined for vigorous and profitable scientific effort, has not found it a necessary branch of self-education, to break up, disentangle, analyze, and reconstruct, these ancient mental compounds; and who has not been driven to do it by his own lame and solitary efforts, since the giant of the colloquial elenchus no longer stands in the market-place to lend him help and stimulus.

To hear of any man,¹ especially of so illustrious a man, being condemned to death on such accusations as that of heresy and alleged corruption of youth, inspires at the present day a sentiment of indignant reprobation, the force of which I have no desire to enfeeble. The fact stands eternally recorded as one among the thousand misdeeds of intolerance, religious and political. But since amidst this catalogue each item has its own peculiar character, grave or light, we are bound to consider at what point of the scale the condemnation of Sokrates is to be placed, and what inferences it justifies in regard to the character of the Athenians. Now if we examine the circumstances of the case, we shall find them all extenuating; and so powerful, indeed, as to reduce such inferences to their minimum, consistent with the general class to which the incident belongs.

¹ Dr. Thirlwall has given, in an Appendix to his fourth volume (Append. vii, p. 526, seq.), an interesting and instructive review of the recent sentiments expressed by Hegel, and by some other eminent German authors, on Sokratês and his condemnation. It affords me much satisfaction to see that he has bestowed such just animadversions on the unmeasured bitterness, as well as upon the untenable views, of M. Forchhammer's treatise respecting Sokratês.

I dissent, however, altogether, from the manner in which Dr. Thirlwall speaks about the sophists, both in this Appendix and elsewhere. My opinion, respecting the persons so called, has been given at length in the preceding chapter.

First, the sentiment now prevalent is founded upon a conviction that such matters as heresy and heretical teaching of youth are not proper for judicial cognizance. Even in the modern world, such a conviction is of recent date; and in the fifth century B.C. it was unknown. Sokratês himself would not have agreed in it; and all Grecian governments, oligarchical and democratical alike, recognized the opposite. The testimony furnished by Plato is on this point decisive. When we examine the two positive communities which he constructs, in the treatises "De Republicâ" and "De Legibus," we find that there is nothing about which he is more anxious, than to establish an unresisted orthodoxy of doctrine, opinion, and education. A dissenting and free-spoken teacher, such as Sokratês was at Athens, would not have been allowed to pursue his vocation for a week, in the Platonic Republic. Plato would not, indeed, condemn him to death; but he would put him to silence, and in case of need send him away. This, in fact, is the consistent deduction, if you assume that the state is to determine what is orthodoxy and orthodox teaching, and to repress what contradicts its own views. Now all the Grecian states, including Athens, held this principle of interference against the dissenting teacher. But at Athens, though the principle was recognized, yet the application of it was counteracted by resisting forces which it did not find elsewhere by the democratical constitution, with its liberty of speech and love of speech, by the more active spring of individual intellect, and by the toleration, greater there than anywhere else, shown to each man's peculiarities of every sort. In any other government of Greece, as well as in the Platonic Republic, Sokratês would have been quickly arrested in his career, even if not severely punished; in Athens, he was allowed to talk and teach publicly for twenty-five or thirty years, and then condemned when an old man. Of these two applications of the same mischievous principle, assuredly the latter is at once the more moderate and the less noxious.

Secondly, the force of this last consideration, as an extenuating circumstance in regard to the Athenians, is much increased, when we reflect upon the number of individual enemies whom Sokratês made to himself in the prosecution of his cross-examining process.

- See Plato, Euthyphron, c. 3, p. 3, D.

Here were a multitude of individuals, including men personally the most eminent and effective in the city, prompted by special antipathies, over and above general convictions, to call into action the dormant state-principle of intolerance against an obnoxious teacher. If, under such provocation, he was allowed to reach the age of seventy, and to talk publicly for so many years, before any real Melêtus stood forward, this attests conspicuously the efficacy of the restraining dispositions among the people, which made their practical habits more liberal than their professed principles.

Thirdly, whoever has read the account of the trial and defence of Sokratês, will see that he himself contributed quite as much to the result as all the three accusers united. Not only he omitted to do all that might have been done without dishonor, to insure acquittal, but he held positive language very nearly such as Melêtus himself would have sought to put in his mouth. He did this deliberately, — having an exalted opinion both of himself and his own mission, — and accounting the cup of hemlock, at his age, to be no calamity. It was only by such marked and offensive self-exaltation that he brought on the first vote of the dikastery, even then the narrowest majority, by which he was found guilty: it was only by a still more aggravated manifestation of the same kind, even to the pitch of something like insult, that he brought on the second vote, which pronounced the capital sentence. Now it would be uncandid not to allow for the effect of such a proceeding on the minds of the dikastery. They were not at all disposed, of their own accord, to put in force the recognized principle of intolerance against him. But when they found that the man who stood before them charged with this offence, addressed them in a tone such as dikasts had never heard before and could hardly hear with calmness, they could not but feel disposed to credit all the worst inferences which his accusers had suggested, and to regard Sokratês as a dangerous man both religiously and politically, against whom it was requisite to uphold the majesty of the court and constitution.

In appreciating this memorable incident, therefore, though the mischievous principle of intolerance cannot be denied, yet all the circumstances show that that principle was neither irritable nor predominant in the Athenian bosom; that even a large body of collateral antipathies did not readily call it forth against any indi-

vidual; that the more liberal and generous dispositions, which deadened its malignity, were of steady efficacy, not easily overborne; and that the condemnation ought to count as one of the least gloomy items in an essentially gloomy catalogue.

Let us add, that as Sokratês himself did not account his own condemnation and death, at his age, to be any misfortune, but rather a favorable dispensation of the gods, who removed him just in time to escape that painful consciousness of intellectual decline which induced Demokritus to prepare the poison for himself, so his friend Xenophon goes a step further, and while protesting against the verdict of guilty, extols the manner of death as a subject of triumph; as the happiest, most honorable, and most gracious way, in which the gods could set the seal upon a useful and exalted life.¹

It is asserted by Diodorus, and repeated with exaggerations by other later authors, that after the death of Sokratês the Athenians bitterly repented of the manner in which they had treated him, and that they even went so far as to put his accusers to death without trial.² I know not upon what authority this statement is made, and I disbelieve it altogether. From the tone of Xenophon's "Memorabilia," there is every reason to presume that the memory of Sokratês still continued to be unpopular at Athens when that collection was composed. Plato, too, left Athens immediately after the death of his master, and remained absent for a long series of years: indirectly, I think, this affords a presumption that no such reaction took place in Athenian sentiment as that which Diodorus alleges; and the same presumption is countenanced by the manner in which the orator Æschinês speaks of the condemnation, half a century afterwards. I see no reason to believe that the Athenian dikasts, who doubtless felt themselves justified, and more than justified, in condemning Sokratês after his own speech, retracted that sentiment after his decease.

Xen. Mem. iv, 8, 3:—

"Denique Democritum postquam matura vetustas
Admonuit memores motus languescere mentis,
Sponte sua letho sese obviis obtulit ipse."

(Lucretius, iii, 1052.)

Diodor. xiv, 37, with Wesseling's note Diog. Laërt. ii, 43; Argument.
ad Isokrat. Or. xi, Busiris.

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